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ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
CONTEMPORARY AFRICAN
MIGRATION
This handbook provides an authoritative multidisciplinary overview of contemporary African

international migration. It endeavours to present a single source of reference on issues such
as migration history, trends, migrant profiles, narratives, migration-development nexus,
migration governance, diasporas, impact of the COVID-19 pandemic, among others.
The handbook assembles a multidisciplinary contributor team of distinguished and
upcoming Africanist scholars, practitioners, researchers, and policy experts both inside
and outside Africa to contribute their perspectives on contemporary African migration. It
attempts to address some of the following pertinent questions:
• What drives contemporary migration in Africa?

• How are its patterns and trends evolving?
• What is the architecture of migration governance in Africa?
• How do migration, diaspora engagement and development play out in Africa?
• What are the future trajectories of African migration?
The handbook is a valuable resource for practitioners, politicians, researchers, university

students, and academics interested in studying and understanding contemporary African
migration.
Daniel Makina is a Professor of Economic Sciences at the University of South Africa. He

holds a PhD from the University of the Witwatersrand, Johannesburg. His research interests
include migration economics, financial inclusion in emerging markets, and FinTech. He has
published in academic journals such as International Migration, Migration Letters, Applied
Economics, Applied Financial Economics, the Journal of Developing Societies, African Finance
Journal, African Development Review, among others. His recent edited volume is Extending
Financial Inclusion in Africa published in 2019.
Dominic Pasura is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Glasgow, UK. He

holds a PhD in Sociology from the University of Warwick, UK. His research interests include
migration, transnationalism, and diaspora, in particular the new African diasporas. He has
published widely in peer-reviewed journals and edited books. He is the author of African
Transnational Diasporas: Fractured Communities and Plural Identities of Zimbabweans
in Britain (2014) and co-editor of Migration, Transnationalism and Catholicism: Global
Perspectives (2016). He is the Principal Investigator on the UK Economic & Social Research
Council (ESRC) three-year funded grant project, ‘The Religious and Spiritual Lives of
Transnational Young People of African Migrant Background,’ which commenced in May
2023.
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF CONTEMPORARY
AFRICAN MIGRATION
Edited by Daniel Makina and Dominic Pasura

Designed cover image: © Getty Images
First published 2024
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2024 selection and editorial matter, Daniel Makina and Dominic Pasura;
individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Daniel Makina and Dominic Pasura to be identified as the
authors of the editorial material, and of the authors for their individual
chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the
Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or
utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now
known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording, or in
any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or
registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation
without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
ISBN: 978-0-367-43755-8 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-55193-7 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-00555-1 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003005551
Typeset in Galliard
by Deanta Global Publishing Services, Chennai, India
CONTENTS
List of Figures viii

List of Tables x
Notes on Contributors xi
Acknowledgementsxvii
1 Contemporary African Migration: An Introduction 1

Dominic Pasura and Daniel Makina
PART I
History of African Migration 21
2 Migration as Empowerment: A Selected History of Migration and

Displacement in Africa 23
Graham Sherbut
3 Postcolonial States and Migration 38

Clayton Boeyink and Simon Turner
4 African Philosophy and International Migration 52

Blessing Chapfika
PART II
Patterns and Trends of Contemporary African Migration 77
5 Patterns and Trends of International Migration within and Out of Africa 79

Daniel Makina and Peter Mudungwe
v
Contents
6 Issues, Patterns, and Trends in Contemporary African Migration to Europe

and North America 99
Charles Temitope Adeyanju and Olabimpe A. Olatunji
7 The Contemporary “African Coolie” in the Middle East: Interrogating the

Narratives of the Modern-Day African Slaves 114
Chris C. Opesen, Opolot Amos and Mathew Amollo
8 Lesotho–South Africa Relations: A Case for Free Movement of Persons

across the Common Border 135
Khabele Matlosa
PART III
Migration Governance, Forced Displacement and Irregular Migration 151
9 Migration Policy Frameworks in Africa 153

Tsion Tadesse Abebe and Peter Mudungwe
10 Refugee Politics in Africa 170

Alexander Betts
11 Contemporary Forced Migration in Africa 182

David Gakere Ndegwa
12 Migrating Out of Migration: Diminishing Seasonal Migration Options and

Conflicts among the Pokot of Kenya 197
Dulo Nyaoro
13 The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on African Migration 210

Margaret Rutendo Magwedere and Daniel Makina
PART IV
Migration, Diaspora Engagement, and the Politics of Development 229
14 The Remittances–Development Debate in Africa 231

Daniel Makina and Margaret Rutendo Magwedere
15 Return Migration to Africa and Its Development Potential 246

Sabastiano Rwengabo
16 Reconsidering the Concept of International Return in the

African Context: The Place of Immobile Cognitive Return 273
Mary Boatemaa Setrana and Adolf Awuku Bekoe
vi
Contents
17 The Nature and “Lived” Experiences of Contemporary African Diasporas 286

Thabani Mutambasere and Dominic Pasura
18 The Landscape of the African Diaspora 296

Almaz Negash
19 Engendering Migration in Africa: The Case of Ethiopian Migration to

South Africa 310
Meron Zekele
PART V
Future Trajectories of African Migration 327
20 Africa without Borders 329

Jesper Bjarnesen and Amanda Bisong
21 The African Continental Free Trade Area and Migration Patterns 346
Daniel Osarfo, Peter Quartey, and Joshua Y. Abor
22 Climate Variability and New Fish Eldorados In Africa 374

Papa Sow
23 Migration Data Management in Africa 389

Daniel Makina and John Atwebembeire Mushomi
24 The Future of Immigration in Africa 407

Daniel Makina and Dominic Pasura
Index419
vii
FIGURES
5.1 Number of International Migrants, by World Bank Income Group at

Origin, 1990–2020 81
5.2 Number of International Migrants Millions by Region of Destination,
2010 and 2020 82
5.3 Annual Rate of Change of Migrant Stock by Region 1990–2020, Percentage 82
5.4 African Migration Trends at a Glance 84
5.5 Top Ten Destination Countries in Africa for International Migrants, 2020 85
5.6 Percentage of Sub-Saharan Africa Immigrants by Education and
Employment in Five Destination Countries (2015) 92
5.7 Projected Net Mobility from Africa to EU15, 2020–2029 93
7.1 Flowchart showing the process followed to select articles for the review 117
11.1 Stock of UNHCR’s Populations of Concern for the Years 2007 to 2020
in Africa 184
11.2 Forced Migration Numbers from 2007 to 2020 in African Sub-Regions 186
11.3 Refugees’ Flow Trends from UNHCR and Elections Years Data from
IDEA, 2007 to 2020: Cote d’Ivoire 187
11.4 Conflict-Related New Displacements in African Sub-Regions, 2009–2020 189
11.5 Number of People Affected by Disasters in African Sub-Regions from
2007 to 2020 192
11.6 Disaster New Displacements in African Sub-Regions, 2008–2020 192
11.7 Population in Moderate or Severe Food Insecurity in Africa, 2014–2020 194
13.1 Migration Flows to Europe, Arrivals, 2021 and 2020 220
13.2 Trends of Total Migrant Arrivals in Europe by Land and Sea from 2016 to
2021221
13.3 Top Ten Countries in Africa with a Larger Share of Remittances as a
Proportion of GDP 222
14.1 Top Ten Remittance Recipients in Sub-Saharan Africa Region, 2021 234
viii
Figures
14.2 Net FDI Flows, Personal Remittances, ODA and Official Aid Received in
Sub-Saharan Africa (US$) (1970–2020) 234
14.3 Top Ten Remittance-Reliant (as a Proportion of GDP) Countries in
Africa (2018–2021) 235
14.4 Percentage of Usage of Formal Remittance Channels 240
21.1 Ghana’s exports and emigration to ECOWAS member states 365
21.2 Ghana’s exports and emigration to non-ECOWAS African member states 366
21.3 Ghana’s exports and emigration to non-African countries 367
21.4 Ghana’s exports (to) and immigration from other ECOWAS member states 368
21.5 Ghana’s exports (to) and immigration from non-ECOWAS African countries 369
21.6 Ghana’s exports (to) and immigration from non-African countries 370
23.1 Total Number of International Migrants at Mid-Year 2020 391
23.2 Number of International Migrants by Major Area of Destination 391
23.3 Actual and Projected Change in Total Population over Five-Year
Time Periods by Major Area, from 2000 to 2050, with and without
International Migration Starting in 2015 (Millions) 393
23.4 Main Elements of a Population Register 394
24.1 Emigration to Africa 415
ix
TABLES
4.1 Prominent African Philosophers 60

5.1 Sub-Saharan African Immigrants in the USA in 2018 86
5.2 Education and Labour Force Participation of Immigrants and US-Born
Citizens in 2017 90
5.3 Labour Shortages and Surpluses by Country, 2020 and 2030 94
5.4 Desire to Migrate by Region 95
5.5 Projected Changes in the Size of the Working-Age Population,
2005–2050 (millions) 95
7.1 Summary of search words by research questions 116
11.1 Numbers and Percentages of Forced Migrant Population of Concern to
UNHCR in Africa, 2007–2020 185
11.2 Number of Fatalities from Conflict in Africa, 2007 to 2019 191
11.3 Leading Causes of Disaster-Related Displacement in Africa, 2008–2020 193
13.1 Timeline of Pandemics in the 20th and 21st centuries 213
13.2 Big Data Types and Pros and Cons 223
14.1 Sources of Remittances to Africa 235
14.2 Remittances Per Capita 236
14.3 Selected Remittance Corridors and Their Cost of Transfer 240
15.1 Migration Context of Selected African Countries vis-à-vis RM-2-A 264
23.1 Key Statistical Indicators for Internet, Mobile and Social Media Users for
Selected African Countries 398
23.2 Migration Data Collection by Selected African Countries 401
24.1 Immigration Attitudes in Selected African Countries 412
24.2 Selected Trading Partners of Sub-Saharan Africa – Change 2006–2018 414
24.3 Stocks of Immigrants to Africa and Origin Countries (1990–2019) 415
x
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Tsion Tadesse Abebe is a leading policy analyst on African migration and displacement
issues. She is currently working as the Senior Policy and Research Officer for the International
Organization for Migration (IOM)’s Regional Office for the East and Horn of Africa. She
is the editor of IOM’s flagship report, ‘The State of Migration in East and Horn of Africa’.
Prior to joining IOM, she worked as a senior researcher on migration and displacement
issues for the Institute for Security Studies (ISS), a leading African think tank. She has widely
published on African migration and displacement policy issues.
Joshua Yindenaba Abor is a Financial Economist, Professor of Finance, and former Dean
of the University of Ghana Business School. He is a Director and Senior Consultant with
the Corporate Support Group. He is an External Fellow at the Centre for Global Finance,
SOAS University of London, an Adjunct Professor of Development Finance at Stellenbosch
Business School, and a researcher with the African Economic Research Consortium. He
has also held Visiting Scholar positions at the International Monetary Fund (IMF), in
Washington DC, and is an Afreximbank Research Fellow. He is also a member of the Bank
of Ghana Monetary Policy Committee.
Mathew Amollo (MSC) is a health researcher with over 15 years in research and evalua-
tion. His research interest is in child health especially equity and utilization of health services
among children and young adults. He has vast experience in the evaluation of public health
programs in Uganda and internationally. He has expertise in experimental research designs
such as randomized control trials and quasi-experimental studies; systematic reviews and
meta-analysis; analyses of secondary datasets such as longitudinal surveys and national sur-
veys; and conduct of impact evaluations. Mathew is currently working as a Research Manager
at the AfriChild Centre, Makerere University.
Opolot Amos holds a BA in ethics and human rights from Makerere University. Currently,
he is an MA Sociology fellow at Makerere University and a research fellow at the Governance,
Development, and Peace Research Centre (GDPRC). His professional career has focused on
both academic and applied research with public, civil society, and the private sector agencies
Charles Temitope Adeyanju is an Associate Professor of Sociology in the Department of
Sociology and Anthropology at the University of Prince Edward Island. He holds a PhD in
xi
Notes on Contributors
Sociology from McMaster University. Adeyanju’s research interests are immigration, media
and society, and race and ethnicity. He has researched a range of social issues that include
media representations of race, migration of Nigerians to Canada for higher education, and
taser use by the Canadian police. His publications have appeared in leading peer-reviewed
journals, including the Journal of Social Identities, Journal of Black Studies, Journal of
Migration and International Migration, African Studies Review, and the Canadian Journal
of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Charles Adeyanju is currently researching African
immigrants in the smallest province in Canada, Prince Edward Island.
Adolf Awuku Bekoe is a licensed Clinical Psychologist and a Lecturer at Methodist

University Ghana (MUG). Additionally, he holds a Diploma in Transitional Justice from
the IJR/ICTJ in Cape Town, South Africa. He recently defended his PhD thesis on the
topic ‘(Im)mobility, cognitive migration and return in Ghana’ to conclude his doctoral
studies in Migration Studies at the Centre for Migration Studies, University of Ghana.
Adolf has considerable experience as a Gender-Based Violence Specialist working with
women’s shelters and law enforcement in GBV response, training, and policy. His research
interests include imagination and future aspirations, mental health, and sexual/gender-
based violence.
Alexander Betts is a Professor of Forced Migration and International Affairs and the Director
of the Refugee Studies Centre at the University of Oxford. His recent books include The
Wealth of Refugees: How Displaced People Can Build Economies (Oxford University Press). He
has received the ESRC’s Outstanding International Impact Award, the International Studies
Association’s ‘Ethnicity, Nationalism, and Migration’ section Distinguished Book Award,
and has been recognized by Foreign Policy magazine among the top 100 global thinkers.
He has previously worked for UNHCR and served on the World Refugee and Migration
Council.
Amanda Bisong is a Policy Officer in the migration and mobility team of ECDPM,
Maastricht, the Netherlands. She has a background in Law and MAs in International Law
and Economics (World Trade Institute) and International Trade Policy and Trade Law (Lund
University). She is currently also pursuing her PhD in migration governance in West Africa at
the Faculty of Law, Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam. Her focus research areas are on migration
agreements, labour migration, exploring the linkages between trade and migration in Africa,
migration governance, and the interplay between regional and national commitments. In
recent years, she has published several research articles on migration governance.
Homepage: https://ecdpm.org/people/amanda-bisong/
Twitter: @BusaSays
Jesper Bjarnesen is a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Africa Institute (NAI) and Associate
Professor in cultural anthropology. He works primarily on the grey zones between forced
and voluntary migration in West Africa. His interests include the generational variations of
displacement, the dynamics of integration among urban youths, and the broader themes
of urban resettlement and transnational families. His current research focuses on the ‘soft
infrastructures’ of labour mobilities across and between secondary cities in West Africa. He
is the cofounder of the African Migration, Mobility, and Displacement (AMMODI) research
network.
xii
Clayton Boeyink’s research explores the shrinking space of asylum in Tanzania, which is
situated within a longer history of containment and mobility manipulation by the state since
the colonial era. Despite severe constraints of encampment, refugees circumvent the state and
co-opt humanitarian structures to establish livelihoods through illicit mobilities. His current
project aims to improve healthcare at the intersection of gender and protracted displacement
amongst Somali and Congolese refugees and IDPs in Somalia, Eastern DRC, Nairobi, and
Johannesburg. This project seeks to understand which social connections displaced people
turn to for care beyond formal biomedical/psychosocial systems.
Blessing Chapfika is a recent Doctor of Philosophy graduate from the University of Hull
(UK). In his PhD thesis entitled ‘Towards an African philosophy of education’, Blessing
appropriates the critical reflexivity paradigm to formulate a dialogic African philosophy of
education. Blessing is mainly interested in African philosophy, philosophy of education,
social and political philosophy, postcolonial theory, critical theory, and ethical theory.
Margaret Rutendo Magwedere is an early career researcher and a post-doctoral fellow

with the University of South Africa (UNISA) where she obtained a PhD in Finance. Her
research interests are in development finance/economics focusing on developing countries
particularly in Africa. These interests are augmented by her work experience as a banker at an
Agricultural bank, economist in government, and as an academic. Challenges that inhibit the
attainment of the SDGs are her passion for developing a career in research.
Khabele Matlosa is currently the Visiting Professor at the Centre for African Diplomacy
and Leadership at the University of Johannesburg, South Africa. He is the former Senior
Governance Advisor at the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) based in
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia. He is the former Director at the Department of Political Affairs,
African Union Commission (AUC), Addis Ababa. He has researched and written widely on
migration in Africa. His latest publication in this area is ‘Governance challenges for migra-
tion in Africa: the missing link’, in Akinola Adeoye and Jesper Bjarnesen. eds. Worlds Apart?
Perspectives on Africa/EU Migration, Auckland Park: Jacana Publishing (Forthcoming,
2022).
Peter Mudungwe has a BSc in Economics from the University of Zimbabwe, and a MA
in Human Resources Development from the University of Manchester. He is an interna-
tional development expert with experience in Africa and has over 10 years of experience
working on migration and development issues in Africa. Between 2004 and 2014 Peter
worked for the International Organization for Migration and the African, Caribbean and
Pacific (ACP) Migration Facility managing migration and development projects. He has
written several papers in the area of migration and development, and has been commissioned
by the Africa Diaspora Policy Centre (ADPC), the European Union Commission and the
International Organization for Migration to work on migration issues in Africa. Peter sits
on the Advisory Board of the University of Coventry’s UK Research & Innovation GCRF
South-South Migration, Inequality and Development Hub as a representative of the African
Union Commission, and is currently a Senior Technical Advisor – Migration Governance at
the African Union Commission in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia.
John Atwebembeire Mushomi holds a PhD in Philosophy in Population Studies and has
14 years of research and policy practice experience in Population and Development. He is
a research and policy fellow at AFIDEP and a Lecturer at the Department of Population
xiii
Studies, Makerere University. Over the years, he has worked on various areas in Demography
including reproductive Health, Demographic dividend, Migration, Urbanization and
Development, Population Policy, and Development. He has provided research and support
services to ministries, departments, and agencies in East and Southern African countries in
areas of Migration, Demographic Dividend, and research and policy analysis, among oth-
ers.
Thabani Mutambasere is a Lecturer in African Studies and International Development at
the University of Edinburgh. His interdisciplinary research interests include, but are not
limited to, African diasporas, particularly how they contribute to their countries of origin
via non-economic routes such as politics, development (charity), and humanitarianism.
Thabani also works on issues of diaspora citizenship, belonging, identity, and transnational-
ism (including religious transnationalism).
David Ndegwa is a demographer based in Maryland, USA. He has worked with various insti-
tutions as a senior research, population, health, education, and infrastructure delivery ana-
lyst. His most recent assignment was to assist the United Nations Economic Commission for
Africa’s (ECA) process to review the implementation of the Global Compact on Migration
(GCM) in Africa including writing of the Africa GCM review report. David has previously
worked for the International Organization for Migration (IOM) in Kenya, Ethiopia, South
Africa, Lesotho, Malawi, Uganda, Bangladesh, and Myanmar on various migration analysis
assignments.
Almaz Negash is named as one of the 100 outstanding Silicon Valley Women of Influence
for her work in social innovation. In 2010, Almaz founded the African Diaspora Network
(ADN) to inform and engage Africans in the diaspora and facilitate direct collaboration
with social entrepreneurs, innovators, and business leaders to invest and improve the lives
of everyone on the continent and the communities where we live. Under her leadership and
vision, ADN is now the home of The African Diaspora Investment Symposium (ADIS), an
annual convening in Silicon Valley, Builders of Africa’s Future, and Impact & Investment
Forums. Currently, Almaz is exploring ways to provide access to capital to Black led start-
ups and SMEs via the newly launched program called: Accelerating Black Leadership &
Entrepreneurship (ABLE). Whether creating market-driven solutions to reduce homeless-
ness and mental health with Pay for Success (a.k.a. Social Impact Bond) – a more than $28
million project in Santa Clara County, supporting women to gain financial security through
microenterprise development, international trade, or engaging former heads of states on
Global Leadership & Ethics, she’s a committed and inspiring social change agent.
Dulo Nyaoro is a Senior Lecturer/Researcher in the Department of Political Science,
Moi University, and Coordinator at Peace Institute since 2011. Qualifications include
a BA degree in Political Science, Moi University, and MA in Migration Studies from
the University of Witwatersrand, South Africa. He is currently finalizing his PhD in
Development Studies at the University of Johannesburg. Nyaoro has over 15 years of
experience working with refugees. He has conducted research on migration and displace-
ment in Kenya, South Africa, and Somalia. He has published several pieces on migration
and refugee issues in Kenya and the horn of Africa. Research interests include development
and migration, human rights, African politics and governance, Peace and Conflicts stud-
ies. He is also the team leader of Geographic Working Group of the Local Engagement
Refugee Research Network.
xiv
Olabimpe Ajoke Olatunji is a Senior Lecturer at the Federal University, Oye-Ekiti, Ekiti
State, Nigeria. She holds a PhD degree in Developmental Psychology. She served as the
Head of the Department of Psychology between the years 2016 and 2018. Her research
interest spans the developmental period of adolescents (teenagers, youth, and emerging
adults) emphasizing on the biological and socio-emotional processes that interact with ado-
lescents’ development. Her research also focuses on some collaborative researches in the area
of adulthood (early, mid, and late adult life) development. The importance of gender issues,
particularly women, and the psychosocial factors surrounding them is of utmost concern in
her research.
Chris C. Opesen is a member of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological

Scientists (IUAES, 2018–2022), Uganda Sociological and Anthropological Association,
Organization for Social Science Research in Eastern and Southern Africa (OSSREA) and
the East African Borderland Research Network. He holds a PhD in Social Anthropology
and has held two post-doctoral fellowships in Medical Anthropology at Exeter University in
the last three to four years. Currently, he is a Population and Demography Lecturer in the
Department of Sociology and Anthropology at Makerere University and a consulting East
African Crude Oil Pipeline Project Induced Immigration specialist.
Daniel Osarfo is a Development Economist and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the

Institute of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana. His research
focuses on Digital and Retail Finance Distribution Networks, Financial and Monetary Sector
Development, Trade and Women Empowerment.
Peter Quartey is a Professor in Development Economics and the Director of the Institute
of Statistical, Social and Economic Research, University of Ghana. He is the Vice National
Advisory Board Chairman of the Hunger Project (Ghana), a Board Member of Agricultural
Development Bank Ltd, a member of both the African Economic Research Consortium
and the Global Development Network, and the Executive Chairman of Startrite Montessori
School. He has published extensively in the Financial and Monetary Sector, Private Sector
Development including SMEs, Development Finance, Migration and Remittances, and
Poverty Analysis. He has consulted for the World Bank, AfDB, OECD, USAID, ODI,
DFID, among others.
Sabastiano Rwengabo is a Ugandan Political Scientist and Consultant in Fragility and

Resilience Assessments (FRAs), Regional Integration, Political Economy Analyses (PEAs),
and Governance. He holds a PhD from the National University of Singapore (NUS), where
he was a Research Scholar and President’s Graduate Fellow, 2010–2014. He is affiliated with
several research institutions in Africa and beyond. He is the author of Security Cooperation
in the East African Community (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 2018), and co-
editor of Peace, Democracy and Development in Africa (London: Adonis & Abbey, 2020).
Mary Boatemaa Setrana is the Director of the Centre for Migration Studies, University
of Ghana. She is currently a member of the consortium working on the following pro-
jects: Migration Decisions and the COVID-19 Pandemic project funded by the Swiss
Government; GCRF South-South Migration, Inequality and Development Hub, funded by
UKRI; Climate Change, Migration and Social Transformation project funded by EU; Culture
for Sustainable and Inclusive Peace Project, funded by UKRI; and Crises as Opportunities
project, funded by EU. Prof. Setrana’s research interests include Force Migration and
xv
Displacement, Labour Migration and Gender, Return Migration and Reintegration, Youth
Migration and Aspirations, Transnational Migration and Diasporas.
Graham Sherbut, a Canadian national, is a political scientist and development practitioner
who currently serves as the Deputy Chief of Party with the USAID Zambia Monitoring,
Evaluation and Learning Platform. Holding a PhD in Political Science from Stellenbosch
University and a MA in Development Studies from the University of KwaZulu-Natal,
Sherbut’s research interests focus on comparative African politics and the interplay between
governance, state fragility, economic development, and migration, particularly in the conti-
nent’s small states. He applies his academic focus to practical development issues, serving as
an evaluator of governance programs for multiple international donors.
Papa Sow is a Senior Researcher at the NAI-Nordic Africa Institute (Uppsala, Sweden). His
main lines of research are migration dynamics, society and culture, and natural resources and
environment. He worked and participated in several research projects, with over 40 publi-
cations since 2000 in international reviews. Previous jobs: Consultant, Research Associate,
Catalan Fund for Cooperation and Development, Spain (2005–2006). Researcher, Project
leader, Open University of Catalonia, Spain (2007–2009), Marie Curie Research Fellow,
CRER, University of Warwick, UK (2009–2011). Senior Researcher, Centre for Development
Research, ZEF – University of Bonn (2012–2017). Senior Researcher at IFAN, University
Cheikh Anta Diop, Dakar (2017–2020).
Simon Turner is a Professor of Social Anthropology at Lund University. He works on forced
displacement, diaspora, conflict, and humanitarianism in the African Great Lakes region.
Presently, he is engaged in a project on anticipating violence in the Burundi conflict and
another project on everyday humanitarianism in Tanzania. He is the author of Politics of
Innocence: Hutu Identity, Conflict and Camp Life (Berghahn, 2010), and the co-editor of
Stuckness and Confinement: Reflections on Life in Ghettos, Camps and Prisons (Ethnos, 2019)
and Invisibility in African Displacements: From Structural Marginalisation to Strategies of
Avoidance (Bloomington 2020).
Meron Zeleke is an Associate Professor with years of international research and guest teach-
ing experiences in North America, Asia, Africa, and Europe. Her core areas of research exper-
tise include gender, migration, social inequality, industrial labour, child migration, religion
and conflict. She has published extensively on these themes in internationally renowned jour-
nals, authored books, edited special issue of journals, and co-edited books and has authored
entries in Encyclopaedias. Meron is an international editorial member of Brill –Islamic Africa
journal and the Editor-in-Chief of Ethiopian Journal of Human Rights (EJHR). Part of her
ongoing research projects include a project gender
xvi
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
As editors we would like to first and foremost extend immense gratitude to contributors for
sharing their scholarship on this fascinating topic and for their patience in responding to
our numerous requests for revisions. We have received countless benefits from their efforts.
Writing the handbook during the COVID-19 situation was difficult and challenging; we are
grateful for the perseverance and collaborative spirit of the contributors.
During our time working on this handbook, Rosie Anderson and Katerina Lade at
Routledge were extremely patient, helpful, and supportive. We are grateful to them for all
of their efforts.
We would like to express our gratitude to our families and colleagues at the University of
South Africa and the University of Glasgow, whose encouragement and support were instru-
mental in the development of this Routledge Handbook of Contemporary African Migration.
xvii
1
CONTEMPORARY
AFRICAN MIGRATION
An Introduction
Introduction
This handbook presents a comprehensive overview of African migration within and outside of
the continent from historical, contemporary, and future perspectives. Even though the major-
ity of migration takes place within the African continent, most research, policy, and media
coverage are focused on those who leave the continent (Carling & Hernández‐Carretero,
2011; Crawley & Blitz, 2019; De Haas, 2008; Pisarevskaya et al., 2020; Pradella & Taghdisi
Rad, 2017), reproducing in thought and practice coloniality of power and knowledge
(Mignolo, 2007; Quijano, 2000). However, most of these studies and works are produced
about Africa rather than studies with and from an African perspective. Our contention is that
Africa and Africans are the epistemological points of departure for the Eurocentric field of
migration studies.
In this introduction, the editors and contributors of this volume outline five ways to fur-
ther understand contemporary African migration sui generis and to combat the Eurocentric
bias that has plagued migration research thus far. First, in order to de-centre and re-centre
the study of African migration, we must first recognise the inadequacy of methodological
nationalism in social sciences (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002), which assumes Western-
centric epistemology and nation-states as starting points for empirical studies on international
migration. We need to be attentive to alternative ways of knowing, including epistemological
stances and methodological approaches. Following Zeleza (2010, p. 2), the challenge
is to resist both the tyranny of hegemonic models and the romance of the local, and
to develop analytical models that are historically grounded and theoretically sugges-
tive—that are sensitive to local experiences without losing sight of the global forces
that structure them.
Second, to comprehend contemporary African migration, it is necessary to thoroughly

understand the continent’s history, including slavery, colonialism, and imperialism, and the
degree to which historical factors contributed to African underdevelopment and shaped its
DOI: 10.4324/9781003005551-1 1
culture, religion, and mobility patterns. Third, the handbook situates the migration and
mobilities of Africans within a racialised and globalised capitalism, which remains rooted
in colonial hierarchies between white Europeans and the “other”, including black Africans.
Fourth, we pay particular attention to the ways in which post-colonial African states, which
are historically contingent social formations, enable, manage, and regulate migration in vari-
ous ways. We also take into account the ways in which these post-colonial states (re)construct
ideologies and practices of exclusive citizenship and belonging. Lastly, while neoclassical,
New Economic of Labour Migration, and Historical-Structural perspectives all emphasise
economic rationale in migratory decision-making (De Haas, 2010; De Haas et al., 2019), we
place a high level of importance on the human agency of Africans and do not see migrations
and mobilities as primarily the result of larger structural forces but rather as the result of pro-
cesses of development and social transformation that have resulted in increased capabilities
and aspirations on the part of Africans (De Haas, 2021).
De-Centring Eurocentrism in Migration Studies

One of the main contributions of the handbook is an attempt to challenge and break away
from Eurocentric approaches to migration and policy-making debates by privileging alterna-
tive ways of knowing, including epistemological stances and methodological approaches, as
well as centring the voices of African scholars and policymakers. Migration to and from Africa
is a topic of increasing research, publications, conferences, and workshops; however, there
remains an unhealthy monopoly of knowledge generated by scholars located in the global
North about migration flows from Africa to Europe. There is an underlying assumption and
perception within such a body of knowledge that Africa is the primitive, traditional, exotic,
and Oriental Other, which should be subject to the Western gaze and knowledge production
system (Said, 1978).
The discourse and theorising of social science in the global North and the cultural
premises that underlie them are problematic and based on Western cultural assumptions
(Bhambra & Santos, 2017). Western modernity established itself as an enlightened civilisa-
tion in opposition to the epistemological Other, the colonial Other, in which Africa and the
rest of the world became the de facto primitive Other of Enlightenment reason (Vásquez,
2012). Binary notions such as religious/secular, tradition/modernity, and public/private
that underpin Western epistemology privilege specific ways of being and belonging while
marginalising others (Pasura, 2022). In modern knowledge formation, Africa has always
occupied a paradoxical position. It has been and continues to be the subject of the social
and scientific attention of scholars from the global North (Shipley et al., 2010). Africa has
at least four overlapping constructions as biology – “Sub-Saharan Africa”, a racial construct,
as geography, as history, and as representation – discursive, imagined, and “invented” by
anthropologists, missionaries, and colonial administrators (Zeleza, 2009). The handbook
warns against the tendency within Western academia to essentialise and homogenise “Africa”
or “Africans”. We do not pretend to speak for all of Africa, but the case studies presented
here give a sense of the continent’s variety and commonalities.
Migration studies’ research agendas are often aligned with the interests of states that
provide major funding to North American and European academics (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh,
2020). Recent decades have seen an institutionalisation of migration and integration research
(Dahinden, 2016) and a call to “de-migranticise” migration and integration research. A large
portion of migration and integration research is informed by methodological nationalism
2
Contemporary African Migration
and nation-state and ethnicity-centric epistemologies (Dahinden, 2016; Wimmer & Glick
Schiller, 2002). Landau and Bakewell (2018, p. 5) observe “the frailty of empirical research
from Africa (and other regions of the developing world) has reinforced more fundamen-
tal, conceptual shortcomings in the literature that tend to universalise the American and
European processes of immigrant integration” Schinkel (2018) rallied against “immigrant
integration” and correctly called “for an end to neocolonial knowledge production”. As
stated by Grosfoguel et al:
Migration studies tend to reproduce a northern-centric social science view of the world
that comes from the experience of others in the zone of being. For many decades,
migration theory was based on European immigrant experience. One of the most per-
vasive myths reproduced by Eurocentric social sciences is the myth of a neutral, univer-
salist, objective point of view. However, there is no neutrality in knowledge production.
We consistently speak from a location in the gender, racial, class and sexual hierarchies
of the world-system. In the case of international migration, due to its relationship to
colonial legacies and the reproduction in the presence of colonial relations between
migrant and host populations, we speak from a location in the “colonial hierarchies”
produced by the coloniality of power.
(Ramon Grosfoguel et al., 2015, p. 646)
How do we address Eurocentrism in migration studies? Post-colonial, decolonial, and/

or southern scholars aim to resist Eurocentrism by drawing on various long-standing
theoretical and methodological interventions (Bhambra & Santos, 2017; Connell, 2007;
Ramón Grosfoguel, 2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). Decolonising migration studies is a
topic that has come up in contemporary scholarship (Achiume, 2019; Fiddian-Qasmiyeh,
2020; Ramon Grosfoguel et al., 2015; Mayblin & Turner, 2020; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2013).
Ndhlovu (2016, p. 28) provided decolonial critiques of migration concepts such as diaspora,
superdiversity, integration, and multiculturism for their “uncritical embrace of elitist neolib-
eral conceptualizations of culture and identity”.
Scholars from the global South have called for alternative epistemologies to challenge
the hegemony of Eurocentric/Western perspectives, which are masked behind discourses of
universalism, modernity, and globalisation (Bhambra & Santos, 2017; Ramón Grosfoguel,
2007; Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). For instance, in “epistemologies of the south”, de Sousa
Santos (2014) examines the production and validation of knowledge rooted in the resistance
experiences of all social groups that have suffered systematically from capitalism, colonialism,
and patriarchy. A re-centring of “Southern theories” has been called for by Connell (2007).
Indeed, South–South migration has emerged as an important research and policy issue in
order to re-centre the global South (Jonathan Crush & Chikanda, 2018; Ratha & Shaw,
2007). By de-centring the Eurocentrism in migration studies, we mean rethinking norma-
tive assumptions about migration and focusing on different forms of mobility in the global
South, particularly in Africa. It involves engaging with questions about how to engage criti-
cally with the geopolitics of knowledge production (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020). In this hand-
book, one of the intellectual objectives is to go beyond the normal constraints within which
migration is understood. The process of migration occurs within the framework of political
structures. Throughout the continent, different forms of mobility occur through, below, or
above the nation-state, as well as before nation-states were established (pre-colonial), for
example, cross-border mobility, rainmaking mobility, and neo-Pentecostal healing journeys.
3
The handbook also includes a conceptual strand related to the current scholarly inter-
est in the “mobilities turn” in the social sciences (Hannam et al., 2006; Urry, 2007),
which shifts the focus of research from sources to sources, networks, and flows. However,
although the concept of mobilities encompasses both movements of people, objects, capi-
tal, and information across the world as well as the travel of material things within everyday
life (Hannam et al., 2006), human mobility still dominates the field despite increasing
attention to the mobility of material objects and information. This volume contributes to
the growing body of research that recognises the analytical inadequacies of classical con-
cepts and frameworks in the global South (Fiddian-Qasmiyeh, 2020) and promotes alterna-
tive ways of knowing and epistemological approaches and methodological stances. Making
sense of mobility’s socio-political consequences in Africa means moving past discussions of
the formal policy regimes that often frame Euro-American analyses (Landau & Bakewell,
2018).
Slavery, Imperialism, Colonialism, and Contemporary Migration

During the development of this Handbook on Contemporary African Migration and the
writing of the introduction, we sought to emphasise that slavery, imperialism, and coloni-
alism, as well as African economic and political history are important variables for a com-
prehensive understanding of contemporary migration in Africa. Mobility practices were
widespread across the African continent prior to the arrival of colonial powers. We agree
with Mbembe (2020, p. 58), who states that it is impossible to understand the cultural his-
tory of the African continent without understanding its itinerancy, mobility, and displace-
ment, but “it is this very culture of mobility that colonization once endeavored to freeze
through the modern institution of borders”. However, as Collins (2022, p. 1248) correctly
observed, “migration research has often demonstrated an amnesia about its relationship to
colonialism.”
Slavery, imperialism, colonialism, and neocolonialism have negatively impacted the African
continent (Ndlovu-Gatsheni, 2012). Many Africans were forced to migrate to the Old World
of Asia through the Atlantic slave trade (Cohen, 2008). European traders began stripping
African societies of their human resources as early as the 16th century. It was not the value
of the land or the capital that drove the majority of the trade; rather, it was the value of
the people through the slave trade (see also Sherbut in this volume). A primary objective
of European colonialism and neocolonialism was to exploit Africa’s human and material
resources by partitioning space, offshoring, and fencing off wealth and splintering territories.
In this volume, Matlosa captures the predicament of colonially imposed borders between
Lesotho and South Africa and argues for free movement across the border.
South Africa wholly surrounds the Kingdom of Lesotho. Due to this geographical
arrangement, Basotho feel they are prisoners in their own land. Many of them feel
like they are a big herd of cattle locked in a kraal with a shepherd or owner who has
forsaken them. Due to hunger and thirst, they are supposed to force their way out.
There is a consensus among the majority of Basotho stakeholders that any cooperation
agreement which does not deal with the burning issue of the free (easy and effortless)
movement across the border would not be addressing the pertinence of Basotho's
interests and aspirations.
(Matlosa this volume)
4
By conquering and colonising the African continent, Europeans hoped to shape the con-
tinent along European lines (Mudimbe, 1988). Mudimbe identified three interrelated but
distinct assumptions and courses of action: the control of physical space, the re-education
of indigenous minds, and the incorporation of regional economic histories into the Western
worldview. Imperial, colonial, and neo-colonial interactions, frequently marked by uneven
power relations and symbolic and material violence, have produced biases, stereotypes, and
negative construction of people of the African continent as the “other”. African philosophy
attempts to reawaken interest in African identity, cultural belief, thought, and value system,
after suffering systematic epistemicide at the hands of slavers and colonisers (Chapfika in this
volume). Decolonising migration studies entails recognising and pushing back against the
ways in which migration studies reproduce colonial, neoliberal, and neo-colonial racialised
and gendered structures of oppression.
Racialised and Globalised Capitalism

Globalised and racialised capitalism, driven by powerful states, former empires, and high-
tech corporations, is intrinsically linked to migration and mobilities within and outside
Africa, which is regarded as a permanent periphery within the global economic system where
modes/relationships of extraction are prevalent. In a sense, Africa’s colonial and post-colonial
context was and continues to be underpinned by what Shipley et al. (2010, p. 668) describe
as “rapacious modes of extraction” by “corporatist modern-imperial – whose globally-out-
sourced systems of production make the racial capitalism of apartheid look almost gentle”.
Africans play an integral role in human mobility driven by economic, social, and political
forces operating on local, national, and global scales (Kane & Leedy, 2013). Our atten-
tion is drawn to the continuities between the colonial past and present global and racialised
capitalism, in which racial/ethnic hierarchies have assumed new forms. The colonial-era dis-
placement and involuntary migrant labour system in Southern Africa is well documented
(Bakewell & De Haas, 2007; Jonathan Crush, 1984), where Africans were viewed as dis-
posable and cheap labour. Colonial administrators forced men to work as settler labourers
in urban centres, gold mines, and farms in South Africa. As the colonial capitalist system
expanded in Southern Africa, South Africa became the industrial hub of the regional political
economy, with Lesotho and neighbouring countries such as Zimbabwe, Malawi, and Zambia
providing cheap labour (Matlosa in this volume). Consequently, contemporary racial catego-
ries are founded on colonialism and must be analysed in the context of the histories of these
colonial empires.
In the post-colonial context, the circulation of labour and its reproduction, as well as
the accumulation and penetration of capital, have all been intensified across the continent.
There is still a sedentary logic embedded within the contemporary discourses of migration in
Europe that considers the mobility of ordinary Africans as dangerous and threatening while
normalising the movements of white and elite travellers (Bakewell, 2008). For Mbembe
(2019), borders are the word for the organised violence that supports modern capitalism
and our world system. The border is both a technology and a moving mass of undesirables.
Citing Quijano on coloniality of power, Ramon Grosfoguel et al. (2015, p. 642) argue that
racism is an organising principle of the international division of labour and all power
hierarchies. The racism that emerged from the history of colonialism did not disappear
with the end of colonialism. Colonial racism continues to produce zones of being and
5
non-being on a world scale. Indeed, the question is rather the relevance of “colonial-
ity” for the understanding of migration experience in the Metropoles.
In Chapter 7, Opesen et al. discuss “modern African coolies” in the Middle East, one of the
most popular destinations for semi-skilled and unskilled African workers.
African Post-Colonial States

In order to understand contemporary African migration, it may be productive to de-centre
the Eurocentric notion of the nation-state and its assumptions. For instance, instead of
subsuming the Eurocentric characterisation of the African post-colonial state as “failed”
or “fragile”, the handbook sees the African state as “a historically contingent product,
whose success or capability varies widely” (Boeyink and Turner in this volume). While
post-colonial states have influenced migration and mobility patterns on the continent, it is
imperative “to decentre the state and analytically incorporate the informal, local, and deeply
socio-political processes associated with joining a new community” (Landau & Bakewell,
2018, p. 6).
Currently, there are 55 member states of the African Union. As a legacy of colonisation,
the borders that divided African states were arbitrarily drawn, dividing people, languages,
cultures, and ethnic groups (Mbembe, 2000). It was colonisation, symbolised by the infa-
mous Berlin Conference of 1884–1885, that drew the boundaries of African states and arbi-
trarily separating peoples, cultures, and ethnic groups. Current conflicts are often attributed
to the imprecise nature of colonial borders. The coloniality of power has influenced migra-
tion studies through bordering practices, the division between citizens and foreigners, and
the development of racist hierarchies (Mayblin & Turner, 2020).
Even though borders are artificial, they are now used to articulate and consolidate the
identities and belongings of individuals within new national contexts (Bjarnesen and Bisong
in this volume). New forms of nationalism in Africa have naturalised the arbitrary bor-
ders and symbolic boundaries created or invented during the colonial era. For instance,
despite cultural, social, economic, and political linkages, colonially enforced borders separate
Lesotho from South Africa (Matlosa in this volume). In recent years, new patterns of con-
flict and violence have emerged, which have caused Africans to turn against other Africans:
against “strangers” – in other words, against all those who do not seem to belong to them
(Fourchard & Segatti, 2015; Geschiere & Jackson, 2006).
The post-colonial promise of freedom, economic, political, and social emancipation moti-
vated thousands of people to move freely in Africa after centuries of European imperialist
aggression, diplomatic pressures, military invasions, and eventual colonial conquest through
migrant settlements (Khalema et al., 2018). As an anti-colonial liberation movement, pan-
Africanist mobilisation was effective, but economic integration has proven far more challeng-
ing in the post-colonial context, where many young people are emerging from the former
“imperial underbelly” (Comaroff & Comaroff, 2006) but are confronted with poverty, cor-
ruption, misery, and social inequality in reality. Africa’s youth, who struggle to produce
meaningful lives in economies underpinned by “rapacious modes of extraction” and corrup-
tion by the ruling elite, migrate internally or internationally in search of better lives. As Kane
and Leedy (2013, p. 1) put it, “there is no better indicator of the level of despair among
Africans today than the exponentially growing numbers trying to exit at all costs for a better
life elsewhere in urban Africa or Western countries”.
6
Human Agency of Africans

While attentive to the structural conditions which constrain, shape, and enable the migra-
tion and mobilities of Africans, we are cognisant that the diversity of population movements
depends on people’s abilities and aspirations to move (Carling & Collins, 2018; De Haas,
2021). The continent continues to experience intra- and inter-regional migration patterns
(Khalema et al., 2018), contrary to the widespread misconception that Africa is a continent
where people constantly move around because of poverty, wars, and inadequate infrastruc-
ture (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). African international migration research is skewed towards
those leaving Africa, except for displacement or forced migration (Landau & Bakewell,
2018).
Wring on the African diaspora, Mohan and Zack‐Williams (2002, p. 233) correctly argue
that
diasporas represent a form of “globalisation from below” in which “small” players, as

opposed to mega-corporations, make use of the opportunities offered by globalisa-
tion. In many senses this is a form of resistance in that the subaltern groups creatively
explore and exploit the interstices of a global economy.
Over the past decades, diaspora and transnational studies have emphasised the role diasporas
played in transforming their countries of origin economically, socially, and politically. In the
African context, scholars and policymakers have long recognised the development potential
of the new African diasporas (Davies, 2010; Mohan & Zack-Williams, 2002). Transnational
diaspora networks are expected to fill the gaps left by the retreating African state, particu-
larly in the areas of welfare, social support, and development (Mercer et al., 2008; Mohan
& Zack-Williams, 2002). As noted by Zeleza (2010), the analysis of historical diasporas has
tended to focus on the political connections represented by the Pan-Africanist movement,
while in the study of contemporary diasporas, the focus is primarily on the economic impact
of remittances and investment flows.
Many African countries are now beginning to actively engage with their diasporas and
consider diaspora investment in small businesses and entrepreneurship as a panacea to slow
economic growth and poverty reduction on the continent (Black & Castaldo, 2009; Plaza &
Ratha, 2011). Studies show that remittances are the largest source of net foreign inflows in
Africa after foreign direct investment, ranking higher than official development aid (Kayode-
Anglade & Spio-Garbrah, 2012). Recent studies have shown how African transnational
diaspora members live in dual homes and perform multiple roles and identities by sending
remittances (Lindley, 2010; Mazzucato, 2008). Migration and development are linked by
European conceptions of appropriate progress, which are dominant in knowledge, institu-
tions, practices, and epistemic coloniality that links racialised difference with power imbal-
ances (Collins, 2022).
Section Overview
The handbook is organised into five parts. Part I – History of African Migration – com-
prises chapters scanning the history of migration and displacement, the nexus between post-
colonial states and migration, and the African philosophy of migration. Part II – Patterns
and Trends of Contemporary African Migration – comprises chapters exploring patterns and
trends of migration within and out of Africa. Part III – Migration, Forced Displacement,
7
and Irregular Migration – comprises chapters that evaluate the architecture of migration
governance in Africa as well as issues in forced displacement and irregular migration. Part
IV – Migration, Diaspora Engagement, and the Politics of Development – comprises chap-
ters dealing with the nexus between remittances and development, return migration, and
diaspora engagement. Part V – Future Trajectories of African Migration – concludes with
chapters that extrapolate future trajectories from the present trends of African migration.
Part I – History of African Migration

Part I applies historical and philosophical perspectives to contextualise and situate migra-
tion in and out of Africa within the contexts of economics, slavery, religion, colonialism,
post-colonial nation-states, and forced and voluntary migrations. We begin with Sherbut’s
historical analysis of pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial migration and displacement on
the African continent in Chapter 2. Sherbut argues that migration in the pre-colonial period,
at least prior to the advent of the slave trade and its traumatic violence, did not undermine
social cohesion in the way that migration during the colonial and post-colonial periods so
often did. Furthermore, the author discusses how the drivers of migration and displacement
had changed over time, especially during the colonial and post-colonial periods when new
political institutions and modes of production were introduced and adapted. Sherbut dem-
onstrates how specific factors – such as environmental and climatic changes, economic devel-
opment, and violent conflict – have contributed to migration and displacement in different
ways throughout the continent’s history. Migration from pre-colonial Africa was primarily
a “collective undertaking”, but this has shifted towards individualised circular migration
within the colonial and post-colonial contexts. While simultaneously exploiting young male
African labour, racialised and colonial capitalism sought to limit the presence of Africans in
(European) towns. Due to the male-migrant labour system in colonial times, production
and formal employment became gendered as male activities, whereas reproduction became
gendered as female activities (see also, Barnes, 1997; Tinarwo & Pasura, 2014).
In Chapter 3, Boeyink and Turner examine how African states attempt to govern migra-
tion and mobility across national borders, out of the continent or inside the territory of the
nation-state. They argue that to understand post-colonial African states, it is crucial to de-
centre the Eurocentric notion of the state and the normative understandings of migration
along certain patterns and logics. Rather than subscribe to the Eurocentric characterisation
of African post-colonial state as “failed” or “fragile”, the authors see the African state as
“a historically contingent product, which exercises public authority through widely vary-
ing degrees of success or capability”. They perceptively argue that to understand the post-
colonial state, we must consider how colonial powers controlled migration and mobility and
how former colonial empires continue to impact migration into, within, and out of Africa.
By appropriating Mamdani’s ideas of the bifurcated state for understanding the racial cat-
egorisation of citizen and subject, the rural and urban divide was a means to accommodate
“extractive capitalism”. In terms of migration policies, while colonial statecraft was defined
by preventing, promoting, and channelling mobility, there are several continuities between
the colonial and post-colonial states. The authors provide numerous cases to show African
states’ policies of migration prevention, promotion, and channelling. For instance, Rwanda
and Uganda utilise extraversion or channelling surrogacy to stimulate migrations of popula-
tions unwanted by the Global North in exchange for aid and to divert from their human
rights abuses.
8
In the 1960s, African philosophy emerged to question the justifications and conse-
quences of slavery and the colonisation of African people. In Chapter 4, Chapfika presents
a dialogue between African philosophy and international migration, primarily due to slav-
ery and colonialism. As Chapkika argues, the development of African philosophy was a
response to forced displacement, knowledge, and value dislocation that occurred during
slavery and colonialism in order to address such issues and revive interest in African iden-
tity, cultural belief, thought, and values. In order to provide answers to the African post-
colonial predicament, which Du Bois (1903) identifies as “double consciousness”, African
philosophy has attempted to provide answers to this predicament. Chapfika outlines three
broad approaches to the African post-colonial predicament: conservative, liberal, and cos-
mopolitan, and these approaches influence, at least in part, whether Africans migrate or stay
and whether transnational migrants return or stay abroad. Relationships with other people,
the environment, and the spiritual world characterise African movements and migration
patterns.
Part II – Patterns and Trends of Contemporary African Migration

Part II foregrounds questions about patterns, trends, and direction of African migration
and integrates insights from migration theory, philosophy, and political science with the
state’s role in managing and controlling migration. Contemporary emigration from Africa
has accelerated and diverged spatially beyond colonial patterns to Europe and towards
regions such as North America, the Gulf, and Asia (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). We begin
Part II with Makina and Mudungwe employing a large number of migration statistics to
present an overview of the patterns and trends of international migration both inside and
outside of Africa in Chapter 5. While over 90 per cent of North African immigrants depart
the continent for destinations outside the region, two-thirds of Sub-Saharan African migra-
tion is intra- and inter-regional. The main destinations for intra-African migrants are South
Africa, Cote d'Ivoire, Uganda, Nigeria, Ethiopia, and Kenya, which host 32 per cent of
all intra-regional migrants. Many migration nodes in Africa, particularly megacities Lagos,
Johannesburg, Nairobi, Luanda, Dakar, and Abidjan, draw migrants, cross-border traders,
refugees, religious pilgrims, and tourists. Based on UNDESA data, Makina and Mudungwe
demonstrate how intra-African migration has grown at an annual rate of eight per cent since
2000, which is higher than the out-of-African migration growth rate of 2.8 per cent. In addi-
tion to economic factors, other contributors to emigration include civil strife, weak institu-
tions, and climate change. Over three-quarters of African migrants move freely, mostly driven
by economic incentives like well-paid jobs, while political instabilities, conflicts, humanitarian
crises, and climate-related calamities impact the other quarter. Refugees originate primarily
from war-torn nations such as Ethiopia, Somalia, and the Democratic Republic of the Congo
(DRC). Immigrants and international students with advanced degrees originate primarily
from Nigeria, Kenya, Ghana, and South Africa. Countries with high levels of prosperity,
like the Maghreb or coastal West Africa, have higher levels of extra-continental migration,
whereas the poorest, like many landlocked Sub-Saharan countries, travel less and largely
to surrounding countries (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). As conventional routes to Europe
become increasingly dangerous, the number of African and Asian migrants transiting through
Latin America with the intention of reaching North America has increased. Migration from
Africa (especially Cameroon and the DRC) and Asia through Latin America is motivated by
economy, conflict, and family reunification.
9
Adeyanju and Olatunji explore the complex contemporary migrations of Africans to

Europe and North America in Chapter 6, characterised by the diversity of destinations, aspi-
rations, aspirations, mixed social environments, and gender inclusion. The changing pattern
of African migration is tied to globalisation, transnationalism, liberalised immigration rules
in North America, and labour demands in oil-rich Middle Eastern nations. While “irregular
migration” of Africans to Europe and North America dominates scholarly, media, and policy
attention, it’s only a fraction of extra-continental African migration. African migrants to
Europe and North America fall into two categories. The first group to relocate to the West
are students, investors, and skilled service workers. Sub-Saharan African immigrants in the
US and Europe are usually well-educated. The second African group includes asylum seek-
ers and refugees, low-income service sector workers, and undocumented migrants. There is
mounting evidence that colonial history or connection no longer determines African migra-
tory patterns, with an upsurge in migration to the Gulf regions, especially Saudi Arabia,
Canada, Australia, and the US (Flahaux & De Haas, 2016). There has been a diversification
of extra-continental African migration from former colonies, as would-be migrants move
from fortress Europe to alternative destinations, especially Canada and the US, with more
favourable immigration and settlement policies.
Even though race structures forms of immobility and its outcomes, it has been absent
from our understanding of migration patterns from Africa. In Chapter 7, Opesen, Amos,
and Amollo discuss the structural factors (economic, governance, environment, and social)
as drivers of migration, the difficulties, and rights of the “modern African Coolie” in the
Middle East, one of the most popular destinations for semi-skilled and unskilled African
workers. The so-called “African Coolies”, also derogatorily referred to as “Kadamas”, are
almost exclusively women who are employed in domestic chores, particularly in the areas of
house cleaning, vacuuming, cooking, washing, and childcare, while male migrants are con-
centrated in security and construction sectors of the economy. The study found that migrant
workers in the Middle East face unsafe working conditions, inadequate social security, low
wages, and few legal protections. Xenophobia, sexual abuse and racial exploitation, struc-
tural inequity and exploitation, and problems associated with finding suitable housing are
only some of the obstacles they come up against. In order to fully understand the exploita-
tion of migrants, the authors focus on the intersection between the interests and activities
of employers (global capitalism), politicians (as officials of the nation-state), and migrants
themselves (Cohen, 2016). The migration of workers is an inherent part of global capital-
ism for the capital of receiving nations. The peripheral nations of the global economy supply
agriculture, manufacturing, and service industries with inexpensive labour.
In the last chapter of Part II, Matlosa (Chapter 8) reminds us of the colonial legacies of
artificial borders in Africa. Despite the cultural, social, economic, and political ties between
Lesotho and South Africa, colonially imposed borders separate them. Even though African
borders are artificial, they have become an important tool for articulating and consolidating
the identities and belongings of individuals and ethnic groups within new national contexts.
Matlosa cites three factors which support the proposition that Lesotho and South Africa
should have a special type of relationship, which warrants the free movement of people
across the common border between the two countries. The first is that Lesotho is landlocked
entirely within South Africa. The second reason is that geographical, historical, sociocultural,
and political-economic linkages exist between Lesotho and South Africa. Thirdly, skilled and
unskilled Basotho migrants have contributed greatly to South Africa’s economic develop-
ment. Matlosa argues that Lesotho and South Africa need to change their relationship from
10
one that is characterised by colonialism and apartheid to one that is based on the mutual
benefit of its citizens.
Part III – Migration Governance, Forced

Displacement, and Irregular Migration
Part III of this handbook addresses the intersection of migration governance, forced dis-
placement, and irregular migration within the continent. De-centring European politics and
migration governance, particularly its securitisation of migration framework (Huysmans,
2000; Léonard & Kaunert, 2022), is crucial to understanding migration governance in
Africa. For instance, across Europe, irregular migration is widely framed as a security issue
rather than the protection of migrants (Carling & Hernández‐Carretero, 2011). The EU’s
engagement with developing countries has been increasingly focused on reducing “irreg-
ular” migration to Europe (Crawley & Blitz, 2019). We begin Part III with Abebe and
Mudungwe’s (Chapter 9) overview of the African Union (AU) and Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) migration policy frameworks, which facilitate and enhance legal migra-
tion between member states. The policy frameworks address the free movement of people,
goods, services, and capital, labour migration, refugees and IDPs, and human trafficking and
migrant smuggling. For instance, the Abuja Treaty is a vital migration law as the first agree-
ment to promote regional integration and development in Africa through free movement
of people and capital. AU Member States adopted the 2006 Migration Policy Framework
for Africa (MPFA) to promote migration and development and address migration issues
on the continent. The MPFA helps AU Member States and RECs create migration policies
based on their priorities and resources by providing policy guidelines and principles. The
MPFA provides recommendations on eight migration themes: migration governance, labour
migration and education, diaspora engagement, border governance, irregular migration,
forced displacement internal migration, and migration and trade. Strengthening continental,
regional, and national institutional mechanisms to implement policies is crucial and challeng-
ing. However, external factors like the externalisation of the EU border in Africa and internal
factors like the lack of political will and commitment of heads of states and political unrest
have hampered its implementation (see also Bjarnesen and Bisong in this volume).
Building in part on this focus on migration governance, Betts (Chapter 10) examines
refugee politics in Africa, showing how the politics of violence, colonialism, Sub-Saharan
Africa’s position in the global economy, fragile states, and competition for natural resources
have shaped forced displacement. As Betts correctly argues, African refugee politics require
nuance and historical context and we should not generalise the experiences of “the African
states” since every country is different even though there are some common themes in refu-
gee movements in Africa, such as encampments, porous borders, and mass influx. As Betts
demonstrates, the comparative politics of refugee rights in Africa can be explained in three
ways. These include identity-based accounts (that elites privilege refugees from common
ethnic backgrounds or from countries with which they have rivalrous bilateral relationships),
interest-based accounts (that elites seek resources, patronage, and legitimacy through their
refugee policies), values-based accounts (that states support refugee rights to advance pan-
African values of hospitality), and norm-based accounts (respect international and regional
legal obligations, including the OAU Convention on the Rights of Refugees). The chapter
shows how donors have prioritised European and North American refugees over African ref-
ugees; for instance, the Syrian, Venezuelan, and Ukrainian refugee crises diverted donor and
11
resettlement support from Africa. Betts concludes the chapter by discussing transnational
political mobilisation among African refugee diasporas, specifically how diasporas challenge
authoritarian governments from abroad through political mobilisation, using Zimbabwe and
Rwanda as examples.
In spite of intra-continental and inter-regional migratory patterns in Africa, images of
Africans fleeing conflict and crossing the Mediterranean to reach Europe have shaped aca-
demic, media, and popular discourses on Africa’s migration in recent years. In Chapter
11, David Ndegwa provides statistical data on contemporary forced migration in Africa.
Citing the UNHCR data, Ndegwa shows how the number of forced migrations in Africa
has quadrupled from 9.01 million in 2007 to 40.12 million in 2020, with IDPs accounting
for more than 60 per cent of the population. On the continent, internal displacement is the
predominant form of forced migration. Forced migration in Africa is primarily caused by
conflicts, disasters, environment, and climate change, which create complex humanitarian
crises. Conflict and violence are largely driven by inter-ethnic fighting for land and valuable
resources such as water and pasture, political upheaval, including violent takeovers and con-
tested elections, claims to territorial self-determination rights, and Islamist insurgency. The
regions of Eastern Africa and the Horn of Africa stand out due to their unique position as a
source of, the destination for, and host for migrants fleeing war, persecution, or other forms
of violence (Schmidt et al., 2019). In his earlier work, Betts (2013) developed the concept
of “survival migration” to emphasise the crisis in which people flee failed and fragile states
when threats such as climate change, food insecurity, and generalised violence are present,
as well as conditions in failed and fragile states that violate human rights. Using the case
studies of Zimbabweans in South Africa and Botswana, Congolese in Angola, and Tanzania
and Somalis in Kenya and Yemen, Betts (2013) argues that the victims of such situations are
not usually recognised as refugees, preventing them from being protected by international
institutions.
While the literature on migration and climate change tends to focus on communities
being forced to relocate due to climate and environmental changes but less on those trapped
by them. Using a social justice and environmental change perspective, Nyaoro examines cul-
tural violence among the Pokot pastoralists in Kenya’s Rift Valley in Chapter 12. As Nyaoro
puts it, East African security and development discourse has almost always included Pokot-
neighbourhood violence. Observers call the conflicts cattle rustling or inter-community
conflicts based on pastoral communities’ age-old cultural practices. Conflicts are deadlier,
causing more deaths, displacement, destruction, and insecurity. The chapter vividly describes
how the Pokot, who rely on semi-nomadic pastoralism, are harmed by political, administra-
tive, climatic, and environmental boundaries. After being marginalised by the British colonial
government and successive post-independence regimes in Kenya and Uganda, the Pokot
face a bleak future without livestock or the ability to defend and fight for their only means
of subsistence. Nyaoro argues that Kenya’s disarmament response is forcing the Pokot to
reconsider seasonal migration as a livelihood; thus, Pokots must “migrate out of seasonal
migration”.
In the last chapter in Part III, Magwedere and Makina (Chapter 13) discuss the impact
of the COVID-19 pandemic on intra-Africa and extra-continental migration and the extent
to which lockdowns, quarantines, and travel restrictions affected the flow of people, goods,
and services throughout the continent. Despite international fears, Africa was one of the least
affected by the COVID-19 pandemic due to climate, low population density, limited travel,
youth, previous epidemics, and insufficient testing. Migrants, refugees and asylum seekers,
12
and irregular migrants were most affected and had the worst health, well-being, and protec-
tion. They argue that COVID-19 pandemic exacerbated pre-existing problems for African
migrants. Specifically, it is a socio-economic crisis, a protection crisis, and a migrant health
crisis. Due to legal, linguistic, cultural, and other barriers, migrants, refugees, and asylum
seekers had very restricted access to health services. Covid severely harmed the informal
economy, limited refugees’ social protection, and exposed them to violence, sexual abuse,
and exploitation. Border closures and travel restrictions to stop the virus exacerbated xeno-
phobia, discrimination, racism, and stigmatisation of migrants and refugees.
Part IV – Migration, Diaspora Engagement,

and the Politics of Development
In Part IV, we focus on the relationship between migration, diaspora engagement, and the
politics of development in Africa. There are several theories and views on the migration-
development nexus. According to the neo-classical theory, returning migrants were consid-
ered important agents of change and innovation in their countries of origin (Beijer, 1970;
De Haas, 2010). From this perspective, the re-allocation of labour from rural/agricultural
areas to urban and industrial sectors (internal migration), and from developing to developed
countries (international migration), was considered as an essential prerequisite for economic
growth (Todaro, 1969). In the late 1960s, the neo-classical migration theory was challenged
by a paradigm shift in social sciences towards structuralist views (partly the dominance of
socialist thinking in the 1960s), which questioned the proposition of the positive role of
migration on development. An increasing number of academics lent support to the hypoth-
esis that migration sustains or even reinforces problems of underdevelopment instead of the
reverse (De Haas, 2010). In the 1980s and 1990s, the new economics of labour migration
(NELM) emerged mainly as a response to neo-classical and structuralist theories. According
to the NELM, the two approaches were seen as too rigid and determinist to deal with the
complex realities of migration and development interactions. The NELM offered a much
more subtle view of migration and development which links causes and consequences of
migration more explicitly, and in which both positive and negative developmental responses
are possible (De Haas, 2010; Stark, 1978; Taylor, 1999) This new approach revitalised the
academic thinking on migration by placing the behaviour of individual migrants within a
wider societal context and focusing on the household rather than the individual (Taylor,
1999).
We begin Part IV with Makina and Magwedere (Chapter 14) revisiting the debate regard-
ing the role of remittances in Africa’s development. Even though remittances contribute
to poverty reduction, the evidence of their direct link to economic growth is inconclusive
and mixed. Migration opponents have also argued that remittances were mainly spent on
conspicuous consumption and “consumptive” investments (such as houses) rather than
invested in productive enterprises. Scepticism about the use of migrant remittances for pro-
ductive investments became the common thread of the migration and development debate.
Evidence shows that remittances make up a large part of the GDP of smaller, poorer, and
fragile African economies; however, recent studies suggest that high remittances may create
a remittance trap of economic stagnation and dependence. Makina and Magwedere argue
that remittances will not solve Africa’s underdevelopment. Structural issues keep African
countries underdeveloped and force migrants to leave. Due to its younger population, Africa
will continue to provide labour to developed nations, and most African nations’ development
13
plans will rely on remittances to alleviate poverty and inequality. As external investments
for development projects in African countries continue to diminish, many African countries
and the African Union are actively pursuing a diaspora engagement agenda (Plaza & Ratha,
2011; Ratha & Shaw, 2007). To make use of the human, financial, and social resources of
its diasporas and migrants, many nations, particularly those in Southern Africa, have begun
adopting national diaspora plans (Chikanda & Crush, 2018). As a result of widespread pov-
erty and inequality, collective remittances from diaspora organisations have been reported
to directly and immediately impact local development in their home countries. It is also
estimated that a large proportion of the Zimbabwean population relies on the diaspora for
survival (J. Crush & Tevera, 2010).
In Chapter 15, Rwengabo shifts the focus to return migrants, who are considered cata-
lysts for change, transformation, and development in their homelands. Rwengabo critically
evaluates the development potential of Return migration to Africa (RM-2-A) and its appar-
ent positive association with development. Return migration to Africa is seen as facilitating
technology transfer from the developed North to underdeveloped Africa, facilitating brain
regrowth by returning educated/skilled Africans, and enabling brain exchange and knowl-
edge exchange. Rwengabo contends that “factors that are agent-specific as well as struc-
ture-specific influence RM-2-A’s development potential”, moving us beyond the current
policy discourses. Networked, skilled, experienced, financed, and investment-savvy returnees
can propel development, but RM-2-A also incorporates non-skilled, inexperienced, non-
resourced, forced, and aged returnees. The structure is based on the context of return,
motivations for return, and the governance and societal dynamics in sending and recipient
states, which constrains and enables returnees’ choices. Return migration should be viewed
as an element of ongoing transnational mobility, not as a permanent relocation to Africa.
In addition to material considerations, return migration is also motivated by emotional and
sentimental ties.
In Chapter 16, Setrana and Bekoe argue that the migration-development nexus has fol-
lowed theoretical orthodoxy and neoliberal policy considerations from the global North,
especially OECD countries. They introduced “cognitive return” to rethink return in Africa,
where voluntary and involuntary migration are oversimplified. Setrana and Bekoe coin
another term, “immobile returnees”, to refer to individuals who, at some point in their lives,
have dreamed of migrating, and have even pursued a migration project, but as a result of a
number of factors, including personal, emigration, and immigration, have decided to give
up on their migration dream and return to their native country or resettle. Mary Boatemaa
Setrana and Adolf Awuku Bekoe argue that the enormous contributions that “immobile
returnees” make once they decide to abandon their migration dream and redirect their skills,
savings, and knowledge to their native country are often overlooked by migration research
when discussing the benefits of voluntary and involuntary return migration to Africa’s devel-
opment. Cognitive return is popular in West Africa, where more young people migrate to
Europe through the Mediterranean.
Remittances, return migration, transnational caregiving, and cross-border investments
are all examples of the types of cross-border transactions that migrants and those who
stayed behind engage in as a means of establishing a transnational “home”. Through their
participation in the social, political, and economic processes and events in their countries
of origin, diaspora and transnational communities are powerful agents of change in those
countries. In Chapter 17, Mutambasere and Pasura examine home, identity, and belong-
ing in contemporary African diasporas. Home and homeland shape diasporic relationships
14
across borders. The chapter examines how contemporary African diasporas, embedded
in multiple social worlds, relate to local, national, regional, and transnational spaces and
places. There are many different interpretations of the term “home” or “homeland”, but
these interpretations are frequently couched in dichotomous terms, such as material or
metaphorical, rooted or immaterial, real or imagined. These terms provide an essential set
of dialectics that continue to structure discussions regarding the meaning of “home”. The
chapter discusses three dominant meanings of home: material, home as a fixed and stable
location; relational, as an assortment of relationships with people and things; and as repre-
sentation in the diasporic imagination. For African diasporas, home refers to both practical,
material, symbolic, and imagined transnational relationships and the hope of returning to
one’s homeland.
Negash discusses the potential role of the contemporary African diaspora in the United
States in Chapter 18 from the perspective of practitioners participating in the 2010 Silicon
Valley-based African Diaspora Network. Negash notes that approximately two million immi-
grants from Sub-Saharan Africa resided in the United States in 2018, accounting for 4.5 per
cent of the country’s 44.7 million immigrants. When investing in Africa, diaspora entrepre-
neurs face several obstacles, including limited funding access, unreliable electricity, political
instability, high tax rates, corruption, and customs and trade regulations.
There is a paucity of literature on gendered migration in Africa, even though women
play key roles as cross-border traders, nannies, caregivers, nurses, and social workers. In
the last chapter in Part IV, Meron Zeleke (Chapter 19) draws on extensive ethnographic
research conducted in southern Ethiopia to discuss gender and migration in the context of
South–South migration, focusing on Ethiopian labour migration to South Africa. According
to Zeleke, Ethiopia’s gender norms and socio-cultural landscape highly influence the phe-
nomenon of labour migration. The gendered choosing of destinations and the dynamics of
migration and marriage were the two main elements the author cited to explain the gen-
dered migration trends along Ethiopia–South Africa corridor. An example of how gender
and migration are intertwined in the study area is the pattern of female migrants heading for
Gulf states while male migrants are often headed for South Africa. Gender ideologies and
gender relations in the place of origin influence migratory patterns. In Ethiopia’s patriarchal
society, men are expected to support their families economically, so the head of households
often migrates. Socially, women are less likely to migrate independently, so they migrate
shorter distances than men. Most parents prefer migrant husbands to their daughters. It is
common for parents to pressure their daughters to marry migrants regardless of their age dif-
ference or appearance. Through arranged marriage and abduction, Zeleke argues, gendered
migration reinforces repressive gender norms in the place of origin. Due to the migration of
male household heads, gendered roles do not change at the household level by challenging
patriarchal norms.
Part V – Future Trajectories of African Migration

In Part V, we address the future trajectories of African migration. The African Union’s long-
term development strategy for structural change, Agenda 2063, The Africa We Want, is
Africa’s 50-year economic blueprint and plan to transform the continent into a global power
and prioritises free movement. In order to achieve economic growth and development, the
strategic framework of the continent aims to spread the Pan-African motivation for solidarity,
self-reliance, opportunities, and collective consciousness to other parts of the world.
15
We begin Part V with Bjarnesen and Bisong (Chapter 20) discussing the concept of “Africa
without borders” using the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS), a
regional economic community, as a model for examining policies and practises pertaining to
the free movement of people across the continent. Throughout its history, Africa’s borders
have been a fundamental symbol of colonialism, contestation, and division; this symbolism
continues to impact African politics as well as intellectual discussion. Bjarnesen and Bisong
propose an understanding of borders as relational, processual, political, and inconsistent,
de-centring the emphasis on European political discourse and international discussions
concerning migrant governance. The concept of free movement does not presuppose the
absence of borders or the absence of state control and governance. Since the establishment
of the ECOWAS and its institutions, the free movement of people has been a cornerstone of
regional integration in West Africa, with an effort to recreate precolonial mobility patterns.
However, several factors have hindered the implementation of this agreement, including the
lack of political will and commitment of the heads of state, civil conflicts, political instability
in some ECOWAS nations as well as external influence from the EU through its securitisa-
tion of migration framework (Huysmans, 2000; Léonard & Kaunert, 2022).
Trade and migration are interconnected in a mutually beneficial and reciprocal manner.
In Chapter 21, Quartey, Osarfo, and Abor assess the African Continental Free Trade Area
(AfCFTA), which aspires to create a single liberalised market for goods, services, and capi-
tal by easing the movement of persons, deepening integration, and accelerating economic
development. AfCFTA aims to promote a common African market to promote structural
transformation, economic diversity, and African growth facilitated by movement of persons.
The authors show that although natural resources dominate Africa’s trade, natural resources
were exported to other countries at a rate of 50 per cent, while intra-African trade was 33 per
cent. Thus, Quartey, Osarfo, and Abor correctly argue that Africa loses the chance to process
or add value, thereby sacrificing a huge opportunity to improve productivity, self-reliance,
and quality of life. The authors draw on the similarities between trade and migration within
and outside ECOWAS in order to examine the AfCFTA’s impact on Africa’s migration. They
argue that the existing agreements and protocols, such as Agenda 2063, the AU’s Protocol
on Free Movement of Persons, and the establishment of Africa’s six Regional Economic
Communities (RECS), will play a crucial role in the build-up, negotiations, and implementa-
tion of the AfCFTA.
In Chapter 22, Sow shifts the focus to examine the various links between migration and
the environment in Africa and other parts of the world using mixed methods. Although
Africa’s contribution to the production of greenhouse gases is significantly less than that of
Eurasia and the Americas, the continent is experiencing an acceleration in the global warm-
ing trend. Sow discusses the relationship between climate variability and mobility in Africa
and concludes with an analysis of fish eldorados in West Africa. Specifically, he examined
how ecological change, overfishing, and depletion of fisheries affect mobility/migration in
Senegal’s new fish eldorados areas in West Africa. By distinguishing natural climatic variabil-
ity from anthropogenic acts, the chapter highlights fishers’ migratory patterns in West Africa,
some of which are caused by environmental degradations. The chapter demonstrates how
illegal fishing by European and Asian trawlers devastated the fish supplies, forcing Senegalese
fishermen to migrate to Mauritania and Guinea Bissau. Migration to these neighbouring
countries increases conflict between populations. Migrant fishers from Senegal have become
“ecological exiles” as a result of their search for new fish eldorados throughout the West
African sub-region. As a result of resource depletion, many Senegalese fishermen (the “Boat
16
captains”) have emigrated or become passeurs (conveyors of clandestine migrants) towards

Spain and the Mediterranean Sea.
Data on migration stocks and flows in Africa are primarily derived from educated guesses,
as national censuses and surveys in the majority of African nations lack modules designed
to collect this information. In Chapter 23, Makina and Mushoni provide an overview of
African migration data management. They argue that it is necessary to produce reliable
migration statistics to implement and monitor migration and development initiatives. Many
African and other countries struggle with capacity, limited human and financial resources,
lack of harmonisation of migration concepts and definitions, insufficient data integration,
and limited systematic collection, management, analysis, and disaggregation. For instance,
even though remittances are acknowledged as a contributor to development, data on them
are scarce because a significant proportion of remittances in Africa are channelled through
informal channels, diminishing their policy relevance.
In Chapter 24, Makina and Pasura examine the future of African immigration. Researchers
have argued that free international labour migration could be one way of overcoming the
Lucas Paradox so that capital could flow to poor developing countries. Poor developing
countries have higher capital returns than rich countries because capital is scarcer than labour.
Rich countries should consider these countries profitable for investment and immigration.
However, few rich countries are sending capital to poor African countries. Makina and Pasura
explain this by viewing Africa as a permanent periphery in the global economic system, where
extraction modes and relationships predominate. Migration outflows and transnational net-
works will continue due to Africa’s perpetual economic subordination and lack of new eco-
nomic opportunities. They draw attention to the continuities between the colonial past and
present global and racialised capitalism, in which racial/ethnic hierarchies have assumed new
forms. However, the continent’s demographic shift and rich natural resources deserve con-
sideration. Africa’s future is bright if it uses its natural resource to create jobs for its youthful
population.
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20
PART I
History of African Migration

2
MIGRATION AS EMPOWERMENT
A Selected History of Migration
and Displacement in Africa
Graham Sherbut
Migration and Mobility as Disruptive and Empowering Forces

An overarching theme of the chapter, albeit perhaps an unsurprising one to students of
African history, is the ubiquity of migration and mobility. Populations have continuously
shifted from location to location, sometimes temporarily but often permanently, prompting
Ricca (1989) to refer to Africa as “a continent perpetually on the move”.
It is useful here to draw a distinction between mobility and migration. Mobility refers to
the movement not only of people, but also of ideas, beliefs, capital, and information across
frontiers. Population mobility can be expressed in a multitude of ways and, crucially, has
taken place in the absence of modern African states and continues to occur today outside
the authority of modern state structures. A notable example is the Fulani pastoralists from
Niger who move seasonally to the northern states of Nigeria in search of pasture but do so
without taking heed of the formal/legal principles that are intended to govern such popula-
tion movements. Migration, on the other hand, describes a process with clear legal – and
political – connotations, which is intimately tied to population movements between modern
African states.
The focus of this chapter is predominantly on migration. Many of the scholars referenced
throughout the chapter conflate mobility and migration, typically using “migration” as a
catch-all term to describe all types of people-centred movements. Where possible, however,
the chapter references and tries to situate the distinctiveness of historical and contemporary
forms of mobility, not least because these mobilities have often had enriching impacts on
African cultures and societies.
Indeed, both migration and mobility have long served to alter the nature of African
politics, economics, and society. It is true that much of this movement, particularly when
it has taken the form of forced displacement resulting from slavery, colonialism, or con-
flict between and within post-colonial states, has been wrenching and has undermined the
very fabric of those societies affected. However, certain types of migration and mobility
have had an empowering effect on many of those individuals and groups who have chosen
to move, as well as on the societies and countries that have received them. The historical
DOI: 10.4324/9781003005551-3 23
Graham Sherbut
detail that follows will emphasize this line of argument, with reference to the emerging
aspirations-capabilities framework for migration, developed by De Haas (2021) and draw-
ing on several other foundational theorists operating in the migration and broader mobility
spaces.
Forced displacement must continue to be addressed as an urgent humanitarian issue,
but intra-African migration and mobility also remain key pillars of the continent’s future
prosperity. The movement of people also brings the movement of ideas and the sharing of
beliefs that can, at least over time, build social capital and produce new ways of addressing
long-standing problems. Moreover, with climate change and unequal patterns of economic
development (to provide just two examples) serving as drivers of current and future popu-
lation movements, it is more urgent than ever for African states and Regional Economic
Communities (RECs) to be cognizant of history, learn appropriate lessons, and develop
institutional frameworks and policies that allow for the empowering aspects of migration and
mobility to be fully realized.
Mobility as a Collective Action: Population

Movements in the Pre-Colonial Period
Okoth-Ogendo (1989), in a seminal paper on the effects of what he terms migration on
African family structures in pre-colonial, colonial, and post-colonial Africa, pointed to three
factors that served as consistent drivers of population movements in the pre-colonial world.
First was the search by communities (whether nationalities, lineages, clans, or villages) for
new locations where they could realize their productive potential. Second, these move-
ments served as a natural response to environmental degradation and associated effects like
droughts or floods. Third, such movements constituted a strategy used to escape violent
conflict. Okoth-Ogendo’s analysis was built on that of Adepoju (1979), who identified pre-
colonial African migration and mobility as being focused on prevailing socio-political and
ecological trends, including “internecine warfare, natural disasters and the search for farm-
land or colonization” (p. 210). Jonsson (2009) and Fenske (2014), while not disagreeing
with the importance of these factors, add trade dynamics and pilgrimage as essential elements
to the pre-colonial migration and mobility story, noting that it was these factors that primar-
ily shaped trans-Saharan movements of small bands or tribes, both in the years before and
after the Arab conquest of the Maghreb – and incursions into the Sahel – in the 7th and 8th
centuries.
Antil et al. (2016) reiterate the importance of these mobility drivers, but also point to the
common error of seeing pre-colonial population movements as taking place in a vacuum,
in which communities uprooted themselves to travel to virgin lands. On the contrary, the
movement of one community to “realize their productive potential”, typically served as
a precursor to the displacement and subsequent flight of other communities. The Bantu
migrations in central and Southern Africa (circa. BCE 1,000 to 300 CE) saw the displace-
ment of existing hunter-gatherer and pastoralist groups (Oliver, 1966; Vansina, 1995). The
Arab migratory expansions in North Africa (647 CE to 709 CE) resulted in the displacement
of the indigenous Berbers (Rouighi, 2011). The Dogon population in what is now Mali fled
Mandé domination and Islamicization by taking refuge in what became the Dogon Plateau
(Antil et al., 2016; Mayor et al., 2005). Even the “Great Trek” of the Boers (1835–1840)
can be seen as a mobile reaction to the advent of another migrant group in the form of
English colonists and their administrative apparatus (Giliomee, 2003).
24
Migration as Empowerment
The above examples mainly describe pre-colonial movements of specific groups within
relatively constrained – albeit still large – geographic areas. Antil et al. (2016) argue that
migration and mobility, on a truly continental scale, emerged with the advent of the Arab and
Atlantic slave trades of the 16th–19th centuries. The European- and American-dominated
Atlantic slave trade, the slave trading operations of Rabih az-Zubayr (concentrated to the
east of Lake Chad), and the operations of the Zanzibar-based Tippu Tip in East Africa (to
provide just three examples), all produced considerable displacement as populations moved
from coastal to far-inland areas that were deemed more remote, or at least more defensible
against the slavers (Black, 2015; Thomas, 2007; Van Reybrouck, 2010). These movements
of displaced people caused additional dislocation of existing communities in these inland
areas – setting the stage for the growth of societal cleavages that persist in many African states
to the present day.
At first glance, pre-colonial African migration and mobility, catalysed by aspirational
desires of communities for improved conditions in which to live, by trade, by religious devo-
tion, but also by the persistent threat of violence and ecological disaster, does not appear
altogether different than the drivers of migration, mobility, and displacement – on the con-
tinent today. However, in two crucial ways, population movements in pre-colonial Africa
were fundamentally different than anything that has come since. First, these movements were
primarily a collective undertaking. The decision to move was not made nor undertaken by
individuals, but rather by families/households or most commonly, by entire bands, tribes,
or communities. The upshot of this “collective migration”, as Okoth-Ogendo (1989) per-
suasively posits, is that migration and mobility in the pre-colonial period, at least prior to the
advent of the slave trade and its traumatic violence, did not undermine social cohesion in the
way that movements during the colonial and post-colonial periods so often did. Prior to the
slave trade, mobility still allowed family structures to remain largely intact, along with band,
tribal, or other community political/authority structures. Even amidst migratory dynamics,
social capital was largely preserved, and culture maintained. Prime examples of this include
the Dogon people in Mali, whose collective migration to escape Islamicization is seen as con-
tributing to their maintenance of shared social practices, technologies, and arts (Tait, 1950).
Another West African example is the Fulani, who collectively migrated from the Senegambia
region to what is today northern Nigeria in the 13th and 14th centuries – in the process
maintaining much of their traditional social structure oriented around oral storytelling and
pastoralism (Okello et al., 2014).
The second way in which pre-colonial African mobility differed from later forms, as the
examples of the Dogon and Fulani also demonstrate, was that it was not cyclical in nature.
With artificial colonial borders not yet established, frontiers between polities were fluid.
When population movements did take place, they tended to involve a permanent (or at least
semi-permanent) transition to a new location on the part of entire communities (Fenske,
2014; Okoth-Ogendo, 1989). This stands in sharp contrast to the migration dynamics in
play in contemporary African contexts, in which cyclical migration – e.g., individual migrants
from Lesotho or Mozambique migrating to/from Johannesburg to work in the mines of
the Witwatersrand – is common. Cohen (2019), providing a Marxist perspective on Africa’s
migration dynamics, points to the lack of industrialization on the continent during the pre-
colonial period – and the resulting lack of need for wage labourers – as the main reason why
collective movements, rather than the individualized cyclical type, was predominant.
The above examples also point to the existence of multiple mobilities during the pre-
colonial era. The permanent movement of entire bands, tribes, or communities to new
25
Graham Sherbut
locations also brought with it the movement of cultures – including ideas and belief sys-
tems – that sometimes displaced, but more often merged with, the cultures of others. For
instance, the Arab “conquest” of the Maghreb in the 5th and 6th centuries was partly a
spread of Arabic culture, including the Arabic language and Islam. However, despite pro-
longed periods of conflict, these movements also created cultural mixing between Arab
and indigenous Berber populations that served to alter – subtly, at first – the linguistic,
religious, and broader cultural practices of both groups (Rouighi, 2011). Such cultural
mixing was common, to varying degrees, elsewhere on the continent as cultural mobility
accompanied physical mobility. Such mobility occurred more commonly in the pre-colonial
era since these mobilities were unconstrained by the imposition of arbitrary political bor-
ders and other bureaucratic measures designed to control mobility and limit group-level
movements.
Was migration and mobility in the pre-colonial period empowering to those who under-
took it? De Haas (2021) draws on Isaiah Berlin’s concepts of “positive” and “negative”
liberty (Berlin, 1969), as well as Amartya Sen’s capabilities framework (Sen, 1999), and
applies these to the migration space. In doing so, he establishes a mode through which to
view migration as a “function of aspirations and capabilities to migrate within given sets of
perceived geographical opportunity structures” (De Haas, 2021, p. 16). Stated more simply,
De Haas situates migration as being a matter of human agency and the freedom to choose
where to live – including the option of not migrating at all. While seemingly straightforward,
this framework provides an alternative theoretical model to the traditional cause-and-effect
view of migration (represented by functionalist and historical-structural schools of thought).
In the latter, migrants respond passively to sets of unchanging push and pull factors and
migrate primarily out of necessity. Under an aspirations-capabilities framework, the deci-
sion to migrate is not passive, but is often aspirational and emerges from a complex set of
individual and collective calculations on how migrating – or not migrating – will influence
subjective well-being.
In the pre-colonial era, intra-African migration and mobility dynamics do broadly reflect
evidence of human agency – the ability, however limited, of people – or social groups –
to “make independent choices and to impose these on the world and, hence, to alter the
structures that constrain [their] opportunities or freedoms” (De Haas, 2021, p. 23). The
flight of the Dogon people from their ancestral lands to the Dogon Plateau, while surely
not reflecting an ideal circumstance, was nevertheless representative of a collective decision
to change this community’s calculus and to employ mobility to maintain cultural freedom.
The movement of the Fulani from Senegambia to Northern Nigeria and the wider Sahel
was an independent choice – made collectively by particular bands/social groups – that was
deemed necessary to open new lands for cattle herding and to maintain pastoral traditions.
The “Great Trek” of the Boers marked a collective community decision to use mobility to
escape the unwanted authority of British colonialism. Even flights in the face of arriving
threats, whether those of hunter-gatherer groups in the face of the Bantu migrations or of
the multitude of groups targeted by slavers, represent an active expression of agency, albeit
largely reactive in nature.
The highlighting of these examples is not intended to suggest that migration and mobility
in the pre-colonial era were universally positive or delivered positive outcomes. Indeed, such
movements were often wrenching, exploitative, and violent. However, these examples do
suggest that migration and mobility also had empowering effects in allowing communities
to retain – at least to a degree – cultural, political, economic, and even physical freedoms.
26
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
risque de perdre toute influence moralisatrice, de provoquer un
amollissement général des facultés, et surtout des facultés de
réaction si nécessaires à la santé physique, intellectuelle et morale
des individus. La souffrance est bonne…
Pour ce qui est du dernier argument on peut se tranquilliser, la
souffrance ne manquera jamais, la Providence ou la destinée se
chargeant toujours de nous la faire connaître. Mais la première
partie de l’objection est juste : il faut savoir, dans l’éducation, toucher
et blesser certains sentiments, les faire saigner même, et viriliser les
caractères en leur imposant l’effort, le renoncement, le travail, toutes
choses qui, au moment même, ressemblent étrangement à des
peines. Les enfants ont à ce sujet des perceptions étonnamment
justes. Ils préfèrent presque toujours les parents sévères à ceux qui
ne le sont pas, pourvu qu’ils découvrent, sous leur rigueur
apparente, un esprit de justice et de bonté. Évidemment un père,
une mère qui, pour éviter une contrariété à leurs enfants, leur
permettent de se lever tard, de négliger leurs études et de consacrer
leurs forces au plaisir, sont leurs pires ennemis. Par une indulgence
puérile et une faiblesse inintelligente, ils risquent d’endommager
l’avenir de leurs fils et de leurs filles de façon irrémédiable ; ils
méritent donc d’être placés parmi les pires faiseurs de peines.
Mais tout raisonnement suppose une intelligence capable de le
comprendre. La vérité la plus évidente, sottement appliquée, peut
avoir des résultats pires que le mensonge. Ainsi la nourriture est
indispensable à la vie, l’air, au fonctionnement des poumons ; mais
gaver un enfant d’aliments, ou l’exposer à un vent du nord glacé,
pendant des heures entières, est atteindre un but contraire à celui
que l’on se propose. Il en est ainsi de la trop grande complaisance.
Vouloir écarter de ceux qu’on aime les difficultés à vaincre et les
occasions d’effort, est le plus mauvais service à leur rendre, surtout
s’il s’agit d’enfants et de jeunes gens. Il faut, au contraire, inventer
les obstacles, si les conditions de la vie n’en fournissent pas. Telle
parole incisive, tel blâme sévère sont comme le sel qu’on mêle aux
aliments ; ils servent de stimulant. Ne pas savoir, à l’occasion,
causer volontairement un moment de peine, serait mal aimer ou
montrer une déplorable absence de compréhension.
Mais entre une critique méritée, destinée à produire un effet
salutaire, et des paroles malignes, reflet de sentiments injustes,
jaloux, ou pis encore, aucune comparaison ne peut s’établir. La
première est semblable au remède qui guérit, même si le goût en est
âcre ; les secondes sont des liqueurs qui empoisonnent.
On objectera encore que telles personnes, capables de formuler
les plus dures vérités, ont été des sonneurs de cloches efficaces.
Que d’âmes réveillées par ces langues acerbes ! Jamais un doux
berger n’aurait eu cette influence. C’est qu’il y avait en ces hommes,
aux paroles brusques et sévères, l’étoffe d’un apôtre, et qu’ils
s’exprimaient en mots cinglants, emportés par leurs convictions et
non par un esprit de méchanceté, d’intolérance ou d’injustice. Il est
certain, du reste, que leur influence dépendait de la valeur et de la
force de leur caractère et non des formes brusques et dures dont ils
enveloppaient leurs enseignements et leurs blâmes. Avec plus de
douceur et d’indulgence, le même effet aurait été produit, peut-être
même un effet meilleur.
En quelques cas, en certaines circonstances, avec les natures
molles et léthargiques, il est possible que la violence soit nécessaire
pour éveiller les consciences. Elles ont besoin de l’effet physique
produit par la voix irritée, les paroles rudes et les manières brutales.
Le fait se vérifie surtout avec les enfants. Plus tard, l’esprit critique
s’étant développé chez l’individu, la boursouflure dans les reproches
en détruit l’efficacité.
De toutes façons, une démarcation nette doit être établie, dès le
début, entre les faiseurs de peine par altruisme et conscience et les
faiseurs de peine par égoïsme et inconscience. Les premiers savent
ce qu’ils font, même s’ils se trompent dans la forme qu’ils emploient ;
les seconds sont semblables à des aveugles, qui mettent le feu
partout où ils passent, sans discerner les désastres dont ils sont
cause. Ces criminels sans le savoir sont les plus à plaindre des
hommes, car ils risquent de se trouver devant l’irréparable, le jour où
ils ouvriront les yeux à la vue nette des responsabilités qu’ils ont
encourues.
CHAPITRE II
CRIMINELS INCONSCIENTS
Sûrement si les créatures vivantes pouvaient

voir les conséquences de toutes leurs mauvaises
actions… elles s’en détourneraient avec horreur.
Imitation de Boudha.
Ernest Renan s’exprimait à peu près en ces termes, en parlant

de l’éducation religieuse : « Nos enfants ont été élevés sous
l’influence de l’ombre du christianisme, mais qu’en sera-t-il de nos
petits-enfants ? Ils n’auront plus que l’ombre d’une ombre : or, c’est
bien mince ! » Nous en sommes maintenant à cette ombre d’une
ombre, et c’est bien mince, en effet ! Cependant, dans certaines
classes sociales, l’instruction religieuse se donne encore par
conviction ou par convenance, et l’on enseigne le décalogue aux
jeunes gens et aux enfants. Mais la plupart sont disposés à penser,
comme d’ailleurs le faisaient leurs pères, qu’une partie des dix
commandements ne les regarde point, ceux surtout qui défendent le
vol et le meurtre. Les personnes qui les instruisent les forcent à s’y
arrêter, leur démontrant qu’on peut voler son prochain sans lui
dérober apparemment aucun objet matériel, en diminuant
injustement sa réputation, en dénigrant ses capacités, en lui faisant
perdre du temps lorsqu’il vit de son travail, en retardant les
payements qui lui sont dus, en essayant d’obtenir des rabais
exagérés sur le prix des objets qu’on lui achète. Les exemples
peuvent se multiplier à l’infini, et tous représentent des vols,
inconscients peut-être, mais non moins réels et pernicieux dans
leurs effets.
Quand il s’agit du : « Tu ne tueras point », les instructeurs sont
plus embarrassés et moins clairs. Toute pensée de haine, disent-ils,
impliquant le désir de la disparition de l’ennemi ou du gêneur qui
encombre notre route, peut être assimilée à l’homicide. Mais si l’on
tue plus souvent par la pensée que par le poignard ou l’arme à feu,
ces élans meurtriers sont toutefois assez rares, et s’ils révèlent des
cœurs violents, rancuniers, intéressés, ils sont du moins nuls dans
leurs effets, car ceux que l’on occit en espérance sont d’ordinaire les
plus rebelles à quitter le monde d’où l’on voudrait les exclure.
Des façons de tuer bien autrement réelles et sûres peuvent être
citées : un fils qui triche au jeu, une fille qui se déshonore, amènent
ou précipitent la mort de leurs parents. Certaines cruelles trahisons
d’amour ont parfois aussi le même résultat. L’associé infidèle qui
ruine l’ami confiant est souvent la cause directe de la maladie qui
emporte celui-ci. Énumérer les occasions tragiques où l’homme est
responsable d’avoir abrégé les jours de son semblable serait trop
long. Les cas extrêmes que je viens de citer sont rares cependant.
La plupart des gens honnêtes ou appelés tels n’ont ni déshonneur, ni
trahison, ni ruines à se reprocher. Ils vont de l’avant dans la vie, la
conscience sereine, certains de n’avoir pas manqué au sixième
commandement et, si on le prononce devant eux, ils relèvent
vertueusement le front. Cet ordre, qu’ils n’ont jamais enfreint, ne les
regarde pas ; il s’adresse à ceux que la police traque ou que les
prisons abritent.
Cette parfaite tranquillité d’esprit est-elle justifiée ? Sommes-nous
réellement certains que ces paroles ne nous regardent pas et que,
s’adressant à un peuple entier, Moïse, sous l’inspiration divine, ait
prononcé des paroles inapplicables à la plupart des hommes ? Il est
probable, au contraire, que les ordres donnés l’étaient pour tous,
s’adossaient à tous, correspondaient à des tentations et à des
possibilités communes à tous.
Il y a dans la vie humaine, comme je l’ai dit déjà [2] , un côté grave
dont on a rarement conscience. Si l’on s’en rendait nettement
compte, l’orientation de l’existence serait différente. J’entends parler
de la portée qu’ont les actes, les paroles et, qui sait ? même les
pensées personnelles. N’est-il pas effrayant que tout ce que nous
disons ou faisons ait une répercussion immédiate qui influe sur notre
propre destinée et sur celle d’autrui ? C’est dans le fait de cette
répercussion qu’il faut chercher en quoi le sixième commandement
regarde tous les hommes, et pourquoi ils sont dans l’erreur en
voulant l’appliquer à une seule catégorie d’individus.
[2] Voir le chapitre : « Faiseurs de peines ».
Quelle que soit la forme des doctrines religieuses,

philosophiques ou positivistes qui gouvernent les vies, certaines
notions sont communes à tous les hommes. La nature, l’hérédité et
l’influence des milieux sont la cause de ces analogies. En tout cas
l’on peut affirmer que tous les êtres créés souffrent des mêmes
peines. Quelquefois leurs joies sont diverses, mais la douleur les
assimile les uns aux autres. Comme la mort, elle est le grand
niveleur, et « la garde qui veille aux barrières du Louvre n’en défend
pas nos rois ». La même qualité de larmes rougit les yeux des
misérables et des puissants, et leurs cœurs se serrent de la même
façon, sous l’étreinte de la souffrance. Nous pouvons donc tous
mesurer ce qu’elle représente pour autrui, et nous rendre compte
des ravages qu’elle produit dans l’organisme physique.
Si réellement l’on doit trouver dans l’au-delà un règne de justice
où toutes les actions secrètes des hommes et tous les effets de ces
actions seront pesés à une juste balance, il y aura de singulières
surprises. Parmi les meurtriers que Dante a placés dans le septième
cercle de l’enfer, au milieu d’une rivière de sang bouillant : Lungo la
proda del bollo vermiglio ove i bolliti faceano alte strida, nous
verrons peut-être surgir des figures que nous n’aurions jamais
supposé devoir faire partie de la sinistre cohorte. Et si le grand poète
demandait à entendre le récit de leurs fautes, ces damnés ne
pourraient plaider ni la passion folle, ni la jalousie aveuglante, ni
l’ambition effrénée, car c’est inconsciemment qu’ils ont été
assassins.
Mais jusqu’à quel point l’homme de notre époque a-t-il le droit de
se déclarer inconscient, de plaider l’ignorance et de décliner les
responsabilités qui lui incombent ? Son premier devoir d’être civilisé
n’est-il pas justement de savoir ce qu’il fait, d’être conscient de ses
actes et de leurs conséquences ?
Il y a évidemment des peines involontaires dont nul n’est
responsable et des peines salutaires [3] qui sont un devoir.
Cependant qui de nous est certain de n’avoir jamais fait souffrir
sciemment et inutilement les êtres dont l’existence se trouve
mélangée à la nôtre, et d’avoir ainsi abrégé des vies ? En certains
cas, ces peines furent passagères, et le repentir de ceux qui les
provoquèrent en a effacé la trace et le souvenir. Mais il y a des
individualités qui s’arrogent le droit, avec suite et persévérance, de
causer les pires souffrances à ceux qui ne leur ont point fait de mal.
Sans parler du déshonneur, de la ruine et des catastrophes
innombrables que certaines créatures malfaisantes provoquent
autour d’elles, il y a des formes infinies de chagrins usants que les
hommes se donnent les uns aux autres, sans même avoir pour
excuse la loi de la conservation, cette loi inférieure et cruelle,
derrière laquelle s’abritent les égoïsmes effrénés. On peut ramener,
il me semble, la plus grande partie de ces peines inutiles à la
formation incomplète des caractères et à l’habitude de ne pas tenir
compte des impressions que nos actes et nos paroles produisent sur
les sentiments d’autrui.
[3] Voir le chapitre : « Faiseurs de peines ».
L’augmentation croissante des suicides est un fait indéniable et

général. Les causes qui les provoquent, — sauf dans les cas
passionnels, — ne sont plus tout à fait les mêmes qu’autrefois. Ainsi
les suicides pour échapper au déshonneur ont diminué, et ceux pour
échapper à la maladie et à la misère ont quintuplé au moins. Le
phénomène s’explique aisément. Le mot honneur est composé des
mêmes lettres, mais sa signification a varié, et ses limites se sont
étonnamment élargies ; ce n’est plus l’île escarpée et sans bord où
nul ne pouvait rentrer quand il l’avait quittée, c’est une plaine qui
s’étend à l’infini et dont on ne discerne plus nettement les bornes.
Par conséquent, la crainte d’en être expulsé a cessé à peu près
d’inquiéter les consciences.
D’autre part, la résignation étant désormais considérée par les
écoles modernes comme la vertu des faibles et des incapables, la
plupart des gens ont honte de la pratiquer. Et lorsque les nuages
s’amoncellent, ils s’enfuient de la pauvreté et de la souffrance, en se
jetant dans la mort. Ceux qui ont désappris aux âmes la beauté et la
grandeur de la patience auraient dû prévoir ce que cette doctrine
provoquerait de désespérance chez les malheureux, désespérance
que les meilleures lois sociales ne guériront pas, car les souffrances
physiques et morales échapperont toujours à leur contrôle.
Peut-être ces contempteurs de la résignation ont-ils, au contraire,
prévu le résultat de leurs leçons et estiment-ils que les êtres inutiles
à la société font bien de se supprimer ? En ce cas ils ne mériteront
pas une accusation de légèreté. Il faut même reconnaître qu’ils n’ont
pas travaillé en vain et que leur influence sur les âmes a été réelle.
La responsabilité d’une autre catégorie de suicides, assez
fréquente de nos jours, et qui a pour cause les chagrins
domestiques, peut en partie leur être attribuée également. Les
trahisons conjugales ne se cachent pas sous cette dénomination
(ayant leur rubrique spéciale) ; il s’agit simplement des tortures que
les membres d’une même famille s’imposent les uns aux autres et
qui, parfois, produisent des exaspérations telles, que les victimes de
ces misères préfèrent en finir avec la vie plutôt que de continuer à
les supporter.
Le dédain ouvertement exprimé pour la patience et la résignation
contribue, certes, à ces accidents, mais d’autres facteurs entrent
également en jeu, et ce sont le manque de contrôle sur soi-même et
l’irascibilité qu’on ose aujourd’hui étaler impudemment en les
décorant du nom de nervosité : « Dans ma jeunesse, la neurasthénie
s’appelait mauvais caractère », disait une femme au franc parler.
Évidemment elle avait le tort de trop généraliser, mais un fond de
vérité ornait ses paroles. Que de choses appelées honteuses
autrefois et que, sous le nom de nerfs, on se pardonne aujourd’hui
avec une aisance étonnante. Accuser quelqu’un d’impatience,
d’irritabilité, d’injustice et même de mauvaise foi n’est plus une
injure : « Ce sont les nerfs », répond-on, et ce mot magique explique
et excuse tout. Chacun se sent devenir irresponsable, car ces nerfs-
là, chacun les a, chacun serait tenté par moment de leur lâcher la
bride.
Une certaine réaction contre l’importance excessive donnée aux
désordres nerveux commence à se manifester dans le monde
médical, et d’autres moyens de cure que la complaisance, dont les
spécialistes ont usé jusqu’ici, sont préconisés. On essaye, par
l’éducation de la raison, de démontrer aux malades que l’état de
leurs nerfs dépend en grande partie de l’état de leur esprit, et que
c’est celui-ci qu’il faut guérir. Mais après avoir persuadé aux gens
qu’ils ont un système nerveux détraqué, il est excessivement difficile
de les convaincre que la guérison dépend d’eux-mêmes. Leur
amour-propre se met de la partie, car ils sont devenus intéressants à
leurs propres yeux, regrettent leur situation de sujets pathologiques
et n’éprouvent aucun désir de redevenir responsables de leurs
propres actes.
Le phénomène est singulier, mais très réel. Évidemment on se
sent humilié des maladies enlaidissantes, répugnantes et qui
mettent des entraves aux jouissances ; mais si la vanité et le plaisir
n’en souffrent pas, certaines gens trouvent une sorte de satisfaction
orgueilleuse à parler de leurs maux. Le personnage de Dickens, qui
était si démesurément fier de la frêle santé de sa femme, n’est,
comme toutes les caricatures, qu’une exagération de la vérité.
Le nervosisme n’a pas créé les défauts par lesquels les hommes
de tout temps se sont fait souffrir les uns les autres, mais il les a
aggravés, leur a fourni le prétexte de s’étaler avec impudeur ; en
même temps, il diminuait les qualités d’endurance. De là un malaise
général ; les nerfs des uns ne veulent plus supporter les nerfs des
autres ; X se laisse aller à son irascibilité, et Z se révolte contre les
façons désagréables qu’il avait jusqu’ici supportées avec patience.
Un examen de conscience s’imposerait à tous, car tous, plus ou
moins — sauf quelques lumineuses exceptions — font souffrir et
souffrent. Or, ces souffrances sont inutiles et pourraient être, en
partie du moins, éliminées, si la préoccupation de ne pas être des
faiseurs de peines pénétrait les esprits, et si chacun apprenait à
mesurer ses responsabilités. Le mauvais caractère d’un membre
d’une famille n’amène pas nécessairement le suicide des autres,
mais il décolore leur existence et peut accélérer le développement
des maladies dont ils portent le germe. Dans beaucoup de cas, il
précipite les morts.
Les organisations sensibles, fières et délicates, les cœurs
profonds sous une apparence brusque, les êtres de bonne foi et de
justice sont ceux qui souffrent davantage des contrariétés de la vie
domestique. Ils ont le besoin intense d’un centre d’harmonie et de
paix où se reposer des luttes extérieures, et ne savent se résigner à
ne pas le trouver sous leur toit. Le regret les ronge et les rend
moroses, ternes, découragés. Ils contribuent ainsi à alourdir
l’atmosphère morale de la famille. D’abord victimes, ils finissent par
devenir bourreaux, tellement l’humeur chagrine est une maladie
contagieuse. Le prince de Bismarck a dit, je ne sais où, que les gens
de bonne humeur avaient toujours raison. En tout cas, les grognons
ont toujours tort. Comme il suffit d’une brebis malade pour
empoisonner un troupeau, il suffit d’un caractère chagrin pour gâter
tous les autres, c’est la traînée de poudre. La minute d’avant, on
riait ; le fâcheux entre, et au bout d’un instant chacun boude !
Ces effets désastreux se manifestent surtout dans les familles,
parce que la gêne en est bannie et que, s’aimant davantage, on est
plus sensible aux procédés désagréables. Et puis c’est l’histoire de
la goutte d’eau qui, tombant chaque jour, finit par creuser le sol. Telle
attitude, prise fortuitement dans le monde par un indifférent, froisse
sans affliger, mais de la part d’une mère, d’une femme, d’un frère,
d’un mari, elle blesse aux points sensibles du cœur. Est-ce à dire
que la vie de famille nous expose à des expériences douloureuses
auxquelles nous échappons ailleurs ? Il est impossible de le nier, et
cependant la famille est encore ce que l’on a inventé de mieux en ce
monde, et ceux qui voudraient la détruire n’y parviendront pas.
On pourra la dissoudre, elle se reformera fatalement. La
supprimer serait priver l’homme de tout appui et de toute
consolation. Mais la rendre douloureuse, comme le fait notre
manque d’altruisme, c’est la forcer à dévier de sa mission véritable,
qui est d’être un abri, une école et un but. Comment concevoir une
humanité sans famille ? Les hommes ne seraient plus que des
voyageurs solitaires, passant d’un hôtel à l’autre, n’appartenant à
personne, sans devoir, sans responsabilités, ne connaissant que la
joie de contacts passagers, d’où naîtra peut-être une autre créature
solitaire, dont l’État s’emparera et qu’il lancera ensuite dans
l’existence, sans le souvenir d’un passé, sans l’espérance d’un
avenir.
Les êtres brutaux et violents, méchants même, ne sont pas

toujours ceux qui enveniment davantage la vie de famille. Les
caractères injustes et de mauvaise foi — l’un ne va généralement
pas sans l’autre — causent des misères plus profondes, et le mal
qu’ils font est autrement subtil et dangereux. L’affirmation paraîtra
paradoxale et ne l’est pas. D’abord les premiers sont rarement
aimés ou cessent promptement de l’être, et leurs actes ne
produisent souvent que des effets extérieurs ; ils donnent des coups
de poing qu’on peut rendre ou dont on peut guérir. Les seconds
versent un poison lent qui tue.
Certaines natures ne souffrent que faiblement de l’injustice ou de
la mauvaise foi de leur entourage ; tout glisse sur elles, pourvu que
leurs intérêts ou leurs plaisirs ne soient pas compromis. Pour les
êtres droits et sensibles, au contraire, tout contact avec ces deux
forces dissolvantes représente une torture qui les exaspère et les
humilie.
On m’a accusé de juger sévèrement les femmes, et certains
passages d’Ames dormantes m’ont valu des reproches de la part de
celles qui, reconnaissant leurs propres mérites, trouvaient mes
réflexions déplacées. D’autres, au contraire, âmes admirables et
droites, se sont montrées d’une humilité touchante, me reprochant
de n’en avoir pas dit assez sur les lacunes de l’esprit féminin. Je
crains, cette fois-ci encore, d’éveiller des susceptibilités en osant
prétendre qu’au point de vue de l’injustice, les femmes rendent des
points à l’autre sexe.
C’est surtout dans la famille que ce manque d’équité se
manifeste. L’homme ayant au dehors de nombreux champs d’action
et d’évolution, se complaît parfois, chez lui, au rôle de bon juge. La
mère, l’épouse, la sœur y prétendent rarement. Dites à un homme
qu’il est injuste, il s’offense. Retournez l’accusation contre la femme,
elle ne se révolte pas, elle sourit parfois même avec complaisance.
Les scrupules ne l’arrêtent guère dans ses aveugles préférences ni
dans ses appréciations fausses. Elle estime que de ne pas avoir à
se soucier de ce qui est juste, représente un des privilèges de son
sexe…
Les femmes sincèrement chrétiennes et les femmes
intellectuellement supérieures ne tombent pas dans cette basse
erreur. Elles se croient dignes d’aspirer à la justice, et l’accusation
d’y manquer les blesse autant que l’homme. Mais tout ce qui est
haut est rare. Pour qu’il y ait un changement dans les conditions
psychologiques de l’humanité, il faudrait que certaines habitudes
morales s’établissent sur le terrain commun. Il ne sera possible d’y
arriver que par l’éducation et l’influence de l’opinion publique,
lorsque celle-ci se reformera sur des bases nouvelles.
Quand l’injustice nous touche directement et lèse nos intérêts,
nous nous révoltons, nous nous indignons, mais notre plus fine
substance n’est pas seule touchée. D’autres éléments s’y
mélangent, et les sentiments qui nous agitent sont tellement
imprégnés de colère et de rancune personnelle, que le sens de
l’équité blessée se fait moins sentir. C’est lorsque les actes, les
paroles et les pensées injustes ne sont pas dirigés contre nous, mais
contre autrui, que nous connaissons, dans toute son intensité, cette
souffrance spéciale, intolérable aux âmes droites.
L’injustice vis-à-vis des enfants est la plus inique ; ils ne peuvent
se défendre et ne se rendent même pas compte de ce qui les fait
souffrir ; on voit passer dans leurs yeux une surprise, une détresse
qui angoissent le cœur. Dans la jeunesse, l’effet des injustices
subies est moins émouvant, mais plus dangereux ; il aigrit, endurcit
et souvent déprave les âmes. Il éloigne de la famille,
prématurément, ceux qui auraient encore besoin d’être guidés par
elle ; il dépose dans les jeunes esprits des germes de défiance et de
rancune qui ne s’éliminent jamais.
Un fils, une fille, qui voient l’un de leurs parents victime de
l’injustice de l’autre, en sont plus frappés que s’il s’agissait de torts
plus graves qui se dissimulent mieux et heurtent moins au fond.
Si encore on parvenait à démontrer leurs torts aux êtres injustes,
une sorte de soulagement s’ensuivrait. Mais on n’y parvient jamais,
souvent parce qu’ils sont inconscients, et presque toujours parce
qu’ils sont de mauvaise foi vis-à-vis d’eux-mêmes et des autres. Il
est rare que la mauvaise foi ne soit pas alliée à l’injustice ; elles
marchent presque toujours de conserve, l’une appuyée sur l’autre.
De la famille où elles s’exercent journellement, ces deux sœurs
perverses s’étendent à tous les rapports sociaux, qu’elles gâtent et
attristent.
La mauvaise foi est subtile, s’insinue partout, même dans l’amour
et aussi souvent dans l’amitié. Les relations mondaines en sont
saturées, et elle atteint des proportions gigantesques dans la vie
publique. Le jeu des partis dans le système parlementaire est basé
en grande partie sur la mauvaise foi. Cette nécessité de
désapprouver toute noble initiative du parti contraire, et d’approuver
aveuglément les sottises de son propre parti donne aux âmes
l’habitude de se mentir à elles-mêmes. Les esprits droits tendent à
réagir contre ce servage politique, mais au point de vue du système
représentatif, ces velléités d’émancipation morale sont réprouvées.
Sur certaines questions l’on voit aujourd’hui les groupes se
désagréger, les caractères indépendants se refuser à voter contre
une motion qui leur paraît bonne, simplement parce qu’elle est
présentée par des adversaires. Ces symptômes semblent indiquer
un avenir meilleur, où les hommes, au lieu de se ranger sous un
drapeau, représentant des intérêts, se disciplineront sous le joug de
principes librement acceptés, dont le but unique sera le bien général.
Que nous sommes loin encore de cette sincérité d’âme ! Dans
quels rapports humains la mauvaise foi ne règne-t-elle pas en
maîtresse ? Les gens, en ce monde, paraissent surtout préoccupés
de se tromper l’un l’autre. De l’homme d’État, qui éblouit le pays de
promesses qu’il sait ne pouvoir tenir, jusqu’au négociant, qui vend
des produits falsifiés, et à l’ouvrier, qui fait par calcul un ouvrage
sans durée, pour s’assurer une clientèle, la mauvaise foi s’étale à
tous les degrés de l’échelle sociale. On le sait : quelques-uns
s’indignent, d’autres sourient ; mais tant qu’elle ne lèse que des
intérêts matériels, qu’elle ne se manifeste que dans la vie publique
et les rapports extérieurs, on la supporte et on n’en meurt pas.
Mais si elle pénètre dans l’intimité de notre existence
sentimentale, elle devient, elle aussi, tout comme l’injustice, une
cause de mort, car elle soulève des révoltes dans la partie la plus
délicate de notre être. Découvrir de la mauvaise foi chez ceux que
l’on aime, — même en dehors de l’amour, — est autrement
douloureux qu’une injure ou un acte brutal. Il est triste de ne pouvoir
tabler sur le dévouement d’un frère, d’une sœur, d’un ami, mais ne
pouvoir compter sur leur bonne foi est plus triste encore. Le cœur se
gonfle d’indignation jusqu’à éclater et n’a pas la ressource de se
soulager par des reproches comme pour un tort tangible, le
caractère de la mauvaise foi étant justement de nuire et d’exaspérer,
sans en assumer la responsabilité.
Des personnes, qui seraient fort étonnées si on doutait de leur
honorabilité, se permettent de dire les choses les plus blessantes et
les plus injustes à leur entourage, de ces choses qui font saigner
l’âme. Puis, si leur victime essaye de réagir, elles jouent la surprise,
déclarent qu’elles ne comprennent pas pourquoi on se fâche, que
pas une parole, dont elles aient à se repentir, n’est sortie de leur
bouche. Et cependant leurs lèvres sont chaudes encore des mots
incisifs et cruels qu’elles ont prononcés ! Est-ce lacune mentale ou
mauvaise foi ?
D’autres individualités ont pour système, dans une discussion, de
ne jamais tenir compte des arguments de leur interlocuteur, et
reviennent toujours à leur point de départ pour défendre leur
égoïsme, imposer des sacrifices à autrui ou reprocher des torts
qu’on ne leur a pas faits. Aucune démonstration, aucune explication
ne les persuade, les bonnes raisons n’arrivent pas à leur cerveau.
Du moins elles n’en tiennent aucun compte et, après des heures de
discussion, remettent sur le tapis leurs premiers arguments, dont la
fausseté cependant leur a été victorieusement démontrée. Ces
mêmes personnes ont pour système de ne jamais reconnaître ce
qu’on a fait pour elles et ne se souviennent que de ce que l’on a
oublié de faire. Si l’on s’abaisse à rappeler des actes positifs de
dévouement accomplis à leur égard, elles regimbent, vous accusent
de leur reprocher les bienfaits reçus et déclarent qu’elles n’en
avaient nul besoin !
Tout esprit manquant de droiture est, par cela même, ingrat. Or
l’ingratitude, jointe à la mauvaise foi et à l’injustice, font tant de mal
aux êtres sensibles, que la plupart des maladies de foie et de cœur
qui, tout à coup, emportent nombre de gens, ont été lentement
préparées par la tristesse, l’amertume, la révolte qu’éprouvent les
âmes loyales et tendres à ces contacts douloureux.
Les femmes en général, — exception faite naturellement des
femmes de cœur et d’intelligence supérieure, — ont l’habitude de
dire du mal des maris, en tant que catégorie. Ils le méritent sur
beaucoup de points sans doute. Mais il en est cependant de
dévoués, de bons, s’exténuant de travail pour donner du bien-être à
leur famille, qui sont tués lentement par l’ingratitude, l’injustice et la
mauvaise foi de leur femme. Celle-ci est peut-être une très
vertueuse personne, qui n’a jamais manqué à ses devoirs d’épouse,
mais elle se plaint toujours ; elle ne reconnaît jamais ce que l’on a
fait pour elle ; elle a des caprices constants et une irritabilité
chronique. Le pauvre homme rentre dans son intérieur où jamais
une bonne parole ne l’attend, où jamais ses oreilles n’entendent un
raisonnement juste. S’il est faible et sans principe, il cherchera des
compensations ailleurs, mais s’il est honnête et affectionné, il se
contentera d’être malheureux, de se ronger intérieurement, et de ces
rongements naissent les maladies qui emportent.
Dans les vies mondaines et les maisons riches, où les obligations
d’une grande fortune finissent toujours par extérioriser forcément les
existences, ces misères morales se sentent moins, parce que l’on
dépend moins les uns des autres. Mais dans les milieux modestes et
laborieux, l’homme aurait besoin de trouver dans sa famille, qu’il soit
mari, père, fils, ou frère, un abri pour se reposer des luttes de la
journée et se préparer à celles du lendemain, un abri où il soit sûr de
ne pas rencontrer l’injustice, la mauvaise foi, l’ingratitude, ces
ennemis qui le guettent à chaque instant dans la vie publique.
Il y a aussi, bien entendu, des maris, des pères, des fils brutaux,
injustes, de mauvaise foi et ingrats, — surtout ingrats, — mais, en
général, les torts des hommes prennent d’autres formes, ils tuent
d’une autre façon, et leurs torts sont plus apparents, plus grossiers,
plus tangibles… Impossible pour ceux-ci de plaider l’inconscience.
Ainsi on voit des hommes ruiner leur famille par leurs vices, leur
imprudence ou leur faiblesse, mais, du moins, ils ont la
responsabilité de ces catastrophes, puisque l’administration de la
fortune est entre leurs mains. Pourtant que de fois c’est la femme qui
pousse au luxe, se refuse à l’économie, ne veut pas sacrifier ses
robes et ses colifichets et rend impossible les réformes que le chef
de famille voudrait imposer.
Des statistiques de la criminalité, il résulte que les hommes
recourent aux moyens violents pour se débarrasser des femmes,
dans une proportion très supérieure à celle de l’autre sexe ; mais
dans la catégorie des empoisonnements, celui-ci reprend le dessus.
Il en est de même pour les torts qui, sans avoir recours au crime,
amènent la mort des membres d’une famille : ceux des femmes sont
plus subtils, ils ne frappent ni le regard, ni le toucher, ni l’opinion, et
si la loi se mêlait de les rechercher, ils échapperaient à son contrôle.
Les hommes prennent leur revanche sur d’autres questions, car
ils sont faiseurs de peines tout autant et même davantage que les
femmes. Ainsi dans les malheurs qu’amène l’amour, leur
responsabilité est plus considérable, et il en est de même sur
beaucoup d’autres points. Mais leurs torts, leurs fautes, leurs crimes
représentent, la plupart du temps, des réalités positives, tangibles,
visibles, dont ils doivent rendre compte. Leur injustice, leur mauvaise
foi revêtent des formes agressives et brutales et se montrent plus
souvent encore dans la vie publique que dans la vie privée, tandis
que la femme, n’ayant pas cette ressource, exerce son action
seulement dans la famille et dans l’intimité.
Si la façon perfide de faire souffrir, où excellent certaines
créatures humaines, excite l’indignation à cause des
découragements douloureux qu’elle provoque et des malheurs qui
en résultent, une tristesse profonde se joint à l’indignation, car ces
créatures ont souvent le cœur affectueux ; elles aiment ceux qu’elles
torturent, elles voudraient être bonnes, remplir leur devoir, elles
croient le remplir et sont parfois — pas toujours — absolument
ignorantes du mal qu’elles causent.
Lorsque, dans cette existence ou dans des existences
successives, elles auront développé leur conscience et que
l’éducation de leur raisonnement sera faite, leur réveil sera terrible,
car le mot trop tard est le plus douloureux que les lèvres humaines
puissent prononcer. Trop tard pour être heureuses elles-mêmes, trop
tard pour rendre heureux ceux qu’elles aimaient, trop tard pour
réparer les ravages qu’elles ont produits, trop tard pour redonner la
vie…
CHAPITRE III
ÉGALITÉ
L’œil ne peut pas dire à la main : je n’ai pas

besoin de toi, ni la tête dire aux pieds : je n’ai pas
besoin de vous.
Saint Paul.
Parmi les faiseurs de peines, il faut placer au premier rang les

utopistes généreux et fous qui ont jeté dans le monde le mot
d’égalité. Ce mot, qui répond au besoin de justice qui tourmente les
consciences modernes, a séduit les âmes ; pourtant jamais mot n’a
contribué davantage à détruire la paix des cœurs en éveillant en eux
d’irréalisables aspirations. Une partie du malaise qui trouble la
société actuelle en procède directement, car donner pour but aux
hommes l’égalité, c’est les placer en face d’une chimère
éternellement fuyante.
Sur quoi se basent, en effet, les espérances égalitaires qui
aujourd’hui soulèvent les foules ? Où que nous regardions, l’inégalité
règne partout : dans les œuvres de la nature, les formations
humaines, les infinies variétés psychologiques des individus. Depuis
le commencement des siècles jusqu’à maintenant, sous aucune
forme, l’égalité n’apparaît dans le monde ; preuve que d’immuables
lois s’y opposent. Les religions s’en sont si nettement rendu compte
qu’elles ne l’ont jamais proclamée, même au point de vue spécial de
la situation de la créature vis-à-vis du créateur.
Le christianisme lui-même, tout en proclamant que tous les
hommes sont enfants de Dieu, contredit absolument, par la doctrine
des appelés et des élus, le principe égalitaire. Pour nous en tenir à
la religion de l’Occident, il résulte de l’ancien et du nouveau

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Routledge Handbook of Contemporary

African Migration 1st Edition Daniel

Routledge Handbook of Contemporary India, 2nd Edition

The Routledge Handbook of African Demography 1st

The Routledge International Handbook of Global

Routledge International Handbook of Contemporary Social

Contemporary African Cinema 1st Edition Olivier Barlet

The Routledge Handbook of Contemporary Inequalities and

Africanizing African Legal Ethics Routledge Studies in

The Making of Contemporary Indian Philosophy 1st

This handbook provides an authoritative multidisciplinary overview of contemporary African

• What drives contemporary migration in Africa?

The handbook is a valuable resource for practitioners, politicians, researchers, university

Daniel Makina is a Professor of Economic Sciences at the University of South Africa. He

Dominic Pasura is a Senior Lecturer in Sociology at the University of Glasgow, UK. He

Edited by Daniel Makina and Dominic Pasura

List of Figures viii

1 Contemporary African Migration: An Introduction 1

2 Migration as Empowerment: A Selected History of Migration and

3 Postcolonial States and Migration 38

4 African Philosophy and International Migration 52

5 Patterns and Trends of International Migration within and Out of Africa 79

6 Issues, Patterns, and Trends in Contemporary African Migration to Europe

7 The Contemporary “African Coolie” in the Middle East: Interrogating the

8 Lesotho–South Africa Relations: A Case for Free Movement of Persons

9 Migration Policy Frameworks in Africa 153

10 Refugee Politics in Africa 170

11 Contemporary Forced Migration in Africa 182

12 Migrating Out of Migration: Diminishing Seasonal Migration Options and

13 The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on African Migration 210

14 The Remittances–Development Debate in Africa 231

15 Return Migration to Africa and Its Development Potential 246

16 Reconsidering the Concept of International Return in the

17 The Nature and “Lived” Experiences of Contemporary African Diasporas 286

18 The Landscape of the African Diaspora 296

19 Engendering Migration in Africa: The Case of Ethiopian Migration to

20 Africa without Borders 329

22 Climate Variability and New Fish Eldorados In Africa 374

23 Migration Data Management in Africa 389

24 The Future of Immigration in Africa 407

5.1 Number of International Migrants, by World Bank Income Group at

4.1 Prominent African Philosophers 60

Adolf Awuku Bekoe is a licensed Clinical Psychologist and a Lecturer at Methodist

Margaret Rutendo Magwedere is an early career researcher and a post-doctoral fellow

Chris C. Opesen is a member of the International Union of Anthropological and Ethnological

Daniel Osarfo is a Development Economist and a Postdoctoral Research Fellow at the

Sabastiano Rwengabo is a Ugandan Political Scientist and Consultant in Fragility and

Dominic Pasura and Daniel Makina

Second, to comprehend contemporary African migration, it is necessary to thoroughly

De-Centring Eurocentrism in Migration Studies

How do we address Eurocentrism in migration studies? Post-colonial, decolonial, and/

Slavery, Imperialism, Colonialism, and Contemporary Migration

Racialised and Globalised Capitalism

African Post-Colonial States

Human Agency of Africans

diasporas represent a form of “globalisation from below” in which “small” players, as

Part I – History of African Migration

Part II – Patterns and Trends of Contemporary African Migration

Adeyanju and Olatunji explore the complex contemporary migrations of Africans to

Part III – Migration Governance, Forced

Part IV – Migration, Diaspora Engagement,

Part V – Future Trajectories of African Migration

captains”) have emigrated or become passeurs (conveyors of clandestine migrants) towards

List of Figures viii

1 Contemporary African Migration: An Introduction 1

3 Postcolonial States and Migration 38

4 African Philosophy and International Migration 52

5 Patterns and Trends of International Migration within and Out of Africa 79

9 Migration Policy Frameworks in Africa 153

10 Refugee Politics in Africa 170

11 Contemporary Forced Migration in Africa 182

12 Migrating Out of Migration: Diminishing Seasonal Migration Options and

13 The Impact of the COVID-19 Pandemic on African Migration 210

14 The Remittances–Development Debate in Africa 231

15 Return Migration to Africa and Its Development Potential 246

16 Reconsidering the Concept of International Return in the

17 The Nature and “Lived” Experiences of Contemporary African Diasporas 286

18 The Landscape of the African Diaspora 296

19 Engendering Migration in Africa: The Case of Ethiopian Migration to

20 Africa without Borders 329

22 Climate Variability and New Fish Eldorados In Africa 374

23 Migration Data Management in Africa 389

24 The Future of Immigration in Africa 407

4.1 Prominent African Philosophers 60