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 ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK
OF THE CHINESE
COMMUNIST PARTY

Whilst the Chinese Communist Party is one of the most powerful political
institutions in the world, it is also one of the least understood, due to the
party’s secrecy and tight control over the archives, the press and the
Internet. Having governed the People’s Republic of China for nearly 70
years though, much interest remains in how this quintessentially Leninist
party governs one-fifth of the world and runs the world’s second-largest
economy.
The Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party gives a
comprehensive and multi-faceted picture of the party’s traditions and values
– as well as its efforts to stay relevant in the twenty-first century. It uses a
wealth of contemporary data and qualitative analysis to explore the
intriguing relationship between the party on the one hand, and the
government, the legal and judicial establishment and the armed forces, on
the other. Tracing the influence of Marx, Engels, Lenin and Stalin, as well
as Mao Zedong, on contemporary leaders ranging from Deng Xiaoping and
Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, the sections cover:

• the party’s history and traditions;

• how the party works and seeks to remain relevant;
• major policy arenas;
• the CCP in the twenty-first century.
The Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party will be of
interest to students and scholars of Chinese Politics, Asian Politics, Political
Parties and International Relations.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam is Adjunct Professor at the Centre for China Studies
and the Department of History at the Chinese University of Hong Kong.
Up-to-date analyses, encyclopedic in scope, by some of the world’s leading
authorities.
Perry Link, University of California Riverside

The Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party is an invaluable

resource for anyone who wants to understand how China is governed and
how its political system has evolved over the past seven decades. Willy Wo-
Lap Lam has assembled an unrivalled group of China scholars and
produced one of the most illuminating volumes on contemporary China.
Minxin Pei, Claremont McKenna College

In this edited collection, veteran China specialist Willy Lam has assembled
a diverse group of authors who dissect the various elements and instruments
in CCP rule. The section on “how the party works” is particularly valuable.
All China watchers will find value in this volume.
David Shambaugh, George Washington University

As usual, the deeply perceptive Willy Lam provides what is almost

certainly the best guide to the current tate of China, the problems with
which her leaders mustgrapple most importantly.
Arthur Waldron, University of Pennsylvania
ROUTLEDGE HANDBOOK OF
THE
CHINESE COMMUNIST PARTY

Edited by Willy Wo-Lap Lam

 First published 2018
by Routledge
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 selection and editorial matter, Willy Wo-Lap Lam; individual chapters, the
contributors
The right of Willy Wo-Lap Lam to be identified as the author of the editorial matter, and of
the authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in accordance with sections 77
and 78 of the Copyright, Designs and Patents Act 1988.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reprinted or reproduced or utilised in any
form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other means, now known or hereafter invented,
including photocopying and recording, or in any information storage or retrieval system,
without permission in writing from the publishers.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-138-68443-0 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-315-54391-8 (ebk)
Typeset in Bembo
by Wearset Ltd, Boldon, Tyne and Wear
For Grace, Ching-Wen and Wen-Chung
 CONTENTS

List of illustrations
Notes on contributors
Preface
List of acronyms

PART I
Overview and introduction

1 The agenda of Xi Jinping: is the Chinese Communist Party capable of

thorough reforms?
Willy Wo-Lap Lam

PART II
History and traditions

2 The legacy of Mao Zedong

Yiu-Chung Wong and Willy Wo-Lap Lam

3 The CCP’s exploitation of Confucianism and Legalism

Delia Lin

4 The CCP’s use and abuse of nationalism

Edward Friedman
PART III
How the Party works and stays relevant

5 The Party runs the show: how the CCP controls the state and towers
over the government, legislature and judiciary
Jean-Pierre Cabestan

6 The role of Party congresses

Guoguang Wu

7 The PLA as the lifeline of the Party

Ka Po Ng

8 Factional politics in the Party-state apparatus

Bo Zhiyue

9 Evolution of the Party since 1976: ideological and functional adoptions

Joseph Yu-shek Cheng

10 The CCP’s meritocratic cadre system

Akio Takahara

11 “The new (old) normal”: the CCP propaganda system under Jiang, Hu,
and Xi
Anne-Marie Brady

PART IV
Major policy arenas

12 How the party-state runs the economy: a model of elite decision-

making in the financial market
Victor Shih

13 Implementing tax reform and rural reconstruction in China: a case

study of the CCP’s agrarian policy
Chiew-Siang Bryan Ho
14 The Party’s policy toward labor
Bill Taylor

15 Reform, repression, co-optation: the CCP’s policy toward intellectuals

Jean-Philippe Béja

16 The Party and the law

Eva Pils

17 Two steps forward, one backward: the CCP’s policy toward women
Marina Thorborg

18 Public policy and LGBT people and activism in mainland China

Elaine Jeffreys

19 The CCP’s Tibet policy: stability through coercion and development

Tsering Topgyal

20 The party-state’s nationalist strategy to control the Uyghur: silenced

voices
Dru C. Gladney

PART V
The CCP in the twenty-first century

21 The future of the Chinese Communist Party

Kerry Brown and Konstantinos Tsimonis

22 Changing patterns of Chinese civil society: comparing the Hu-Wen

and Xi Jinping eras
Chloé Froissart

23 Can the Internet and social media change the Party?

David Bandurski

24 China and the world: from the Chinese Dream to the Chinese World
Order
Simon Shen
Index
 ILLUSTRATIONS

Figures
3.1 The number of articles containing rujia, ruxue or guoxue as the
keyword in People’s Daily (2000–2015)
3.2 The percentage of articles on Confucianism on the Chinese classics
page in Guangming Daily (2013–2016)
3.3 The number of articles containing wenhua zixin as the keyword in
People’s Daily (2000–2015)
12.1 Financial policy process

Tables
6.1 Terms of the National Party Congress, from irregularity to regularity
6.2 The 18th National Party Congress (2012) at a glance
6.3 Instability of congressional-elected provincial party leaderships,
2011–2016
12.1 Main consumers of financial policies
12.2 Producer agencies
19.1 Tibetan cadres in TAR
 CONTRIBUTORS

Editor
Willy Wo-Lap Lam is an Adjunct Professor at the History Department and
the Center for China Studies, Chinese University of Hong Kong. He is a
Senior Fellow at Jamestown Foundation, Washington, DC. Dr Lam
specializes in elite politics, China’s economic and political reforms, and
Chinese diplomacy. He is the author of seven books on China, including
Chinese Politics in the Hu Jintao Era: New Leaders, New Challenges
(Routledge, 2006) and Chinese Politics in the Era of Xi Jinping:
Renaissance, Reform or Retrogression? (Routledge, 2015). His books have
been translated into Chinese and Japanese.
 Chapter authors
David Bandurski is Editor of the China Media Project research website at
the University of Hong Kong, where he is Honorary Lecturer at the
Journalism and Media Studies Centre. A frequent commentator on Chinese
media and current affairs, his writings have appeared in the New York
Times, the Wall Street Journal, ChinaFile, Index on Censorship, the Far
Eastern Economic Review and other publications. He is the author of
Dragons in Diamond Village (Melville House, 2016), a work of non-fiction
on urban villages in China, and co-author of Investigative Journalism in
China (Hong Kong University Press, 2010).

Jean-Philippe Béja is Senior Research-Fellow Emeritus, Centre National de

la Recherche Scientifique (CNRS), CERI-Sciences-Po, Paris. Dr. Béja’s
research areas cover ideological and political reforms in China, including
the plight of intellectuals. He is the author of A la recherche d’une ombre
chinoise: Le mouvement pour la démocratie en Chine, 1919–2004
(Gallimard, 2004). He is also the editor, with Fu Hualing and Eva Pils, of
Liu Xiaobo, Charter 08 and the Challenges of Political Reform in China
(Hong Kong University Press, 2012).

Bo Zhiyue has written widely on China’s elite politics and policy-making.

He is the Founder and President of the Bo Zhiyue China Institute, a China-
focused consulting firm. Dr. Bo has taught at Peking University, Roosevelt
University, the University of Chicago, American University, St. John Fisher
College, Tarleton State University, the Chinese University of Hong Kong,
National University of Singapore and Victoria University of Wellington. He
obtained his Bachelor of Law and Master of Law in International Politics
from Peking University and his Ph.D. in Political Science from the
University of Chicago. His research interests include China’s elite politics,
Chinese provincial leaders, central-local relations, cross-strait relations,
Sino-US relations and international relations. He is the author of nine books
(published by World Scientific), including Chinese Provincial Leaders:
Economic Performance and Political Mobility since 1949 (2002), China’s
Elite Politics: Political Transition and Power Balancing (2007) and China’s
Elite Politics: Governance and Democratization (2010). His most recent
books are China–US Relations in a Global Perspective (Victoria University
Press, 2016) (edited) and China’s Political Dynamics under Xi Jinping
(World Scientific, 2017).

Anne-Marie Brady is Professor in Political Science at the University of

Canterbury, a Global Fellow at the Woodrow Wilson Center in Washington,
DC and a Senior Fellow at the China Policy Institute at the University of
Nottingham. A highly regarded specialist on Chinese politics as well as
polar politics, she is Editor-in-Chief of The Polar Journal, and the author of
nine books including Making the Foreign Serve China: Managing
Foreigners in the People’s Republic (Rowman & Littlefield, 2003),
Marketing Dictatorship: Propaganda and Thought Work in Contemporary
China (Rowman & Littlefield, 2008) and her most recent book China as a
Polar Great Power (Cambridge University Press, 2017).

Kerry Brown is Professor of Chinese Studies and Director of the Lau China
Institute at King’s College London, and an Associate Fellow on the Asia
Programme at Chatham House. His main interests are the modern history of
China, the politics and leadership of the Communist Party and China’s
political economy and international relations. He is the author of over 13
books on China, the most recent of which are CEO China: The Rise of Xi
Jinping (I.B. Tauris, 2016), China and the New Maoists (Zed Books, 2016,
with Simone Van Neuwenhuizen) and China’s World (a study of China’s
international relations, forthcoming).

Jean-Pierre Cabestan is Professor and Head, Department of Government

and International Studies at Hong Kong Baptist University. He is also an
associate researcher at the Asia Centre, Paris and at the French Centre for
Research on Contemporary China, Hong Kong. His main themes of
research are Chinese politics and law, China’s foreign and security policies,
China–Taiwan relations and Taiwanese politics. His most recent
publications include Le système politique chinois. Un nouvel équilibre
autoritaire [The Chinese Political System: A New Authoritarian
Equilibrium] (Presses de Sciences Po, 2014) and Political Changes in
Taiwan Under Ma Ying-jeou: Partisan Conflict, Policy Choices, External
Constraints and Security Challenges (Routledge, 2014, co-edited with
Jacques deLisle).

Joseph Yu-shek Cheng is retired Professor of Political Science and former

Coordinator of the Contemporary China Research Project, City University
of Hong Kong. He is the founding editor of the Hong Kong Journal of
Social Sciences and the Journal of Comparative Asian Development. He
has published widely on the political development in China and Hong
Kong, Chinese foreign policy and local government in southern China.
Volumes on China he has recently completed include China’s Japan Policy:
Adjusting to New Challenges (World Scientific, 2015) and China’s Foreign
Policy: Challenges and Prospects (World Scientific, 2016). He served as the
Convener of the Alliance for True Democracy in Hong Kong in 2013–14.

Edward Friedman is Professor Emeritus in the Political Science Department

at the University of Wisconsin where he teaches about Chinese foreign
policy. Since 1965, he has worked on and off for various branches of the US
Government on PRC foreign policy. His books dealing with Chinese
foreign policy include America’s Asia (Pantheon, 1969), Taiwan and
American Policy (Praeger, 1971), The Politics of Democratization:
Generalizing East Asian Experiences (Westview, 1994), National Identity
and Democratic Prospects in Socialist China (M.E. Sharpe, 1995), What If
China Doesn’t Democratize? Implications for War and Peace (M.E. Sharpe,
2000), China’s Rise, Taiwan’s Dilemmas and International Peace
(Routledge, 2005), Asia’s Giants: Comparing China and India (Palgrave,
2005), Regional Cooperation and Its Enemies in Northeast Asia (Routledge,
2006) and Political Transitions in Dominant Party Systems (Routledge,
2008).

Chloé Froissart is Director of Tsinghua University Sino-French Centre in

Social Sciences in Beijing, Senior Researcher in Political Sociology at the
French Centre for Research on Contemporary China (CEFC) in Hong Kong
and Associate Professor at the University of Rennes 2 (France). She studied
Chinese and Chinese Studies at the Institut National des Langues et
Civilisations Etrangères (INALCO, Paris) as well as Political Science at
Paris Institute of Political Sciences, where she received her Ph.D. in 2007.
Dr. Froissart has taught at various institutions, such as INALCO, Paris
Institute of Political Sciences and the School for Higher Studies in Social
Sciences (Paris). Her research interests focus on the development of civil
society in China, citizenship and political participation, especially in the
fields of labor and environmental politics. She is the author of La Chine et
ses migrants: La conquête d’une citoyenneté (Presses Universitaires de
Rennes, 2013). She has written numerous articles on the development of
civil society in authoritarian regimes, social protest movements and the rule
of law. She sits on the editorial boards of China Perspectives and Critique
Internationale. Aside from her scientific research, Dr. Froissart has been
involved in advisory work for several governmental and non-governmental
bodies and she has testified before the US Congressional Executive
Commission on China.

Dru C. Gladney is Professor of Anthropology at Pomona College in

Claremont, California. He is the author of Muslim Chinese: Ethnic
Nationalism in the People’s Republic (Harvard University Press, 1996),
Ethnic Identity in China: The Making of a Muslim Minority Nationality
(Cengage, 1998) and Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan,
China, Korea, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey, and the U.S. (editor, Stanford
University Press, 1998). His most recent book is Dislocating China:
Muslims, Minorities, and Other Sub-Altern Subjects (University of Chicago
Press, 2004).

Chiew-Siang Bryan Ho teaches in the Government and Public

Administration Department at the University of Macau. His research
interests include electoral participation and the legitimation of power in
rural China as well as issues relating to governance, political participation,
democratization, public management and policy studies in Chinese states
and societies. His publications (English and Chinese) include a book on
Policy Implementation in Rural China (co-authored with Bolong Liu and
Qianwei Zhu in Chinese, Fudan University Press, 2011) and book chapters
as well as journal articles on electoral participation in rural China, political
culture, social movement and governability in Macao, and governance and
development in Singapore, Hong Kong and Macao. His papers have
appeared in the Journal of Chinese Political Science, the Journal of
Comparative Asian Development, Asian Affairs: An American Review and
Asian Education and Development Studies. He is currently working on a
research project on state collaboration and policy implementation in China
and Singapore.

Elaine Jeffreys is Professor in the School of International Studies, Faculty

of Arts and Social Sciences, University of Technology Sydney. She is the
author of China, Sex and Prostitution (Routledge, 2004), Prostitution
Scandals in China: Policing, Media and Society (Routledge, 2012) and Sex
in China, with Haiqing Yu (Polity, 2015). She is the editor of Sex and
Sexuality in China (Routledge, 2006), China’s Governmentalities:
Governing Change, Changing Government (Routledge, 2009), Celebrity in
China, with Louise Edwards (Hong Kong University Press, 2010),
Celebrity Philanthropy, with Paul Allatson (University of Chicago Press,
2015) and New Mentalities of Government in China, with David Bray
(Routledge, 2016).

Delia Lin gained her Ph.D. in Humanities (Political Culture) from Griffith
University, Australia. She lectures in the School of Social Sciences at the
University of Adelaide. Her research interests include political thought,
governance, ideology and discourse. Her monograph Civilising Citizens in
Post-Mao China: Understanding the Rhetoric of Suzhi (Routledge, 2017) is
the first book to provide an in-depth study of the dominant discourse of
suzhi – a term that denotes the idea of cultivating a “quality” citizenship –
and its relevance to governance and Chinese society.

Ka Po Ng has a Ph.D. from the University of Queensland and is a professor

at the University of Niigata Prefecture, where he teaches both postgraduate
and undergraduate courses on security studies, international relations theory
and Chinese politics. He has published books and articles on relevant
subjects. One of his latest publications is a book chapter on Chinese
military politics under the Xi Jinping leadership. He is currently working on
a project about the security dimensions of China’s relations with Japan.

Eva Pils is Reader in Transnational Law at The Dickson Poon School of

Law at King’s College London. She studied law, philosophy and sinology in
Heidelberg, London and Beijing and holds a Ph.D. in Law from University
College London. Her scholarship focuses on human rights, authoritarianism
and law in China. She has written on these topics in both academic
publications and the popular press, and is author of China’s Human Rights
Lawyers: Advocacy and Resistance (Routledge, 2014) and of Human
Rights in China: A Social Practice in the Shadows of Authoritarianism
(forthcoming). Before joining King’s, she was an associate professor at The
Chinese University of Hong Kong Faculty of Law. She is a Non-resident
Senior Research Fellow at the US–Asia Law Institute of New York
University Law School, an external member of the Chinese University of
Hong Kong Centre for Social Innovation Studies, an external fellow of the
Bingham Centre for the Rule of Law, and a legal action committee member
of the Global Legal Action Network. In April 2017, she became a Visiting
Professor of Law at Columbia Law School.

Simon Shen is an Associate Professor of the Faculty of Social Science,

Chinese University of Hong Kong, serving as its Director of Global Studies
Programme, Director of Master of Global Political Economy Programme
and Co-Director of International Affairs Research Institute. He is a
prominent international relations commentator, serving as the Lead Writer
(Glocal) of the Hong Kong Economic Journal and has contributed to media
all over the world. In Hong Kong he has served in various government
consultation committees and founded several think tanks that have close
interaction with the government, academia and civil society. His research
interests include China–US relations, Chinese nationalism, and regional
security and external relations of Hong Kong, among others. He has worked
as visiting fellows at Brookings Institution, Warwick University, East-West
Center and Rikkyo University. His latest publications include
Deconstructing the Chinese Dream (Chinese University of Hong Kong
Press, 2015) and Hong Kong in the World: Implications to Geopolitics and
Competitiveness (World Scientific, 2016).

Victor Shih is a political economist at the University of California at San

Diego specializing in China. Dr. Shih received his doctorate in Government
from Harvard University. He is the author of Factions and Finance in China:
Elite Conflict and Inflation (Cambridge University Press, 2009), which is
the first book to inquire about the linkages between elite politics and
banking policies in China. He is also the author of numerous articles
appearing in academic and business journals, including The American
Political Science Review, The China Quarterly, Comparative Political
Studies, Journal of Politics, The Wall Street Journal and The China
Business Review, and frequent adviser to the financial community. Dr. Shih
holds a BA from the George Washington University, where he studied on a
University Presidential Fellowship and graduated summa cum laude in East
Asian studies with a minor in Economics. His current research concerns
coalition composition under Mao and Deng. Dr. Shih also has ongoing
research projects on quantitative measurements of factions and the impact
of factions on elite promotions, rent-seeking activities and the growth of the
private sector.

Akio Takahara is Professor of Contemporary Chinese Politics at the

Graduate School of Law and Politics and Vice-Dean of the Graduate School
of Public Policy, the University of Tokyo. He received his D.Phil in 1988
from the University of Sussex, and later spent several years as Visiting
Scholar at the Consulate-General of Japan in Hong Kong (1989–91), the
Japanese Embassy in Beijing (1996–98), the Fairbank Center for East Asian
Research, Harvard University (2005–06), the School of International
Studies, Peking University (2014–15) and the Mercator Institute for China
Studies, Berlin (January 2016). He also served as a Member of the
Governing Body of the Institute of Development Studies, UK (1999–2003),
and as the Secretary General of the New Japan-China Friendship 21st
Century Committee (2009–14). He currently serves as a senior researcher of
the Tokyo Foundation, senior adjunct fellow of the Japan Institute of
International Affairs and a senior researcher of the Japan International
Forum. His publications include: The Politics of Wage Policy in Post-
Revolutionary China (Macmillan, 1992); New Developments in East Asian
Security (Akashi Shoten, 2005, co-editor, in Japanese); Beyond the
Borders: Contemporary Asian Studies Volume One (Keio University Press,
2008, co-editor, in Japanese); The History of Japan–China Relations 1972–
2012: Volume 1: Politics (University of Tokyo Press, 2012, co-editor, in
Japanese); To the Era of Developmentalism, 1972–2014, Series on China’s
Modern History, Volume 5 (Iwanami Shoten, 2014, co-author, in Japanese)
and Japan–China Relations in the Modern Era (Routledge, 2017, co-
author).

Bill Taylor is Associate Professor at the Department of Public Policy, City

University of Hong Kong. His areas of research interest include labor and
employment issues, mostly focused on China and covering the management
of labor, collective organizations and, recently, CSR. Dr. Taylor is also
active in the area of collective human rights. He is the author, with Bill
Chang Kai and Li Qi, of Industrial Relations in China (Edward Elgar,
2003).

Marina Thorborg is Professor of Economic History at Södertörn University,

Sweden, former China Research Associate at the Nordic Institute of Asian
Studies, Copenhagen University, Dean and Director of The Gender
Research Institute at Lund University and Associate Professor of Political
Science at Aarhus University. Her areas of speciality include the Chinese
labor market, employment, development, gender policies and international
and East European development. She is the author of numerous books and
papers on the issue of labor market, development and gender policies in
particularly China, East Asia and Eastern Europe. Her recent publications
include “Where Have All the Young Girls Gone? Fatal Discrimination of
Daughters – A Regional Comparison,” China Perspectives, No. 57, 2005;
“Chinese Workers and Labour Conditions from State Industry to Globalized
Factories: How to Stop the Race to the Bottom?” in M. Mehlman, M.
Soffritti, P. Landrigan and E. Bingham (eds.) Living in a Chemical World:
Framing the Future in the Light of the Past (New York Academy of
Sciences, 2006); Kvinnor i Kina: pirater, järnflickor och finanslejon
[Women in China: Pirates, Iron-girls, and Financial Wizards] (Bokförlaget
Atlantis, 2014); and “From White Elephants to Flying Geese: China in
Africa, A New Model for Development or More of the Same,” in Young-
Chan Kim (ed.) China and Africa: A New Paradigm of Global Business
(Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

Tsering Topgyal is Lecturer in International Relations, Department of

Political Science and International Studies, University of Birmingham. His
research interests encompass Tibet, Chinese foreign and security policy, and
the international politics of the Indo-Pacific region. A selection of Dr.
Topgyal’s most recent publications include: “The Tibetan Self-Immolations
as Counter-Securitization: An Inter-Unit Theory of Securitization,” Asian
Security, 12:3, 2016: 166–187; China and Tibet: The Perils of Insecurity
(Hurst, 2016); and “South Asian Responses to the Rise of China: Indian and
Nepalese Handling of the Tibet Issue,” in Michael Clarke and Doug Stokes
(eds.) China’s Frontier Regions (I.B. Tauris, 2016).
Konstantinos Tsimonis completed his Ph.D. at the School of Oriental and
African Studies (SOAS), where he taught classes on Chinese politics for
two years. He is Lecturer in Chinese Society, Lau China Institute, King’s
College London. His research, conference papers and publications
concentrate on the adaptation of Chinese mass organizations and on the
PRC’s engagement with international and regional anti-corruption regimes.
He is currently working on a manuscript on the Communist Youth League
and China’s youth.

Yiu-Chung Wong is Professor in the Department of Political Science at

Lingnan University, Hong Kong. He graduated from the Chinese University
of Hong Kong and gained his doctoral degree from the Department of
Government, University of Queensland. His research areas include China’s
political reform, Hong Kong democratic transition, cross-strait relations and
Greater China. He is author of From Deng Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin: Two
Decades of Political Reform in the People’s Republic of China (Rowman &
Littlefield, 2005) and editor of One Country, Two Systems in Crisis: Hong
Kong’s Transformation Since the Handover (Rowman & Littlefield, 2004).
He has also edited four volumes of articles on the politics and foreign
policies of the People’s Republic of China. His latest paper is “Civil
Disobedience Movement in Hong Kong: A Civil Society Perspective” (co-
author with Jason K.H. Chan), forthcoming in Asian Education and
Development Studies.

Guoguang Wu is Professor of Political Science, Professor of History and

Chair in China and Asia-Pacific Relations at the University of Victoria,
Canada. His research interests follow two tracks: political institutions in
China and the political economy of capitalism. He is author of four books,
including China’s Party Congress: Power, Legitimacy, and Institutional
Manipulation (Cambridge University Press, 2015) and Globalization
Against Democracy: A Political Economy of Capitalism after its Global
Triumph (Cambridge University Press, 2017).
 PREFACE

A Taiwan poet and fellow fan of T.S. Eliot has turned his famous “History
is now and England” into “History is now and China.” This comprehensive
anthology, which analyzes and assesses different aspects of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP), is being published on the eve of its 19th National
Congress, which is due to endorse Party General Secretary and State
President Xi Jinping as China’s supreme leader for the early twenty-first
century. This timely book is written by 25 China experts who have delved
into the CCP’s history and traditions; the party’s secretive organization and
its strategy for monopolizing power; its policies in various political,
economic, social and cultural sectors; and possible paths for the party’s
evolution in the coming one to two decades. Readers will be well equipped
to make their own judgment on not only major events such as party
congresses and Central Committee plenums but also the ideology, policies
and decision-making processes of strongman Xi and his fast-developing Xi
Jinping Faction.
While the Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist Party is
primarily about domestic issues, it will also throw light on “core leader”
Xi’s overarching nationalistic ambitions, particularly his “Chinese dream”
mantra of global power projection. Early interactions between Xi and
United States President Donald Trump have demonstrated China’s
expanding role in setting global agendas and tackling flashpoints in regions
ranging from the Middle East to the Asia-Pacific.
Yet as the Chinese saying goes, “a poor country can’t do much in foreign
affairs.” As the world’s second biggest economy and largest trading
country, China is flaunting its wealth by offering economic aid to and
forgiving the debts of dozens of developing countries. Yet the party-state
apparatus suffers from what reformist intellectuals call a “poverty of
philosophy,” namely, failure to consider goals and objectives that could
vitiate the CCP’s hold on power. Chapters in this book that appraise the
CCP’s political and socio-economic policies – especially the party’s refusal
to pick up the threads of political and economic reforms – show up the
increasingly obvious chinks in the armor of the vaunted “China model.”
The overriding obsession of Xi and his colleagues appears to be grabbing
power for themselves – and ensuring the CCP’s “perennial ruling party”
status. Even as the party’s multi-billion dollar quasi-police state apparatus
seems capable of reining in muck-racking journalists, social-media
bloggers, liberal intellectuals and NGO activists, China’s capacity for
innovation in economic and technological sectors as well as the art of
governance is found wanting.
Xi’s answer to the question of China’s repeated failure to comply with
international norms, including United Nations covenants on civil rights to
which it has acceded, is that values such as universal-suffrage elections and
freedom of expression are “Western” ideas that are alien to the Chinese
tradition. “Whether a pair of shoes fits only the feet can tell,” Xi likes to
say. Chapters in this Handbook on the well-being of groups ranging from
workers and peasants to ethnic minorities such as Tibetans and Uyghurs,
however, show that at the very least, a) these disadvantaged classes are not
given their rightful share of the economic pie and b) they have few channels
to air their grievances let alone press for changes in the authoritarian
political and economic system.
Even without getting into arguments about the relative merits of the
“China model” versus globally recognized democratic development –
which has been attained in numerous countries in Asia – we can reference
Francis Fukuyama and Chris Patten’s view that China suffers from the lack
of simple “good governance.” A party-state apparatus that values its own
survival – and the perpetuation of the special privileges of the “red
aristocracy” – above all else will continue to command the world’s attention
thanks to the country’s quasi-superpower status. Yet the only way that
China can get back on what former president Bill Clinton called “the right
side of history” is to embrace universal-style economic and political
reforms and to halt the alarming regression to Maoism that President Xi is
championing. The last section of this book, which contains chapters
mapping the future development of the party and country, offers scenarios
for the CPP’s trajectory into the 2020s and 2030s. They include possibilities
that the party-state apparatus might be forced to adopt meaningful reforms
owing to factors such as growing pressure put to bear on the authorities by
disaffected classes within the country as well as China’s enhanced
interactions with the global community. The prospect also exists that the
CCP might implode due to intensifying factional strife triggered by
cataclysmic mishaps in domestic or foreign-policy arenas.
It is this editor’s conviction that the insights and analytic tools provided
by the veteran Sinologists who wrote this book’s 24 chapters will enable
readers to make well-informed assessment of the CCP’s intriguing and fast-
paced evolution. The China story will likely dominate the headlines for a
long time to come.

Willy Wo-Lap Lam

 ACRONYMS

ACFTU All-China Federation of Trade Unions

ACWF All-China Women’s Federation
AIIB Asia Infrastructure Investment Bank
APEC Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation
ASEAN Association of Southeast Asian Nations
BNSC Building a new socialist countryside
CAC Cyberspace Administration of China
CAS Chinese Academy of Sciences
CASS Chinese Academy of Social Sciences
CAT Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment
CBRC China Banking Regulatory Commission
CC Central Committee
CCDI Central Commission for Discipline Inspection
CCP Chinese Communist Party
CCTV China Central Television
CEDAW Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against
Women
CERD Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
CFWC Central Finance Work Committee
CICA Conference on Interaction and Confidence-Building Measures in Asia
CIRC China Insurance Regulatory Commission
CLB China Labor Bulletin
CLGCA Central Leading Group for Cyberspace Affairs
CLGCDR Central Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms
CLGCI Central Leading Group for Cybersecurity and Informatization
CLGFA Central Leading Group for Foreign Affairs
CLGFE Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics
CLGPIW Central Leading Group for Propaganda and Ideology Work
CLGs Central Leading Groups
CMC Central Military Commission
CMR Civil–Military Relations
CNSC Central National Security Commission
COD Central Organization Department
CPLC Central Politics and Law Commission
CPPCC Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference
CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child
CRPD Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities
CSRC China Securities Regulatory Commission
CYL Communist Youth League
CYLF Communist Youth League Faction
FTZ Free Trade Zone
FYP Five-Year Plan
GDP Gross Domestic Product
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
ICESCR International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights
KMT Kuomintang (Guomindang)
LGBT Lesbian, gay, bisexual and transgender
LGFV Local government financing vehicle
MOC Ministry of Commerce
MOF Ministry of Finance
MOFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MPS Ministry of Public Security
MSS Ministry of State Security
NDRC National Development and Reform Commission
NPC National People’s Congress
OBOR One Belt One Road
PAP People’s Armed Police
PBOC People’s Bank of China
PBSC Politburo Standing Committee
PLA People’s Liberation Army
PRC People’s Republic of China
QDII Qualified Domestic Institutional Investor
QFII Qualified Foreign Institutional Investor
RMB Renminbi
RTFR Rural Tax-for-fee Reform
SAPPRFT State Administration of Press, Publication, Radio, Film and Television
SAR Special Administration Region
SASAC State Assets Supervision and Administration Commission
SC State Council
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SOE State-owned Enterprise
TAR Tibet Autonomous Region
VPN Virtual Private Network
WHO World Health Organization
WTO World Trade Organization
XUAR Xinjiang Uyghur Autonomous Region
 PART I

Overview and introduction

 1
THE AGENDA OF XI JINPING
Is the Chinese Communist Party capable of
thorough reforms?
Willy Wo-Lap Lam

Introduction: China’s authoritarianism goes global

Despite the virtual end of the “Chinese economic miracle,” China’s global
footprint has increased by leaps and bounds since Fifth-Generation leader
Xi Jinping took over the helm of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) in
2012. The Chinese economy accounts for more than 25 percent of total
global growth. The People’s Republic of China (PRC) is the largest
contributor of troops to United Nations-mandated peacekeeping missions.
China is a major player in global forums such as the G20 and the Asia-
Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC). More significantly, Chinese
outbound direct investment (ODI) has since 2015 exceeded inward capital
flow – to the extent that “China buys the world” has become the rallying
cry of PRC multinationals snapping up oilfields, farms and hi-tech firms
around the world (China Daily 2016; Reuters 2016a). President Xi’s “One
Belt One Road” gameplan is a bold attempt to bond China with dozens of
countries in Asia, Central Asia, Europe and Africa via infrastructure
projects such as bridges, ports and high-speed railways, many of which are
financed by Chinese banks and corporations. This is despite worries that
with the country’s shrinking foreign exchange reserves – and the CCP
administration’s fears about uncontrolled capital outflow – Beijing’s ability
to buy influence or project power through means such as ODI and
bankrolling infrastructure projects could soon run into serious hiccups
(CNBC.com 2017; Xinhua News Agency 2017a).1
While President Xi and his Politburo colleagues have emphasized that
Beijing has no intention of challenging the international order laid down
largely by the United States after WWII, it seems evident that the CCP
leadership is exploiting weak links in the status quo so as to lay down its
own rules. The protectionist and nationalistic posture of the Donald Trump
administration has provided President Xi with an opening to boost China’s
rule-making potentials in the global arena. At an early 2017 speech at the
World Economic Forum in Davos, Xi criticized unnamed world leaders for
“locking oneself in a dark room.” The supreme leader of one-fifth of
mankind reassured WEF delegates that China “will keep its door wide open
and not close it.” In a veiled reference to Trump’s decision to renege on
America’s commitment to fighting global problems such as climate change,
Xi pledged to redouble China’s efforts to cut carbon emissions, saying that
this was “a responsibility we must assume for future generations” (Reuters
2017; Xinhua News Agency 2017b).
Apart from the OBOR, Beijing is behind the establishment of the Asian
Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) and the BRICs Bank, on which the
Xi leadership hopes to anchor a Sinocentric global financial structure. The
PRC displaced the U.S. as Africa’s largest trading partner and investor
several years ago. And in the wake of the Trump administration’s
abandonment of the Transpacific Pact (TPP), Beijing is putting extra efforts
to persuade Asia-Pacific countries to join China-led free-trade arrangements
such as the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP).2 A
dozen-odd countries ranging from Laos and Cambodia in Asia to Angola,
Zimbabwe and the Sudan in Africa have become virtual client states of Big
Brother China. Sinologist Andrew Nathan cited a “growing worry among
Western analysts about the extent to which China, as its power grows, will
seek to remake the world in its authoritarian image” (Nathan 2016: 23;
Brown and Huang 2016). China’s Great Leap Outward prompted former
president Barack Obama’s famous line that “we can’t let countries like
China write the rules of the global economy” (The White House 2015). In a
similar vein, British Prime Minister Theresa May zeroed in on the
consequences of the Western alliance’s failure to provide global leadership.
While touring America in January 2017, she cautioned that the U.S. and the
U.K. “have a joint responsibility to lead.” In a thinly veiled reference to
China, May warned of an “eclipse of the West” when rising Asian powers
“step up and we step back” (Financial Times 2017). (See Chapter 24,
“China and the World: From the Chinese Dream to the Chinese World
Order.”)
The leap forward in China’s international clout has been made possible
by the viability of the CCP, which is the brains and the brawn behind
President Xi’s “Chinese dream,” namely, that the PRC will attain
superpower status by the late 2040s. Despite stunning aberrations ranging
from the Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) and the Tiananmen Square
massacre (1989), the party seems to have morphed into a gritty and
aggressive behemoth that is the envy of political institutions around the
world. As Orville Schell and John Delury point out,
in contemplating the future, it is always important to remember that, despite all
its rigidities and infirmities, the CCP has repeatedly surprised the world with its
ability to change course and prevail, including the most recent feat of steering
China into the twenty-first century as a nascent superpower.
(Schell and Delury 2013: 384)

Yet chinks in the armor of the mind-set and policies of the CCP
leadership are also becoming obvious. Beijing has taken a cavalier attitude
toward international law. This is demonstrated by the large-scale
reclamation works undertaken by the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)
engineering corps on several islets in the South China Sea whose
sovereignty is disputed by China’s neighbors. These artificially enlarged
islets have since been converted into air and naval bases. The Xi leadership
simply ignored the July 2016 ruling by the Permanent Court of Arbitration
in the Hague that its territorial claims to the South China Sea were without
legal basis (Foreign Policy 2016; Rapp-Hooper 2016). Yet another example
of Beijing violating international law is the kidnapping in October 2015 of
Swedish national Gui Minhai – a Hong Kong-based publisher specializing
in political-gossip books that Beijing finds embarrassing – in Thailand by
Chinese state security agents3 (Gui 2016).
Other notable transgressions of international diplomatic norms, which
are observed by both Western and “non-Western” nations, include using
economic weapons to punish countries which have allegedly challenged
China’s “core national interests.” European leaders who had met the Dalai
Lama were warned that they would suffer consequences such as a reduction
of Chinese investment. In reaction against human rights icon Liu Xiaobo
being awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2010, Beijing froze relations with
Norway for six years (Reuters 2016b). This was despite the fact that the
Norwegian Nobel Committee is an NGO whose members are appointed by
the Storting (Parliament), not the government. And in retaliation against
Seoul’s installation of America’s THAAD missile defense system, Beijing
has instigated a large-scale “boycott Korean products” campaign that could
result in a trade war between the two neighbors (Huang 2016; Sun 2017).
The glaring self-righteousness in Beijing’s global posture can be
understood by looking at the mentality and governing philosophy of the
CCP. This chapter examines the values and norms that have sustained this
political party of close to 90 million members. What is the rationale behind
the party’s monopolization of political, and to a considerable extent,
economic resources of this mammoth country? What undergirds the official
dogma of “socialism with Chinese characteristics” – and is it incompatible
with universal values? How potent and sustainable is the “China model”
that the party has licked into shape since late patriarch Deng Xiaoping
unleased the reform and open-door policy 40 years ago? Are ordinary
Chinese enjoying the fruits of the party’s apparent success? Above all, is the
CCP under current supreme leader Xi capable of thorough-going political
and economic reforms? This chapter also serves as an introduction to the 23
other chapters in this Routledge Handbook of the Chinese Communist
Party.

What the party stands for

At the heart of the quasi-superpower’s global projection of hard and soft
power is the CCP, the most powerful political organization on earth. What
does the CCP stand for? For a party whose devastatingly erroneous policies
accounted for the death of at least 40 million Chinese, what are the reasons
behind its stunning longevity? Is the party capable of far-reaching reforms
which could enable it to tackle the challenges of the twenty-first century?
The priorities of the CCP, as laid down by President Xi, who is expected
to run the country at least until 2027, are preservationist rather than
forward-looking.4 The foremost task of Xi (born 1953), who gained the
penultimate title of “core of the leadership” in late 2016, is holding down
the fort of party predominance and not venturing into the unknown and
potentially dangerous terrain of reform. Xi’s oft-repeated mantra is that
officials and people alike must have “self-confidence in the path, the
beliefs, the institutions and the culture of socialism with Chinese
characteristics” (Xi 2013a, 2016c). Xi further cautioned on the 95th
birthday of the CCP on July 1, 2016 that “the decline of political parties
begins with a deficit in the beliefs in the ideals [of the party].” “Vacillations
about our ideals and beliefs are the most dangerous vacillations,” he said,
adding that “the downhill trajectory of ideals and beliefs” could not be
tolerated. Earlier, the General Secretary had warned party members against
“a deficiency of calcium” in their conviction about the CCP’s auspicious
future (China News Service 2016; Wang, X. 2013).
That Xi’s philosophy is retrogressive – rather than progressive – is also
evidenced by his paranoia about the party losing power. Way back in 2008,
when Xi was vice-president and president of the CCP Central Party School,
he underscored the imperative of the party’s preserving its quasi-
omnipotence: “Whatever [powers] we possessed in the past we may not
possess now; whatever [powers] we possess now doesn’t mean we can
possess them forever,” Xi said in 2008 (Xi 2008b).
This sense of insecurity is due to the fact that party leaders of Xi’s
generation are obsessed with the pitfalls of the Communist Party of the
Soviet Union (CPSU), which collapsed suddenly after having been in power
for 74 years. This monomaniacal streak was revealed by Xi on an
inspection tour to Shenzhen in December 2012, one month after taking
power. Xi warned in an unpublicized speech that the party could
disintegrate if it failed to heed the lessons from the demise of the CPSU.
According to Xi, the Soviet party collapsed because “their ideals and
convictions wavered.” The Fifth-Generation titan indicated that first, the
CCP must never denigrate its founding fathers, particularly Mao. Second,
the party must weed out dangerous Western ideas. Third, it must be in
control of the military and the police (Buckley 2013). Xi’s psychology is
very typical of members of his generation. As the People’s Daily noted in
early 2013: “Today, the Soviet Union, with his 74-year history, has been
dissolved for 22 years. For more than two decades, socialist China has
never stopped reflecting on how the Soviet Communists lost their party and
country” (Ren 2013).
 Given this background, it is not surprising that Xi has presided over the
large-scale resuscitation of Maoist norms (see Chapter 2: “The Legacy of
Mao Zedong”). In a 2013 speech marking the 120th birthday of Mao, Xi
praised the Great Helmsman for “establishing the fundamental socialist
order, obtaining the fundamental achievements of socialist construction, as
well as accumulating the experience and providing the conditions for our
exploration of the path of building socialism with Chinese characteristics.”
Xi added that party members would “sink into the quagmire of historical
nihilism” if they were to denounce Mao because of his mistakes5 (Xi
2013f). At the same time, Xi – and his predecessors such as ex-president Hu
Jintao – have argued that the so-called “Western democracy system” is not
suitable for China. Both Xi and Hu waxed eloquent on the fact that the CCP
“will not go down the xielu [alien and treacherous path] that will lead to the
changing of the flags and standards [of the party]” (Xi 2016d). The CCP’s
propaganda machinery has stepped up ideological movements to warn
citizens about “anti-Chinese forces” in the West trying to subvert the
socialist order through infiltration and espionage. In April 2016, Chinese
authorities ran a so-called “dangerous love” campaign warning female civil
servants to beware of “honey traps”: “foreign spies” who want to ferret
state secrets out of them under the guise of romance (The Guardian 2016).
The Xi administration’s preoccupation with preserving the status quo has
inevitably affected its capacity for political and economic reforms (see
following sections). Policies are designed to uphold stability rather than
initiate fundamental changes. “We must seek progress and accomplishments
in the midst of stability,” the president said one year after taking office.
What most concerned Xi is that “erroneous and overly hasty” measures
might jeopardize the “socialist road.” “Our direction must be correct, the
navigation must be stable, and in particular we must avoid errors that would
subvert [the socialist system],” he instructed (Xi 2013c). Li Zhanshu, a
Politburo member and close adviser to Xi, argued in a People’s Daily article
that “incremental reforms” were needed to avoid “subversive errors” –
meaning mistakes that will result in a collapse of the socialist system and
the party’s authority (Li, Z. 2013).
Xi and his colleagues have, of course, reiterated that the CCP is a
learning-oriented, innovation-driven party. In a 2009 speech, Xi urged party
cadres to seek “innovation in concepts of development, innovation in
approaches to development, innovation in development policies, and
innovation in leadership methodology” (Xi 2009). Yet the initiatives laid
out by Xi do not seem to match the people’s expectations about either
liberalizing the decision-making processes of the party or boosting the
market elements of the economy. Instead of seeking to integrate China with
international values, the “core leader” has gone the opposite direction by
asking his countrymen to go after the illusive realm of Communism. “We
cannot reach Communism in one go,” he said in 2015. “But we cannot
regard Communism as a mirage simply because it requires a protracted
process.” Xi called on CCP affiliates “to become honest and dedicated
Communists.” “Revolutionary ideals are as high as the sky,” he said.
“Realizing Communism is the highest ideal of every Communist Party
member” (Tian 2015).
Since the demise of Chairman Mao Zedong, few cadres and members
have retained any faith in socialism, let alone Communism, which even
Karl Marx deemed a Utopian ideal. After all, Deng Xiaoping sought to
demystify socialism by inventing the concept of shehui zhuyi chuji jieduan
(“the primary state of socialism”), which is a euphemism for Chinese-style
capitalism. The Great Architect of Reform famously said that the
preliminary stage of socialism could last up to 200 years, meaning that
China’s particular form of “capitalism within a cage” would last for
generations.6 Xi’s singing the praises of a Communist order being ushered
into China in the not-too-distant future seems symptomatic of a particularly
befuddled form of “historical nihilism.”

The CCP and the “China model”?

The “China model” explained

As we trace the ideology and statecraft of leaders from Deng Xiaoping and
Jiang Zemin to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, new ideas about reform are in
increasing short supply. Nonetheless, officials and scholars in both Western
and Asian nations have credited the CCP with having come up with a novel
approach of governance called the “China model.” Admirers of the China
model ranging from Daniel Bell to Martin Jacques have claimed that the
Chinese way of doing things might be significantly better than the so-called
“Western model” of laissez-faire economics, universal-suffrange elections
and the rule of law. What exactly is the China model and will it enable the
party to attain a sustainable development plan that will defuse entrenched
contradictions in Chinese society?
Bell wrote in his 2015 book The China Model: Political Meritocracy and
the Limits of Democracy that “the China model is a combination of
economic freedom and political oppression.” Bell, however, noted that the
CCP’s authoritarianism was tempered with “democracy at the bottom,
experimentation in the middle, and meritocracy at the top,” qualities which
are responsible for the regime’s ability to make economic progress and
uphold social stability (Bell 2015: 179–180). In a similar vein, Suizheng
Zhao characterizes the China model as an effort to “strike a balance
between economic growth and political stability and between a market-
oriented economy and an authoritarian state to sustain its continued
economic growth in its modernization efforts.” While Bell seems to have a
positive appraisal of institutional reforms undertaken by the party, Zhao has
expressed qualms about inadequacies such as corruption as well as socio-
economic inequality and injustice. “China’s economic performance
improvement came mostly when China became less brutal and allowed
greater personal and economic freedoms,” he wrote7 (Zhao 2010).
As most of the chapters in this anthology suggest, the China model
reduced to its basics consists of an amalgamation of Leninism (the CCP
monopolizing economic and political resources – and controlling the hearts
and minds of party members and citizens alike); nationalism; a generous
helping of ancient Chinese tradition, particularly Confucianism and
Legalism; and a supposedly super-efficient top-down policymaking
mechanism sometimes known as “neo-authoritarianism.”
Scholars who have studied the academic sources of the Great
Helmsman’s works have pointed out that 18 percent of the references and
citations were from Stalin, 24 percent from Lenin and 22 percent from
Confucianist and other classical Chinese writings. Only 4 percent were
from Marx and Engels (Holubnychy 1964). (See Chapter 3, “The CCP’s
Exploitation of Confucianism and Legalism.”) Party leaders ranging from
Mao to Xi have used a crypto-Leninist police-state apparatus to tackle
destabilizing elements in society. Oxford political scientist Stein Ringen’s
The Perfect Dictatorship is but one of many treatises which have exposed
the fact that much of the China model consists of a “controlocracy”: a
Leninist – or Orwellian – machinery of control “of a size and complexity
unprecedented in world history.” “The threat of terror is omnipresent,”
writes Ringen. “And that threat is backed up by a physical use of violence
that is sufficient for citizens to know very well that the threat is not an idle
one” (Ringen 2016: 139–140). Similarly, Andrew Nathan refers to how the
CCP has used its “large fiscal resources, technological sophistication, a
well-trained and loyal security apparatus, and sufficient political discipline”
to keep destabilizing forces at bay (Nathan 2016: 27). In 2013, the last year
in which comparable figures were available, China’s budget for maintaining
social stability was 769.1 billion yuan, or 28.5 billion yuan more than the
publicized military spending for that year (Reuters 2013a).
Not unlike his good friend President Vladimir Putin, whose ambition is
to bring back the “imperial glory” of the Soviet Empire, Xi aspires to re-
create the Middle Kingdom of the Tang and Sony Dynasties. This is
inherent in his Chinese dream mantra, which is destined to be one of Xi’s
most important initiatives. The “Chinese dream” is geared toward the
realization of the “great renaissance of the Chinese nation.” A key goal of
the Chinese dream is that by the year 2049, the centenary of the
establishment of the PRC, China will have closed the gap with the U.S. in
most measures of national comprehensive strength. This, however, is much
more an appeal to raw emotions than substantial policy8 (Xi 2013d).
Post-Tiananmen, the regime is essentially left with two pillars of
legitimacy: one is economic growth and improvement in ordinary people’s
livelihood; the other is nationalism. Given that high-speed GDP expansion
is a thing of the past, nationalism has become an indispensable cornerstone
of party legitimacy. As Joseph Fewsmith pointed out, “there is no denying
the widespread patriotic feelings of the Chinese people.” Yet as Fewsmith
notes, “patriotism in China is a two-edged sword, providing support for the
government but also holding up a standard that is perhaps impossible for
the government to attain”9 (Fewsmith 2016: 105–107). (See Chapter 4,
“The CCP’s Use and Abuse of Nationalism.”)
It is somewhat ironic that while Xi has based the party’s legitimacy on a
Sinicized version of socialism, he has at the same time used age-old
Chinese wisdom to buttress Chinese patriotism. It is no accident that Xi
favors Confucianism, one of whose tenets is respect for authority and
conformism with orthodoxy. “CCP members are the faithful successors and
developers of superior traditional Chinese culture,” Xi said. The supreme
leader noted that Chinese culture could be of great benefit in helping party
members and citizens to “establish the correct world view, philosophy of
life and values.” “Traditional Chinese culture is deeply etched onto the
DNA of the Chinese people,” Xi argued. “Our superior culture has provided
nutrient for the renaissance of the Chinese nation. It can be considered the
‘calcium of the spirit’” (Cui 2014; People’s Daily 2014a).
Another aspect of the “China model” consists of the claim that
authoritarian, top-down decision-making makes for efficiency. Believers in
so-called xin quanwei zhuyi, or “neo-authoritarianism” – which surprisingly
includes Deng Xiaoping and even liberal icon, the ousted general secretary
Zhao Ziyang – argue that in such a complex and divided country as China, a
leader needs to have overriding powers to push through reforms.10 It can be
argued that since major policies are made by the CCP Politburo Standing
Committee (PBSC), which does not need to worry about either the
“opposition” or, to a considerable extent, public opinion, efficiency of
implementation can be guaranteed. Examples that apparently illustrate the
merits of Chinese-style management include the way in which Jiang Zemin
and Zhu Rongji managed to fast-track China’s accession process to the
WTO despite substantial opposition from numerous ministries as well as
local administrations. Others have praised Premier Wen’s resolute decision
to inject 4 trillion yuan into the economy in late 2008, which supposedly
spared China from the adverse impact of the global financial crisis that
broke out that year. As the following sections illustrate, however, this non-
democratic approach to governance not only militates against Deng
Xiaoping-style reform but could result in ill-considered decisions as well as
bureaucratic paralysis.

Are “universal values” incompatible with Chinese

modernization?
To justify the CCP’s socialism with Chinese characteristics, President Xi
has claimed that no any single set of values in the world, including what is
usually known as “universal values” in global intellectual discourse, is valid
for all countries. Demonstrating Mao’s unique gift of using earthy language
to express abstract concepts, he said in 2013 that “whether a pair of shoes
fits only the feet can tell; whether a country’s developmental path [is
suitable] only people in that country will know” (China News Service
2013).
 It is ironical, therefore, that the long list of “core socialist values” cited
by the party contains norms and goals that seem to have a universal
resonance. These values comprise “prosperity and strength, democracy,
civilization, harmony, freedom, equality, justice, rule of law, patriotism,
respect for work, honesty and trust, benevolence” (People’s Daily 2013).
Many Chinese observers have become cynical about the apparent ease with
which Chinese propagandists have twisted – and Sinicized – their
interpretations of words and phrases such as “rule of law” and “democracy.”
(The trick seems to be to add the qualifier “with Chinese characteristics”
after these terms.)
Quite a few liberal intellectuals, however, have argued that values such
as democracy as understood in the Western world should be adopted by
China. Yu Keping, a Peking University professor and one-time senior cadre
at the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, attracted a lot of
attention when he published the article “Democracy is a good thing” in
2006. The one-time adviser to ex-president Hu seemed to be talking about
the universal version of “democracy” rather than the Chinese one. It is no
accident that when the political climate changed upon Xi’s ascendency, Yu
has pretty much kept his mouth shut. He resigned from his government post
in 2015 (Mai 2015; Yu 2006). Similarly, notable sociologist Yu Jianrong
highly recommended “Western-style” norms such as civil liberties, rule of
law and mass elections in his “open letter” to central party authorities in
early 2016 (Yu 2016).
And to the extent that the Chinese government and legislature have
signed several United Nations instruments on human rights, Beijing has at
least indicated that it is willing to be held to account regarding whether it
has abided by clear-cut sets of global norms (Sceats and Breslin 2012). This
is despite the fact that while China signed the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights in 1998, it has yet to ratify it. And while Beijing
signed and ratified the International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights in 2000, it indicated that it would only implement Article 8,
Clause 1 within the parameters of the Chinese Constitution. (The clause in
question stipulates that workers have the right to form trade unions, a key
right that is not honored in the PRC) (China Labor Bulletin 2001; Human
Rights Watch 2013).
Among forward-looking senior cadres, ex-premier Wen Jiabao stood out
as perhaps the only one who has explicitly endorsed pushijiazhi, or
universal values or norms. The former aide to ousted liberal icons Hu
Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang argued in an early 2007 article that China should
unhesitatingly embrace pushijiazhi. “Democracy, a [fair] legal system,
freedom, human rights, egalitarianism … are not unique to capitalism,”
Wen noted. “They are values that all humankind is jointly pursuing” (Wen
2007).
Liberal intellectuals who have been barred from the official media can
only reminisce over how large numbers of First- and Second-Generation
revolutionaries seemed unabashed advocates of “Western” political ideals
before the CCP seized power in 1949. Testimonies by an older generation
of intellectuals pointed to the fact that they joined the revolution in the
1920s and 1930s precisely to fight for “Western values.” Dai Huang (1928–
2016), one of Xinhua News Agency’s earliest journalists, had this to say
about why he joined the New Fourth Army at the age of 16: “We wanted to
sacrifice our lives to achieve ‘liberty, democracy, equality and fraternity’ for
China.” “However, after the party had conquered heaven and earth [in
1949], these [ideals] vanished like ghosts” (Dai 2016).
The Harbingers of History: The Promises Once Made by the CCP, which
was edited by dissident writer Xiao Shu, contains many pledges that Mao
Zedong and other early revolutionaries made before 1949. Mao said in
1947, two years before taking power, that “we support the abolition of one-
party dictatorship.” He added that the CCP would not “imitate the social
and political order of the Soviet Union.” Liu Shaoqi, who would become
China’s first president, said before Liberation that “one-party rule is against
democracy; and the CCP will not institute one-party dictatorship.” Deng
Xiaoping went on the record in 1941 as saying that “we are against the
concept of ‘the party running the country’.” Then there were innumerable
editorials of CCP newspapers proclaiming progressive ideas such as
“Democracy is possible only after ending one-party rule” and “One party
dictatorship will bring forth disasters all over China” (Xiao 2013: 340–360).
As Lord Patten, the “last governor of Hong Kong,” indicated during a
tour of the Special Administrative Region in 2016, “there are not separate
and distinct Western, African or Asian models. Just as human rights are
universal, so too is good governance.” The question of whether “culture is
destiny,” or whether it is possible for Asian countries to develop democracy,
was long ago answered by South Korean president Kim Dae-jung (1924–
2009). The Nobel Laureate indicated that historical development has shown
that “countries practicing democratic capitalism or democratic socialism,
despite temporary setbacks, have prospered.” Kim persuasively punctured
the myth, raised by “Asia’s authoritarian leaders,” that “cultural differences
make the ‘Western concept’ of democracy and human rights inapplicable to
East Asia” (Kim 1994).

The primacy of the party and whether the CCP is capable

of far-reaching reforms
The party not only made possible the triumph of Chinese-style socialism in
1949; it has provided both the ideological and organizational underpinning
for the continuation of the special powers and privileges of China’s new
ruling class. Above all, the party has facilitated the apparent triumph of
Chinese exceptionalism, the fact that China has emerged in record time as a
quasi-superpower despite not following the bulk of “universal values” such
as rule of law and freedom of expression and religion.11 Even the most
zealous defenders of the CCP, however, may recognize that it is also the
extremely rigid party orthodoxy that has ensured that Chinese both as
individuals and as a whole cannot attain the lofty goal raised in Marxist
teachings, here summarized by the eminent social scientist Erich Fromm:
“the spiritual emancipation of man, of his liberation from the chains of
economic determination, of restituting him in his human wholeness, of
enabling him to find unity and harmony with his fellow man and with
nature” (Fromm 1961).
Following the Leninist tradition to the hilt, Mao – and Xi – has used the
party and the “dictatorship of the proletariat” to maintain tight control over
not only party members but all Chinese. Xi has revived Mao’s dictums
issued at the Yan’an Talks on Literature and Art (1942), whereby the Great
Helmsman ordained that dangxing ( 党 性 or “party nature”) overrides
renxing (人性 or “human nature”) or renminxing (人民性 or “the nature of
the people”). Each party member must subsume his individual aspirations
under dangxing and become the proverbial “cog in the machinery” of the
regime. Mao and Xi have also insisted that all knowledge has its dangxing
and knowledge that is anti-party must be banished12 (Mao 1942; Study
Times 2013).
 To boost the power of the party, or more accurately, the power of himself
and his coterie of advisers and cronies, Xi has abandoned yet another
institutional reform, dangzheng fenkai (the separation of party and
government). In his Political Report to the 13th Party Congress of 1987,
then party general secretary Zhao Ziyang said that the CCP must resolve the
“fundamental question of the non-separation of party and government as
well as the party doing the work of the government.” Zhao, who enjoyed
the backing of Deng, argued that the party should focus on weighty and
long-term issues such as “political principles, political directions and major
decision-making.” Government units, Zhao added, should have full
responsibility over the execution of policy and the day-to-day
administration of the country13 (Zhao 1987).
While the process of refocusing powers in the party began with ex-
president Jiang, Xi will go down in history as having stood the dangzheng
fenkai principle on its head. As discussed in Chapter 5, “The Party Runs the
Show: How the CCP Controls the State and Towers over the Government,
Legislature and Judiciary,” decision-making powers in areas ranging from
military and foreign policies to the economy have been arrogated by a
dozen-odd Central Leading Groups or Central Commissions. Most of these
top-level units are headed by Xi; and they report only to the PBSC. They
are totally non-transparent, and are beyond the scrutiny of the legislature,
the Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference, the judiciary and,
of course, the media and public opinion (McGregor 2010: 1–33; Lam
2015a: 99–103).
The most striking example is that the economic decision-making powers
of the premier, who is head of the State Council or central government,
have been drastically truncated. Up to the Xi era, the premier headed the
Central Leading Group for Finance and Economics (CLGFE), which is the
most authoritative decision-making body on the economy. Not only did Xi
take over the chairmanship of the CLGFE on day one of his administration,
he created in 2013 another powerful policy-setting body called the Central
Leading Group for Comprehensively Deepening Reforms, which he heads.
Moreover, while the CLGFE was set up in the early 1980s, its members
largely stayed in the background. From 2013 onwards, however, senior
members of the CLGFE such as the Director and Deputy Director of its
General Office, respectively Liu He and Shu Guozeng, began regularly
talking to the media on specific policy issues. The Harvard-educated Liu,
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Fig. 169.—Colorado beetle (potato bug).

Fig. 170.—Life history of ant lion.

 Illustrated Study of Ant Lion, or Doodle Bug (Fig. 170).—Find the pitfall
(what shape?); the larva (describe it); the pupa case (ball covered with web and
sand); the imago. Compare imago with dragon fly (Fig. 177).
How does ant lion prevent ant from climbing out of pitfall (see Fig. 170)? What is
on edge of nearest pitfall? Explain.
Ant lions may be kept in a box half filled with sand and fed on ants. How is the
pitfall dug? What part of ant is eaten? How is unused food removed?
How long is it in the larval state? Pupal state? Keep net over box to prevent adult
from flying away when it emerges.
Illustrated Study of Insect
Pests (Figs. 171–176).—Why
does the clothes moth (171) lay
its eggs upon woollen clothing?
How does the larva conceal
itself? The larva can cut through
Fig. 171. paper and cotton, yet sealing
clothes in bags of paper or
c
ot
to Fig. 172.—Metamorphosis of
n house fly (enlarged).
p
r
otects
them.
Explain.
The
house fly
eats liquid
sweets. It
lays its eggs
in horse
Fig. 173.—Metamorphosis of flea. dung. Fig. 174.—Louse and
Describe its its eggs attached to a
larval and hair. Natural size and
pupal forms. Banishing horses from city would have what magnified.
beneficial effect?
Describe the louse and its eggs, which are shown
attached to a hair, natural size and enlarged.
Describe the bed bug. Benzine poured in cracks kills bed bugs. Do bed bugs bite
or suck? Why are they wingless?
Describe the larva, f, pupa, g, and the adult flea, all shown enlarged. Its
mandibles, b, b, are used for piercing. To kill fleas lather dog or cat completely and
 le
t
la
th
er
re
m
ai
n
o
n
Fig. 175.—Bed bug. × 5. fi
v
e
minutes before washing.
Eggs are laid and first stages
passed in the ground.
How does the mosquito
lay its eggs in the water
without drowning (176)?
Why are the eggs always
laid in still water? Which
part of the larva (wiggletail)
is held to the surface in
breathing? What part of the
pupa (called tumbler, or
bull head) is held to the
surface in breathing? Give
differences in larva and
pupa. Where does pupa
change to perfect insect?
Describe mouth parts of Fig. 176.—Life history of mosquito.
male mosquito (at left) and
female (at right). Only
female mosquitoes suck blood. Males suck juice of plants. Malarial mosquito
alights with hind end of body raised at an angle. Why does killing fish and frogs
increase mosquitoes? 1 oz. of kerosene for 15 ft. of surface of water, renewed
monthly, prevents mosquitoes.
What is the use to the squash bug (Fig. 184) of having so bad an odour?
 Fig. 177. Illustrated Study of Dragon Fly.—3 shows dragon fly
laying its eggs in water while poised on wing. Describe the larval form
(water tiger). The extensible tongs are the maxillæ enlarged. The
pupa (1) is active and lives in water. Where does transformation to
adult take place (5)? Why are eyes of adult large? its legs small?
Compare front and hind wings.

Do the eyes touch each other? Why is a long abdomen useful in

flight? Why would long feelers be useless? What is the time of
greatest danger in the development of the dragon fly? What other
appropriate name has this insect? Why should we never kill a dragon
fly?

Illustrated Study of Spiders (Figs. 178–183).—The tarantula, like most

spiders, has eight simple eyes (none compound). Find them (Fig. 178). How do
spiders and insects differ in body? Number of legs? Which have more joints to
legs? Does trap-door spider hold the door closed (Fig. 179)? How many pairs of
spinnerets for spinning web has a spider (Spw, 180)? Foot of spider has how many
claws? How many combs on claws for holding web? Spiders spin a cocoon for
holding eggs. From what part of abdomen are eggs laid (E, 182; 2, 181)? Find
spider’s air sacs, lu, Fig. 181; spinning organs, sp; fang, kf; poison gland, g; palpi,
kt; eyes, au; nerve ganglia, og, ug; sucking tube, sr; stomach, d; intestine, ma;
liver, le; heart, h, (black); vent, a. Give two reasons why a spider is not an insect.
How does it place its feet at each step (Fig. 110)? Does the size of its nerve ganglia
indicate great or little intelligence? Why do you think first part of body
corresponds to both head and thorax of insects?
The following Farmer’s Bulletins, (revised to 1921) are available for
distribution to those interested, by the United States Department of
Agriculture, Washington, D.C.—
 Farmer
’s Bulletin
No. 47,
Insects
Affecting
the
Cotton
Plant;
No. 447,
Bee Fig. 179.—Trap-door
Keeping; spider.
No. 440,
The
Peach Twig Borer; No. 120,
Fig. 178.—The tarantula. The Principal Insects

Fig. 180.

Affecting the Fig. 181.—Anatomy of spider.

Tobacco Plant; No.
8
56,
Im
po
rta
nt
In
Fig. 182.—Laying egg. sec
Fig. 183.—Foot of spider.
ticides; No. 835, The Principal
Insect Enemies of Growing Wheat; No. 799, Carbon Bisulphide as an
Insecticide; No. 243, Insecticides and Fungicides; No. 152 (revised)
Mange in Cattle; No. 155, How Insects Affect Health in Rural
Districts; No. 492, The Control of the Codling Moth; No. 172, Scale
Insects and Mites on Citrus Trees; No. 196, Usefulness of the Toad;
No. 209, Controlling the Boll Weevil in Cotton Seed and at
Ginneries; No. 211, The Use of Paris Green in Controlling the Cotton
Boll Weevil; No. 872, The Cotton Bollworm; No. 848, The Control of
the Boll Weevil; No. 223, Miscellaneous Cotton Insects in Texas; No.
908, The Control of the Codling Moth and Apple Scab.

Bulletins of the Bureau of Entomology may be obtained from the

same source, while the supply lasts, as follows:

Destructive Locusts; The Honey Bee; The San José Scale; The
Principal Household Insects of the United States; The Gypsy Moth in
America; The Periodical Cicada; The Chinch Bug; The Hessian Fly;
Insects Injurious to Vegetables; Notes on Mosquitoes; Some Insects
Attacking the Stems of Growing Wheat, Rye, Barley, and Oats.

Bulletins on Similar Topics, Published by the Department of

Agriculture, Ontario—
(Write to the Publications Branch)
Bulletin No. 187—The Codling Moth
Bulletin No. 195—The Insecticides and Fungicides
Bulletin No. 198—Lime Sulphur Wash
Bulletin No. 219—The San José and Oyster-shell Scales
Bulletin No. 241—Peach Growing in Ontario
Bulletin No. 250—Insects Attacking Fruit Trees
Bulletin No. 251—Insects Affecting Vegetables
Bulletin No. 256—The Wintering of Bees
Bulletin No. 257—The More Important Fruit Tree Diseases in
Ontario
Bulletin No. 258—The More Important Fungus and Bacterial
Diseases of Vegetables in Ontario
Bulletin No. 271—The Apple Maggot
Bulletin No. 276—Bee Diseases in Ontario
Bulletins Published by the Department of Agriculture, Ottawa—
(Write to the Publications Branch)
Bulletin No. 9—The Army Worm
Bulletin No. 10—Cutworms and their Control
Bulletin No. 26—Bees and How to Keep Them
Circular No. 9—1921—Common Garden Insects and their Control

Pearl divers.
 CHAPTER IX
MOLLUSCS

The Fresh-water Mussel

Suggestions.—The mussel is usually easy to procure from streams and lakes by
raking or dredging. In cities the hard-shelled clam, or quahog, is for sale at the
markets, and the following descriptions apply to the anodon, unio, or quahog, with
slight changes in regard to the siphons. Mussels can be kept alive for a long time in
a tub with sand in the bottom. Pairs of shells should be at hand for study.
External Features.—The shell is an elongated oval, broader and
blunter at one end (Fig. 188). Why does the animal close its shell?
Does it open the shell? Why? Does it thrust the foot forward and pull
up to it, or thrust the foot back and push? (Mussels and clams have no
bones.) Does it go with the blunt end or the more tapering end of the
shell forward? (Fig. 188.) Can a mussel swim? Why, or why not?
Lay the shells, fitted together, in
your hand with the hinge side away
from you and the blunt end to the
left (Fig. 188). Is the right or the left
shell uppermost? Which is the top,
or dorsal, side? Which is the front, or
anterior, end? Is the straight edge at
the top or at the bottom? Our word
“valve” is derived from a word
Fig. 188.—Anodon, or fresh-water meaning shell, because the Romans
mussel. used shells for valves in pumps. Is
the mussel a univalve or a bivalve?
Which kind is the oyster? The snail?
Does the mussel have bilateral symmetry? Can you find a horny
covering, or epidermis, over the limy shell of a fresh specimen? Why
is it necessary? Does water dissolve lime? Horn? Find a bare spot.
Does any of the shell appear to be missing there?
The bare projection on each shell is
called the umbo. Is the umbo near the
ventral or the dorsal line? The posterior or
anterior end? Is the surface of the umbones
worn? Do the umbones rub against the
sand as the mussel ploughs its way along?
How are the shells held together? Where is
the ligament attached? (Fig. 189.) Is it
opposite the umbones or more to the front
or to the rear? (Fig. 189.) Is the ligament of Fig. 189.—Diagram of
the same material as the shell? Is the Shell open and closed,
ligament in a compressed condition when showing muscle, m, and
the shell is open or when it is closed? (Fig. ligament, b.
189.) When is the muscle relaxed?
Notice the lines on the outside of the shell
(Figs. 188 and 190). What point do they
surround? They are lines of growth. Was each
line once the margin of the shell? If the shell
should increase in size, what would the
present margin become? (Fig. 191.) Does
growth take place on the margin only? Did the
shell grow thicker as it grew larger? Where is
it thinnest?
Draw the outside of the shell from the side.
Fig. 190.—Mussel Draw a dorsal view. Near the drawings write
crawling in sand.
the names of the margins of the shell (p. 98)
and of other parts learned, using lines to
indicate the location of the parts.
Study the surface of the shell inside and out. The inside is called
mother-of-pearl. Is it of lime? Is the deeper layer of the shell of lime?
(When weak hydrochloric acid or strong vinegar is dropped on limy
substances, a gas, carbon dioxide, bubbles up.) Compare the
thickness of the epidermal layer, the middle chalky layer, and the
inner, pearly layer.
Anatomy of the Mussel.—What parts protrude at any time
beyond the edge of the shell? (Fig. 190.) The shell is secreted by two
folds of the outer layer of the soft body of the
mussel. These large, flaplike folds hang down
on each side, and are called the mantle. The
two great flaps of the mantle hang down lower
than the rest of the body and line the shell
which it secretes (Fig. 192). The epidermis of
the mantle secretes the shell just as the Fig. 191.—Diagram.
epidermis of the crayfish secretes its crust.
Can you find the pallial line, or the line to Change of points of
which the mantle extended on each shell attachment of muscles as
mussel enlarges.
when the animal was alive? A free portion of (Morgan.)
the mantle extended like a fringe below the
pallial line.
The shells were held together by two large
adductor muscles. The anterior adductor
(Fig. 193) is near the front end, above the
foot. The posterior adductor is toward the
rear end, but not so near the end as the
anterior. Can you find both muscle scars in
the shells? Are they nearer the ventral or the
dorsal surface? The points of attachment
travelled downward and farther apart as the
animal grew (see Fig. 191). Higher than the
larger scars are small scars, or impressions,
where the protractor and retractor muscles
that extend and draw in the foot were
Fig. 192.—Cross Section attached.
of Mussel. (Diagram, after
Parker.) The muscular foot extends downward in
the middle, halfway between the shells (Fig.
193). On each side of the foot and behind it
hang down the two pairs of gills, the outer pair and the inner pair
(Fig. 192). They may be compared to four V-shaped troughs with their
sides full of holes. The water enters the troughs through the holes and
overflows above. Is there a marked difference in the size of the two
pairs of gills? A kind of chamber for the gills is made by the joining of
the mantle flaps below, along the ventral line. The mantle edges are
separated at two places, leaving openings called exhalent and
inhalent siphons.
 Fresh water with its
oxygen, propelled by
cilia at the opening
and on the gills,
enters through the
lower or inhalent
siphon, passes
between the gills, and
goes to an upper
passage, leaving the
gill chamber by a slit
Fig. 193.—Anatomy of Mussel. (Beddard.)
which separates the
gills from the foot. For this passage, see
arrow (Fig. 194). The movement of the
water is opposite to the way the arrow
points. After going upward and
backward, the water emerges by the
exhalent siphon. The gills originally
consisted of a great number of filaments.
These are now united, but not
completely so, and the gills still have a
perforated or lattice structure. Thus they
present a large surface for absorbing
oxygen from the water.
The mouth is in front of the foot,
between it and the anterior adductor
Fig. 194.—Mussel. muscle (Fig. 194). On each side of the
mouth are the labial palps, which are
A, left shell and mantle flap lateral lips (Fig. 195). They have cilia
removed. which convey the food to the mouth
B, section through body.
after the inhalent siphon has sent food
Question: Guided by other beyond the gill chamber and near to the
figures, identify the parts to mouth. Thus both food and oxygen enter
which lines are drawn. at the inhalent siphon. The foot is in the
position of a lower lip, and if regarded as
a greatly extended lower lip, the animal
may be said to have what is to us the absurd habit of using its lower
lip as a foot. The foot is sometimes said to be hatchet-shaped (Fig.
195). Do you see any resemblance? Does the foot penetrate deep or
shallow into the sand? (Fig. 190.) Why, or why not?
The food tube of the mussel is comparatively
simple. Behind the mouth it enlarges into a swelling
called the stomach (Fig. 193). The bile ducts of the
neighbouring liver empty into the stomach. The
intestine makes several turns in the substance of the
upper part of the foot and then passing upward, it
runs approximately straight to the vent (or anus),
which is in the wall of the exhalent siphon. The
intestine not only runs through the pericardial cavity
(celome) surrounding the heart, but through the
ventricle of the heart itself (Fig. 196).
The kidneys consist of
tubes which open into the
pericardial chamber
above and into the gill
chamber below (Neph.,
Fig. 193). The tubes are
surrounded by numerous
blood vessels (Fig. 198) Fig. 195.—Mussel. From
and carry off the waste below. Level cut across
matter from the blood. both shells.
The nervous system
consists of three pairs of Se, palp; P, foot; O, mouth;
ganglia and nerves (Fig. G, liver; Gg, Vg, Pg,
197). The ganglia are ganglia.
Fig. 196.—Heart of
Mussel, with intestine distinguishable because of
passing through it. their orange colour. The pedal ganglia on
the front of the foot are easily seen also; the
visceral ganglia on the posterior adductor
muscle may be seen without removing the mussel from the shell (Fig.
193). The reproductive organs open into the rear portion of the gill
cavity (Fig. 193). The sperms, having been set free in the water, are
drawn into the ova by the same current that brings the food. The eggs
are hatched in the gills. After a while the young mussels go out through
the siphon.
Summary.—In the gills (Fig. 198) the blood gains what? Loses Fig. 197.
what? From the digestive tube the blood absorbs nourishment. In the
kidneys the blood is partly purified by the loss of nitrogenous waste.
The cilia of the fringes on the inhalent, or lower, siphon, vibrate
continually and drive water and food particles into the mouth cavity.
Food particles that are brought near the labial palps are conveyed by
 them to the mouth. As the water passes along
the perforated gills, its oxygen is absorbed;
the mantle also absorbs oxygen from the
water as it passes. The water, as stated before,
goes next through a passage between the foot
and the palp into the cavity above the gills and
on out through the exhalent siphon. By
stirring the water, or placing a drop of ink
near the siphons of a mussel kept in a tub, the
direction of its flow may be seen. The
pulsations of the heart are plainly visible in a
living mollusc.
Habits of the Mussel.—Is it abundant in
clear or in muddy water; swift, still, or slightly
Fig. 198.—Diagram of moving water? Describe its track or furrow.
Mussel cut across, What is its rate of travel? Can you distinguish
showing mantle, ma; the spots where the foot was attached to the
gills, kie; foot, f; heart, h; ground? How long is one “step” compared to
intestine, ed. the length of the shell? The animal usually has
the valves opened that it may breathe and eat.
The hinge ligament acts like the case spring of a watch, and holds the
valves open unless the adductor muscles draw them together (Fig.
189).
When the mussel first hatches from the egg, it
has a triangular shell. It soon attaches itself to
some fish and thus travels about. After two
months it drops to the bottom again.
Other Mollusca.—
The oyster’s shells are
not an exact pair, the
shell which lies upon the
bottom being hollowed
out to contain the body,
Fig. 200.—Trochus.
and the upper shell Fig. 199.—Oyster.
being flat. Can you tell
by examining an oyster C, mouth; a, vent; g,
shell which was the lower valve? Does it show g′, ganglia; mt, mantle;
signs of having been attached to the bottom? b, gill.
The young oyster, like the young mussel, is free-
swimming. Like the arthropoda, most molluscs undergo a
metamorphosis to reach the adult stage (Fig. 199).
Examine the shells of clams,
snails, scallops, and cockles. Make
drawings of their shells. The slug is
very similar to the snail except that it
has no shell. If the shell of the snail
shown in Fig. 202 were removed,
there would be left a very good Fig. 201.—Cypræa. (Univalve, with a
representation of a slug. long opening to shell.)
Economic Importance of
Mollusca.—Several species of clams
are eaten. One of them is the hardshell clam (quahog) found on the
Atlantic coast from Cape Cod to Texas. Its shell is white. It often
burrows slightly beneath the surface. The softshell clam is better liked
as food. It lives along the shores of all northern seas. It burrows a foot
beneath the surface and extends its siphons through the burrow to the
surface when the tide is in, and draws into its shell the water
containing animalcules and oxygen.
Oysters to the value of many millions of dollars are gathered and
sold every year. The most valuable oyster fisheries of North America
are in Chesapeake Bay. The young oysters, or “spat,” after they attach
themselves to the bottom in shallow water, are transplanted. New
oyster beds are formed in this way. The beds are sometimes strewn
with pieces of rock, broken pottery, etc., to encourage the oysters to
attach themselves. The dark spot in the fleshy body of the oyster is the
digestive gland, or liver. The cut ends of the tough adductor muscles
are noticeable in raw oysters. The starfish is very destructive in oyster
beds.
Pearls are deposited by bivalves around some irritating particle
that gets between the shell and the mantle. The pearl oyster furnishes
most of the pearls; sometimes pearls of great value are obtained from
fresh-water mussels. Name articles that are made partly or wholly of
mother-of-pearl.
Study of a Live Snail or Slug.—Is its body dry or moist? Do land snails and
slugs have lungs or gills? Why? How many pairs of tentacles have they? What is
their relative length and position? The eyes are dark spots at bases of tentacles of
snail and at the tips of the rear tentacles of slug. Touch the tentacles. What
happens? Do the tentacles simply stretch, or do they turn inside out as they are

Fig. 202.—A Snail.
l, mouth; vf, hf, feelers; e, opening of egg duct; f,
foot; ma, mantle; lu, opening to lung; a, vent.
or the rear of its body? Is enough
mucus left to mark the path
travelled? The fold moves to the
front, adheres, and smooths out as
the slug or snail is pulled forward.
Cephalopods.—The highest and
best developed molluscs are the
Fig. 204.—Circulation and Respiration in
Snail.
a, mouth; b, b, foot; c, vent; d, d, lung; h,
heart. Blood vessels are black. (Perrier.)
uncanny, terrifying appearance.
The sepia or “ink” discharged through the siphon of the squid makes a dark cloud
in the water and favours its escape from enemies almost as much as does its
extended? Is the respiratory
opening on the right or the
left side of the body? On the
mantle fold or on the body?
(Figs. 202–3–4.) How often
does the aperture open and
close?
Place the snail in a moist
tumbler. Does the whole
under surface seem to be
used in creeping? Does the
creeping surface change
shape as the snail creeps? Do
any folds or wrinkles seem to
move either toward the front
Fig. 203.—A Slug.
cephalopods, or “head-footed”
molluscs. Surrounding the mouth
are eight or ten appendages which
serve both as feet and as arms.
These appendages have two rows
of sucking disks by which the
animal attaches itself to the sea
bottom, or seizes fish or other
prey with a firm grip. The
commonest examples are the
squid, with a long body and ten
arms, and the octopus, or
devilfish, with a short body and
eight arms. Cephalopods have
strong biting mouth parts and
complex eyes somewhat
resembling the eyes of backboned,
or vertebrate, animals. The large
and staring eyes add to the
swiftness (Fig. 205). The squid sometimes
approaches a fish with motion so slow as to
be imperceptible, and then suddenly seizes
it, and quickly kills it by biting it on the
back behind the head.
The octopus is more sluggish than the
squid. Large species called devilfish
sometimes have a spread of arms of twenty-
five feet. The pearly nautilus (Fig. 206) and Fig. 205.—A Squid.
the female of the paper argonaut (Fig. 207)
are examples of cephalopods that
have shells. The cuttlefish is
closely related to the squid.
General Questions.—
The living parts of the
mussel are very soft, the
name mollusca being
derived from the Latin word
mollis, soft. Why is it that
the softest animals, the
molluscs, have the hardest
coverings?
To which class of
Fig. 206.—Pearly Nautilus. (Shell sawed
through to show chambers used when it was
molluscs is the name
smaller, and siphuncle, S, connecting them. acephala (headless)
Tentacles, T.) appropriate?
Lamellibranchiata
(platelike gills)?
Why is a smooth shell suited to a clam and a rough shell suited to
an oyster? Why are the turns of a snail’s shell so small near the
centre?
Why does the mussel have no use for head, eyes, or projecting
feelers? In what position of the valves of a mussel is the hinge
ligament in a stretched condition? How does the shape of the mussel’s
gills insure that the water current and the blood current are brought
in close contact?
The three main classes of molluscs are: the pelecypoda (hatchet-
footed); gastropoda (stomach-footed); and cephalopoda (head-
footed). Give an example of each class.
 Fig. 208.—Paper
Fig. 207.—Paper Argonaut (female). × ⅓ Argonaut (male). × ½.
(i.e. the animal is three times as long and
broad as figure).

Comparison of Mollusks

Mussel Snail Squid

Shell
Head
Body
Foot
Gills
Eyes
 Comparative Review.—(To occupy an entire page in notebook.)

Grasshopper Spider Crayfish Centipede Mussel

Bilateral or
radiate
Appendages
for
locomotion
Names of
divisions of
body
Organs and
method of
breathing
Locomotion
 CHAPTER X
FISHES

Suggestions.—The
behaviour of a live fish in
clear water, preferably in a
glass vessel or an aquarium,
should be studied. A skeleton
may be prepared by placing a
fish in the reach of ants.
Skeletons of animals placed
on ant beds are cleaned very
thoroughly. The study of the
perch, that follows, will apply
to almost any other common
fish.
Movements and
External Features.—What is the general shape of the body of a
fish? How does the dorsal, or upper, region differ in form from the
ventral? Is there a narrow part or neck where the head joins the
trunk? Where is the body thickest? What is the ratio between the
length and the height? (Fig. 209.) Are the right and the left sides
alike? Is the symmetry of the fish bilateral or radial?
The body of the fish may be divided into three regions—the head,
the trunk, and the tail. The trunk begins with the foremost scales; the
tail is said to begin at the vent, or anus. Which regions bear
appendages? Is the head movable independently of the trunk, or do
they move together? State the advantage or the disadvantage in this.
Is the body depressed (flattened vertically) or compressed (flattened
laterally)? Do both forms occur among fishes? (See figures on pages
123, 124.)
How is the shape of the body advantageous for movement? Can a
fish turn more readily from side to side, or up and down? Why? Is
the head wedge-shaped or conical? Are the jaws flattened laterally or
vertically? The fish swims in the water, the bird swims in the air.
Account for the differences in the shape of their bodies.

Fig. 209.—White Perch (Morone Americana).

Is the covering of the body like the covering of any animal yet
studied? The scales are attached in little pockets, or folds, in the skin.
Observe the shape and size of scales on different parts of the body.
What parts of the fish are without scales? Examine a single scale;
what is its shape? Do you see concentric lines of growth on a scale?
Sketch a few of the scales to show their arrangement. What is the use
of scales? Why are no scales needed on the head? How much of each
scale is hidden? Is there a film over the scale? Are the colours in the
scale or on it?
The Fins.—Are the movements of the fish active or sluggish? Can
it remain stationary without using its fins? Can it move backward?
How are the fins set in motion? What is the colour of the flesh, or
muscles, of a fish? Count the fins. How many are in pairs? (Fig. 209.)
How many are vertical? How many are on the side? How many are
on the middle line? Are the paired or the unpaired fins more effective
in balancing the fish? In turning it from side to side? In raising and
lowering the fish? In propelling it forward? How are some of the fins
useful to the fish besides for balancing and swimming?