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Prediction of Bridge Behavior Through Failure: A Case Study Of The Minnesota


I-35W Bridge Collapse

Conference Paper · April 2013


DOI: 10.1061/9780784412848.253

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Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645

Contents lists available at ScienceDirect

Engineering Structures
journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/engstruct

Numerical investigation of collapse of the Minnesota I-35W bridge


H.M. Salem a, H.M. Helmy b,⇑
a
Cairo University, Giza, Egypt
b
Applied Science International, Giza, Egypt

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: The I-35 Bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Minnesota catastrophically failed during the
Received 8 May 2013 evening rush hour on August 1, 2007, collapsing to the river and riverbanks beneath. In the years prior
Revised 14 November 2013 to the collapse, several reports cited problems with the bridge structure. This research analytically inves-
Accepted 18 November 2013
tigated the cause of the collapse using the Applied Element Method, which recently presented its capa-
bility to study the behavior of collapsing structures. The bridge was modeled using the original
construction drawings, where all the structural details were taken into consideration (steel truss, gusset
Keywords:
plates, concrete slabs, concrete piers, etc.). All the loads at the time of collapse were taken into consider-
Progressive collapse
AEM
ation including traffic and construction loads. It was proven that AEM was capable of analyzing and
Corrosion investigating the cause of collapse of the I35-W bridge. The cause of collapse was found to be the failure
Minnesota I-35 of the gusset plates at connections L11 and U10, which well agreed with the field investigations of the
collapsed bridge. The under-designed thickness of the plates, their corrosion, and the over loading due
to traffic and construction loads at time of collapse were the reasons for the bridge collapse.
Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

1. Introduction The bridge was modeled using original construction drawings.


All the structural details were taken into consideration (steel truss,
The I-35 Bridge over the Mississippi River in Minneapolis, Min- gusset plates, concrete slabs, concrete piers, etc.). All the loads at
nesota was built in 1967. It was a truss-arched bridge 580 m long the time of collapse were taken into consideration including traffic
and 33 m wide. The 8-lane bridge used to serve 140,000 daily traf- and construction loads. A three dimensional model of the bridge
fic counts. The bridge height above the river was 20 m. The bridge has been created with around 102,000 elements.
catastrophically failed during the evening rush hour on August 1,
2007, collapsing to the river and riverbanks beneath as shown in
2. Bridge description
Fig. 1. Thirteen people died and 145 were injured. 117 Cars were
damaged including a school bus and 17 cars fell in the river.
The east elevation of the I-35W bridge is shown in Fig. 2. The
In the years prior to the collapse, official reports cited problems
deck truss portion consisted of three spans. Fixed bearing was used
with the bridge structure [20]. In 1990, the federal government
at pier 7, while expansion roller bearings were used at piers 5, 6,
gave the I-35W bridge a rating of ‘‘structurally deficient,’’ citing
and 8. The deck truss comprised two parallel main trusses spaced
significant corrosion in its bearings. Maintenance work was taking
22 m apart. Each of the upper chords, the lower chords and the
place in the weeks prior to the collapse including joint work and
diagonals and verticals, designed primarily for compression, were
replacing concrete and guard rails. At the time of the collapse, four
welded box members. On the other hand, the vertical and diagonal
of the eight lanes were closed for resurfacing.
members designed primarily for tension were H members consist-
In the current research the cause of the collapse is investigated
ing of flanges welded to a web plate. Riveted steel gusset plates at
using the Applied Element Method (AEM), which recently pre-
the nodes were used to tie the ends of the truss members to one
sented its capability to study the behavior of collapsing structures
another and to the rest of the structure as shown in Fig. 3.
[32,15,16,33,28,29,24,34,5,13,26,8,9]. AEM is a structural analysis
Transverse welded floor trusses spaced at 11.6 m connected the
technique that has the capability to study the behavior of the
east and west main trusses. The floor trusses were cantilevered out
structure before, during and after collapse. AEM can predict the
about 4.9 m past the east and west main trusses. The concrete deck
mode of failure, time of failure, forces induced in different ele-
rested on 685-mm-deep wide-flange longitudinal stringers
ments during failure, as well as the velocity of flying debris.
attached to the transverse floor trusses and spaced at 2.5 m as
shown in Fig. 4. Diaphragms connected the webs of adjacent
⇑ Corresponding author. Tel.: +20 1005664092. stringers to transfer lateral loads and maintain structural rigidity
E-mail address: eng_hudahelmy@hotmail.com (H.M. Helmy). and geometry.

0141-0296/$ - see front matter Ó 2013 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.engstruct.2013.11.022
636 H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645

Fig. 1. Collapsed I-35W bridge over the Mississippi River in 2007 [20].

3. Bridge condition to collapse

Fig. 3. Typical five-member node in the top chord of I-35W bridge [20].
In 1991, the superstructure of the I-35W bridge received its first
condition assessment as ‘‘poor condition’’ and hence the I-35W
bridge had been classified structurally deficient [20]. According
to the FHWA, a status of structurally deficient does not indicate
that a bridge is unsafe but only that the structure is in need of
maintenance, repair, or eventual rehabilitation. If unsafe condi-
tions are identified during a physical inspection, the bridge will
be closed. The last regular State inspection of the I-35W bridge
prior to the collapse was in June 2006 when inspectors assigned
a condition rating ‘‘poor’’ to the bridge where deficiencies like poor
weld details, corrosion, connections sway, paint failure, surface
rust, and section loss were found in each of paint system, main
truss members, floor beam trusses, stringers, truss bearing assem-
blies, end floor beams and crossbeams and rocker bearings in scat-
tered locations.
The 2006 report recommended that an eventual replacement of
the entire structure would be preferable [20]. The report also rec-
ommended that, if replacement were to be significantly delayed,
the bridge should be redecked and its superstructure repainted.
The report indicated that the gusset plates at L11E node showed
a section loss and pitting inside the gusset plate. It showed that
the inside gusset plate at the L11E node had loss of section Fig. 4. Interior structure of north portion of deck truss, looking north [20].
457 mm long and up to 4.75 mm deep (original thick-
ness = 12.7 mm). From the debris of the collapsed bridge, safety the upper chords U90 /U100 and the diagonals L90 /U100 (north edges
board investigators measured the corrosion of the gusset plate at of the plates) were bowed to the east.
node 11 and found it as shown in Table 1.
Earlier investigations for the bridge showed visible bowing in
all four gusset plates at the two U10 nodes. At both U10 nodes, 4. Bridge traffic and construction loading at time of collapse
the unsupported edges between upper chords U9/U10 and diago-
nals L9/U10 (south edges of both plates) were bowed toward the On the day of bridge collapse, the contractor was preparing to
west. At the two U100 nodes, three of the four plate edges between pour an overlay in the southbound inside lanes. The pour would

Fig. 2. East elevation of I-35W bridge [20].


H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645 637

Table 1
Statistics for laser scan measurements of L11 gusset plate thickness [20].

Measurement Gusset plate


L11E outside (east) L11E inside (west) L11W inside (east) L11W outside (west)
Mean thickness (mm) 12.11 10.5 10.7 11.48
Minimum thickness (mm) 9.2 6.96 7 8.64
Mean section loss (%) 4.7 17.1 15.8 9.6

dinally over the deck truss U10 nodes. Along with the aggregates in
this area was a water tanker truck with 11,350 l of water, a cement
tanker, a concrete mixer, one small loader/excavator, and four self-
propelled walk-behind or ride-along buggies for moving smaller
amounts of materials.

5. Field investigations and numerical analysis

After the bridge collapsed, field investigations were con-


ducted by the Mn/DOT [19] and the NTSB. Reported observa-
tions [10,21,22] indicated that the failure initiated at panel
point U10. Fig. 7(a) is a photograph taken prior to the collapse
[20]), showing a pair of gusset plates connecting five truss
members at panel point U10 of the west main truss (U10W).
Fig. 7(b) identifies the five truss members: upper chords U9/
Fig. 5. Construction equipment and aggregates stockpiled on southbound lanes of U10 and U10/U11, diagonals L9/U10 and U10/L11, and a verti-
bridge about 2 h before collapse [20].
cal U10/L10. The five truss members were connected through a
pair of 13-mm thick gusset plates of ASTM A441 grade 50 steel
[3] and using 25-mm diameter rivets. The upper chords U9/U10
extend between node 14 near the center of the deck truss north- and U10/U11 and compression diagonal L9/U10 were box sec-
ward to node 00 . The required materials included four end-dumps tions, while the tension diagonal U10/L11 and vertical U10/
of sand, four end-dumps of gravel, and three cement tankers. L10 were W-sections. All members were welded built-up sec-
Two of the cement tankers were fully loaded 363-kN vehicles that tions. Because U10 was located near an inflection point of the
would be positioned off the deck. One tanker, with weight less than continuous truss, the force in the upper chord switched from
363-kN, would be staged on the deck. The aggregates and the con- tension on one side of the panel point to compression on the
struction vehicles occupied an estimated 70-m-long section of the other side, as indicated in Fig. 7(b), while the diagonal mem-
two closed southbound lanes over the main river span. The area bers delivered substantial compression and tension to the con-
where the equipment and materials were stored is shown in nection. As a result, a large net shear force was produced along
Fig. 5 for a photograph taken 2 h before bridge collapse [20]. After the horizontal critical section indicated in the figure. Based on
this photograph was taken, the contractor moved the materials commonly used, simplified design checks, Holt and Hartmann
closer to the median barrier to allow more space for the movement [11] suggested that the gusset plates at panel points U10
of construction vehicles and traffic. The aggregates were needed to be twice as thick to safely transfer the shear force
distributed in eight adjacent piles placed along the median in the produced by design loads. Fig. 8(a) shows a photograph of pa-
leftmost southbound lane just north of pier 6. The aggregates occu- nel point U10W taken after the collapse [21], while Fig. 8(b)
pied a space about 35 m long and 3.6–4.9 m wide, with its south- illustrates the three primary fractures seen in Fig. 8(a) and that
ern boundary about 3 m north of pier 6 as illustrated in Fig. 6. were commonly observed in all four U10W and U10E gusset
This staging placed the aggregate piles generally centered longitu- plates:

Fig. 6. Estimated positions of construction aggregates and equipment along the two inner southbound lanes of I-35W bridge at the time of collapse [20].
638 H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645

Fig. 7. Connection U10 before collapse.

Fig. 8. Connection U10 after collapse.

(A) Diagonal fracture along rivet holes connecting the gusset strength of the U10 gusset plates was insufficient to carry the de-
plate to the compression diagonal L9/U10. The fracture sign forces [11] and strongly suggest that failure of the I-35W
occurred along the perimeter holes of the rivet group adja- bridge.
cent to U10/L10. Liao et al. [18] carried out 2D finite element analysis for the
(B) Horizontal fracture below the lower edge of upper chord U9/ bridge using SAP2000. The deck was not assumed to act in a com-
U10. posite manner with the steel truss in this model. 3D finite element
(C) Vertical fracture near the separation between the upper analysis was carried out for the joint U10 using ABAQUS. The ap-
chords U9/U10 and U10/U11. plied forces on the joint was calculated from the 2D analysis . They
found that, the new constructed deck at the later years and the
Fracture of gusset plates was uniquely observed in the U10 pa- construction material and equipment increases the forces applied
nel points. This observation combined with the fact that the design on U10 gusset plate along with insufficient strength of the gusset

Z Y Element 1 Element 2
Reinforcing
x
bar

Element 1 Element 1 Element 1


Reinforcing bar
springs
Normal Springs Shear Springs x-z Shear Springs y-z
(a) Elements Discretization (b) Interface Springs between
in AEM Adjacent Elements
Fig. 9. Modeling of a structure with AEM.
H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645 639

fects of the forces from diagonal members. Although the bridge’s


truss cell structure was appropriately designed, the design of the
node that connected the floor members to the main truss frame
ΔX θZ was inadequate to effectively distribute live and dead load. Conse-
quently, the local redundancy provided by the truss cells was sig-
Normal Stresses
Normal Stresses nificantly reduced.

ΔZ
6. Applied Element Method (AEM)
θX
Shear Stresses x-z& x-y Literature has shown that the Applied Element Method (AEM)
Shear Stresses x-z theory gives good estimations for large displacements and defor-
ΔY mations of structures undergoing collapse [5,26,24,7,28,29,34,
3,31,27]. AEM is a modeling method adopting the concept of dis-
θY crete cracking. As shown in Fig. 9(a), the structure in the AEM is
Z modeled as an assembly of elements connected together along
their surfaces through a set of normal and shear springs. The two
Shear Stresses x-y X Normal Stresses
elements are shown in Fig. 9(b) are assumed to be connected by
Relative Translations Y Relative Rotations normal and shear springs located at the contact points, which are
distributed on the element faces. These connecting springs
Fig. 10. Stresses in springs due to elements’ relative displacement. represent the state of stresses, strains and connectivity between
elements. They can represent both concrete and steel reinforcing
bars.
plate. Also the temperature gradient between the two sides of the Each single element has six degrees of freedom: three for trans-
connection produced additional stresses. lations and three for rotations. Relative translational or rotational
Hao [30] performed 3D nonlinear finite element computation displacement between two neighboring elements cause stresses
based load rating analysis. The analysis indicates that some of in the springs located at their common face as shown in Fig. 10.
the gusset plates had almost reached their yield limit when the Two neighboring elements can be totally separated once the
bridge experienced the design load condition. The bridge was sus- springs connecting them rupture. Fully nonlinear path-dependant
tained by additional safety margin provided by the ultimate constitutive models are adopted in the AEM as shown in Fig. 11.
strength of the ductile steel that comprised the gusset plates. He For concrete in compression, an elasto-plastic and fracture model
found that the thickness of the gusset and the thickness of the side is adopted [14,23] as shown in Fig. 11(a). When concrete is sub-
wall of the upper chord were designed proportional to the bending jected to tension, a linear stress strain relationship is adopted until
moment solution of a one dimensional influence line analysis. This cracking of the concrete springs, where the stresses then drop to
fact reveals the NTBS disclosed underside gusset plates are the zero. The residual stresses are then redistributed in the next load-
consequence of a bias toward a ‘‘one dimensional model’’ in the ing step by applying the redistributed force values in the reverse
original design that did not give sufficient consideration to the ef- direction. For concrete springs, the relationship between shear

Fig. 11. Constitutive models for concrete and reinforcing bars.


640 H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645

Fig. 12. A comparison for analysis range between FEM and AEM.

Fig. 13. Progressive collapse analysis by Kaewkulchai and Williamson [12].

Fig. 15. AEM model for the gusset plates for the main trusses.

Fig. 14. AEM model of the whole bridge. progressive collapse and large deformation analyses. Many draw
backs are associated with the FEM progressive collapse analysis.
The element damage, separation, falling and collision with other
stress and shear strain is assumed to remain linear till the cracking elements is very difficult. Fig. 12 shows a comparison of analysis
of concrete. Then, the shear stresses drop down as shown in range between FEM and AEM. The main obstacle facing FEM when
Fig. 11(b). The level of drop of shear stresses depends on the aggre-
gate interlock and friction at the crack surface.
For reinforcement springs, the model presented by Ristic et al.
[25] is used as shown in Fig. 11(c). The tangent stiffness of
reinforcement is calculated based on the strain from the reinforce-
ment spring, loading status (either loading or unloading) and the
previous history of steel spring which controls the Bauschinger’s
effect.
The solution for the dynamic problem adopts implicit step-by-
step integration (Newmark-beta) method [2,4]. The equilibrium
equations represent a linear system of equations for each step.
The solution of the equilibrium equations is commonly solved
using Cholesky upper–lower decomposition. Once elements are
separated, the stiffness matrix becomes singular. However, the sta-
bility of the overall system of equilibrium equations is kept be-
cause of the existence of the mass matrix. Separated elements
may collide with other elements. In that case, new springs are gen-
erated at the contact points of the collided elements.

6.1. Applied element versus finite element

Although the FEM is a robust and well established structural


analysis method, it is not the optimum solution for the scope of Fig. 16. Detailed model for gusset plates including rivet holes.
H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645 641

Table 2
Material properties of bridge components.

Material Young’s modulus (GPa) Yield stress (MPa) Ultimate tensile strength (MPa) Ultimate compressive strength (MPa)
Concrete 24.6 – 4 60
Steel 200 323 470 470
Gusset plates 200 253 407 407

modeling structures is the modeling of large cracks and element Element Erosion Technique by removing damaged elements from
separation. Although there are several FEM techniques that enable the analysis when certain damage criteria are met. The main
element separation, these are still limited to small problems with advantages of using AEM center on its ability to reliably and accu-
limited cracking and separation and cannot be generalized for rately predict structural behavior beginning with the initial loading
use by practicing engineers in a full structural application. Using stages, into crack initiation, through propagation on to complete
FEM, the element separation location can be either pre-defined collapse. AEM’s algorithms facilitate complex structural analysis
by the user or automated; however, both solutions are impractical. without any user intervention and without artificial assumptions
Pre-defining the location controls the location of element separa- as to where or when cracks will occur. Hartmann et al. [6] showed
tion, an event unknown in many cases, especially during structural that the computations associated with the simulation of collapses
collapse. Automation of element separation can be done using the of real world structures based on conventional FEM are very costly,

Buckling of gusset
plate connecting
diagonal L11-1U2
@ L11E

t = 0.23 seconds
L
U10E plate 11E plate
(a) Time= 0.23 seconds

Buckling of gusset
plate connecting
diagonal L9-U10 @
U10E
Rupture of gusset
plate connecting
diagonals U10-L11
and L11-U12 @
L11E

t = 0.32 seconds

U10E plate L11E plate


(b) Time= 0.32 seconds

L11E plate
Rupture of gusset
plate connecting
diagonal L9-U10 @
U10E

Total rupture of
gusset plate L11E

t = 0.6 seconds

U10E plate
(c) Time= 0.6 seconds
Fig. 17. Failure of gusset plates L11 and U10.
642 H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645

and therefore followed another approach based on multibody not expected to have a significant role in the bridge collapse.
models Researchers have used the FEM for progressive collapse Therefore, they were assumed rigid for modeling simplicity.
analysis of frame structures [1,12,17]. As an example, Fig. 13 shows In these runs the weakening in the connection, caused by the
a model of Kaewkulchai and Williamson which does not follow the corrosion, was explicitly modeled by using a gusset plate with re-
behavior to the complete collapse. On the other hand, the Applied duced thickness according to Table 1. The bowing of gusset plates
Element Method (AEM), adopted in the current study, proved to be at connection U10 was not considered for simplicity. Material
capable of incorporating these features and following the structure properties for different materials used in the analysis are shown
to its total collapse [5,7,8,9,24,26,28,29,31,33,34]. in Table 2.
All vehicles, equipments and aggregates were modeled using
lumped masses in their relevant locations. The reason for using
7. Bridge model lumped masses instead of direct applied loads is that effect of iner-
tia forces of these vehicles and equipments during collapse can be
The I-35W bridge has been modeled using the AEM as shown in included.
Fig. 14, where all structural components have been taken into con-
sideration. The created model was a sophisticated one where the
8. Analysis results
connections of the main trusses have been modeled in detail
including their gusset plates as shown in Fig. 15. The holes of the
A dynamic analysis was carried out for the bridge under the
rivets were included as shown in Fig. 16. The rivets were not
traffic and construction loading at the time of collapse. The load
explicitly modeled, however, a the truss members and the gusset
was monotonically increased up to failure in a dynamic manner.
plates was considered to represent the rivets effect. This assump-
The analysis results showed that the failure initiated in the lower
tion is not far from reality, where observations showed that the riv-
chord gusset plates L11. The part of the gusset plate connecting
ets did not fail and that the failure was in the gusset plates away
the diagonal L11–U12 (a compression member) buckled as shown
from rivets. Connections other than main trusses connections are
in Fig. 17. This was followed by rupture of this part together with a
tensile rupture of the part of the gusset plates L11 connecting the
diagonal L11–U10 (a tension member). At the same time the part
of the gusset plate U10 that connects the diagonal U10–L9 buckled
as shown in Fig. 17. This gusset plate reached the yield stress at
48% of the ultimate load as shown in Fig. 18. This obtained high
stress proves the issue of the under-designed gusset plate as well
as the corrosion effect. The behavior of gusset plates at both east
and west sides of the bridge was generally similar. This agreed
with the real behavior of the bridge during collapse where the

Fig. 18. Principal stresses contours in gusset plate U10. Fig. 19. Sliding of roller above pier 6.
H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645 643

(a) Observed fracture of gusset plate U10E (b) Analytically obtained buckling
of gusset plate U10E

(c) Analytically obtained principal compressive


strains in gusset plate U10E
Fig. 20. Comparison of analytical and observed fracture of gusset plate U10E.

compared to the analytically obtained buckling and rupture in


Fig. 20(b) and principal compressive strains in Fig. 20(c). As can
be seen, the analysis is in a good agreement with the field
observations.
The evolution in normal forces in the three diagonals U10–L9,
U10–L11 and U12–L11 at the eastern main truss is shown in
Fig. 21, where the normal forces drops to zero as a result of failure
of connections L11 and U10 indicating loss of load-carrying capac-
ity of the truss members.
Fig. 22 shows a comparison of the I35-W bridge collapse cap-
tured by traffic cameras and the analytical results obtained by
the AEM. As seen in Fig. 21, a very good agreement is obvious.

9. Conclusions

Based on the analytical results of the AEM, the following conclu-


sions could be obtained;

(1) The AEM was proven to be a very good numerical tool that
was capable of analyzing and investigating the cause of col-
Fig. 21. Evolution in normal forces in Diagonals U10–L9, U10–L11 and U12–L11 in lapse of the I35-W bridge. The AEM could analyze the bridge
the eastern main truss. behavior till its complete collapse. The cause of collapse was
obtained from the analysis and was found to be in very good
bridge fell into the river without tilting around its longitudinal agreement with the investigations of the collapsed bridge.
axis. The failure of those connections lead to instability of the main (2) The failure of the gusset plates at connections L11 and U10
trusses and was the initiator of the bridge progressive collapse. was found to initiate the collapse of the bridge. Their failure
Fig. 19 shows the sliding of rollers above pier 6 which resulted was initiated by their buckling at the portions connecting
from huge deflection of the central bay of the bridge. the diagonal members under compressive axial loads.
Failure of the gusset plates at U10 obtained by AEM analysis (3) The under-designed thickness of the plates, their corrosion,
was verified by the investigations of the collapsed bridge [20]. and the over loading due to traffic and construction loads
Fig. 20(a) shows the observed fracture of gusset plate U10E at time of collapse were the reasons for the bridge collapse.
644 H.M. Salem, H.M. Helmy / Engineering Structures 59 (2014) 635–645

(a) Pictures for I-35W bridge (b) Analytical results for I-35W
collapse taken by traffic cameras bridge collapse
Fig. 22. Comparison of the analytical results of I35-W collapse and the pictures obtained from the traffic cameras.

[9] Helmy H, Salem H, Mourad S. Computer-aided assessment of progressive


collapse of reinforced concrete structures according to GSA code. ASCE J
Perform Constr Facil 2013. October.
Acknowledgements [10] Hill HJ, McGermely JC, Koob MJ, Nugent WJ. I-35W Bridge over the Mississippi
River: collapse investigation-bridge no. 9340. Minneapolis, Minnesota. Final
Report. Northbrook, IL: Wiss, Janney, Elastner Associates Inc.; 2008 [prepared
The authors gratefully acknowledge Applied Science Interna- for Mn/DOT].
tional, LLC, for the financial support to the current research. The [11] Holt R, Hartmann J. Adequacy of the U10 gusset plate design for the Minnesota
authors would like to express their gratitude to Tegeldin, H., Mohs- bridge No. 9340 (I-35W over the Mississippi River) – Final Report. Federal
Highway Administration Turner-Fairbank Highway Research Center Report;
sen, S., Lotfy, N., and Elfouly, A., for their kind helps in this research. 2008.
[12] Kaewkulchai G, Williamson E. Dynamic behavior of planar frames during
progressive collapse. In: 16th ASCE engineering mechanics conference,
Washington; 2003.
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