Sexual Abuse and Education in Japan:

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Sexual Abuse and Education
in Japan
Bringing together two voices, practice and theory, in a collaboration
that emerges from lived experience and structured reflection upon
that experience, O’Mochain and Ueno show how entrenched
discursive forces exert immense influence in Japanese society and
how they might be most effectively challenged.
With a psychosocial framework that draws insights from feminism,
sociology, international studies, and political psychology, the authors
pinpoint the motivations of the nativist right and reflect on the
change of conditions that is necessary to end cultures of impunity
for perpetrators of sexual abuse in Japan. Evaluating the value of the
#MeToo model of activism, the authors offer insights that will
encourage victims to come out of the shadows, pursue justice, and
help transform Japan’s sense of identity both at home and abroad.
Ueno, a female Japanese educator, and O’Mochain, a non-Japanese
male academic, examine the nature of sexual abuse problems both
in educational contexts and in society at large through the use of
surveys, interviews, and engagement with an eclectic range of
academic literature. They identify the groups within society who
offer the least support for women who pursue justice against
perpetrators of sexual abuse. They also ask if far-right ideological
extremists are fixated with proving that so-called “comfort women”
are higaisha-buru or “fake victims.” Japan would have much to gain
on the international stage were it to fully acknowledge historical
crimes of sexual violence, yet it continues to refuse to do so.
O’Mochain and Ueno shed light on this puzzling refusal through
recourse to the concepts of “international status anxiety” and “male
hysteria.”
An insightful read for scholars of Japanese society, especially those
concerned about its treatment of women.

Robert O’Mochain is an Associate Professor at the College of

International Relations, Ritsumeikan University, Kyoto, Japan. He has
extensively researched issues surrounding masculinities, gender
discrimination, and sexual violence. He is a contributor to the
Routledge Handbook of the Politics of the #MeToo Movement.

Yuki Ueno is a Lecturer in the Faculty of Japanese Language,

Literature, and Civilization at the University of Toulouse Jean Jaures,
France. Her research focuses on sexualization of school uniforms in
Japanese society.
Routledge Contemporary
Japan Series
89 Women and Political Inequality in Japan
Gender Imbalanced Democracy
Mikiko Eto

90 Somaesthetics and the Philosophy of Culture

Projects in Japan
Satoshi Higuchi

91 Japan’s Nationalist Right in the Internet Age

Online Media and Grassroots Conservative Activism
Jeffrey J. Hall

92 Zainichi Koreans and Mental Health

Psychiatric Problem in Japanese Korean Minorities, Their Social
Background and Life Story
Kim Taeyoung

93 Japanese War Orphans

Abandoned Twice by the State
Jiaxin Zhong

94 Japanese Media and the Intelligentsia after Fukushima

Disaster Culture
Katsuyuki Hidaka
95 Japanese Public Diplomacy in European Countries
The Japan Foundation in Bulgaria and France
Nadejda Gadjeva

96 Sexual Abuse and Education in Japan

In the (Inter)National Shadows
Robert O’Mochain and Yuki Ueno

For more information about this series, please visit:

www.routledge.com/Routledge-Contemporary-Japan-Series/book-
series/SE0002
Sexual Abuse and Education
in Japan
In the (Inter)National Shadows

Robert O’Mochain and Yuki Ueno

First published 2023
by Routledge
4 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge
605 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10158
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2023 Robert O’Mochain and Yuki Ueno
The right of Robert O’Mochain and Yuki Ueno to be identified as authors of this
work has been asserted in accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright,
Designs and Patents Act 1988.
With the exception of Chapter 3, no part of this book may be reprinted or
reproduced or utilised in any form or by any electronic, mechanical, or other
means, now known or hereafter invented, including photocopying and recording,
or in any information storage or retrieval system, without permission in writing
from the publishers.
Chapter 3 of this book is available for free in PDF format as Open Access at
www.taylorfrancis.com. It has been made available under a Creative Commons
Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivatives 4.0 International license.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks or registered
trademarks, and are used only for identification and explanation without intent to
infringe.
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
A catalogue record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging in Publication Data
A catalog record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-032-31023-7 (hbk)
ISBN: 978-1-032-31024-4 (pbk)
ISBN: 978-1-003-30766-2 (ebk)
DOI: 10.4324/9781003307662
Typeset in Galliard
by SPi Technologies India Pvt Ltd (Straive)
The Open Access version of Chapter 3 was funded by Ritsumeikan University.
For Futoshi, my treasure.
Contents
List of Tables
Introduction
Part One The present situation: An overview
1 Sexual abuse in Japanese society
2 Sexual abuse in educational contexts in Japan
Part Two Sexual abuse in Japan: A psychosocial
exploration
3 In the shadow of male hysteria: International status
anxiety
4 In the shadow of male hysteria: Retaliation anxiety
Part Three Beyond the #MeToo model
5 Transcending the past, constructing the future
6 “Sei higaisha o kizutsukenai shakai ni”: Toward a society
without victims of sexual abuse
Appendix
Index
Tables
1.1 Awareness of #MeToo and related campaigns
3.1 Attitudes to sexual harassment issues and victims of abuse
4.1 Perpetrator professions and willingness to report abuse
Introduction
DOI: 10.4324/9781003307662-1

Compared to 30 years ago, awareness of sexual harassment has

increased, and the term “sexual harassment” has stuck, but
people still say and do the same things: They bash women who
raise their voices. Fundamentally, nothing has changed.
Haruno Mayumi, the first woman to successfully sue her
employer due to sexual harassment in her workplace in a
publishing house in Fukuoka. (Cited by Suzuki, 2018)

By international standards of women’s empowerment, Japanese

women have considerable quality of life. The UN Development
Programme’s Gender Inequality Index (UNDP, 2014) collates data on
women’s participation in the labor force, their attainment of higher
education, maternal mortality, and reproductive health. When these
and other factors are taken into account, Japan has a creditable
record being ranked at no. 25 in the world, a rank lower than that of
South Korea (no. 17) but better than that of the United States and
many other states. However, commitment to gender equality values
is relatively low. An international survey of 27 nations (Kaur-Ballagan
& Stannard, 2018) asked respondents to agree or disagree with the
statement, “Achieving equality between men and women is
important to me personally.” Based on this response (39% agreeing,
37% disagreeing), Japan ranked lowest in terms of personal
commitment to gender equality, in contrast to two neighboring
countries, South Korea (ranked no. 15) and China (ranked no. 4).
While many lauded the policies of ex-Prime Minister Abe Shinzō’s
administration (2012–2020) to “let women shine” in Japanese
society, the results were disappointing. Study participant Akiko
[Interview No. 11] commented,

The ratio of the number of women employed under Abe’s

administration increased. However, most of them are engaged in
part-time jobs, and they can easily be fired when companies do
not need them. The domestic responsibility of men is not even
discussed once. The idea of freedom in a new marital surname
system is gone. We cannot even imagine Japan accepting
diverse kinds of families.

Reports of karōshi (death by overwork) and of mental health

problems among female workers were worrying enough for the
Japanese government to survey over 1000 female employees. A
White Paper from the Ministry of Health, Labor, and Welfare (MHLW)
on measures to prevent death from overwork yielded worrying
results. The survey indicated that over one-third of the women with
mental health issues named workplace harassment as the main
cause of their anguish (MHLW, 2020). Other research data regarding
sexual abuse, gender harassment, and the reporting of such
misconduct also reveal a worrying picture. In 2020, a sexual assault
survivors’ organization, “Spring,” surveyed nearly 6000 respondents
(96% female) on issues of sexual abuse. Only 15% of respondents
went to the police. Police accepted only 7% of victim reports from
those respondents. A mere 0.7% of attackers were indicted and
found guilty in a law court. Yamamoto Jun, the representative
director of Spring commented, “I would like for us to foster a society
that places trust in the voices of victims” (Shiota, 2020). The roots of
this fundamental lack of trust deserve closer examination, as do
questions regarding the likelihood that the #MeToo movement and
offshoot campaigns will achieve significant changes in society for the
benefit of victims. The following sections outline the theoretical
framework used here to contextualize and interpret research data
regarding high levels of sexual abuse and non-reporting in Japanese
society.

Inter(national) identities, “comfort

women,”1 and male hysteria
The internalization of regulatory cultural norms is a key process in
the formation of a sense of social identity (cf. Butler, 1993). Norms
categorize us in terms of sex, gender, race, nationality, religion,
class, and so on. We are called to affirm these identifications that
are made on our behalf, but identification with also involves
identification against, as in processes of exclusion on the level of the
psyche (cf. Butler, 1997) and this can be a source of cognitive
dissonance. Identity has a constructed rather than an essential
nature. It is something that we do, rather than something we reveal.
Identity is also relational. Without being placed in relation to the
“other” it is not possible to sustain processes of identity formation.
These processes involve a struggle for “ontological security” or the
sense that one’s positive self-image corresponds to reality and is
recognized by others. In her account of nations’ identity construction
and their search for ontological security in an age of globalization,
Kinnvall (2004, p. 12) titles one section “The formation of We-
images: The other as an object or an abject.” A key means of
sustaining the construction of these “We-images” is in storytelling,
and identities can also be seen as emotionally charged stories of self
or of the group that allow individuals and collective groups to
construct meanings about their place in the world with a sense of
agency (cf. Hall, 1993, on identities as “necessary fictions”). Bracher
(1993, 2006) suggests that the narratives of identity which provide a
foundational sense of meaning for the self take precedence over
almost all other aspects of existence as they guarantee a sense of
cohesion on an existential level. Social beings must believe in the
foundational maxim, “I am a force that matters in the world.” Thanks
to the success of the nation-building project, this maxim often
becomes confounded with the nationalist aspiration, “We are a force
that matters in the world.” All individuals, including those who
function as embodiments of national identity, are capable of extreme
actions and reactions in order to guarantee and sustain their
foundational narratives of identity as a force that matters in the
world. As time goes on, social subjects more deeply internalize the
norms that embody social identities, which provide reassurance of
the cohesion of the self, in spite of the prospect of bodily
disintegration and mortality. An example of age-related
internalization patterns can be found in Sasaki (2004). He found that
national identity is not particularly important for children and young
people in Japan who have positive associations with non-Japanese.
However, this tends to change as one surveys older age groups and
their perception of foreign nations.
Wendt (1999) writes of homogeneity as a “master variable” in the
logic of identity formation. National identity emerges from the
encounter with other nations and often requires the construction of
the national self as homogenous so that only one position on any
topic can be legitimized, even when the topic in question may be
nuanced and complex. A psychoanalytic understanding of discourse
(and of identity) draws on a Lacanian vocabulary in which discourse
represents a series of fundamental relationships that are mediated
by symbolic and linguistic codes. Four fundamental structures of
discourse produce four major social effects that are associated with
a range of psychological factors. Some social subjects take up a
position within the “discourse of the hysteric” (cf. Lacan, 1977;
Bracher, 1993), which is characterized by expressions of extreme
opposition to alternative systems of knowledge that threaten the
successful production of their own signifiers of identity and meaning
(Chapters 3 and 4). These processes are often interwoven into
discourses of exceptionalism: “all others are X, but we are Y.” This
relationality prompts us to use parenthetical symbolism to refer to
the dichotomous nature of identity, national and international, in the
case of Japan.2 Depending on context and audience, either
orientation, whether a focus on required homogeneity of national
identity or enhanced status of international identity, may demand
expression. Weber (1998, p. 164) shows how the dynamics of
intervention by post-hegemonic states require a blurring of the
foreign/domestic dichotomy. Japan is not a post-hegemonic state
according to Weber’s classification, but it does seek recognition of its
status within such a geopolitical world where domestic and
international spheres inter-penetrate. The interpenetration of
identities that is involved in the national/international vector also
resonates with the analysis made by Grosvenor (1999) who
identifies three key factors in the construction of national identity in
Japan since the foundation of the Meiji-era nation-state –
interactions with foreign states, perceptions of Japan’s status in the
international system, and identity pressures from within the
domestic sphere. The following chapters explore these factors, with
a focus on the identity pressures that are exerted by far-right
ideological extremists in Japanese society and the wide-ranging
deleterious effects that are involved. Chapter 3 points to some of
these effects by providing survey research data that illustrate the
influence of context and identity concerns in the expression of
attitudes toward sexual abuse issues. This has relevance for
seemingly unrelated issues, such as the difficulties encountered by
female victims of sexual violence who pursue justice. The results
also help to provide new answers to the question highlighted in
Chapter 6: “What are women afraid of?”
A historical perspective on Japan within the East Asian region is
provided by Han and Ling (1998) who classify Japan and three other
East Asian states with a Confucian cultural heritage as exponents of
“Capitalist Developmental State” (hereafter CDS) (cf. Johnson, 1995,
p. 8). In such economies, citizens will submit their personal
preferences to the economic goals of the nation, as defined by the
government and its bureaucratic elites. In CDS, the masculinism that
is characteristic of capitalism in the West forms a hybrid system that
casts society as the child to be governed by authoritarian, parent-
state guardians. This “hybrid, hyper-masculinized state … glorifies
aggression, achievement, control, competition, and power …” (Han &
Ling, 1998, p. 54). While society’s voice is weakened before the
state, women find themselves at a particular disadvantage due to
the expectations and norms that shape their experiences of
domestic, economic, and civic spheres. Women are subject to
exploitation, then, within the family, within the economy, and within
the state. Han and Ling (1998) go on to delineate the characteristics
of CDS, which include the necessity for interest groups to become
institutionalized if they are to achieve their objectives in a society
where political elites control and curtail the dissemination of data
that are classified as “Western,” such as discourses of individual
rights. The authors caution against the use of their analysis to
bolster East–West essentialism. No one should suggest that citizens
of CDS are “naturally” predisposed to the type of authoritarian
governance that is eschewed by Western democracy. Nevertheless,
they recognize the power of essentializing discourses to produce
real-world effects. “World Order” discourses of East and West still
effectively construct gender images of CDS rulers/parents as moral
and benevolent in contrast with the children of the West who are
barbaric and greedy. The relevance of this imagery is apparent in our
analysis of the Westernized “bad girl” figure who has been
stigmatized in various discursive contexts in Japan (see Chapter 4).
All of these considerations will be relevant in an assessment of the
likelihood of success for movements that represent individual citizens
who are victims of sexual abuse and who may be targeted by
stigmatizing discourses if they pursue justice.
Zarakol (2011) contextualizes Japan within a global context and
identifies historical similarities of East–West ambiguity in the history
of Japan, Turkey, and Russia. In each of these nations, narratives of
national identity are particularly contested around the maintenance
of “us/them” polarities that are structured by “East–West” tensions.
Each country had large empires which were forfeited after defeat at
the hands of the West, and these parallels may also be relevant
when considering contemporary political developments in these
states, such as the fate of social movements.3 #MeToo or its
offshoot campaigns have not been particularly successful in any of
the three states, and in each case, the identification of #MeToo with
the West has been (made) problematic.4 In her account of the
#MeToo movement in Russia, Sedysheva (2021) shows that the
long-term effects of the movement have probably been as much
negative as positive. #MeToo could not overcome pre-existing
discourses that stigmatize all feminist movements originating in “The
West” as attacks on local culture and national pride. Sedysheva’s
analysis prompts the question: “Are similar processes of
stigmatization at work in Japan, and what are the consequences?”
Chapters 3 and 4 help to provide some answers. Zarakol (2011, p.
199) elaborates on identity issues when she asserts that national
identity is at stake when narratives about historical crimes are in
question. The frequently heated controversies over Japan’s wartime
behavior reflect the determination of certain groups to promote a
sense of national identity that is based on “a whitewashed version of
Japanese history.” These groups are investigated in the following
chapters. Chapter 3 presents findings from two surveys that were
conducted with university students. The addition of five items that
evoke anxieties about international status and a toxic association of
ideas between military “comfort women” and “compensated dating”
resulted in substantial changes in overall response. The significance
of the survey findings is explained, with particular reference to the
likely effectiveness of campaigns that adopt a #MeToo approach.
 Struggles to define national identity and to reinscribe narratives of
the country’s place in the world are ongoing endeavors within
struggles for power in diverse social formations. In an account of
gender and work relations in modern Japan, Yoda (2000) argues
that, since the 1990s, far-right commentators have crafted a
narrative of Japan that reinforces paternalism. According to this
narrative, Japan has become a “maternal society” in which citizens
lack respect for authority, Japanese identity, and the role of the
father. Symptoms included rampant narcissism, rebellious youth,
poor school attendance, and prostitution by middle-class girls. Yoda
argues, however, that contemporary Japan cannot justly be
characterized as a “maternal society” because the discursive power
of paternalism has never been erased. Similarly, Baradel (2019, p.
36) elaborates on the trend toward greater authoritarianism and
“shaming paternalism” over the past quarter century. Transgressive
members of society such as professional criminals, drug addicts, and
radical social activists are subject to shaming on the basis that they
are “individuals who made a deliberate choice” for wicked things
and, thus, are deserving of punishment. While authorities use their
power to stimatize more stringently such individuals, the possibility
that this paternalistic, authoritarian mindset may work to stigmatize
other groups has not yet been fully interrogated. Women who have
been subjected to sexual assault often risk further subjection to
victim blaming and being cast as the instigators of rape or other
forms of sexual assault through the choices they made regarding
clothing, appearance, and consumption of alcohol (see Chapter 1).
This work shows that female victims of sexual abuse are also
affected by increased authoritarianism and by “shaming paternalism”
due to a fear that they, rather than their assailants, will be cast in a
culpable light. In this way, far-right political discourse inhibits the
pursuit of gender justice in Japanese society. Chapter 4 explores
historical links between politics, extreme nationalism, and organized
crime syndicates, three groups that are affiliated not only by a
commonly held ultra-nationalist ideology, but also by male hysteria.
In different and overlapping ways, these powerful constituencies
have attempted to promote a set of negative associations with
“comfort women.”
Yamamoto (2004, p. ix) accurately refers to “comfort women” as
those who “were systematically recruited, generally by force,
deception or under conditions of debt-slavery, during the period
1937 to 1945 and forced under slave-like conditions to serve the
sexual ‘needs’ of the Japanese military during the Asia Pacific war.”
The term jūgun ianfu or “military comfort women” was the official
phrase used by the Japanese military forces during the Asia-Pacific
War. The problematic nature of the term has been widely
recognized. Shibata (2008, p. 9) notes that the term “constructs the
perception of this gross human rights violation as something non-
problematically pleasant.” Similarly, Burns (2005) argues that so-
called “comfort stations” should be referred to as “rape centers” of
enforced prostitution. In a comprehensive account of “comfort
women” issues, historian Yoshimi Yoshiaki (2000, p. 23) uses the
term “sexual slavery” as the “comfort women” system involved
“grave violations against human rights that combined sexual violence
against women, racial discrimination, and discrimination against the
impoverished.” However, as the term has become recognized and
widely used in academic texts, the term “comfort women” is used
here with quotation marks, as a reminder of the potential harm of
the term to offend the sensibilities of the women who were
condemned to sexual slavery under the pretense of providing sexual
“comfort.” For the purposes of this book, the most important aspect
of the “comfort women” issue that needs highlighting is that it
concerns public conversations about non-consensual sexual activity
and the criteria for acceptance of evidence regarding such sexual
abuse. The following chapters show that powerful lobbies within
Japanese society are preoccupied with proving that the sexual
activity of “comfort women” was consensual, and that the women
who seek apologies or compensation are higaisha-buru (fake
victims). The sinister nature of the factions who display this
preoccupation and the vehemence of their denunciations are bound
to have a chilling effect.
In the field of International Studies (IS), Weber (1998, pp. 152–
153) shows that a wide range of historical and social events can be
better understood through recourse to a political psychology
vocabulary which explores processes on the level of the psyche. For
example, Weber (1999) sees displacements of castration anxiety at
work in the formulators of US foreign policy in South America from
the late 1950s to mid-1990s. She makes use of the concept of “male
hysteria,” a term that had previously been identified with men who
had experienced profound trauma on the battlefield or in railway
accidents. Bodies which had previously been physically dexterous
and accorded high status in patriarchal social environments were
now experienced as effete and vulnerable and this could trigger a
type of hyper-anxiety that would involve episodes of hysteria. Some
time is given here and in Chapter 3 to elaborate on the concept of
“male hysteria,” as this is central to showing how concerns about
national identity, which have been influenced by hysterical
subjectivity, have an effect on women’s possibilities for the pursuit of
justice in the aftermath of sexual abuse. While the etymology of the
term “hysteria” (referring to the womb in Old Greek, hystera)
denotes its sexist origins and stigmatization of women as essentially
irrational and hyper-emotional, Weber shows that the term can often
be more fittingly ascribed to men who over-compensate or over-
react to perceived threats to their hyper-masculine self-image.
“Hysteria” can refer to an impassioned refusal to be bound by the
constraints of a system that is experienced as an imposition with a
desire to incite similar feelings and is usually related to unprocessed
trauma (cf. Fink, 1995, p. 125). In the case of Japan’s national
identity, this could be the trauma of forced submission to
“barbarians” in the latter half of the nineteenth century or the
humiliation of complete defeat at the end of the Asia-Pacific War in
1945.5 While this work focuses on Japan, it resonates with feminist
perspectives, which argue that male hysteria lies behind many of the
military conflicts that have been initiated in global history. Walker
(1983) provides numerous examples of irrational acts of violence by
men who fear being uncoded as men. The reason that hysteria was
not ascribed to men in the past was due to a patriarchal idealization
of men as fully rational, masterful, and able to make meaning.6
If all members of a society are prone to develop complexes
around repressed memories that are connected to primary emotions
and infantile logic, only biological males are prone to the fantasy
that the penis, their identifying body part, is the phallus, that is, the
definitive signifier of plentitude, power, and authority. Male hysteria
can result whenever the shaky foundations of this belief are called
into question, such as when women fail to play their assigned role as
the “other” of male subjectivity or when phallocentric posturing has
not produced the desired effect of acknowledgment and
subordination from rivals who may perform an even more
exaggerated form of hyper-masculinity. Denigrating men for a “lack”
of masculinity can incite participation in male hysterical subjectivity.
For example, Miyazaki (1996), who was involved in organized
criminal activity in Japan during the 1980s and 1990s, blames the
end of Japan’s economic prosperity on the deficient masculinity of
bureaucrats and bankers who forgot to be men. The fear of being
publicly revealed as a subject of lack (perceived as weak, cowardly,
vulnerable, or powerless before rivals) engenders feelings of panic
that can entangle psychological threats with political threats. In such
instances of intense affect, actions taken are often self-defeating.
One thinks of efforts by far-right ideologues to suppress publicity
surrounding San Francisco’s recognition, in November 2017, of the
“Women’s Column of Strength,” a memorial at St. Mary’s Park in
Chinatown that depicts four “comfort women,” two Korean, one
Chinese, and one Filipina. The efforts of the Japanese consulate to
oppose the memorial, which gained considerable cross-community
support in San Francisco, and the decision by City of Osaka officials
to terminate its sister-city relationship with San Francisco only
served to internationalize a story that would have gained only scant
attention otherwise (Yamaguchi, 2020a).
As circumstances, needs, and aspirations change over time,
groups with a conservative mindset and agenda may rely on
psychological mechanisms to provide a source of long-term cohesion
in nationalistic terms. Chapters 3 and 4 explain why it may be
helpful to speak of “male hysteria” fulfilling that role in the Japanese
context. It is not implied here that each practitioner of extreme
nationalism in Japan has the psychical structure of the hysteric in
the clinical psychology sense. It means, rather, that this type of
ideological extremism elicits participation in the discourse of the
hysteric. Male hysteria can also be defined as a complex of feelings
and ideas that emanates from fear of an emasculation of identity
(individual or collective) by a systematic source. This positionality as
a subject of the discourse of male hysterical subjectivity is seen in a
pattern of disproportionate reactions against perceived threats to
idealized masculine identity, especially reactions of violent behavior
or threats of violence (both physical and psychological). When the
subject experiences a lack of ontological security, it can respond in
the discourse of hysteria that says, “While you (the ‘other’) claim to
have possession of meaning, power, and plenitude, in fact it lies with
us.”
This type of hysteria has filtered through to the popular imaginary
in a way that allows for the identification of two types of anxiety.
When social subjects have only a vague sense of what they fear,
when we fear something in the shadows, so to speak, the word
“anxiety” can be used. The anxiety of an extreme or obsessive level
that targets some enemy on an irrational basis can be characterized
as “hysteria.” It is hinted at, perhaps, by study participant Akiko
[Interview No. 11] when she refers to ex-Prime Minister Abe as
being “strongly obsessed with protecting Japan’s pride” (Chapter 2).
“International status anxiety”7 denotes a preoccupation with the
notion of defending and enhancing a state’s global image.
“Retaliation Anxiety” denotes a vague fear that someone will take
revenge for one’s actions, even if those actions are blameless. These
terms are elaborated on in Chapters 3 and 4, which also draw on
Zarakol’s (2011) analysis of Russia, Turkey, and Japan. These three
imperial powers experienced comprehensive defeat and have similar
preoccupations about their positions between West and East. There
is a “thirst for and obsession with international power-prestige,
which is a constant for the populations of these semi-peripheral,
insider-but-outsider countries with imperial pasts” (p. 195). Such
states can be likened, perhaps, to Weber’s (1998, p. 163; 1999)
“posthegemonic states … [they] are lesser, impaired states because
they lack the ability to project phallic power internationally.
Described in terms of sex, they are hysterical men.” Though neither
author uses the term “international status anxiety,” it is used here for
ease of reference in describing a cultural environment surrounding
“comfort women” issues in Japan and to show how this anxiety is
one reason (among many others) for the silence of female victims of
sexual abuse. As we shall see (Chapters 3 and 4), the male hysteria
in question also demands uniform agreement on certain issues as a
key signifier of national identity, that is, “A cluster of values and
tendencies that is neither fixed nor alterable at will, and that …
needs to be periodically redefined” (Parekh, 1995, p. 255).
International status anxiety might have gradually faded into
insignificance over the second half of the twentieth century had it
not been for the vigilant solicitude of far-right ideological extremists
who adopted the male hysterical subject position. Their shadowy
presence has emerged into the full light of day in more recent years,
especially during the administration of former Prime Minister Abe
Shinzō between 2012 and 2020 (see Chapters 3 and 4). Abe belongs
to a political tradition that exists in tension with a principle that has
guided sengo (post-war) Japan’s formulation of economic policy, the
Yoshida rosen (Yoshida doctrine). That doctrine held that, while
Japan might not have a high-rank status in terms of military power
(as it would rely on US military power), it would acquire such status
through economic power. This motivation helped Japan to become
the second greatest economic power in the world. However, since
the 1990s, the country has dealt with economic stagnation and the
rise of China as a potential global hegemon. In such geopolitical
circumstances, militarism and “traditional values” have become more
enticing as a proposed panacea.
This section has shown that one of the most difficult challenges
facing feminist activists in Japan is the hyper-politicized nature of
issues pertaining to “comfort women.” Feminist theory helps to
explain the reluctance of government authorities to apologize to
“comfort women” in a way that they see as adequate. Under the
impulse of male hysterical subjectivity, ultra-nationalist discourse has
depicted the oral testimony of former “comfort women” as
fraudulent, and “comfort women” issues have been constructed as
signifiers that affect inter(national) identity for Japan. In
consequence, female victims of sexual violence feel diminished
confidence about pursuing justice. The role of the higaisha-buru
(fake victim) motif in public conversations has not yet been fully
recognized for its relevance, complexity, and historical depth. The
following chapters shed light on toxic labeling processes and the
association of ideas that links fake victims with former “comfort
women.” Unless this stigmatization is taken into account and
challenged, significant progress cannot easily be made in the field of
education or other social spheres. Chapter 2 shows that conservative
revisionist groups are working to ensure that national discourse,
which they entangle with denial of some historical crimes, is given
ever greater importance in the education system. Negative
implications for victims of sexual abuse are explored.

Feminist approaches
In this work, one author (Ueno) adopts a broadly sociological
perspective, while the other (O’Mochain) applies an international
studies/political psychology framework. However, both share a
broadly feminist perspective which assumes that male subordination
of women is a significant problem facing global society in varied and
complex ways. Reasons for the lack of popularity of feminism in
Japan may include it being portrayed as a “Western” import and
because of a common perception that feminism can be equated with
a higaisha ishiki (victim mentality).8 This is problematic in a culture
that values self-reliance and individual endurance for the common
good (Dales, 2009, p. 92). However, it is still possible to adapt
feminist principles to Japanese culture and society in a way that is
empowering for all. This aim justifies recourse to tertiary sources of
data such as newspaper and magazine articles as they cover topical
cases that provide insights into the nature of abuse and harassment
in the lives of contemporary individuals who are often overlooked in
academic analysis. We also draw on shinsho, which are short,
relatively cheap books that are often written by academic scholars to
share their knowledge on a specific cultural, political, or social topic
with a broad audience. Shūkanshi, which are weekly newsmagazines
that are similar to tabloid press publications in some respects,
provided content for analysis as these magazines sometimes reflect
the views of powerful far-right factions while also enjoying a massive
readership. While this genre is often ignored by “serious
scholarship,” perhaps because of its association with sensationalist
content and pornographic imagery and because there is a great deal
of variation in ideological positionings and in the accuracy of news
reporting, shūkanshi remain the most influential opinion-shapers in
Japanese society and they merit greater academic attention (Gamble
& Watanabe, 2004). Interviews and informal conversations allowed
us to check that our interpretations of readings were plausible and,
more importantly, to deepen our understanding of how sexual abuse
affects people’s lives. The feminist movement negotiates a tension
between those who focus on the production of academic scholarship
grounded in theory and those who use broad-based activism for the
transformation of the attitudes of all members of society. They focus
on solidarity among women of all backgrounds, and many see texts
with excessive “academic jargon” as inaccessible and unhelpful for
most readers who try to engage with feminist thought (Itō, 2015).
The latter school of thought argues that if feminists seek to
incorporate the “masculine logic” of academic rigor, then connectivity
will be lost in the name of objectivity. This work compromises by
incorporating most academic conventions, but also departing from
them at times to maximize accessibility and possibilities for a fully
human reaction, simultaneously cognitive and emotional. Certainly, a
bias in male-dominated academic scholarship often prevents
women’s issues from receiving the attention that they deserve. Thus,
recourse to non-academic sources is justified when these sources
are evaluated from a critical perspective.

Feminism, psychosocial theory, and IS

Psychosocial feminist theory provides a helpful framework for
analysis of issues surrounding sexual violence, women’s safety, and
moral panic. The theory sees subjectivity emerging from the
complex interaction of social norms and practices with the individual
psyche while its feminist variety focuses on the mutually inflecting
roles of psyche, and sociological realities in the formation of social
beliefs and performance of actions related to gender relations and
hierarchies (cf. Chodorow, 1994, 1999). The theory also points to the
power of misogyny on the level of the psyche as a factor that
explains the reluctance to apologize to “comfort women” as such
heartfelt apologies would involve a recognition and celebration of the
female other as fully human. “Misogyny” is used here in the sense
expounded by Kate Manne (2018) who uses it to denote the
systemic processes by which women are divided into “good” and
“bad” women or girls, the latter being those who threaten men’s
privileged position in society. On the level of the psyche, irrational
fear of threats can express itself in negative attitudes such as
sexism. Glick and Fiske (2001) delineate two main types of gender
malaise: hostile sexism and benevolent sexism. While benevolent
sexism prizes women who embody traditional norms of femininity –
and devalues women and girls who transgress such norms – hostile
sexism openly pits women against men. While acknowledging the
widespread influence of benevolent sexism, this work shows that
hostile sexism needs to be more widely recognized as a key factor
underpinning sexual abuse and gender harassment in Japanese
society. While discourses of “the good girl” may translate into actions
that are complacently classified as “benevolent sexism,” discourses
of misogyny work to surveil, punish, and stigmatize “bad” women
and girls through acts of hostile sexism. Psychosocial theory enriches
our understanding of “comfort women” issues, by, for example, its
highlighting of the necessity of public justice as a means of
acknowledging the psychic wounds of “comfort women,” which are
much more long-lasting and socially harmful than is commonly
understood.
Dussich (2001) conducted a nationwide survey of distinct groups
of women living in Japan (Japanese, Korean, Chinese, and English-
speaking). Respondents reported the reasons why they chose not to
report sexual assault. Factors included the theme of “trouble” – the
women did not want to cause trouble, or they did not want to get
the perpetrator of the assault into trouble. Some believed that they
were “too young” to report a sexual assault, which may indicate that
the younger a victim is, the less likely she is to feel confident of a
supportive response. Another factor related to police. Respondents
expected police to be rude or to violate their confidentiality. Some
victims reported a fear that the perpetrator would take revenge on
them if they reported the assault. The following chapters will help to
explain these systemic factors that contribute to victims’ silence,
especially the vital factor of fear. Do women simply fear the revenge
of offenders or do they also fear revenge from those groups that
stigmatize women who pursue justice? How significant is the fear of
revenge in the form of social disapproval and hostile attitudes from
people in one’s work and social environments? This question will be
dealt with in the following chapters, along with another question
that has remained under-researched: What are the effects for a
victim of sexual assault when exposed to public conversations that
trivialize or fail to recognize her victimhood? This exposure may
occur on reading that a high-profile rape victim has received death
threats from ultra-nationalist trolls online, that a senior police officer
has scuttled a police investigation into a case of alleged rape, or that
male students who forced alcohol on a young woman before
committing gang rape have received suspended sentences (Chapter
4 refers to such events). Similarly, in the field of education, there are
negative effects when a city mayor who belongs to ultraconservative
political factions wants to promote “patriotic” textbooks that display
historical revisionism. This raises another important question that
has not been fully considered: “If political leaders can deny historical
evidence about sexual violence against women, how does that affect
women today when they have evidence of sexual violence
perpetrated against them?” Reading about related events in
magazines and newspapers may not lead to explicitly formulated
judgments or conscious conclusions, but the cumulative effect will
be chilling. Those who have experienced sexual assault will sense
that speaking out could cause trouble for themselves or their
families. Stakeholders in education may surmise that sexual abuse is
too controversial a topic for classrooms. Silence will remain the
preferred option if breaking silence makes powerful people angry or
hostile. This silence is all the more likely with the resurgence of
conservative revisionism in recent years. Since the early 2000s,
Japanese society has been characterized by ukei-ka (rightward drift),
by which far-right groups, including socially conservative women’s
groups, have become increasingly dominant in mainstream sectors
of society (Asahina, 2019). This rightward drift has been closely
intertwined with the hyper-politicization of controversial issues from
the Asia-Pacific War (Lewis, 2017; Yamaguchi, 2020a, 2020b). While
Osawa (2015, 2019) represents women in conservative political
movements as meaningful agents who display empowerment
through their activities, even if such activities aim to restore
traditional gender norms in Japanese society, the possibility that this
activism dis-empowers other women – such as victims of sexual
violence who fear speaking out – is not addressed, and this question
requires deeper interrogation.
Feminist IS challenges three negative aspects of mainstream IS
theory: The prevalent idealizations and assumptions of masculinity in
the discipline (‘hyper-masculinism’ in IS Realism and “rational
masculinity” in IS Liberalism); the false dichotomy between (male)
international space and (female) national space; and the “cult of
power” (Carroll, 1972; cf. Ashworth & Swatuk, 1998; Pettman,
1998). For leading feminist IS scholars such as Cynthia Enloe (2013,
2017) and Tickner (2014), women matter. The lives of women
matter, and their life stories are important sources of wisdom in the
formulation of policy. A feminist IS theoretical framework is applied
in later chapters to elaborate on senses of national identity in Japan,
a story of Japanese exceptionalism, of Japan’s “other” as the rest of
the world, and this narrative has a gendered impact that needs to be
unpacked.

Japanese feminisms
Feminists in Japan have strenuously promoted non-hierarchical social
arrangements as well as problematizing the notion of legitimate
violence. Prominent feminist and sociologist Ueno Chizuko (2004, p.
178) asserts that feminism problematizes violence per se, especially
the notion that state-sponsored public violence can be normalized or
that the violence that goes on behind closed doors in domestic
settings is beyond society’s remit. Ayres, Friedman, and Leaper
(2009) found that women who identify as feminist are more likely
than women who do not make a feminist identification to confront
sexism when they experience it in their own lives. Rather than being
associated with a victim mentality, then, feminism should be
associated with those who refuse to silently accept and internalize a
victim mentality. This perspective is appropriate for an examination
of sexual abuse in Japanese society. Justice Ministry figures for
criminal cases of “forced obscenity” in 2018 showed that out of 5340
cases, 5152 victims (over 96%) were women and girls. Shibata
(2008, p. 5) clarifies that “forced obscenity” usually refers to acts of
coercive touching of a person’s sexual body parts or kissing a person
on the lips without their permission. While it is likely that many male
victims do not report the acts of unwanted sexual attention that they
have experienced, it remains clear that sexual assault is
disproportionately carried out by men and it is a problem that
disproportionately affects women. Feminists in Japan have provided
copious supports for the contention that men are still accorded
excessive status in their society. A focus on negative social
conditions in Japan does not imply that the country is being unfairly
singled out; most parts of the world have similar or worse
conditions. In 2020, a UN-sponsored global survey found that 90%
of people in the world have some form of bias against women
(Tackling Social Norms, 2020). The survey of over 80% of the
world’s population found that over 40% of respondents believed
that, in times of job scarcity, men have a greater right to jobs than
do women. This implies a danger that many women will be made to
feel as if they do not belong in particular workplaces and may be
subject to harassment. This is a danger in Japan, as a national
survey from 2012 indicated that only 20% of Japanese men fully
supported the right of married women to pursue their careers
(Norma, 2018, p. 3).
While it is more accurate to speak of Japanese feminisms in the
plural, as there have been, and still are, a large number of varying
backgrounds and perspectives (cf. Bullock, Kano, & Welker, 2018),
this work assumes that all feminists share the common objective of
trying to eliminate sexual abuse from every society. A feminist
theoretical framework prioritizes women’s rights as human rights and
equality of opportunity for all. It rejects social Darwinism models of
international or national society as these models promote hierarchies
of human beings and of citizens within a social climate of intense
rivalry, competition, and aggressive behaviors (Tickner, 2014; cf.
hooks, 2015). A feminist perspective is alert to practices of gender
subordination that fail to cherish the well-being and security of each
individual. It focuses on egalitarian human relations, and the
nurturing of societies without violence, whether that be violence
through the militarization of relations between states or acts of
violence in interpersonal relations (Enloe, 2017). While this
perspective appreciates cultural differences, it also notes that what
often passes for “valued cultural traditions” are in fact the will of a
sexist elite being imposed on a more progressive majority. Tokyo-
based journalist and lecturer, David McNeill (2001) identifies an elite
of this kind in Japan, and he challenges the claim that Japanese civil
society lacks open debate and frank discussion of difficult issues
because the culture highly esteems harmony and consensus. In fact,
the most powerful groups in society are discouraging or suppressing
free discussion and they impose their own will on others: “This
notion of consensus, reinforced through the education system and
other state apparatus, often boils down, in practice, to the
imposition of power over dissenting, minority, and sometimes even,
majority opinions.” Also, the culturally formed proclivity for social
harmony and consensus is a gendered phenomenon. With reference
to cultural factors in Japan that inhibit speaking out on issues of
sexual abuse, Muta (2015) notes the double standard by which men
are given much more leeway regarding the social norm of
consideration for others. Women and girls are often socialized into
submissive behaviors which include never confronting others about
their toxic behavior for fear of causing trouble or hurting others’
feelings. If progress is to be made regarding issues of gender and
sexuality in Japan, many unhelpful beliefs and norms that are widely
accepted as common sense need to be revealed as impositions by a
powerful minority, which can and should be called into question.
A critical feminist approach is alert to the ways in which processes
of economic class oppression and structures of patriarchy interact in
perpetuating social inequality. When social subjects have multiple
experiences of a gender inequality mindset that subordinates women
below men and single men below fathers, the term “patriarchy” can
be used.9 It refers to a society where adult, fully abled, heterosexual
males, especially fathers, are idealized as fully human and all others
as, at least partially, incomplete humans. While the majority of
Japanese may not hyper-idealize paternal masculinity in this way,
many influential citizens, have displayed such gender discrimination.
In recent years, regular citizens, who have been drawn into online
communities of ever-increasing extremist views, have been able to
spread the ideas of high-placed ideologues of patriarchy on social
networking service (SNS) platforms, and this has had a baneful
influence on society as a whole.
The denotation of Japan as a society of patriarchal influence forms
the basis of the feminist and emancipatory perspective that shapes
the selection and interpretation of data in this work. Analysis of
Japan as a patriarchal society risks creating or reinforcing a
stereotype of the country as a place where benighted women wallow
in subordinated roles. Steel (2019, p. 1) refers to one newspaper
headline that implied that the situation for women in Japan was
worse than that for women in Saudi Arabia. In fact, Steel’s edited
collection of works from a wide range of scholars argues that most
women in Japan, far from being perennial victims, are fulfilled
human beings with high levels of well-being who have found ways to
assert their agency. This point is well taken, but many female victims
of sexual abuse and gender harassment in Japan find it extremely
difficult to break their silence, and the reasons for this difficulty need
to be interrogated. While Japanese women have power in a number
of social contexts, that does not apply to the context of sexual abuse
victimhood. Men’s sexual violence during war has often been
reduced to biological essentialist explanations, which see “wartime
rape” as a marginal issue. The discursive power of these accounts
underlines the helpfulness of a feminist IS approach, which asserts
that the role of women in national life and in international relations,
though long confined to a shadowy existence, should be revealed
and appreciated for all its significance. Insights from the field shed
light on multiple aspects of sexual violence, including the reluctance
of women in Japan to speak out about their experiences of sexual
misconduct. Obviously, women need to be aware of the support that
is available to them if they are to come out of the shadows. Due to
the actions and public conversations of Japan’s nativist right factions
(Hall, 2021) that are delineated in Chapters 3 and 4, women who
fear that their evidence of non-consensual sexual activity will not be
believed are more likely to remain silent. The existence of public
conversations in Japan that elicit this fear of being labeled as a “fake
victim” is a problem which needs to be given more comprehensive
recognition. The following chapters provide such recognition by
adopting a feminist lens to unpack the implications of an
identification of the mutual interactions between three areas:
Inter(national) identity formation, “comfort women” issues, and male
hysterical subjectivity.

Overview and key concepts

Our research endeavors began with these questions: Is sexual abuse
a pervasive and substantial problem for Japanese society, including
for participants in education? Just how serious is the problem, and
how difficult will it be for educators to offer solutions? As
stakeholders in education, we wondered how difficult it would be to
raise awareness among our students, to correct imperceptions, and
to gain support for programs that hold perpetrators accountable for
their abusive behavior. We asked, “In what ways is sexual
misconduct a problem within educational institutions? Do university
students in Japan have progressive views on sexual harassment, that
is, awareness of sexual harassment issues? Do they support
prevention policies? Or do they tend to blame victims rather than
perpetrators? A survey of 400 Japanese university students’ attitudes
on sexual harassment issues in the summer of 2019 yielded largely
positive results. It indicated that young people were supportive of
victims of sexual harassment and that they supported initiatives for
comprehensive educational programs. The following chapters explain
why we did not take these results at face value. In the face of a
predominance of data indicating the grave seriousness of the
problem, we sought alternative explanations before predicting a
bright future. Chapters 3–5 grapple with another significant
question: Does the #MeToo movement provide an appropriate model
that will assure significant gains in solving problems of sexual abuse
in Japan? (cf. O’Mochain, 2021). A historical perspective that draws
on insights from political psychology offers a helpful perspective in
exploring the issues raised by this question, which is of vital
importance for all those who seek the most effective methods
possible to relieve the suffering of victims of sexual abuse.
Chapters 1 and 2 provide some insight into the present situation in
Japanese society and in education regarding the extent of and
tolerance for sexual harassment and other forms of sexual
misconduct. The extent and the nature of sexual abuse and gender
harassment in educational institutions have not been fully explored
in English language research publications, which also makes this
work’s contribution timely. Toxic beliefs surrounding women’s role in
workplaces – including educational context workplaces – have been
perpetuated for many years on a systemic level, and discursive
mechanisms function to prevent protest or reform. If workplaces are
places of bullying, humiliation, and resignation about high levels of
sexual abuse and gender harassment, it should not be too surprising
to find similar conditions in many schools. Findings from quantitative
and interpretative research indicate that levels of abuse are relatively
high, and the role of instructors in perpetuating the problem needs
to be more fully acknowledged. Having established the extent and
nature of sexual abuse and gender harassment issues in educational
contexts in Japan, we demonstrate that incidents of sexual
misconduct in schools cannot be seen as isolated, individual, or
personal problems. A more comprehensive understanding analyses
the systemic factors that feed into the problem of sexual abuse
within education. Chapter 2 also includes two case studies of toxic
teacher–student relationships that illustrate the severity of the
problem and the severe challenges that are faced by those who
oppose cultures of impunity for perpetrators of sexual abuse.
Chapter 3 draws on the work of two IS scholars – Mikanagi (2011)
and Ayse Zarakol (2010, 2011) – to explore Japan’s engagement, or
lack of engagement, with evidence regarding historical crimes,
particularly crimes regarding jūgun ianfu or military “comfort
women.” The chapter also draws on the work of a scholar of
Japanese Studies, Sharon Kinsella (2014) who accounts for patterns
of media reporting that promote an association of ideas between
“comfort women” and schoolgirls who engage in enjo kōsai or
“compensated dating” (which involves young women’s dates and
possible sexual activity in exchange for cash from male clients). In
the light of analyses from these scholars, we delineate the shadowy
influence of ultra-nationalist groups, especially those denoted by Hall
(2021) as “nativist right,” on popular (mis-)perceptions of sexual
misconduct issues. Hall shows that since the mid-2000s, the nativist
right groupings have made use of Internet resources and digital
technology platforms to disseminate their beliefs and to induce in
others the types of anxiety that they themselves feel. Hall notes that
a principal feature of the nativist right groupings is their rejection of
what they term shazai gaikō or “apology diplomacy.” Negative effects
for victims of sexual violence – including surviving “comfort women”
or victims of sexual violence in Nanjing, China, and other parts of
Asia that were invaded by Japanese Imperial Army forces – who
seek direct and comprehensive apologies from the Japanese state
are obviously implicated, and these implications are fully teased out.
Chapter 4 focuses on the inhibitory force of intimidatory groups in
Japanese society – in business, in politics, in crime syndicates, and
in extremist nationalist groups – which have not been sufficiently
explored heretofore, and this work helps to fill that gap. The
possibility of retaliation by far-right extremists serves to deter female
victims of sexual abuse from pursuing justice. Use of the concept of
“male hysterical subjectivity” is used to highlight the cohesive nature
of disparate groups of extreme far-right ideology who will continue
to over-stimulate feelings of international status anxiety among
Japanese citizens so that alternatives to the #MeToo model of social
activism need to be found.
Chapters 5 and 6 provide a realistic picture of strategies that may
help to reduce high levels of sexual abuse and non-reporting in
Japan today and an account of what can be expected in the future.
Ideally, this will be a future in which recipients of sexual abuse can
come out of the shadows and achieve some measure of justice. Both
chapters decry the slow pace of change to improve the situation and
they make recommendations about how Japanese society could
begin dealing with the effects of international status anxiety and
male hysterical subjectivity, drawing a line under its patriarchal past,
and transforming institutions to end cultures of impunity. The
concluding reflections elaborate on the implications of the main
themes explored in the book, underlining the argument that social
and political changes are needed in Japan for significant progress to
occur for victims of sexual abuse in all fields, including that of
education. Data indicate that abusive behavior by school and
university instructors is all too common and that procedures need to
be set in place to take account of this reality.
Every analytical framework has its limitations. Some may have
misgivings about possible “Orientalism” in the application of
“Western” theories in a Japanese context. It should be noted,
though, that Edward Said (1994), the originator of the concept of
Orientalism, saw Japan in affiliation with the West to some degree as
there was a strain of Orientalist discourse in the rhetoric and foreign
policy of Japanese policymakers during the Interwar Period, in order
to advance their own imperialistic, expansionist designs in east Asia
(cf. Niva, 1998, p. 111).10 During that time, Japan portrayed itself on
the international stage as a benevolent, reasonable power that
obeyed its moral responsibility to “liberate” its neighbors from
Western imperialist forces. However, Zarakol (2011, p. 192) notes
that “The particular kind of imperialism that Japan was manifesting
was a European-style imperialism with aggressiveness of
colonization justified with a rhetoric of civilizing mission.” It is
notable, also, that during the “apartheid era,” many Japanese
benefitted from their designation as “honorary whites” in South
Africa (cf. Osada, 2002). More recently, in a newspaper opinion
piece, Sono Ayako, a writer and former advisor to Prime Minister
Abe, extolled the virtues of the South African apartheid system as a
model for Japan if it opened its doors to more immigrants. The
article drew a critical response from the South African embassy in
Japan (Durfee, 2015). Additionally, in his discussion of the history of
the concept of minzoku (nation) in Japanese history, Doak (2007, pp.
216–264) shows that Japanese intellectuals have a long history of
engaging with ideas from the West as a means of tailoring a
discourse of national identity that would suit their own (sometimes
belligerent) purposes. To some degree, then, Japan has been of the
West while still not of the West. If Japan has been the object of
Orientalism, it has also been, at times, its disseminator, and has
chosen to identify itself, at least partially, with the West, as well as
with the East, but without ceasing to inscribe narratives of unique
national identity.
Theories and concepts are not applied here to characterize Japan
in an essentializing way. The following chapters focus on particular
groups within Japan who are not representative of the greater
majority: ultra-nationalists, conservative revisionists, and violence
specialists who will be denoted here by Hall’s (2021) term “nativist
right,” a term which has particular application to the far-right in the
early twenty-first century. These are individuals who, on the level of
the psyche, persist in the discourse of the hysteric by which they
continually react – often with a tone of vehemence, outrage, and
long-suffering victimhood – against the critique that threatens to
uncode their “masterful” subject position. Bukh (2009) rightly points
out that analyses based on the notions of self/other and of the
nation-state as the individual writ large are rooted in Western
experience and they fail to fully comprehend a wide range of
phenomena outside of this Western paradigm. However, in spite of
these shortcomings, the self/other analytical framework can be
helpfully employed in certain instances, including in accounts of
Japan’s relationship with other nations. In the same way that every
individual seeks recognition of self, the same can be said for the
projected self in narratives of the national self. The prospect of not
being recognized on a fundamental level can be a cause of anxiety,
and overwhelming feelings of lack of recognition can lead to
identification with the hysterical position on the level of the psyche
(cf. Weber, 1998), as is displayed, perhaps, in the considerable time
and resources expended by the Japanese government to prevent the
unveiling of commemorative “comfort women” statues in the United
States, Korea, Germany, and elsewhere (cf. Yamaguchi, 2020a).
Feminist analysis points out the dangers involved in those styles of
masculinity, which tend to exacerbate the feelings of anxiety
regarding emasculation11 and the consequent actions of individuals
and states. This is also true in the case of Japan, where many
citizens, in the words of Zarakol (2011, p. 185) “[are] always acutely
conscious of their ranking among nations.”
Regarding other key concepts from this work’s title, we use the
term “sexual abuse” more often than “sexual violence” or “sexual
harassment” to convey the sense that psychological, as well as
physical, harm is involved because all acts of forced sexual behavior
induce some level of trauma (cf. Zero Tolerance, 2019).
“Harassment” involves the targeting of a person because they
belong to a socially disadvantaged group, they are in a vulnerable
position, or because perpetrators are exploiting an acute asymmetry
of power in a relationship, whether transient or structured. “Gender
harassment” involves actions that inflict harm on a person through
the imposition of discriminatory norms about gender ideals. It often
occurs within a hostile environment where repeated instances of
“verbal and nonverbal behaviors convey hostility, exclusion, or
second-class status” due to a person’s biological sex (predetermined
by cultural norms of binary gender categorizations). Behaviors
constituting a hostile environment are – “in the judgement of a
reasonable person – pervasive, severe, and altering the conditions of
employment” (Saguy, 2003, p. 121; Johnson, Widnall, & Benya,
2018, p. 29). In the Japanese language, “sexual harassment” is most
often translated as sekuhara which is the abbreviated form for
“sexual harassment.” The term has been used as an umbrella term
for a wide range of behaviors, some of which are trivialized when
they are denoted by the not-so-serious-sounding sekuhara (Sasaki,
2004). Writing on gender and sexuality in Japanese society, Lunsing
(2001, p. 284) argues that sexual harassment has been recognized
as a significant problem. In contrast, this work argues that it is still
too soon to make that assertion. It may still be common for most
victims to “cry themselves to sleep” (nakineiri). Many factors that
inhibit victims from seeking justice are still poorly understood, and
this includes the baneful influence of powerful groups who have
politicized “comfort women” issues. While liberal feminism may
optimistically predict linear progress for women outside the West
who apply the models that have worked in Europe, the United
States, Australia, and other Western contexts, we argue that the
historical and political conditions of particular locales, such as Japan,
may negate these misplaced predictions.
The titular metaphor of “shadows” refers principally to the victims
of sexual abuse who fear coming out into the open to tell their
stories and to pursue justice. The principal inspiration comes from
the titles of Shigematsu (2012) and Castro-Vázquez (2007). In the
latter work, the author shows how young people are left in the
shadows of ignorance when they do not receive comprehensive sex
education in schools. This means they are less likely to pursue
justice when they experience sexual abuse or when they become
aware of it in their environment. The “shadow” metaphor can also
be given a political dimension through reference to Jacob
Schlesinger’s (1999) book Shadow Shoguns: The Rise and Fall of
Japan’s Political Machine. Chapters 3 and 4 provide more details
about these “shadow shoguns” and their role in a nexus between
conservative politicians, ultra-nationalist groups, and organized crime
(cf. Siniawer, 2008). In international politics, when Japan involves
itself with the West, it does so in the shadow of its Eastern identity;
when it involves itself with Asian states, it remains in the shadow of
its identifications with the West (cf. Zarakol, 2011). However, the
metaphor can also be taken in other senses. Masculinist
determination to keep women and “weak men” in the shadows of
fear, vulnerability, and inequality continues to impoverish human
experience. Writ large on the screen of relations between states, this
masculinist orientation perpetuates global structures of
subordination with the concomitant dangers of exploitation and
abuse (e.g., “Global North/Global South”) and a propensity for
“strongman” authoritarian governments. Progress comes with
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mächtigem grauen Schlapphut. Sie erzählten mir allerlei
Neuigkeiten, darunter auch die von meinem eigenen Tode. Der
Europäer, meinten sie nämlich, der früher in Katoto sass, sei von
den Wagaya todtgeschlagen worden. Andere behaupteten, er wäre
vielleicht doch nicht ganz todt, habe jedoch eine Speerwunde
erhalten. Ich lachte damals über dieses Negergeschwätz, konnte ich
doch nicht ahnen, dass sich ein schlauer Europäer (der
Stationsvorsteher von Mwansa) finden würde, der nichts eiligeres zu
thun hatte, als diesen Unsinn nach der Küste zu melden, von wo er
nach Europa gelangte und dort unnütze Besorgnisse hervorrief.
Am 19. Juli hatten wir Usmau hinter uns und betraten Usukuma
im engeren Sinne, wie die Landschaften am Nyansa genannt
werden. Am nächsten Tage stiegen wir den steilen Abfall zum See
ab und erreichten gegen Mittag die Station Mwa n sa. Wieder
breitete sich der herrliche See vor uns aus und drüben, jenseits der
Bai, tauchten die grünen Ufer Usinja's verheissungsvoll aus der
tiefblauen Fluth.

Weiber der Karawane.

 [←] IV. KAPITEL.

Vom Victoria-See zum Tanganyika.

Durch Usinja. — Ussui. — Kassussura's Residenz. — Uyogoma. — An der Nil-
Fähre. — Urundi. — Freudenfeste der Warundi. — Der Akanyaru. — Ruanda. —
Raserei der Warundi. — Gefecht mit Watussi. — An der Nilquelle. —
Uebersteigung der Missosi ya Mwesi (Mondberge). — Am Tanganyika.

An den Gestaden der Bukumbi-Bai stand die Expedition

abermals an einem Wendepunkt. Der Marsch durch's Massai-Land
und die Erforschung der östlichen Nyansa-Gebiete war vollendet,
nun hätte programmmässig die Reise nach den südlichen Massai-
Gebieten folgen sollen. Ich brachte es jedoch nicht über mich, meine
Schritte ostwärts, nach der Küste zu lenken. Denn im Westen, an
der Grenze des deutschen Schutzgebietes, lockten mich gänzlich
unbekannte Striche, welche die letzten Räthsel des alten
Nilproblems bargen. Allerdings hatte Stanley vor fast zwanzig Jahren
vergeblich versucht in jene Gebiete einzudringen und das mächtige
Prestige, welches dieser Reisende mit Recht geniesst, hatte seither
andere abgehalten, ihre Schritte dahin zu lenken. Aber ich besass
eine vorzüglich eingeschulte, leistungsfähige Mannschaft; das
Material der Expedition war noch in gutem Stande, ich selbst fühlte
mich gesund und kräftig: wenn es irgend Vorbedingungen gab die
ein Gelingen erhoffen liessen, so waren es diese.
In den Instruktionen freilich, die meine Auftraggeber mir
fürsorglich mitgegeben, war das Gebiet meiner Forschungen so
 ziemlich umgrenzt und von
jenen entfernten Ländern stand
keine Zeile darin zu lesen. Aber
solche Instruktionen sind ja nur
dazu da, um nicht befolgt zu
werden: entweder sie
verlangen zu viel oder zu wenig
von dem Reisenden, im
letzteren Fall werden sie
überschritten — »und wenn es
glückt, so ist es auch
verziehn.«
So begann ich denn meine
Vorbereitungen für den Marsch
nach dem Westen. Ich liess alle
Lasten, die nicht unbedingt
nöthig waren, bei Seite packen,
wählte eine Anzahl schwacher
Leute aus und sandte diese,
sowie einige angeworbene Wasukuma, unter Befehl des Askari
Mz e e b i n Ju ma h, eines älteren, vorsichtigen Mannes, voraus
nach Tabora mit der Instruktion, mich dort zu erwarten. Ferner
entliess ich sämmtliche Sudanesen bis auf einen (Faraj Abdallah)
und gab sie an die Station Mwansa ab, da sie für meine Zwecke
gänzlich unbrauchbar waren. Alle Leute, mit Ausnahme der
Sudanesen, schieden nur sehr ungern von der Expedition und
mussten förmlich gezwungen werden, mit Mzee zu marschiren,
obwohl sie ganz gut wussten, welch' abenteuerliche Reise wir
vorhatten.
Der Aufenthalt in Mwansa war nicht übermässig angenehm. An
die Stelle des liebenswürdigen Kompagnieführers Langheld war ein
Feldwebel getreten, der als Gärtner wohl vorzügliche Eigenschaften
besass, im Uebrigen jedoch mit seinem Vorgänger nicht rivalisiren
konnte. Dazu kam, dass mir ein Unfall passirte, der leicht ernste
Folgen haben konnte. Ein Träger kam nämlich eines Morgens zu mir
und erklärte, sein Gewehr wolle nicht losgehen. Als ich selbst
versuchte, ging das Gewehr allerdings los, aber nach rückwärts und
scharfer Pulverdampf drang mir in die Augen. Eine heftige
Entzündung war die Folge, die mich zwang, acht Tage mit
verbundenen Augen im Zimmer zu sitzen. Ich siedelte während
dieser Zeit nach Nye g e si über. Es war dies eine französische
Missions-Station, die für einige Zeit an die Seen-Expedition des
Antisklaverei-Komite vermiethet worden war und wo mein armer
Landsmann Baron F isch e r vor Kurzem seinen Tod gefunden. Seine
gründlichen topographischen Kenntnisse — er war ein Zögling des
Wiener militärisch-geographischen Instituts — sowie sein
wissenschaftlicher Eifer liessen glänzende Leistungen von ihm
erwarten, als er leider durch ein tückisches Fieber dahingerafft
wurde. Zur Zeit meiner Anwesenheit befand sich in Nyegesi nur der
Steuermann Blatt, welcher in der zur Werkstatt umgewandelten
Kapelle eifrig an einem Boote hämmerte.
Während ich in Nyegesi krank lag, hatte Mzimba das
Uebersetzen der Karawane über die Bucht mit grossem Geschick
besorgt. Es war das keineswegs eine leichte Aufgabe, da uns nur
wenige und sehr elende Kanus zu Gebote standen und besonders
die Rinder grosse Schwierigkeiten machten. Dieselben in das
schmale Fahrzeug zu verladen, erwies sich als unmöglich und so
mussten sie schwimmend über den breiten Seearm gelangen, was
auch ganz gut ging. Am 2. August bezog Mzimba in Ng o ma, einem
kleinen Dorf des Wasinja-Häuptlings Rotakwa, das Lager. Ich selbst
konnte erst am 7. August Nyegesi verlassen. Ich begab mich zu
jener felsigen Landzunge, von der aus die Ueberfahrt stattfindet und
setzte in etwa einer Stunde an's andere Ufer, wo ich von meinen
Leuten mit Freudengeschrei begrüsst wurde.
 Eine Musterung ergab, dass alles in schönster Ordnung war: alle
kränklichen und schwächlichen Leute waren mit Mzee nach Tabora
gegangen, die Lasten waren bedeutend vermindert und leicht
verpackt worden, für die 30 Rinder, die wir mithatten, waren reichlich
Treiber vorhanden und der Unternehmungsgeist, der aus den
Blicken der gesunden, nun völlig ausgeruhten Leute sprach, war mir
eine Gewähr des Erfolges.
In meinem Haushalt war eine kleine Aenderung vorgegangen
indem der Koch, den ich von der Küste mitgebracht, nun nicht mehr
da war. Ich hatte ihn an einen Agenten der britisch-ostafrikanischen
Gesellschaft, den ich in Mwansa traf, abgetreten, da die
Küchenjungen und besonders die Küchenmädchen, von welchen es
jetzt wimmelte, ihm seine Kunst bereits abgelernt hatten. Ueber
ihnen stand, als unumschränkte Herrscherin, die »Mami safari«,
Kibibi, die alle Strapazen und Entbehrungen mit gleich
unverwüstlicher Gesundheit und trefflichem Humor ertrug.
Auch einer meiner Dienerjungen musste krankheitshalber in
Mwansa bleiben, doch fand ich vollen Ersatz an H a ma d i (Pflaume),
einem etwa vierzehnjährigen Jungen, der durch den Tod seines
Herrn, eines Unteroffiziers, dienstfrei in Mwansa weilte. Trotz seiner
Jugend hatte er schon viel mitgemacht und war bei der
verhängnissvollen Wahehe-Expedition Zelewsky's mit dabei
gewesen. Es war der richtige Buschboy, ein anstelliger,
aufgeweckter Junge und ein Kerl, der selbst im dichtesten Kugel-
und Pfeilregen nicht von seinem Herrn wich.
Am Tage meiner Ankunft in Ngoma gebar ein Makuaweib einen
Sprössling, der blassroth gefärbt war und sich — wie alle
neugeborenen Neger — nur durch den Typus von europäischen
Säuglingen unterschied. Erst nach Tagen bricht das dunkle Pigment
durch und der kleine Mensch erscheint in schwarzer Farbe. Dieser
Junge, der mir zu Ehren den Namen Kivunja erhielt, war der erste
einer langen Reihe von Nachfolgern, die alle unterwegs das Licht
der Welt erblickten. Unter dem Grasdach der Lagerhütte, ja oft in
einem Gebüsch am Wege wurde das Weib von Wehen überkommen
und am nächsten Tage schon konnte sie, mit dem Neugeborenen
auf dem Rücken, weiter marschiren.
Am 9. August verliessen wir das buchtenreiche Ufer des Nyansa
und zogen durch leicht gewelltes, von lichtem Steppen-Wald
bedecktes Land. Die grosse Trockenzeit nahte ihrem Ende und
einzelne Schauer deuteten das Herannahen der kleinen Regen, der
mwua za mwaka, an. Gelb und dürr hingen die Blätter an den
Bäumen, wodurch die Landschaft ein herbstliches Gepräge erhielt,
das durch die traurigen, verbrannten Grashalden, den trüben
Himmel und besonders durch den scharfen Nordwind gesteigert
wurde, der vom Nyansa herüberstrich. Doch schon machte sich die
Wirkung der jüngsten Regen bemerkbar, aus den schwarzen
Brandflächen spross das zartgrüne, junge Gras hervor und neben
dürrem Laub schlugen an den Bäumen grüne Knospen aus — ein
Bild der ewig jungen Tropenwelt. In dem gänzlich unbewohnten
Gebiet sah man Spuren früherer Siedelungen; die Ackerfurchen sind
noch erkennbar und nicht selten trifft man tief ausgeriebene
Mahlsteine. Die Wangoni haben diese früher reichen Gebiete
entvölkert.
 Dorf der Wasinja.

Am 12. August gelangten wir wieder zu Dörfern, die dem

Wasinja-Distrikt Ug u l u l a angehören. Ausgedehnte Maniokfelder, in
welchen gleichzeitig auch süsse Kartoffeln gebaut werden,
bedecken hier das Land, in den Wasserrissen und Mulden gedeihen
prächtige, tiefschattige Wäldchen, überragt von schlanken Phönix-
Palmen. Ueberall sieht man kleine Dörfer mit leichten lebenden
Hecken, an welchen sich Bohnengerank hinaufschlingt, und in
denen die netten Grashütten unregelmässig verstreut sind. Neben
ihnen stehen Vorrathshütten aus eigenthümlichem,
cigarrenförmigem Grasgeflecht, welche Getreide enthalten. Die
Eingeborenen sind Wasinja, geschickte Schmiede, welche ihr
Handwerk in offenen Grashütten ausüben und schöne Speere, Pfeile
und Hacken anfertigen, eine Kunst, der sie das viele Baumwollzeug
verdanken, das sie von anderen Stämmen eintauschen. Ihr
Häuptling Mtikiza besuchte uns und bat, wir möchten einen seiner
Feinde bekämpfen, was uns natürlich gar nicht einfiel.
Ausser diesem menschlichen hatten Mtikiza und seine Leute
noch einen thierischen Feind, der nicht so leicht zu besiegen war. Es
war das ein alter Bekannter von der Westküste Afrika's, den ich hier
zum ersten Male traf, ohne sagen zu können, dass mich dieses
Wiedersehen besonders erfreute. Ich meine den Sa n d fl o h, Pulex
penetrans, jenes widerliche Insekt, welches sich in die Zehen und in
andere Körpertheile des Menschen einbohrt. Als ich 1885 den
Kongo bereiste, war der Sandfloh, der bekanntlich aus Brasilien
stammt und von Schiffen mit Sandballast nach West-Afrika gebracht
wurde, erst am Stanley-Pool. Durch die Kongo-Dampfer gelangte er
rasch nach Stanley-Falls und verbreitete sich über Manyema, von
wo er allmählich bis Ujiji und Tabora kam. An das Westufer des
Nyansa soll er direkt durch die Stanley'sche Expedition
eingeschleppt worden sein. Es wird sicher nicht mehr lange dauern,
bis er die Ostküste Afrika's erreicht, ja vielleicht erleben wir, dass er
von dort über Indien seinen Triumphzug um die Welt fortsetzt.
Wer seine Füsse rein hält und täglich untersuchen lässt, um die
etwa eingedrungenen Thiere zu entfernen, der hat diese Plage nicht
besonders zu fürchten. Wird jedoch ein Sandfloh — der einmal
eingedrungen, nicht mehr schmerzt — vernachlässigt, so schwillt er
zu Erbsengrösse an und erzeugt schliesslich Geschwüre, die, wenn
massenhaft auftretend, Blutvergiftung und den Tod veranlassen
 können. Besonders in Gegenden, wo
das Thier neu auftritt, wo also dessen
Behandlung nicht bekannt ist, richtet
es geradezu Verheerungen an. Wir
sahen in Usinja Leute, welchen die
Glieder einzeln abfaulten, ja ganze
Dörfer waren in Folge dieser Plage
ausgestorben. Ich suchte derselben
dadurch zu begegnen, dass ich bei
meiner Mannschaft eine strenge
Strafe für Jeden ansetzte, der sich
wegen Sandfloh fussmarode meldete.
Dadurch erreichte ich, dass die Leute
Hackenklinge, Usinja.
ihre Füsse sorgfältig visitierten, und litt
fast gar nicht unter diesem Uebel.
In den nächsten Tagen zogen wir durch flaches Land längs des
Emin Pascha-Golfes, der in zahlreiche papyrusreiche Buchten
endet. Die Landzungen zwischen diesen sind meist mit Busch
bedeckt. Am Ende der Buchten wechselt Sumpfgebiet mit offenem,
theilweise bebautem Land, in welchem grosse Schmiedehütten
verstreut lagen. Die eigentlichen Dörfer waren fast ganz im Papyrus
des Ufers verborgen und gegen aussen durch hohes Gras fast
unsichtbar. Als wir im Dorfe Ir a n g a l a lagerten, fing eine der
Grashütten, die in nächster Nähe meines und des pulvergefüllten
Lastenzeltes lagen, Feuer, welches ohne das energische Eingreifen
der Askari und Makua leicht schweres Unheil hätte anrichten
können. So wurde jedoch alles Feuergefährliche rasch beiseite
geschafft und schliesslich verbrannte nichts als eine — Kaffeemühle.
Am 19. August erreichten wir die äusserste Südwestecke des
Nyansa, wo die Hütten und ärmlichen Felder von Amr a n d a liegen.
Hier kreuzten wir die Route Stanley's und Emin Pascha's und
lagerten etwas nördlicher in Busirayombo, dem Hauptdorf von
B u k o me, das an Papyrusufer in öder, staubiger,
buschbewachsener Gegend liegt. Es hat etwa dreissig Hütten und ist
die Residenz eines blutjungen, etwas beschränkt aussehenden
Häuptlings mit Wahumatypus, der einen Schutzbrief von Dr.
Stuhlmann besass und in dessen Reisewerk abgebildet ist. Er
brachte mir Bananen und Pombe und erhielt ein Gegengeschenk,
das von ihm und seinem Gefolge buchstäblich mit stürmischem
Applaus aufgenommen wurde. Hier, wie in ganz Usinja und den
westlichen Gebieten, ist es nämlich Sitte, Höhergestellte durch
Niederknien und Händeklatschen zu begrüssen, welches in Bukome
besonders kräftig gehandhabt wurde. (Siehe Abb. pg. 63.)
Etwas nördlich lag eine kleine Handelsniederlassung Mr. Stokes',
des irischen Händlers, dessen Angestellter, ein netter Mnyamwesi,
mir seinen Besuch machte. Bei dieser Station ist der Nyansa nicht
mehr von Papyrus eingeengt. Bei Busirayombo besitzt er gelblich
schmutziges und übelriechendes Sumpfwasser, in dem
Wasserwanzen umherschwimmen und das Abends ganze Wolken
Mosquitos ausspeit, die eine keineswegs angenehme Zugabe zu
den tausenden von Sandflöhen bilden.
Am 21. August verliessen wir ohne Bedauern Bukome und zogen
westwärts, durch einen unbewohnten Streifen, der Landschaft Ussui
zu. Ziegelrother Lateritboden bedeckte die hügelige, mit jungem,
lichtem Buschwald, Akazien und einzelnen Baumeuphorbien
bestandene Landschaft. Wir passirten einen Hügel, von dem die
Eingeborenen Raseneisensteine als Erz gewinnen, und erreichten
Mittags das erste Dörfchen von Ussu i. Dasselbe zeigte sich uns als
ein reich bebautes, ziemlich stark gewelltes Land, das hauptsächlich
von Sorghum- und Patatenfeldern bedeckt ist, in welchen die
kleinen, von Bananenhainen umgebenen Dörfer liegen. In der
Umgebung reifen auch schöner Tabak und Tomaten. Die
Eingeborenen, die fast alle in Zeug gekleidet waren, besitzen viele
Schmieden und begegneten uns scheu, weil sie noch nicht wussten,
wie ihr König Kassussura sich zu meinem Besuche stellen würde.
Am 23. August überstiegen wir zwei hohe felsige Kämme,
zwischen welchen leicht gewelltes, bewohntes und bebautes Land
lag. Von der letzten Höhe stiegen wir in ein weites Thal ab, dessen
untere Hänge mit Bananenhainen und Feldern bedeckt waren.
Jenseits lag der grosse Hüttenkomplex Ka ssu ssu r a ' s, des
Häuptlings von Ost-Ussui, eines der mächtigsten eingeborenen
Potentaten in Deutsch-Afrika.
Von Bananen umschlossen lagen in der Nähe die ärmlichen
Hütten einer Niederlassung Mr. Stokes', deren einzigen Reiz ein
hoher Schattenbaum bot. Eine andere, aus Swahíli-Hütten
bestehende Handelsstation hatte der Inder Kipilipili gegründet, der
augenblicklich nicht anwesend und durch den Araber Pangalala
vertreten war. Auch Stokes hatte einen intelligenten Araber Namens
Raschid in Ussui stationirt, der uns freundlich begrüsste. Er war im
Innern Afrika's gross geworden, hatte Burton und Speke gekannt
und wies uns die Stelle des Dorfes Uthungu, wo der grosse Forscher
vor 30 Jahren durchgekommen. Auch die Eingeborenen erinnerten
sich deutlich an Speke und erzählten, er habe dem Vorgänger des
jetzigen Häuptlings durch Schiessen sehr imponirt.
Von Kassussura erfuhr ich nicht viel Gutes, er sollte persönlich
zwar recht freundlich, doch sehr habsüchtig sein und keine
Karawane ohne Wegzoll (Hongo) passiren lassen. Einen deutschen
Reisenden hatte er noch nicht bei sich gesehen und die Araber
versicherten, dass es ohne Hongozahlen nicht abgehen werde.
Wirklich erschien auch nach einiger Zeit ein Würdenträger mit einer
Anzahl Leute als Abgesandter Kassussura's, der ein ziemlich
unverschämtes Benehmen zur Schau trug. In solchen Fällen
schadet es nie, die Unverschämtheit durch noch grössere zu
übertrumpfen; bevor daher der Abgesandte eine Hongoforderung
stellen konnte, fragte ich ihn, warum er mit leeren Händen zu mir
komme, ob denn Kassussura nicht wisse, dass er an mich Hongo zu
bezahlen hätte? Der Würdenträger war erst ganz starr darüber, dass
er, der gekommen war, um Hongo zu fordern, nun selbst Hongo
zahlen sollte; aber ein Rundblick durch das Lager mit den Askari und
Ruga-Ruga machte ihn doch nachdenklich, und in dieser Stimmung
kehrte er zu seinem Herrn zurück.
Die Araber begannen
nun eifrig verrostete
Schiessprügel und
Schwerter zu putzen und
meinten, es müsse
unbedingt zu blutigen
Kämpfen kommen, denn so
etwas lasse sich der grosse
Kassussura in seinem
Wassui. eigenen Lande nicht bieten.
Aber nichts dergleichen
geschah: am Abend erschien eine ganze Schaar von Wassui, die
ungeheure Massen Lebensmittel anschleppten, das Hongo
Kassussura's. Zugleich kam auch der Würdenträger, nun ganz
kleinlaut, und erklärte, dass der König zwar mein Freund sei, aber
doch den heissen Wunsch hege, mich n ich t zu sehen. Ich glaubte
auf das Vergnügen seiner Bekanntschaft verzichten zu können und
sandte ihm ein schönes Geschenk, welches ihn sehr befriedigte und
zu neuer Spende veranlasste.
Den 24. August verbrachte ich in der Stokes'schen
Niederlassung, wo sich auch ein ganz weisser Egypter befand, der
kränklich und von Sandflöhen gequält war. Es war einer der Leute
Emin Pascha's, Namens Hassan, der mit Stanley aus Equatoria
abgegangen, jedoch in Karagwe liegen geblieben war. Von da ab
wurde er von verschiedenen Arabern ernährt und beherbergt, war
jedoch halb verrückt, was sich hauptsächlich darin äusserte, dass er
von Jedermann, z. B. auch von mir, seinen rückständigen
egyptischen Sold verlangte. Ich hätte den Armen gern
mitgenommen, doch konnte er kaum gehen.
Am selben Tage liess ich pro forma die Einwilligung Kassussura's
zum Marsch durch sein Land einholen, die er bereitwilligst ertheilte
und uns vier Mann als Wegweiser und Geleit mitgab. Gleichzeitig
schickte er eine Heerde Ziegen und an 100 Lasten Bananenmehl
und süsse Kartoffeln und bat um eine deutsche Flagge und um
Stellung unter deutschen Schutz, ein Ansuchen womit ich ihn an die
Station Bukoba verwies.
Am 25. August zogen wir an dem bananenreichen, aber
anscheinend nicht sehr stark bewohnten Residenzdorf Nyaruvungu
vorbei, überstiegen ein Joch und gelangten in ein Grasland mit
offenen Büschen, das von Sorghumfeldern, Bananenhainen und
freundlichen Hütten unterbrochen war. Stellenweise erhebt sich ein
hoher Laubbaum, von früherer stärkerer Waldbedeckung zeugend.
Höher ansteigend gelangt man in das Plateauland am Msenyi, das
von tief einschneidenden Thälern durchzogen ist, deren Gewässer
dem Urigi-See zuströmen. Die Höhen bedecken wellige,
ausgedehnte Weidegebiete, die mit ihrem üppigen Graswuchs und
der kühlen Luft, die auf ihnen herrscht, an Mutyek erinnern. Nur
fehlten dort die kleinen Bananenhaine und Felder der weit
zerstreuten Siedelungen, an welchen sich die Eingeborenen,
schlanke Leute mit sanften, angenehmen Gesichtszügen zeigten,
die uns knieenden Gruss darbrachten.
Schon früh hielten Kassussura's Wegweiser bei einem
freundlichen Dörfchen und meinten, dass dieser Ort uns zum Lager
bestimmt sei. Da wir noch weiter marschiren wollten, baten sie uns
dringend zu bleiben, da Kassussura's Programm, das er schon
durch Boten überall hin verkündet hatte, sonst gänzlich zerstört
würde, was ihnen eventuell den Kopf kosten könnte. Thatsächlich
sah man schon von allen Hängen mit Lebensmittel und Pombe
beladene Eingeborene herabsteigen, denn in diesen Ländern ist der
Reisende überall Gast des Königs und zwar eines Königs dem alles
im Lande gehört und demgegenüber niemand Privat-Eigenthum
besitzt. Eine Art Polizei erschien, die mit langen Knüppeln Ordnung
hielt und tüchtig auf die Eingeborenen einhieb, falls sie in das Lager
eindringen oder uns sonst irgendwie belästigen wollten. Denn wir
hatten natürlich der Bitte der Wegweiser nachgegeben und gelagert,
worauf diese ihre Köpfe wieder etwas sicherer zwischen den
Schultern sitzen fühlten. Doch sollte einer von ihnen noch einmal an
diesem Tage für sein Haupt zittern müssen, indem er einen
Regenschirm verlor, den Kassussura ihm vor einigen Tagen
geschenkt hatte. Eine solche Nichtachtung seines Geschenkes
würde sicher mit dem Tode bestraft worden sein und der Arme war
der Verzweiflung nahe, bis er zum Glück seinen Regenschirm wieder
fand.
Je weiter wir gegen Westen vordrangen, desto bergiger und
reizvoller wurde das Land. Zwar behielten die Höhen noch
Plateaucharakter, doch fielen sie nach allen Seiten in steilen, oft in
schroffen terassenförmigen Felswänden abstürzenden Hängen nach
den engen Bachthälern ab. Auf felsigem Pfade stiegen wir zu den
grasigen, von ziegelrothen Viehwegen durchschnittenen Thälern ab.
Die Eingeborenen der spärlichen, weit zerstreuten Dörfer pflegten
mich meist in Gruppen zu erwarten, die etwa zehn Schritte vor mir
Halt machten, worauf die Leute einzeln laufend ankamen und
knieend und händeklatschend ihren Gruss »Kssura!« riefen. Das
Baumwollzeug beginnt hier abzunehmen und macht der Fellkleidung
Platz. Das Lager im Dorfe Uakilinda war durch eine riesenhafte
Ricinuspflanze merkwürdig, die etwa 10 Meter hoch war, einen
dicken Stamm und ausgebreitete Aeste besass.
Am 27. August verliessen wir das Gebiet des Urigi-See's und
betraten den Grenzdistrikt Kassussura's, der weit trockener und
weniger fruchtbar ist. Während sonst überall klare Bäche in den
Thälern rieseln, trifft man hier auf trockene Wasserrisse und an den
Hängen tritt oft rothbraunes, metallisch glänzendes Gerölle zu Tage,
zwischen welchem nur einzelne, niedrige Bäumchen ihr Dasein
fristen. Auch der graue Boden der Thäler scheint wenig fruchtbar.
Wir bestiegen einen hohen Kamm, auf dem eine duftende
Veilchenart gedieh und hatten einen weiten Blick über den Distrikt
Ny a k a wa n d a mit seinen bräunlichen, tafelförmigen Bergen und
den fernen Höhen von Uha im Süden.
Das Land ist wenig bewohnt, stundenweit liegen die kleinen
ärmlichen Dörfchen von einander entfernt. Das grösste ist jenes des
»Gouverneurs« von Nyakawanda, das einen Stachelzaun besitzt,
der durch zahllose Spinngewebe von Weitem das Aussehen einer
Mauer bekommt. Auch das Thierleben dieser Gegend, überhaupt
der Länder westlich vom Nyansa, ist sehr arm, Wild trifft man fast
gar nicht und selbst die unvermeidliche Hyäne liess sich Nachts
selten hören. Vielleicht war daran die empfindliche Kälte schuld, die
besonders in den frühen Morgenstunden das Thermometer auf 5
Grad Celsius fallen liess.
Am 28. August verliessen wir Kassussura's Land und
durchzogen eine wilde von Bergkämmen durchschnittene, steinige,
wasserarme Gegend, die den südlichsten Zipfel von Karagwe bildet
und gänzlich unbewohnt ist. Sie trennt Ost-Ussui von West-Ussui
oder Uyo g o ma, dessen erste Dörfer wir am Morgen des 29. August
erreichten. Hier herrschte der Häuptling Ya vig imb a (Ruavigimba)
der von unserem Nahen und friedlichen Absicht offenbar schon
gehört hatte, denn an der Grenze erwarteten uns andere Wegweiser,
und Lebensmittel wurden überall bereit gehalten.
Am 29. August kreuzten wir vor Ka p o n o r a 's Dorf die Route
Stanley's und traten in gänzlich unbekanntes Gebiet ein. Für die
nächsten Tagereisen, soweit Yavigimba's Herrschaft reichte, konnten
wir Erkundigungen einziehen, darüber hinaus jedoch lag Ur u n d i,
ein Land, mit dem keinerlei Verkehr bestand und von dem nur dunkle
Gerüchte in's Ausland drangen. Vor der Massai-Tour konnten wir
doch Nachrichten über die zu bereisende Gegend einziehen,
diesmal jedoch tappten wir völlig im Dunkeln, betraten eine terra
incognita im buchstäblichen Sinne des Wortes, ein Land, in dem der
Kompass uns als einziger Leitstern diente.
Das östliche Uyogoma war kein besonders einladendes Gebiet,
ein steriles Bergland mit unendlichen Hügelzügen, mit wenigen,
ärmlichen Dörfern. Die Bewohner sind dunkler, negerhafter als die
Leute in Ost-Ussui, sie gehören bereits der Warundi-Gruppe an und
einige meiner Leute, die in Ujiji am Tanganyika geboren waren,
konnten sich fliessend mit ihnen verständigen.
Von Ru se n g o an trat der Plateau-Charakter schärfer zu Tage,
grasige Halden dehnten sich aus, in welchen einige Laubbäume
verstreut waren. Die engen Thälchen haben ein schwaches Gefälle
und sind von Papyrus-Massen erfüllt, zwischen welchen dünne,
sumpfige Gewässer sickern. Die Niederlassungen waren weit auf
den Hochebenen verstreut und schlecht gehaltene Felder umgaben
die verfallenen Grashütten. Erst am 1. September erreichten wir ein
etwas grösseres Dorf, die Residenz des Häuptlings Yavigimba.
Derselbe zeigte sich vorerst nicht, doch kamen zahlreiche
Eingeborene, die ihren Kniefall machten und reichlich Lebensmittel
brachten, obwohl sie anscheinend selbst nicht sehr viel hatten. Alle
waren mit langen Stäben und Speeren ausgerüstet, die sie bei der
Begrüssung weglegten und trugen am Unterarm einen
merkwürdigen dicken Holzring, der beim Bogenspannen dienlich ist.
Sie sprachen kein Kisinja mehr, sondern nur Kirundi und scheinen
früher eifrig Viehzucht getrieben zu haben, die jedoch durch die
Seuche schwer litt.
Am 2. September kam Yavigimba, ein hochgewachsener
dunkelfarbiger Mann, um Geschenke mit mir auszutauschen. Es war
ihm sehr um die Freundschaft der Europäer zu thun und er bat mich
dringend, ihm als sichtbares Zeichen eine Flagge zu geben. Hier war
ein Verweisen nach Bukoba nicht mehr
möglich, denn dieser Ort lag für Yavigimba
gänzlich aus der Welt, ich nahm daher
keinen Anstand, ihm eine deutsche Flagge
und eine Bescheinigung zu geben, die
jederzeit gegen einen Schutzbrief
eingetauscht werden konnte. Armring der
Wenn ich gehofft hatte, in Yavigimba's Warundi.

Residenz etwas Sicheres über Urundi zu erfahren, so sollte ich mich

getäuscht haben. Zwar erzählte man mir allerlei von den
blutgierigen, kriegerischen Warundi, die keine Fremden in ihr Land
liessen, von ihrem König Mwesi, der irgendwo an unbekanntem Orte
throne, von zahlreichen »Nyansa«, welche das Land bewässern —
aber irgend welche Klarheit konnte ich nicht erlangen. Von dem
»Akanyaru«, dem Alexandra-See, den Stanley erkundet, kannte man
allerdings den Namen und berichtete, dass er ein »Nyansa« sei, der
Tage lang mit Kanus befahren würde, so dass ich hoffen durfte,
einen grossen See zu entdecken.
Noch zwei Tagereisen hatten wir durch Uyogoma zurückzulegen,
dann überschritten wir einen Kamm und stiegen sanft in ein Thal ab,
das von mauerartigen, von verbranntem Gras geschwärzten
Tafelbergen gesäumt ist. Die Wassui der kleinen zerstreuten
Dorfkomplexe folgten uns schaarenweise mit ihren langen Speeren,
leisteten ihren Gruss und schlossen sich dann in lachenden und
scherzenden Gruppen der Karawane an.
Schon in den Morgenstunden erreichten wir das Ufer eines
breiten Flusses, der seine graubraunen Wogen zwischen hohen von
üppiger Vegetation gekrönten Ufern dahin wälzte. Mit Bewegung
blickte ich in die Fluthen dieses Stromes, aus welchem steile
Granitriffe hervorragten; war es doch der Q u e l lf lu ss d e s Nil, hier
Ruvuvu, später K a g e r a genannt, bildete er doch die Westgrenze
von Ussui gegen jenes räthselhafte Urundi, in welches wir nun
eindringen sollten!
Doch das Leben des Reisenden gewährt keine Frist zu langen
Betrachtungen; schon hatte Mkamba den primitiven Einbaum, der
als Fähre dient, in Beschlag genommen und mit kräftigen Stössen
und Ruderschlägen beförderten die Wassui-Fährleute die ersten
Askari an's linke Ufer. Hinter der Karawane, die sich am Ufer
niederliess und allmählich übergeführt wurde, sammelten sich
hunderte von Wassui und bedeckten dicht gedrängt als schwarze
bewegliche Masse mit blitzenden Speeren die Hügelhänge und das
Ufer. Auf der Felsinsel im Flusse hockten zahlreiche Eingeborene,
gleich Affen sassen sie auf Baumstämmen, die in den Fluss
hinausragten, ja sie schwammen trotz der vielen Krokodile darin
herum, um das Schauspiel unseres Uebergangs zu geniessen.
Mit dieser Bewegung am rechten stand die Ruhe am linken Ufer
in grellem Widerspruch. Wussten die Warundi etwa nicht, dass wir
kamen, oder brüteten sie abseits Arges? Sollten die vielen Tage des
Friedens, die wir genossen nun wirklich ein Ende haben und wir
wieder blutigen Kämpfen entgegengehen? Die Askari am linken Ufer
schienen ähnliches zu vermuthen, sie hatten Wachen ausgestellt
und Mkamba's hohe Gestalt tauchte auf dem Gipfel eines
Termitenhügels auf, unbeweglich in die Ferne spähend.
Plötzlich — ich befand mich gerade im Kanu — ertönte aus dem
Dickicht des Ufers von Urundi ein langgezogenes Jauchzen und wie
durch Zauberschlag tauchten plötzlich zahlreiche dunkle Gestalten
mit langen Stäben aber ohne Waffen auf. Im Gänsemarsch kamen
sie, Laub und ihre Stäbe schwingend, an, kräftige Gestalten mit
originellen Haartouren und braun und grau gemusterten
zipfelförmigen Ueberwürfen aus Rindenzeug, das von nun an das
einzige Bekleidungsmaterial bildete. Auf der Höhe der Rampe
stellten sie sich in zwei oder drei Reihen an und führten jenen
merkwürdigen Tanz auf, den ich dann noch unzählige Male sehen
sollte, ohne dass er seinen Reiz für mich verlor. Derselbe wird weder
von Trommeln, noch von Gesang, noch von irgend einem Instrument
begleitet. Den Takt giebt einfach der Tanzschritt, der durch mehr
oder weniger kräftige Tritte bezeichnet ist. Unter Leitung eines
Vortänzers führen die Massen mit unglaublicher Gleichmässigkeit
und Geschicklichkeit diese Tänze auf, dass der Boden dröhnt und
mächtige Staubwolken die Tänzer umhüllen. Mit hocherhobenen
Armen schwingen sie zierlich ihre Stäbe und Laub, schreiten vor-
und rückwärts, führen gleichzeitig hohe Sprünge aus und fallen
dabei niemals aus dem Takt, der durch die Fusssohle gegeben wird.
Dabei verliert der Tanz nie das Gepräge einer kraftvollen Anmuth;
besonders die Vortänzer könnten es in kühnen und doch eleganten
Sprüngen mit jedem Ballettänzer aufnehmen. Für einen alten
Unteroffizier müsste der Tanz der Warundi geradezu ein Labsal sein,
denn was ist der schneidigste Parademarsch gegen diese
komplizirten, fortwährend wechselnden und doch unglaublich taktfest
ausgeführten Tanzschritte!
Zum Schluss stimmten alle wieder das eigenthümliche Jauchzen
oder besser gesagt Jodeln in der Fistel an, rissen Blätter von den
Bäumen und streuten dieselben knieend vor mir aus. Während die
Karawane übersetzte und wir am Ufer Lager schlugen, kamen immer
neue Schaaren von Tänzern und die früheren lagerten in
malerischen Gruppen auf der Uferrampe. Es war ein grossartiges
Schauspiel. Am rechten Ufer standen Kopf an Kopf die Wassui, in
dicht gedrängten Massen die Hügel bedeckend, am linken
trampelten, jauchzten und klatschten hunderte von Tänzern in der
grellen Sonne, einer Bande Wahnsinniger gleichend. Bei den Wassui
sah man noch einzelne Fetzen Baumwollzeug, einige Glasperlen,
die äussersten Vorposten der alles umfassenden europäischen
Industrie, hier nichts dergleichen; Kleidung und Schmuck war
echtes, unverfälschtes Afrika. Erst gegen Abend verzogen sich die
Menschenmengen und es erschienen die Aeltesten der Gegend, um