Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239

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Aggression and Violent Behavior

Empathy deficits and sexual offending: A model of obstacles to empathy

Georgia Barnett ⁎, Ruth E. Mann
National Offender Management Service, Operational Services and Interventions Group, 4th Floor Clive House, 70 Petty France, London, SW1H 9EX, United Kingdom

a r t i c l e i n f o a b s t r a c t

Article history: Theoretical models of the role of empathy in sexual offending agree on five components relevant to the ex-
Received 11 November 2010 perience of empathy: a respectful and compassionate orientation to others, perspective taking, affective
Received in revised form 8 November 2012 responding, the ability to manage personal distress, and situational factors. We identify overlap between
Accepted 13 November 2012
these components of the empathic process and established risk factors for sexual offending and create a
Available online 22 November 2012
model detailing potential blocks to the empathic process during sexual offending. The model has external
Keywords:
consistency and useful implications for interventions with sex offenders. Viewed in the light of this model,
Empathy we argue that current sex offender treatment programs spend a disproportionate amount of time examining
Victim empathy empathy for past victims. We recommend, instead, that treatment aims to enhance offenders' abilities in re-
Sexual offending lation to the components of the empathic process more generally, using creative and engaging techniques
akin to those used to develop “victim empathy”.
Crown Copyright © 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 228
2. What is empathy and how does it work? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
2.1. Definitions of empathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 229
2.2. Current forensic psychological models of empathy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
2.3. Emotional contagion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 230
2.4. Perspective taking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
2.5. Compassion and respect . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 232
2.6. Situational influences . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 233
2.7. Ability to manage emotions in face of others' distress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
3. Model of the empathic process (MEP) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 234
3.1. Empirical and theoretical adequacy of the model . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
3.2. Empirical adequacy and external consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
4. Treatment implications . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 237
4.1. Implications for victim empathy work in sexual offender treatment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
5. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 238

1. Introduction
Evidence from meta-analyses has given increasing weight to the
notion that victim empathy work should be removed from treatment
⁎ Corresponding author at: Interventions Unit, 4th Floor Clive House, 70 Petty France,
London, SW1H 9EX, United Kingdom. Tel.: +44 300 047 5630.
E-mail addresses: georgia.barnett@noms.gsi.gov.uk (G. Barnett),
ruth.mann@noms.gsi.gov.uk (R.E. Mann).
aimed at helping sexual offenders to live more fruitful, satisfying, and
prosocial lives and reducing reoffending (Hanson & Bussière, 1996,
1998; Hanson & Morton-Bourgon, 2004, 2005; Landenberger &
Lipsey, 2005). However, service-user studies indicate that offenders
themselves often see victim empathy work as one of the most impor-
tant and influential components of their treatment (Levenson,
Macgowan, Morin, & Cotter, 2009; Levenson & Prescott, 2009;
Wakeling, Webster, & Mann, 2005). Indeed, the most recent national
survey of sexual offender intervention providers in the U.S. indicated

1359-1789/$ – see front matter. Crown Copyright © 2012 Published by Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.avb.2012.11.010
 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
that between 87% and 95% of interventions include victim empathy
work (McGrath, Cumming, Burchard, Zeoli, & Ellerby, 2010). In England
and Wales, victim empathy work is included in all of the accredited
primary programs for sexual offenders run by the Probation and Prison
Services. This suggests that treatment providers accord this sort of work
considerable therapeutic significance. Elsewhere (Mann & Barnett,
2012), we have discussed the reasons for this conflicting position, in-
cluding the conflation of ethical and rehabilitative justifications for vic-
tim empathy work (Ward, 2010). We concluded that before we are able
to resolve the question of whether or not we should be incorporating
into treatment work to increase empathy for the victim(s) of an
offender's sexually abusive behavior, it is necessary to have a clearer
idea of the theoretical relationship between a lack of empathy and sex-
ual offending.
In this paper we will build on previous theoretical work about empa-
thy in sexual offending. We start by examining definitions of empathy
in order to obtain a sound understanding of this important therapeutic
and psychological concept. We then identify the processes and factors
involved in generating empathy, and propose and systematically out-
line a model of the empathic process. Assuming that sexual offending
occurs, in part, as a result of a failure to empathize properly with the
victim, we suggest ways in which the empathic process could be
blocked or impaired during offending, as a result of specific factors
known to be related to risk of sexual reoffending. Specifically, we sug-
gest that empathy processes can be disrupted or impaired by the pres-
ence of offense-supportive implicit theories, theory of mind deficits,
intense emotion resulting in cognitive deconstruction, emotions that
lead to a self-focus and reduced ‘other focus’, such as shame, a general
lack of concern for others, a restricted ability to experience emotion or
problems coping with personal distress. We consider that any of these
could present obstacles to the experience of empathy for a potential vic-
tim in a sexual offense situation. We also suggest that these blocks will
differ across and within individuals, as what may have been an obstacle
for one offender will not explain another's lack of empathy for their vic-
tims at the time of offending. Relatedly, what may have been an obstacle
to empathy for an offender in one offense situation may be different to
the obstacles that were relevant to that offender in another. We go on to
examine the empirical adequacy and external consistency of the model,
before discussing its treatment implications.
2. What is empathy and how does it work?
A number of the theories of empathy in the forensic psychological
literature conflate definitions of empathy with descriptions of the em-
pathic process, that is, those processes and mechanisms involved in
generating the experience of empathy. We start by proposing a defini-
tion of empathy, before going on to review literature that has focused
on the theoretical constructs developed to explain its occurrence.
2.1. Definitions of empathy
Early theorists believed that empathy was primarily an emotional
response to another person. In an excellent review, Gladstein (1984)
described the history of thinking about the concept of empathy, starting
with philosopher–psychologists such as Theodor Lipps. Lipps believed
empathy to be a primarily affective unconscious experience in which
observing someone's physical appearance led to an immediate and in-
tuitive understanding of their thoughts and feelings. He proposed that
this creates a connection between two people in which the empathizer
becomes ‘as one’ with the person they are observing and that this only
becomes cognitive and conscious after the empathic experience. While
Lipps felt that the empathizer projects his or her emotions and under-
standing onto the other person, other theorists', such as Wundt, a phys-
iologist–psychologist, believed the converse to be true; that the other
person's emotions are experienced by the empathizer. Social psycholo-
gists like Allport and Heider referred to the ‘taking on’ of someone else's
229
emotional state as ‘emotional contagion’, a process through which the
experience of empathy could be achieved (Allport, 1924). From this
viewpoint, it is emotional contagion that distinguishes empathy from
a related concept, sympathy. While sympathy is characterized by im-
mediate feelings of pity and sorrow, the affective component of empa-
thy is captured by experience of the emotion (or imagined emotion)
of the other, regardless of what that emotion may be.
Gladstein (1984) also described how an early sociologist, George
Mead (when writing about what was then termed sympathy but
came to be called empathy) was one of the first to suggest that empa-
thy could be achieved through a deliberate, conscious and cognitive
process. Indeed, developmental psychologist Piaget (1975) believed
that it is only with the ability to take others' perspectives that emo-
tional contagion could lead to empathic behavior towards another.
Thus, if emotional contagion exists without the understanding gained
from perspective-taking the ensuing action's main function would be
entirely egocentric, serving to alleviate personal distress, rather than
serving to help the other person (although the latter could occur as
a by-product). A number of theorists have proposed that empathy
should be defined, in part by one's behavior towards another person;
that is, empathy necessarily involves acting empathically towards an-
other. Marshall, Hudson, Jones, and Fernandez (1995), for example,
asserted that empathy is a four-stage process that ends in action to
ameliorate the other's distress. This model, however, appears to con-
flate the processes, and indeed possible outcomes, of the experience
of empathy, with a definition of empathy. Polaschek (2003) criticized
the notion of defining empathy on the basis of behavioral outcomes,
arguing that whether or not someone acts on an experience of empa-
thy is determined by multiple factors, such as competing interests,
situational determinants, and so on. Conversely, we argue that even
if someone acts in an empathic manner this will not necessarily be
motivated by the experience of empathy but can be ethically driven,
out of a sense of duty.
Hanson and Scott (1995) suggested empathy is also characterized
by caring or concern for the other (the terms caring, compassion and
concern have been used interchangeably in the literature on empa-
thy). They suggested that empathy is more than feeling how someone
else feels, or thinking how someone else thinks, (both of which they
conceptualize as processes involved in empathy); it is defined by a
feeling of compassion for the other resulting from these processes.
Certainly, someone high in callousness and who had a lack of concern
for others could potentially understand how someone else thinks or
feels without necessarily experiencing compassion for them. It is car-
ing about someone else's experience, once the experience is recog-
nized, that is central to the concept of empathy.
The notion that any definition of empathy must involve the expe-
rience of compassion or concern is supported by Polaschek (2003),
who argued that caring may be important in understanding both
trait (general) and state (situational) empathy deficits. The differenti-
ation between general and situational deficits in empathy is one that
has gathered growing importance among those working with sexual
offenders, and is an issue to which we will return later in this review.
As mentioned earlier, Polaschek (2003) stated that definitions of em-
pathy should move away from inclusion of compassionate behavioral
responses, as whether such responses occur could be unrelated to
whether the individual experienced a sense of compassion for anoth-
er. For example, situational constraints or competing interests may
suppress a compassionate response in an individual despite the expe-
rience of empathy for another. Interestingly, this is the reverse of the
way in which caring is defined in the literature on the ethics of care.
Care theorists argue that care involves actions, and that actions can
be still be regarded as caring regardless of whether or not they actu-
ally stem from feelings of concern, empathy or care (Ward & Salmon,
2011). We argue that empathy, however, is an intrinsically affective
experience, and that taking the affect out of any definition of empathy
would be going against the very nature of this construct. Thus, caring
230 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
actions and the experience of empathic concern are distinct phenome-
na. Taking all of this into account, we propose to define empathy as a:
cognitive and emotional understanding of another's experience, resulting
in an emotional response that is congruent with a view that others are wor-
thy of compassion and respect and have intrinsic worth.
Most theorists have agreed that there are several processes in-
volved in empathy, and while some propose staged models of the em-
pathic process others see the various processes comprising empathy
as having a less linear relationship. However, in essence, most of the
models of the empathic process are quite similar.
2.2. Current forensic psychological models of empathy
Marshall et al. (1995) proposed a four-stage model of the empath-
ic process. The first stage involves recognizing another's emotional
state, which is followed by viewing the world from another's perspec-
tive. The third stage is the experience of compassion or a replication
of the observed emotion and this leads to the fourth stage which in-
volves taking action to reduce or ameliorate the other's distress.
This model has been criticized for failing to account for the behavior
of those who act heroically in situations in which recognizing and un-
derstanding another's emotional state is not relevant (e.g., when a
person in danger is unconscious and therefore has no emotional
state to identify) (Pithers, 1999). In this situation perspective taking
is arguably irrelevant to the empathic response, which could instead
be precipitated by a general sense of duty towards others, based on
a fundamental respect for human life, and a view of others as worthy
of being treated with compassion. However, arguably it is possible to
react heroically or in an ethical manner, without going through any of
the processes associated with empathy, cognitive or emotional, but
rather out of a sense of duty alone.
In addition, Polaschek (2003) asserted that the first stage, emo-
tional recognition, is unnecessary for the experience of empathy, as
we are able to feel empathy for someone who may be masking how
they feel by thinking about how you would feel in their situation, or
imagining how that person might be experiencing that situation. In-
deed, arguably it is possible to experience empathy for someone ret-
rospectively. If we hear from someone that a friend has been through
an ordeal, although we cannot see them, we may imagine how they
would have been feeling during that ordeal based on an understand-
ing of their beliefs and experiences; Marshall et al.'s (1995) second
stage of empathy. In addition, it is surely possible to experience em-
pathy for an unseen stranger, for example, by imaging ourselves
into the position of someone we hear about, through friends or the
news, who has been through a distressing experience.
Pithers (1994) proposed a slightly different model of the empathic
process but like Marshall and colleagues also suggested that empathy
was defined by behavior. He suggested that empathy is generated
through the cognitive perception of another's perspective and the ex-
perience of personal affect, either of which could initiate an empathic
behavioral response.
Hanson (2003) stated that the experience of empathy relies on four
related factors; 1) the relationship between the people involved (is it
caring, detached or adversarial?) 2), perspective-taking ability, 3) abil-
ity to cope with the perceived distress of others, and 4) the resulting
emotional reaction which could be either sympathetic (e.g., compas-
sion, pity, tenderness, emotional contagion), unhelpful (e.g., distress,
fear, withdrawal, avoidance), or anti-social (e.g., anger, vengeance, su-
periority or sexual excitement). Hanson suggested that we all adopt dif-
ferent attitudes or stances towards different people or towards the
same people at different times, and that this defines whether or not
we have a caring, indifferent or adversarial relationship with them.
Rather than claiming that indifference or an adversarial orientation to-
wards another is caused by a lack of empathy for that person, Hanson
suggested that the nature of the relationship influences whether or
not we feel empathy for that person. Hanson also included the notion
of personal distress in his description of the processes involved in em-
pathy, suggesting that those who are poorly equipped to deal with the
emotions of others will be less likely to be empathic. For example, indi-
viduals who manage knowledge of another's suffering by making de-
fensive attributions or by avoiding engaging with it are less likely to
experience empathy for the sufferer. Their methods of coping with the
observed distress include trying to minimize or justify it to help amelio-
rate their own negative feelings which were caused by witnessing that
distress.
While each of these models is slightly different, we argue that
there are five common components that emerge: emotional conta-
gion, perspective-taking (including theory of mind), belief in others'
intrinsic worth, the influence of situational factors, and the ability to
manage personal distress. It seems that the first three of these pro-
mote the experience of empathy, while the second two could impair
or inhibit the first three, leading to a reduction in or absence of empa-
thy. In the next section of this paper, we will outline possible causes
for problems in each of these areas and review the literature examin-
ing how these areas have been linked to sexual offending. It is impor-
tant to note that we use the term ‘deficit’ or ‘problem’ to refer to
factors that result in an absence of empathy, and are not making
any moral judgment about whether or not the absence of empathy
is a deficit in itself. Certainly, there are those that suggest that Psy-
chopathy, which is in part characterized by a lack of empathy, is an
adaptive alternative evolutionary strategy (e.g., Buss, 2009; Murphy
& Stitch, 2000). The hypothesized benefits of a lack of empathy,
from an evolutionary adaptationist perspective, include resilience to
depression and stress and the health problems that can follow, an un-
restrained ability to take advantage of others, a lack of anxiety which
can help pursuit of goals even in adverse circumstances, and an ability
to abandon parental responsibility (Glenn, Kurzban, & Raine, 2011).
An alternative view is that Psychopathy results from the accumula-
tion of genetic mutations which are passed on not because they are
adaptive, but because they do not interfere with an individual's re-
productive fitness (Glenn et al., 2011).
2.3. Emotional contagion
Each of the models of empathy described above propose that there
are affective processes involved in the empathic process. Marshall et
al. (1995) suggested emotional processes are relevant in the first
and third stages of the empathic process, Pithers (1994) asserted
that empathy can be precipitated by the experience of personal affect,
and Hanson (2003) commented that the final stage of the empathic
process was an emotional reaction.
Neuropsychological research provides an explanatory perspective
on the affective process through which empathy can occur; emotional
contagion, also called ‘automatic resonance’ or ‘mirror matching’.
According to the theory of embodied simulation, automatic resonance
with another's emotional state creates implicit affect sharing, a form
of empathy (Gallese, 2007; Gallese, Keysers, & Rizzolatti, 2004). Brain
regions proposed to be linked to automatic resonance include the ante-
rior insular and the anterior mid-cingulate cortex (e.g., Keysers &
Gazzola, 2006). In a review of the neurobiology of empathy and callous-
ness, Shirtcliff et al. (2009) concluded that the neurocircuitry involved
in promoting emotional contagion empathy is also that which is in-
volved in experiencing and recognizing stress in oneself. Mirror neu-
rons are intrinsically linked to the emotion-related neurocircuitry, and
are activated when stress/distress is experienced by the self or observed
in others. That is, the same anatomic areas of the brain are activated re-
gardless of who is experiencing distress (whether it is observed in
others or occurring in oneself). The only way to distinguish whether
someone is experiencing or observing stress is through the degree to
which relevant areas are activated; there is a higher degree of activation
in those areas when the experience is your own. It is argued that this
provides the neurological basis for empathy — in other words, we
 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
process others' experiences in the same way that we process our own.
Although, processing other's experiences requires less intense brain ac-
tivity than processing our own, as you might expect. The above review
suggested that individuals classed as callous or unemotional have both
blunted cortisol activity and diminished reactivity to stress (i.e., a higher
threshold for stress), and that those who have deficits in recognizing
emotions in others will also have deficits in detecting or experiencing
stress in themselves (Shirtcliff et al., 2009). They hypothesized that
“This stress threshold may be prohibitive for a very small subset of indi-
viduals, but the stress threshold is unique for different individuals and
changes with experience and context” (Shirtcliff et al., 2009, pp.160).
The notion that empathic abilities can vary depending on situational in-
fluences is one that we will return to later. However, this does indicate
that the experience of emotion, and particularly resonance with the
emotions someone else is experiencing, is an important part of the em-
pathic process, and that it is possible that in some people there could be
a neurological basis for deficits in this area.
There is a growing body of research that converges on the sugges-
tion that failing to appropriately respond to someone else's emotional
state has an important relationship with sexual offending. In a study
of 79 rapists' offense accounts, Scully (1988) discovered that while
some of offenders understood on a cognitive level how the victim
may have viewed them and their behavior, they did not experience
emotional contagion or compassion for their victims. In fact, com-
monly when interviewed they stated that they felt nothing for their
victims during the offense. This finding indicates that it may be the af-
fective, emotional contagion or compassion aspect of empathy that
influences whether or not someone engages in harmful sexual behav-
ior towards another, rather than the cognitive perspective-taking
component. Indeed, Hart, Cox, and Hare (1995) theorized that psy-
chopathic offenders' high risk of violent offending can be attributed
to their shallow affect and lack of affective empathy. The psychopathic
offender's ability to manipulate others is, in part, actually a result of
good perspective-taking, which allows recognition of others' emotions
and an understanding of how to elicit certain reactions from them.
Keenan and Ward (2000) proposed that the same is true of sexual
offending. They too suggested that rather than problems in inferring
others' thoughts and feelings, some offenders, notably psychopathic
sexual offenders, are unable to emotionally experience another's men-
tal state (i.e., they are unable to experience emotional contagion).
Miller and Eisenberg (1988) conducted a meta-analysis of the
emotional contagion aspect of empathy and its relationship with
aggressive behavior and found a significant negative relationship
between affective empathy and antisocial behavior (r = − .18). A
large-scale study of adolescents by Joliffe and Farrington (2007) pro-
duced similar findings. They administered questionnaires measuring
cognitive (perspective-taking) and affective (akin to emotional con-
tagion) empathy, and self-reported offending behavior, and found
that those reporting that they had committed an offense scored
lower on affective empathy, but not cognitive empathy, than those
who reported not having done so (Joliffe & Farrington, 2007). In
addition, both men and women who reported a high frequency of
offending reported lower levels of affective empathy, but not cogni-
tive empathy, than low offense-rate offenders. The high frequency of-
fenders were also those most likely to have self-reported violent
offending. The measure of affective empathy used in this study was
the Basic Empathy Scale, a 20-item self-report scale which targets
both cognitive and affective aspects of empathy. Affective empathy
is measured by participants' responses to items such as ‘I usually
feel calm when other people are scared’, suggesting that this mea-
sures whether individuals experience emotional contagion or an
emotional response when others are in distress.
In summary, theoretical perspectives and emerging research sup-
port the notion that deficits in the ability to experience emotion, par-
ticularly to take on the emotional states of others, could play a role in
sexual offending for certain sexual offenders. However, emotional
231
empathy deficits are by no means always implicated in sexual
offending. Such deficits may be more influential in the sexual offenses
of those who are more generally criminal or psychopathic, than in
those offenders whose offending is exclusively sexual in nature or
driven by motives such as intimacy seeking. This could suggest that
there are different etiological pathways for these two types of
offending.
2.4. Perspective taking
Sometimes referred to as ‘role-taking’, perspective taking can be
defined as the ability to understand another's view, even if it is differ-
ent from your own, by cognitively “putting yourself in the place of”
another person. Counseling and psychotherapy theorists like Rogers
(1957) and Stewart (1956) have placed emphasis on the role of
perspective-taking in empathy, suggesting that thinking as if you
were another could improve relationships with others, as it would
help you both understand and feel more positive towards them. In-
deed, most researchers now suggest that empathy can begin with
the process of perspective taking.
All of the models of the empathic process outlined earlier involve
perspective taking of some kind. The second stage of Marshall et al.'s
(1995) model of the empathic process involves viewing the world
from another's perspective, which involves what is referred to in sym-
bolic interactionism (Lauer & Boardman, 1971) as synesic role-taking;
the process of constructing an internal imagined representation of
another's attitudes and thoughts which we can use to anticipate their
behavior. This is a higher level of perspective taking that goes beyond
thinking about how you would feel if you were in that situation.
Pithers (1994) also suggested that empathy involved the cognitive per-
ception of another's perspective. Polaschek (2003) proposed that per-
spective taking could precipitate empathy for someone who is not
outwardly demonstrating the emotions they are experiencing, To
achieve this, we categorize the situation and ask ourselves, “How
would we feel in this situation?” If our judgment was that the person
felt something, we should then experience that emotion ourselves.
Thus ultimately, there is an emotion detected, albeit a masked one, via
the process of perspective taking rather than via emotional recognition.
Hanson (2003) also suggested that perspective taking was one of the
four processes involved in empathy.
In summary, across theories of the empathic process, there is a re-
curring idea that, regardless of when perspective-taking occurs, a
cognitive understanding of someone's experience is usually an impor-
tant part of the process of generating empathy for that person.
Shifting theoretical focus from a purely psychological level of anal-
ysis, there is evidence that perspective taking is associated with par-
ticular areas of the brain that are separate from, but linked to, areas
that deal with emotional experiences associated with empathy.
These areas include midline structures such as medial prefrontal
and posterior cingulate cortices (e.g., Olsson & Ochsner, 2008).
According to the theory of embodied simulation, perspective taking
is considered a higher-level inferential process which allows the em-
pathizer to understand others' emotions in a reflective way (Gallese,
2007; Gallese et al., 2004). Danziger, Faillenot, and Peyron (2009) ex-
amined the brain activity of people with a congenital insensitivity to
physical pain (CIP). They discovered that to experience emotional
contagion you do not have to have previous personal experience of
the emotion or pain witnessed in others. They concluded that partic-
ipants' previous experience of any psychological distress allowed
them to understand what it meant to feel pain, and to therefore
have an immediate affective response to images of others in physical
pain. Danziger, Prkachin, and Willer (2006) found that, compared
with healthy controls, the CIP participants reported reduced aversive
emotional responses to videos of injury. Interestingly, the more re-
cent study found that CIP participants' scores on measures of emo-
tional empathy strongly predicted the responses of their midline
232 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
structures (level of activity in these areas) to the pictures of pain.
Danziger et al. (2009) hypothesized that this could mean CIP patients
rely on their perspective-taking ability (with which these midline
structures are associated) to imagine the pain of others. Taken togeth-
er, these results indicate that perspective taking can generate an af-
fective response, and also that emotional contagion experiences are
possible even when the empathizer has no previous experience of
the type of emotion or pain in question. This suggests that there is a
natural neural connection between the two brain areas associated
with perspective-taking and emotional contagion.
Problems with perspective taking have also been linked to sexual
offending. Rather than problems with general perspective-taking
ability it seems that some sexual offenders have deficits in taking
the perspective of particular groups of people, including victims or po-
tential victims of sexual offenses. Studies have consistently demon-
strated that some sexual offenders hold offense-supportive attitudes
that minimize the harm caused by sexual offending, leading to a
lack of empathic response in relation to perspective-taking, and sub-
sequently empathy, for those groups. For example, Finkelhor and Lewis
(1988) proposed that a more specific deficit in empathizing with chil-
dren, rather than a general empathy deficit, is one aspect of masculine
socialization that could contribute to sexual abuse against children.
Keenan and Ward (2000) theorized that sexual offenders tend to view
their victims and potential victims in distorted ways which facilitate
and maintain their offending behavior, and have apparent difficulty in
understanding their victims' distress and appreciating the consequences
of their abusive behavior. They explain such deficits with reference to
different types of deficit in sexual offenders' theory of mind.
Theory of mind refers to an individual's knowledge of the mind,
both their own and others', which is used to make mental state infer-
ences and subsequently to determine appropriate action. Keenan and
Ward (2000) endorsed the view that adult knowledge of others'
minds is based on implicit theories (or schemas) that are developed
during childhood and which become more entrenched through the
gathering of confirmatory evidence for such beliefs. According to
this perspective, interpretations of others' behavior and predictions
about the actions and experiences of others are based on these
implicit theories. Ward, Keenan, and Hudson (1999) argue that
some sexual offenders could have localized deficits in understanding
others' mental states; that is, they have deficits in the theory of mind
they have created for certain groups of people. This could contribute
to sexual offending if, for example, an individual developed the im-
plicit theory that children are sexual beings who could enjoy and con-
sent to sex, or that women are deceitful and hostile. Keenan and
Ward (2000) commented that such implicit theories about specific
groups of people could bias offenders' interpretations of their victims'
behavior and lead to attributions that justify the offending behavior.
This would result in inaccuracies in their understanding of the mental
state of their victims, as a result of the inaccuracies in perspective tak-
ing, as well as potentially leading to deficits in emotional empathy for
the victim, due to misreading or misinterpretation of cues that signal
the victim's emotional state. This theory would suggest that unlike
those criminally versatile psychopathic offenders, the deficits lie not
in the processes associated with empathy, such as the ability to expe-
rience emotional contagion or general perspective-taking ability, but
rather that these processes or abilities are disrupted or corrupted by
internal biases.
This theory is supported by numerous findings that men who offend
against children tend to hold beliefs that support the abuse of children,
suggesting that they have localized deficits in their ability to perspective
take with children who have suffered sexual abuse. Studies have consis-
tently found that beliefs supportive of child abuse, such as beliefs that
children benefit from sex with adults or can actively enjoy sex with
adults, can differentiate child molester groups from both other types
of offenders and nonoffenders (e.g., Mann, Webster, Wakeling, &
Marshall, 2007; Marshall, Hamilton, & Fernandez, 2001; Wood &
Riggs, 2008). Hanson and Morton-Bourgon's (2004, 2005) meta-
analysis found that attitudes tolerant of sexual assault, such as beliefs
that children are not harmed by sexual contact with adults, were sig-
nificantly related to sexual recidivism.
However, the picture is less clear for rapists. While clinicians report
that many rapists also minimize their victim's experience, research sup-
port for the notion that rapists lack an understanding of the experience
of rape victims is inconsistent. While Marshall and Moulden (2001)
stated that rapists were significantly less empathic towards victims of
rape than nonoffenders were, Fernandez and Marshall (2003) found
the opposite to be true. There are a number of studies in which rape-
supportive beliefs differentiated rapists from nonoffenders (e.g., Hall,
Howard, & Boezio, 1986), however a number of others have failed to
demonstrate any significant difference between rapists and others
(Epps, Haworth, & Swaffer, 1993; Feelgood, Cortoni, & Thompson,
2005; Field, 1978; Harmon, Owens, & Dewey, 1995; Segal & Stermac,
1984). There could be a number of reasons for these conflicting findings,
including problems with the composition of comparison groups used,
and problems with the attitudinal measures employed. At present,
however, there is insufficient support for the notion that generally rap-
ists fail to accurately take the perspectives of victims of rape.
As well as offense-supportive beliefs, a number of deeper-level be-
liefs or implicit theories supportive of sexual offending have been iden-
tified in research on small sexual offender samples, each of which could
interfere with an individual's ability to take the perspective of their vic-
tim groups. Interestingly, these do not include distorted beliefs about
women as enjoying or benefiting from rape per se. Ward and Keenan
(1999) identified five main implicit theories associated with sexual
offending; 1) children as sexual beings (according to which children
are believed to pursue pleasure and to find sexual activity pleasurable),
2) entitlement (characterized by the notion that the offender's wants
and rights outweigh or override those of others), 3) dangerous world
(where the world is conceptualized as a hostile place and in which
others are likely to react in a rejecting and abusive manner to further
their own causes), 4) nature of harm (which assumes that harm occurs
in degrees and sexual activity does not cause harm but rather is benefi-
cial), and 5) uncontrollability (the world is uncontrollable and individ-
uals cannot exert any influence over what will happen). A large-scale
study of English and Welsh sexual offenders in prison found support
for the presence of two of these theories (children as sexual beings
and nature of harm) in child molesters (Mann et al., 2007).
Some of these implicit theories could lead to inaccurate represen-
tations of certain groups' mental and emotional states, and hence in-
accuracies in perspective-taking with people from these groups in
sexual situations (such as women or children). However, again, not
all sexual offenders have deficits in their theory of mind for victim
groups, or hold beliefs that would render inaccurate their perspective
taking with victims. Further examination of the implicit theories asso-
ciated with sexual offending exposes another of the elements re-
quired to experience empathy; a view of humans as inherently
worthy of compassion and respect. For example, some of these theo-
ries could impair empathy for certain people as they lend themselves
to viewing others as unworthy of empathy, as potential aggressors
(according to the dangerous world theory), or as inconsequential or
unworthy of empathy (according to the entitlement theory). Ward
and Salmon (2011) argued that one way in which this phenomenon
could be addressed is through teaching the ethics of care, which pro-
vides a framework in which humans are obligated to act in a caring
way towards each other, regardless of their internal biases.
2.5. Compassion and respect
Both Polaschek (2003) and Hanson (2003) hypothesized that
compassion was an important component of empathy, either indicat-
ing that this was part of the process involved in empathy, or was
something that singled out a response as being empathic. However,
 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
as with perspective taking, deficits in compassion can be general, group
specific, or person specific. Arguably a fundamental belief that humans
are worthy of respect and compassion (termed Menschenliebe by
German philosopher Max Scheler) is a precursor to experiencing com-
passion. The ethics of care perspective argues that caring for others gen-
erally is developed through a process of moral development, from
individual relationships with caregivers, family and friends (Ward &
Salmon, 2011). A lack of care from others as a child and adolescent
can therefore be influential in determining whether or not someone
will have a general caring orientation towards others. However, even
those who hold generalized beliefs that humans have intrinsic worth
and deserve respect are still capable of lacking compassion for particu-
lar groups of people or individuals. Hanson (2003) pointed out that we
do not have the same sort of relationship with everyone in our lives. Our
relationships are different with different people and can be caring, indif-
ferent, or adversarial. From this view point, a generally compassionate
person may still lack compassion for certain people; specifically those
they have an adversarial or indifferent relationship with. Hanson
suggested that we will tend to feel little or no empathy for people we
have an indifferent or adversarial relationship with.
As previously discussed, there is evidence to suggest that some
sexual offenders have implicit theories or schema that would lead
them to have little or no empathy for people they regard as unworthy
of empathy. The dangerous world theory typifies others as potential
aggressors while an entitlement theory would lead to a view of others
as inconsequential or unworthy of empathy. Such world views are in-
compatible with the world view that others deserve respect and com-
passion, which is proposed to be an essential element in the empathy
process.
A lack of Menschenliebe may be a feature of some sexual offenders,
as research suggests that dangerous world and entitlement thinking
are apparent in rapists' offense-related actions. Beech, Fisher, and
Ward (2005) identified the presence of the dangerous world implicit
theory in the accounts of sexual murderers, while Mann and Hollin
(2007) discovered that a sense of grievance was one of the most com-
mon explanations for offending cited by the rapists in their sample.
Beech, Ward, and Fisher (2006) examined 41 rapists' accounts of
their offending and concluded that dangerous world and entitlement
were two of the five implicit theories that emerged. This finding
supported the theoretical inferences of Polaschek and Ward (2002)
who, following a review of the literature on rapists' cognitions,
asserted that these schemas were relevant to explaining sexual of-
fenses against adult women. A view of women as hostile or deceitful
has also emerged in these studies: a schema or implicit theory that
could interfere with the cognitive processes of empathy and could en-
courage a view of women as not worthy of respect or compassion. In
line with the ethics of care, this could also indicate a failure to gener-
alize caring to certain groups of people based on developmental expe-
riences and social learning (Ward & Salmon, 2011).
In summary, for rapists, the evidence points to the frequent presence
of an aggressive and dangerous world view, a hostile, suspicious view of
women, or a view of ones' own needs as superior to that of others. The
presence of such views can erode the basic foundation of the empathic
process; the belief that other people should be treated respectfully and
compassionately. Those who lack this Menschenliebe are likely to be
deficient in the ability to empathize with people generally, and those
who hold a suspicious view of women are likely to have specific deficits
in the ability to empathize with women.
However, the fact remains that some sexual offenders demon-
strate no such deficits. For these offenders it appears that their deficits
are situational and confined to their victim alone (person-specific).
The ethics of care approach suggests that failing to behave in a caring
way does not mean there are generalized deficits in compassion for
others. Instead, situational factors, such as feeling angry with some-
one, could result in a lack of caring behavior towards them, in that
instance. Furthermore, faulty learning could lead someone to think
233
caring involves actions that it actually does not, such as having sex
with children (Ward & Salmon, 2011). Indeed, most people manage
to suspend empathy for others in particular situations, even though
they have a compassionate view of others, have good perspective tak-
ing skills and have the ability to experience emotions when others are
distressed (e.g., Pithers, 1999). It seems, therefore, that certain situa-
tional factors may impair the ability to experience empathy with
others; factors which we now go on to consider in more depth.
2.6. Situational influences
Polaschek (2003) argued that situational influences could ultimate-
ly dictate whether or not the experience of empathy for someone culmi-
nates in empathic behavior towards them. However, taking this further,
while many people consider themselves to be generally empathic to-
wards others (and indeed if they were not, their relationships would
be severely impoverished), to be able to experience emotional conta-
gion and compassion, to have good perspective-taking abilities, and to
view others as worthy of respect, we will all have experienced situa-
tions in which we have not, in the moment, experienced empathy for
someone in distress. Extreme and intense emotions such as fear or
anger can lead to an increase in self-focus and a concomitant decrease
in ‘other’ focus. Consumption of alcohol or drugs can also impair our
ability to recognize stress or distress in others. An important part of
the empathic process then, is the presence or absence of state or situa-
tional factors that can impair the experience of empathy at any given
time.
Situational or state influences on empathy have been used to help ex-
plain sexual offending. Pithers (1999) argued that most sexual abusers
do not generally lack empathic understanding about the consequences
of their actions for others, suggesting that risk of sexual offending is ele-
vated in the presence of specific precursors such as emotional states,
which can impair the ability to empathize at that time. Keenan and
Ward (2000) also proposed that in some cases, sexual offenders will
have an adequate theory of mind and no deficits that could impact on
their ability to empathize in either a perspective-taking or affective
way, but simply fail to apply these skills in a given situation. They, like
Pithers, suggested that this could be a result of situational factors such
as strong negative emotional states. However, they also commented
that such failure to apply empathic abilities could result from a lack of
motivation, caused, for example, by strong sexual desire, or as a result
of external influences such as alcohol or drugs which could impair
their empathic ability.
Ward, Hudson, and Marshall (1995) suggested that situational
deficits in empathy occur as a result of cognitive deconstruction,
which is essentially, an escape from self-scrutiny and evaluation. Cog-
nitive deconstruction occurs in situations of particular stress and is
often accompanied by intensely negative mood states. Cognitive
deconstruction is characterized by an inhibition of self-regulatory
processes that would normally prevent socially unacceptable behav-
ior. According to this theory, in order to manage the subjective expe-
rience of stress or distress, individuals narrow their attentional focus,
become concrete in their thinking, and attend only to instant gratifi-
cation of needs and present-oriented goals (Covell & Scalora, 2002).
Thus, normal self-evaluative processes are suspended as the individ-
ual becomes fully focused on achieving pleasurable, concrete, sensa-
tions. The suspension of self-evaluation and of attention to the
welfare of others allows the offender to continue with behavior that
they would otherwise accept as wrong. If this theory is correct, then
we should find that some sexual offenders do not demonstrate defi-
cits in either general perspective taking or affective empathy, but in-
stead have deficits in their empathic understanding of their specific
victim (“victim empathy”). We should also find that for such individ-
uals, sexual offenses are committed in the context of a stressful or
painful life situation, which caused the state of cognitive deconstruc-
tion to occur.
234 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
Certainly, some research has found that many sexual offenders do
not suffer from general or victim group specific perspective-taking def-
icits, but instead fail to express appropriate empathy for their own vic-
tims. In a small-scale study Marshall and Moulden (2001) discovered
that rapists had lower levels of empathy for their victims than for
other rape survivors or for women who had been subject to another
harmful incident. Fernandez and Marshall (2003) replicated this finding
with another small sample of rapists. Marshall et al. (2001) found a sim-
ilar pattern among child abusers, who as well as displaying greater def-
icits in cognitive empathy (measured by ability to identify harm caused
to the victim) in relation to victims of child sexual abuse than nonsexual
offenders and nonoffenders, also displayed the most profound deficits
(both in identifying possible harm to victims, and in their own feelings
towards the suffering of the victims) towards their own victims. This
study might point to the conclusion that sex offenders have both
group-specific and person (victim)-specific empathy deficits.
Marshall and colleagues believe, therefore, that empathy should be
viewed not as a trait, but as situation-specific and person-specific.
Marshall, Marshall, Serran, and O'Brien (2009) hypothesized that em-
pathic responding is determined by a variety of situational and personal
features of the ‘other’; the person is in receipt of an empathic response
(or not). They suggested that people withhold empathy from others
whom they perceive to be ‘villains’ or they perceive to be unworthy of
empathy at that time. In Hanson's (2003) terms, this would be individ-
uals with whom people have an adversarial or indifferent relationship.
However, Marshall et al. (2009) also pointed out that the person-
specific deficits noted in sexual offenders could also be the result of at-
tempts to minimize, distort, or deny offending behavior in order to
protect fragile self-esteem. Arguably, villainizing someone could also
serve to protect self-esteem. Ethics of care theorists suggest that occa-
sional failure to act in an empathic way is either a result of a failure to
generalize caring to larger groups outside of their family or friends, or
is a result of situational factors, such as the experience of anger or fear
(Ward & Salmon, 2011).
In summary, theoretical perspectives suggest that person or
situation-specific deficits in empathy can be caused by a number of
factors. These include the presence of strong negative emotional
states, which could lead to cognitive deconstruction associated with
an increased ‘self-focus’ and inhibition of usual self-regulatory pro-
cesses. Failure to apply empathic processes may also result from a
lack of motivation or the presence of disinhibitory influences such
as drugs or alcohol. Finally, situational or person-specific deficits in
empathy could reflect attempts to protect fragile self-esteem or
occur because the victim is perceived to be a villain, or unworthy of
empathy. Although these hypotheses have yet to be properly tested
empirically they offer reasonable explanations for the failure of other-
wise empathic individuals to apply their abilities to certain people on
specific occasions.
2.7. Ability to manage emotions in face of others' distress
Hanson (2003) also included the notion of personal distress in his
conception of empathy, proposing that people who are poorly equipped
to deal with the emotions of others will be less likely to be empathic. For
example, those who manage knowledge of another's suffering by mak-
ing defensive attributions or by avoiding acknowledgment of their pain
are less likely to experience empathy for the sufferer. Such individuals'
methods of coping with the observed distress include attempting to
minimize or justify it to help ameliorate the negative feelings caused
by witnessing that distress. Bumby, Marshall, and Langton (1999) stat-
ed that the self-focused nature of shame is likely to lead to a concomi-
tant decrease in the ability to empathize with others, partly because
the experience of self-oriented distress can impede other-oriented
emotional recognition, and partly because shame makes an individual
more prone to defensive externalization (Bumby, 2000). This is in line
with an ethics of care approach, which would suggest that the problems
in this area are likely to stem from problems in tolerating self-referring
emotions, such as shame (Ward & Salmon, 2011). It seems therefore,
that ability to manage the distressing feelings that can arise as a result
of emotional contagion or perspective-taking is fundamental to en-
abling the experience of empathy.
Problems in managing personal distress have also been associated
with sexual offending. Defensive externalization in the form of victim
blaming or minimization of victim harm, as a result of shame is some-
thing frequently observed in sexual offenders, both of which would
manifest as deficient empathy for the victim (e.g., Marshall et al.,
2009). This could be particularly relevant in explaining prolonged
periods of abuse, when defensive externalization or minimization of
victim harm effectively excuse the offending behavior, acting as
‘permission-givers’ allowing the offending to continue despite the ev-
ident harm it is causing. Marshall et al. (2009) have recently proposed
a theoretical model of empathy which suggests that personal distress
(resulting from problems in managing emotions in the face of other's
distress) inhibits empathy for others, and is related to the concepts of
shame, guilt, self-esteem and cognitive distortions. They suggest that
low self-esteem leads to shame, which blocks recognition of harm
(and, therefore, empathy) in order to ameliorate the experience of
shame or the experience of personal distress which would be evoked
if the harm was acknowledged. On the other hand, someone with
adequate self-esteem will experience guilt, which leads to recogni-
tion of harm, empathy, and reparative action. Marshall et al. (2009)
argued that self-esteem, offense- and harm-minimizing cognitions,
shame, guilt, and empathy are strongly correlated and influence
each other. Guilt has been found to positively correlate with both em-
pathy and perspective taking, while shame has had negative correla-
tions with these concepts (e.g., Leith & Baumeister, 1998; Tangney,
1991). Low self-esteem has been found to correlate with high levels
of shame (Tangney, 1990), and with poorer levels of cognitive empa-
thy (e.g., Marshall, Champagne, Sturgeon, & Bryce, 1997). In addition,
research indicates that shame positively correlates with an externali-
zation of blame for transgressions (Tangney, Wagner, Fletcher, &
Gramzow, 1992).
While Marshall et al. set out the evidence base that links these
concepts this model has yet to be explicitly tested empirically. Fur-
thermore, Marshall et al.'s model examines a reactive process that fol-
lows an offense, rather than being a theory of the (partial) causes of
offending. However, in support of their views, a problem managing
emotions that occur when observing others in distress appears to be
one factor that leads to a lack of empathy, and this could reasonably
be the case in some sexual offenses.
3. Model of the empathic process (MEP)
In summary, it appears that sexual offending could be partially
explained by problems with one or more of the five factors relevant
to the experience of empathy (the ability to have an emotional re-
sponse, perspective-taking ability, compassion and respect, absence
of certain situational factors, ability to manage personal distress).
Table 1 lists the five proposed components of empathy, and the prob-
lems with each which we suggest could lead to sexual offending.
Given the complexity of the factors that play a role in enabling (or
inhibiting) the experience of empathy, we propose that a new model
of the empathic process may help to explain absence of or limited em-
pathy for the victim of a sexual offense, and be a valuable addition to
the literature. The resulting model of the empathic process (MEP) is
based on the factors implicated by current theory and research on em-
pathic responses and represents an attempt to weave together these
factors into an integrated, dynamic account. Thus, on the basis of the lit-
erature reviewed above, we have constructed a multi-faceted, non-
staged, temporal model of the empathic process (Fig. 1). As mentioned
earlier, we consider that empathy should be defined as a cognitive and
emotional understanding of another's experience, resulting in an emotional
 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239 235

response that is congruent with a view that others are worthy of compassion experience of emotion that that individual would feel were (s)
and respect and have intrinsic worth. We propose that victim empathy is he in that situation. In this way, the model does not suppose
the experience of an appropriately matched, compassionate response to that the emotional processes occur before or after the cognitive
the victim's actual experience. We suggest that in order to achieve vic- processes involved in eliciting empathy; rather these can occur
tim empathy the offender must be able to identify and understand in either order, or indeed could potentially occur simultaneously.
what the victim is likely to have experienced, free from their own biases
(whether these be schema-related or self-serving). In order for a distressing situation to come to the attention of in-
Fig. 1 outlines the relationship between processes that can result dividuals, we suggest that they must be cognitively lucid — that is
in an empathic response. This response is hypothesized to be internal should be free from intoxication (which can reduce ‘other focus’),
(both cognitive and affective) but requires the presence of specific and lacking the experience of shame or intense emotion which
conditions in order to lead to an empathic behavioral response. We could cause cognitive deconstruction, both of which are likely to in-
argue that an internal empathic response can occur following the crease self-focus and concomitantly decrease other-focus. Indeed, in
co-operation of cognitive and affective processes, which can follow order for an individual to prevent himself from offending due to the
one of two pathways. Assuming that a distressing situation has experience of empathy, all of the components involved in the em-
come to the attention of the individual it is hypothesized that they pathic process need to be present. These include: the ability to expe-
will either: rience an emotional response, accurate perspective taking, a belief
that others should be treated with compassion and respect, absence
a) experience an immediate emotional contagion (feel what the per- of any situational factors likely to result in an almost exclusive self-
son in distress feels), which is then followed by a cognitive ap- focus, and an ability to manage the emotions that arise from all of
praisal of the situation in one of two forms, i) imagining how the these processes. Some of these are person (internal) level variables
person suffering sees the situation based on an internal model of that are relatively stable (e.g., ability to experience emotion, implicit
their beliefs and experiences or ii) imagining how they (the ob- theories that lead to reasonably accurate interpretation of sufferer's
server) would experience that situation, or experience, ability to tolerate or manage self-referring emotions
b) cognitively appraise the situation in one of the two ways outlined such as shame), while others are fluctuating, contextual or situational
above, from which follows either emotional contagion or the variables (e.g., intoxification through drugs/alcohol, extreme positive
or negative emotion/sexual desire). We propose that deficits in, or
Table 1 problems with, any of these areas could occur during sexual offending
Processes involved in empathy and proposed links to sexual offending. and would lead to a lack of empathy for the victim. It is clear that em-
Component of Nature of empathy deficit Hypothesized etiology pathy constitutes a complex process that has many components. In
empathy and hypothesized to link to of deficit order to understand the role of empathy in offending behavior it is
sexual offender necessary to have a comprehensive understanding of the processes
Emotional response Restricted ability to i) Psychopathic traits, and structures that cause and could potentially block empathic
The capacity to experience other people's i.e., shallow affect responses. We, therefore, hypothesize that dynamic risk factors rele-
be emotionally emotions/callousness ii) Blunted cortisol
vant to sexual offending could lead to a failure to experience empathy
affected by others' activity and low
experiences/ reactivity to stress in the lead up to, and at the time of, a sexual offense.
distress (in self and others) The MEP is an outline of the process involved in an empathic re-
Perspective taking Inaccuracies in Implicit theories about sponse, and we consider that a supplementary model is required,
The ability to take perspective taking lead to other people or groups building on this, to demonstrate how this process might be disrupted
the perspective of distorted view of the victim's that minimize their
others by imagining experience, in which harm is experience of harm
or impaired during a sexual offense. Fig. 2 builds on the above norma-
how the other minimized, or the abuse is tive outline of an empathic response and indicates the potential
would feel in that construed as beneficial causes of empathic failure in sex offenders. Fig. 2 illustrates how
situation or by each of the problems with the processes outlined in Table 1 could
imagining how you
act as ‘blocks’ to experiencing empathy for a victim of sexual abuse,
would feel in that
situation each one interfering with the cognitive or affective processes required
Compassion and A view of others that is i) Psychopathic traits, to have an affective response that is appropriately matched to the sit-
respect hostile and aggressive, or i.e., callousness uation. This model assumes that in order to commit a sexual offense
A view of others as indifference to/lack of concern ii) Situational factors there must be an absence of empathy for the victim at the point of
worthy of respect for others' experiences. May (e.g., anger at person)
and compassion leave the offender feeling iii) Implicit theories/
offending. This model highlights the range of potential causes for
(Menschenliebe) justified in harming others, or associated attitudes the lack of empathy at the time of the offense, specifically focusing
simply not caring about the (values) that suggest on causes that are known dynamic risk factors for sexual offending.
harm caused others do not deserve It is a temporal or process model, and states that the first point at
respect or that others'
which the empathic process could be disrupted by stable or acute dy-
needs are less important
that your own namic risk factors is in picking up the cues that someone is distressed.
Situational factors Specific failures of any of the i) Stress, leading to The ability to identify such cues can be disrupted if someone is experienc-
Application of the above in a given situation, cognitive deconstruction ing intense emotion (either positive or negative), including shame, and/
above cognitive or allowing focus on self and ii) Use of alcohol, drugs or cognitive deconstruction, all of which reduce “other-focus”, which
affective processes pursuit of pleasure, iii) Intense bodily
means the cues of distress may not be attended to at all. Even if the
to a specific co-occurring with a decrease in sensations such as sexual
situation in which ‘other’ focus arousal cues are observed, then theory of mind deficits for the group to which
another is the victim belongs could result in misinterpretation of the cues. For ex-
distressed ample, an implicit theory that suggests that children are not harmed by
Ability to manage Inability to manage emotional I) Low self-esteem
sex or actively seek sex could lead to inaccurate interpretation of a child's
emotional distress distress e.g., becoming ii) Lacked role models for
The ability to egocentrically consumed by coping with emotions behavior leading up to or during a sexual offense.
manage emotions own feelings/experiencing The second point at which the empathic process could be disrupted
rather than to shame which leads to self-focus is after the indicators of distress have been attended to and interpreted
become consumed and reduces other-focus as distress. At this point a lack of concern for others generally or an in-
by them
ability, or at least restricted ability, to experience emotion would impair
236 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239

Cognitive process: Emotional

Perspective taking/ response:
putting yourself in Feeling the other’s
that situation emotion/ or
emotion as result
of imagining how
you would feel in
that situation
Situation in Cognitive process:
which suffering Accurate Appropriately
or distress construction of matched
would be another’s view empathic
expected response

Affective process: Cognitive process:

Experience of other’s Perspective taking/
emotion construction of
another’s view

Internal (Person) variables

Situational/Contextual factors
Belief that others should be treated with respect and
Stable mood (absence of extreme positive
compassion
or negative emotion)
Ability to experience emotion
Cognitive lucidity (absence of intoxication
Ability to tolerate/manage self-referring emotions/ personal
through drugs/alcohol)
distress
Theory of mind/ Perspective taking ability
Absence of implicit theories that would bias interpretations of
sufferer’s experience
Caring relationship with individual

Fig. 1. Model of the empathic process (MEP).

the experience of empathy for the victim. This would lead to a feeling of
indifference rather than compassion for the victim. Similarly, grievance
or entitlement thinking could permit the conclusion that the victim de-
serves to be distressed or that the victim's experience is unimportant.
The presence of these implicit theories/schema could even lead to a
nonempathic internal response, such as feeling powerful or sexually
aroused.
The final point at which an internal empathic response could be
blocked occurs when the offender has attended to the distress of
the victim and has accurately interpreted this distress at both a

Cognitive process:
Emotional
Perspective taking/
2. Potential response:
putting yourself in blocks: Feeling the other’s
that situation Entitlement emotion/ or
schema
Grievance emotion as result 3. Potential
1. Potential /dangerous of imagining how blocks:
blocks: world you would feel in Poor coping
Cognitive schema that situation
Lack of
with
deconstructio personal
Situation in Cognitive process: concern for
n (as result of others distress
which suffering drugs/ alcohol/ Accurate Appropriately
generally
or distress emotional construction of matched
Restricted
would be state another’s view ability to empathic
expected (positive or experience response
negative)/ emotion
sexual desire)
Shame
Theory of
mind deficits
Cognitive process:
Affective process: Perspective taking/
Experience of other’s construction of
emotion another’s view

Indicators of distress filtered out or Inappropriate emotional response e.g., Self-focused emotional response
interpreted inaccurately powerful

Fig. 2. Temporal model of blocks to empathic responding.

 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
cognitive and emotional level. At this stage, problems with managing
the personal distress that arises from such knowledge might culmi-
nate in defensive externalization, including victim blaming or mini-
mization of harm, which then inhibits an empathic, compassionate
response.
The MEP assumes that there are multiple points at which the em-
pathic process can be inhibited or disrupted, and that there are mul-
tiple causes of this inhibition/disruption. In our view, it is unlikely
that any single factor could explain an absence of empathy for victims
during sexual offenses. Instead, the factors that interfere with em-
pathic responding are likely to vary for different individuals, and
could fluctuate within an individual across time. For example, an of-
fender who committed multiple offenses may on some occasions be-
lieve that their victim deserved to be harmed, but on others their lack
of empathy for their victim(s) may be better explained by cognitive
deconstruction.
3.1. Empirical and theoretical adequacy of the model
This model is an example what Ward and Hudson (1998) defined as
a level II theory. That is, it attempts to provide a detailed description of a
single factor (lack of empathy for the victim) that is hypothesized to
play an important role in the initiation and maintenance of sexual
offending. It is important that any theory is critically evaluated, and
there are a number of standard criteria against which theories can be
judged. Ward and Beech (2006) described seven epistemic (i.e., knowl-
edge related) criteria to assess a theory's explanatory adequacy and
usefulness, derived from Hooker (1987) and Newton-Smith (2002).
These are 1) the theory's predictive and empirical accuracy (whether
the theory can explain the range of phenomena requiring explanation
and can account for extant findings), 2) the internal coherence of the
theory, 3) the external consistency of the theory (whether it is consis-
tent with other current and relevant accepted theories), 4) the theory's
unifying power (whether it brings together existing theories from the
same or different domains, in a new or innovative way), 5) the theory's
fertility or heuristic value (including a theory's capacity to lead to new
predictions and to direct new and effective treatment interventions),
6) the simplicity of the theory (how many theoretical assumptions it
makes; the fewer the better) and finally, 7) the explanatory depth of
the theory, which includes how deeply it goes into explaining causation
and etiology.
In brief, the MEP fares well when evaluated using the above set of
epistemic criteria. The MEP has internal coherence and has drawn
upon the primary current models and theories that are concerned
with explaining the relationship between lack of empathy and sexual
offending. The theory is relatively simple and makes few assump-
tions, but may not be complete, as although it touches on the etiology
of some of the blocks to empathy, this is not an explicit focus of the
model. We will spend the rest of this paper examining the empirical
adequacy and external consistency of the model (i.e., how well it
fits with extant findings and theories), and then discuss its heuristic
value, focusing on how it could be used to inform treatment with sex-
ual offenders.
3.2. Empirical adequacy and external consistency
Much research examining the link between lack of empathy and
sexual offending has examined whether reconviction for such a
crime is related to whether or not an individual is able to experience
empathy for previous victims after the event. However, this theory
proposes that it is those deficits/problems that led to a lack of empa-
thy at the time of offending that should have a relationship with
reconviction; and that the continued presence of these factors, rather
than an absence of victim empathy post-offense, would predict
reconviction. This is an important distinction, because in some cases
it would be possible to increase (or apparently increase) empathy
237
for past victims without affecting the deficits that prevented an em-
pathic experience at the time of the offense. For example, an offender
who is poor at perspective taking may still be able to learn in therapy
that his victim was harmed. However, in learning this he has not nec-
essarily developed the (general) skill of perspective-taking that he
can apply in novel future situations. Arguably, his greater victim em-
pathy may motivate him to acquire this skill but it does not necessar-
ily ensure this is the case. As another example, an offender whose
ability to perspective take was diminished in a particular situation
where he was sexually aroused, or angry, or drunk, may be able to
adopt his victim's perspective with hindsight in therapy. But it is
unclear whether he will be able to exhibit empathy ability when he
is sexually aroused, angry or drunk. These examples illustrate how in-
dividuals could receive post-treatment clinical ratings that indicate
they possess victim empathy without their having been any underly-
ing change in their specific obstacles to future empathic responding.
These points all emphasize the importance of clearly detecting the
nature of individual sex offender's particular blocks and the degree
to which they are situational, stable, structural, contextual etc.
Additionally, whether or not someone is able to demonstrate vic-
tim empathy post-offense is difficult to measure. One of the reasons
for this difficulty is that it is not apparent what clinicians should be
looking for — that is, what does demonstrating victim empathy look
like? Furthermore, various non risk-related factors such as level of
cognitive functioning, cultural factors, neurological impairments,
and language abilities, not to mention denial of offending and defen-
sive externalization, might interfere with the demonstration of victim
empathy. We suggest therefore, that if it is true that lack of empathy
plays a causal role in sexual offending, we should be able to find em-
pirical evidence of a relationship between the factors listed above
(see Table 1), which were present at the time of the offense and
reconviction for a sexual offense. Certainly, the individual compo-
nents of the MEP have emerged from meta-analysis as valid predic-
tors of sexual recidivism. This provides some post hoc support for
the validity of the MEP.
In the latest assessment of empirically supported risk factors for recid-
ivism, Mann, Hanson, and Thornton (2010) identified 10 factors which
have strong empirical support. These include: Offense-supportive atti-
tudes (beliefs that condone sexual offending), and Grievance/hostility.
Risk factors with “promising” empirical support include a lack of concern
for others, and poor coping with negative emotions. It can be argued that
grievance/hostility and lack of concern for others are synonymous with
deficits in compassion and respect for others. It can also be argued that
offense-supportive attitudes are implicit theories which limit or impair
perspective taking, and poor coping with negative emotions is synony-
mous with personal distress. Feelings of inadequacy involve low self-
esteem, which Marshall and colleagues argue is related to dysfunctional
management of personal distress. Finally it is reasonable to argue that
cognitive deconstruction is more likely if someone has difficulty coping
with their emotions, or if they are experiencing high levels of sexual pre-
occupation, another risk factor for sexual recidivism. If this argument is
accepted, then these established risk factors do indeed seem to validate
the hypothesis that problems that interfere with the empathic process
are part of the explanation for sexual offending. This suggests that the
model has some external validity and empirical adequacy.
4. Treatment implications
The MEP suggests that it is time to move away from a view of victim
empathy as a single construct and a vital treatment goal, and instead to
adopt measures of the multiple deficits that may have led the offender
to lack empathy for his victim at the time of the offense. In essence, this
means that the dynamic risk factors of grievance/hostility, callousness,
offense-supportive attitudes (including child abuse supportive beliefs,
sexual entitlement beliefs and women as deceitful beliefs), poor coping
(including personal distress), poor self-regulation, sexual preoccupation,
238 G. Barnett, R.E. Mann / Aggression and Violent Behavior 18 (2013) 228–239
and feelings of inadequacy, become the key targets for assessment and
treatment, rather than the less precise construct of “victim empathy”.
Treatment of empathy deficits in sexual offenders should there-
fore depend on the exact nature of each individual's deficits with re-
spect to the individual risk factors that could block empathy. One
current confusion, however, both in the literature and in practice, is
that “empathy” and “victim empathy” are often used as interchange-
able terms. These concepts should be carefully distinguished. We
recommend that the term “empathy treatment” is used to refer to
practice activities that address blocks to empathy such as those
depicted in Fig. 2. “Victim empathy treatment” refers to activities
that encourage an offender to articulate and/or experience the impact
of his past sexual offense(s) on his particular victim(s). We propose
that any empathy-enhancing procedure with sexual offenders should
follow an assessment of which of the five problems proposed in this
review, listed in Table 1, are relevant to the offender's abusive behav-
ior. Treatment approaches would then vary depending on the nature
of the deficit that an individual presents with. Someone with a deficit
in general ability to perspective take would need different treatment
to someone who is has difficulties in applying their cognitive and
affective empathy skills to particular situations in which they cogni-
tively deconstruct. For some, work on managing strong negative emo-
tional states, or medication for high levels of sexual preoccupation,
may be a way to avoid cognitive deconstruction. For others, it may
be that general work on developing poor perspective-taking skills
will take priority. For other offenders, work on challenging offense-
supportive implicit schemas should take precedence. In this way,
this theory may point to a different treatment approach to that com-
monly used in addressing ‘victim empathy deficits’. However, it is
important to note that this model, and its implications for treatment,
may have less value for offenders with psychopathic traits, for whom
empathy deficits could be considered the result of both learned and
evolved strategies and therefore which would be more resistant to
change (e.g., Lalumière, Harris, Quinsey, & Rice, 2005).
4.1. Implications for victim empathy work in sexual offender treatment
Would traditional empathy techniques, such as role-playing the vic-
tim at the time of the offense, writing an account of the offense from
the victim's perspective and watching videoed accounts of survivors of
abuse, be likely to address any of these problems? Arguably, this is possi-
ble. As Williams (1996) wrote, “Much of cognitive therapy aims at dealing
with [the] fact memory aspect of psychopathology. The client and thera-
pist spend time discovering what self-referential facts are believed and
what assumptions he or she is making” (p. 102). Role-playing past trau-
matic experiences to uncover contemporaneous irrational thoughts is a
commonly used cognitive therapy technique (e.g., Beck, 1995). In victim
empathy role-plays (see Mann, Daniels, & Marshall, 2002) the purpose
of the role-play is to uncover self-serving biases, rather than
self-damaging biases, but the principle is the same: revisiting memories
of past events in the context of cognitive therapy enables the client to
reassess the extent to which their beliefs at the time were mistaken,
which, in turn, assists the client to choose different courses of behavior
should similar events occur. It could be argued, therefore, that revisiting
a past sexual offense with a focus on the victim's perspective enables an
offender to see the situation differently, and that the more accurate per-
spective taking achieved through hindsight develops a skill that will gen-
eralize to other, future, situations. On the other hand, there is no empirical
evidence for the notion that developing empathy for past victims general-
izes to future situations. In order to explore this possibility, we need the
findings from qualitative studies of desistance after treatment; no such
studies have been conducted to our knowledge.
Similarly, psycho-educational lessons about the experience of sex-
ual abuse victims may help to address offense-supportive beliefs by
providing evidence that beliefs such as “sexual abuse does not cause
lasting damage” are erroneous. Commonly, such lessons involve use of
written or filmed survivor accounts as discussion points in offender
groups. Are survivor accounts likely to prove effective at addressing
offense-supportive attitudes, grievance thinking, lack of concern for
others, problems with self regulation, poor problem solving, or sexual
preoccupation? In our view, the only likely effect would be on offense-
supportive attitudes. We suspect that this is true in fact of the majority
of victim empathy-enhancing activities. Certainly, this is also how Mar-
shall and his associates have framed this aspect of practice, a view
supported by Pithers' (1999) study. While we agree that this conceptual-
ization is plausible we retain some concerns. For one thing, there are is-
sues about the proportion of time allotted to victim empathy modules in
many treatment programs. It may be disproportionate to spend a quarter
or a third of a treatment program addressing one risk factor when
(according to Mann et al., 2010) we know of at least 12 risk factors for
sexual recidivism with a strong empirical base, particularly as there is
no evidence that any one risk factor is more important than another.
5. Conclusion
What is clear is that assessment of deficits and subsequent treat-
ment planning should start with an evidence-based model of the rela-
tionship between empathy and offending, which we hope we have
provided in this paper. We have argued elsewhere (Mann & Barnett,
2012) that treatment activity designed to enhance victim empathy
should probably remain as a component of an intervention. However,
we believe that such work alone will not sufficiently protect offenders
against future failures of empathy. More important is work to build em-
pathic capacity, namely interventions that seek to improve perspective
taking, emotional responding, Menschenliebe, and the ability to cope
with distress. Such skills should be practiced in real life situations so
that they are more accessible at times of future stress, and can be
implemented before another victim is created.
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank Professor Tony Ward and Dr. Robert
McGrath for their invaluable comments on earlier drafts of this paper.
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