DR. V. ORESTES ROMUALDEZ EDUCATIONAL FOUNDATION, INC.

COLLEGE OF LAW
STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION
MIDTERM EXAMINATIONS
A.Y 2021-2022 1st Semester

INSTRUCTIONS

1. This Questionnaire contains _____________________ PAGES including this page. Check the number
of pages and their proper sequencing. You may write notes on this Questionnaire.
2. Your answers should demonstrate your ability to analyze the facts, apply the pertinent laws and
jurisprudence, and arrive at sound and logical conclusions.
3. Marking of your answer sheets or booklets with your name or other identifying signs or symbols
extraneous to the subject matter of the questions may be considered as cheating and may disqualify you
for the whole examination.
4. You have two (2) hours to answer the exam.

I. (10)
A. Distinguish Construction and Interpretation. (2%)
Answer: CONSTRUCTION relates to the ascertainment of the MEANING and the
INTENTION of the authors of the law. What did the authors mean when they drafted a particular
law? What was their intention in crafting that law or a particular provision thereof. What was
their purpose? One is construing the law if the purpose is to KNOW THE MEANING OF THE
LAW BY LOOKING INTO THE INTENTION OF ITS AUTHORS through the use of
EXTRINSIC AIDS.
INTERPRETATION is it concerned with the meaning of the language used. One is
INTERPRETING THE LAW, when the purpose is to know the INTENTED SIGNIFICATION
OF THE WORD OR PHRASE USED IN THE LAW ONLY through the use of INTRINSIC
AIDS. Meaning, the courts do not go beyond the law in ascertaining legislative intent.
B. Explain why the terms ‘construction’ and ‘interpretation’ are used interchangeably in our
jurisdiction despite their technical differences. (3%)
Answer: They are both utilized in case of ambiguity in the law—in the language used or in its
application.
They have the same object—to ascertain the meaning and the will of the authors of the law in
order that it may be enforced.
C. What is Statutory Construction? (3%)
Answer: It is the art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the
authors of the law, where that intention is rendered doubtful by reason of the ambiguity in its
language or of the fact that a given case is not explicitly provided for in the law. (p. 104, Agpalo.
Merged definition of construction and interpretation)
“The art or process of discovering and expounding the meaning and intention of the authors of
the law with respect to its application to a given case, where that intention is rendered doubtful,
amongst others, by reason of the fact that the given case is not explicitly provided for in the law”
(Also okay, but only award a 2.5 since this is just a definition of construction.).
D. Distinguish Statutory Construction from Constitutional Construction. (2%)
Answer: Both differ as to SUBJECT AND INTENT.
Subject- StatCon’s subject are statutes lower than the constitution. Meanwhile, the subject of
ConCon, is the constitution.
Intent- In StatCon, interpretation seeks to ascertain and discover the intent of the legislature.
Meanwhile, in ConCon, what the interpreter seeks is to ascertain the intent of the framers of the
constitution.

II.
 How does a bill become a law? (10%)
3 readings in each house of Congress. 1st reading—referred to appropriate committee for studt.
2nd reading—interpellation, amendments are made. 3 rd reading, no amendments are allowed. But
before third reading, final copy must be distributed to all members of the house unless the
president certifies to the bill’s immediate enactment to meet a public emergency or calamity. If
the other house not amenable to version of the house or origin, bill referred to bicam committee
which will reconcile both versions. If both houses are amenable to bicam report, it become the
final form of the bill which is transmitted to the Pres for approval. If the other house amenable to
version of the house of origin, the authenticated bill is transmitted to the Pres. If he signs it, it
becomes a law. If he fails to sign it within 30 days from receipt, it also becomes a law. If he
vetoes the bill, he shall return it to the house of origin together with his objection. His veto may
be overridden by 2/3 vote.
III. (10)
Ismael Makadatu filed a petition for original registration of his title over 700 square
meters of land under Presidential Decree (PD) No. 1529. However, during the pendency
of his petition, he died. Thus, his heirs—Amirah, Diane, and Farrah—all surnamed
Makadatu were substituted as applicants. Upon receipt of the notice of initial hearing,
they had the same published only in the Official Gazette. Subsequently, the land
registration court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction, noting that the applicants
failed to fully comply with the publication requirement under Section 23(1) of PD 1529
which reads:

Sec. 23. Notice of initial hearing, publication, etc. — The court shall, within five days
from filing of the application, issue an order setting the date and hour of the initial
hearing which shall not be earlier than forty-five days nor later than ninety days from the
date of the order.

The public shall be given notice of initial hearing of the application for land registration
by means of (1) publication; (2) mailing; and (3) posting.

1. By publication. —
Upon receipt of the order of the court setting the time for initial hearing, the
Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause a notice of initial hearing to be published
once in the Official Gazette and once in a newspaper of general circulation in the
Philippines: Provided, however, that the publication in the Official Gazette shall be
sufficient to confer jurisdiction upon the court. Said notice shall be addressed to all
persons appearing to have an interest in the land involved including the adjoining owners
so far as known, and "to all whom it may concern." Said notice shall also require all
persons concerned to appear in court at a certain date and time to show cause why the
prayer of said application shall not be granted.
 A) What is the verba legis rule? (2%)
ANSWER: Under the verba legis rule, where the law is clear, plain, and free
from ambiguity, it must be given its literal meaning and applied without any
interpretation or even construction.

B) On what presumption is the verba legis rule based? (1%)

ANSWER: This rule is based on the presumption that the words employed therein
correctly express its intent and preclude even the courts from giving it a different
construction.

C) Was the land registration court correct in dismissing the petition for the applicants’
failure to fully comply with the publication requirements under Sec. 23(1) of PD
1529? (7%)
ANSWER: Yes, the land registration court was correct in dismissing the petition for
failure to fully comply with the publication requirements under Sec. 23(1) of PD
1529.
It is a well-settled rule in Statutory Construction that where the law speaks in clear
and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation, vacillation or
equivocation; there is room only for application.
Here, Sec. 23(1) of PD 1529 is very clear that upon receipt of the order of the court
setting the time for initial hearing, the Commissioner of Land Registration shall cause
a notice of initial hearing to be published once in the Official Gazette and once in
a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines. The said provision
explicitly requires the publication of the notice of initial hearing both in the
Official Gazette and in a newspaper of general circulation. However, the
applicants only had the notice published in the former, but not the latter.
Hence, the land registration court was court in dismissing the petition. (The
Director of Lands vs. CA and Abistado)

IV. (10%)
A. Define the following:
1. Constitution (1%)
2. Statute (1%)
3. Golden Rule (1%)
4. Purpose Rule (1%)
5. Mischief Rule (1%)
B. Give the three (3) basic rules in the application and interpretation of statutes as discussed in class. (5%
ANSWER: If the law is clear, apply, do not interpret.
If the law is ambiguous, determine legislative intent by going over the law itself. Identify first
legislative intent by looking at the four corners of the statute. (intrinsic aid)
If the letter of the law is unclear, as well as the language thereof, use extrinsic aids in
determining legislative intent (e.g. legislative deliberations)

V (10%)
The Citizen’s Battle Against Corruption (CIBAC) an organized group duly registered under the
party-list system in the Philippines manifested its intent to participate in the May 14, 2007
synchronized national and local elections. Through its president Emmanuel Joel Villanueva,
CIBAC submitted a list of five nominees namely, Emmanuel Joel Villanueva, Luis Lokin Jr,
Cinchona Cruz-Gonzalez, Sherwin Tugna, and Emil Galang. However, on May 7, 2007, CIBAC,
still through Villanueva, filed a certificate of nomination, substitution, and amendment of the list
of nominees withdrawing the nominations of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang; and substituted Armi
Jane Borje as one of the nominees, thus leaving as nominees in the amended list only Villanueva,
Cruz-Gonzales, and Borje. Subsequently, CIBAC garnered such number of votes entitling it to a
second seat in Congress. The COMELEC en banc approved the withdrawal of the nomination of
Lokin, Tugna, and Galang as second, third, and fourth nominees based on Section 13 of
Resolution No. 7804 which states that, “A party-list nominee may be substituted only when he
dies, or his nomination is withdrawn by the party, or he becomes incapacitated to continue as
such, or he withdraws his acceptance to a nomination. x x x” This, notwithstanding Section 8
of the Party-List System Act (RA 7941) which states that, “No change of names or alteration of
the order of nominees shall be allowed after the same shall have been submitted to the
COMELEC except in cases where the nominee dies, or withdraws in writing his nomination,
becomes incapacitated in which case the name of the substitute nominee shall be placed last
in the list.” As a result, Cruz-Gonzalez was proclaimed as the second nominee and thereafter,
took her oath of office.
a) Was the COMELEC en banc correct in approving the withdrawal of nomination of Lokin
and the others? (7%)

ANSWER: No, the COMELEC en banc is not correct in approving the withdrawal of
nomination of Lokin, Tugna, and Galang.

In the case of Lokin Jr vs. COMELEC, it was held that administrative regulation
cannot extend the law and amend a legislative enactment, and that the clear letter of
the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere administrative rule issued
for its implementation.
Administrative agencies have neither the authority nor the license to expand,
extend, or add anything to the law it seeks to implement thereby. The IRRs the
 COMELEC issues for that purpose should always accord with the law to be
implemented, and should not override, supplant, or modify the law.

Here, COMELEC extended the Party-List System Act by adding withdrawal of the
nomination by the party as a ground for substitution in Sec. 13 of Res No. 7804 even
though such ground is not provided under the Party-list System Act. By doing this, the
COMELEC has modified the Party-List System Act which, under the law, is proscribed.

Thus, the COMELEC erred in approving the nominations of Lokin and the others.

b) What are the requisites for the validity of an administrative IRR? (3%)

ANSWER:
1. Its promulgation must be authorized by the Legislature;
2. It must be within the scope of the authority given by the Legislature;
3. It must be promulgated in accordance with the prescribed procedure; and
4. It must be reasonable.

VI. (10%)
Darlene filed a case for damages against Norvelyn alleging that the latter vexed, insulted, and
humiliated her in a hostile and furious mood offensive to the former’s dignity and personality
while they were having a sleepover party. In support of her allegations, Darlene produced a
transcript of a recording she had secretly made of the conversation between her and Norvelyn.
Subsequently, Norvelyn filed a criminal case against Darlene for violation of the Anti-
Wiretapping Act (RA No. 4200). In her defense, Darlene alleged that section 1 of RA 4200 only
applies to the secret recording of a private conversation by a person not a privy thereto and as
such, she cannot be prosecuted for violation of RA 4200. Norvelyn, however, contented that
section 1 of the law is very clear—it shall be unlawful for any person, not being authorized by
all the parties to any private communication or spoken word, to tap any wire or cable, or by
using any other device or arrangement, to secretly overhear, intercept, or record such
communication or spoken word by using a device commonly known as a dictaphone or
dictagraph or detectaphone or walkie-talkie or tape recorder, or however otherwise described.
Thereafter, Darlene was convicted by the Regional Trial Court.
A) Was the conviction proper? (5%)
ANSWER: Yes, the conviction was proper. The unambiguity of the express words of the
provision, taken together with the above-quoted deliberations from the Congressional
Record, therefore plainly supports the view held by the respondent court that the
provision seeks to penalize even those privy to the private communications. Where the
law makes no distinctions, one does not distinguish.
Second, the nature of the conversations is immaterial to a violation of the statute. The
substance of the same need not be specifically alleged in the information. What R.A.
 4200 penalizes are the acts of secretly overhearing, intercepting or recording private
communications by means of the devices enumerated therein. The mere allegation
that an individual made a secret recording of a private communication by means of
a tape recorder would suffice to constitute an offense under Section 1 of R.A. 4200.
As the Solicitor General pointed out in his COMMENT before the respondent court:
"Nowhere (in the said law) is it required that before one can be regarded as a violator, the
nature of the conversation, as well as its communication to a third person should be
professed." (Ramirez vs. CA), this is still verba legis.

B) What is legislative intent? (2.5%)

ANSWER: Legislative intent is the PURPOSE OF THE LEGISLATURE IN
ENACTING THE LAW, or the meaning the legislature seeks to convey.

The intent of a statute is the law itself, and it always has to be given effect.

C) Where is legislative intent principally determined?

ANSWER: Legislative intent is principally determined from the language of the statute
(Ramirez vs CA)
VII (10%)
Original Certificate of Title No. 12345 covering the Santa Mesa and D Estates of the Tuason
mayorazgo with areas of 879 and 1,625 hectares, respectively was the subject of several land
disputes in the past where the defendant was always Tuason. In all these cases, most, reaching
the Supreme Court, the validity of OCT No. 12345 and the titles derived therefrom was upheld.
Thereafter, siblings Donatella and Donotello Dimawili filed a complaint praying that they be
declared the owners of a parcel of land located at Quezon City. They contended that the said
property was fraudulently or erroneously included in OCT No. 12345 and it was registered under the
name of the defendant, Tuason. The plaintiffs Dimawili prayed that OCT No. 12345 and the titles derived
therefrom be declared void due to certain irregularities in the land registration proceeding.
a) May OCT No. 12345 and the titles derived therefrom be questioned at this later hour by the
Dimawilis? (7%)

ANSWER: NO, OCT No. 12345 and the titled derived therefrom can no longer be questioned by
the Dimawilis.

Stare Decisis. Follow past precedents and do not disturb what has been settled. Matters already
decided on the merits cannot be relitigated again and again.

b) What is the principle of stare decisis? (3%)

ANSWER:
A principle underlying the decision in the in once case is deemed an imperative authority,
controlling the decisions of like cases in the same court and in lower courts within the same
jurisdiction unless and until the decision in question is reversed or overruled by a court of
competent authority.
 VIII.

a) Every bill passed by Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in
the title thereof. What are the aims of this constitutional requirements? (5%)

ANSWER:
1) To PREVENT A HODGE PODGE OR LOG-ROLLING LEGISLATION;
2) TO PREVENT SURPRISE OR FRAUD UPON THE LEGISLATURE
3) TO FAIRLY APPRISE THE PEOPLE, of the subjects of the bill being heard in the
legislature;
4) TO USE AS A GUIDE IN ASCERTAINING LEGISLATIVE INTENT when the
language of the law does not clearly express its purpose. The title of the law may clarify
doubts or ambiguity in the meaning and scope of a statute, and limiting the statute to only
one subject and expressing it in its title will strengthen its function as an intrinsic aid to
statutory construction.

b) What are the substantive requirements for the validity of an ordinance? (5%)
ANSWER:
1) must not contravene the constitution;
2) must not be unfair or oppressive;
3) must not be partial or discriminatory;
4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade;
5) must be general and consistent with public policy; and
6) must not be unreasonable.

IX. (10%)

Congress passed RA 8180 for the deregulation of the downstream oil industry, but was
subsequently declared unconstitutional. A Motion for Reconsideration was thereafter filed, the
movants contending that only the provisions on the 4% tariff differential, minimum inventory,
and predatory pricing should be struck down, and not the entire law because of the separability
clause. The Court denied the Motion for Reconsideration and held that in the case of RA. 8180,
the unconstitutionality of the provisions on tariff differential, minimum inventory and predatory
pricing cannot but result in the unconstitutionality of the entire law despite its separability clause.
These provisions cannot be struck down alone for they were the ones intended to carry out the
policy of the law.
a) What is the effect of the unconstitutionality of a provision a statute on other provisions? (5%)
(see. TATAD vs. SEC of ENERGY)
 ANSWER: THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT WHERE PART OF A STATUTE
IS VOID, WHILE ANOTHER PART IS VALID, THE LATTER MAY STAND
AND BE ENFORCED IF SEPARABLE FROM THE INVALID PORTION. The
presence of the separability clause a statute creates a presumption that the
legislature intended separability, rather than complete nullity of a statute. TO
JUSTIFY THIS RESULT, THE VALID PORTION MUST BE SO FAR
INDEPENDENT OF THE VALID PORTION THAT IT IS FAIR TO PRESUME
THAT THE LEGISLATURE WOULD HAVE ENACTED IT BY ITSELF IF IT
HAD SUPPOSED THAT IT COULD NOT CONSTITUTIONALLY ENACT
THE OTHER. Enough must remain to make a complete, intelligible and valid
statute, which carries out the legislative intent x x x
THE EXCEPTION TO THE GENERAL RULE IS THAT WHEN
PARTS OF THE STATUTE ARE MUTUALLY DEPENDENT AND
CONNECTED AS TO WARRANT A BELIEF THAT THE LEGISLATURE
INTENDED THEM AS A WHOLE, THE NULLITY OF ONE PART WILL
VITIATE.
b. Was the Court correct in denying the Motion for Reconsideration? (5%)
ANSWER: Yes, the court was correct in denying the Motion for Reconsideration.
Settled is the rule in StatCon that after removing the void parts of a statute, what remains is no
longer workable or is incomplete, the Court may strike down the entire statute despite its
separability clause.
Here, the unconstitutional provisions of RA 8180 are the ones intended to carry out the very
policy of the law thereby rendering the remaining provisions incomplete or no longer workable
or useless once the former is removed.
Thus, the Court was correct in denying the Motion for Reconsideration, and declaring the entire
statute unconstitutional, and not just the specific parts thereof.

X (10)
Doofenshmirtz Bank Manila filed with the BIR an administrative claim for refund or issuance of
its tax credit certificate in the amount of P76,543,210.00 believing that it made an overpayment
of its branch profit remittance tax (BPRT) on its regular banking unit net income remitted to
Doofenshmirtz Bank Germany for 2002 and prior taxable years. Simultaneously, it also
requested from the International Tax Affair Division of the BIR a confirmation of its entitlement
to the preferential tax rate of 10% under the RP-Germany Tax Treaty. Subsequently,
Doofenshmritz filed a Petition for Review before the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA) alleging the
inaction of the BIR. This was however denied by the CTA citing that a foreign corporation
wishing to avail of the benefits of the tax treaty should invoke the provisions of the tax treaty and
prove that indeed the provisions of the tax treaty applies to it, before the benefits may be
extended to such corporation, and pointed out that it violated the 15-day rule for tax treaty relief
application under Revenue Memorandum Order (RMO) No. 1-2000. This compelled
Doofenshmritz to file a petition before the Supreme Court contending that it has met with all the
conditions under Article 10 of the RP-Germany Tax Treaty and as such, the CTA erred in
denying its claim solely by reason of RMO No. 1-2000. The CIR, on the other hand, contended
that RMO NO. 1-2000 is mandatory in character; thus, non-compliance thereof will deprive
persons or corporations the benefit of a tax treaty.
a) May Doofenshmirtz Bank Manila be deprived of the benefit under the RP-Germany Tax
Treaty on the sole ground of non-compliance with RMO No. 1-2000? (7%) (SEE.
DEUTSCHE BANK AG MANILA, vs. CIR)

ANSWER: NO, Doofenshmirtz Bank Manila may not be deprived of the benefit under
the RP-Germany Tax Treaty on the sole ground of non-compliance with RMO No. 1-
2000.

In a case decided by the SC, it was held that a state that has contracted a valid
international obligation is bound to make in its legislations those modifications that may
be necessary to ensure the fulfillment of the obligations undertekan. Thus, laws and
issuances must ensure that the reliefs granted under tax treaties are accorded to the parties
entitled thereto. RMO No. 1-2000 should not operate to divest the entitlement to the relief
as it would constitute a violation of the duty required by bad faith in complying with a tax
treaty. The denial of the availment of tax relief for the failure of the taxpayer to apply
within the prescribed period under the administrative issuance would impair the value of
the tax treaty.

b) What is the Presumption Against Violation of International Law? (3%)

ANSWER: Laws of the state are presumed to be in accord with treaties to which the Philippines
is a party under the time-honored international principle of pacta sunct servanda which demands
the performance in good faith of treaty obligations on the part of the states that enter into the
agreement.