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Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities: From Assessment of

Performance To Assessment of Competence

Article in European Journal of Psychological Assessment · January 1997

DOI: 10.1027/1015-5759.13.1.10

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European Journal of Psychological Assessment, Vol. 13, Issue 1, pp. 10–20 © 1997 Hogrefe & Huber Publishers

Jacques Grégoire Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities

Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities:

From Assessment of Performance To Assessment
of Competence
Jacques Grégoire
Université Catholique de Louvain, Belgium

Models underlying diagnostic assessment of learning disabilities are seldom explained and discussed. More
often too, those assessments are offered without empirical support. The goal of the current paper is to reflect
on the diagnostic assessment of learning disabilities. A distinction can be made between assessments which
focus on performance and those which focus on competence. Competence-based diagnostic assessments
provide more useful information to practitioners to understand learning disabilities and to organize special
education. Historically, the Piagetian theory opened the way to assessments of competence. But the assess-
ments based on Piagetian theory suffer from methodological shortcomings. In this paper, significant changes
for diagnostic assessments which are due to the recent development of cognitive psychology are emphasized.

Keywords: Diagnostic assessment, learning disabilities, cognitive psychology

The assessment of school learning remains strongly From Performance to Competence

influenced by the behaviorist framework. Teachers’
and school psychologists’ attention is often focus on
the directly and objectively observable reality: the
student’s performance. This viewpoint can be justi-
fied when the goal of the assessment is the selection,
the ranking or the certification. In this case, quanti-
fying a performance and comparing it to a cut score
give enough information to come to a fair decision.
But today, greater attention is paid to formative
evaluation and diagnostic assessment and leads to a
shift in the practitioners’ needs. Diagnostic assess-
ment is not a trivial process. In this paper, the main
assumptions of this kind of assessment are dis-
cussed. The distinction between an assessment
which is focused on performance and an assessment
which is focused on competence is especially em-
phasized. The evolution of the diagnostic assess-
ment focusing on competence is reviewed from the
Piagetian framework to the cognitivist framework.
The relevance, but also the shortcomings, of these
frameworks are discussed. The most promising di-
rections for the diagnostic assessment are then indi-
cated and the questions which need to be answered
in the future are emphasized.
The Concepts of Performance and
Competence
What is a diagnostic assessment of learning disabili-
ties? This assessment is not obvious and many as-
sumptions, often implicit, are made.
(1) The most important assumption relates to the
reality to be assessed. Since the work of Chomsky
(1965), the distinction between performance and
competence is widely accepted. Performance refers
to the observable behaviors produced by a person.
Competence is a set of organized abilities assumed
to underlie performance. Competence is not directly
observable and can only be inferred from perform-
ance.
The distinction between performance and com-
petence can be used to classify diagnostic assess-
ments. Some assessments focus on the task and on
performance; they are basically atheoretical. On the
other hand, some assessments are rooted in a theo-
retical model of the reality underlying performance.
Several constraints of the diagnostic tools come
from this initial choice. In the case of an assessment
which is focused on competence, the relationship
between the performance and the task used to re-
veal it needs to be validated. We need to be sure that
the selected tasks measure abilities related to the
competence to be appraised. In the case of an as-
Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities
sessment which is focused on performance, no infer-
ences to constructs are made and hence the validity
requirements are less important. Still, evidence is
needed that the performance is being recorded.
Also validity evidence is needed to generalize from
performance on particular tasks to large sets of
tasks. Therefore, the choice of tasks for performance
assessment can be very important.
(2) A second assumption underlying the diagnos-
tic assessment of learning relates to the importance
given to the context. Some authors (e. g., Resnick &
Resnick, 1990) emphasize that the abilities take dif-
ferent shapes according to the context in which they
are being used. For these authors, a valid assessment
can only be contextualized. To be correctly assessed,
a person has to be confronted with a significant and
motivating task. The emphasis placed on context is
certainly relevant, but it complicates assessment too.
The same context may not be equally stimulating
and facilitating for all persons. This raises some
questions as if equity and valid generalizations can
be made. Furthermore, it is incorrect to assert that
some tests are contextualized and others are decon-
textualized. Sternberg (1990, p. 221) observes that,
even in standardized tests, “the items are contextu-
alized with respect to the environment in which they
are supposed to measure performance-namely, the
environment of the school.” Consequently, the de-
bate is not between contextualized assessment and
decontextualized assessment (all assessment is con-
textualized) but rather concerns the extent to which
generalizations can be made upon series of contex-
tualized assessments. Messick (1994, p. 18) empha-
sizes that, in order to avoid the proliferation of
qualitatively different abilities according to the con-
text of use, inferences have to be drawn taking into
account the consistency of performance across con-
texts. This consistency is then considered a reliable
indicator of competence.
(3) Finally, a third assumption of the diagnostic
assessment is related to the legitimacy of breaking
complex competencies into basic abilities. Resnick
and Resnick (1990) defend an assessment which re-
spects the complexity of the competence. They ar-
gue that an evaluation which focuses on basic abili-
ties does not take into account the interactions
among abilities. It is true that a competence is more
than a sum of abilities. The interactions are impor-
tant, too. However, it is difficult to imagine how a
diagnostic test could avoid analyzing complex com-
petence into some basic abilities. Furthermore, we
can have doubts as to the possibility to directly ap-
praise the complexity of a competence. Indeed, the
scoring of the results is almost always analytical and,
11
consequently, the score of a complex task is usually
equal to the sum of the scores of the basic tasks.
In the next section, the first assumption will be
more deeply discussed. Through some examples, the
need to focus the diagnostic assessment on the per-
son’s competencies will be emphasized. The choice
of the conceptual framework to assess competen-
cies will also be discussed.
Restrictions of Diagnostic Assess-
ments Which Focus on Performance
Problems of Score Interpretation
Most tests designed to diagnose learning disorders
focus on performance. One of the reasons comes
from the criteria generally used to define learning
disabilities. Following the DSM-IV (American Psy-
chiatric Association, 1994), “learning disorder” is
present when the ability measured by a stand-
ardized test is substantially below the expected one,
given the age, the intelligence and the education of
the person. Table 1 shows mathematics disorders as
an illustration. The criteria are similar for disorders
of reading and written expression.
Tests focused on performance do not provide any
basis for understanding the underlying cause of the
observed phenomena. As Snow and Lohman (1989,
p. 268) rightly point out, “Item writers are more
likely to be content specialists working from test
specifications that bear no relation to the specifica-
tions of relevant psychological theory.” Conse-
quently, items are usually a sample of relevant con-
tent domain knowledge, but not of learning. This
kind of test does not lead to any explanation of the
performance.
Table 1. Diagnostic criteria for mathematics disorders fol-
lowing the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (DSM-IV).
A. Mathematical ability, as measured by individually
administered standardized tests, is substantially below
that expected given the person’s chronological age,
measured intelligence, and age-appropriate education.
B. The disturbance in criterion A significantly interferes
with academic achievement or activities of daily living
that require mathematical ability.
C. If a sensory deficit is present, the difficulties in
mathematical ability are in excess of those usually
associated with it.
12
Table 2. Diagnostic assessment of mathematical knowledge with KEY-MATH-R.
Area Subtests
Basic concepts Numeration
Rational numbers
Geometry
Operations Addition
Subtraction
Multiplication
Division
Mental computation
Applications Measurement
Time and money
Estimation
Interpreting data
Problem solving
As an illustration (see Table 2), consider the Key
Math Revised (Connolly, 1988). This test is explicitly
presented as “a diagnostic inventory of essential
mathematics.” Three main area of knowledge are
assessed: (1) basic concepts, (2) operations and (3)
applications. Each area is divided into subtests (e. g.,
“addition,” “subtraction” . . . ) and domains (e. g.,
“models and basic facts,” “algorithms: whole num-
bers,” “adding rational numbers” . . . ). The items
have been carefully selected using the Rasch model
(see, for example, Hambleton, Swaminathan & Ro-
gers, 1991). This means that the author assumes that,
for each subtest, there exists a unidimensional latent
continuum on which the items can be ordered and
linked to a level of ability. But is it defensible to con-
sider some domains of the mathematical knowl-
edge, e. g., data interpretation or problem solving, as
unidimensional? From raw scores, derived scores
can easily be computed: standard scores, scaled
scores, grade or age equivalents . . . allowing to com-
pare the person’s scores to the scores of a repre-
sentative sample of the population.
Though designed with great care, Key Math raises
some questions. The division into area and subtests
is not supported by any theoretical model of mathe-
matics learning. Indeed, we recognize the traditional
divisions used in the mathematics curriculum in pri-
mary school. It is a division into subjects and not an
analysis supported by a model of mathematical
learning. The interpretation of the results cannot
only be made from the pattern of standard scores,
but also from the item level for which the author pro-
poses a description in terms of behavioral objectives
(e. g., “the student can add fractions with common
denominator”). This viewpoint on the results re-
Jacques Grégoire
Domains (e.g.,)
Models and basic facts
Algorithms: whole numbers
Adding rational numbers
mains behaviorist. No hypothesis is proposed about
the procedures used by the student to solve a pro-
blem. And no explanation is proposed to understand
failures. Thus, when a person does not correctly an-
swer the question “2/5 + 1/5,” we can say only that
the student is unable to add fractions with a common
denominator. Or, if a picture with three children and
18 squares of chocolate is shown to a student and he
cannot answer the question “How many squares of
chocolate will each person receive if the chocolate
squares are divided equally?,” we can deduce that
this student has difficulty mastering the operation of
division. But, why is this student unable to succeed?
What is the relationship between this failure and the
abilities of the student? How can this student be
helped? . . . We have no answers to these questions!
Through this example, it can be seen that an as-
sessment focused only on performance appears to
be insufficient for real diagnostic assessment. At
best, it allows a first appraisal of the problem a per-
son is having. But it does not provide a deep under-
standing of the difficulties encountered by a student
and, therefore, does not provide a sound foundation
for identifying learning disabilities and how they
might be corrected.
Problem of Assessing the Difference
Between Observed Score and
Expected Score
Another shortcoming of tests focus on school per-
formance comes from norms which are often ex-
pressed in terms of grade equivalent scores. Grade
equivalent scores can be more or less accurate. This
Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities
way to express norms is popular because it is easy
to understand by teachers and by psychologists and
because it takes into account the developmental na-
ture of the measured constructs. Unfortunately,
grade equivalent scores raise many problems and
can be the cause of serious errors of interpretation.
The first criticism comes from the meaning of
school grades defined on the basis of the average per-
formance of a sample. Pretending that given speed
of reading corresponds to the average performance
of second grade pupils, is a deceitful expression. It
legitimizes the idea of a “normal” level of perform-
ance at the second grade, independently of the con-
text of learning. We are then led to think that a pupil
having a score below this level of performance does
not reach the end level of the second grade, as if the
mean score of the sample of second grade pupils
were an absolute level. But this is incorrect! The pu-
pils assessed can be at a normal level of performance
according to a teacher’s requirements. In other
words, when we express norms in terms of school
grades, we risk intermingling interindividual vari-
ability with interclass variability. Many researchers
have shown that this latest variability is very impor-
tant. For example, from the scores of a sample of
1500 5th grade Belgian pupils, Grisay (1989, p. 3) ob-
served a significant variability of the average per-
formances in French from one class to another. An
analysis of the factors of variability showed that
“nearly 45% of the differences between pupils ob-
served on the standardized test are related to the
school class,” whereas the social class account for
only 5% of the differences in performance.
The assessment of the discrepancy between the
observed and the expected score is even more diffi-
cult when the seriousness of the discrepancy needs
to be interpreted. Starting from which value is a dis-
crepancy or a pathological feature and therefore a
learning disability? This question raises a more gen-
eral problem: the legitimacy of cut scores, that is, a
score which provides a dividing line between one
state which one considers to be normal, and another
state, which one considers to be pathological. In
most cases, such scores are relative and reflect, at
best, a consensus. Obviously, the problem of cut
scores does not arise for the most serious cases
where the pathology is self-evident. But, when the
results are around the cut score, the question be-
comes much more difficult to answer and other in-
formation than test scores has to be considered. To
base important decisions on the results of single
tests with arbitrary cut points is to participate in a
flawed process which can only undermine the valid-
ity of diagnostic assessments.
13
Diagnostic Processes which Focus
on Competence
The Piagetian Model
Having emphasized the shortcomings of assessment
models which focus on performance, the advantages
as well as the problems of models which focus on
competence will be considered next.
Historically, the Piagetian theory is the first ref-
erence to an assessment focus which is on compe-
tence (Inhelder, 1943). The Piagetian model was
very appealing to practitioners during the sixties
and the seventies. But today, it is less popular. How-
ever, it is still used for the diagnosis of mathematical
learning disorders. Therefore, it deserves some at-
tention. It allows to go further than the sole report
of success or failure and enables to catch the per-
son’s way of thinking. In this sense, the Piagetian
model provides an understanding of the observed
phenomena and also quite a number of ways for
special education. Unfortunately, the Piagetian
model is not without shortcomings and therefore it
appears to have limited utility in the assessment of
learning disabilities.
Criticisms can be illustrated with the assessment
of the learning of the concept of number. Let’s re-
member that, for the Piagetian epistemology, “the
person is active, author too and builder of the ob-
ject” (Bideaud, 1991, p. 19). This basic assumption
deeply determines the concept of number proposed
by Piaget. According to him, number is not an ex-
ternal reality passively absorbed by the child. On the
contrary, number is built by the child thanks to his
logical abilities. It is self-evident that number is not
a property of objects in the same way as color or
hardness. Number is a relation between objects that
the person builds by reflective abstraction. Its real
root is inside the person.
Piaget proposed a psychogenetic explanation of
number where logic plays the role of a normative sys-
tem progressively built by the child. From this view-
point, “the study of the development of number will
be the one of the operations ‘on number’ and of the
seriation and the classification subsystems which
found it” (Bideaud, 1991, p. 20). In his book written
with Szeminska, The Child’s Conception of Number
(1941), Piaget specifies the logical abilities that chil-
dren progressively acquire and coordinate to master
the concept of number. These abilities develop al-
most in parallel and their integration begins before
their complete mastery. In this theoretical frame-
work, the following operations have to be assessed
when the learning disorders of number is diagnosed:
14
1. The operation of “seriation,” which consists in or-
dering objects according to their differences. The
child has to distinguish objects considering only
one or several variables (height, weight . . . ). The
person creates an asymmetrical relationship be-
tween objects and disregards equivalencies. At
the numerical level, seriation is illustrated by the
acquisition of ordered series of integers: 5 is big-
ger than 4 which is bigger than 3.
2. The operation of classification. It consists in ar-
ranging objects in a set, disregarding their differ-
ences and paying attention only to their shared
qualities. The relationship so created is that of
equivalence. At the numerical level, classification
is the basis of the cardinal side of number. Cardi-
nal number represents a set of elements consid-
ered as equivalent, in this case as units.
3. The conservation of number is intrinsically related
to the evolution and to the integration of logical
abilities described previously. Indeed, so that the
children may be conserving, “empirical knowl-
edge needs to be interpreted and corrected by
reason” (Kamii, 1990, p. 38). The child who has
constructed the logico-mathematical structure of
number can tackle problems of conservation
from a logical point of view free from appear-
ances. In order to be free of the sensitive appear-
ance, the thought must be reversible: it has to be
able to perform the same operation in the two di-
rections, while being conscious that it is the same
action. The child so understands that the modifi-
cation of the spatial arrangement of a set of ele-
ments does not alter its cardinal. He can mentally
come back to the initial situation and free himself
from surface changes. If in a set nothing is added
nor subtracted, it keeps the same cardinal despite
the appearance.
Even created 50 years ago, the Piagetian model of
number still is a reference for diagnostic assessment.
Some students’ errors can only be understood if re-
lated to the mastery of number. Consider the exam-
ple of a subtraction of which the result is wrong:
506
– 42
544
If the error is analyzed in terms of procedure, the
hypothesis can be forwarded that, thinking it was
impossible to compute “0–4”, the student has in-
verted the terms and computed “4–0”. The person
did not follow the correct procedure, that is to bor-
row in the hundreds column for the tens column.
Jacques Grégoire
The student who computes a difference between
two positive integers should be aware that the result
must necessarily be included in the highest term of
the operation. In the previous example, the result
must be logically included in “506.” Consequently,
when students give the answer “544,” they not only
make procedural errors but also logical ones. With-
out any computation, students should recognize that
their answer cannot be correct.
This short example demonstrates the relevance
of the Piagetian model for the diagnosis of mathe-
matical learning disorders. But, unfortunately, intro-
ducing the Piagetian theory in the area of assess-
ment is not as easy as it first appears. Many meth-
odological problems arise:
1. Although the Piagetian assessment is strong from
a theoretical viewpoint, it is weak from a psy-
chometric viewpoint. Standardization and norms
are generally inadequate. The assessment is al-
ways a comparison. If they do not follow some
methodological criteria, these comparisons are
not valid nor reliable.
2. An other methodological problem concerns the
characterization of intermediate behaviors. From
a diagnostic viewpoint, it is often insufficient to
classify a behavior as at the operational level or
not. A more precise apprehension of the level of
the cognitive development is often useful. The in-
termediate levels described by Piaget himself can
be interesting starting points, but certainly are in-
sufficient for diagnostic assessment
3. The main methodological question is the validity
of the tasks used for assessment. Are Piagetian
tasks measuring what we think they measure, and
only that? When the assessment is focus on com-
petence empirical evidence is needed that the se-
lected tasks correctly reveal the competence
which is intended to be assess. Numerous studies
about Piagetian tasks has shown that this require-
ment is very difficult to meet. For example, Fayol
(1990), through an important analysis of research
on assessment of conservation of number, notices
that the results show sometimes a very important
impact of variables that Piaget considered as sec-
ondary. This is the case for the way in which the
questions are expressed and the spatial arrange-
ment of the sets of elements.
Consequently, is it possible to conduct a valid assess-
ment of the logical abilities of students? Perhaps it
is impossible to assess pure reasoning. This one is
always expressed in a particular context that influ-
ences positively or negatively the student’s per-
formance. As it is impossible to remove the influ-
Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities
ence of context, the only solution is to follow Mes-
sick’s proposal (1994, p. 19) of a “cross-contextual
assessment.” Only the consistency of results across
different contexts can be used as a valid indicator of
the student’s level of competence.
The problem of context is related to a fundamen-
tal shortcoming of the Piagetian model. Recall that
Piaget was not a psychologist; he was a philosopher
and a logician. His viewpoint on the cognitive devel-
opment is normative. Across all his work, his main
goal was to define the logical norms useful for the
building and the evolution of knowledge. But, Piaget
did not pay attention to the social, cultural and spe-
cifically psychological conditions influencing the de-
velopment of knowledge. If, the pragmatic aspect of
knowledge may be unimportant for the logician, it is
the opposite for the psychologist and the teacher.
Their goal is not to construct a general model of the
thinker but to teach and to help persons in particular
contexts. This difference of viewpoint on the building
of thought is the main reason for relative failure of
the application of Piagetian tasks for assessment.
On the other hand, the solution may not be to
discard Piagetian thought, but to revise it if possible
to enhance the validity of the assessments. The real
person and his context have to be taken into account
in order to develop what Bideaud and Houdé (1991,
p. 90) call: “a constructivism-in-context” linking the
pragmatic and the normative aspects of the thought.
The recent developments of cognitive psychology
gives us a new conceptual framework allowing this
enlargement of the classical Piagetian theory.
Cognitivist Models
Contribution of Cognitivist Models to
Learning Assessment
As Richelle emphasizes (1993, p. 9 3), “There is not
one cognitivism, there are variations of cognitiv-
ism.” Under the same term, we use to gather some-
times very different models although linked by a
common will to transcend the behaviorism and to
study the information processing carried out be-
tween the stimulus and the response.
In comparison with the Piagetian theory, cogni-
tivist models are more concerned with the under-
standing of the real person in context. For example,
when they study problem solving, researchers want
to understand all the complexity of the information
processing without limitation to the sole logical
components. They take into account the co-ordina-
15
tion of different kinds of knowledge: mathematical,
linguistic, factual . . . They also pay more attention
to the representations and to the kind of knowledge
used by the person. Particularly, the concepts of de-
clarative and procedural knowledge and the rela-
tionship between the two (Anderson, 1983) have
been widely applied to understand the school learn-
ing (e. g., Hiebert, 1986; Gagné, Yekovich, & Yek-
owich, 1993). This goes together with great attention
paid to the level of automaticity of procedures,
which is appraised via the speed of process and/or
the resistance to interferences from other tasks per-
formed simultaneously. For example, Fischer (1996)
has developed a computer program to assess the
knowledge of elementary numerical computations
(addition, subtraction, division and multiplication of
integers). Across a school year, he observed a dra-
matic increase in the speed of 5th grade students’
answers. The speed of answering indicated a shift in
the procedure. At the beginning of the school year,
students often needed to compute before giving an-
swers. At the end of the school year, they needed
only to retrieve the correct answer from their mem-
ory. This shift in the nature of the procedure leads
to a great reduction in cognitive involvement. The
students can then use their working memory for
other problems, such as the control of goals. This ex-
ample shows how the constrains of the cognitive sys-
tem, e. g., the limited capacity of working memory,
are taken into consideration in a cognitive-based di-
agnostic assessment.
Within the general framework of cognitive psy-
chology, numerous attempts have been made to de-
sign useful tasks for diagnostic assessment. For ex-
ample, Royer, Cisero, and Carlo (1993) reviewed
more than forty tasks designed to assess cognitive
skills. Their conclusion from this review is quite dis-
appointing:
In all the research that [they] read, there was not
a single report of a reliability index for an assess-
ment procedure, and indexes of validity were
available only as inferences of the form, “if the
measures were not valid, the experiment would
not have come out as it did.” (Royer et al., 1993,
p. 235)
Researchers in cognitive psychology show an im-
portant lack of concern about the psychometric
properties of the measures they use. More deeply,
these researchers often have no general model for
assessment. The tasks they design are not related to
a measurement model. Consequently, practitioners
have no conceptual framework for organizing a di-
16
agnostic assessment with these tasks nor to interpret
the results. The need for such a framework for test
development has recently been emphasized by
Nichols (1994).
Two ways that have been used to design tests for
diagnostic learning assessment will be considered
next:
1. Some researchers have tried to measure very gen-
eral processes, useful in a wide range of situations.
This viewpoint will be illustrated with the Kauf-
man Assessment Battery for Children (K-ABC).
2. Other researchers have focused their attention on
domain-specific procedures, useful only in partic-
ular situations. This viewpoint will be illustrated
with a test for diagnostic assessment of reading
disabilities, based on the model of Patterson and
Morton (de Partz, 1994).
Assessment of General Processes
The K-ABC was created by Kaufman and Kaufman
(1983). The authors chose to develop a test which
would reveal a defect in some general information
processing. This defect could be the reason for some
learning disabilities. Consequently, the diagnosis us-
ing the K-ABC provides proposals for special edu-
cation focus on the training of procedures.
This test was designed on the basis of Das’s mod-
el of information processing, which is itself built on
Luria’s work. Following this model, there are two
general processing modalities: the simultaneous
processing and the sequential one. The first one re-
quires the processing of many stimuli at once. The
second one requires the processing of stimuli fol-
lowing a serial order. Picture recognition is an illus-
tration of a simultaneous processing. Listening to
sentences is an illustration of a sequential process-
ing. But these two illustrations are not really good
examples of the use of the two processing modali-
ties. Indeed, when persons are confronted with a
complex task, such as the ones proposed, they do
not use only one processing modality. Usually, the
two processing modalities are mixed and each one
plays a part at different stages of the task.
The K-ABC is an interesting illustration of the
difficulty of assessing only one modality of process-
ing. The shortcomings of the test are the general
shortcomings of this kind of assessment which is to
appraise general-domain procedures. In the case of
the K-ABC, we observe first that: The test does not
equally measure the simultaneous and the sequen-
tial modalities. The authors noticed that some tasks,
originally designed to measure sequential process-
Jacques Grégoire
ing, were in fact measuring simultaneous processing.
This is the case for tasks like Magic Window and
Photo Series. Consequently, in the definitive version
of the test, only three tasks are measuring sequential
processing whereas seven tasks are measuring si-
multaneous processing. Furthermore, all three tasks
are memory tasks (memory of hand movements,
number recall, memory of word order). So we have
to question the real nature of the total score on the
Sequential Processing Scale. There is considerable
risk when oversimplifying the cognitive reality.
Second, factor analysis results show that the fac-
tors loading on the tasks are not always the expected
ones. For example, for children at age 4, the Triangles
Subtest loaded equally on the sequential factor and
the simultaneous factor. Furthermore, factor load-
ings can change across age groups. For example, at
age 8, the Triangles Subtest does not measure the
sequential factor. Similar observations can be made
about other subtests. The Hand Movements Subtest
better reflects the sequential factor for 4-year-old
children and the simultaneous factor for 8-year-old
children.
These observations lead the practitioner to ques-
tion the way of interpreting failure or success from
scores on these subtests. Is it possible to make a
valid assessment of procedures applying to a wide
range of situations? This problem of validity seems
difficult to solve. Previously, the problem of validity
was raised for tests assessing the g factor and for
tasks assessing the stages of development in Piaget’s
model. These tests measure a “domain-specific” ver-
sion instead of a “domain-general” version of the
competence of interest. The only solution to this
problem may be to assess the intended competence
in a large range of situations. But such an assessment
is very time consuming.
Componential Models and
Assessment
Many cognitivist models propose to represent cogni-
tive functioning in the form of an organization of
components, each one responsible for a specific pro-
cessing of the information. The componential mod-
els are an important conceptual framework for diag-
nostic assessment. There are a guide for the diagnos-
tic assessment and a reference for the interpretation
of observed performance.
The componential models currently used refer
only to domain-specific procedures. Consequently,
each local model is only useful to appraise a compe-
tence related to very specific problems. This assess-
Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities
Figure 1. Componential model for the assessment of rea-
ding of words (de Partz, 1994).
ment is illustrated with a model developed to ap-
praise acquired reading disabilities (de Partz, 1994).
This model can be seen as an architecture organ-
izing the successive processes involved in oral read-
ing. The figure shows the two procedures that a per-
son can use to read a word. Following the first pro-
cedure, called addressing procedure, the word is first
linked with the visual representation of the word en-
coded in long-term memory and next with the sound
representation of the same word, which is then pro-
nounced. This procedure is the one we use to read
irregular words like “few” or “bomb,” of which the
pronunciation can only be deduced from the recog-
nition of the whole word. The second procedure to
read a word, called assembling procedure, begins
with the analysis of the word into letters (graphems).
Each graphem is then matched with a basic sound
(phonem). Finally, all the graphems are assembled
and the word is pronounced. This procedure is used
when a reader meets a new word which is not en-
coded in his/her long-term memory in the ortho-
graphic lexicon. Consequently, such a word cannot
be read following the first procedure described.
Using such a model, the assessment consists in
discovering the defective component(s). For this
purpose, tasks are needed to precisely appraise each
of the components. We also need to interpret each
result in relation with the results in the other tasks.
For example, if a pupil can read regular pseudo-
words (i. e., words that do not belong to the English
language lexicon, but that are regularly constricted,
17
e. g., “bact,” “erol”) and cannot read a correct but
irregular word (e. g., “blood”), we can deduce that
the problem is inside the addressing procedure. But,
we cannot already determine if the problem is at the
level of the orthographic lexicon or at the level of
the phonologic lexicon. Other tasks are needed to
answer this question. For example, if the pupil is able
to correctly pronounce the words corresponding to
pictures, we can think that the phonologic lexicon is
not involved. So we have to make a conditional
analysis of the results. This analysis relies on logical
reasoning conducted on the basis of the theoretical
model. However, in the present situation, such rea-
soning does not take into account the psychometri-
cal properties of the tasks. The error of measure-
ment of each of the tasks is often neglected and the
conclusions are drawn assuming that all the tasks
are reliable. But it is often far from being true!
Moreover, local models used for assessment are
“minitheories” (Richelle, 1993, p. 221) generally not
linked together. We cannot dismiss the hypothesis
that some problems are related to the global cogni-
tive functioning. These problems can, for example,
concern attention or memory functioning. But com-
ponential models have difficulties taking into ac-
count more general problems. Consequently, there
is a risk of being simplistic when using only a local
model, and believing it can take into account all the
facets of the competence we want to appraise.
The Future of Diagnostic Assessment
After the previous analysis of current viewpoints on
diagnostic assessment of learning, some future pros-
pects can be drawn. The recent development of cog-
nitivist models does not imply that the Piagetian
theory is out of date. Each theoretical model pro-
vides specific concepts to describe the characteris-
tics of the cognitive functioning underlying an ob-
served performance. The Piagetian theory provides
a particularly strong conceptual framework to
understand the construction of the logical structure
of the thought. Consequently, it will remain espe-
cially helpful to understand the development of
some concepts, like the concept of number. In this
case, it focuses our attention on logical operations
that constitute the roots of the concept of number.
It also puts the stress on the progressive co-ordina-
tion of the operations.
But the assessment of the abilities related to
school learning cannot be restricted to logical abili-
ties. Cognitivists have emphasized that we need to
take into account other features of the thought, es-
18 Jacques Grégoire

pecially the representation of knowledge in long-
term memory and the constrains related to the
working memory. Most of the assessment tools de-
veloped in cognitive psychology are measuring pro-
cedural knowledge, that is “knowing how.” The pro-
cedural knowledge can be domain-general or do-
main-specific. The assessment tools focused on
more specific situations seem the more promising.
This is the case of the test we described, which mea-
sures the procedures involved in the reading of
words. The results it provides are very specific since
they concern only the reading situation; but they are
certainly more valid and, consequently, more inter-
esting for practitioners. This assessment related with
a componential model of the procedural knowledge
we want to appraise is the best illustration of the
power of an assessment which focus on competence.
In order to create other tests based on a compo-
nential model, a general framework is needed. The
ACT theory developed by Anderson (1983, 1993)
seems the most suited for such a function. The ACT
(Adaptive Control of the Thought) theory is a the-
ory of the cognitive architecture. The basic proposal
of this theory is that a cognitive skill is composed of
production rules (Anderson, 1993, p. 4). A produc-
tion rule is a condition-action pair (IF-THEN). If
the conditions exist, then the actions are executed.
The production rules are organized around a set of
goals, creating a production system (see Table 3 for
an example). A production system is a precise and
complete theory of a particular task. The main fea-
tures of the production systems are (Anderson,
1993, p. 7): (1) each production rule embedded in a
production system is a modular piece of knowledge
representing a well-defined step of cognition; (2) a
production system is achieved by stringing together
production rules “by appropriate setting of goals
and other writing to working memory, and by read-
ing from working memory”; (3) the condition-ac-
tions rules are asymmetric; (4) the production rules
are abstract and can apply in multiple situations.
The ACT theory, very shortly described here, can
be a powerful framework to develop tests for diag-
nostic assessment of learning problems. The Ad-
vance Computer Tutoring Project at Carnegie Mel-
lon University has developed successful intelligent
tutorial systems based on the ACT theory. The ap-
proach taken by these tutors has lots in common
with the mastery learning approach (Anderson,
1995) where the diagnostic assessment plays an im-
portant role (Huberman, 1988).
Referring to the ACT theory, a componential
analysis of the complex skills is needed. Complex
skills have to be decomposed into a large number of
production rules. The relevance of such an analysis
is related to the second assumption of the diagnostic
assessment discussed in the first section. Some au-
thors, such as Shepard (1991), see this componential
analysis as an error. This is related to the failure of
the task analysis used in the past in mastery learning.
But this analysis was made in a behaviorist frame-
work. As Anderson (1995, p. 396) emphasized there
is no evidence to generalize the perceived failures of
the behaviorist program to any program that at-

Table 3. Production rules for addition1 (Anderson, 1993, p. 3).

NEXT- COLUMN
IF the goal is to solve an addition problem and c1 is the rightmost column without an answer digit
THEN set a subgoal to write out an answer in c1

PROCESS-COLUMN
IF the goal is to write out an answer in c1 and d1 and d2 are the digits in that column and
d3 is the sum of d1 and d2
THEN set a subgoal to write out d3 in c1

WRITE-ANSWER-CARRY
IF the goal is to write out d1 in c1 and there is an unprocessed carry in c1 and d2 is the
number after d1
THEN change the goal to write out d2 and mark the carry as processed

WRITE-ANSWER-LESS-THAN-TEN
IF the goal is to write out d1 in c1 and there is no unprocessed carry in c1 and d1 is less than 10
THEN write out d1 and the goal is satisfied

WRITE-ANSWER-GREATER-THAN-NINE
IF the goal is to write out d1 in c1 and there is no unprocessed carry in c1 and d1 is 10 or
greater and d2 is the ones digit of d1
THEN write out d2 and note a carry in the next column and the goal is satisfied
1c
1, d1, d2 and d3 denote variables that can take on different values for different instances of each production
Diagnostic Assessment of Learning Disabilities
tempts to analyze a skill into components. Given the
correct units, this analysis can be successful.
Even if the ACT theory proves to be a powerful
framework for diagnostic assessment, some general
problems will unfortunately remain:
1. Is it possible to use only local models of the cog-
nitive functioning to understand all the learning
disorders? We have to recognize that some defec-
tive procedures are very general. Consequently,
using only local models, we tend to neglect the
role of such procedures in learning disabilities.
2. The local models and the related tasks have usu-
ally been well validated by researchers. But the
reliability of the results gathered with such tasks
is generally unknown. More collaboration be-
tween cognitivists and psychometricians seems to
be necessary.
3. Finally, using local models, it is much more com-
plicated and time consuming to conduct an as-
sessment which focus on competence than to
make a simple assessment of performance. That
is why, we think that normative tests which focus
on performance will still have a place in diagnos-
tic assessment. Indeed, they allow a fast screening
of the student’s knowledge. If some problems are
observed, a deeper investigation can then be con-
ducted in a more restricted domain of knowledge
using an assessment focused on competence.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have stressed that the assessments
which focus on competence, according to Piagetian
theory or cognitivist theories, give more interesting
information for special education than assessments
which focus on performance. Indeed, the purpose of
diagnosis is not only to quantify successes and fail-
ures but it is also, and, above all, to understand the
meaning of the observed performance. For such an
understanding, we need to refer to models of learn-
ing and cognitive functioning. These models allow
us to interpret the observed scores.
Some assessment tools are focused on proce-
dures which are useful in a wide range of situations.
This is the case of the K-ABC, which measures two
general procedures that process a great variety of
information. Unfortunately, because the tasks in-
cluded in the tests measure these procedures in
some specific situations, it is difficult to draw con-
clusions about a person’s ability to correctly use the
procedures in general. The assessment tools focused
on more specific procedures seem more promising.
This is the case of the test we described, which mea-
19
sures the procedures involved in the reading of
words. This kind of test, related with a componential
model of the information processing, proves to be a
very efficient tool for diagnostic assessment. To de-
velop such componential diagnostic test, a theory of
the cognitive architecture is needed. We have em-
phasized that Anderson’s ACT theory is particularly
suited for this function. However, even if the ACT
theory proves to be a powerful framework for diag-
nostic assessment, some questions remain for the fu-
ture.
Author’s Address:
Professor Jacques Grégoire
Université Catholique de Louvain
Faculte de Psychologie et des
Sciences de l’Education
Place du Cardinal Mercier, 10
1348 Louvain-la-Neuve
Belgium
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