NOBILITY UNDER MUHAMMAD TUGHLUQ

Author(s): M. Athar Ali

Source: Proceedings of the Indian History Congress , 1981, Vol. 42 (1981), pp. 197-202
Published by: Indian History Congress

Stable URL: http://www.jstor.com/stable/44141132

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 NOBILITY UNDER MUHAMMAD TUGHLUQ
M, Athar Ali

The reig of Muhammad Tughluq ("1325-51 ) spans a critical period

in the history of the Delhi Sultanate. Under him it reached its largest
extent as well as greatest power; it also underwent an acute crisis which
led to its veritable collapse, masked and only partly delayed by the stabi-
lity and "prosperity" of the reign of Firuz Tughluq.

Muhammad Tughluq is doubtless a controversial figure, full of "Con-

tradictory qualities", as Barani and Ibn Battuta tell us or, of devilish
hypocrisy as Isami assures us. Was he an ingenious author of luckless
projects (Barani ) or a genius seeking pleasure in human distress
( Isami)?. The argument can go on and on, but the tendency initiated
by Moreland1, and continued by lshwari Prasad and Mehdi Husain*, is
to see his various measures in the light of the requirments of the actual
situation rather than in primitive psyeh.-analysis.
One major aspect of the crisis that developed in Muhammad Tugh-
luq's reign was the internal conflicts in the Sultanate nobility, which
led to the spate of rebellions in the various provinces which not only
resulted in the final secession of large parts of the Empire, but gravely
weakened its powe reven in areas that nominally remained under its
control.
Barani suggests as if the Sultan's "punishments" were the major
reason for these outbreaks. But it is clear that the roots of the crisis
lay at least partly in the composition of the nobility. Ibn Battuta
refers to the jealousy between the indigenous and foreign nobility;1
Isami to the provocation given to Muslims by the appointment of Hindu
officers,4 and Barani himself., a personal aide (muqarrab) of the Sultan,
inveighs against the appointment and promotion of men of low birth-5
In addition, he speaks of the intransigence of officers known as amiran -
i Sada who suddenly appear very prominently during the closing years
of the Sultani reign. What their grievances were does not immediately
become clear but needs investigation.
It seems that even under Ghiyasuddin Tughluq whose reign( 1320-25)
Barani describes in almost idyllic terms there were certain suspicions in

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 198

the hearts of the previous "(Alai)" nobility ti.e. those who had served
under Alauddin Khalji) as to the intentions of the new regime towards
them. Certainly, most of them had been either passive or lukewarm in
supporting Ghiyasuddin Tughluq against the "usurper" Khusrau Khan.'
When Muhammad Tughluq (then Ulugh khan) had gone on an expedi-
tion against Warangal, these suspicions ignited a conspiracy of Alai
nobles.® Subsequently Bahram Aiba Kishlu Khan who governed Multan
and had supported Ghiyasuddin Tughluq against Khusrau Ķhan
rebelled against Muhammad Tughluq.9 Subsequently, Ali Shah, a
Khalji, a kinsman of the famous commander of Alauddin, Zafar
Khan, revolted in the Deccan.10
It is, therefore, probable that a part of the nobility inherited
frorft the Khaljrs was not loyal to Muhammad Tughluq, and this
in part necessitated the recruitment of new elements.
In the first place, this probably represented nothing more than
the promotion of those already in service. The outstanding case was
that of Ahmad ( son of ) Ayaz. Ayaz, who from his name appears
originally to have been a slave, was Kotwal of Delhi in J320.11
Ahmad Àyáz became the Principal minister4of Muhammd Tughluq.18
He was a foreigner (Turk) and his daughters were married to
Iranian immigrants.13 Ahmad Ayaz was a pure bureaucrat and finan-
cier.14 and this was apparently reflected in his title Khwaja Jahan
(Khwaja meant a financial official, a moneyed man).
Another officer who probably came from older service was Ainul
Mulk 'Mahru* the last, being his father's name (presumably title)
He is to be distinguished from Ainul Mulk Multani, a commander
under Alauddin Khalji, whose last assignment was as Governor
Of Malwa at the time of Ghiyasuddin Tughluq's victory against Khusrau
Khan.16 This distinction has unfortunately not been made.17 Unlikle
Ain-ul Mulk Multani, Ainul Mulk Mahru was a bureaucrat who had
no experience of military matters. He had his own apprehensions
on being transferred to the Deccan, but his revolt in 1340-41 was
supported by Indian amirs who were jealous of the Khurasani and
other foreigners, who were being invited and given posts in large
numbers by Sultan Muhammad Tughluq.18
Others were favourites of the reigning Sultan appointed directly
to office. Qutlugh Khan, the Vicercy of the Deccan, had been a tutor

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 199

oí Sultan Muhammd, and this was responsible for his high appointment
as well as the promotion of hii brother Nizamuddin. w

A somewhat different example was that of Kannu, an officer

under the Rai of Warangal. Captured, he became formally a slave of
Muhammad Tughluq and was given the Muslim name MaqbuL10 He
became Deputy Prime Minister ( Naib Wazir ) under Sultan Muhammad.10
and Prime minister in the next reign.0

It was obviously a part of the attempt to create his own nobility

which made Muhammad Tughluq open door so wide to foreign
immigrants. Ibn Battuta has left a detailed account of how richly
well-born persons from Central Asia and Iran were rewarded. He
gives particulars of how Khudawandzada and bis brothers were received
at Sultan Muhammad's court, and in this connexion he gives a
number of other foreign born nobles of high station.13

Barani not only corroborates Ibn Battuta, even mentioning the

case of Khudawandzada.14 but also tells us that Muhammad Tughlq
paid special attention to receive Mongol nobles, "Commanders of
10,000 (amiran-i tuman), of 1,000 (amiran-i hazara), ladies of high status
and Ughlis.K" Among those welcomed were a son-in-lav of the khan
Tamarshin.^and two others who remained very high officers under
Firtiz Tughluq..27

It is likely that Muhammad Tughluq wanted to attract officers to

his service who would not have any local base of their own and would
be dependent on him. Ibn Battuta tells Us that only those foreigners
received rewards who agreed to enter the Sultan's service, as Ibn Battuta
did himself. His entertainment of Mongol Commander s probably indi-
cated his desire to reinforce the Delhi Army with Mongol methods of
organisation and tactics. We shall revert to this point when we discuss
the question of amiran-i- Sada.

A similar anxiety drove Muhammad Tughluq to take into service

people from communities which had so far not been the source of rec-
ruitment for the nobility- The increase in the number of Afghans was
probably owing to this cause. The rebellions of the Afghan Qazi Jalal
in Gujarat and Nasiruddin in the Deccan as well as another Afghan
revolt described by Ibn Battuta,29 brings to light the fact that the

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 iOO

Afghans now held a considerable position in the nobility as against the

period before Qutbuddin Mubarak Shah (acc. 1316), during which not
a single Afghan Officer is heard of.

Barani tells us that Muhammad Tughluq denounced men of low

birth in words but appointed a large number of such officers. Two of
those whom he mentions are well known. Aziz Khummar (Khummar
means wine distiller) was the revenue official (Waliul Kharaj) of Amroha,30
then in charge of a s hiq (Province) in the Deccan81 and then finally
Governor of Dhar (Malwa)32. He killed a number of Amiran-i- ada
and then went into Gujrat where he was captured and kllied by the
rebels. Aziz Khummar is repeatedly designated bad-asl (base-born) by
Barani. A person still more bitterly denounced, Muqbil had been a
slave of Ahmad Ayaz, and served in Gujarat, where he ultimately
became Governor ( Naib-i-Ważir J.33 He too was defeated and driven out
by the rebels.34 Among other officers he recalls Najaba, a dancer's son
who was given charge of territories like Gujarat, Multan and Badaun.
Pira Mali "the lowest of the meanest caste of India", was appointed to
head the Finance Ministry ( Diwan-i Wizarat)' Kishan Bazaran Indri,
similarly low in status, was given Awadh.35

Kishan was probably a Hindu (who did not, like Maqbul above,
change his faith), but all Hindus were not of low caste. There was a
Hindu astronomer, Ratan, who was appointed Governor of Siwistan
(Sehwan, Sind),36 Bharan, Governor of Gulbarga, was a Hindu who was
treacherously killed by rebels 8? It was probably this policy of appoint-
ing Hindus to administrative posts that led to criticism that Muhammad
Tughluq sat with Jogis and played Holi, or that he stopped congregation
prayers.88 Muhammad Taghluq probably had a genuine interest in
Hinduism, but his policy of appointing Hindus had political objectives to
serve* irrespective of his own ideological liberalism.

Barani speaks as if in the last days of Muhammad Tughluq the basic

danger to him came from the amiran-i Sada (Commanders of 100) whom
he set out to destroy. Now it is clear that this term was a new one ; it
occurs for an office in a system of a chain of decimal commands in woids
put by Barani into Bughra Khan's mouth, but that is probably unhistori-
cal. We also hear of amiran-i panjah bandgan (Captains of 50). 39 These
are almost certainly officers over ICO and fifty cavalry respectively. The

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 201

names also suggest Mongol associations since captains of Mongol army are
described by Barani himself as amiran-i hazara and amiran-i Sada .40

It is possible that the grievance of the military officers arose because

of the prominance Muhmmad Tughluq was giving to bureaucracy. This
appears from Ibn Battuta's account of the fracas at Amroha, where Aziz
Khummar as the Chief tax-Collector (Waliul Kharaj) was bes/eged by army
Commander. 41 The cases of Nusrat Khan and Nizam Main show that
Muhammad Tughluq was also farming out revenues to speculators in
order to get fixed amounts. 42

It is probable that Muhammad Tughluq was trying to divide the

army command from revenue collection and so reduce the extra revenues
which went to commanders as Muqtis. This could have provided a
provocation enough to rise against the Sultan ; but the material is perhaps
not sufficient to warrant a very definite conclusion.

Muhmmad Tughluq's policy creating a heterogeneous nobility might

have been influenced partly by eccentricity, but it was also partly the
response to a certain alienation already existng between the Sultan and
the established nobility. Unfortunately, for him the heterogeneous elements
could not be combined together into a composite nobility. This was achie-
ved by Firuz Tughluq by practically freezing its compositon. This might
have helped to overcome the pressing difficulties of the moment, but it
cost the Sultan the lever (new recruitments) by which the nobles could
be controlled. A decline in the Sultan's power was thus inevitable,

NOTES & REFERENCE

1. Agrarian System of Moslem India , Cambridge, 1929, 45-52.

2. Ishwari Prasad, History of Qaraunah Turks in India, Allahabad, 1936; M
Husain, Rise and Fall (Sicl) of Muhammad bin Tughluq , London, 1938.
3. Ibn Battuta, Rehla , tr. Mehdi Husain, Oriental Institute, Baroda, 1953, pp. 10
4. Isami, Futuhus-Salatin, ed. A. S. Usha, Madras, 1948, p. 515.
5. Barani, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahif ed. Saiyid Ahmad Khan, Calcutta, 1862, p. 504.
6. Barani, p. 501.
7. Ibid., pp. 410-14.

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 202

8. Ibid. y p. 448,
9. On Bahram Aila, son of Malik Ghazi see Barani, 379-80, 479.
10. Isami, pp. 453-87 ; Re hi a, p. 111.

11, Isami, p. 425.

12. Ibn Battuta, 54,

13. IbidĒ9 p. 24.

14. Barani, 540.

15. Isami, pp. 472-75.

16. Barani, p. 419.

17. As in Professor S.A. Rashiďs introduction to Insha-l Mahruy ed. S.A. Rashid and
Bashir Husain, Lahore, 1965 pp. 1 ff.
18. Ibn Battuta, pp. 105-6.
19. Barani, pp. 479-81,
20. Afif, Tarikh-i Firuz Shahi , Calcutta, 1890, pp. 394-405.
21. Barani, 544-45.

22. Afif, 394-405.

23, Ibn Battuta, pp. 12,81, 118.
24, Barani, pp. 461-62,
25. Barani, p. 499.
26. Barani, p. 584.
27. Barani, p. 585.
28. Ibn Battuta, p. 118.
29. Barani, pp. 482, 514-16; isami, pp. 503, 531-32; Ibn Battuta, pp. 113-16
30. Ibn Battuta, p. 144.
31. Barani, pp. 501-2.
32. Barani, p. 502; Isami, p. 507.
33. Isami, 505; Ibn Battuta, pp. 113, 116.
34. Isami, 505.

35. Barani, p. 505.

36. Ibn Battuta, p. 8.
37. Isami, pp. 522-23.
38. Isami, 515.
39. Barani, 373-76.
40. Barani, 461-62.

41. Ibn Battuta, 144-46.

42. Barani, 481, 487-88.

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