HAMDARD INSTITUTE OF LEGAL STUDIES AND RESEARCH (HILSR)

SCHOOL OF LAW
JAMIA HAMDARD, NEW DELHI

COURSE TITLE – ADMINISTRATIVE PROCESS AND JUDICIAL CONTROL

ARTICLE REVIEW - (CONSTITUTIONALIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

IN THE INDIAN SUPREME COURT: NATURAL JUSTICE AND
FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS)

SUBMITTED BY-
FAIZAN AHMAD AGHA
LL.M 2ND SEMESTER
ENROLLMENT NO – 2023-585-002
SPECIALIZATION – CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

SUBMITTED TO-
PROF. TABISH EQBAL
JAMIA HAMDARD (HILSR)
NEW DELHI, 110062
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INTRODUCTION
The article explores three major challenges in Indian constitutional law related to judicial review in
common law countries. First, despite India's parliamentary system, it lacks parliamentary sovereignty,
leading to a strong form of judicial review by the Supreme Court. Second, India's legal framework
involves a mix of a written constitution and uncodified common law, creating complexity in
reconciling constitutional and common law rights. Third, the Indian judiciary's architecture and
conventions result in a broad, often contradictory, body of jurisprudence, complicating efforts to
create unified legal doctrine. The article focuses on the Indian Supreme Court's use of "principles of
natural justice" from uncodified administrative law in interpreting and enforcing constitutional rights.
These principles, derived from common law, are invoked in statutes but are also rooted in the Indian
Constitution's fundamental rights. This dual basis has led to a vast and confusing body of
jurisprudence.

The Indian Supreme Court has expanded its jurisdiction, engaging deeply with administrative and
regulatory processes, reviewing decisions for compliance with both statutory requirements and
fundamental rights. This increased jurisdiction includes appeals over regulatory decisions, direct
control of regulatory measures, and the enforcement of fundamental rights through writs. The
author argues that the Supreme Court's approach, blending administrative law with constitutional
rights, has created unpredictability and inconsistency in judicial review, posing risks to both
administrative adjudication and the enforcement of fundamental rights. The article calls for a more
comprehensive and systematic approach to resolving these conflicts.

THE FRAMEWORK OF RIGHTS AND NATURAL JUSTICE IN INDIAN

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
JUDICIAL EXAMINATION OF LEGISLATIVE AND EXECUTIVE ACTS IN INDIA
The Indian Constitution, while not explicitly stating the power of judicial review, establishes this
authority through a combination of articles, primarily focusing on Part III, which covers Fundamental
Rights. Article 32 empowers the Supreme Court to enforce these rights, allowing for judicial review
against any law or action that contravenes them. Article 13 ensures that any law contradicting
Fundamental Rights is void, reinforcing the court's ability to scrutinize legislation. The Indian
Supreme Court's control over administrative action relies on a mix of British common law doctrines
and constitutional provisions. Judicial review encompasses various remedies like writs, and
challenges can be based on grounds like illegality, unreasonableness, proportionality, arbitrariness,
and procedural impropriety. The broad scope of "law" under Article 13 includes not just legislative
acts but also administrative and regulatory measures.

This framework allows for significant judicial intervention in administrative actions, using doctrines
like fairness, arbitrariness, and proportionality, often grounded in Fundamental Rights such as Article
14 (equality) and Article 19 (freedoms). The judicial review process thus aligns closely with the
constitutional rights framework, with the Supreme Court's jurisprudence expanding the
interpretation and application of these principles.

UNDERSTANDING THE FOUNDATIONS OF NATURAL JUSTICE

The principles of natural justice in India are common law rules primarily guiding administrative
decision-making, emphasizing two key tenets: the right to a fair hearing and the rule against bias.
Despite this focus, these principles are somewhat vague, providing flexibility in their application.

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The Supreme Court of India has tied these principles to various constitutional rights, such as those
under Articles 14, 19, and 21, allowing them to review administrative and legislative actions for
fairness and compliance with fundamental rights. This has resulted in common grounds for judicial
review, such as issuing writs for violation of these principles, though the exact interpretation can
vary, leading to potential conflicts.

INSTITUTIONAL STRUCTURE
The Indian Supreme Court faces challenges due to its wide jurisdiction, covering both constitutional
and civil/criminal appeals from various high courts and tribunals. This has led to a heavy caseload
managed by up to 31 judges in smaller benches, often resulting in inconsistent jurisprudence. The
principles of natural justice, frequently referenced in regulatory statutes, lack clear definition and
consistency, leading to varied and sometimes arbitrary procedures across adjudicatory bodies. This
uncertainty creates unpredictability in the legal system, complicating the task of reconciling differing
approaches to natural justice within constitutional and administrative law.

CONSTITUTIONALIZING ADMINISTRATIVE LAW WITH FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS

The statement discusses the fluidity of fundamental rights in the context of Indian constitutional law,
highlighting Justice Mathew's view that these rights are "empty vessels" that require reinterpretation
by each generation based on their experiences. This idea leads to an ongoing debate over what
content these vessels can be filled with, with the Supreme Court often employing a variety of
approaches without a consistent underlying principle. To "fill" these rights, the Supreme Court draws
from multiple sources, including non-justiciable "Directive Principles of State Policy," international
human rights treaties, and common law principles of natural justice. Notably, the use of natural
justice principles has been cited by the Court as a way to broaden the interpretation of fundamental
rights. The principles of natural justice, which include fairness and due process, have a significant role
in both constitutional and administrative law, though their application differs between the two. Over
time, the Indian legal system has developed a complex relationship between the usage of these
principles in administrative and constitutional contexts, leading to varying interpretations and
potential ambiguity in judicial doctrine.

The trajectory of the Supreme Court's approach can be divided into three stages:

1. Initial rejection of the principles of natural justice in the context of constitutional rights.

2. A gradual acceptance of these principles as integral to constitutional rights.

3. A resulting complex and sometimes unclear doctrine, influenced by the intertwining of

administrative and constitutional interpretations of natural justice.

Overall, this evolving approach has contributed to the rich yet sometimes inconsistent landscape of
Indian constitutional jurisprudence.

TEXUALISM AND IGNORING THE PRINCIPLES OF NATURAL JUSTICE

The Article discusses the evolution of the interpretation of fundamental rights and the principles of
natural justice in the context of Indian constitutional law.

Initial Approach to Rights Interpretation: In the early years post-independence, the Indian Supreme
Court adopted a strict textualist approach, interpreting the Constitution's fundamental rights
narrowly. This was consistent with the framers' intention to avoid substantive judicial review,

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especially in regard to Article 21 (the right to life and personal liberty). This intent was influenced by
the rejection of the American concept of "due process of law" during the drafting of the Indian
Constitution.

A.K. Gopalan v. State of Madras (1950): This landmark case solidified the Supreme Court's early
approach to fundamental rights. A.K. Gopalan, detained under an executive order for preventive
detention, claimed that Article 21 should be read to include principles of natural justice, like the right
to a hearing. The majority rejected this claim, interpreting "law" in Article 21 as procedural, not
substantive. Justice Fazal Ali's dissent, however, argued that natural justice principles were well-
defined and crucial to procedural fairness.

A.D.M., Jabalpur v. Shivakant Shukla (1976): This case occurred during a state of emergency when
the government temporarily suspended fundamental rights. The Supreme Court, following its earlier
approach, refused to issue writs of habeas corpus, asserting that the principles of natural justice had
no common law basis but were reliant on statutory provisions. This marked a dramatic denial of
natural justice in both administrative and constitutional matters unless specifically backed by statute.

Administrative Law vs. Constitutional Law: Despite the narrow approach in constitutional cases, the
principles of natural justice were developing in administrative law. The Supreme Court's approach to
these principles in civil and administrative matters became broader, focusing on concepts of
arbitrariness, reasonableness, and positive rights (like Article 14's right to equality and Article 19's
various freedoms). This led to a contradiction where administrative cases saw an expanded role for
natural justice, while constitutional cases continued to maintain a stricter interpretation.

Impact on Judicial Review: The distinction between the interpretation of principles of natural justice
in constitutional and administrative law became increasingly problematic, especially with Gopalan's
restrictions and Jabalpur's further erosion of these principles. This contradiction began to resolve
with the landmark case Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, which ultimately bridged the gap between
procedural rights in administrative and constitutional contexts.

This Article captures the complexity and evolution of the Indian Supreme Court's approach to natural
justice and its interpretation of fundamental rights, highlighting key cases and their impacts on the
broader legal landscape.

MANEKA GANDHI V. UNION OF INDIA AND THE INCORPATION OF NATURAL

JUSTICE IN RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
The landmark case of (Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) in the Indian Supreme Court
significantly transformed the interpretation of fundamental rights, particularly focusing on the right
to life and liberty under Article 21, the guarantee of equality under Article 14, and the freedom of
speech, occupation, assembly, and other freedoms under Article 19. The case arose when the
petitioner, Maneka Gandhi, had her passport impounded without being given a hearing or an
explanation, invoking multiple fundamental rights violations. The majority of the Supreme Court
ruled in her favor, with the key points being:

Expanded Procedural Review: The decision redefined "procedure established by law" under Article
21 to require compliance with standards of reasonableness (from Article 19) and non-arbitrariness
(from Article 14). This transformation implied that procedures under Article 21 must be "right and
just and fair, not arbitrary, fanciful, or oppressive."

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Integration of Natural Justice Principles: Justice Bhagwati's interpretation included principles of
natural justice derived from fairness and reasonableness, leading to a more substantive review of
administrative and legislative action.

Rights-Based Review: The court asserted that any statutory or administrative order must not only
comply with its enabling provision but also pass the test of fundamental rights. This created a
potential for laws violating these principles to be struck down, though the court was reluctant to
declare the challenged legislation unconstitutional in this case.

Confusion and Uncertainty: Despite its transformative stance, the ruling left uncertainties. Justice
Krishna Iyer, in his concurring opinion, emphasized that natural justice could not be circumscribed by
statutory requirements, suggesting that it was inherently embedded in Article 21. This viewpoint,
along with the majority's reluctance to declare laws void, contributed to doctrinal confusion.

In, the Maneka Gandhi case marked a significant shift in the Indian legal landscape, promoting a
broader interpretation of fundamental rights and incorporating principles of natural justice. However,
the decision also led to ongoing uncertainties about the extent and application of these principles in
judicial review, particularly regarding administrative and legislative actions.

A LEGACY OF DOCTRINAL CONFUSION

The application of principles of natural justice in Indian administrative law has evolved into a broader
concept of "fairness," particularly after the landmark case Maneka Gandhi. Initially, these principles
served as supplementary administrative standards, emphasizing flexibility in decision-making.
However, following Maneka Gandhi, the Indian judiciary began to merge these administrative
standards with broader constitutional review, complicating the clarity and consistency of rights
jurisprudence. Justice Krishna Iyer, in the aftermath of Maneka Gandhi, applied these principles to
rights under Article 21, leading to a broader interpretation that encompassed fairness and due
process. This approach resulted in a complex jurisprudence, with principles of natural justice applied
in varied ways across different articles of the Constitution, including Article 14 and Article 19, leading
to confusion and inconsistency in judicial outcomes. Furthermore, the inherent flexibility and
undefined boundaries of these principles created ambiguity regarding when and how they should be
applied, especially in the context of fundamental rights. The resulting lack of clear guidance has the
potential to reduce the protection of rights, contrary to the intention of expanding them following
Maneka Gandhi. This development poses significant challenges in constitutional litigation, as it
creates uncertainty about the procedural protections available to litigants, thus complicating the
enforcement and interpretation of fundamental rights.

FOCUSING REMEDIES IN ADMINISTRATIVE AND CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

The constitutionalization of administrative law in India has changed how constitutional rights are
enforced. Article 32 allows individuals to seek direct remedies for the enforcement of fundamental
rights in the Supreme Court, bypassing the usual civil appellate process.

Administrative decisions, typically reviewed in lower courts, can now be challenged directly in high
courts or the Supreme Court if they are seen as violating fundamental rights. The landmark Maneka
Gandhi case highlighted that administrative principles might align with fundamental rights, allowing
direct Supreme Court access. This shift centralizes administrative review power in the Supreme
Court, potentially leading to a top-heavy system that might overlook common law roots. It raises
concerns about access to justice, judicial overreach, and the boundaries between administrative and

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constitutional law, presenting unresolved questions about the impact on the traditional appellate
process and the broader legal system.

CAN VIOLATION OF NATURAL JUSTICE BE ENFORCED AS VIOLATION OF

RIGHTS ?
UJJAMBAI V. STATE OF UTTAR PRADESH AND ITS IMAPCT ON CONSTITUTIONAL REVIEW

The case of Ujjambai v. State of Uttar Pradesh explored whether administrative orders, if otherwise
legally valid, could be challenged on the grounds that they violated fundamental rights. The Supreme
Court ultimately ruled that if an administrative authority acted within its jurisdiction and followed
the law, then such an order could not be challenged on grounds of violating fundamental rights. This
was decided by a majority of five judges to two. The Court distinguished between "errors of
jurisdiction" and "errors of law." It ruled that administrative acts done within jurisdiction (even if
erroneous) were typically not subject to fundamental rights challenges, with the remedy for such
acts lying in administrative or civil appeals. However, acts performed without jurisdiction or violating
natural justice could be challenged as violations of fundamental rights. An additional distinction
made by the Court was between "quasi-judicial" and "executive" functions. Administrative orders in
a quasi-judicial capacity were subject to review based on statutory compliance and natural justice.
However, administrative orders in an executive capacity could still be subject to claims of
fundamental rights violations.

This ruling was criticized for narrowing the scope of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction to enforce
fundamental rights. The case of Maneka Gandhi, which was also decided by a bench of seven judges,
avoided the quasi-judicial versus administrative distinction and held that principles of natural justice
should apply to both. This contrasted with Ujjambai, leading to a divergence in how the courts
approach administrative acts that potentially violate fundamental rights.

While Maneka Gandhi provided broader protection for fundamental rights, it did not address the
limitations set by Ujjambai. This unresolved conflict suggests that some administrative actions may
avoid constitutional review based on the distinctions drawn in Ujjambai. Critics argue that the
Supreme Court should resolve this ambiguity to ensure a consistent approach to evaluating
fundamental rights violations, regardless of the administrative authority's capacity or jurisdictional
distinctions. Until then, certain acts by administrative authorities remain shielded from constitutional
scrutiny due to an unclear legal framework.

IMPACT OF DECLARING BREACH OF NATURAL JUSTICE AS A VIOLATION OF

NATURAL RIGHTS?
The legal issue concerning the voidness or voidability of administrative orders in India has faced
considerable ambiguity, especially in light of rulings like Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat
and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.

Nawabkhan Abbaskhan v. State of Gujarat: Nawabkhan was subjected to an "externment" order

(prohibiting him from entering a certain area) under the Bombay Police Act, 1951. He was
prosecuted for violating this order, which was later quashed by the High Court of Gujarat because it
violated the principles of natural justice. The question was whether this externment order was void
from the beginning (making his prosecution invalid) or voidable (which would make his prosecution
valid at the time of violation). The Supreme Court, in a judgment by Justice V. R. Krishna Iyer, ruled
that the order was void from the start because it violated Nawabkhan's fundamental rights under

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Article 19(1)(d) (freedom of movement), alongside issues of natural justice and statutory law. This led
to his acquittal. The Court's decision established that administrative orders violating fundamental
rights are inherently void, but it did not fully address the implications of this finding, indicating that
further legislation might be needed to resolve these ambiguities.

Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India Air 1978

In this case, the Supreme Court considered the impoundment of Maneka Gandhi's passport without
a prior hearing, which was seen as violating the natural justice principle of Audi alteram partem
Despite acknowledging this breach and its impact on Maneka's Article 21 rights (right to personal
liberty), the Court, through Justice P. N. Bhagwati's majority opinion, allowed for a post-decisional
hearing to remedy the violation, refusing to declare the impoundment order void. The contrasting
outcome between Nawabkhan and Maneka Gandhi created confusion over when administrative
orders are considered void or voidable. The Court's willingness to accept a post-decisional hearing in
Maneka Gandhi seemed to conflict with the strict interpretation in Nawabkhan.

Challenges and Ongoing Ambiguities:

The lack of clarity in these rulings has led to a situation where the courts have significant discretion
in determining the voidness of administrative orders. The inconsistency between these key rulings
highlights the need for the Supreme Court to address the void/voidable conflict more directly. M. P.
Singh noted that trying to reconcile these cases is difficult due to the differing stances, leading to a
broader legal uncertainty. The confusion stems from the fact that Maneka Gandhi allows for post-
decisional correction of a violation, whereas Nawabkhan Abbaskhan indicated that administrative
orders violating fundamental rights are void from the beginning. There is a call for more concrete
legislative guidance or judicial clarity to resolve these ambiguities.

CONCLUSION
The 1978 Supreme Court of India case, Maneka Gandhi, marked a significant turning point in the
interpretation of fundamental rights in the Indian constitution. It led to greater access to justice,
expanded judicial review, and more flexible rules for public interest litigation (PIL). However, this
development has had several problematic consequences. By using principles of natural justice to fill
out the content of fundamental rights, the Supreme Court effectively "constitutionalized"
administrative law, resulting in a less consistent and more fragmented jurisprudence. This approach
creates confusion because the Court's use of these principles lacks clarity in terms of their purpose
and application. The principles can be interpreted in multiple ways, leading to inconsistencies and
even unfairness in the application of rights. Additionally, this conflation of constitutional and
administrative law has broader implications for legal remedies and court jurisdiction. The
administrative principles applied by the Supreme Court have impacted how litigants seek
constitutional remedies and have muddled doctrinal clarity in administrative cases. This ambiguity,
combined with the Court's tendency to focus on achieving just outcomes without consistently
following clear procedures, has contributed to an erratic legal landscape.

As a result, the Supreme Court's structure and decision-making processes are creating a broader
impact on governance and potentially jeopardizing constitutional rights. The Court's use of
administrative principles could redirect a significant amount of administrative litigation to itself,
taking cases away from administrative tribunals and lower courts, which further complicates legal
processes and strains the judiciary. To address these issues, the Indian Supreme Court must clarify its
jurisprudence concerning the integration of administrative law into constitutional interpretation. The
legacy of Maneka Gandhi should be critically examined to establish a more consistent, rational, and

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fair approach to the application of these principles, avoiding doctrinal inconsistencies that could
undermine the constitutionally enshrined bill of rights.