City of Manila v.

Cuerdo

Facts:
Background and Parties Involved
The case involves a tax refund dispute between the City of Manila and several private
companies.
The City of Manila is represented by Mayor Jose L. Atienza Jr. and City Treasurer Liberty M.
Toledo.
The private respondents are the companies who were assessed taxes by the City of Manila for
the taxable period from January to December 2002.
Complaint and Arguments of the Private Respondents
The private respondents filed a complaint for refund or recovery of the allegedly illegally and/or
erroneously collected local business tax with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City.
They argued that the tax assessment violated the limitations and guidelines on double taxation
under the Local Government Code.
They also claimed that the city's ordinance amending the Revenue Code had been declared
illegal and unconstitutional by the Department of Justice.
Granting of Preliminary Injunction by the RTC and CA
The RTC granted the private respondents' application for a writ of preliminary injunction.
The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.
The City of Manila filed a petition for certiorari with the CA, but it was dismissed for lack of
jurisdiction.
The CA ruled that since the complaint for tax refund was filed with the RTC, the appellate
jurisdiction over the case lies with the Court of Tax Appeals (CTA).
Petition for Certiorari with the Supreme Court
The City of Manila filed a special civil action for certiorari with the Supreme Court, raising
several issues including the jurisdiction of the CA and RTC, the issuance of the writ of
injunction, and the failure of the private respondents to make a written claim for tax credit or
refund with the City Treasurer.

Issue:
WON the Court can here the petition under R65 even if it is a wrong remedy? YES

Ruling:
Petitioners availed of the wrong remedy when they filed the instant special civil action for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court in assailing the Resolutions of the CA which
dismissed their petition filed with the said court and their motion for reconsideration of such
dismissal. There is no dispute that the assailed Resolutions of the CA are in the nature of a final
order as they disposed of the petition completely. It is settled that in cases where an assailed
judgment or order is considered final, the remedy of the aggrieved party is appeal. Hence, in the
instant case, petitioner should have filed a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, which
is a continuation of the appellate process over the original case.
Petitioners should be reminded of the equally-settled rule that a special civil action for certiorari
under Rule 65 is an original or independent action based on grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction and it will lie only if there is no appeal or any other
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law. 16 As such, it cannot be a
substitute for a lost appeal.
Nonetheless, in accordance with the liberal spirit pervading the Rules of Court and in the
interest of substantial justice, this Court has, before, treated a petition for certiorari as a petition
for review on certiorari, particularly (1) if the petition for certiorari was filed within the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari; (2) when errors of
judgment are averred; and (3) when there is sufficient reason to justify the relaxation of the
rules. 18 Considering that the present petition was filed within the 15-day reglementary period
for filing a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45, that an error of judgment is averred,
and because of the significance of the issue on jurisdiction, the Court deems it proper and
justified to relax the rules and, thus, treat the instant petition for certiorari as a petition for review
on certiorari.

Montes v. CA

Facts:
Petitioner: Carlito L. Montes
Respondents: Court of Appeals, Department of Science and Technology (DOST), Imelda D.
Rodriguez, Elizabeth Fontanilla
Allegation: Montes violated the Anti-Wiretapping Law by illegally recording private conversations
without consent
Ombudsman's decision: Montes found guilty of grave misconduct and suspended for one year
without pay
Montes' petition before the Court of Appeals
Montes filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals to overturn the Ombudsman's
decision.
The Court of Appeals dismissed the petition for being procedurally infirm.
Montes' petition before the Supreme Court
Montes filed a petition for prohibition before the Supreme Court.
Argument: Implementation of the suspension order was premature and there was no law
mandating immediate execution of the Ombudsman's decision in an administrative case with a
one-year suspension penalty.

Issue:
WON Montes failed to consider the hierarchy of court in filing Rule 65?
Ruling:
Montes failed to adequately show that there was no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law to warrant the issuance of a writ of prohibition.
Montes transgressed the proscription against forum shopping by seeking simultaneous
remedies in two different fora.
Montes disregarded the doctrine of judicial hierarchy by filing the instant petition before the
Supreme Court instead of the Court of Appeals.
The Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo
warranto, habeas corpus, and injunction is not exclusive and should be allowed only when there
are special and important reasons clearly set out in the petition.
Montes implicitly confirmed that he committed forum shopping by stating that he had to file the
instant petition before the Supreme Court due to the denial of his motion for reconsideration
before the appellate court.

Gio Samar v DOTR

Facts:

Issue:

Ruling:

In a certiorari and prohibition case, like the instant case, only legal issues affecting the
jurisdiction of the tribunal, board or officer involved may be resolved on the basis of undisputed
facts. Sections 1, 2 and 3, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court require that in the verified petition for
certiorari, mandamus and prohibition the petitioner should allege "facts with certainty."
In this case, the facts have become uncertain. Controversial evidentiary facts have been
alleged. What is certain and indubitable is that a notarized peddling contract was executed.

This Court is not a trier of facts. It would be difficult, if not anomalous, to decide the jurisdictional
issue on the basis of the parties contradictory factual submissions. The record has become
voluminous because of their efforts to persuade this Court to accept their discordant factual
statements.

Pro hac vice the issue of whether Repomanta and Moralde were employees of Mafinco or were
independent contractors should be resolved mainly in the light of their peddling contracts. A
different approach would lead this Court astray into the field of factual controversy where its
legal pronouncements would not rest on solid grounds. (Emphasis supplied.)

Heirs of Zoleta v. LBP

Facts:
Eliza Zoleta voluntarily offered a parcel of land for sale to the government under the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program.
Land Bank of the Philippines (Landbank) made a valuation of the land and deposited the
amount in the name of Eliza.
Eliza rejected Landbank's valuation, and the case was transferred to the Office of the Regional
Agrarian Reform Adjudicator (RARAD).
RARAD rendered a decision fixing just compensation.
Landbank filed a petition for just compensation before the Regional Trial Court.
Eliza filed a motion for execution of judgment, which was granted by RARAD.
Landbank sought to quash the writ of execution, but the Special Agrarian Court denied its plea.
Landbank filed a petition for certiorari before the Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication
Board (DARAB).
DARAB granted the petition and annulled the order and writ of execution issued by RARAD.
Issue:
Whether it was proper for DARAB to issue the resolution granting Landbank's petition for
certiorari.
Ruling:
DARAB exceeded its authority by exercising certiorari powers.
Certiorari powers belong to the judiciary and not an administrative agency like DARAB.
DARAB, as an administrative agency, is not a court of law exercising judicial power.
The power to issue writs of certiorari is an incident of judicial review, and administrative
agencies may not issue writs of certiorari to annul acts of officers or state organs.
Ratio:
Jurisdiction over certiorari cases must be expressly conferred by law.
DARAB, as an administrative agency, does not have the jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari.
The separation of powers must be upheld, and the constitutional mandate that judicial power is
vested in the courts must be respected.
Administrative agencies, while they may have quasi-judicial powers, are not authorized to
exercise certiorari powers.

Dacudao v. SOJ

Spouses Augusto G. Dacudao and Ofelia R. Dacudao were among the investors defrauded by
the Legacy Group of Companies.
They filed charges for syndicated estafa against the individuals involved in the fraud.
The Secretary of Justice issued an order directing all cases against the Legacy Group to be
forwarded to the Secretariat of the DOJ Special Panel in Manila for appropriate action.
Petitioners' Claims
The petitioners claimed that the Secretary of Justice's order violated their right to due process,
equal protection of the laws, and speedy disposition of cases.
They argued that the order obstructed justice and violated the prohibition against laws with
retroactive effect.
They also challenged the exemption of cases filed in the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City from the consolidation mandated by the order, alleging a violation of their
right to equal protection.

Issue:
WON SOJ gravely abused its discretion in exercising administrative function can be subject of
Rule 65? NO.
Ruling:
Dismissal of the Petition
The Court dismissed the petition, stating that the petitioners should have followed the hierarchy
of courts and filed their petition in the appropriate lower court instead of directly coming to the
Supreme Court.
The Court emphasized the importance of the hierarchy of courts and the need for a strict
observance of this policy.
Jurisdiction of the Secretary of Justice
The Court found that the Secretary of Justice did not act without or in excess of his jurisdiction
in issuing the order.
The Court clarified that the Secretary of Justice's function in conducting a preliminary
investigation is purely executive or administrative and not quasi-judicial.
Therefore, the Secretary of Justice's order did not violate the petitioners' constitutional rights.

Clark Freeport v. SOF, CIR

Issue:
WON the Rule 65 applies to issuance of memorandum by SOF/ CIR? No.
Ruling:

Accordingly, this petition must fail because this Court does not have original jurisdiction over a
petition for declaratory relief even if only questions of law are involved. The special civil action of
declaratory relief falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Courts. The Rules of
Court is explicit that such action shall be brought before the appropriate Regional Trial Court.
Section 1, Rule 63 of the Rules of Court provides:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested under a deed, will, contract or other
written instrument, whose rights are affected by a statute, executive order or regulation,
ordinance, or any other governmental regulation may, before breach or violation thereof, bring
an action in the appropriate Regional Trial Court to determine any question of construction or
validity arising, and for a declaration of his rights or duties, thereunder.
Lastly, although this Court, the Court of Appeals and the Regional Trial Courts have concurrent
jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of choice of court
forum. In Heirs of Bertuldo Hinog v. Hon. Melicor, citing People v. Cuaresma, we held:
This Court's original jurisdiction to issue writs of certiorari is not exclusive. It is shared by this
Court with Regional Trial Courts and with the Court of Appeals. This concurrence of jurisdiction
is not, however, to be taken as according to parties seeking any of the writs an absolute,
unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to which application therefor will be directed. There
is after all a hierarchy of courts. That hierarchy is determinative of the venue of appeals, and
also serves as a general determinant of the appropriate forum for petitions for the extraordinary
writs. A becoming regard for that judicial hierarchy most certainly indicates that petitions for the
issuance of extraordinary writs against first level ("inferior") courts should be filed with the
Regional Trial Court, and those against the latter, with the Court of Appeals. A direct invocation
of the Supreme Court's original jurisdiction to issue these writs should be allowed only when
there are special and important reasons therefor, clearly and specifically set out in the petition.
This is an established policy. It is a policy necessary to prevent inordinate demands upon the
Court's time and attention which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive
jurisdiction, and to prevent further over-crowding of the Court's docket.
The rationale for this rule is two-fold: (1) it would be an imposition upon the precious time of this
Court; and (2) it would cause an inevitable and resultant delay, intended or otherwise, in the
adjudication of cases, which in some instances had to be remanded or referred to the lower
court as the proper forum under the rules of procedure, or as better equipped to resolve the
issues because this Court is not a trier of facts. EATCcI
We thus affirm the judicial policy that we shall not entertain a direct resort to this Court unless
the remedy cannot be obtained in the appropriate courts, and exceptional and compelling
circumstances, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications, justify the
availment of the extraordinary remedy of writ of certiorari.

ROSALES v. ERC

Ruling:
The petitioners' choice of remedy, a petition for certiorari, is inappropriate because the
MCC/RFSC charges were issued by the ERC in its quasi-legislative power, not in its judicial or
quasi-judicial function.
The proper remedy would have been to file a petition for declaratory relief or to exhaust
administrative remedies by filing a case with the ERC.
The court recognizes the authority of the ERC to establish and enforce the MCC/RFSC charges
imposed by the ECs.
The charges are necessary for the ECs to fund the expansion, rehabilitation, and upgrading of
their electric power systems.
The charges are considered contributions from member-consumers and are intended to ensure
the quality, reliability, security, and affordability of electric power supply.
Conclusion:
The court dismisses the petition for procedural and technical defects, including lack of legal
standing and failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Falic III v. Civil Registrar General
Facts:
The case involves a petition filed by Jesus Nicardo M. Falcis III seeking the recognition of same-
sex marriage in the Philippines.
The petitioner argues that the provisions of the Family Code of the Philippines violate the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
The petitioner argues that the denial of same-sex marriage infringes upon the fundamental
rights of individuals to marry and to equal protection under the law.

Issue:
WON Rule 65 is the proper remedies in addressing constitutional issues? No.
Ruling:
Petitioner's choice of remedy further emphasizes his ignorance of basic legal procedure.
Rule 65 petitions are not per se remedies to address constitutional issues. Petitions for certiorari
are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses of officers or bodies exercising judicial or quasi-
judicial functions. Petitions for prohibition are filed to address the jurisdictional excesses of
officers or bodies exercising judicial, quasi-judicial, or ministerial functions. Rule 65, Sections 1
and 2 state:

SECTION 1. Petition for Certiorari. When any tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial or
quasi-judicial functions has acted without or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal, or any
plain, speedy, and adequate remedy in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby
may file a verified petition in the proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that
judgment be rendered annulling or modifying the proceedings of such tribunal, board or officer,
and granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or resolution
subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto, and a
sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the paragraph of Section 3, Rule 46.

SECTION 2. Petition for Prohibition. When the proceedings of any tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions, are without
or in excess of its or his jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy, and adequate remedy
in the ordinary course of law, a person aggrieved thereby may file a verified petition in the
proper court, alleging the facts with certainty and praying that judgment be rendered
commanding the respondent to desist from further proceedings in the action or matter specified
therein, or otherwise granting such incidental reliefs as law and justice may require.

The petition shall likewise be accompanied by a certified true copy of the judgment, order or
resolution subject thereof, copies of all pleadings and documents relevant and pertinent thereto,
and a sworn certification of non-forum shopping as provided in the third paragraph of Section 3,
Rule 46.

Here, petitioner justifies his resort to Rule 65 on the basis of this Court's prior pronouncements
that certiorari and prohibition are the remedies for assailing the constitutionality of statutes. He
cites, in particular, Magallona and Araullo.Petitioner even faults this Court, asserting that its
failure to create a "specific remedial vehicle under its constitutional rule-making powers" made
his resort to Rule 65 appropriate.

Yet, petitioner's presentation of his case, which is lacking in an actual or imminent breach of his
rights, makes it patently obvious that his proper remedy is not Rule 65, but rather, a petition for
declaratory relief under Rule 63.

Villanueva v. JBC
Background of the Case
The case involves a petition filed by Presiding Judge Ferdinand R. Villanueva challenging the
constitutionality of the Judicial and Bar Council's (JBC) policy requiring five years of experience
as judges of first-level courts for qualification as applicants to the Regional Trial Court (RTC).
The petitioner, who was appointed as the Presiding Judge of the Municipal Circuit Trial Court,
applied for vacant positions in the RTC but was not included in the list of candidates.
The petitioner argues that the JBC's policy should not be merely directory and should be fully
implemented, and that he has all the qualifications for the position prescribed by the
Constitution.
Arguments of the Parties
The JBC argues that the petition is procedurally infirm and that the policy does not violate the
equal protection and due process clauses.
The JBC states that the writ of certiorari and prohibition cannot be used to prevent the JBC from
performing its principal function, and that the equal protection clause is not violated as the
classification of judges based on years of experience is valid and performance-based.
The JBC also argues that there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in
nature.
ISSUE:
WON Villanueva applied the proper remedy? No.

RULING:
Court's Determination of Proper Remedies
The Court concludes that the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are tenable, as they can be
used to correct errors of jurisdiction and set right acts of grave abuse of discretion by any
branch or instrumentality of the government.
The Court also states that it has supervisory authority over the JBC and can inquire about the
matter to ensure compliance with its own rules.
However, the Court finds that the remedy of mandamus cannot be availed of by the petitioner as
his inclusion in the list of nominees for judicial vacancies is not a legally demandable right.
The Court also rules that the petition for declaratory relief is improper as it does not involve an
unsound policy but rather seeks a judicial declaration of the petitioner's right to be included in
the list of applicants.

Court's Ruling on the Substantive Issues

The Court upholds the constitutionality of the JBC's policy requiring five years of service as
judges of first-level courts before qualifying as applicants to second-level courts.
The Court states that the policy is necessary and incidental to the JBC's function of selecting
and recommending nominees for vacancies in the judiciary.
The Court finds that the policy does not violate the equal protection clause as it is based on
reasonable classification intended to gauge the proven competence of the applicants.
The Court further rules that there is no violation of due process as the policy is merely internal in
nature.

Conclusion
The Court dismisses the petition but directs the JBC to comply with the publication requirement
of its policies and guidelines for transparency and informing potential applicants of the
requirements for judicial positions.
Council of Teacher v. Sec. of Education

FACTS:
The petitioners include Maria Carolina P. Araullo, Judy M. Taguiwalo, Luz Ilagan, Carlos Isagani
Zarate, and Renato M. Reyes.
The respondents are Benigno Simeon C. Aquino III, Paquito N. Ochoa Jr., and Florencio B.
Abad.
Controversy Surrounding the DAP
The controversy began when Senator Jinggoy Estrada revealed that some Senators had been
given additional funds as an "incentive" for voting in favor of the impeachment of Chief Justice
Renato C. Corona.
Secretary Florencio Abad confirmed that these funds were part of the DAP, a program designed
to accelerate economic expansion.
The funds were released based on the Senators' letters of request, and the DAP had been
instituted in 2011 to address slow disbursements and stimulate economic growth.
Arguments Against the DAP
The petitioners argue that the DAP violates the Constitution, specifically Section 29(1) of Article
VI, which states that "No money shall be paid out of the Treasury except in pursuance of an
appropriation made by law."
They also argue that the DAP violates the Equal Protection Clause, the system of checks and
balances, and the principle of public accountability.

ISSUE:

What are the remedies by which the grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the Government may be determined
under the Constitution?

RULING:
The present Rules of Court uses two special civil actions for determining and correcting grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. These are the special civil
actions for certiorari and prohibition, and both are governed by Rule 65. A similar remedy of
certiorari exists under Rule 64, but the remedy is expressly applicable only to the judgments and
final orders or resolutions of the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit.
The ordinary nature and function of the writ of certiorari in our present system are aptly
explained in Delos Santos v. Metropolitan Bank and Trust Company: 30

In the common law, from which the remedy of certiorari evolved, the writ of certiorari was issued
out of Chancery, or the King's Bench, commanding agents or officers of the inferior courts to
return the record of a cause pending before them, so as to give the party more sure and speedy
justice, for the writ would enable the superior court to determine from an inspection of the record
whether the inferior court's judgment was rendered without authority. The errors were of such a
nature that, if allowed to stand, they would result in a substantial injury to the petitioner to whom
no other remedy was available. If the inferior court acted without authority, the record was then
revised and corrected in matters of law. The writ of certiorari was limited to cases in which the
inferior court was said to be exceeding its jurisdiction or was not proceeding according to
essential requirements of law and would lie only to review judicial or quasi-judicial acts.
The concept of the remedy of certiorari in our judicial system remains much the same as it has
been in the common law. In this jurisdiction, however, the exercise of the power to issue the writ
of certiorari is largely regulated by laying down the instances or situations in the Rules of Court
in which a superior court may issue the writ of certiorari to an inferior court or officer. Section 1,
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court compellingly provides the requirements for that purpose, viz.:
...
The sole office of the writ of certiorari is the correction of errors of jurisdiction, which includes
the commission of grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. In this regard,
mere abuse of discretion is not enough to warrant the issuance of the writ. The abuse of
discretion must be grave, which means either that the judicial or quasi-judicial power was
exercised in an arbitrary or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility, or that
the respondent judge, tribunal or board evaded a positive duty, or virtually refused to perform
the duty enjoined or to act in contemplation of law, such as when such judge, tribunal or board
exercising judicial or quasi-judicial powers acted in a capricious or whimsical manner as to be
equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. 31
Although similar to prohibition in that it will lie for want or excess of jurisdiction, certiorari is to be
distinguished from prohibition by the fact that it is a corrective remedy used for the re-
examination of some action of an inferior tribunal, and is directed to the cause or proceeding in
the lower court and not to the court itself, while prohibition is a preventative remedy issuing to
restrain future action, and is directed to the court itself. 32 The Court expounded on the nature
and function of the writ of prohibition in Holy Spirit Homeowners Association, Inc. v. Defensor:
A petition for prohibition is also not the proper remedy to assail an IRR issued in the exercise of
a quasi-legislative function. Prohibition is an extraordinary writ directed against any tribunal,
corporation, board, officer or person, whether exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial
functions, ordering said entity or person to desist from further proceedings when said
proceedings are without or in excess of said entity's or person's jurisdiction, or are accompanied
with grave abuse of discretion, and there is no appeal or any other plain, speedy and adequate
remedy in the ordinary course of law. Prohibition lies against judicial or ministerial functions, but
not against legislative or quasi-legislative functions. Generally, the purpose of a writ of
prohibition is to keep a lower court within the limits of its jurisdiction in order to maintain the
administration of justice in orderly channels. Prohibition is the proper remedy to afford relief
against usurpation of jurisdiction or power by an inferior court, or when, in the exercise of
jurisdiction in handling matters clearly within its cognizance the inferior court transgresses the
bounds prescribed to it by the law, or where there is no adequate remedy available in the
ordinary course of law by which such relief can be obtained. Where the principal relief sought is
to invalidate an IRR, petitioners' remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which
properly falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. In any case, petitioners'
allegation that "respondents are performing or threatening to perform functions without or in
excess of their jurisdiction" may appropriately be enjoined by the trial court through a writ of
injunction or a temporary restraining order.
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions.This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second paragraph
of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials. 34
Necessarily, in discharging its duty under Section 1, supra, to set right and undo any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, the Court is not at all precluded from making the inquiry
provided the challenge was properly brought by interested or affected parties. The Court has
been thereby entrusted expressly or by necessary implication with both the duty and the
obligation of determining, in appropriate cases, the validity of any assailed legislative or
executive action. This entrustment is consistent with the republican system of checks and
balances. 35
Following our recent dispositions concerning the congressional pork barrel, the Court has
become more alert to discharge its constitutional duty. We will not now refrain from exercising
our expanded judicial power in order to review and determine, with authority, the limitations on
the Chief Executive's spending power.

PHAPI v. Medialdea

RULING:
Petitioner seeks to declare as unconstitutional certain provisions of R.A. No. 10932 and for this
purpose, availed of the remedy of certiorari and prohibition. Respondents counter that certiorari
and prohibition are available only against judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions and not
against legislative acts, as in the instant case.
The rule is settled that the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief sought
determine the nature of the action and the court that has jurisdiction over it. The present petition
specifically alleges that R.A. No. 10932 is unconstitutional for being violative of substantive due
process, the presumption of innocence, and the equal protection of laws and as such, seeks
that the enforcement and implementation thereof be prohibited.
Under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, the ground for review in certiorari and prohibition is grave
abuse of discretion, and there is grave abuse of discretion when an act is done contrary to the
Constitution, the law or jurisprudence or executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of
malice, ill will or personal bias. Petitions for certiorari and prohibition are thus appropriate
remedies to raise constitutional questions.
Grave abuse of discretion as a ground for review does not only appear under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court but also under Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution defining judicial power.
As constitutionally defined, judicial power includes not only the duty to settle actual
controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, but also, the duty
to determine whether or not there has been grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the government. Such
innovation under the 1987 Constitution later on became known as the Court's "traditional
jurisdiction" and "expanded jurisdiction," respectively.
Given the commonality of the ground of grave abuse of discretion, the Court has allowed the
use of a Rule 65 petition to invoke this Court's expanded jurisdiction.
As expressly granted by the Constitution, the Court's expanded jurisdiction when invoked
permits a review of acts not only by a tribunal, board or officer exercising judicial, quasi-judicial
or ministerial functions, but also by any branch or instrumentality of the Government. "Any
branch or instrumentality of the Government" necessarily includes the legislative and the
executive, even if they are not exercising judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.
In Pedro Agcaoili, Jr., et al. v. The Honorable Representative Rodolfo C. Fari as, et al., we
affirmed the availability of the extraordinary writs for determining and correcting grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the legislative and executive
branches following Judge Villanueva v. Judicial and Bar Council, as follows:
With respect to the Court, however, the remedies of certiorari and prohibition are necessarily
broader in scope and reach, and the writ of certiorari or prohibition may be issued to correct
errors of jurisdiction committed not only by a tribunal, corporation, board or officer exercising
judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions but also to set right, undo and restrain any act of
grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction by any branch or
instrumentality of the Government, even if the latter does not exercise judicial, quasi-judicial or
ministerial functions. This application is expressly authorized by the text of the second
paragraph of Section 1, supra.
Thus, petitions for certiorari and prohibition are appropriate remedies to raise constitutional
issues and to review and/or prohibit or nullify the acts of legislative and executive officials.
(Citation omitted and emphasis ours)
Accordingly, we held as proper remedies the writs of certiorari and prohibition in Samahan ng
mga Progresibong Kabataan (SPARK), et al. v. Quezon City, as represented by Mayor Herbert
Bautista, et al., assailing the constitutionality of curfew ordinances and in Agcaoili questioning
the contempt powers of the Congress in the exercise of its power of inquiry in aid of legislation.
Following this trend in jurisprudence, petitioner therefore correctly availed of certiorari and
prohibition under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to assail the constitutionality of R.A. No. 10932
and enjoin its enforcement, notwithstanding that these governmental actions do not involve the
exercise of judicial, quasi-judicial or ministerial functions.

Republic v. Cantor

Ruling:
Certiorari Lies to Challenge the
Decisions, Judgments or Final
Orders of Trial Courts in a Summary
Proceeding for the Declaration of Presumptive
Death Under the Family Code
A losing party in this proceeding, however, is not entirely left without a remedy. While
jurisprudence tells us that no appeal can be made from the trial court's judgment, an aggrieved
party may, nevertheless, file a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court to
question any abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction that transpired.
As held in Delos Santos v. Rodriguez, et al.,10 the fact that a decision has become final does
not automatically negate the original action of the CA to issue certiorari, prohibition and
mandamus in connection with orders or processes issued by the trial court. Certiorari may be
availed of where a court has acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of
discretion, and where the ordinary remedy of appeal is not available. Such a procedure finds
support in the case of Republic v. Tango,11 wherein we held that:
This case presents an opportunity for us to settle the rule on appeal of judgments rendered in
summary proceedings under the Family Code and accordingly, refine our previous decisions
thereon.
Article 238 of the Family Code, under Title XI: SUMMARY JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS IN THE
FAMILY LAW, establishes the rules that govern summary court proceedings in the Family Code:
"ART. 238. Until modified by the Supreme Court, the procedural rules in this Title shall apply in
all cases provided for in this Code requiring summary court proceedings. Such cases shall be
decided in an expeditious manner without regard to technical rules."
In turn, Article 253 of the Family Code specifies the cases covered by the rules in chapters two
and three of the same title. It states:
"ART. 253. The foregoing rules in Chapters 2and 3 hereof shall likewise govern summary
proceedings filed under Articles 41, 51, 69, 73, 96, 124 and 217, insofar as they are
applicable."(Emphasis supplied.)
In plain text, Article 247 in Chapter 2 of the same title reads:
"ART.247. The judgment of the court shall be immediately final and executory."
By express provision of law, the judgment of the court in a summary proceeding shall be
immediately final and executory. As a matter of course, it follows that no appeal can be had of
the trial court's judgment ina summary proceeding for the declaration of presumptive death of an
absent spouse under Article 41 of the Family Code. It goes without saying, however, that an
aggrieved party may file a petition for certiorari to question abuse of discretion amounting to lack
of jurisdiction. Such petition should be filed in the Court of Appeals in accordance with the
Doctrine of Hierarchy of Courts. To be sure, even if the Court's original jurisdiction to issue a writ
of certiorari is concurrent with the RTCs and the Court of Appeals in certain cases, such
concurrence does not sanction an unrestricted freedom of choice of court forum. [emphasis
ours]
Viewed in this light, we find that the petitioner’s resort to certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of
Court to question the RTC’s order declaring Jerry presumptively dead was proper.

Delima v. Reyes

Death of the Palawan Anchor, charging Mayor Ortega as the perpetrator

Ruling: