1

People's Democratic Republic of Algeria

Ministry of Higher Education and Scientific Research
MOHAME LAMINE DEBAGHINE University, SETIF 2

Faculty of Letters and Languages

Department of English Language and Literature
Domain: Letters and Foreign Languages
Stream: English Language
Specialty: Literature and Civilization

The Future Wars of America

A dissertation submitted in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree

of
Master in Literature and Civilization
Presented by

Rania Al-Obaidi

Board of Examiners

Chairperson UMLD Setif 2

Supervisor Hichem Bennia UMLD Setif 2
Examiner UMLD Setif 2
Guest Examiner UMLD Setif 2

2021/2022
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DEDICATION

I dedicate my dissertation work to the souls of my beloved father and grandmother, whose

memory has been such an inpiration to me. I would like to aknowledge and thank my dearest

husband and mother, especially this later who supported me through the process and

continually provided me with moral and emotinal help. A special feeling of gratitude to my

aunt ‘’Salima ‘’ for the constant backing when I thought of giving up. Finally,I will always

appreciate the help offered by my coleague ‘’ Labidi Nour El Islem’’ whether in time or

expertise for the completion of this work.

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ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to express my most sincere gratitude to all who taught me something

during my journey of knowledge, especially my supervisor, Mr Hichem Bennia His

contribution and valuable information helped me throughout my research. Without his

confidence in my research, this work would not have seen the light.

Special appreciations go to the board of examiners for their supplied time and efforts

to enrich this modest work by their valuable and guiding comments.

My most profound appreciation goes to all those who contributed to completing this

work throughout different phases, namely teachers and colleagues. To the friends who

provided me their feedback and support, thank you all.

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Statement of Originality

I hereby authenticate that the content of this dissertation is my work. Any contribution

made to this humble research is explicitly acknowledged. I also confirm that the academic

content of this dissertation is the outcome of my work. All the contribution obtained in

making this dissertation and references have been acknowledged.

Rania Al-Obaidi
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Abstract

This research attempts to forecast America’s future wars over the coming decades, not

only on the basic categories; political and economic but on more modern and trendy scales

such as environment, space, technology, mass displacement, and information. Further, this

research will provide the reader with a comprehensive analysis of the means and tools used by

the United States to fight its future wars. Finally, a thorough analysis of the reasons, along

with the effects of the Russian and Ukrainian war on the world, and precisely on America will

be presented.
 ‫‪6‬‬

‫ملخص‬

‫يحاول هذا البحث توقع حروب أمريكا المستقبلية على مدى العقود القادمة ‪ ،‬ليس فقط على الفئات األساسية ؛‬

‫سياسي واقتصادي ولكن على مستويات أكثر حداثة وعصرية مثل البيئة والفضاء والتكنولوجيا والتشرد الجماعي‬

‫والمعلومات‪ .‬عالوة على ذلك ‪ ،‬سيزود هذا البحث القارئ بتحليل شامل للوسائل واألدوات التي تستخدمها الواليات المتحدة‬

‫لخوض حروبها المستقبلية‪ .‬أخيًر ا ‪ ،‬سيتم تقديم تحليل شامل لألسباب ‪ ،‬إلى جانب آثار الحرب الروسية واألوكرانية على‬

‫العالم ‪ ،‬وتحديدًا على أمريكا‪.‬‬

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Résumé

Cette recherche tente de prévoir les guerres futures de l'Amérique au cours des

prochaines décennies, pas seulement sur les catégories de base ; politique et économique,

mais à des échelles plus modernes et à la mode telles que l'environnement, l'espace, la

technologie, les déplacements massifs et l'information. De plus, cette recherche fournira au

lecteur une analyse complète des moyens et des outils utilisés par les États-Unis pour mener

leurs futures guerres. Enfin, une analyse approfondie des raisons, ainsi que des effets de la

guerre russe et ukrainienne sur le monde, et précisément sur l'Amérique, sera présentée.
 8

Table of Contents

DEDICATION............................................................................................................................2

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS........................................................................................................3

Statement of Originality..............................................................................................................4

Abstract.......................................................................................................................................5

‫ملخص‬............................................................................................................................................6

Résumé........................................................................................................................................7

Introduction...............................................................................................................................10

Chapter One: Motives of the future wars of America...............................................................13

1. Potential Future Wars....................................................................................................13

2. Adversaries and Allies of America................................................................................15

3. Motive of the Future Wars of America..........................................................................17

3. 1. Global Economic motives......................................................................................18

3. 2. Geopolitical Motives..............................................................................................19

3. 3. Environmental Motives..........................................................................................19

3. 4. Military Motives.....................................................................................................20

Chapter Two: Means and Trends of the Future American Wars..............................................21

1. Wars in the Past Versus Wars in the Present.................................................................21

2. Future American wars and Technology.........................................................................24

3. Types of wars.................................................................................................................25

4. Means of the Future Wars of America...........................................................................29

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5. Trends of The future wars of America...........................................................................33

5.1. Geopolitical Trends................................................................................................33

5.2. Military Trends.......................................................................................................34

5.3. Space and Nuclear Trends......................................................................................35

5.4. Cyber Trends..........................................................................................................36

5.5. Global Economic Trends........................................................................................37

5.6. Environmental Trends............................................................................................38

Chapter Three: Russian and Ukraine war.................................................................................40

1. Causes of Russia-Ukraine Conflict................................................................................40

2. Effects of Russia-Ukraine Conflict................................................................................44

Conclusion................................................................................................................................53

References
 10

Introduction

By definition, war is " a state of usually open and declared armed hostile conflict

between states or nations, " ( Merriam. W, nd ). The very first war in documented history is

said to be a war between a civilization named Sumer and a civilization named Elam roughly

2700 BC. Sumer is one of the ancientest civilizations, conceivably the first. In old wars,

negative consequences were much more than positive ones. Ancient wars burdened massive

loss, economically, financially, and also humanly. Wars are predicted not to have an ending.

Accordingly, there was a need for ways to lessen these losses in future wars. The most usable

and powerful methods applied in the current and future wars are through the use of

technology. The United States of America is one of the first countries to take advantage of

technology concerning the matter, in addition to Russia, Iran, and China.

As time moves forward, the world changes. Consequently, it leads to numerous

developments on many levels, mainly that of technology. When mentioning technology, the

majority of people would think of the internet, washing machines, television, electronic

devices... etc. In short, the thinking would move around the positive side of it and how it

helped mankind to facilitate their lives. However, humans did not stop here. They wanted

more out of technology. Therefore, they started to use and develop it for dangerous purposes,

one may describe it. Nuclear weapons, which are the most dangerous weapons ever existing

on mother earth, were created and further developed. The most famous atomic bombs were

the Hiroshima and Nagasaki bombs. They killed between 129.000 and 226.000 people.

Robots and drones are also a result of technology use. They were created to spy on other

countries and therefore threaten their national peace. Nevertheless, there is also a positive side

to developing these weapons and tools. Countries use the before-mentioned tools to protect

themselves against its dangerousness and to also keep up with the world so that it would not

be left behind.
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The aim of this study is to investigate the motives behind the future wars of America,

in addition to its trends. Also, the researcher attempts to investigate the means and tools used

by the United States in its future wars. Finally, the researcher will tackle the Russian and

Ukraine war and how it affects the world, mainly America.

This dissertation answers the question of why would the United States fight wars in

the future. In addition, how will the United States fight its future wars. Finally, What is the

effects that the Russian and Ukraine war on America, and how the latter is involved in their

conflict.

The first chapter looks into the political tendencies that may lead to conflict. To begin,

the researcher will talk about growing powers like Russia and China. As economic interests

expand, so will security interests, potentially altering global power balances and resulting in

confrontation with the United States. This latter wants to preserve a larger area of influence

while avoiding any harm to its national identity. Other key drivers for conflict include the

fight against terrorism and ongoing conflicts, which have resulted in widespread displacement

and a sense of enmity among the hosting countries. Furthermore, nuclear weapons are a major

driving force, particularly in light of the degradation of treaties restricting their use and the

return of nuclear proliferation, namely in North Korea and Iran. Also, new technologies and

space are disputed sectors that benefit from commercial exploitation in the areas of

intelligence, communication, and navigation. It has a crucial role in inciting future conflicts,

especially when non-governmental and armed groups have access to military new-tech.

The second chapter attempts to answer the core question ;what future wars will look

like. That is to say, how they will be fought. To be able to answer this question we need to

have an insight into U.S adversaries tactic potentials to wage a conflict as they can’t match

U.S military power. First of all, in a world where information is getting increasingly digitized
 12

yet vulnerable, cyber battles are likely to be adopted as a warfare option mainly through

espionage and sabotage operations. In the same respect, the use of media to influence the

public opinion and increase the spread of disinformation over facts proved itself useful.

Another strategy is investing in cutting-edge technologies such as drones and space assets,

privileges the ability to reach almost the same goals beyond the threshold of what can be

called a war. Finally, I saved the last part of this chapter to discuss the biological wars that are

unlike any of the previous scenarios. They will pull the world in critical and different

directions and have much more comprehensive implications on all respects with growing

inabilities to control their outcomes.

The third and the last chapter will investigate the reasons behind the current war, the

Russian and Ukraine war. Also, what does America has to do with that war. First, the

researcher will present view points of several analysts who predict the reasons of the before

mentioned war, which is the famous war nowadays in the world. Secondly, the researcher will

analyze the effects of the Russian and Ukraine war on the entire world, especially on the

European Union and America.

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Chapter One: Motives of the future wars of America

All wars have causes, certainly. Nonetheless, those causes vary from the past to the

future. Just like the past wars have reasons, so have the prospective warfare. This chapter

tackles the motives of the future of the American wars. The chapter contains the potential

wars the U.S may fight in the future. Moreover, it includes a thorough explanation of the

adversaries and allies of America. Finally, The motives that may cause America to enter new

wars in the future are tackled; namely: global economic, geopolitical, environmental, and

military motives.

1. Potential Future Wars

Former U.S. Secretary of Defense Robert Gates has been famous for quipping that the

forecasts of Washington regarding its future wars have been false most of the time. Stephen P.

R stated in the early 1950, bureaucrats said that the United States would not fight in Korea. In

1964, U.S. President Lyndon Johnson promised that he would not send American armies to

fight wars in Asia. Iraq was not among any American's list of antagonists in 1990. However,

the United States had assisted that country in its war against Iran merely a decade back

( 2018). Concludingly, all of those assumptions were inaccurate. The history of the American

wars is congested, it has been part of all the before mentioned wars. The past wars differ from
 14

that of the current and the future ones. Previously, all parties involved in the wars suffered

vast losses in terms of human beings because of the use of weapons and killing. Yet, the

future wars are expected to have a different shape. it will focus more on major factors

including new technologies, new threats, the obsolescence of heavy armor, offensive cyber

war capabilities, and the replacement of humans by drones, robots, and potentially cyborgs.

The United States of America is among the richest and also most technologically

advanced nations that ever existed ( Harvey. M and Jeremy. S, 1996). They can manage more

combat power and move it farther, faster, and for longer than many other countries. Whenever

enough challenged, they can indeed be highly hazardous, even cruel. The record of World

War II implied this, and the Korean and Vietnam wars provided evidence. They are

considered to be the main reason for a lot of past wars including the Mexican American war

( 1846-1848), Spanish American war ( 1898), first world war ( 1917-1918), second world war

( 1941-1945), Korean war ( 1950-1953), and so many others. It is also a part and, let's say an

important one, in current wars that started previously and still going till the moment of writing

these lines; including Syrian American war ( 2014- present), the Yemeni civil war ( 2015-

present), and Lybian American war ( 2015- present).

Considering the present events, mainly the unstable relations between the USA and

Russia, and between China and USA, also The Russian and Ukraine conflict, America is

expected to enter new wars the coming years. It is worth mentioning that both Russia and

China, in addition to America, are the most powerful nations in the globe. Therefore, if

bureaucracies do not thoroughly assess probable future scenarios, they will make decisions

based solely on their implicit or explicit assumptions about the types of warfare they will face.

Worse, they might merely keep doing what they've always done, with little regard for the

future. Following up on US President Barack Obama's call to "don't do foolish things" is

insufficient. Policymakers must be able to choose among several options ( Stephen. P.R,
 15

2018). According to RAND ( 2020 ), the United States military frequently fails to anticipate

the future correctly, and failures cannot be attributed to individual commanders' folly,

technological illiteracy, or an inability to recognize trends. Speaking of warfare future

predictions, Robert Gates who is the U.S. Secretary of Defense stated that: " When it arrives

at indicating the nature and establishment of our subsequent military engagement, since

Vietnam, our history has been perfect. We have never earlier conveyed it exactly, from the

Mayaguez to Grenada, Panama, Somalia, the Balkans, Haiti, Kuwait, Iraq, and more; we had

no thought a year earlier any of these assignments that we would be so involved." However,

the possible American wars predicted by professionals in the domains are set to be against its

adversaries.

2. Adversaries and Allies of America

The official list of US adversaries has remained fairly consistent. China, Russia, Iran,

North Korea, and terrorist groups are the five main rivals, according to Secretary of Defense

Ash Carter. Despite the fact that Carter's announcement was more clear than those made by

prior presidents, strategy documents from the late George W. Bush administration contain a

similar list of difficulties. Despite a change in political party and foreign policy orientation,

the Trump administration maintained the same list of declared rivals in both its National

Security and National Defense Strategies. The consistency in the list of foes is all the more

startling given that the Obama administration proclaimed the Russian "reset," a pivot to Asia

(away from Middle East wars), and, later, the Iran nuclear deal pillars of its foreign policy

legacy. The Trump administration has recently attempted to repair relations with Russia and

North Korea. Indeed, despite many attempts by various presidential administrations over the

last several decades to bring various rivals into the fold, U.S. opponents rarely cease to be a

strategic problem. For a variety of geopolitical, military, nuclear, economic, and

 16

environmental reasons, the five countries identified in the National Defense Strategy will

likely remain adversaries throughout the next decade.

There are structural reasons for this strategic continuity. China and Russia see the

current international system as dominated by the US and, on some levels, incompatible with

their interests and security, thus they want to change it. Both countries desire a more

multipolar world in which their own countries have more global power, particularly over their

own regions. In crucial locations such as Taiwan, the East and South China Seas, Eastern

Europe, and the Caucasus, both countries' self-defined regional spheres of influence collide

with those of the US and its allies. As a result, while different US presidential administrations

may soften their rhetoric toward both states, Russia and China will almost certainly remain

foes for the next decade or longer. There are other more oblique reasons to believe that China

and Russia will remain US competitors for the next decade. On the military front, both China

and Russia will be better positioned militarily to compete with the US during the next decade;

as a result, they may be more willing to challenge international standards that they perceive

unjust or unpleasant. In the economic domain, China will need to acquire new sources of raw

materials to fuel its economic expansion, and it will look for these resources in many parts of

the world. Economic rivalry is likely to grow as a result of this and other trade conflicts,

feeding the security competition between the great powers. Similar to Russia and China, Iran

and North Korea desire to wield influence in their own regions in ways that directly contradict

US objectives. Unlike Russia and China, Iran and North Korea are unable to directly

challenge the United States militarily, though both have invested in asymmetric weapons to

do so. Finally, despite the fact that both governments have been the subject of US diplomacy,

they are likely to remain rivals. Despite President Obama's hope that the Joint Comprehensive

Plan of Action on Iran's Nuclear Program would herald a new era in US-Iran relations, even

supporters of the accord admitted that Iran continued to conduct missile tests and offer
 17

support for its proxy forces in Yemen and Syria after the agreement was signed. Furthermore,

publicly available satellite imagery shows that North Korea continues to improve its missile

capabilities and one of its primary nuclear research labs even after the summit. Ultimately,

despite the United States' ongoing counterterrorism effort since 2001, terrorist groups in

general, and Islamic terrorist groups in particular, will continue to pose a threat US interests

far into 2030, if not beyond. "The threat from terrorism will intensify in the next decades as

the growing significance of small groups, and people employ new technologies, ideas, and

relationships to their benefit," the National Intelligence Council says. There are a number of

reasons to trust the council's judgment. The so-called caliphate of the Islamic State may be

gone, but the ideology that fueled it remains. Many believe the Sunni-Shia rift will worsen,

fueling Islamic terrorism in the Middle East. Furthermore, developing-world countries,

especially those in the Middle East, will face long-term political, economic, and

environmental issues, with public anger likely to feed terrorism. These same issues will

weaken the governments in these countries, making it more difficult to launch an effective

counterterrorism response and generally maintain law and order. Therefore, on the one hand,

the United States' list of rivals is likely to stay largely stable from now until 2030. On the

other hand, the United States partners and friends may undergo substantial changes. For most

of modern history, the United States has fought alongside its allies; if history repeats itself, the

US will most likely fight its next combat alongside its allies and partners. Those allies are

Canada, United Kingdome, France, Ireland, Norway, Sweden, Italy, Germany, Australia, and

Israel.

3. Motive of the Future Wars of America

It is difficult to forecast precisely when and why the next war would break out, but

analysts have listed several possible reasons why America may engage in other conflicts.
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3. 1. Global Economic motives

Some of the customary safeguards that the US has depended on for many years to

avert serious power struggles appear to be crumbling. The vast U.S. conventional military

supremacy is dwindling, in part due to decisions made by the country, actions taken by its

enemies, changes in how war is fought, and changes in the traditional means of deterring war.

The free trade system, which encourages economic cooperation and reduces the likelihood

that nations would use force to get market access, is also under attack on the economic front.

The ability of the United States to compel action without resorting to violence may deteriorate

along with the relative strength of the economy of the United States and its allies. Above all,

if polarization and impasse continue, it could become tougher for the United States to exercise

global leadership in preserving the international system.

The likelihood of causing internal instability or cross-border migration flows increases

along with climate change and the frequency of extreme weather events. Similar risks come

from insufficient resources. Because it usually is less expensive to purchase these resources

on international markets than to resort to conquest, the search for rare resources currently does

not frequently result in conflict between wealthy countries. If the world trading system

deteriorates, this may alter. The United States remains dependent on imports of oil and other

natural resources to power its economy, despite the possibility that it may become a net

exporter of natural gas in the upcoming ten years. China was the leading producer of 19 and

the top supplier for 12 of the 33 minerals (or groupings of minerals, such as rare-earth

elements) that the Department of the Interior designated as critical to the U.S. economy in

February 2018.
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3. 2. Geopolitical Motives

There may be increasing internal pressures that might lead to conflict. In addition to

the aforementioned issues of economic unrest, unfavorable environmental changes, further

upending economic and societal structures, migration, and terrorism, the past few years, in

particular, have seen the rise of the strongmen who will shape the next ten years of politics

around the world. Strongmen are often solidifying power at the top of U.S. competitors, as

shown with the recent election of Russian President Vladimir Putin to a fourth term and the

decision by Chinese President Xi Jinping to suspend term restrictions. These tyrants are in

charge of U.S. friends and partners in other instances, such as Crown Prince Muhammad Bin

Salman. On the one hand, these strongmen's propensity for longevity might serve as a

stabilizing influence in the international order; on the other hand, it can provide them with

incentives to achieve significant foreign policy goals in order to establish their legacies and

justify their rule at home. What's more worrying is what would happen if these leaders'

influence ever started to diminish. Strongman rule focuses all complaints on the leader and

creates a potentially volatile situation should that leader lose power. It also effectively reduces

the safety valves for domestic unrest. Any leader who could survive would even be ready to

risk going to war in order to maintain their domestic power base.

3. 3. Environmental Motives

The chance that the United States may be drawn into a regional battle against its will

is also rising. As previously indicated, U.S. rivals desire to alter the international system

because they believe that it is mostly in opposition to their interests. Even if this does not

immediately result in a confrontation with the US, US allies have different sensibilities than

the US. It seems sensible that Poland and the Baltic states be especially alert to Russian

border measures. Israel has reacted violently to stop Iran from establishing a permanent
 20

military presence in the area because it sees Iran's military presence in Syria as an existential

danger. Japan views Taiwan as essential to the security of its southern island chain and the

Senkaku Islands, which are also claimed by China, as a part of its sovereign territory. The

United States may face an entrapment issue in 2030, especially since gray zone warfare

entails pressing on these delicate regions while refraining from overt uses of force. The

United States may have to make the tough decision of starting a conflict it does not want or

betraying an ally if China, Russia, Iran, or North Korea cross a U.S. ally's redlines.

3. 4. Military Motives

In the years to come, there may be a rise in the amount of external shocks that might

cause conflict. Traditional conflict starters come in a variety of forms. The events in 2001

showed that terrorism, especially in the Middle East, is still a problem and has the potential to

lead to extensive action. War may potentially be sparked by the return of nuclear

proliferation, notably by Iran and North Korea. Additionally, there are more and more

chances for errors to trigger crises and even direct violence. Already, American military assets

cross paths with Chinese forces in the South China Sea and Russian forces in Syria, raising

the possibility of mishaps and unintentional escalation. There will be additional potential

flashpoints as the Belt and Road Initiative expands China's economic and security interests

and as Russia engages more in its neighborhood.

The likelihood of a major conflict by 2030 might rise as a result of the aforementioned

motives, and the US's capacity to influence its timing and causes is likely to decrease. As the

first Gulf War and the 9/11 terrorist attacks show, the United States has never had a complete

ability to control global events, not even at the height of its relative supremacy at the

conclusion of the Cold War. Nevertheless, rather than dictating battle at a time and place of its
 21

choosing, the United States may find itself increasingly drawn into conflict by aggression

from an enemy or the trapping of an ally.

Chapter Two: Means and Trends of the Future American Wars

In this chapter, we will discuss the changes occurring in the wars in the past and the

wars in the present. Following this, we will tackle how technology has and will affect the

American wars in the following years. In addition, a thorough explanation of the types of wars

in America is going to be elaborated. Following this, we will explore the ways and means

through which the future wars will be fought. Finally, we will conclude with the trends of the

future wars.

1. Wars in the Past Versus Wars in the Present

Following the conclusion of the Cold War, the world looked for a new era of peace.

However, things did not go as planned. War is more difficult than it has ever been in the 30

years after the historic collapse of the Berlin Wall, which transformed power balances. Wars

dominated the twentieth century. Two global wars claimed the lives of an estimated 80

million individuals. Then there was the Cold War, which was essentially an arms race

between the United States and Russia. Two opposing sides confronted each other in Europe

and most of the rest of the world. Global powers funded brutal proxy conflicts in Asia, the

Middle East, Africa, and South America. The Iron Curtain was finally pulled down in 1989 by
 22

peaceful revolutions. The Cold War has come to an end. According to Brockmeier. S, "there

is hope that after the ending of the cold war, there would be a period of peace." However, this

optimism was quickly dashed. There are still a lot of conflicts going on in the world. Their

numbers have risen steadily since the mid-2000s. "We've seen more additional battle, more

brutality, and notably since the starting of the Syrian war, more conflict deaths," Brockmeier

says. According to Brockmeier, this is primarily owing to the intrastate disputes of the 1990s,

which no one foresaw after the fall of the Berlin Wall. The Yugoslav wars, as well as disputes

in Sierra Leone and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, are among them. The wars in

Mali in 2012 and Syria, which started in 2011, appear to be resuming the trend. Researchers

from Uppsala University's Department of Peace and Conflict Research have documented 23

wars and 162 minor disputes with fewer than 100 casualties per year in the last ten years.

Brockmeier further added that the ability to recognize conflict warning indicators has been

improved. Despite this, it is still frequently unable to avert them. "We have not learned the

lessons of early mobilization of political will to intervene before armed bloodshed breaks out,

" Brockmerier claimed. In 2017, governments invested a total of €1.8 trillion ($1.98 trillion)

in their militaries around the world. This represents less than 2% of global GDP, a new low.

In fact, during the last few decades, global military spending has consistently decreased.

It is a period of swift technological disruption, particularly in the realm of artificial

intelligence (AI). While this technology was created by and for the commercial sector, the

evident promise for AI in military applications is prompting armed forces throughout the

world to test out early AI-enabled defense systems to see how they can be employed for

combat and non-combat duties. The information revolution, fueled by the advancement of

powerful computer technology, has had a profound impact on each and every area of our lives

for more than a decade. The computer revolution is driving commercial operations from the

world's financial markets to the most fundamental transactions in retailers. It's hardly strange,
 23

then, that these technologies, which appear to be so far removed from troop movements and

conflict, are also tied by military operations. However, new technologies are altering not only

society, but also our understanding of war and how military operations are carried out.

The nature of warfare is evolving as a result of emerging technologies. Rapid

advancements in unmanned systems, robotics, data processing, autonomy, networking, and

further stimulating technologies have the possibility to usher in a completely new era of

warfare. State and non-state actors correspondingly will try to take advantage of these and

other new technologies, many of which are fueled by commercial information technology

innovation ( Herr. A, 2019). To leverage these technologies and remain ahead in the coming

warfighting regime, the US military will require to establish new operational ideas, doctrine,

training, rules, and organizational structures. Although technology is recognized as a

component that improves human existence, it is also seen as a source of security holes as it

develops. This vicious loop is the result of a never-ending battle between terror and counter-

terrorism technologies. Terrorist organizations, particularly in the defense industry, detect

flaws in emerging technology and utilize them for their own tactical attacks, which is one of

the most defining qualities of "innovative terrorism." Terrorist organizations' new skills are

adaptation and imitation ( Balkan. S, 2019). Transitioning to a new technology, on the other

hand, might produce a variety of outcomes. While some businesses succeed in improving new

technology and increasing its efficacy, others fail. This holds true for terrorist organizations as

well as non-state entities. Commercial unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs or drones) should be

examined from this standpoint ( Balkan. S, 2019). Balkan added that drones are given to

humanity as a new technological potential, but terrorist organizations have already uncovered

their security shortcomings. In the past two years, the employment of drone systems by non-

state actors and terrorist organizations has skyrocketed. Some organizations have quickly

adapted to the use of drones, expanding their capabilities and planning complex strikes.
 24

Balkan further claimed that the low cost of UAV technology and the defeat to generate a

comprehensive anti-UAV technology for a full-fledged and adequate fight against them are

the causes for their widespread use ( 2019).

2. Future American wars and Technology

US forces have led the way in the development of precision-guided missiles, in part to

limit pilot exposure to hostile antiaircraft weapons and, more importantly, to avoid the ever-

unwanted "collateral damage," as military briefers refer to civilian losses. Weapons entering

airshafts of buildings to destroy enemy command and control capability is the TV image, if

not the truth ( Harvey. M & Jeremy. S, 1996). From self-driving vehicles to manufacturing

robots, information technology is driving rapid advances in the autonomous capabilities of

unmanned systems, and more autonomous unmanned systems will play a vital part in future

wars as well. The prospect of greater weapon system autonomy creates difficult lawful, moral,

ethical, policy, and strategic resilience concerns. Nation-states and activists in the United

States and elsewhere are already arguing how autonomy breakthroughs will affect warfare –

and what, if anything, should be done about it. Over 60 non-governmental groups have joined

activists in launching the "Campaign to Stop Killer Robots," ( Hern .A & Julia .P, 2015). In

the same article, Herr and Julia said that the state parties to the United Nations Convention on

particular conventional weapons have been holding informal discussions about autonomous

weapons for several years, and in 2016, nations agreed to form a group of governmental

specialists to further examine the matter ( 2015). Humans will make up a less quantity of the

battlefield in the future. However, these warriors will be physically and mentally enhanced

( Schmorrow, Dylan. D, & Calin. M, 2014). This will boost their ability to perceive, make

sense of, and interact with humans and robotic systems. Consequently, they would not only do

things differently, but they would do distinct things. In the year 2050, human-robot
 25

combinations will constitute the mainstay of military forces. As a result, human capacities

will need to be enhanced in order to effectively collaborate with robots and function in an

information-rich environment. The latter will be thoroughly discussed in the coming sections.

While the War of 2050 will still be controlled by humans, four developments will have a huge

impact on the war ( Herr. A, 2014 ). Herr. A also elaborated that the expansion of intelligent

systems will be the first; augmented humans will be the second; the crucial struggle for the

information domain will be the third; and the introduction of new, networked techniques to

command and control will be the fourth. Each of these new capabilities has similar major

flaw: attacks on the information, communications, and computing systems that will allow

human-robot teams to understand the battlefield and act decisively. As a result, the mostly

hidden war for information, communications, and computer security will decide how well

enemies can operate and succeed on the battlefield in 2050 ( 2014).

3. Types of wars

What capabilities U.S. opponents are investing in today are the best signal of what

future fights may look like. After all, military modernization projects might take years to

complete; in many situations, today's investment decisions will have long-term consequences.

Although each future battle will have its distinct flavor, my study shows that the US will face

four basic conflict archetypes in all ( Raphael. S, Cohen, et al, 2020).

The United States will first have to battle terrorism. As previously said, a variety of

geopolitical, economic, and environmental factors make it likely that the current instability in

the Middle East and other regions of the world—and with it, the continued threat of

international terrorism—will persist for years. The US will face an increasingly "atomized

jihadist militancy," according to the National Intelligence Council ( 2017 ), which will use

advances in communication technology and the proliferation of conventional weaponry to

 26

wage a low-level if decentralized, the global terrorist campaign against the US and its allies.

As a result, the US will need to keep its ability to locate and kill these cells before they attack.

Second, the United States will face a gray-zone fight. Definitions vary regarding what

the gray zone consists of, but China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea all have sought to achieve

national objectives by using coercion short of armed conflict, often by exploiting the U.S. and

allied thresholds for a response ( Raphael. S, Cohen, et al, 2020 ). According to Heidi. R and

Aleksandr. G, in many cases, this involves the use of covert, civilian, or proxy forces; such as

China’s People’s Maritime Militia, Russia’s “little green men,” or Iran’s Quds Force ( 2014 ).

Second, the US will be involved in a gray-zone conflict. The gray zone's definition varies, but

China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea have all sought to achieve national goals through

coercion rather than armed combat, frequently by leveraging the United States' and allies'

response thresholds ( Raphael. S, Cohen, et al, 2020 ). According to Heidi R and Aleksandr

G, in many cases, covert, civilian, or proxy forces are used, such as China's People's Maritime

Militia, Russia's "little green men," or Iran's Quds Force ( 2014 ). Gray-zone battles

sometimes don't use kinetic force at all, instead relying on information warfare, economic

pressure, or cyber capabilities to achieve national goals without starting a shooting war. These

tactics can be less costly in terms of blood and gold than more traditional kinds of conflict. In

many situations, they have also been successful: Iran has used them to advance its goals in the

Middle East, as has Russia in Eastern Europe, and China in the South China Sea ( Raphael. s,

Cohen, 2020 ). Gray-zone disputes are likely to become more common in 2030 for two

reasons. First, these tools have already proven to be reasonably inexpensive and effective, so

there is little reason for US opponents to abandon them. Second, the United States may be

more vulnerable to this type of warfare, as may some of its allies. Lawfare, false allegations,

and cyberattacks will become more common in the United States and its liberal democratic

friends. They will also find it more difficult to manage the narrative surrounding military
 27

operations, potentially exposing greater weaknesses for enemies to exploit through gray-zone

conflict. Because of their demonstrated track record of success and increased potential

vulnerabilities, US adversaries may be more inclined to use similar techniques in the future.

Third, an asymmetric war could erupt between the US and Iran or North Korea over

the next decade, especially if the US chooses an overt military confrontation with either Iran

or North Korea. As previously stated, neither of those powers can equal US military might.

Instead, the US will fight conventional forces that are numerically large but qualitatively

inferior. These opponents' genuine military difficulties come from their niche capabilities,

such as anti-air and anti-ship missiles, as well as their capacity to utilize missiles, weapons of

mass destruction, and cyber weapons in strikes on predominantly non-military targets (Heidi.

R and Aleksandr. G, 2008). Considering that both countries continue on their current

modernization pathways, the United States needs to prepare for this asymmetric conflict in

2030 will be the same as it is today.

Finally, if the US finds itself in an open battle with either China or Russia, it will be

forced to fight on a high level. It goes without saying that not all high-end conflicts are

created equal: A maritime-centric battle with China in the Indo-Pacific will differ from a land-

based struggle with Russia in Europe. However, there are some parallels. Despite the fact that

neither China nor Russia can fully replicate the US military's capabilities, both will have a

home-field advantage, localized numerical dominance, and a qualitative edge on the horizon.

Both will have advanced military systems, including powerful air defense systems, vast

offensive and defensive space and cyber capabilities, and the potential to wage a tactical

nuclear war (Heginbotham et al., 2015).

To summarize, unlike any of the preceding scenarios, these enemies will be able to

challenge all three domains where the USAF operates—air, space, and cyber—in a high-end
 28

conflict. By 2030, the chances of high-end conflict will almost certainly increase, despite the

fact that it is still unlikely. China and Russia will likely be better positioned in a decade to

wage high-end the conflict with the United States. The latter would be possible if they

modernize and professionalize their conventional forces, invest in cutting-edge technologies

(such as cyber, offensive, space, and AI), and chip away at nuclear weapons constraints

( specifically in Russia's case). Of course, competence does not equal motivation, and

deterrence logic still applies in the end. Nonetheless, the chances of a high-end battle will

undoubtedly rise during the next decade, if only because China and Russia will have increased

their capabilities to wage one ( Raphael. S, Cohen., et al, 2020 ).

Eventually, the formation of these four conflict paradigms will drive the USAF and

the joint force in divergent directions. The capabilities required for each of these conflicts

overlap in some circumstances, but not in others. All four engagements, for example, require

ISR, but the high-end and asymmetric fights may prioritize stealth and speed, whereas the

counterterrorism and gray-zone fights may necessitate slower, more-persistent platforms.

Similarly, while the asymmetric fight may value the ability to quickly locate and neutralize

adversaries' missile and WMD stockpiles, that capability may be destabilizing to overarching

strategic deterrence in a high-end fight where Russia and China are concerned about their

second-strike capabilities. In terms of training and posture, there are similar trade-offs.

Although the 2018 National Defense Strategy appears to prioritize preparation for a high-end

conflict with a large power, this does not mean that the other scenarios have vanished or are

becoming less plausible. Instead, this strategy represents deliberate decisions that current and

future defense officials will have to make ( Raphael. S, Cohen. et al., 2020 ).
 29

4. Means of the Future Wars of America

To ensure that the US military can prevent and, if necessary, battle and win against its

adversaries, new war fighting tactics and operational ideas must be developed. This section

will discuss the US military innovation to operate in new ways in specific areas and across

domains to better face the challenges of future war.

The US military must train its soldiers to operate in an environment where every

domain is disputed to effectively execute new operational concepts against its adversaries.

Against the aforementioned adversaries, the US may make use of emerging technology and

educate its military for high-end warfare ( Pettyjhon, S. & Dougherty. C. et al. ). NSAAs

formerly had little air power capabilities, but this has begun to change with the advent of

commercial drones. Terrorist organizations have boosted their use of commercial drones due

to their growing popularity, ease of procurement, and low cost. Numerous NSAAs and

terrorist associations employ drones today, at least to acquire data about their targets, from

Continental America to Asia. As a result, drones have emerged as a recent intelligence means

for these organisations to improve their capabilities. NSAAs, on the other hand, don't only

utilize drones for reconnaissance and surveillance. Some of these actors choose to employ

drones for assaults, which is a more advanced manner of using drones. Following the Arab

Spring, the number of different types of armed factions, as well as their ability to deploy

drones for varied reasons, has rapidly expanded throughout the Middle East (Yeşiltaş, M., and

Kardaş, T., 2018). This is a reflection of the NSAAs' and terrorist groups' methods of

imitating and adapting to new technology, as well as the rapidity with which they learn and

adapt ( Bryan. A, 2018 ). A variety of intelligent systems, working with variable and regulated

degrees of autonomy, will continue to grow, whether they are referred to as "robots" or

anything else. Intelligent systems, according to the workshop attendees, will be a pervasive

presence on the battlefield of 2050, fueled by continual breakthroughs in machine sensing and
 30

reasoning ( Scharre and Paul, 2018 ). Intelligent beings capable of sensing, interacting, and

coordinating will densely inhabit the battlespace, displaying a variety of complex skills.

Selectively gathering and processing information, acting as agents to promote sensemaking,

coordinating defensive measures, and releasing a range of impacts on the opponent will all be

part of these capabilities. Many of them will be equipped with organic sensors, allowing them

to act as sensing fields,' offering constant and comprehensive range of the battleground. Other

robots will serve as protective shields or intelligent weapons that will operate alone or in 'wolf

packs.' The latter, as well as any technologies capable of using force, will be controlled by

humans rather than being autonomous. This implies that in 2050, hypothetical fighters abide

by a restriction on "offensive automated weaponry beyond meaningful human control."

Numerous scientists, whose fears about a future AI weapons race the authors of this piece

fully share, have asked for such a prohibition in a recent open letter. Although the US

Department of Defense has already placed significant limits on autonomous and semi-

autonomous weapon systems, the stance of other technologically competent governments are

unknown. Robots will be valuable targets, and will provide a broad surface for the adversary's

attacks since they perform so many essential activities. In addition to being prone to physical

attack or capture, robots will be particularly vulnerable to many forms of attacks targeting

their information, information processing, and communications. As a result, computer and

network security will be a top priority in the design and operation of physical and cyber

robots, as well as the networks that support the human-robot teams that will populate the

battlefield in 2050. Moreover, in the future, there will be human warriors with superhuman

abilities. They will be well trained as if they are robots. As a result, human capacities will

need to be enhanced in order to effectively collaborate with robots and function in an

information-rich world. Seamless access to sensors and processing power will enable

augmented humans, continuing the trend toward more natural man-machine interaction.
 31

Although it may appear unlikely, one round of remarkable human enhancement has already

occurred: the ubiquitous smart phone, which has become nearly inseparable from our persona,

has dramatically increased humans' abilities to obtain, process, and communicate information

to levels unimaginable just 30 years ago. Warriors in 2050 are projected to be digital natives

who would have learned information survival skills as a result of need. Moreover, their

cognitive capacities will have been improved. They will also be aided by cyberbots that would

assist them in checking sources. They'd have better visualization and other human-machine

interactions as well. Exoskeletons may be used by 2050-era fighters to increase their physical

talents in addition to their superhuman cognitive abilities.

It will become increasingly impossible to hide one's troops from the opponent with so

many clever, sharp-eyed objects blanketing the battlefield and relaying their precise views.

Cloaking and uncloaking assets will be a major focus. Surviving and operating on the

battlefield of 2050 will need disinformation and deceit. The capacity to extract value from

information while stopping enemies from doing the same will become a critical feature in the

War of 2050, according to workshop attendees. This development is a direct effect of the

change from Industrial Age to Information Age Warfare, according to (Libicki. M., 1996).

Until recently, a soldier's only source of information was a few reliable and trustworthy

sources. Soldiers gained access to more information sources when information was detached

from the chain of command, but a new difficulty arose: judging the quality and

trustworthiness of the information ( Alberts, David S.,1996 ). While the War of 2050 will still

be controlled by humans, four innovations will have a huge impact on the war. The first of

them, according to Herr. A., (2015), will be a proliferation of intelligent systems. The second

category is that of enhanced people. The key struggle for the information realm is the third.

Finally, new, networked techniques for command and control are being introduced. Each of

these new powers has the same major vulnerability assaults on information, communications,
 32

and computers that will allow human-robot teams to understand the battlefield and respond

decisively. As a result, the mostly hidden war for information, communications, and computer

security will decide how well enemies can operate and succeed on the battlefield in 2050.

The modern weapons for future wars also include biological weapons. Biological wars

are defined as "wars involving the usage of biological weapons." ( Merriam. W., nd ). With

the advancement of technology, biological weapons, and later nuclear weapons, have evolved.

In reality, chemical substances were overused as offensive weapons throughout World War I.

During the iconic trench warfare confrontations between 1915 and 1918, these chemical

weapons included phosgene gas, chlorine gas, and mustard gas. Chemical weapons were

extremely effective, and their release during conflict had a significant impact, resulting in a

great number of deaths ( Biological Warfare, 2016 ). It is argued that COVID-19 virus is a

biological weapon. However, there is no evidence in the literature that says it actually is.

According to scientific research, the COVID-19 virus spread from animals to humans.

COVID-19 virus is 96 percent genetically matching to a corona virus formerly discovered in

bats ( Is COVID-19 a Biological Weapon? | FAQ, 2020 ). Researchers are seeking to find

even closer corona virus matches in animals to narrow down the trail of human infection.

Finally, some of the most important technologies for future warfare, notably in the

areas of cyber security and artificial intelligence, may not originate in the military industry.

Unlike prior military capabilities, which were largely developed by and for the Department of

Defense, commercial and academic sectors are driving some of the most important research in

these domains in the US. China and Russia, to a lesser extent, have spent major state

resources in these fields ( Elsa. K., 2017 ). Even if these technologies are created by US or

allied corporations and institutions, enemies may be able to purchase or steal the data ( Zach.

D., 2018 ). As a result, there's no assurance that the US government will have a monopoly on
 33

new technology or that the combined force would be able to sustain a qualitative advantage

over its rivals.

5. Trends of The future wars of America

Future wars, by definition, are the wars anticipated to be fought in the future. There

are a variety of variables that are predicted to shape the conduct of the American future

warfare. The before mentioned variables are said to be the trends of the future wars of

America. The later are geopolitical, military, space and nuclear, cyber, global economics, and

environmental trends. These trends will have a significant impact on the future of war in the

next years. The coming trends are analyzed by RAND in 2020.

5.1. Geopolitical Trends

The geopolitical factors defining the strategic environment, starting with those within

the world's last superpower, the United States, serve as the backdrop for the conflict analysis

in 2030. On a multitude of subjects, particularly foreign and defense policy, the American

people are becoming increasingly split, resulting in a political impasse in the United States.

From financing the defense budget to responding to international crises logically and

cohesively, the United States' ability to function effectively as a global superpower would be

hampered by this impasse. Moreover, because the military is one of the few government

institutions that Americans trust, politicians may increasingly turn to military solutions. These

political ills show no signs of abating, and they may potentially worsen in the coming years

( RAND, 2020). If the other five trends were not there, the absence of US leadership on the

international scene would not be as worrisome. First and foremost, China is growing. Xi

Jinping, China's president, recently lifted term limits and pledged "the great rejuvenation of

China," returning China to its "rightful place" on the world stage and correcting its "century of
 34

humiliation." Second, as China advances, other countries, particularly in Asia, are

contemplating whether to join or counter China's rise in response to their larger, more

powerful neighbor's expanding ambitions. Third, despite being a declining state, Russia is

becoming more assertive, interfering in Moldova, Georgia, Ukraine, and Syria to reinforce its

status as a great power. Fourth, with an immigration problem, the rise of right-wing populism,

and the lingering impacts of the Euro crisis, the European Union is becoming more divided,

less engaged in expeditionary operations, and more inward-looking. Finally, despite a

decades-long international counterterrorism campaign, Islamic jihadist terrorism, systemic

poor governance, economic issues, and growing tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia and

Iran and Israel, which are already shaping conflicts in Syria, Yemen, and elsewhere, continue

to plague the Middle East. None of these issues appear to be going away anytime soon, and

they will undoubtedly define the outlines of future war.

5.2. Military Trends

The military trends are parallel to the geopolitical ones in numerous ways. First,

conventional overmatch in the United States is decreasing. Despite the "reemergence of long-

term, strategic competition," the US military will likely stay a fraction of its size during the

Cold War. That was the last time of long-term, strategic competition, and it will lack the

technological advantage it had in the aftermath of the Persian Gulf War. Second, the Chinese

and, to a lesser extent, Russian forces are becoming fully capable, as both continue to

modernize and professionalize. In China’s case, especially, these military advancements

assumably will continue, closing the qualitative gap between the People’s Liberation Army

and the U.S. military. Third, second-tier countries like Iran and North Korea can't match the

US militarily, so they're increasingly relying on asymmetric capabilities like cyber, missiles,

and weapons of mass destruction to challenge the US's conventional advantage. Fourth, and

perhaps as critical as the changes in their capabilities, U.S. adversaries are shifting their
 35

tactics to operate in the gray zone, utilizing coercion to achieve national goals below the

threshold of war. The fifth trend, the weakening of the official monopoly on violence,

contributes to the success of gray-zone techniques. Non - states actors, or proxy forces in

gray-zone wars, can destabilize governments with growing ease thanks to advancements in

military and communications technology. Finally, new military technology, most notably

artificial intelligence (AI), is on the horizon, which could disrupt current military balances.

Taken together, these patterns suggest that "competitive military advantage has been fading,"

as the National Defense Strategy claims, and that if left ignored, U.S. enemies will be able to

exploit these flaws to their advantage.

5.3. Space and Nuclear Trends

Furthermore, to the general military balance, changes in the space and nuclear worlds

are worth noting, particularly given USAF holdings in both. The ability to exploit space-based

assets for intelligence, communication, and navigation has long been a cornerstone of the US

military's advantage, but two competing trends could threaten future US dominance in space.

First, as China and Russia enhance their abilities to deactivate and destroy satellites, space is

becoming a more competitive area. Second, commercial space exploration has grown in

recent years, and this trend is expected to continue until 2030. As more business entities

launch microsatellites for images and communications, the overall U.S. space infrastructure

may become more resilient, assuming the US can capitalize on these commercial investments.

Nuclear trends paint a more positive, albeit less optimistic, view of the future. Nuclear

proliferation has resurfaced as a global concern. Several second-tier powers, most notably

Iran and North Korea, have sought to develop nuclear weapons, and in spite of intensive

international diplomatic efforts to impede or change nuclear proliferation, it is unclear

whether either endeavor will succeed. Given the tense connections that both countries have

with their neighbors, nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea might lead to more
 36

regional nuclear proliferation, preventative conflict, and possibly limited nuclear war.

Simultaneously, nuclear arms command regimes seem to be disintegrating, placing Russia

and, to a lesser extent, China, in a position to use tactical nuclear weapons in the future.

5.4. Cyber Trends

Cyber operations will become increasingly important in combat as the world becomes

increasingly digital, notably in three areas. First, cyber domain control will become

increasingly crucial for domestic stability. China is undoubtedly the most extreme example

here, as it closely censors the content that its citizens can access and uses cyber-surveillance

to control behavior, but many states are concerned about foreign subversion using the cyber

domain. Second, as more data is digitized and stored in the cloud, espionage operations will

increasingly focus on the cyber realm. Finally, in 2030, cyber sabotage may become

increasingly crucial in combat.

The amount of discretion that troopers exert in battle is shaped by a variety of aspects,

namely: international regulation, public view, media coverage, technological capacities,

partner preferences, and functional imperatives. Considerable number of these variables will

be an important indicator how the United States and its allies fight wars in 2030. To begin

with, as smartphones and social media pervade the world, militaries will find it more difficult

to oversee what pictures the public sees and the narrative that surrounds procedures. Second,

Domestic belief in liberal democracies is highly sensitive to civilian casualties, particularly in

perceived wars of preference. By distinction, the most authoritarian antagonists of the United

States might not deem similarly restrained by their public, international opinion, or

international law. U.S. Adversaries are also increasingly specialists at manipulating

international regulation to capitalize on the U.S. and associated restraint ( RAND, 2020 ).

Known as lawfare, or "the strategy of using, or miss using, law as a replacement for

traditional military norms to conduct an operational purpose," adversaries including: Hamas

 37

in Gaza, China in the South China Sea, and Russia in Ukraine have depended on this plan to

overcome U.S. and allied replies and will likely do so highly in the future. At the same time,

the media in the United States have probably evolved to be more sensitive to disinformation

as a result of: the rising role of social media, rising the distribution of opinions over facts in

traditional media outlets, declining levels of trust in the government, and the rising impact of

explicitly partisan news sources. These advancements will provide adversaries with more

options to propagate disinformation and even deter military action by the US or allies.

Considered altogether, the United States may face a developing "restraint gap" in how the US

and its allies use force in conflicts and how their rivals do, particularly in lower-level

conflicts.

5.5. Global Economic Trends

The global economic trends will have a considerable, if indirect, impact on why and

how wars will be waged in 2030. Three global economic trends boost the possibilities of

future dispute. To begin with, more trade is usually associated with less war. Protectionism is

on the upswing, despite the fact that trade is far freer today than it was for much of the

postwar period. Governments globally carried implemented more than 15,000 trade-related

actions between November 2008 and early 2018, the majority of which were constraints, even

before the latest rounds of trade tariffs between the US and China. Second, China’s economic

industries are developing. Its Belt and Road Initiative spread across Eurasia to traditional U.S.

allies (like the United Kingdom, France, and Germany), and as Chinese economic interests

evolve, so will Chinese security interests. Finally, natural resource management and access

have long been viewed as a possible source of conflict. Additional resources, such as energy,

minerals, and resources for new technologies and industries, will be required in the future

global economy, which could raise the likelihood of war, particularly if states are incapable to

trade freely for these resources on the open market. In absolute terms, the United States and
 38

its allies are projected to remain the world's dominating economic force in 2030. Nonetheless,

as China grows, the United States and its allies will grow more slowly and hence account for

a lower part of global GDP (GDP). Consequently, the US will be less able to rely on its

enormous economic dominance in the second half of the twentieth century to supply it with a

numeric or even qualitative military benefit ( Lebow. R., 2012 ). Another trend, the

consolidation, and deterioration of both US and allied defense industrial bases, will worsen

this result. By 2030, with fewer production lines and fewer types of aircraft and other critical

equipment, the United States and its allies have fewer options for critical weapons systems

that may be needed in larger conflicts. Also the capability to increase production is lessened.

Finally, if other major economies develop alternative international payment methods in

response to abuse, and if coordination between allies becomes more difficult, and also if

China adopts its financial sector, it will be compulsory ( Lebow. R., 2012 ). The power of the

United States to use the preferred means of economic sanctions can diminish, much more

open than it is now. As sanctions become more and more ineffective, the United States may

have to resort to more dynamic forms of coercion.

5.6. Environmental Trends

The last trend that will also shape the future warfare is the environmental trend. The

effects of climate change will be felt primarily in the distant future after 2050, but some

effects may appear sooner. World temperatures can rise by 1 degree Fahrenheit in 2030

compared to the last few decades of the 20th century, impacting health, reducing economic

productivity, and bases in already hot regions of the world. It causes a lot of operational

problems on the aircraft you put on. Contribute to the Persian Gulf. Higher temperatures can

also cause many problematic secondary effects as well. They can exacerbate drinking water

shortages, especially in the Middle East, sub-Saharan Africa, and parts of Asia, including

areas already vulnerable to instability and territorial violence. As the polar ice melts, the
 39

Arctic Circle becomes easier to navigate and conflicts between rival powers (US, Russia,

China) are more likely to occur in the region ( RAND, 2020 ). At the same time, rising sea

levels create humanitarian challenges, change the geography of geopolitically sensitive areas

such as the South China Sea, and influence China's sovereignty claims. In addition to

increasing demand for disaster relief operations, extreme weather events have also spread to

lowland U.S. military bases, including bases in strategic areas already at risk of flooding, such

as the Marshall Islands, Guam, and Diego Garcia. Geography will shape disputes in different

manners. The world's population is becoming more and more urbanized ( RAND, 2020 ). In

2008, more than half of the world's population lived in cities for the first time, and the number

is increasing. By 2030, the number of megacities with a population of 10 million or more will

increase from 31 to 41. As the population becomes more urbanized, especially in developing

countries, states become more difficult to maintain law and order, and the military in general,

and the Air Force in particular faces more difficult challenges in distinguishing between

military and civilian targets.

 40

Chapter Three: Russian and Ukraine war

As mentioned in the previous chapters, the history of the American wars is congested.

Some of those wars are still happening while writing these words, and some have ended; yet,

they still have several impacts on America on different levels. The most famous and current

conflict in the world is Russia versus Ukraine. It is worth saying that the direct parties in this

war are Russia and Ukraine. However, there are a few indirect sides to the conflict namely-

the United States of America and the Europe Union. In this chapter we will explore the

Russian-Ukraine war as a case study. Further, we will discuss the reasons behind the Russian-

Ukraine war. Eventually, we will tackle the effects of that crisis on the world, particularly on

the USA.

1. Causes of Russia-Ukraine Conflict

Since 2019, President Volodymyr Zelensky along with his employers of the People

party have ruled Ukraine. Ukraine has executed significant economic and governance

improvements, albeit with some antagonism and indecisiveness, and coped with the economic
 41

and social effects of the Coronavirus condition 2019 (COVID-19) epidemic during Zelensky's

administration ( Welt. C , 2021, p. 1). Welt further added that Ukraine has also faced Russia's

continued annexation of Ukraine's Crimea area and sections of eastern Ukraine under

President Zelensky's leadership. Zelensky has attempted to re-energize the dispute resolution

procedure in Russia-controlled eastern Ukraine; and also bring the situation in Ukraine's

annexed Crimea peninsula to the attention of the international community. Alternately,

Russia does not appear to be any closer to enacting a durable cease-fire or withdrawing its

military forces from Ukraine.

Russia’s invasion of Ukraine is the biggest military mobilization in Europe since

World War II. On Thursday morning, the Russian Defense Ministry declared that it had taken

on Ukraine’s air defenses and its Air Force with a sequence of exactitude attacks after airports

and runways across the country were rocked by explosions ( Krishna . N, 2022). On President

Vladimir Putin's instructions, Russian armed troops initiated the much-hyped attack against

Ukraine on Thursday morning, with the stated goal of demilitarizing and "de-Nazifying"

Ukraine. Moreover, the Russian leader asserted that the military movement was essential to

prevent Ukrainian aggression on both breakaway regions of Donetsk and Lugansk, which

Moscow admitted as sovereign states. President Vladimir Putin had declared that Russia could

come under aggression by the Ukrainian far-right government unless their power in the

country is diminished. He accused Western Nations of arming Kyiv against Russia.

Many analysts believe that of all the post-Soviet governments, Russia's acceptance of

Ukraine's liberation has been the most challenging. Many Russians have long believed much

of Ukraine to be a historical Russian territory, and Ukrainians to be ethnic cousins ( Welit . c,

2021, p. 14). Russian President Vladimir Putin wrote an essay in July 2021, elaborating on

previous statements about Ukraine's connections to Russia and asserting that Russians and

Ukrainians are united people ( Putin . V, 2021). In the same year, Welit further added that the
 42

majority of Ukrainians can communicate in Russian, whether as a first or second language. In

Ukraine's most recent national census (2001), 17% of the people were classified as ethnic

Russians, with the majority of ethnic Russians located in the south (Crimea) and east, where

relations with Russia are more solid than the remainder of the nation. Eastern Ukraine was

home to a large industrial and defense production sector during the Soviet era, and it

maintained tight economic relations with Russia following independence. Disputes over

Ukraine's links to NATO and the EU, the status of Russia's Crimea-based Black Sea Fleet,

and the transit of Russian natural gas through Ukraine to Europe plagued the Russia-Ukraine

relationship before 2014. By the end of 2013, ex-President Yanukovych appeared to have

made a strong turn toward Russia, deferring an association agreement with the EU to establish

tighter political and economic connections with the EU in favor of substantial financial aid

from Moscow. This determination sparkled the Euromaidan demonstrations, which eventually

resulted in Yanukovych's depositionAfter several years of economic drudgery and interior

battle following the collapse of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) in the early

1990s, President Vladimir Putin's leadership confirmed that Russia is currently considered an

energy giant, becoming the world's third-largest producer of oil and the second-biggest

producer of natural gas. Russia is said to have amassed $630 billion in foreign exchange

reserves because to energy revenues. Russia, for example, balanced its budget in 2021 with a

very low oil price of $45 per barrel, compared to an average of roughly $70 per barrel

( Krishna . G, 2022).

In terms of energy security, Unlike his predecessors, who avoided shutting down oil

exports, President Vladimir Putin cleverly combined economic and geopolitical goals. In the

earlier 2000s, Ukraine, for example, received the same substantially subsidized gas exports

from Russia as it had a decade earlier when it was a member of the Soviet Union. However,

when the "Orange Revolution" near the end of 2004 resulted in the ousting of a pro-Russian
 43

government and the replacement of him with one who persued stronger connections with the

West, Gazprom, the Russian gas giant, requested that Ukraine pay full market rates for its gas.

In addition, Moscow regards the areas it controls in eastern Ukraine as Ukrainian territory, in

contrast to its position regarding Crimea. Despite Russia's denials of military involvement in

eastern Ukraine, US officials have stated that "Russia has 100 percent command and control

of what is happening there—military forces, political entities, and direct economic activities."

Nearly 3,000 Russian military forces, largely in command and control posts, were fighting in

eastern Ukraine, according to Ukrainian officials, with a total number of Russia-led militants

estimated at over 35,000. More than 525,000 people of Russia-controlled territories of eastern

Ukraine have been granted citizenship, according to Russian officials ( Sopova. A & Taylor.

A, 2021). Residents were able to cross the nearly 300-mile-long "contact line" that divides the

government- and Russia-controlled territories of Donetsk and Luhansk until the outbreak of

the COVID-19 pandemic. In 2019, five official crossing stations saw an average of around 1.2

million total crossings per month (expanded to seven in November 2020). Crossing points

were temporarily closed due to the epidemic. Authorities in Russia-controlled territories set

fresh restrictions after the border points reopened, limiting overall crossings to under 100,000

per month. President Zelensky advocated for a reassessment of the Minsk process and an

expansion of the Normandy Format to include the United States and others after Russia's

spring 2021 military buildup around the Ukrainian border and in Crimea.

Ukrainian officials have emphasized the importance of a permanent cease-fire and the

removal of Russian official and unofficial forces, both as a matter of principle and as a

precondition for holding free and fair municipal elections in Russia-controlled eastern

Ukraine ( Ben. H, 2021). President Zelensky advocated for a reassessment of the Minsk

process and an expansion of the Normandy Format to include the United States and others

after Russia's spring 2021 military buildup around the Ukrainian border and in Crimea.
 44

Ukrainian officials have emphasized the importance of a permanent cease-fire and the

removal of Russian official and unofficial forces, both as a matter of principle and as a

precondition for holding free and fair municipal elections in Russia-controlled eastern

Ukraine ( Welt. C, 2021. p 19).

2. Effects of Russia-Ukraine Conflict

In recent months, both print and electronic media outlets around the world have begun

to speculate on the possibility of Russian aggression in Ukraine. The United States (US) also

began to signal that a Russian invasion of Ukraine was coming. As a result, US President Joe

Biden's administration began to assert that the threat of "serious economic consequences"

would dissuade Russia from invading Ukraine.

On February 7, 2022, during President Biden's meeting with German Chancellor

Angela Merkel, the US and its allies were observed emphasizing their unity on the

consequences of a Russian invasion of Ukraine. However, there was a fear that the European

Union's (EU) anti-US/UK internal politics, as well as its symbiotic connection with Russia,

would undermine this declared solidarity. Several Central European countries, including

Germany, who are heavily reliant on Russia for cheap energy and, as a result, competitive

industrial exports, may be hesitant to support US sanctions against Russia, albeit quietly.

While Russia is reliant on revenue from Europe, Europe is reliant on Russian energy supplies.

In general, Russia supplied around a third of Europe's natural gas, which is used in the winter

for heating, electricity generation, and industrial output. In addition, Russia supplies more

than a quarter of the EU's crude oil imports. As a result, Russia had emerged as the bloc's

greatest single supply of energy. Because of this interdependence, implementing tighter

sanctions on Russia will have a significant impact on its energy supplies, putting dependent

European countries at risk. Few EU countries are more reliant than others. While Portugal and
 45

Spain consume little Russian energy, Germany, Europe's largest economy, imports more than

half of its natural gas and over a third of its crude oil. The majority of France's electricity

comes from nuclear power, although it relies on Russian imports for its fossil fuel needs.

Furthermore, Germany's and other nations' plans to phase out nuclear and coal power in the

future would have simply exacerbated their energy reliance on Russia.

Looking back, it is clear that such a reliance on Russian energy did not develop

suddenly. The US has long been concerned about Russia's readiness to use commerce to bind

the hands of other countries, a concern that dates back to the Cold War's early days.

Following WWII, both the USSR and the US began to clash in an attempt to expand

their control by influencing and enlisting countries who were not technically allied with either

superpower. The Soviet Union began to offer favorable trade treaties and other economic

support to countries outside of the Warsaw Pact, such as Finland, the United Arab Republic,

and India, in a way that established long-term reliance on the Soviet Union. As the Soviet

Union began to build oil and gas pipelines to Europe, the United States became increasingly

concerned about the region's rising energy dependence on it.

In the 1960s, Western Europe only purchased 6% of its oil from the Soviet Union. The

proposed planned oil pipeline connecting Russia's far east with several European countries,

including Ukraine and Poland, before finishing in Germany, was expected to significantly

enhance supplies. The Soviet Union was to gain enormous coercive power as a result of this

increased dependence. As a result, these shifting dynamics sparked strategic worries in

Washington and sounded the alarm. The Kennedy administration attempted to halt the

development of the Druzhba, or "Friendship," Oil Pipeline in 1963 by placing a wide-

diameter pipe embargo on Soviet-aligned countries. Because the embargo was insufficient to

halt the project, the US pressed its allies, particularly West Germany, a major pipe exporter, to
 46

join forces. Despite Britain's refusal to follow the US line, West Germany reluctantly

consented, ensuring a partial NATO embargo. Regardless of this partial restriction, the

pipeline was finally built one year later.

After nearly two decades, the Reagan administration was confronted with a similar

predicament. When the Soviet Union began construction of a natural gas pipeline from

Siberia to Western Europe in 1981, the US attempted to persuade European allies such as

France and Germany to join its embargo by not only providing pipeline technology but also

finance for the project. However, when all of these countries refused to comply with US

demands, the US retaliated with penalties in order to deter European corporations from

contributing funds or equipment to the project. However, the United States' arbitrary

intervention damaged relations among Western nations, spreading seeds of discord between

the United States and Europe. However, the United States' arbitrary intervention damaged

relations among Western nations, spreading seeds of discord between the United States and

Europe. This forced the US to back down and repeal the sanctions just a few months after

they were imposed. Three years later, in 1984, the pipeline was finally built.

The Nord Stream pipeline, which was completed in 2011, not only cost Ukraine $720

million per year in transit fees, but also increased Germany's reliance on Russia for energy

supply. By 2020, Russia will have supplied Germany with around 75% of its natural gas, up

from 35% in 2015. Natural gas is widely used in Germany to fuel the country's power plants,

meet heating needs, and create electricity for widespread consumption. The Nord Stream

pipeline transports natural gas from northwest Russia to Germany via the Baltic Sea,

accounting for one-third of all Russian gas exports to Europe.

The German government approved Nord Stream 2, an enlargement of the existing

Nord Stream pipeline, in 2018, and work was finished in September 2021. Its launch,
 47

however, was hampered by regulatory delays caused by US pressure on European politicians.

Once operational, Nord Stream 2 would have allowed Russia to sell more natural gas to

Germany while bypassing Ukraine and other countries where the pipelines now traverse. This

has heightened US concerns, as Russia's energy exports may no longer be held captive by pro-

Western countries such as Poland and Ukraine in Eastern Europe.

When Russia stopped selling extra gas as it had in the past in December 2021, shortly

after the current situation in Ukraine began, Europe once again tasted the potential

consequences. The International Energy Agency was quick to accuse Russia of attempting to

disrupt European energy security the next month. The primary concern of both transit

countries when Nord Stream 2 became operational was that it would divest them of billions of

dollars in annual transit expenses, leading to significant income losses. It's worth noting that

the total demand for natural gas in the EU's twenty-seven countries peaked at 390 billion

cubic meters in 2019. (bcm). Russian gas shipments to these twenty-seven EU nations peaked

at 168 bcm in the same year, accounting for 43 % of the whole EU natural gas use. However,

demand is improbable to get that level again due to the EU's robust climate legislation.

Russian natural gas shipments to the EU are expected to reach 135 billion cubic meters in

2021. With the completion of Nord Stream 2, it was predicted that roughly 110 bcm, or 81

percent, of the annual Russian gas supply of 135 bcm would have passed through both Nord

Stream pipelines.

As a result, the Nord Stream2 pipeline's operationalization would have been disastrous

for Ukraine. To conclude, Nord Stream 2 is regarded as Russia's most audacious attempt to

dismantle the European Union. Russia has long sought to build an alliance with Germany and

Austria, as well as the Netherlands and Belgium, to counter Eastern and Northern Europe.
 48

In October 2015, Germany's Economy and Energy Minister stated unequivocally that

the Nord Stream 2 project was in their interest and that they would pursue it to completion.

This alleged remark, made just weeks after Nord Stream 2 was announced in mid-2015, left

no question that Germany viewed it as a geopolitical enterprise. Every year, Germany might

earn $2 billion in transportation fees. Russia negotiated energy deals with Hungary in January

of this year, right at the heart of the crisis, to further encourage Germany and Austria with

lucrative prospective transit fees that could come from such an agreement between Russia and

Hungary. With the completion of Nord Stream 2 in September 2021, the US understood it

only had a short window of opportunity before the pipeline became operational and the EU's

energy markets were entirely dominated by Russian influence. In order to achieve over 80%

of its European energy supply requirements, Russia would no longer require Ukrainian transit

pipelines. As a result, America would lose a trump card it had had since 2014, when the

Obama administration engineered a coup d'état in Kyiv and established a pro-Western far-

right militia-run state in an election that was utterly illegitimate.

Nord Stream 2 opponents in EU politics have claimed that Moscow will use the

pipeline to arm-twist Europe to achieve Russian geopolitical ambitions. They voiced worry

that the project had not been geopolitically ring-fenced by Germany and Russian partners. As

a result, if the US or its artificially placed administration in Kyiv made any major moves

against Russia, Moscow would be caught and unable to cut off EU gas shipments, as this

would give anti-Russia lawmakers in the EU a pretext to scrap the Nord Stream 2 project

entirely. As a result, Russia has little influence in this scenario, despite the fact that it sorely

needs the Nord Stream 2 pipeline to be constructed.

In the case of Crimea, US authorities have raised concerns about Russia's human

rights violations in the annexed territory. "A savage movement of repression against Crimean

Tatars, racial Ukrainians, and other members of juvenility ethnic and religious parties in
 49

Crimea," according to the report of U.S Department of State, 2021. Officials from the United

States have chastised Russia for failing to meet its obligations under the Minsk agreements

and have condemned Russia's aggressive activities in and around Ukraine. President Biden

talked with Russian President Vladimir Putin in April 2021 to "express concerns over Russia's

unexpected military build-up in annexed Crimea and on Ukraine's borders, and appealed on

Russia to de-escalate tensions " (From the White House.) Furthermore, the State Department

urged Russia to "stop harassing vessels" in the Black Sea region ( U.S. Department of State,

2021). The U S stands by Ukraine in the face of Russian efforts to restrict Ukraine's role as a

natural gas transit state ( Belkin. et al). According to the CRIEEA, the United States' objective

is to "oppose the Nord Stream 2 project due to its negative consequences on the EU's energy

security, gas market development in Central and Eastern Europe, and energy reforms in

Ukraine." The Trump Administration levied penalties on a Russian-related corporation and a

pipe laying vessel on President Trump's final full day in office for their roles in the building

of Nord Stream 2. A second set of sanctions was imposed by the Biden Administration on that

entity and vessel, as well as 21 other entities and vessels. The Biden Administration appears

to have switched its focus away from preventing the Nord Stream 2 pipeline from being

completed and toward managing the potential negative consequences of a functioning

pipeline. This includes, among other things, making a joint statement in July 2021 in which

the US and Germany commit to bolstering Ukraine's energy security and supporting sanctions

in reaction to additional Russian aggression toward Ukraine. Amos Hochstein was named

Senior Advisor for Energy Security by Secretary of State Antony Blinken in August 2021,

with a focus on the "implementation of measures to limit the risks posed by the Nord Stream

2 pipeline" ( U.S. Department of State, 2021). According to the Biden Administration, the US

is a "full partner" in Ukraine's domestic reform initiatives ( U.S. Department of State, 2021).

When Secretary Blinken visited Kyiv in May 2021, he said Ukraine "faces twin challenges:
 50

external aggression from Russia, and internal aggression from corruption, oligarchs, and

others who are placing their interests ahead of that of the Ukrainian people." ( Department of

State, U S A, 2021). "Building institutions with integrity and guaranteeing accountable

governance in both governmental institutions and the corporate sector is the key to Ukraine

attaining its Euro-Atlantic objectives and constructing a prosperous, safe, and democratic

future," according to the State Department. The same source added that following Russia's

invasion of Ukraine, the US began providing Ukraine with increased amounts of annual aid

across numerous accounts. State Department and USAID bilateral aid allocations to Ukraine

(including foreign military finance, or FMF) averaged $418 million per year from 2015 to

2020. The State Department and USAID allocated around $464 million to Ukraine in 2021,

including $115 million in FMF. The President's State/USAID request for Ukraine in 2022 is

approximately $459 million.

The US favors domestic reforms in Ukraine. According to the US Department of

State, the Yanukovych regime was attacked by US officials during the Obama administration

for crushing the Euromaidan protesters. Before Yanukovych fled to Russia in 2014, US

authorities backed a negotiated solution to Ukraine's domestic problems and the formation of

an interim administration ( 2014). The Obama Administration supported a wide range of

governance and economic changes in Ukraine under Poroshenko's presidency, including the

development of new anti-corruption institutions. In 2015, then-Vice President Joe Biden

reportedly advised Ukrainian officials that if Ukraine's prosecutor general did not resign, the

US would withhold a $1 billion loan guarantee (the third since 2014). Officials from the

United States and Europe have chastised the prosecutor general's office for obstructing

corruption probes( James. R. 2015). Officials from the Trump administration have also

indicated their support for Ukraine's domestic changes. "It serves no use for Ukraine to fight

for its body in Donbas if it loses its soul to corruption," then-Secretary of State Rex Tillerson
 51

stated in 2017. Institutions dedicated to combating corruption must be encouraged, resourced,

and protected." In 2019, then-US Ambassador to Ukraine Marie Yovanovitch asked for the

change of Ukraine's anti-corruption prosecutor "to preserve the integrity of anti-corruption

institutions," according to the US Department of State. According to the Biden

Administration, the US is a "full partner" in Ukraine's domestic reform initiatives ( 2021).

When Secretary Blinken visited Kyiv in May 2021, he said Ukraine "faces twin challenges:

external aggression from Russia, and internal aggression from corruption, oligarchs, and

others who are placing their interests ahead of that of the Ukrainian people." "Constructing

institutions with integrity and guaranteeing accountable governance in both governmental

institutions and the private sector is the key to Ukraine attaining its Euro-Atlantic objectives

and building a prosperous, safe, and democratic future," according to the State Department.

(2021).

Ukraine has considerable energy resources, but due to low domestic energy prices,

subsidies, high consumption, and corruption, the sector has historically performed below its

capacity ( Anders. A, 2016). According to an article in the Review of World Energy,

Ukraine's major energy mix consists of around 32% natural gas, 30% coal, and 21% nuclear.

Ukraine produces almost two-thirds of the country's total energy, including two-thirds of its

natural gas and 55% of its coal (2021). Before Russia's incursion in 2014, Ukraine relied on

Russian imports for more than half of its total natural gas consumption ( Cedigaz). According

to observers, Russia has historically used gas price rises, debt repayments, and cutoffs as

leverage in its disagreements with previous Ukrainian governments ( Jonathan. S, 2006). Due

to decreasing industrial production, the halting of gas supplies to Russia-controlled areas of

eastern Ukraine, and increased pricing, Ukraine's gas usage and, as a result, dependency on

Russian gas decreased after Russia's invasion. Ukraine completely stopped importing direct

gas from Russia in 2016, replacing it with supplies from Slovakia, Poland, and Hungary (all
 52

of which import gas from Russia). After Russia’s invasion of Ukraine, the Ukrainian

government began to reform its energy sector, including raising tariffs for households (while

retaining subsidies for lower-income consumers). Following Russia's invasion of Ukraine, the

Ukrainian government began reforming its energy industry, including hiking household tariffs

(while retaining subsidies for lower-income consumers). Strengthening the energy regulator's

independence, promoting competition and transparency in the power sector, and facilitating

private investment in oil and natural gas production are all ongoing priorities ( Council of UE,

2020; Todd. P, 2019; and Ihor. O, 2020). In 2019, the government delivered on a long-

standing promise to split Ukraine's state-owned energy corporation, Naftogaz, into production

and transmission businesses ( Alexender. Q, 2020).

A number of members of Congress have asked the administration to implement

penalties to prevent the pipeline from being put into service. The EU, like the US, has placed

sanctions ("restrictive measures") on Russia as a result of its invasion of Ukraine. Sanctions

enforced by the EU are comparable to, but not identical to, those imposed by the United

States. Most EU sanctions are in place for a set amount of time (typically six months or a

year) to encourage reform and allow the EU to alter the sanctions as needed. To extend the

EU sanctions, all EU member states must agree. In response to Russia's invasion of Ukraine,

Ukraine and other nations such as Australia, Canada, Japan, Norway, and Switzerland have

imposed sanctions on the Russian government ( Welt. C, 2021).

 53

Conclusion

There are apparent dangerous areas all around the world now that have the potential to

ignite into catastrophic wars at any point in the near or distant future. This research looks at

what history has to say about the future possibilities and features of war, as well as the role

that conflict analysis should play in shaping American strategy in the coming decades.

History claimed that armed conflict between organized political organizations has always

been a part of humanity's history and that America must remain prepared to employ military

force to deal with an unpredictable, uncertain, and divided globe.

Although many characteristics of human conflict will not alter regardless of

technological or computer improvements, the nature of war is evolving at an increasingly fast

rate. The latter is accomplished by technical advancements that supply new and more

complicated weaponry, manufacturing methods, communications, sensors, and a plethora of

other technologies, all of which are capable of altering the combat space's nature in

unforeseen ways. Understanding many of the options that lie ahead, as well as assessing the
 54

history of American policy and military performance in the future, requires talking about

previous battles. It also cautions that the moral and human consequences of American

politicians and military leaders' inability to comprehend the implications of the past are now

visible, and that future conflicts are almost certain.

After dealing with the future wars of America from different angles, in the three

chapters, this dissertation demonstrates the distinguished motives leading the US to fight

wars in the future . Also, the several trends discussed in the dissertation show that the US will

always be a strong country. The analysis of the means and tools used in the American wars

are developed, powerful, updated, and mainly dangerous. The study establishes that the new

war, which is all over the media, between Russia and Ukraine has the US as an indirect

reason. This war affected the globe, and caused many losses on the allies of Ukraine,

including US. The US is also expected to be in war with Russia and China. US, Russia, and

China are the most powerful countries in the world, therefore the war is predicted to be an

economic, biological, and technological war; rather than a military one.

 55

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