Democracy and Security

ISSN: 1741-9166 (Print) 1555-5860 (Online) Journal homepage: http://www.tandfonline.com/loi/fdas20

The İsmailağa community and its relationship with

the AK party

Efrat Aviv

To cite this article: Efrat Aviv (2018): The İsmailağa community and its relationship with the AK
party, Democracy and Security, DOI: 10.1080/17419166.2018.1428897

To link to this article: https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2018.1428897

Published online: 27 Feb 2018.

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DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY
https://doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2018.1428897

The İsmailağa community and its relationship with the

AK party
Efrat Aviv
Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat Gan, Israel

ABSTRACT KEYWORDS
This article aims to demonstrate the importance of the rela- Naqshbandiyya; AK party;
Ismailağa; Mahmut Efendi;
tionship between the Naqshbandi Ismailağa community and Erdoğan
the AK Party (Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi, “Justice and
Development Party”) government. As one of the most wide-
spread Sufi brotherhoods in the world, the strength of the
Naqshbandiyya lies in its characteristic combination of strict
adherence to religious law and active involvement in social
and political affairs. The İsmailağa community, one of five main
Naqshbandi communities in Turkey, is highly conservative and
traditional, historically dominated by elders who have
remained aloof from any power struggles within the Turkish
government. While the AK Party has developed ties with reli-
gious orders in recent years, including the Ismailağa, some
voices within the Ismailağa community have become critical
of this relationship, leading to a rift within the community. In
addition, since 2013, and especially after the attempted coup
of July 2016, the AK Party has lost the support of its old ally,
the Fethullah Gülen movement. This article examines the rela-
tionship between the AK Party and religious movements in
Turkey as reflected via its relationship with Ismailağa, and
assesses whether the Fethullah Gülen movement can be
replaced as a party ally by the Ismailağa community.

Introduction
The Naqshbandiyya1 is a Sunni Sufi order2 that emphasizes the practice of
“zikr” (recitation of the attributes of Allah). It acquired its institutional
configuration under the influence of Bahauddin Naqshband (1318–89).
Naqshbandi seek to reach Allah through supererogatory acts of prayer (nafile
namaz) and zikr. Zikr is performed openly (celi) or covertly (hafi) by silently
reciting Allah’s names. The spiritual teacher (mürşid) determines a disciple’s
(mürid) level of spiritual maturity, and prescribes the type and amount of
zikr to be recited. The order originated in the regions of Khorasan and
Transoxania in Central Asia, and Sheikh Abdullah-ı Simavi (also known as
Şeyh İlahi) (1430–90) introduced it to the Ottoman lands. From the twen-
tieth century onward, Naqshbandi orders have developed a variety of

CONTACT Efrat Aviv efrat.aviv@biu.ac.il Department of Middle Eastern Studies, Bar Ilan University, Ramat
Gan, Israel 5290002.
© 2018 Taylor & Francis Group, LLC
2 E. AVIV

strategies for coping with the challenges of modernity and post-modernity,

including modifications to the brotherhood’s modes of operation and general
commitment to orthodoxy—for example, the zikr was turned into a religious
lesson.3
Turkey remained a major arena of Naqshbandi and Naqshbandi-inspired
activity despite the ban on Sufi orders by the secularizing Atatürk regime in
1925, which led Naqshbandi masters to go underground or into exile. During
the first decades of the Turkish republican era, Islamic thought faced new
conditions that included the deracination of much of its old legacy. In
response, the İsmailağa community began to close itself off, in contrast to
other Naqshbandi communities (such as İskenderpaşa) who sought to adapt
to the modern processes Turkey was undergoing.4 As part of this moderniza-
tion of Islamic thought in Turkey during this period, the authority of the Sufi
lodge and the Sufi religious masters was replaced to a large extent by the
authority of the text. The shift to texts and to modern forms of education, as
well as to modern organizational structures, marked the rise of rationalism in
Turkish Islamic faith, and in turn, led to a resurgence of Islam in the country
in the second half of the twentieth century.5
The Demokrat Parti (Democrat Party), which came to power in 1950, was
conservative, center-right, and economically oriented to Western capitalism,
and was also more supportive of religious freedoms than its predecessors.
During the 1960s, various religious orders contributed to the Islamic renais-
sance in Turkey, after becoming involved in political activities and setting up
newspapers and other media outlets. The most active among them was the
Naqshbandi, which was the largest movement until the 1990s.6 In the ensu-
ing decades, particularly following economic and social liberalization during
the 1980s and the subsequent emergence and growth of Turkish civil society,
Islamic movements became more active in social, political, and economic
spheres. In addition, the state eased religious restrictions and even encour-
aged religious groups during the 1970s and 1980s, as part of its attempts to
counter radical leftist and communist elements in the country. Throughout
this process, there was a shift of power within the Islamic movements in
favor of traditional Sufi orders,7 in particular, the Naqshbandiyya. Various
Naqshbandi groups transformed themselves from purely religious networks
into informal educational and cultural associations. This included the aban-
donment of the lodges, and taking up positions as imams in mosques. Thus,
the Naqshbandiyya reinforced its position as the most popular brotherhood
in Turkey, and gained increasing influence in the political arena. It can now
be seen to have a special place in the evolution of Islam in Turkey, to the
extent that all the successful elements of modern Turkish Islamic politics,
ranging from political parties to intellectuals and the Anatolian bourgeoisie,
either originated from it or were influenced by its teachings.8
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 3

Two events that deeply affected the political-religious spectrum in Turkey,

and that played a major role in shaping the Naqshbandi İsmailağa commu-
nity, were the 1997 coup and the victory of the AK Party in the 2002
elections. Following the coup of February 28, 1997, the government cut all
funding to nongovernmental religious communities and brotherhoods. As a
result, the communities’ religious schools that were not under the super-
vision of the Diyanet (the Religious Affairs Ministry), and in which children
under the age of twelve were being taught against Turkish state regulations,
were closed down.9 Meanwhile, since its 2002 victory, the AK party has
actively sought the integration of Islamic political and social actors in the
secular state. While it may not yet have put an end to the secular model of
the Turkish republic, it has made the elimination of state control over Islam
and the separation of state and religion its primary political goal.10
The İsmailağa community is one of five main Naqshbandi groups in
Turkey, and is named after the İsmailağa Mosque, built in 1723 by
Ebuishak İsmail Efendi, who served in the Naqshbandi order after being
dismissed from his position as Seyhülislam. Based on its Naqshbandi ideol-
ogy, the İsmailağa community opposes the West and strictly follows the
writings of Sayyid Qutb (1906–66), an Egyptian author and Islamic theorist
who was a leading member of the Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood in the 1950s
and 1960s, even though the Brotherhood was broadly opposed to mysticism.
The community is also highly influenced by Necip Fazıl Kısakürek’s Islamist-
nationalist, anti-communist, and anti-Western viewpoint.11 Yet the
Naqshbandi order in Turkey, which is one of the most deeply rooted orders
in Turkey and which has always been very involved in politics, does not view
the Turkish secular state as an enemy, and thus has not produced any
antagonism toward it. In this context, the İsmailağa community seeks to
synthesize Islam, Turkish nationalism, and Ottoman heritage in order to
establish a strong new ruling elite in Turkey, based on Muslim moral values.-
12
This may be one of the reasons why the İsmailağa support the AK Party
government.

The community
The İsmailağa is one of the most widespread communities representing the
Naqshbandi tradition in Turkey, with well over one hundred thousand
members and supporters. According to Milliyet, of some 4.5 million people
affiliated with the various Naqshbandi communities in Turkey, as many as
7.2 percent are attached to the İsmailağa community.13 Despite these num-
bers, the community is closed and prefers living in isolated neighborhoods or
in small towns or villages where it can keep an eye on its limited territory.
Consequently, it is also known as “Çarşamba Cemaati,” referring to its main
and sacred Çarşamba neighborhood in the Fatih district of Istanbul, where
4 E. AVIV

the community prides itself on living in ascetic conditions in an “Islamic

ghetto.”14 According to the Naqshbandi concept of isolation, spirituality is
not confined to place and time, and isolation does not necessarily mean the
social and material isolation of an individual from society, only that close
contact between the adherents themselves is preferable. In cities, however,
social isolation is recommended because living in such big places encourages
non-involvement with the community’s inner principles and weakens the
society’s control over the lives of the community’s members. By withdrawing
from the urban milieu, members become more conscious regarding their sins
as they witness the danger of a free life.
At the same time, the Islamic sciences (ulum) are more prevalent in
the city than in a village.15 İsmailağa community members take their
affiliation with Sunni Islam so seriously, they call themselves “ehli
Sünnet ve cemaat” (people of tradition and community), and members
address each other as “ihvan” or “ihvan kardeşimiz” (our brothers).
While the community is sponsored by the İsmailağa foundation
(İsmailağa Vakfı), it also receives financial support from associations
close to the AK Party, such as Knowledge and Wisdom House (Bilgi
ve Hikmet Evi), Science and Service Association (İlim Ve Hizmet Vakfı),
and the Association for Scientific Research and Culture (İlim Araştırma
ve Kültur Derneği).16
Although the İsmailağa community’s existence is directly dependent on
sharing its activities and influence with an increasing number of disciples,
many Muslims do not find it attractive. It does not follow the intellectual
religious development that has taken place in Turkey in recent years, and
those seeking to be religious can now find a place in much “softer” religious
paradigms and communities.17 Among the well-known Turks who do find
the community attractive, Aykut Demir, a Trabzonspor football player, was
reported to have entered the community and to wear traditional garments
like every other member of the community.18 Another famous Turk who
seems fond of the community is the actor Celal Al, who was reported to have
visited and kissed the hand of its spiritual leader Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu
during a visit, in order to ask for his blessing.19
Known for producing books for teaching elements of religion (İlmihal),
the community conducts intensive and continuous training that requires the
complete devotion of its adherents.20 The members call themselves the
advocates of the Age of Bliss (Asr-i Saadet) and believe in reviving the
lifestyle, traditional dress, and practices of the mythical age of the Prophet
Muhammad and the first caliphs. Men wear a shalwar and turban cloth, keep
their beards, and shave their hair: women wear a niqab.21 This might be one
of the reasons the İsmailağa community is rapidly taking on a folkloristic
character in Turkey, as Ruşen Çakır points out.22
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 5

The leader: Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu

In the Naqshbandi tradition, the sheikh is considered the disciple’s perfect
guide to the World of Reality (alam al-Haqiqa). The disciple should show
self-renunciation and should have full respect and loyalty for his sheikh and
express complete obedience and loyalty to that sheikh alone.23 Thus the
İsmailağa community is known as the Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu community,
referring to its leader.24
Born in 1931 in Of, Çaykara, Trabzon, Ustaosmanoğlu became a hafiz (some-
one who has memorized the entire Quran) under his father by the age of ten and
continued his madrasa education, gaining his ijazah (from icazet—“permis-
sion”—whose technical meaning is permission to narrate) by the age of sixteen.
He became competent in Quranic exegesis, hadith, Islamic jurisprudence, kelam
(theology), and Islamic mysticism (Tasawwuf). Once he completed his military
service, he started living as a practicing Sufi,25 married his cousin, and started his
work as an imam. In 1952, Ustaosmanoğlu met Ahıskalı Ali Haydar Efendi
(Gürbüzler), a Naqshbandi sheikh who became his master and who appointed
Ustaosmanoğlu the imam of the İsmailağa Mosque in 1954. Subsequently,
Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu served in the Gümüşhaneli Mosque “as a tribute”26
to the leader of the most powerful Turkish Islamic group, Naqshbandi Sufi leader
Mehmet Zahit Kotku (1897–1980), who was the imam of the Fatih İskenderpaşa
and the most influential Naqshbandi sheikh, and who oversaw the
Naqshbandiyya’s advancement and expansion during the 1960s.27 Kotku, the
first personality to be trained in a nonreligious school in his youth, emphasized
the priority of knowledge and turned the mosque into an “open university” that
attracted students from all over Turkey.28 Ustaosmanoğlu’s life took its greatest
turn in 1960, when he became the leader of the İsmailağa community upon the
death of Ahıskalı Ali Haydar Efendi. In 1972 Ustaosmanoğlu separated from the
İskenderpaşa community led by Kotku and gradually established his own
Naqshbandi community,29 although some sources still debate the legitimacy of
this succession.30 After Mehmet Zahit Kotku’s death in 1980, his son-in-law, Esat
Coşan (1938–2001), became the new leader of the İskenderpaşa community but
failed to gain Kotku’s popularity and influence,31 and as that community dis-
solved into irrelevance, Ustaosmanğolu began acting more independently due to
ideological disagreements with Coşan.
In his new role, Ustaosmanoğlu encountered trouble with Turkish authorities.
In 1982, the Mufti of Üsküdar, Hasan Ali Ünal, was shot and killed, and a Turkish
court sentenced Ustaosmanoğlu to a life term for a fetva (mufti’s opinion on a
matter involving the Islamic religious law) he allegedly had cast for the murder of
the mufti, who had prevented sheikhs belonging to İsmailağa from delivering their
sermons, as well as any other İsmailağa related activity, in Üsküdar’s mosques.32
Ustaosmanoğlu was later acquitted of responsibility for the murder but was also
subject to police investigation over the content of sermons that were taped secretly
6 E. AVIV

by some journalists. The fact that he was never tried for his sermons, and that he
was acquitted in the previous case, actually enhanced Ustaosmanoğlu’s reputation
in the eyes of his disciples, who were convinced that “they cannot do anything to
hurt him.”33 On October 6, 1985, Turkish authorities began another investigation
of Ustaosmanoğlu for recommending in a sermon he gave in Fatih Yavuz Sultan
Selim Mosque that women not read newspapers or watch television.34 From that
point until the 1990s, the community assumed that he did not draw public
attention, and after retiring as the imam of the İsmailağa Mosque in 1996,
Ustaosmanoğlu tried to keep a low profile. The community, however, soon
came under public scrutiny again through a series of internal struggles. In what
is called “The 28 February process” or “postmodern coup,” Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü
(b. 1965), also known as Cübbeli Ahmet for his cübbe (a robe worn by imams,
judges, barristers, and professors, with full sleeves and long skirts), became
notorious for constructing an illegal complex of buildings for the religious educa-
tion of some five thousand children in Beykoz, Istanbul.35 Following police
pressure, the construction was stopped, but Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü was later
accused of marrying his young disciples and of having a fondness for a life of
luxury.36 On May 17, 1998, Ustaosmanoğlu’s son-in-law and successor, Hızır Ali
Muratoğlu, was shot seven times and killed during his Sunday morning conversa-
tion (sohbet). As Turkish newspapers aired speculations on the murder, some
sources alleged that the İsmailağa community wielded power within the Mafia.37
In 1999, after Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü described the great earthquake in the Izmit
area as a “punishment from God” for the bordello that prevailed in Turkish
society, he was sentenced to two years and seven months imprisonment but was
released after thirteen months. Later on, during a television interview, he
expressed his regret by telling the host: “all the truth should not be said all the
time.”38 Finally, on September 3, 2006, retired imam Bayram Ali Öztürk, who was
in line to succeed Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu as a spiritual leader, was stabbed to
death in the İsmailağa Mosque following morning prayer. The murderer, Mustafa
Erdal, was lynched immediately by the imam’s fellow worshippers.39
These incidents did not stop the community’s activities. Ustaosmanoğlu’s
weekly sermons (vaazlar) were published as a book in 1988,40 and he has
been writing a thirty-seven-volume interpretation to the Quran titled
Rûhu’l-Furkân Tefsiri, almost half of which is already printed.
Ustaosmanoğlu has also written a philological exegesis to the Quran that
explains the individual words in the Quranic verses and then places their
meaning into context. Still, Ustaosmanoğlu always preferred teaching and
personal contact in the belief that writing contradicts the sharia, and he was
known for his conversations [sohbetler], which took place after Sunday
morning prayers in the Sultan Selim Mosque. Despite the early hours, the
always-full attendance made them a prominent event that characterized the
community. The conversations, published in four volumes based on notes his
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 7

disciples took during the conversations, convey an exposition on ethics

rather than a mystical experience or close relation to God.41

Political involvement
There has always been a link between the Naqshbandi Sufi order and the
Islamist political parties, especially during the 1970s when some members of
the current AK Party cadres were reputed to have attended Kotku’s lessons.
Many of the major figures of the Welfare Party (Refah Partisi, 1983–98) came
out of the İskenderpaşa community when it was a famous center of the
Naqshbandi order. Among them, Necmettin Erbakan and Recep Tayyip
Erdoğan both participated in Kotku’s lessons.42 According to Şerif Mardin,
there still is a Naqshbandi involvement in politics, although its pattern is not
immediately obvious, and the mode of involvement has changed over time.43
Almost all religious movements in Turkey hold ties with political parties
and bureaucrats, even when they declare their opposition to politics. As
researcher and writer Çetin Demirhan explains, traditionally, there has
been a tacit competition between the various Sufi orders so governments
could easily play one against another.44 In most cases, however, the Islamic
movements are connected with politics for pragmatic reasons, namely, as
security against a radical laic regime and to obtain legitimacy on the political
level, which is a necessity regardless of their legitimacy in the social sphere.45
The İsmailağa community declares it has no ideological or political structure
or motives that could result in its departure from Sufi principles,46 yet,
whether as a pragmatic approach or not, the community has supported
Erbakan’s political parties.47 Although in 2015 Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü was
quoted as saying: “politics is none of our business, our sole duty is to explain
religion to the people” and “we will keep on staying above politics,”48 before
the 1991 general election, he had called on his followers to vote for the
Welfare Party and had termed those who voted for other parties “sinful”
(vebal).49 Parties such as the Motherland Party (Anavatan Partisi) were also
supported by the community, and members of the Felicity Party (Saadet
Partisi) participated in the funeral of imam Bayram Ali following his murder
in the community’s mosque, 2006.50 Former Republican People’s Party
(CHP-Cumhuriyet Halk Partisi) chairperson Deniz Baykal phoned Ahmet
Mahmut Ünlü before a surgery, and the latter called to console Baykal after
he resigned from the CHP leadership.51
Çakır believes that the İsmailağa community’s support for various parties
is a consequence of seeking financial opportunities, so when they do support
political parties, the community avoids shaping certain political lines. Taking
an active role in politics is strongly not recommended for the disciples, as
politics is considered a road leading away from Sufi teachings.52 Today
İsmailağa members vote for either the AK Party or Erbakan’s Felicity Party,
8 E. AVIV

but mostly for the AK Party since its rise. Before the June elections in 2015,
İsmailağa Camii İlim ve Hizmet Vakfı posted on its official website a call to
vote for the AK party.
In what became known as the Ergenekon affair53 in 2007, at a meeting of
local authorities in Erzincan, intelligence reports were circulated accusing the
İsmailağa community of preventing local girls from attending school and of
conducting clandestine Quran courses without the consent of the Religious
Affairs Ministry. When a police report stated that no illegal activity was
conducted by the community in Erzincan, prosecutor İlhan Cihaner asked
the National Intelligence Organization (MIT—Millî İstihbarat Teşkilatı) to
conduct another investigation, which revealed financial irregularities and that
politicians and businessmen close to the AK Party government had
demanded favors for the İsmailağa community in return for granting tenders
and employment to the members of the community, as well as other mis-
demeanors by the community. Cihaner then obtained a court order for
monitoring the phone calls and correspondence of several İsmailağa officials,
and many businessmen, politicians (including Kadir Topbaş, Istanbul’s for-
mer mayor), and even some government ministers were intercepted.
In late 2009, however, the AK Party succeeded in suspending Cihaner for
an alleged abuse of office.54 After the investigation was transferred to Osman
Sanal, a more “AK Party friendly” prosecutor,55 235 suspects were acquitted
and Cihaner was jailed for refusing to halt his investigation. He and others
who were arrested in the Ergenekon affair faced charges of plotting against
the İsmailağa and Fethullah Gülen56 communities, as part of that affair.57
In the eyes of the larger Turkish society, the Ergenekon affair stemmed from
an inheritance battle within the İsmailağa community as Mahmut
Ustaosmanoğlu was aging and in poor health. Whereas Furkan (Quran) maga-
zine praised the Ergenekon affair, the journal Baran, identified with Ahmet
Mahmut Ünlü, criticized it as a campaign conducted by the United States and
Israel.58 In this context, the İsmailağa community was also accused by Turkish
media of having an affinity with the terror organization İBDA-C (İslami Büyük
Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi-Islamic Great Eastern Raiders Front) through Salih
Mirzabeyoğlu. The leader of the İBDA-C since its establishment in 1989,
Mirzabeyoğlu was an adherent of Ustaosmanoğlu. This illegal Sunni organiza-
tion was anti-Shi’i and pursued an aggressive subversive policy against the
constitutional government in order to establish a religious regime based on
Sharia law. It has close ties with İsmailağa, and it made the community’s Furkan
magazine, which was first published by Ustaosmanoğlu’s nephew Saadettin
Ustaosmanoğlu in 1995,59 a sort of publishing organ for the İBDA-C.60
The real bond between the community and Mirzabeyoğlu appears to have
been Saadettin Ustaosmanoğlu, who was sentenced with Mirzabeyoğlu to
eighteen years imprisonment for ties with the İBDA-C. Incarcerated between
1999 and 2005, Saadettin was the cellmate of Mirzabeyoğlu (who declared
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 9

himself the Messiah in 2005).61 After Mirzabeyoğlu was released from his life
sentence in July 2014, he met with President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan on
November 29, 2014.62 Meanwhile, Saadettin Ustaosmanoğlu had clarified
that his uncle Mahmut Efendi did not oppose the İBDA-C as he never
took action against any Muslims.63
Gabriel Piricki claims that there is no organic link between the İBDA-C and
İsmailağa,64 but on December 8, 2014, Furkan magazine’s website indicated that
once Mirzabeyoğlu was released from prison, he had visited Mahmut
Ustaosmanoğlu and kissed the leader’s hands.65 In fact, the journal, which
dedicated its fiftieth volume to Mirzabeyoğlu,66 no longer belongs to the
İsmailağa community but is now directly connected with the İBDA-C
organization.67 Furthermore, the pro-AK Party Sabah has charged the İBDA-
C received militants and monetary support via the İsmailağa community; the
community’s members were planted in key positions within public agencies; and
an extensive report, supposedly made by the Istanbul Police Directorate on the
community’s growing ties to the İBDA-C in 2000 and some members’ switching
to terrorism, was “swept under the carpet.” In addition, the same police report
was said to have alleged that the connection with the İBDA-C was one of the
main reasons for the rift inside the community, for some members wanted to
carry out armed action like the İBDA-C, while others opposed this.68
A Turkish citizen named Ramazan Bozkurt was convinced to join ISIS by a
member of the İsmailağa community from Ortacık village in the Akşehir district
of Konya. When he was returned to Turkey, Bozkurt testified that İsmailağa
targets young workers who are economically weak and culturally ignorant to
“make them fall into their trap. They display an easygoing approach towards
them and try to address their spirit. They fool the people under the guise of
fighting against the Syrian regime, and later use them in the fight against Kurds
in Rojava.”69 The İsmailağa community strongly denied any relation to Bozkurt
or to any terror organization and claimed the publication of his charges was a
pure provocation with a clandestine purpose.70

Ismailağa and the AK party

While the AK Party’s support of religious orders is clear, the party sees
membership in religious orders as a personal matter and professes to support
freedom of belief. In the words of Adıyman Deputy Hüsrev Kutlu, religious
orders have never caused any harm to society.
They are a unity of hearts… perhaps the issue of religious orders attracted media
attention with the murder at the İsmailağa mosque, but not a single member of a
religious order has ever hurt the nation… there are members of orders and they
have emotional ties to a particular order among politicians… the activity of
religious orders concerns the other world and it’s impossible for them to have
mundane desires or designs on worldly power.71
10 E. AVIV

Atilla Kart, a CHP deputy from Konya, disagrees, contending that members
of religious orders have become financial supporters of both local govern-
ment and the central administration, which is a “dangerous process” as these
communities get their powers from the AK Party government, and the ties
between them are so deep they cannot be severed. According to Kart, the
problem is not with religious orders that follow the teachings of classical
philosophical movements but with those that turn into communities.72
Deniz Baykal, while head of the CHP, cited the murder of Bayram Ali
Öztürk as a reason for the resignation of Abdülkadir Aksu, the AK Party’s
minister of interior affairs. Baykal also pointed to the lynching in the
İsmailağa mosque following that murder as one more incident on a list of
political murders whose perpetrators were never caught at different periods
when Abdülkadir Aksu was the minister of interior affairs.73 As a result of
the murder, Baykal continued, the AK Party brought anti-secularist groups
into power for the first time in decades because the AK Party government
could not bring itself to accept that the subsequent lynching had occurred at
the hands of a religious community.74
The İsmailağa community has benefited from the looser restriction on
religious activities and publications due to the rise of the AK Party in Turkey.
Since Erdoğan himself has visited the Imam Hatip schools near the İsmailağa
Mosque, the mosque itself, and Quranic courses, the community sees
Erdoğan as a close “fellow combatant” who has taken the community
under his wing.75 In recent years, politicians from parties across the political
spectrum, such as Süleyman Demirel, Türkeş, Muhsin Yazıcıoğlu, Deniz
Baykal, and others, have followed Erdoğan’s example in paying warm visits
to the community.
Erdoğan has also visited Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu several times. On
August 9, 2014, Erdoğan, his wife, and his daughter paid a two-hour visit
to Ustaosmanoğlu to receive his blessing before the presidential election the
following day.76 Three pictures of Erdoğan and Ustaosmanoğlu were tweeted
by the community. According to Radikal, the caption below one was: “Our
big brother Tayyip Erdoğan, his wife and daughter visited Mahmud Efendi
tonight.” Below another was: “Thank you Oh God! After 90 years, a president
who is affiliated with religion and Shari’a is coming, Praise be to God!”77
After the election of September 2014, the İsmailağa community published
warm congratulations on its website saying that its “happiness is endless.”78
Hasan Kılıç, who is known for his close ties with Erdoğan and who is a
candidate to succeed Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu after his passing,79 and
Ustaosmanoğlu’s son Ahmet Ustaosmanoğlu visited Erdoğan at his residence
in Kısıklı on behalf of the İsmailağa community in order to congratulate him.80
Upon being nominated as prime minister, Ahmet Davutoğlu visited
Mahumut Ustaosmanoğlu, and on January 30, 2015, Davutoğlu, wearing
the Takke (skullcap), participated in the funeral of Mahmut
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 11

Ustaosmanoğlu’s brother Ismail Ustaosmanoğlu.81 Erdoğan had called

Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu to express his condolences, a gesture the commu-
nity members appreciated very much.82 The community’s official website
mentioned a number of prominent people who also attended the funeral,
among them, Kadir Topbaş and Rahmi Yaran Mufti of Istanbul.83
Saadettin Ustaosmanoğlu acknowledged in a televised interview on CNN
Türk that some members of the community have been involved in business
transactions with the AK Party government, dismissing it as “normal… since
they are simply soliciting business from the people who voted for them.”84
Nevertheless, within the İsmailağa community, there is such disagreement
over the ties with Erdoğan and the AK Party that the community is split in
two. Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü seems to be anti-Erdoğan, while others, such as
Hasan Kılıç, as mentioned, support him.85 Praise has come from supporters
at the local level; on December 2, 2014, Adem Şener, the community repre-
sentative in Sakarya, thanked the AK Party for its assistance with local
development: “Thanks to the AK Party these obstacles were removed. They
made our area flourish… we assist this government which eased things on us
with our prayers. As long as this government keeps on this way, I will keep
my prayers as a man and as a hoca.”86 By contrast, in the September 2014
issue of the Marifet Magazine, a monthly science and culture publication of
the Marifet Association (Marifet Derneği), which is related to Ahmet
Mahmut Ünlü, a story titled “Whose New Turkey Is It?” harshly criticized
senior members of the AK Party government.87 The article was written by
Muhammed Keskin, who is the chairperson of the Marifet Association and
the son-in-law of Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu as well as one of the community’s
influential leaders. Keskin is known for his critical attitude towards the AK
Party government, especially on policies regarding the Kurdish issue.
Opposed to the close relations between the AK Party and the İsmailağa
community, Keskin has alluded to the pro-AK Party group within the
community as Ak Sakalılar (the white-bearded ones) and has called the
İsmailağa Mosque “the building of the party.”88 According to some reports,
Ustaosmanoğlu was so hurt by Keskin’s remarks that he avoided entering the
mosque for a while.89
Although Keskin’s article represented the first openly written criticism
of the AK Party from within the İsmailağa community, it expressed the
view of pious Muslims in the establishment who believed that “perverted
foreign ideas invade the morals of Turkish society.”90 In that regard,
Keskin argued that the real Anatolian Muslims are forsaken at the expense
of Wahhabi and Shiite beliefs, referring to Saudi Arabian and Iranian
influence in Turkey. Specifically, Keskin criticized a well-known theologian
and columnist for Yeni Şafak, a pro-government newspaper, for not
supplying sufficient spiritual guidance to the AK Party. Among the AK
Party members Keskin singled out were the Minister for EU Affairs at the
12 E. AVIV

time, Egemen Bağış, and Efkan Ala, Minister of the Interior, the former
for allegedly mocking verses of the Quran with a journalist, and the latter
for insulting the prophet Muhammad. During the presidential campaign in
July 2014, after Ala praised the AK Party for its “humility” in lifting the
headscarf ban by saying that even the prophet Muhammad “showed signs
of pride after his conquest of Mecca but the AK Party would not,”91
Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü had criticized Ala for a so-called misunderstanding
of Islam unworthy of his position.92
The article in Marifet was later published and used against the AK Party in
Gülen publications and subsequently shared by secular media outlets as well,
carrying Keskin’s criticism beyond conservative readership in Turkey. On
September 22, the pro-AK Party Sabah and Yeni Şafak newspapers asked
Gülen’s official newspaper Zaman to correct the story as the piece was the
author’s personal view and not that of the İsmailağa community. Three days
later, when Marifet made it clear that İsmailağa stood behind the piece, which
was approved by Ustanosmanoğlu himself, other communities, such as the
Alperen movement (Alperen Ocakları), issued supportive declarations against
the two pro-AK Party newspapers.93 The Gülen movement (or Hizmet, here-
after FGM) praised Keskin’s courageous and poignant disapproval both of the
AK Party’s elites and of more secular groups on social media and in print.94
But the İsmailağa community clarified that Keskin does not represent the
community.95 The AK Party itself did not respond to the article as Marifet’s
readership is limited and the article reflected an internal rift between two parts
of the community that AK Party members preferred to avoid.
Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü criticized the AK Party’s use of Mahmut
Ustanosmanoğlu before the 2015 election and requested it cease exploiting
the name, picture, and messages of Mahmut Efendi for political purposes.96
Criticism had also been directed towards the AK Party by Saadettin
Ustaosmanoğlu, who had charged in a televised interview for CNN Türk in
2010 that the AK Party was hypocritical for not publicly revealing its real
desire for Sharia rule. According to Saadettin, although the AK Party was
indebted to İsmailağa’s voters and the community’s help, “We are currently
not totally pleased with the AK Party.”97 On the other hand, when the imams
of the order traveled to Soma to pray for the victims of the mine disaster,98
they advised the mourners not to speak against the AK Party government.99
Asked whether the AK Party period is good for the İsmailağa community,
Saadettin Ustaosmanoğlu said that if the community started a new school,
the AK Party government would not place any obstacles in its way or open a
police file and conduct surveillance. In contrast, he continued, during the
1997 process, people were scared but survived. They had a reason to live, but
now the “İslam sosyetesi,” meaning those who consider themselves devoted
Muslims (used by Saadettin to refer to modern Muslims who support the AK
Party), actually twist Islam, thus are not “real” Muslims like the AK Party.
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 13

The controversy with the AK Party is related to the school system. The
İsmailağa community perceives academic education as a channel for European
agents in Turkey and nonreligious schools as dark and immoral. Coeducation is
prohibited, as is women teaching boys and men teaching girls. Even the Imam
Hatip schools and theology faculties do not completely follow true Islamic
principles, according to the İsmailağa community.100 As Saadettin
Ustaosmanoğlu has argued, the İsmailağa girls find it hard to attend the state’s
secular schools despite the fact that the AK Party sends covered women to
convince these girls to go to school. For this reason, he adds: “Let the Prime
Minister know this: I want education according to the Quran and tradition …
but the AK Party here is being a stooge to a regimen (system of government).”101
The breach inside the İsmailağa community in regard to the AK Party
government was manifested once again in February 2016. For the past two
years, the Marifet Association had been carrying out construction work in a
külliye (a traditional complex around a mosque that provides services for the
community) known as Mahmut Efendi Külliyesi, located in a grove in the
Cavuşbaşı neighborhood of the Beykoz district in İstanbul. A decision to
demolish two buildings in the complex, as unlicensed construction, was issued
by the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs in January 2016, but the Marifet
Association initiated a legal appeal of the decision. Speaking to the media in
front of the complex, Şefik Kocaman, a member of the association’s board of
directors, said both President Erdoğan and Prime Minister Davutoğlu had
visited the complex and were briefed on its construction, and no problem had
been raised before the elections on November 1, but “we are now being punished
for our stance.”102 Kocaman emphasized that the buildings were demolished by
the order of the police without a decision from any court or a letter from a
prosecutor. Rather, Kocaman said, the decision for the demolition was made by
President Erdoğan and passed to the İstanbul Governor’s Office.
“Unfortunately, all developments indicate [that it was] Mr. President
[Erdoğan], as police officers didn’t show any official documentation but said
the governor gave the order for the demolition.”103
Noting that the AK Party had criticized the 1997 postmodern coup,
Kocaman said: “I don’t know what they would say now.” Although the
situation during that earlier process may have been harder for the commu-
nity to handle, he went on, at least they were found innocent. Now it is
unclear of what they will be accused.104
According to Kocaman, what the community is actually being punished
for is its critical stance towards the government, especially on the rapproche-
ment launched in 2012 with Kurdistan Workers’ Party (PKK) leaders.

We criticized the stance [of Erdoğan] when he said “my religion is not Sunnism.”
We did not accept his stance when he said “my second motherland is İran.” When
the government transferred the Süleyman Shah tomb from Syria without any
14 E. AVIV

danger prevailing and without shooting, we said it was not the right thing to do.
We will not sit at the same table with a terror organization we said… And today,
we are being punished for all this.105

The İsmailağa community released a harsh statement on its website, signed by the
İsmailağa Camii İlim ve Hizmet Vakfı, stating that there was no connection
between the vakıf and külliye and that the demolition was an official matter
between the ministry and the construction company responsible for building the
külliye belonging to the Marifet Association.106 Muhammed Fatih
Ustaosmanoğlu, grandson of Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu, asserted on his personal
Facebook page that his grandfather had opposed the construction of his own
tomb in the complex to avoid exploitation of his image after his death.107
According to the Ministry of Forest and Water Affairs, the Marifet Association
had unlawfully undertaken construction in several places, without official per-
mission or knowledge. Muhammed Fetih further claimed that because of the
internal dissension within the İsmailağa community, Keskin had offered them
the opportunity to “sell the complex in Fatih and move to Çavuşbaşı.”108
Using the occasion to distance itself from the conflict with the government as
well as from the Marifet Association, the İsmailağa community reminded
members: “In his 70-year-old tradition [of leading the community], our leader
[Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu] has never been involved in any illegality and has
always warned his community not to do so.”109 In addition, the official website
of the community charged that the media had exploited the demolition event to
highlight an alleged conflict between İsmailağa and the government, although
“This matter is between the Ministry of Forestry and Water Affairs and the
leasing company MSN… İsmailağa Camii İlim ve Hizmet Vakfı has nothing to
do with it.”110 The Marifet Association replied to the community’s website
statement by suggesting that Erdoğan had received his information about the
incident only from the Camii İlim ve Hizmet Vakfi’s website and, believing that
source, unfairly issued instructions accordingly. This declaration, however, was
deleted from the Facebook page of the association shortly after being posted.111
What is clear from the incident is that the İsmailağa community is divided
into two parts: one against and one for the AK Party government. Ahmet
Hakan believes this incident also shows that regardless of religious, ideolo-
gical, or political affiliation, anyone who confronts or criticizes the govern-
ment will be punished. In other words, the allegedly illegal construction
proved the AK Party government’s anti-democratic tendencies.112
According to Gareth Jenkins, Erdoğan’s silence towards the criticism coming
from parts of the community indicates that his need for the religious orders
has been reduced as he has become the longest-serving leader in Turkish
history. At the same time, while the religious orders prefer not to be too close
to Erdoğan due to his attachment to money, the strong struggle the AK Party
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 15

has waged against its former ally, the FGM, makes other orders more careful
about having close ties with the AK Party.113

The Ismailağa community, the FGM, and the AK party

In the past, the FGM and the İsmailağa community found themselves on the
same side. In the so-called Ergenekon affair in 2007, prosecutor İlhan
Cihaner, in Erzurum, had begun investigating the activities of local elements
of both groups, including allegations they were using their connections with
leading members of the AK Party to fix state contracts. In late 2009, however,
the AK Party succeeded in suspending Cihaner for an alleged abuse of
office,114 and the investigation was transferred to Osman Sanal, a more
“AK Party friendly” prosecutor.115 At this stage, the FGM and the
İsmailağa community were on the same side of the political map, although
the FGM much more aggressively targeted its rivals and opponents who
allegedly belonged to the Ergenekon group.116 While Ali Bulaç of Zaman
defended the İsmailağa community in 2006, relations have not always been
so positive, for the İsmailağa community perceives itself as expressing “true
Islam” and other communities as inferior.
Saadettin Ustaosmanoğlu has claimed that Erdoğan and the FGM attempt
to present “moderate Islam” and that in order to include İsmailağa in this self-
proclaimed role, “since 2006 they have tried to portray Mahmut
Ustaosmanoğlu as someone who does not oppose moderate Islam… we
oppose the diluting of Sharia as the AK Party and FGM do. Of course, they
want Sharia. Their basis is totally sincere. They want Sharia but they are falling
into a conspiracy that is preparing to degenerate them. Otherwise, how can a
Muslim be in a position to oppose the order of his own creator?”117 According
to Saadettin, before 2006 the İsmailağa community had no relations with the
FGM. Then the latter wanted an interview with Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu titled
“First Time That Mahmut Efendi Gives an Interview” in which he would say
he does not oppose moderate Islam.118 For Saadettin, the division between
those who oppose and those who support the AK Party is not confined to the
İsmailağa community but can be found in all the Muslim communities in
Turkey. In his view, the attempt by the AK Party and FGM to align Muslims
with the idea of moderate Islam and to make them more “centered” when it
comes to Islam will cause the party and FGM to pay heavily afterwards.
The break between FGM and the AK Party has several plausible causes.
Among them are the February 7 MIT crisis with Fidan and the Mavi Marmara
incident in which Gülen spoke in favor of Israel in an interview with the Wall
Street Journal and also criticized Erdoğan for sending the flotilla despite Israel’s
opposition. The willingness to close the dershaneler was also a main reason,
after which the relationship continued to deteriorate further.119
16 E. AVIV

Whatever caused the split between FGM and the AK Party, the İsmailağa
community seems to have filled the economic and bureaucratic vacuum that
resulted. In election campaigns, the photographs of AK Party leaders and
with prominent İsmailağa leaders support Faik Bulut’s observation that not
only has Erdoğan put those who support Fetullah Gülen under siege, but he
has also replaced them by drawing to himself parties in line with the National
View (Milli Görüş) and communities that support the National View, such as
İsmailağa.120

Conclusions
Despite the close ties between Erdoğan and the İsmailağa community, the AK
Party seems to ignore the divisions over the party inside the İsmailağa
community and does not oppose the criticism of the party by groups within
the community. One reason is that the opponents of the AK Party do not
represent the entire İsmailağa community but only one part of the move-
ment’s attitude, which it has hastened to make clear. In addition, Erdoğan is
not interested in another confrontation with a religious order after the harsh
war he has declared on the FGM. It might be too high a price to pay to
debate with a community that is usually regarded as “funny” or folkloristic in
Turkey. Then there are Erdoğan’s own ties with Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu. In
contrast, Erdoğan has never received any official public blessing from
Fethullah Gülen, perhaps because Gülen was mainly a political partner rather
than a religious authority or spiritual inspiration for Erdoğan, as they are
rooted in different religious schools (Naqshbandi for Erdoğan and Nurcu for
Gülen). While, like other religious orders, the Fethulah Gülen Movement is
not much appreciated as a religious authority, Erdoğan’s silence might
demonstrate his genuine respect for Mahmut Efendi.
Apparently, Erdoğan has learned a lesson from his old ties with the FGM.
Now he attempts to respect the religious orders without giving priority to any
of them or creating any political partnership. Even so, the İsmailağa commu-
nity could never become an acceptable replacement for the FGM, contrary to
the suggestions of some scholars. The FGM’s size, influence inside and outside
Turkey, flexible organizational system, and number of adherents not only
made a great contribution to Erdoğan’s electoral victories and domestic gov-
erning, but they also provided the AK Party an entrée into the political
corridors of both the European Union and the United States. By contrast,
İsmailağa’s political involvement is mostly local and minor, and its economic
resources and influence on any sector of Turkish society are limited.
The break between the government and the FGM helped portray the
İsmailağa community as more trustworthy and as more “Islam authentic,”
unlike the FGM. At the same time, the community seems to be uncertain
regarding its involvement in politics. On the one hand, it needs to maintain
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 17

contact with influential political organizations and parties, such as the AK

Party, for its own pragmatic interests, even as a continuous internal debate
over the separation of the community from politics makes this message
ambivalent and unreliable. On the other hand, after more than a decade in
power and after winning three consecutive election campaigns, the AK Party
can permit itself to be associated with a group that is not considered to be
part of “moderate Islam,” as the FGM was, but with one deemed more
“authentic” or even more radical if one faction of the İsmailağa community’s
ties with the İBDA-C organization are taken into account. In other words,
when the AK Party sensed it was politically strong enough, it could cooperate
publicly with the İsmailağa community. Thus its association with the com-
munity is also, it seems, the result of political considerations.

Acknowledgment
My thanks go to Prof. Himmet Hülür for his excellent suggestions and thoughtful guidance
when reviewing this article.

Notes
1. On Naqshbandi, see M. Habib, “Some Notes on the Naqshbandi Order,” Muslim
World 59 (1969): 40–49; Hamid Algar, “A Brief History of Naqshbandi Order,” in
Naqshbandis: Historical Developments and Present Situation of a Muslim Mystical
Order, edited by M. Gaborieau, A. Popovic, and T. H. Zarcone (İstanbul-Paris:
Editions Isis, 1985), 3–45; Hamid Algar, “The Naqshibandi Order in Republican
Turkey,” Islamic World Report 2 (1997): 51–62; Hamid Algar, Nakşibendilik
(Istanbul: İnsan Yayınları, 2007); Dina Le Gall, “Forgotten Naqshbandis and the
Culture of Pre-modern Sufi Brotherhoods,” Studia Islamica 19, 2003 (2006): 87–119;
Dina Le Gall, A Culture of Sufism: Naqshbandis in the Ottoman World, 1450–1700
(Albany: SUNY Press, 2005); Ali Kadri, Tarikat-ı Nakşibendiye Prensipleri (İstanbul:
Pamuk, 1994); Elisabeth Özdalga, ed., Naqshibandis in Western and Central Asia
(Istanbul: Swedish Research Institute, 1999); J. Spencer Trimingham, The Sufi
Orders in Islam (London: Oxford University Press, 1973); Thierry Zarcone, “Les
Nakşibendi et la Republique turque: De la presecution au repositionment theologique,
politique et social (1925–1991),” Turcica 24 (1992): 133–51.
2. Mardin attempts to answer the question of whether the Naqshbandi is indeed a Sufi
order or not, because according to him Sufi means Islamic mysticism of any sort and
does not fit well with the disciplined spiritual practice of the order. See Şerif Mardin,
“The Nakşibendi Order in Turkish History,” in Islam in Modern Turkey, edited by
Richard Tapper (London: I.B Tauris, 1991), 123.
3. Itzchak Weismann, The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi
Tradition (London: Routledge, 2007), 147.
4. Himmet Hülür, “Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism: An Empirical Analysis of İsmail
Ağa and İskender Paşa Branches,” Selçuk Üniversitesi Fen Edebıyat Fakültesi Edebiyat
Dergisi 13 (1999): 306.
18 E. AVIV

5. M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement (Oxford:

Oxford University Press, 2013), 72.
6. Nezir Akyeşilmen and Arif Behiç Özcan, “Islamic Movements and Their Role in
Politics in Turkey,” Selçuk University: Journal of Institute of Social Sciences 31
(2014): 31.
7. Ibid. p. 32.
8. Menderes Çınar and Burjanettin Duran, “The Specific Evolution of the Contemporary
Political Islam in Turkey and Its ‘Difference,’” in Secular and Islamic Politics in
Turkey: The Making of the Justice and Development Party, edited by Ümit Çizre
(London: Routledge, 2008), 22.
9. Gabriel Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community: Shifting Religious Patterns in
Contemporary Turkey,” Archiv Orientalni: Quarterly Journal of African and Asian
Studies 80, no. 3 (2012): 544. For the courses, see http://www.ismailagakurankursu.
net/ (accessed 11 October 2015).
10. Thijl Sunier and Nico Landman, Transnational Turkish Islam: Shifting Geographies of
Religious Activism and Community Building in Turkey and Europe (London: Palgrave,
2015), 11, 37.
11. Ahmet Necip Fāzıl Kısakürek (26 May 1904–25 May 1983) was a Turkish prolific poet,
novelist, and playwright. He was noticed by the French philosopher Henri Bergson, who
later became his teacher, and Al-Ghazali, a Muslim theologian, jurist, and mystic. He
expressed Sufist ideas in his plays and poems. He is also the spiritual father of the Turkish
terrorist group IBDA-C (İslami Büyük Doğu Akıncılar Cephesi). He called for a founda-
tion for a new Caliphate in Turkey and encouraged an Islam based on pure Islamic values.
Kısakürek is known for his ultra-nationalistic and also anti-Semitic views expressed in
his writings. See, for instance, an anthology of all his articles published in Büyük Doğu
[the Great East] journal: Necip Fāzıl Kısakürek, Yahudilik-Masonluk-Dönmelik]
Judaism, Freemasonship, sabbetaism[(Istanbul: Büyük Doğu Yayınları, 2010). On
Kısakürek and his anti-Semitic viewpoints, see Rıfat N. Bali, Antisemitism and
Conspiracy Theories in Turkey (Istanbul: Libra Kitap, 2013), 25–26; 140–58.
12. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 542.
On İsmailağa’s important figures and religious leaders, see Himmet Hülür,
“Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism: An Empirical Analysis of İsmail Ağa and
İskender Paşa Branches,” Selçuk Üniversitesi Fen Edebıyat Fakültesi Edebiyat Dergisi
13 (1999): 302–06.
13. Quoted in Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 537.
14. Ibid., p. 553.
15. Hülür, “Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism,” pp. 327, 329–330.
16. Ibid., p. 539.
17. Ruşen Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan: Türkiye’de İslami Oluşumlar (Istanbul: Metis, 2002), 66.
18. “Aykut Demir tarikata girdi,” Sözcü, 10 November 2015, http://amkspor.sozcu.com.tr/
2015/11/10/aykut-demir-tarikata-girdi-452157/ (accessed November 12, 2015).
19. http://www.sondakika.com/haber/haber-dirilis-ertugrul-oyuncusu-celal-al
-İsmailağa-7894451/ (accessed November 15, 2015).
20. Hülür, “Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism,” p. 307.
21. İsmail Saymaz, “İsmailağa tarikatındaki kadın anlatıyor: Yaşamımı çaldılar,” Radikal,
1 October 2009, http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/İsmailağa-tarikatinin-icindeki-
kadin-anlatiyor-yasamimi-caldilar-956992/ (accessed November 10, 2015).
22. Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 68.
23. Hülür, “Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism,” p. 292.
24. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 236.
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 19

25. Hülür, “Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism,” p. 303.

26. Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 65.
27. On Kotku, see, for example, Şerif Mardin, “The Naqshbandi Order in Turkish
History” in Islam in Modern Turkey, edited by Richard Tapper (London: I.B Tauris,
1991), 132–34; İrfan Gündüz, “Mehmed Zahid Kotku’nun tarikat ve İrşad Anlayışı,” in
Mehmed Zahid Kotku ve Tasavvuf, edited by Hüseyin Erkaya (İstanbul: Neşri, 1995),
85–95.
28. Itzchak Weismann, The Naqshbandiyya: Orthodoxy and Activism in a Worldwide Sufi
Tradition (London: Routledge, 2007), 152–53.
29. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 540.
30. See, for example, http://www.yeniaktuel.com.tr/tur101,73@2100.html (accessed
October 14, 2015).
31. M. Hakan Yavuz, Toward an Islamic Enlightenment: The Gülen Movement (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2013), 248.
32. “Elini Üsküdar’dan çek diyen müftüye 5 kurşun,” Hürriyet, 23 October 2006, http://
www.hurriyet.com.tr/elini-Üsküdar-dan-cek-diyen-muftuye-5-kursun-5304267
(accessed October 4, 2015).
33. Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan, p. 65.
34. Gülden Aydın, “İsmailağa Camii,” Hürriyet, 9 September 2006, http://www.hurriyet.
com.tr/İsmailağa-camii-5057666 (accessed October 27, 2015).
35. A close disciple of Ustaosmanoğlu, Ahmet Mahmut Ünlü- Cübbeli Ahmet, is a
possible successor of Ustaosmanoğlu but a controversial preacher. His conversations
are distributed on CDs and online, and he has a popular television show on
İsmailağa’s television and radio channel, established in 2014. Nevertheless, his luxur-
ious residence in Istanbul is often criticized, and pictures of him on vacations
accompanied by bikini-clad women have been widely published in Turkey. He even
spent a year in jail after being arrested in December 2011 for “aiding an organization
established to obtain unfair advantages,” “conducting human trade on two counts,”
“sexual assault,” and “depriving someone of their freedom.”
36. Aydın, “İsmailağa Camii.”
37. “Derin cemaat,” Radikal, 10 September 2006, http://www.radikal.com.tr/haber.php?
haberno=198250 (accessed November 9, 2015).
38. http://www.yenisafak.com/gundem/cubbeli-ahmet-hocanin-deprem-pismanligi
-200569 (accessed May 8, 2016).
39. Tamer Korkmaz, writing in the official publication of the Fethullah Gülen Movement,
Zaman, accused the “dominant media” of using the murder in the İsmailağa Mosque
as an opportunity to carry out an anti-reactionary campaign against the İsmailağa
community despite statements by witnesses affirming that neither the person who
killed Bayram nor those who “lynched” the murderer were members of the commu-
nity. “Hasıraltı Cemaati!,” Zaman, 12 September 2006, http://www.zaman.com.tr/
yazarlar/tamer-korkmaz/hasiralti-cemaati_347628.html (accessed October 15, 2015).
40. Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu, Haftalık vaazlar (Istanbul: Siraç Kitabevi, 1988).
41. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 541.
42. Brian Silverstein, Islam and Modernity in Turkey (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2011), 103.
43. Şerif Mardin, “The Naqshbandi Order in Turkish History,” in Islam in Modern
Turkey, edited by Richard Tapper (London: I.B Tauris, 1991), 123.
44. Quoted in Pınar Tremblay, “Turkish Religious Order Tests AK Party’s Limits,” Al-
Monitor, 30 September 2014, http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2014/09/tur
key-AK Party-religious-movements-power.html (accessed November 3, 2015).
20 E. AVIV

45. Nezir Akyeşilmen and Arif Behiç Özcan, “Islamic Movements and Their Role in
Politics in Turkey,” Selçuk University: Journal of Institute of Social Sciences 31
(2014): 33.
46. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 557.
47. Ömer Şahin, “Hangi tarikat, cemaat kime oy verecek?” Radikal, 8 December 2013,
http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/omer-sahin/hangi-tarikat-cemaat-kime-oy-verecek
-1165051/ (accessed September 14, 2015).
48. İsmailağa Cemaati’nde AK Party çatlağı,” Yurt, 4 June 2015, http://www.yurtgazetesi.
com.tr/gundem/İsmailağa-cemaati-nde-AK Party-catlagi-h89570.html (accessed
September 23, 2015).
49. Banu Eligür, The Mobilization of Political Islam in Turkey (London: Cambridge
University Press, 2010), 199.
50. Telegram from Turkish Consulate in Istanbul to the Secretary of State,
14 September 2006, https://www.wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/06ISTANBUL1669_a.
html (accessed November 10, 2015).
51. Şenol Ateş, “CHP’de başkan gitti halef çekişmesi başladı,” Sabah, 13 May 2010, http://
www.sabah.com.tr/fotohaber/gundem/chpde_baskan_gitti_halef_cekismesi_basladi?
tc=47&page=45 (accessed November 9, 2015). In 2006 Baykal had claimed that the
İsmailağa community had established an independent republic with underground
court systems that dispensed sharia law: Şükrü Küçükşahin, “Fatih’te İsmailağa cum-
huriyeti kurulmuş,” Hürriyet, 11 September 2006, http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/fatih-te
-İsmailağa-cumhuriyeti-kurulmus-5063011 (accessed November 14, 2015).
52. Çakır, Ayet ve Slogan, pp. 66–67.
53. The Ergenekon group, named after a mythical Central Asian valley in the Altay
Mountains connected to Turkish nationalist lore, was described as consisting of
members of the armed forces and civilians in the media, academia, and opposition
political parties. The group was accused of being part of a secret “deep state,” and
members were said to view themselves as the protectors of Turkey’s national identity
and the secular values of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. By May 2011, over three hundred
people had been charged with membership in the “Ergenekon terrorist organization,”
allegedly plotting to use violence in an attempt to destabilize the AK Party govern-
ment. See Gareth H. Jenkins, “Between Fact and Fantasy: Turkey’s Ergenekon
Investigation,” Central Asia-Caucasus Institute, 2009, http://www.silkroadstudies.org/
resources/pdf/SilkRoadPapers/2009_08_SRP_Jenkins_Turkey-Ergenekon.pdf.
54. Cihaner was eventually arrested and charged with membership in Ergenekon.
55. Gareth Jenkins, “Ergenekon, Sledgehammer, and the Politics of Turkish Justice:
Conspiracies and Coincidences,” MERIA 15, no. 2 (June 2011): http://www.rubincen
ter.org/2011/08/Ergenekon-sledgehammer-and-the-politics-of-turkish-justice-
conspiracies-and-coincidences/.
56. Fethullah Gülen is a moderate Turkish Muslim scholar, a prolific writer, philosopher, and
leader of a self-named movement. His critics accuse him of undermining Turkish secular
values, while his followers claim that he is a moderate religious scholar who is a victim of
baseless and recurring attacks. Gülen and his movement promote interfaith dialogue. For
many years, the movement has been an ally of the AK Party, but in 2013 a rift occurred
and a rivalry between the two groups began. Gülen was the disciple of Bediüzzaman Said
Nursi (1877–1960), a scholar and intellectual, founder of the Nurcu movement and author
of the six-thousand-page commentary of the Koran, Risale-i Nur. Following Nursi’s death,
and in the absence of an undisputed heir, his followers split into subcommunities in the
1960s and 1970s, mainly for political-religious reasons. Gülen’s movement, centered on
Gülen as the leader, formed as an independent community in the early 1970s. Nursi
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 21

received his primary religious education by Naqshbandi masters. Among his admirable
teachers was Seyyid Nur Muhammed Efendi, a descendant of Mevlana Halid-i Bagdadi
(1779–1827) founder of the Khalidi order. Despite the fact that Nursi was rejected from
the Naqshbandi medreses, and his philosophy contradicted the Naqshbandi’s in some
aspects, he was deeply influenced by its thinking, especially by the writings of Sirhindi
(1564–1624). See Şerif Mardin, Religion and Social Change in Modern Turkey: The Case of
Bediüzzamn Said Nursi (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1989), 66–68;
Camilla T. Nereid, In the Light of Said Nursi: Turkish Nationalism and the Religious
Alternative (Bergen: Center for Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies, 1997), 21.
57. Ahmet Şık and Niyazi Dalyancı, “Warfare between Judiciary and Government,”
Newsetc, 18 February 2010, http://en.habervesaire.com/haber/1743/ (accessed
October 15, 2015).
58. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 553.
59. Aryeh Shmuelevitz and Mitchell Bennett, “Turkey,” in Middle East Contemporary
Survey, edited by Bruce Maddy-Weitzman (Tel Aviv: Moshe Dayan, 2002), 593.
60. Yavuz Rençberler, Ulaş Yıldız, and Ferit Zengin Umut, “İsmailağa’da İBDA-C
kavgası,” Sabah, 10 September 2006, http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2006/09/10/gnd109.
html (accessed December 10, 2015).
61. Mirzabeyoğlu declared himself the Messiah in a book he wrote while in jail; see Salih
Mirzabeyoğlu, Furkan Lûgat-ı Salihûn’un (Istanbul: İbda Yayınları, 2005).
62. See http://www.haberler.com/cumhurbaskani-Erdoğan-ofisinde-mirzabeyoglu-ile
-6738549-haberi/ (accessed November 10, 2015).
63. Selin Ongun, “Cübbeli Ahmet’e ‘Zekât paralarını yiyor’ Suçlaması,” T24,
16 February 2010, http://t24.com.tr/haber/cubbeli-ahmete-zekat-paralarini-yiyor-
suclamasi,70487 (accessed December 10, 2015).
64. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 553.
65. “Salih Mirzabeyoglu Mahmut Efnedi’yi ziyaret etti,” Furkan Dergisi,
8 December 2014, http://furkandergisi.com/mirzabeyoglu-mahmud-Efendiyi-ziyaret
-etti/ (accessed October 10, 2015).
66. See http://furkandergisi.com/50-sayisi-cikti/ (accessed October 10, 2015).
67. See http://www.yeniaktuel.com.tr/top112,158@2100.html (accessed November 1,
2015).
68. The murder of Bayram Ali Öztürk occurred after the İBDA-C leader Mirzabeyoğlu
declared himself the Messiah: Yavuz Rençberler et al., “İsmailağa’da İBDA-C kavgası.”
69. See https://anfenglish.com/special/jailed-isis-member-from-turkey-ismail-aga-sect-
sent-me-to-isis (accessed November 14, 2015). Yet in 2014 Cübbeli Ahmet opposed
ISIS and said that “those who help them fit in hell”; see http://www.yurtgazetesi.com.
tr/gundem/Cübbeli-isidi-kizdirdi-h55575.html (accessed December 10, 2015).
70. See http://www.kanalahaber.com/haber/gundem/İsmailağa-cemaatinden-
cumhuriyetin-isid-iddiasina-cevap-263656/ (accessed December 10, 2015).
71. Göksel Bozkurt and Barış Altıntaş, “Politicians on Religious Orders,” Hürriyet Daily
News, 26 September 2006, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/politicians-on-
religious-orders.aspx?pageID=438&n=politicians-on-religious-orders-2006-09-26
(accessed September 3, 2015).
72. Ibid.
73. “Opposition Leader Tears Government Apart over Dink Murder,” Hürriyet Daily
News, 2 February 2007, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/opposition-leader-tears-
government-apart-over-dink-murder.aspx?pageID=438&n=opposition-leader-tears-
government-apart-over-dink-murder-2007-02-02 (accessed October 4, 2015).
22 E. AVIV

74. “Anti-Secularist Groups in Power for First Time in Decades, Says Baykal,” Hürriyet
Daily News, 2 February 2007, http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/default.aspx?pageid=
438&n=anti-secularist-groups-in-power-for-first-time-in-decades-says-baykal-2006-
10-04 (accessed October 4, 2015).
75. Piricky, “The İsmailağa Community,” p. 554.
76. See http://www.İsmailağadernegi.org.tr/muhterem-basbakanimizdan-mahmud-Efendi
-hazretlerimizi-ziyaret (accessed October 24, 2016).
77. “Erdoğan’dan Mahmut Ustaosmanoğlu’na Ziyaret,” Radikal, 10 August 2014, http://
www.radikal.com.tr/politika/Erdoğandan-mahmut-Ustaosmanoğluna-ziyaret
-1205926/; https://twitter.com/search?q=%20%20Bu%20resim%20Mahmud%20Efendi
%20Hz.%20ve%20C%C3%BCbbeli%20Hocam%C4%B1z%C4%B1%20RTE%E2%80%
99ye%20kar%C5%9F%C4%B1t%20g%C3%B6stermeye%20%C3%A7al%C4%B1%C5%
9Fan%20paralel%20yap%C4%B1ya%20tokatt%C4%B1r&src=typd; https://twitter.com/
search?q=Tayyip%20Erdo%C4%9Fan%20a%C4%9Fabeyimiz%20han%C4%B1m%
C4%B1%20ve%20k%C4%B1z%C4%B1%20ile%20bu%20gece%20Mahmud%20Efendi
%20Hazretlerimizi%20ziyaret%20ettiler&src=typd (accessed November 4, 2015). The
third tweet was not found on Twitter.
78. See http://www.İsmailağacamii.com/cumhurbaskanimizi-tebrik-ve-dua-ediyoruz
(accessed November 24, 2015).
79. “Ustaosmanoğlu neden artık İsmailağa camisine gitmiyor,” ODATV,
5 December 2014, http://odatv.com/Ustaosmanoğlu-neden-artik-İsmailağa-camisine-
gitmiyor-0512141200.html (accessed October 2, 2015).
80. “İsmailağa’dan Erdoğan’a anlamli ziyaret,” Sabah, 30 September 2014, http://www.
sabah.com.tr/gundem/2014/09/30/İsmailağadan-Erdoğana-anlamli-ziyaret (accessed
November 2, 2015).
81. http://www.sabah.com.tr/webtv/turkiye/davutoglu-ismail-ustaosmanoglunun-
cenazesine-katildi (accessed May 2, 2015).
82. See http://www.İsmailağacamii.com/cumhurbaskanimiz-telefon-ederek-taziyede-
bulundular (accessed October 25, 2015).
83. See http://www.İsmailağa.org.tr/tesekkur-merhum-ismail-Ustaosmanoğlu-hoca-
Efendinin-cenaze-merasimine-katilim (accessed November 24, 2015).
84. See http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/2010/03/04/İsmailağa.cemaati.liderinin.
yegeni.cnn.turkte/18883.316040/index.htm (accessed September 13, 2015).
85. “Ustaosmanoğlu neden artık İsmailağa camisine gitmiyor,” ODATV,
5 December 2014, http://odatv.com/Ustaosmanoğlu-neden-artik-İsmailağa-camisine-
gitmiyor-0512141200.html (accessed October 2, 2015).
86. Kaan Gümüşel, “İsmailağa Cemaatinde ‘Vekillik’ tartışması! Adem Hoca konuştu,”
Medyaber, 2 December 2014, http://medyabar.com/haber/79743/İsmailağa-cemaatinde-
vekillik-tartismasi-adem-hoca-konustu.aspx (accessed September 23, 2015).
87. “İsmailağa Cemaati’nden hükümete sert eleştiri,” Radikal, September 20. 2014, http://
www.radikal.com.tr/politika/ismailaga-cemaatinden-hukumete-sert-elestiri-1213857/
(accessed November 3, 2015).
88. “Ustaosmanoğlu neden artık İsmailağa camisine gitmiyor,” ODATV,
5 December 2014, http://odatv.com/Ustaosmanoğlu-neden-artik-İsmailağa-camisine-
gitmiyor-0512141200.html (accessed October 2, 2015).
89. Ibid.
90. Tremblay, “Turkish Religious Order Tests AK Party’s Limits.”
91. Ibid.
92. See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=SzAjn3wipfM (accessed December 15, 2015).
 DEMOCRACY AND SECURITY 23

93. See http://odatv.com/İsmailağa-cemaatindeki-bacanak-kavgasi-alperenlere-sicradi

-2609141200.html (accessed May 14, 2015).
94. Tremblay, “Turkish Religious Order Tests AK Party’s Limits.”
95. “İsmailağa’dan Erdoğan’a anlamli ziyaret,” Sabah, 30 September 2014, http://www.
sabah.com.tr/gundem/2014/09/30/İsmailağadan-Erdoğana-anlamli-ziyaret (accessed
November 2, 2015).
96. “İsmailağa Cemaati’nde AK PARTY çatlağı,” Yurt, 4 June 2015, http://www.yurtgaze
tesi.com.tr/gundem/İsmailağa-cemaati-nde-AKPARTYarty-catlagi-h89570.html
(accessed September 23, 2015) .
97. See http://www.cnnturk.com/video/turkiye/2010/03/04/İsmailağa.cemaati.liderinin.
yegeni.cnn.turkte/18883.316040/index.html (accessed September 13, 2015).
98. On May 13, 2014, an explosion at a coal mine in Soma, Manisa, Turkey, caused an
underground mine fire, killing 301 people.
99. “İsmailağa Cemaati’nden 50 hoca Soma’da,” Yeni Akit, 17 May 2014, http://www.
yeniakit.com.tr/haber/İsmailağa-cemaatinden-50-hoca-somada-18281.html (accessed
May 15, 2015); Tremblay, “Turkish Religious Order Tests AK Party’s Limits.”
100. Hülür, “Technology and Naqshbandi Sufism,” pp. 331–332.
101. Ongun, “Cübbeli Ahmet’e ‘Zekât paralarını yiyor.’”
102. See http://odatv.com/İsmailağaya-allahin-sopasi-yok-dedirten-gelisme-0802161200.
html (accessed March 2, 2016).
103. Ibid.
104. Ibid.
105. “Turkish Police Demolish Parts of Complex Belonging to İsmailağa Community,”
Turkish Sun, 9 February 2016, http://theturkishsun.com/news/turkish-police-demolish
-parts-of-complex-belonging-to-İsmailağa-community/ (accessed March 12, 2016).
106. See http://www.İsmailağa.org.tr/kamuoyuna-duyuru-kulliye-yikim-haberleri-ile-ilgili
(accesssed March 13, 2016).
107. This assertion has been strongly denied by the Marifet Association on its Internet
program “Marifet Penceresi,” calling it “a slander”: http://www.İsmailağacemaati.com/
video/marifet-penceresi-ozel-bolumu-part-1-kulliyeye-dair-hersey-bu-programda-.
html (accessed March 23, 2016).
108. “İsmailağa Cemaati’nde iç tartışma büyüyor,” Timetürk, 22 February 2016, http://
www.timeturk.com/İsmailağa-cemaati-nde-ic-tartisma-buyuyor/haber-130910
(accessed March 1, 2016).
109. See http://www.ismailaga.org.tr/kamuoyuna-duyuru-kulliye-yikim-haberleri-ile-ilgili
(accessed March 1, 2016).
110. Ibid.
111. See http://odatv.com/İsmailağa-bolundu-1301161200.html (accessed March 3, 2016).
112. Ahmet Hakan, “Hükümet, İsmailağa Cemaati’ni gözden mi çıkardı?” Hürriyet,
9 February 2016, http://sosyal.hurriyet.com.tr/yazar/ahmet-hakan_131/hukumet-
İsmailağa-cemaatini-gozden-mi-cikardi_40051627 (accessed March 3, 2016).
113. Istanbul, 10 February 2016.
114. Cihaner was eventually arrested and charged with membership in the Ergenekon
group.
115. Jenkins, “Ergenekon, Sledgehammer.”
116. On this topic, see Ali Dağlar, Operasyon adı: Ağa 01 İsmailağa Cemaatinden Gülen
Cemaatine Uzanan bir Davanın perde arkası (Istanbul: Destek yayınları, 2010).
117. Ongun, “Cübbeli Ahmet’e ‘Zekât paralarını yiyor.’”
118. Ibid.
24 E. AVIV

119. In November 2013, Erdoğan began an action to close down FGM’s many prep schools
(the dershaneler) for purportedly serving as a parallel educational system, which is against
the Union of Education Law of 1925. (The issue is a sensitive one because the dershaneler
are considered incubators for the nation’s educational elite.) That clash was the public’s
first inkling of the depth of the rivalry. A month later, at the Dershane debate, friction
erupted openly between the groups, culminating in corruption charges being published by
the FGM against the AK Party. See Mohammad Jaber Thalji, “Prep Schools, Elections and
AK Party-Gulen Clashes,” Al-Jazeera, 14 April 2014, http://studies.aljazeera.net/en/
reports/2014/01/2014130112636877115.html (accessed May 15, 2017).
120. Millî Görüş is the political ideology and movement funded by Necmettin Erbakan
(1926–2011), who subsequently became prime minister of Turkey from 1996 until
1997, when he was pressured by the military to step down as prime minister and later
was banned from politics by the Constitutional Court of Turkey for violating the
separation of religion and state mandated by the constitution. Millî Görüş called for
strengthening Islamic values in Turkey and turning away from what Erbakan per-
ceived to be the negative influence of the Western world in favor of closer relations to
Muslim countries. With the Millî Görüş ideology, Erbakan was the founder and leader
of several prominent Islamic political parties in Turkey from the 1960s to the 2010s:
the Milli Nizam Partisi (National Order Party, 1970–71), the Millî Selâmet Partisi
(National Salvation Party, 1972–80), the Refah Partisi (Welfare Party) (1983–98), the
Fazilet Partisi (Virtue Party, 1998–2001), and the Saadet Partisi (Felicity Party, 2001–).
On Milli Görüiş, see Hakan Yavuz, Modernleşen müslümanlar: Nurcular, Nakşiler,
Milli Görüş ve AK Parti (İstanbul: Kitap Yayınevi, 2003); Efecan İnceoğlu, Türkiye”de
Siyasal İslamcılığın Evrimi (MA thesis, Ankara University, 2009).