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Topic Knowledge/Application Analysis Evaluation Government Policies to Solve

Technological Invention – Making something Improves Productivity Creative Destruction (unemployment) but Reduce Patent Power
Change entirely new/did not exist Lower Barriers to Entry competition and improved efficiency is
before e.g. microprocessor Lower starting Costs better for societal welfare
Innovation – Improvements on Improves Efficiency Microsoft 92% - 20% of Computers
something that has already Lower Cost of Production
been invented e.g. Apple’s First Reduced Need for Physical Depends on Industry – may erode, or
iPod Premises e.g. Missguided encourage monopoly power
Lower Prices - CS - Could have monopoly or perfect c.
Increased Choice
Encourages LR Dynamic Efficiency Could encourage Patent Power
Provides Perfect Information – E.g. Microsoft
Maximise Utility
Consumer Data Could Exploit Consumers
e.g. FB

Most are free to use at point of


consumption – so altering price would be
ineffective
Objectives of Profit Maximisation Supernormal Profit Divorce of Ownership and Control Maximum Price
Firms MC = MR High Dividends (Principle Agent Problem)
Apple - £400 per iPhone Lower Prices CS - Owners want high dividends Windfall Tax
Dynamic Efficiency - Managers want higher market
Allocative and Productive share for higher salaries and perks
Inefficiency
Revenue Maximise MR = 0 Knowledge of MR = MC is imperfect
Lower Price – Increased CS
Allows for Increased Market Share Even if a Firm Revenue Maximises, likely in
E.g. Amazon Kindles at Cost Price the LR they will Profit Maximise
Satisficing E.g. Netflix now increasing price £1-2
Prevents future high costs
E.g. Pret (no waste), DPD (all
electric cars)
Oligopolies Only a few large firms Assume MC = MR Collusion Occurs Strong enforcement to Deter
dominating the market Supernormal Profit AR > AC E.g. BA and Virgin 2007 £270 million Cartels – not worth risk
Specifically when the 5 firm High Prices – Lost CS OPEC
ratio is more than 60% Allocative Inefficiency P > MC Consumers are exploited – reduced CS Quality Checks
Big 4 Supermarkets – 70% Welfare Loss All round Inefficient
Duopoly Coke and Pepsi – 70% CS appropriated by Producer Misallocation of Resources (currently oil)
Big 6 Energy – 75% (Closer to AE than monopolies, as
Telecoms Big 4 – 85% oligopolies still must compete) Brand Loyalty Affects the impact of
Differentiated Goods – Less Very close to Productive Efficiency Lowering Prices
likely to be substitutes so Price High Economies of Scale
Makers Keep Costs Low May not choose to Reinvest profits
High Barriers to Entry and Exit – Keep Prices Low (Divorce of Ownership and Control)
Supernormal profits in LR Still Generate Profit
Interdependence Dynamic Efficiency – especially
Non-Price Competition Cartels

Interdependence – Kinked Demand


Not worth Increasing or decreasing
price
Game Theory (collusion)
Monopoly Neo-Classical view is that one Profit Maximise MC = MR Supernormal profit may not be reinvested Maximum Price
dominant firm has 100% market Supernormal profit AR > AC (Divorce of Ownership and Control) Likely to Cut cost in order to
share High Prices – Lost CS maintain Profit
Monopoly Power is 25% Allocative Inefficiency P > MC May Revenue Maximise in SR (Amazon),
E.g. Google 92% Welfare Loss but in the LR is likely to Profit Maximise Quality Checks
BT 33% CS appropriated by Produce
Tesco 27% Productively Inefficient – Because Contestability/Threat of Entry Profit Control
British Gas 27% of Lack of Comp. Or Diseconomies However, monopolist is likely to build Inefficiency
Apple 50% of Scale barriers to entry
Luxottica Eyewear 73% Dynamically Efficient – Reinvest (Adverts/ Predatory pricing) Windfall Tax
Differentiated Goods so Lack of Patent Power Shell £14 billion 2021
Substitutes = Price Makers Natural Monopoly Argument Bp £13 billion 2021
Higher Barriers to Entry/Exit – Cross Subsidisation Falling LRAC
Supernormal Profits in LR Continuing Economies of Scale Merger Policy
Imperfect Information Huge Fixed Costs Asda and Sainsbury’s
Heavily Regulated by CMA as High MES EE and BT (Takeover)
likely to exploit Consumers Avoid Wasteful Duplication of Resources O2 and Virgin Media

A Monopoly is purely theoretical, in Privatisation/Nationalisation


context monopoly power means firms will
still face competition e.g. Tesco Deregulation
Contestable No Barriers to Entry = High Firms cannot sustain production at Firms may be hesitant to expand by fear of Regulation to prevent anti-
and Non- Threat of Entry MC = MR Hit and Run Entry competitive pricing
Contestable Large Pool of Potential Entrants Supernormal Profits attract new Reduced Economies of Scale
Perfect Information entrants Nationalisation/Privatisation
Incumbent Firms are vulnerable Reduce Price and Increase Quantity Quality may be sacrificed to Reduce costs
to Hit and Run Increased CS However taking shortcuts harms LR market Deregulation e.g. Airlines
Baumol Theory Better Allocative Efficiency share Ryanair – No Frills Service
Firms are not simply Maybe more Productive
contestable or incontestable, Lower Cost Creative Destruction Subsides to Small Firms
there is a degree of Lower Prices Incumbent firms shut down and
Contestability Benefit from Economies of Scale unemployment
E.g. Taxi Drivers that new firms will not have Benefits of Competition outweigh costs
Firms should continue to cut cost,
in case potential entrants become Other Barriers to Entry may remain high
a reality E.g. if incumbent firms generated Barriers,
Dynamic Efficiency is unlikely to be Government will struggle to fix this
achieved

Nationalisation Transfer of Assets from the Natural Monopoly Inefficient as state lack profit incentive to Public Private Partnerships
Private to the Public Sector Continuous Economies of Scale keep costs low Competitive Tendering
E.g. Railways in Scotland Falling LRAC Productive Inefficiency Firms buy franchises from the
Huge Fixed Costs X-Inefficiency Government
High MES Moral Hazard However, even with this policy,
Avoids the wasteful duplication of large Government subsidies are
Resources Diseconomies of Scale if too Large still required (£3-4 billion)
Allocative Efficiency
Public Sector Considers Private and Opportunity Cost, Budge Deficit
Social Costs/Benefits
Maximise Social Welfare Depends on current size of Private Firms
Social Optimum Small = nationalisation can bring about
Lower Prices – Higher CS greater benefits of EoS
Lack of Supernormal Profits

Privatisation Sale of Government owned Likely to form a Contracting out of services is likely to Public Private Partnerships
Assets to the Private Sector monopoly/oligopoly increase Government Cost Competitive Tendering
(If barriers to entry are high) Opportunity Copts, Budget Deficit Firms buy franchises from the
Firms are incentivised for efficiency Government
Generates significantly high Profit Maximise Natural Monopoly Argument However, even with this policy,
Gov. Revenue to reduce Supernormal Profits Continuous Economies of Scale large Government subsidies are
National Debt Dynamic Efficiency Falling LRAC still required (£3-4 billion)
E.g. Royal Mail Huge Fixed Costs
£3.3bn Or could become like Perfect High MES
Competition Avoids Wasteful Duplication of Resources
Normal Profit
Allocative and Productive Efficiency

Deregulation The removal of rules and More like Perfect Competition High levels of Competition may force Regulation is necessary to
regulations in order to increase Allocative Efficiency investment in Dynamic Efficiency Prevent Market Abuses
the efficiency of markets Productive Efficiency
E.g. Air Traffic Regulations and Lower Cost – Higher CS If non-legal barriers to entry are still high,
Flight Tax Normal Profit – Less Dynamic firms will not enter the market
Encourages Ryanair – No Frill Efficiency (Monopolies/Oligopolies will form)
Service
Up to 40 competitive low cost Quality may be reduced
airlines Unlikely as competition is still high
Perfectly Theoretical All workers are homogenous so all Labour is not homogenous
Competitive Infinite number of employees workers will be offered equilibrium Different MRPs
Labour Markets and employers wage rate Leads to Wage Differentials
All workers homogenous (No wage Differentials) Incentive to Gain Qualifications
Firms and workers are Wage Supply = MCL = AC = Wage
Takers of equilibrium wage rate Firms are profit maximisers, will Geographical and Occupational Immobility
No Barriers to Entry/Exit into a only employ up to where
Profession MRP = MCL(Wage) Imperfect Information
Perfect Knowledge
Perfect Mobility of Labour Trade Unions and NMW
E.g. Closely related – factory
workers Monopsony Employers
Imperfectly Monopsony – A market with a In a competitive Labour market, Promotion of Trade Union Power
Competitive single dominant buyer of labour wage and quantity is offered where E.g. Unison, National Education
Labour Markets Monopsony power is the AC (Supply) = MRP (Demand) Union
difference between MRP and A monopsony can afford to profit
wage offered by monopsonist maximise (MRP = MCL) NMW
Government for School Lower Wage £9.50/hour
Teachers Less Employment
NHS for nurses
Amazon has some degree of Shows that monopsonies exploit
Power as it is a huge employer and under-employ workers
of factory and delivery workers
Trade Unions A group of workers which make Bargain for wages higher than Strength and Power depends on Union Regulation to Reduce Union
use of collective bargaining to competitive Wage Rate Density Power
increase their wages Increased wage Determine whether actions like strikes will Maintain international
E.g. Unision Higher Disposable Income actually make a difference competitiveness of economy
National Education Union Higher Standard of living E.g. unions are only allowed to
Higher Cost to Firm State of Economy – Boom strike if a certain percentage
Reduce Quantity Employed to agree in a vote
maintain profit Firms may shut down, further increasing
Increased Unemployment unemployment

Opportunity Cost for State Wages

Trade Union Working in Monopsonies


Establish the higher wage where MC = MR
Increases wage without increasing
unemployment
NMW A statutory minimum wage Increased Wage Comparison to National Living Wage Subsidies for Workers
used to increase the earnings of Higher Disposable Income
the low paid Increased Living Standards 20% of UK Still Live in Poverty
£9.50/hour Reduced Poverty
Higher incentive to Work Level of Unemployment is dependent on
Increased Tax Revenue Elasticity of Demand and Supply for L
(Direct and Indirect)
Increased Productivity Government Failure - Low skilled are likely
Increased Cost for Firms to lose jobs first, despite NMW being
Reduce Q employed to maintain implemented to protect them
profit
Increased Unemployment In-work Poverty – Cost of Living Crisis

Opportunity Cost for State Wages

Higher costs = higher Prices

Encourage Training and Education so that


MRP > NMW
Self-Employed are not Eligible
Recent Court Ruling for Uber Drivers
Discrimination When workers are paid Perceived MRP of the Workers may boost their wage if they Government Legislation
different wages, for equal work, discriminated group is lower than prove their productivity Gender Discrimination Acts
with no different skill sets or Actual MRP However, this is dependent on the Equality Acts
costs of employment Reduces Demand for these workers employers attitudes towards the group Governments must enforce
UK has Gender Pay Gap of 7.9% Leads to Underemployment and Higher Opportunity Cost
5th Largest in Europe Low Wages Strikes and Disputes – Extra Cost
Reduces Cost for employers
Lower Prices Lack of Diversity
Will fail to attract most
desirable/productive workers

Economy is below productive potential

Brain Drain
Income, Wealth Income – A flow of money to a Incentivises people to gain skills Social Tensions Progressive Taxes
and Poverty factor of production (usually and qualifications to earn high Crime and Rioting Disincentivise work
labour) incomes Voluntary Unemployment
Wealth – A stock of valuable Economic Growth Rich have a high MPS so trickle down is Brain Drain
assets such as property/shares Trickle Down Effect unlikely to occur Slower Economic Growth
Relative Poverty – Earning less
than 60% of the country’s Strain on Welfare System Low Social Mobility NMW
median income (22%) Poor Educational Attainment
Absolute Poverty – When Poor Health High Opportunity Cost Benefits
people cannot afford the basic Poverty Trap Jobseekers Allowance Disincentivise Work
necessities to sustain life Poverty Cycle Universal Credit – Calls for £20 rise to be
Gini coefficient = 0.34 before reinstalled Education and Training
Pandemic Furlough Scheme – 9.3 million people Increase MRP
0.363 now (More unequal) Could have been more efficient without? Takes Long Time
Indirect Tax for A good which is over consumed MPB > MSB Inelasticity means price will increase, Instead opt for Minimum Price
Demerit Goods in the free market Cost to 3rd Parties (NHS) quantity will not decrease proportionally
E.g. Alcohol and Cigarettes Consumers ignore social benefit Regressive Information Provision
Over-Consumed
A Tax on spending Welfare Loss from Socially LR Gov. Revenue can be hypothecated
E.g. £200/tonne of plastic not Optimum Level
made from >30% recycled
Sugar levy 18p per litre of drink Increases the cost of Production Government Failure – Black Market selling
5-8g of sugar Likely to be inelastic, so much of unregulated Goods
Cigarette Tax generated Gov. the tax is passed onto the Cigarette Black Market is estimated to be
£8.8billion 2020 consumer worth £2billion per year
MPC shifts Upwards Nanny State
Price Increases However price mechanism still allows
Quantity Decreases consumers to choose their own behaviour
Now at Socially Optimum level
Subsides for A good which is under MSB > MPB To what extent is the subsidy passed on for Instead opt for Maximum Price
Merit Goods consumed in the free market Benefits to 3rd Parties (Growth) Lower Consumer Prices This would cause large Excess
E.g. Dental Care Consumers ignore social Benefit Demand
Under-Consumed Government Failure – Firms using subsidy
A payment made to producers, Welfare Loss from Socially to pay off debt/increase wages Information Provision
to encourage increased Optimum Level
production of a good/service Elasticity State Provision
CAP – 60 billion Euros Reduce the Cost of Production
US Subsidy for Dairy and Meat MPC Shifts downwards LR financing via higher Taxes
$38 billion Price Falls Opportunity Cost
Quantity Increases
Now at Socially Optimum level Size
State Provision A good which is not provided by State maximises social welfare by Technology is making the provision of Determine a role for the Private
of Public Goods the free market (Complete considering private and social costs public goods more excludable Sector
Market Failure) and benefits E.g. Dart Charge (Quasi-Public Good) Ideally those who can afford
Must be non-excludable and State provision allows for universal Perhaps state provision is not always private provision should pay for it
non-rival Access required to reduce burden on public
Free Rider Problem State allocates resources at the services
e.g. Flood Defences socially optimum level of fixed High Opportunity Cost which must be However, public goods must be
supply funded by Tax non-excludable
Government providing Does lead to Excess Demand E.g. 1.25% National Insurance increase for Rich would not tolerate well
resources so that they are free No-one is excluded from the most Health and Social Care Levy paying high taxes for public
at the point of consumption important of goods goods, that they are not eligible
E.g. Education and Healthcare Dealing with Excess demand to use
E.g. Waiting Lists

Strain on Public Services

State Run Organisations are inefficient


Lack Profit Motive
Minimum Price A price floor placed above the Price is increased Intervention Buying would not take place Tax
free market equilibrium, below Quantity Demanded falls to the for Demerit Goods Creates Government Revenue
which the price cannot fall Socially Optimum Level As a result, producers would be at a loss Hypothecation
E.g. Alcohol Consumption Quantity Supplied Increases
Excess Supply Inelastic so likely to not reduce Quantity
Demanded much
Would require a very high min. Price
Regressive

Has been effective in Scotland and Wales


(Scottish Alcohol Consumption fell by 7.7%)

Government Failure – Setting Price at right


level to eliminate negative externalities by
accounting for social cost

Government Failure – Black Market


Maximum Price A price ceiling below the free Price is decreased Formation of a black market as an Subsidise Production to increase
market equilibrium, above Lower profits to firms alternative method of accessing good supply and reduce excess
which price cannot be Quantity Demanded rises Leads to Price Exploitation demand
E.g. Energy Cap Quantity supplied falls
Risen by about 54% by about Large Excess Demand Reduce excess demand by excluding those State provision to increase supply
£700 who do not need Max. Price and reduce excess demand
40% of UK in Fuel Poverty E.g. Rent Controls only for those with
Main cause of Cost of Living incomes below a threshold
Crisis
Size of Maximum Price – 40% in fuel
poverty
Information Information Failure – When Consumers become more aware of Effective in reducing smoking since late Changing the price (either
Provision economic agents do not know the MSB of their consumption 1900s through taxation, subsidies or
everything they need to know in Shifts MPB closer to MSB price controls triggers the price
order to make a fully informed (Or all the way) Opportunity Cost mechanism)
decision Price and Quantity are Closer to Could be funded from Taxation Signals to change
Asymmetric Information – Socially Optimum Level (Hypothecation) Incentivises Change
Information failure where one Welfare Loss is Reduced Rationalises the Change
economic agent knows more Government Failure – Low Quality And Allocates Resources more
than the other, giving them Information efficiently
more power in the transaction e.g. Low Uptake of the Green Homes Grant Could be more effective
Irrational Decisions
Consumers are only looking to maximise
Government providing private utility
information in the forms of May not effect their behaviour
Campaigns and Adverts to
increase consumption of merit Requires a long time period
goods and decrease
consumption of demerit goods Marketing power of Firms/ Brand Loyalty is
stronger than Government Campaign
E.g. Anti-Smoking
Better Health Campaign
Sport England – Uniting the
Movement Campaign
Regulation Rules/Laws used to control or Depends on regulation, may Likelihood of effectiveness is dependent on May Consider:
restrict the actions of economic increase/decrease supply or enforcement and punishments for
agents, in order to reduce demand Breaking Regulation Tax
market failure Reduce Welfare Loss
Regulation carried out by Reach Socially Optimum Level Opportunity cost Subsidy
regulatory bodies e.g. OfGem Especially of enforcement, otherwise there
E.g. Banning of Smoking in is no point in implementing Price Controls
Public Places
Legal Drinking Age Difficult to set at correct level Information Provision
Banning of new fuel cars from Government’s have asymmetric knowledge
2030 of markets

Government Failure – Black Market

Nanny State – Does not leave economic


agents to make decision based on price
mechanism
Solving Tragedy of Commons – The MSC > MPC Very Difficult to Distribute Rights Pollution Permits – Combines the
Negative overuse or exploitation of Cost to 3rd Parties (Pollution) E.g. To Sea and Air market forces and regulation to
Production resources, (oceans, forests, air), Producers ignore social cost allow carbon dioxide emissions
Externalities that are not owned by Over—Produced Opportunity Cost of Administration and Government issue permits
individuals/organisations Welfare Loss from the Socially Enforcement Firms can invest in Green
Optimum Level Technology, reduce production or
Dependent on enforcement, in order to be buy permits
successful
Property Rights – The legal Increase incentive to maintain Overtime Government reduces
rights of ownership of use of an resource International Market Failure requires the number of permits in the Free
economic resource MPC increases (closer to MSC) International solution market
Reduces Over-production E.g. Tackling Climate Change
Reduces Welfare Loss However,
Closer to Socially Optimum Level Opportunity Cost
Difficulty Setting Cap at Correct
Level (can be adjusted in LR)
Government When Government Intervention High Opportunity Cost, which without Free Market Economic Theory
Failure in the market reduces overall Budget Surplus, must be funded either
welfare. through borrowing (increasing future Theory of the Invisible Hand
Worse she the misallocation of taxation), or financial cuts to other public Economic Agents will maximise
Resources sectors social utility if everyone acts in
E.g. Black Markets their individual best interest
Green Homes Grant If Government failure is very high, there is
Regulatory Capture – Causing rationale for no intervention even if market
the 2008 Financial Crisis failure occurs.

Benefits should outweigh the costs

Government intervention should be


avoided, in order to reduce the risk of
Government Failure

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