273 THE SAGE H A N D 8 0 0 K OF PUBLIC A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
(eds), Can the Government Govem? W a s h i n g t o n , D i s a b l e m e n t P e n s i ó n A d m i n i s t r a t i o n ' , Scandinavian
DC: B r o o k l n g s I n s t i t u t i o n , p p . 2 6 7 - 3 2 9 .
O ' T o o l e , L a u r e n c e J., Jr ( 2 0 0 0 ) ' R e s e a r c h o n Policy
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n : A s s e s s m e n t a n d P r o s p e c t s ' , Journal
ofPublic Administraron Research and Theory, 1 0 ( 2 ) :
i 263-2S8.
O ' T o o l e , L a u r e n c e J., Jr a n d MonTjoy, R o b e r t S. ( 1 9 8 4 )
' i n t e r o r g a n a a t i o n a l Policy I m p l e m e n t a t i o n : A
T h e o r e t i c a l P e r s p e c t i v e ' , Public Administration
Review, 4*1(6): 4 9 1 - 5 0 3 .
P a r k e r , C h r i s t i n e a n d N i e l s e n , V i b e k e L e h m a n n (eds)
( 2 0 1 2 ) Explaining Compliance: Business Responses
to Regulation. C h e l t e n h a m : E d w a r d Elgar
P r e s s m a n , J e f f r e y l. a n d W i t ó a v s k y , A a r o n ( 1 9 7 3 )
Implementation. 8 e r k e l e y , CA: U n i v e r s l t y of
California Press.
Riccucci, N o r m a M. ( 2 0 0 5 ) How Management Matters:
Street-Level Bureaucrats and Welfare Reform.
W a s h i n g t o n , DC: G e o r g e t o w n University P r e s s .
Rossi, P e t e r H. a n d F r e e m a n , h i o w a r d £. ( 1 9 8 9 )
Evaiuation, 4 t h e d n . L o n d o n : S a g e P u b l i c a t i o n s .
S a b a t i e r , Paul A. ( 1 9 8 6 ) ' T o p - D o w n a n d B o t t o m - U p
A p p r o a c h e s to I m p l e m e n t a t i o n R e s e a r c h : A Critica!
A n a l y s i s a n d S u g g e s t e d S y n t h e s i s ' , . Journal of Public
Policy, 6(1): 2 1 - 4 8 .
S a b a t i e r , P a u l A. a n d J e n k i n s - S m i t h , K a n k C. (eds)
( 1 9 9 3 ) Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy
Coalltion Approach. B o u l d e r , CO: W e s t v i e w
Press.
S c h r a m , S a n f o r d F., Soss, J o e , F o r d i n g , R i c h a r d C., a n d
H o u s e r , Linda ( 2 0 0 9 ) ' D e c i d i n g t o Discipline: R a c e ,
C h o l e e , a n d P u n l s h m e n t a t t h e F r o n t l i n e s of W e l f a r e
R e f o r m ' , American Socological Review 7 4 ( 3 ) :
398-422.
Tyler, T o m R. ( 2 0 0 6 ) Why People Obey the Law.
P r i n c e t o n , NJ: P r i n c e t o n University P r e s s .
W e a t h e r a l l , C. D. a n d M a r k w a r d t , K.S. ( 2 0 1 0 )
Caseworker Behavior and Clients' Employability.
C o p e n h a g e n : SFl - D a n i s h N a t i o n a l C e r n e r for
Social R e s e a r c h W o r k i n g P a p e r Seríes 0 4 .
W i l l i a m s , W a l t a n d E l m o r e , Richard F. ( e d s ) ( 1 9 7 6 )
Social Program Implementation, N e w York:
A c a d e m i c Press.
W i n t e r , S s r e n ( 1 9 8 6 a ) ' S t u c y i n g t h e I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of
Top-Down Policies from the Bottom-Up:
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n of D a n i s h Y o u t h E m p l o y m e n t Policy',
in Ray C. Rist (ed.), Finding Work: Cross National
Perspeetives on Employment and Training. N e w
York: T h e F a l m e r Press, p p . 1 0 9 - 1 3 8 .
Winter, Ssren (1986b) 'How Policy-Making Affects
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n : T h e D e c e n t r a l i z a t i o n of t h e D a n i s h
Political 5tudies, 9 ( 4 ) : 3 6 1 - 3 8 5 .
Winter, Ssren (1990) 'Integrating Implementation
R e s e a r c h ' , In D e n n i s J. P a l u m b o a n d D o n a l d J.
Calista (eds), Implementation and the Policy Process.
N e w York: G r e e n w o o d Press, p p . 1 9 - 3 8 .
Winter, Ssren (1999) ' N e w Dlrectlonsfor Implementation
R e s e a r c h ' , Policy Currents - Newsletter of the Public
Policy Design and.
Policy Secion of the American Political Science
Association, 8(4): ¡ - 5 .
W i n t e r , S s r e n C. ( 2 0 0 2 ) Explaining Street-Level
Bureaucratic Behavior in Social and Regularon/ Implementation
Policles. P a p e r p r e p a r e d f o r t h e a n n u a l m e e t i n g of
t h e A m e r i c a n Political S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n in 8 o s t o n ,
29 A u g u s t to 1 S e p t e m b e r 2002. Danish National
P e t e r J. M a y
I n s t i t u t e of Social R e s e a r c h , C o p e n h a g e n .
W i n t e r , S s r e n C. ( 2 0 0 3 ) Political Control, Street-Level
'•'•ÍPÍSi1
Bureaucrats and Information Asymmetry in
Regulatory and Social Policies. P a p e r p r e s e n t e d a i
t h e a n n u a l m e e t i n g of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n f o r P u b l i c
Poiicy A n a l y s i s a n d M a n a g e m e n t h e l d in W a s h i n g t o n ,
DC, 6 - 8 N o v e m b e r . D a n i s h N a t i o n a l I n s t i t u t e of
Social R e s e a r c h , C o p e n h a g e n .
W i n t e r , S s r e n C. ( 2 0 0 5 ) Effects of Casework: The
Relation between Implementation and Social Effects INTRQDUCTIQN carries forward into policy implementa-
in Danish Integration Policy. P a p e r p r e s e n t e d a t t h e tion (see B a r d a c h , 1977; B r o d k i n , 1990;
2 0 0 5 R e s e a r c h C o n f e r e n c e of t h e A s s o c i a t i o n f o r P u b l i c policies set f o r t h c o u r s e s of action f o r N a k a m u r a a n d S m a l l w o o d . 1980).
Public Policy a n d M a n a g e m e n t , W a s h i n g t o n , DC, A p r i m a r y i s s u e of r e l e v a n c e to p u b l i c
a d d r e s s i n g p r o b l e m s or f o r p r o v i d i n g g o o d s
3 - 6 November.
and services to s e g m e n t s of society. P o l i c i e s a d m i n i s t r a t i o n is understanding how the
W i n t e r , S s r e n C. a n d B a v i s k a r , S i d d h a r t h a ( 2 0 1 0 )
c o m e in a variety of f o n n s that i n c l u d e legis- i m p l e m e n t a t i o n of a policy is s h a p e d b o t h by
Street-Level Sureaucacy and Performance: A Cross-
lación. executive orders, rules, or other offi- the design of the p o l i c y and the f o r c e s that
Policy Analysis. P a p e r p r e s e n t e d a t t h e 2 0 1 0 m e e t -
cial acts. T h e s e authorities d o m o r e than i n f l u e n c e the w a y the policy is c a n i e d out.
ing of t h e M i d w e s t Political S c i e n c e A s s o c i a t i o n ,
C h i c a g o , IL, 2 2 - 2 5 April. simply a n n o u n c e a c o u r s e of action. Policies T h e m a i n a r g u m e n t of this c h a p t e r is that
W i n t e r , S e r e n C. a n d M a y , P e t e r J. ( 2 0 0 1 ) ' M o t l v a t i o n s typically c o n t a i n a set of i n t e n t i o n s o r goals, policy d e s i g n s p r o v i d e both the b l u e p r i n t
for Compliance with Envlronmental Reguiations', a m i x of í n s t r u m e n t s o r m e a n s f o r a c c o m - f o r c a i r y i n g out p o l i c i e s and the f o c i f o r
Journal of Policy Analysis and Management, 2 0 ( 4 ) : p l i s h i n g the intentions. a d e s i g n a t i o n of g o v - e f f o r t s to s h o r e u p o r u n d e r m i n e policy
675-698. e r n m e n t a l and n o n - g o v e n i m e n t a l e n t i t i e s implementation.
W i n t e r , S s r e n C. a n d M a y , P e t e r j. ( 2 0 0 2 ) ' I n f o r m a t i o n , c h a r g e d with c a r r y i n g out the intentions, and Relatively lirtle is k n o w n b e y o n d b r o a d
I n t e r e s t s , a n d E n v i r o n m e n t a l R e g u l a t i o n ' , Journal of generalities about w h a t constitutes well-
an allocatíon of r e s o u r c e s f o r the requisite
Comparative Policy Analysis, 4(2): 1 1 5 - 1 4 2 .
tasks. I n short. these s p e c i f y a policy d e s i g n d e s i g n e d policies. T h i s p r e s e n t s c h a l l e n g e s
W i n t e r , S e r e n C. a n d N i e l s e n , V i b e k e L e h m a n n ( 2 0 0 8 )
for accomplishing a public purpose. f o r those w h o s e e k a better u n d e r s t a n d i n g of
Implementering afpolitik. C o p e n h a g e n : A c a d é m i c a .
C h o i c e s that are m a d e a b o u t the relevant the r e l a t i o n s h i p s b e t w e e n policy d e s i g n a n d
W i n t e r , S a r e n C., D i n e s e n , P e t e r T „ a n d M a y , P e t e r J.
( 2 C 0 3 a ) Implementation Regimes and Street-Level policy i n s t r u m e n t s . the entities that c a r r y out i m p l e m e n t a t i o n . Various strands of literacure
Bureaucrats: Employment Service Delivery in the policy, the available r e s o u r c e s , and the in p u b l i c a d m i n i s t r a t i o n and political science
Denmark. SFl W o r k i n g P a p e r Serles 12. actions to b e t a k e n establish a b l u e p r i n t f o r address aspeets of these c h a l l e n g e s . One
W i n t e r , S s r e n C., S k o u , M e t t e H „ a n d B e e r , F r e d e r i k k e policy i m p l e m e n t a d o n . T h a t p a t h is f u r t h e r strand considere the a s s u m p t i o n s a n d valúes
( 2 0 0 8 b ) Eñective Management for National or Local signaled by the l a b e l i n g of t h e policy, the that enter into policy design (see B o b r o w
Policy Objectives? Implementing Welfare Sanction l a n g u a g e u s e d to c o m m u n i c a t e p o l i c y goals, and D r y z e k . 19S7; I n g r a h a m , 1987; L i n d e r
Policy in Denmark. SFl W o r k i n g P a p e r S e r i e s 1 4 . and m o n i t o r i n g by p o ü t i c i a n s a f t e r policy and Peters, 1984). A s e c o n d strand c a t a l o g s
e n a e t m e n t . B e c a u s e of these actions, the policy i n s t r u m e n t s that m a k e up the e l e m e n t s
n e x u s b e t w e e n politics and- policy m a k i n g of p o l i c i e s (see H o o d , 1983; M c D o n n e l l
280 THE SAGE H A N D 8 0 0 K OF PUBUC A D M I N I S T R A R O N
and Elmore, 1987; Salamon, 1989, 2002;
Schneider and Ingram, 1990). A third strand
coasiders che way in which policies structure
implementation and send signáis about
desired courses of action (see Elmore, 1987;
Goggin et al., 1990; Smith and Ingram,
2002). A fourth strand considers how choices
about policy targets and instruments shape
the reactions to the policies and tbeir
eventual durability (see Patashnik. 2008;
Schneider and Ingram. 1997).
This chapter draws from these strands of
literature in discussing the interplay of policy
design and implementation. The fírst part
of tbe chapter addresses the ways that policy
designs shape the course of policy imple-
mentation. The second part of the chapter
considers how this relates to different politi-
cal environments. The third part of the chap-
ter addresses choices for policy design along
witfr unresolved issues.
1NFLUENCE OF POLICY DESIGN
ON IMPLEMENTATION
The crafting of policies typically entails a
long process of analysis of problems and
options, give-and-take over politically accept-
able courses of action, and an authoritative
decisión to enact a policy. In oae of the
earlier writings on this topic, John Dryzek
defines policy design as 'the process of
mvenóng. developing and fine-tuning a
course of action with the amelioration of
some problem [in mind]' (1983: 346). The
design perspective in particular calis atten-
tion to matching content of a given policy to
the political context in wbich the policy is
formulated and implemented (see Linder
andPeters, 1984,1989; May, 1991; Schneider
and Ingram, 1997).
Different design contentions
It is undisputed that policies signal desired
courses of action and suucture implementation.
Less sectled, howevcr. are the ways in which
different policy designs either hinder or
facilítate implementation. An extensive set
of case studies of implementation shortfalls
suggest that problems arise from inadequate
specification of desired actions and from
failure to include features that overcome
basic conflicts among tliose cairying out
policies. Building upon these case studies, an
influential body of theorizing and research
(see Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983; Van
Meter and Van Hom, 1975) points to the
ways that implementation is limited by key
attributes of policies (i.e.. lack of goal claiity
and inconsistency in goals), complex chains
of implementing actioos and indirect control
(i.e., múltiple actors, decisión points, and
levels of action). and by other non-statutory
factors (i.e., problem intractability, unsup-
portive political environments).
The message of these s&dies is cot par-
ticularly optimistic about implementation
prospects given that most policies lack goal
clarity and have complex implementation
structures. The basic prescription for enhanc-
ing implementation from this line of research
is a cali for 'statutory coherence' that is
brought about by clear goals and' simple
implementation structures (see Mazmanian
and Sabatier, 1981, 1983). This prescription
fails to recognize the political realities
that account for policies with múltiple goals,
vague language, and complex implementa-
tion structures. The stated goals or intent of
policies, as found in preambles to statutes,
are often so vague as to provide Iáttle
basis for guiding actions. As noted by
Schneider and Ingram (1997: 82-84),
policy goals can be framed broadly or
nanrowly, be opaque, or may be largely sym-
bolic or hortatory (see also Stone. 1997: 37).
Eugene Bardach suggests this leaves
room for renegociados of goals during imple-
mentation by diverse partners in one of
several directions: 'trimming them back,
distorting or preventing them, or even adding
to them in a manner that eventually leads
to an unsupportable political burden"
(1977: 85).
POLICY DESIGN A N O I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
A different perspective is offered by those
who argüe that the appropriate crafting of
policies can overcome implementation diffi-
culties attributable to vague goals and com-
plex implementation structures (see Elmore,
1987; Goggin et al.. 1990; May. 1993; Scoker,
1991). According to this viewpoint. imple-
mentation prospects are enhanced through
tbiee sets of policy provisions. One set are
those provisions that build the capacity of
intermediarles to carry out requisite actions.
Capacity-building instruments include fund-
iog, education and training, and technical
assistanoe. A second seí are policy provisions
that foster increased commitment of interme-
diarles to the basic policy goals. Commitmepc-
building instruments include publicity
about policy goals. authorizaáon for citizen
suits against inadequate implementation.
sanctions for failing to act, cost-sharing
requirements, and incentives to carry out
programs. A third set are policy provisions
that help to signal desired courses of action.
These include oversight mechanisms and
publicity about successful implementation
practices. These mechanisms entail wbat
Howlett (2000) labels procedural policy
instruments aimed at intermediaries, rather
than substantive provisions aimed at the
targets of policy.
The thomy problems of intergovemmental
implementation were highüghted in fiist-
generation ca?e studies of implementation
failures (see Derthick, 1972; Presssman and
Wildavsky, 1973). Those problems are all the
more evident for poiieies that address diffuse
problems - dealing with inmigración. pro-
viding health care, refonning education.
strengthening emergeney management, and
so on - that requixe actions at múltiple levels
of govemment as well as by public and prí-
vate sector entiti.es. Because many policies
establish overJappiag authorities andrespon-
sibilities for implementation, shared govern-
ance is the norm rather thah the exception.
Added to this mix is the increased extensive
involvement of non-governmental actors
in policy implementation, leading to what
public management scholars have more
281
recently labeled 'dispersad collaborative
authority' (Moynihan et al., 2011). The chal-
lenges of successful implementation for such
policies are well illustrated by Kathryn
McDermott's study of education reform in
Massachusetts in which she found that
'pooriy thought-out incentive structures,
lack of capacity, and lack'of trust impeded
implementation' (2006: 45).
Some research suggests the implementa-
tion conflicts that arise from shared govern-
ance and dispersed collaborative authority
can be ameliorated as part of policy designs.
Goggin et a]. (1990) fiad, in what they
labelas the 'communication model' of imple-
mentation, that differences in state-level
implementation of federal programs can
be explained by variation in the clarity and
consistency in the communication of policy
intent. Stoker (1991) describes successful
implementation by states and localiti.es of
reforms of the federal National School Lunch
Program that he attributes to the programs
establishment of incentives for cióse cooper-
ation among different ímplementers.
Other research has highüghted the mobili-
zation of stakeholders in support of common
goals as a way of addressing dispersed col-
laborative authority and diffuse goals (see
Chisholm. 1989: 29-33; O'Toole, 2003).
One set of notable examples of use of such
mobilization in addressing diffuse problems
consists of a range of programs and policies
that employ public information campaigns.
Janet Weiss (2002) discusses the use of this
tool for information previsión about hartos
and ways to address them (e.g., Smokey Bear
campaign and wildfires, information about
environmentally responsible recycling) or in
establishing processes of information collec-
úon and dissemination that in turn seek to
lessen harms (e.g., food and cigarette labeling).
Policy instruments and
policy design
The research findings that suggest key fea-
tures of policy designs can be altered to

282 THE SAGE H A N D 8 0 0 K OF PUBLIC A D M I N I S T R A R O N
enhance implementation leads to considera-
tion of the components of public policies.
One of the conceptual sbifts in implementa-
tion research from the 1970s to the 1990s is
a shift from the study of policies and pro-
grams to a study of different policy instru-
ments or tools that are pan of policies and
programs. With this, scholarly attention
shifeed from addressing the content of a
policy as a whole to understanding the work-
ings and politics of the components of the
policy. These components are variously
labeled as policy instruments or as policy
tools. The basic notion is that any given
policy incorporates a variety of means or
tools for accomplishing objectives that
include maudaces, incentives (e.g., granes,
loans, tax expendí tures), penalües (e.g.. sanc-
tions, fines), and information provision.
Although this change in focus from the
study of policy content as a whole to the
study of policy instruments provides a
stronger analytic basis for unpacking poli-
cies. there is little agreement about the rele-
vant components of policies. Over a dozen
different typologies of policy instruments
have been devised that vary in terms of theix
ievei of specifcation and their scope (for
overviews see Salamon, 1989, 2002; Vedung.
1998). While there is conceptual agreement
that policy instruments are the building
blocks of policies. there is little agreement
about the basic instruments. The more spe-
cific and comprehensive categorizatíons
identify 10 to 15 instruments. For example,
one commonly cited compilaüon (Salamon.
2002) addresses the foüowing 14 tools: direct
government provision. governmental corpo-
rations and sponsored enterprises. economic
regulation, social regulation. govemment
insurance, public infonnation, charges and
specíal taxes. contracting, purchase-of-
service contracting, granes, loans and loan
guarantees, tax expenditures, vouchers. and
tort liability.
Other taxonomies of policy instruments
are more parsimonious in their classificaüon
of instruments. Elmore (1987) draws a dis-
tinction among mandates as rules that are
Mm
intended to produce compliance, induce-
ments as conditional transfers of money for
provision of specified services, capacity-
building tools that invest in development of
future services. and system-changing tools
that transfer authority in order to alter service
delivery. Schneider and Ingram (1990) pro-
vide a related analytic distinction among
authority tools that prescribe desired behav-
iors, inducements and sanctions that alter
calculated behaviors, capacity-building tools
chat enhance abilities, and hortatory tools
that are used to cajole action.
The strength of the üterature about policy
tools is development of an understanding of
how each tool works. the key featuies and
variants of each tool. and the strengths and
weakness of each tool. In developing this
understanding, the literature has taken a
somewhat technocratic perspective that is
fairly devoid of consideración of the linkages
among problems, tools, and outeomes. Guy
Peters argües 'the contingent relationship
argued to exist between problems and instru-
ments is crucial to the enterprise of policy
design' (2005: 351). In other words. the
problem context needs to be considered in
che selección of toois. Anne Schneider and
Helen Ingram argüe chat the political context
is paramount in situating 'the concept of
policy design within a causal model that
emphasizes the political processes through
which designs are created as well as the
translating processes through which the
effeets of democracy are realized' (1997:
72-73). From this perspective the selection
of tools for a policy design is in part a reac-
ción to the pow?r and social construction of
the relevant target groups (1997: 102-140).
The choice of tools, in rurn, sends signáis to
target groups about their worth and rein-
forces the stereotypes that led to the tool
selection in the first place (1997: 140-145).
FoDowing from these lines of reasoning,
the more recent literature about policy tools
has considered how different tools can be
combined co form distinct policy strategies.
Richard Elmore (1987) was one of the first to
characterize the policy rationales for different
—
3ii
POLICY DESIGN A N D I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
combinadores of instruments. Gunningham and
Grabosky (1998) suggested different instru-
ment mixes for achieving 'smart regulation'
that refleets the contingent nature of different
policy instruments. Michael Howlett (2009)
has developed this kind of reasoning further
in suggesting how different governance
modes and policy logics lead to the identiñ-
cation of different mixes of policy tools.
In short. the literature about policy instru-
ments has moved from cataloging and con-
sidering different instruments to addressing
the interplay of different combinations of
instruments. Despite these developments, the
literature still falls short in suggesting insights
about tradeoffs when choosing different
mixes of instruments. This is because the
valué of a particular combination of instru-
ments is shaped as much by the political
context in which they are employed as by the
iaherent features of the instruments.
POLITICAL E N V I R O N M E N T S
AFFECT1NG DESIGN A N D
IMPLEMENTATION
m Viewing implementation as policy politics
m alters how one thinks about policy design
and implementation. Rather than treating
design as a technocratic activity of finding
the best design subject to certain political
constraints, the political perspective views
policy design as an art aimed at channeling
energies of disparate implementers to foster
agreement in working toward similar goals
and at mobiüzing constituencies in support
of the policy. The latter is one key factor
in affecting the durability of policies. Lee
us consider different aspeets of the policy
politics of implementation.
Implementation environments
and policy design
It is useful to depict differing political'
environments that affect policy design and
•JiP
p
•
jgj
283
implementation. Drawing from the discus-
sion of May (1991). a continuum of political
environments can be depicted. with one
extreme labeled 'policies with publics' and
the other extreme labeled 'policies without
publics'. The notion of a continuum is useful
in making the point that the differences are
more matters of the degree.of development of
the relevant publics and related policy sub-
systems than of their existence or total
absence. For 'policies with publics' there are
well-developed coalitions of interest groups
surrounding particular issues. For 'policies
without publics' there is limited development
of interest groups, usually restricted to
technical and scientific communities.
Policies with publics
The dominant characterization of political
environments for countries with democratic
syseems is chat of policies with publics.
According to this depiction. policy options
are fashioned and choices are made in
policy worlds composed of múltiple publics
with competing interests and differencial
resources, In forming loosely connected.
sometimes highly fragmented advocacy coa-
litions (see Sabatier and Jentíns-Smich,
1993) the publics engage in a series of strace-
gic inCeractions, often over a period of years,
in attempting to domínate the processes of
political problem definition. policy forma-
ción, and implementation. ünderlying'these
interactions are differing causal beliefs and
belief syseems (see Stone. 1989). The ability
to arrive at a stable consensus over problems
or appropriate actions is undennined by
the existence of strongly held, opposing
core beliefs by relevant publics and those
political actors they influence. In such
instances. policy making takes place at the
margins of solutions, and problems persist
for many years.
The implementation challenges for poli-
cies with publics stem from the fact that rel-
evant intermediarles and target groups wbo
were active publics in defining the problem
and shaping policy solutions also attempt to
influence implementation. In some settings,
284 THE SAGE H A N D B O O K OF PUBLIC A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
as discussed by Winter (1990) regarding
policy implementation in Scandinavia. stable
relationships among publics are helpful for
policy legitimization and implementation.
In the American settmg, as discussed by
Baumgartner and Jones (1993). existing ways
of doing business and exisüng policy monop-
olies become potentially powerful drags for
policy change and implementation,
As long as the coalitions in support of
business as usual are stable, fundamental
changes are difScult to achieve, Similarly, in
a given arena, policy instruments for new
policies will differ little from those of the
existing policy. Mandates get added to exist-
ing mandates. Regulations get piled on
existing regulations. Grant-in-aid programs
proliferate in areas wheie they already exist.
As a consequence, it is not surprising that
'system changing' policy designs entailing
new allocations of authority (McDonnell
and Elmore, 19S7) or 'roundabout methods'
(Majone, 1989) entailing institucional rede-
sign are infrequenüy used instruments for
policy design.
The policy design prescriptions for poli-
cies with publics emphasize structuring of
relationships and coordiaating behavior
among the relevant publics that comprise
intermediaries and target groups. The trick is
finding a political and goveroance logic that
makes it possible to change policy thrusts
(see Elmore, 1987; Howlett, 2009; Linder
and Peters, 1984). This may consist of devel-
oping a policy design that is supported by a
new coalition among interests with the coali-
tion based around a new combination of
policy instruments. The political logic may
also consist of a different political strategy
than used in the past efforts to enact new
policies. This may include creating a crisis,
or the appearance of one, so as to make the
case for new policies. Or, it may include find-
ing a leader willing to cake the blame for
the negative impacts of the policy.
Policies without publics
A contrasting political world is that of poli-
cies without publics. This is the opposite end
of the continuum of policy publics for which
policy options are fasbioned and choices
made in whac appears to be an apolitical
environment. Publics suirounding the issue
are neither extensive ñor a source of major
conflict. Issue networks or policy communi-
ties are only weakly developed. Belief sys-
tems concerning problems and solutions are
tentativa and dominated by technocratic
expert opinions. Relevant policy discussions
take place in the backwaters of political insti-
tutions. These include issues for which there
is little incentive for organized interests to
evolve in pursuit of a policy, This typically
arises for public goods (or, conversely public
bads), as illustrated by dilemmas of acbiev-
ing déficit reduction. maintaining biological
diversity, addressing global environmental
problems, addressing terrorism, or dealing
with potencial catastrophic disasters like
major earthquakes.
The situación for policies without publics
might appear to be beneficial for imple-
mentadon. The lack of publics provides a
greater degree of implementation autonomy
than is the case for policies with publics.
Under such circumstances, policy implemen-
tation is not likely to be actively thwarred
by intermediaries or target groups. However.
the relative absence of publics creates
unique implementation challenges, Target
groups are likely to be poorly delineated.
Various intermediarles such as governmental
organizations and street-level bureaucrats
will exist, but are likely to be relatively
uninterested.
Two broad strategies are potentially rele-
vant to the design of policies when publics
are lacking. One is dixect governmental pro-
visión of programs without relying upon
other intermediaries. In some instances, such
as the response to terrorismo a centrally-
managed and implemented program is neces-
sary for achieving rapid response to diffuse
problems. In other instances, such as provi-
sión of terrorism insurance, direct govem-
ment action is a necessary substitute for the
faults of prívate markets. A second strategy
is to stimulate the formation of publics.
POLICY DESIGN A N D I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
Mobüization of publics is appropriate when
such participation of relevant stakeholders is
necessary for successful policy implemen-
tation, as might be the case for protecáng
endangered species, for increasing awareness
of civil rights, or for engaging the prívate
sector in the upgrading of infrastructure.
The provisión of infonnatioa can be an
important tool for mobilizing attention (see
Weiss. 2002).
Implementation and policy
durabiííty
Policies take form and are adapted to chang-
ing circumstances as different forces shape
their implementation. These include the
interests that are mobilized in support
of strong implementation or that seek to
undermine policy implementation. Much
depends on the relative political power of
these grciups, their perceptions of benefits
and burdens. and their resources, A newer
line of research considers how these forces
and the broader political environment
affects the durability of policy reforms (see
Patashnik, 2008) and of policy regimes (see
Jocfaim and May, 2010).
Such durability depends in part on the
degree to which a coastituency is mobilized
in support of the policy while limiting oppo-
sition, The pollution abatement regime for
reducing pollution in the United States was
strong in the 1970s because of the streogth
of environmental groups and the decisión
by the Environmental Protection Agency to
only pursue notable polluters. The powerful
forces behind this regime and their ties
to political power, provided a basis at
least initially for warding off opposition
during implementation (see Andrews, 1999:
238-239). As the forces weaken or are
altered, the durability of a regime is under-
mined and potentially destabilized.
The political dynamic that affects policy
durability is also influenced by the way in
which the use of different tools affects
various interests. Smith and Ingram (2002;
285
see also Schneider and Ingram. 1997) sug-
gest that the selección of tools can have
a profound effect upon target groups by
sending messages about their valué to others
and by shaping opportunities for partici-
pation and involvement in collective deci-
sión making. They argüe' that these effects
reverberate over time in shaping the ability
and willingness of different groups to
endorse or work to undermine the imple-
mentation of a given policy. Schneider
and Ingram (1997) underscore that because
groups differ in their power and resources,
such policy feedback is biased toward
more powerful groups that were previously
advantaged in the original design of a
policy.
Also relevant is the power of the ideas that
are the heart a given policy design - what
Howlett (2009; 79-SO) refers to as the logic
of a policy regime. Ideas about 'pollution
abatement" for environmental pollution, 'zero
tolerance' for illegal drug use, 'personal
responsibility' for welfare reform, and 'home-
land security' for addressing the threat of
terrorism provide a shared purpose and
common logic for policy design and imple-
mentación. Greater agreement about core
ideas that and the logic for them ease imple-
mentation and enhance policy durability.
With a sense of common purpose comes
commitment to carry out the policy and to
resist efforts to undermine it.
The durability of policies is as much
dependent on the broader political context
as it is on the preceding forces (see Jochim
and May, 2010). As new political aügn-
ments take shape, the composition of inter-
ests who have privileged access to political
institutions changes. As a result, the coali-
tions that support specific policy regimes
and strong implementation are weakened.
For example, the emergence of the busi-
ness 'pro-growth' coalition in the United
States under the Reagan administration
shifted the balance of power towards busi-
ness and ultimately chipped away at the
environmental pollution abatement regime
of the 1970s (see Andrews, 1999: 256-261).
286 THE SAGE H A N D 6 0 0 K OF PUBLIC A D M I N I S T R A R O N
SHAP1NG IMPLEMENTATiON -
C H O I C E S IN P O L I C Y D E S I G N
The process of policy design and implemen-
tation is not simply one of assembling parts
and plugging in implementation machinery,
The compromisos that are necessary to gain
support for a given policy explain why policy
designs and implementation structures are
often messy. Recogninng these faets. how-
ever, does not negate the valué of considering
how choices made when designiag policies
potentially shape policy implementation.
Policy intentíons and philosophy
Perhaps the overriding considerations in
shapiag the contours of a policy are the
intenüons for and philosophy of the policy. Is
the policy intended to provide benefits for
particular segments of society. rescrict behav-
iors in preventing harm, mobüize action on
the part of groups to address a problem, or
something else? Policy intentions establish
the goals and type of policy that is to be put
in place. They also establish the contours of
political debate that shape eventual politics
of policy adoption and implementation.
A key lesson of efforts to classify different
tvpes of policies is the dual relationship
between politics and policy. As discussed in
a seminal árdele by Lowi (1972), not only
does politics affect the design of policies but
also the choice of policy affeets the associ-
ated politics. Lowi demonstrated this in
showing the different politics associated with
distributive, redistributive. and regulatory
policies. Wilson (1973) further elaborated
upon this framework in showing how the
perceptions of the distributions of costs and
benefits of a given policy affect polidcs by
creaüng different challenges for policy enact-
ment and implementation. The important
point for implementation scholars of research
about the duality of policy and politics is that
the political environment for policy imple-
mentation is a malleable landscape that can
be affected by policy content.
The underlying philosopbical or ideologi-
cal glue provides important policy ratiotiale
for linking solutions to problems. recogniz-
ing that any given intent can be justified and
carried out in a variety of ways (Donovan,
2001; Stone, 1989). Linder and Peters (1984,
1989). among others, have argued that differ-
ent national policy styles, reflecting cross-
national differences in policy approaches.
establish the foundations for such philoso-
phies. Noteworthy studies of the develop-
ment of policy regioies concerning economic
policy (Hall. 1993). social policy (Heclo,
1974). and other reforms (Jochim and May,
2010) bighlight the role of ideas, interests,
and institutions in shaping the contours of
policy regimes.
How does policy intention affect imple-
mentation? Rather than setting forth explicit
directions for policy, it sets boundaries
around choices of policy instruments and
implementation structures (see Howlett,
2009). Thus. for example, a conservative
ideological approach may favor use of tax
incentives, while a less conservadve govem-
ment may prefer direct subsidies to promote
particular ends. One key lesson for policy
design is to fashion instruments and imple-
mentation approaches (means) that are con-
sistent with the policy intent (goals).
Otherwise, the poíicy is workiag at cross-
purposes. A second key lesson is that the
political environment, i.e., the target groups
and field staff that implement the policy.
must be supportive of the policy intention.
Otherwise. they may exercise principlcd dis-
agreement with the policy and work to sub-
ven it. This is one reason why. as discussed
below. it is important to build features into
policies for building commitment to policy
goals.
Scope of a policy
The scope of the policy addresses the scale of
the undertaking. This can be charactenzed
with respect to geographic scale (whether a
policy is national or more limited in scale).
POLICY DESIGN A N D I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
with respect to the degree to which particular
groups are targeted (a focused policy versus
a more general one), with respect to the het-
erogeneity of the affected groups (whether
they are similar or differ greatly), and whether
the policy is new or an adaptación of an exist-
ing policy.
How does the scope of the policy affect
policy implementation? There are tradeoffs
that present a basic dilemma for policy
implementation. On the one hand, all else
being equal. a more contained policy is easier
to implement (Mazmanian and Sabatier,
1983). On the other hand, the likely impaets
of a more contained policy are more liroited
in that fewer are affected by the policy. This
dilemma gets to the basic issue of the tracta-
bility of the policy, which has been a key
variable in thinking about prospective imple-
mentation success.
As the scope of a policy becomes more
heterogeneous with respect to affected groups
or other components, there is likely to be
greater need and political pressure for policy
adaptación in impiercentation. What consti-
tutes appropriate adaptation has not been
considered in the implementation literature
beyond the observation that such adaptation
can add valué to policy. The topic of design-
ing policies to promote learning about appro-
priate adaptation has been considered more
generally in the literature concerning policy
leaming (May, 1992) and the evolution of
policies over time (Majone and Wildavsky,
1979).
Policy instruments affecting
target groups
The means for bringing about behavioral
changes among affected groups or for deliv-
ering governmental services to segments of
society entail choiccs about the appropriate
means of intervention. As Majone and
Wildavsky (1979) articulated. all policies
contain hypotheses about how to bring about
change - a theory of change - that may or
may not be adequate (see also Linder and
287
Peters, 1989: Schneider and Ingram, 1997).
Part of the theory of change are presumptions
about the workings of different policy instru-
ments or tools that. as articulated by Salamon
(2002). structure action in identifiable ways.
Strategy, ideoiogy, and politics influence
the ways in which different- tools are com-
bined into policy mixes.. The strategic issues
revolve around policy analysis considera-
tions concerning the appropriate role of gov-
emment and other actors, the potential means
of intervention. and the costs and feasibility
of carrying out programs. The possible com-
binations of tools into policies provides a
bewildering array of potential choices, but it
is often the ideological glue that guides
choices about different potential mixes. The
political considerations for the choice of
policy instruments affecting target groups
invoke the dynamics discussed earlier in this
chapter. as theorized about by Anne Schneider
and Helen Ingram (1997: 102-135). They
suggest that perceptions of the social con-
structions and perceived political power of
target populatíons profoundly influcnces the
choice of policy instruments. In selecting
policy tools. policy makers treac groups as
advantaged (deserving, powerful groups).
deviants (undeserving, weaker groups),
dependants (deserving, weaker groups). or
contenders (undeserving, powerful groups).
Regardless of the forces that lead to the
selection of different tools aimed at affecting
the behaviors of target groups, it is clear that
policy tools differ with respect to the imple-
mentation issues they raise. One basic issue
is the receptivity of target groups to their
treatment, Schneider and Ingram (1997:
140-149. see also Smith and Ingram. 2002)
suggest target groups react to the negative
messages that are embedded in tools that are
burdensome, thereby undermining the ease
of implementation. As discussed by Lester
Salamon and various contributors to the
edited book. The Tools of Government (2002),
policy tools vary in terms of their degree of
automaticity, direetness, and coerciveness.
The prospects for implementation problems
grow as policy designs invoke tools that are
288 THE SAGE H A N D B O O K OF P U 8 U C A D M I N I S T R A T I O N
less automaüc in their implementation by
virtue of introducing new ways of doing
business, by being more indirect in working
through actions by múltiple entities, and by
being more coercive with respect to burden-
ing targets. The important lesson for policy
design and implementation is that that the
mix of instruments needs to adhere to an
overall strategy for which the elements do
not work at cross-purposes.
Policy instruments affecting
intermediarles
Although much of the discussion of policy
design focuses on the intended targets or
outcomes of policy. the intermediaries
charged with carrying out policy are also
relevant. The key advice of the literatura is
that policies should contain features that
sncourage or compel intermediaries to carry
out requisite actions for implementing the
policy. Weimer (1992) provides an instruc-
tive set of examples of how creation of desir-
able incentives, favorable structuring of
decisions, and instilling appropriate habits
and norms can promote desired responses on
the part of implementers.
Building the commitment to the basic
policy goals and the capacity of intermediar-
ies to accomplish those goals are important
elements of this aspect of policy design.
Commitment- and capacity-building provi-
sions are best thought of as interactive fea-
tures that reinforce each other in facüitating
policy implementation (May. 1993). These
features also serve important functioos in
signaling what is expected of intermediaries
(see Goggin et al., 1990).
Implementation structures
and third parties
The intermediaries that are charged with
policy implementation and how they share
responsibilities are important aspeets that
constitute the implementation stxucture for a
given policy. The choice of a structure is
rarely a simple matter of naming a govern-
mental organization to carry out a policy.
One of the key themes of this Handbook
is the increased role of networks of public
and prívate actors in carrying out policies.
Laurence O'Toole (Chapter 19), in discuss-
ing interorganizational relations and policy
implementation. makes a convincing case
that it is no longer sufñcient to understand
how governmental agencies operate to fully
understand policy implementation. It is now
necessary to understand the dynamics and
operations of other types of institutions and
their relationships. As O'Toole elaborates,
this in turn introduces a host of possibilities
and potential pitfalls.
The guidance of the implementation litera-
ture about relevant structures has shifted
from advice to clarify and simplify them (see
Mazmanian and Sabatier, 1983) to advice
to develop implementation structures that
'mesh' with policy objectives (see O'Toole.
1993). What the latter consists of is not welJ
articulated in the literature. It can be thought
of as a structure that both refleets the phi-
losophy of the policy and engages entities
that are committed to and have the capacity
to cairy out the policy. Stoker (1991) refers
to this as the development of constructive
pattems of cooperation. This is illustrated by
New Zealand's intergovemmental approach
to environmental management (see May et al.,
1996). Regional and district councils are
given latitude to carry out the spirit of the
policy in ways they best see fit. This structure
fits the policy intent of devolved policy
making while the policy also incorporates
mechanisms to ensure coordination of poli-
cies among layers of govemment.
It is important to recognize when the exist-
ing implementation structure is deficient or
too rigid to adapt to new requirements of
a given policy. Under such circum-
stances, Elmore (19S7) rerainds us that
'system changing' can be a useful policy
tool. Changing the service delivery or regu-
latory responsibilities provides an opportu-
nity to put in place a new. and hopefully
POLICY DESIGN A N D I M P L E M E N T A T I O N
more constructive, set of relationships. It
also strongly signáis a desire to do things
differently.
CONCLUSION
This chapter has addressed the interplay
of policy design and implementation. Policy
design is not simply a technocratic task
undertaken in a backroom that entails the
assembly of policy instruments to achieve
some end. Ñor is implementation an admin-
istrative task of handing over policy details
to an organizational machinery. Policy
design and implementation are tasks of policy
and political problem solving that are subject
to a variety of pressures. This chapter has
considered how different political environ-
ments foster implementation and design
challenges as weU as how policies shapes
choices about different mixes of policy
instruments and the durability of policies.
The literature addressing the nexus of
policy design and implementation provides
important insights. The prescriptions of the
early implementation literature to clarify and
simplify the design of policies have been
replaced with more realistic advice about the
design of policies that create incentives for
implementers to take requisite actions. In
particular, implementation prospeets are
enhanced through policy designs that contain
provisions that build the capacity of interme-
diaries to carry out requisite actions. that
foster increased commitment to policy goals,
and that he'lp to signal desired courses of
action.
The policy and political problem-solving
perspective alters how one thinks about
policy design and implementation. Rather
than treating design as a technocratic activity
of finding the best design subject to certain
political constraints. the political perspective
views policy design as an art aimed at chan-
neling energies of disparate implementers to
foster agreement in working toward similar
goals and at mobilizing constituencies in
289
support of the policy. The latter is particu-
larly challenging for issues for which there is
little incentive for organized interests to
evolve in pursuit of a policy. The mobiliza-
tion of constituencies is also important for
sustaining policies over time.
Policy design is, of course. not the only
factor that shapes implementation processes
and outcomes. The observations in this
chapter need to be considered along with the
discussion of interorganizational relations
and policy implementation by Laurence
O'Toole (Chapter 19) and the discussion of
street-level bureaucracy in implementation
by Marcia Meyers and Vibeke Lehmann
Nielsen (Chapter IS). Although much of the
implementation literature has moved on to
address the role of other factors in shaping
implementation, it is worth remembering the
basic axiom that well-designed policies are
necessary but not sufñcient for improving
implementation prospeets.
REFERENCES
A n d r e w s , R i c h a r d N,L. ( 1 9 9 9 ) Managing the
Environment, Managing Ourseives: A History of
American Environmental Policy. N e w H a v e n , CT:
Yale University P r e s s .
B a r d a c h , E u g e n e ( 1 9 7 7 ) The Implementation Game:
What HappensAfter a Bill Becomes Law. C a m b r i d g e ,
M A : MIT P r e s s .
B a u m g a r t n e r , F r a n k R. a n d J o n e s , Bryan D. ( * 9 9 3 )
Agendas andInstabilityin American Politics. C h i c a g o ,
IL: University of C h i c a g o Press,
3 o b r o w , Davis 8 . a n d D r y z e k , J o h n S. ( 1 9 8 7 ) Policy
Analysis by Design. P i t t s b u r g K , PA: University of
Pittsburgh Press.
B r o d k i n , Eveiyn Z. ( 1 9 9 0 ) ' I m p l e m e n t a t i o n a s Policy
Politics', in O e n n i s J. P a i u m b o a n d D o n a l d J. Calista
( e d s ) , Implementation and the Policy Process,
Opening Up the Black Box. W e s t p o r t , CT: G r e e n w o o d
Press, p p . 107—"í 1 8 .
C h i s h o l m , D o n a l d ( ¡ 9 8 9 ) Coordination without
Hierarchy. Berkeley, CA: University of California
Press.
Derthick, M a r t h a ( 1 9 7 2 ) New Towns in Town, Why a
Federal Program Failed. W a s h i n g t o n , DC: U r b a n
Institute.
 290 THE SAGE H A N D 8 0 0 K OF PUBLIC A D M I N I S T R A R O N
O o n o v a n , M a r k ( 2 0 0 1 ) TakingAim: Target Populations
and the Warz on AIDS and Drugs. W a s h i n g t o n , DC:
G e o r g e t o w n University P r e s s .
Oryzek, J o h n S. ( 1 9 8 3 } ' D o n ' ; Toss C o i n s ¡n G a r b a g e
C a n s : A P r o l o g u e to Policy D e s i g n ' , Journal of Public
Policy, 3 (4): 3 4 5 - 3 6 3 .
E l m o r e , R i c h a r d F. ( 1 9 8 7 ) ' I n s t r u m e n t s a n d S t r a t e g y in
Public Policy', Policy Studies Review, 7 0):
174-136.
G o g g i n , M a l c o l m L , S o w m a n , A n n O ' M . , Lsster, J a m e s
P„ a n d O ' T o o i e , L a u r e n c e J., J r ( 1 9 9 0 ) Implementation
Theory 3nd Practice, Toward a Third Generation.
G l e n v i e w , IL: S c o t t F o r e s m a n .
G u n n i n g h a m , Neii a n d G r a b o s k y , P e t e r ( 1 9 9 3 ) Sman
Regulation, Designing Environmental Policy. N e w
York: O x f o r d University P r e s s .
Hall Peter A. (1993) 'Policy Paradigms, Sotisl Learning,
a n c t h e S t a t e : T h e C a s e of E c o n o m i c P o l i c y m a k i n g
in Britain', Comparative Politics, 2 3 : 2 7 5 - 2 9 6 .
H e d o , H u g h ( 1 9 7 4 ) Modem Social Politics in Britain
and Sweden. N e w H a v e n , CT: V a l e U n i v e r s i t y
Press.
Hootí, C h r i s t o p h e r C. ( 1 9 8 3 ) The Tools of Government.
London: Macmillan Press.
Howlett, Michael (2000) 'Managtng the "Hollow
State": Prcceóural PoJicy I n s r r u m e n t s anó M o d e mM A : L e x i n g t o n S o o k s .
Govemaftce,' C a n s d i a n PuWíc Admm/strstíon, 4 3
(4): 4 1 2 - 4 3 1 .
H o w i e t t , M i c h a e l ( 2 0 C 9 ) ' G o v e r n a n c e M o d e s , Poíicy
R e g l m e s , a n d O p e r a t i o n a l Píans: A Multi-Level
N e s t e d M o d e l of I n s t r u m e n t C h o i c e ' , Policy Sciences,
42: 7 3 - 8 9 .
I n g r a h a m , Patricia W . ( 1 9 S 7 ) ' T o w a r d M o r e S y s t e m a t i c
C o n s l d e r a t l c n of Poiicy D e s i g n ' , Policy Studies
Journal, 1 5 (4); 6 1 1 - 6 2 8 .
J o c h i m , A s h l e y E. a n d M a y , P e t e r J. ( 2 0 1 0 ) ' S e y o n d
S u b s y s t e m s : Policy R e g l m e s a n d G o v e r n a n c e ' ,
Policy Studies Journal, 3 8 (2): 3 0 3 - 3 2 7 .
Linder, S t e p h e n H. a n d P e t e r s , S. G u y ( 1 9 8 4 ) ' F r o m
Social T h e o r y t o Policy D e s i g n ' , Journal of Public
Policy, 4 (3): 2 3 7 - 2 5 9 .
Linder, S t e p h e n H. a n d P e t e r s , B. G u y ( 1 9 8 9 )
' i n s t r u m e n t s of G o v e r n m e n t : P e r c e p t i o n a n d
C o m e x r s ' , Journal of Public Policy, 9 (1): 3 5 - 5 8 .
Lowi, T h e o d o r e J. ( 1 9 7 2 ) ' F o u r S y s t e m s of Policy,
Poiítics, a n d C h o i c e ' , Public Administración Review,
3 2 : 2 9 8 - 3 i 0.
M c D e r m o t t , K a t h r y n A. ( 2 0 0 6 ) ' I n c e n t i v e s , C a p a c i t y ,
and Implementation: Evidence from Massachusetts
E d u c a t i o n R e f o r m ' , Journal of Public Administraron
Research and Theory, 16 (1): 4 5 - 6 5 .
M c D o n n e l l , L o r r a i n e M . a n d E l m o r e , R i c h a r d F.
( 1 9 8 7 ) ' G e t t i n g t h e J o b D o n e : A l t e r n a t i v e Policy
-s; v
POLICY DESIGN A N D I M P L E M E N T A T I O N 291
I n s t r u m e n t s ' . Educatlonal E'/aluation and Policy Washington Are Dashed in Oakland. B e r k e l e y , S t o n e , D e b o r a h A. ( 1 9 9 7 ) Policy Paradox, The Art
Analysis, 9 (2): 1 3 3 - 1 5 2 . CA: University of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . of Political Decisión Making, 2nd ed. N e w York:
M a j o n e , G i a n d o m e n l c o ( 1 9 8 9 ) Evidence, Argument S a b a t i e r , Paul A.^ a n d J e n k i n s - S m i t h , H a n k ( 1 9 9 3 } W.W. Norton & Company.
and Persuasión in the Policy Process. N e w H a v e n , Policy Change and Learning. B o u i d e r , CO: W e s t v i e w V a n M e t e r , D o n a l d S. a n d V a n H o r n , Cari E. ( 1 9 7 5 )
CT: Yaie University P r e s s . Press. ' T h e Polio/ I m p l e m e n t a t i o n P r o c e s s : A C o n c e p t u a l
Majone, Giandomenico and Wildavsky, Aaron (*979) S a l a m o n , Lester M . (ed.) { 1 9 8 9 } Seyond Privatlzation: F r a m e w o r k ' , Administration and Society, 6 :
' I m p l e m e n t a t i o n a s Evoltrtion', In J e f f r e y P r e s s m a n The Tools of Government Action. W a s h i n g t o n , DC: 445-488.
and Aaron Wildavsky (eds), Implementation, 2nd Urban Institute Press. V e d u n g , Evert (1998} 'Policy Instruments: " y p o l o g i e s
e d n . S e r k e l e y , CA: University of C a l i f o r n i a P r e s s . S a l a m o n , Lester M. ( 2 0 0 2 } ' T h e N e w G o v e r n a n c e ; a n d T h e o r i e s ' , in • M a r i e - L o u i s e B e m e l m a n s - V i d e c ,
M a y , P e t e r J. ( 1 9 9 1 } ' R e c o n s l d e r i n g Policy D e s i g n : An I n t r o d u c t i o n ' , ín Lester S a l a m o n (ed.), The Tools Ray C. Rist, a n d Evert V e d u n g ( e d s ) , Carrots, Sticks
Policies a n d P u b l i c s ' , Journal of Public Policy, 11 of Government: A Guide to the New Governance. & Sermons: Policy Instruments and Their Evaluación.
(Part 2): 1 3 7 - 2 0 6 . N e w York: O x f o r d University Press, p p . 1 - 4 7 . N e w Brunswick a n d London: Transaction Publishers,
May, P e t e r J. ( 1 9 9 2 ) 'Policy L e a r n i n g a n d Failure', Schneider, A n n e a n d Ingram, Helen (1990) 'Behavioral pp. 2 1 - 5 3 .
Journal of Public Policy, 12 (Part 4 ) : 3 3 1 - 3 5 4 . A s s u m p t i o n s of Policy Tools', Journal of Politics W e i m e r , D a v i d L. ( 1 9 9 2 ) ' C l a i m i n g R a c e s , S o i l e r
M a y , P e t e r J. ( 1 9 9 3 } ' M a n d a t e D e s i g n a n d 5 2 (2): 5 1 0 - 5 2 9 . Contracts, Heresrhetics, a n d Habits: Ten C o n c e p t s
I m p l e m e n t a t i o n : E n h a n c i n g I m p l e m e n t a t i o n Efforts Schneider, A n n e Larason a n d Ingram, Helen (1997} f o r Policy D e s i g n ' , Policy Sciences, 2 5 (2);
anó Shaping Regulatory Sryles', Journal of Policy Polio/ Design for Democracy. L a w r e n c e , KS: <35-159.
Analysis and Management, 1 2 : 6 3 4 - 6 6 3 . University of (Cansas P r e s s . W e i s s , J a n e t A. ( 2 0 0 2 ) ' P u b l i c I n f o r m a t i o n ' , in Lester A.
M a y , P e t e r J„ S u r b y , R a y m o n d J., Ericksen, Neil J., et al. Smith, Steven R a t h g e b a n d Ingram, Helen ( 2 0 0 2 ) S a l a m o n (ed.), The Tools of Government, A Guide to
( 1 9 9 6 ) Environmental Management and Governance: 'Policy T o o l s a n d D e m o c r a c y ' , in L e s t e r S a l a m o n the New Governance. N e w York: O x f o r d University
Intergovernmental Approaches to Hazards and (ed.), The Tools of Government: A Guide to the Press, pp. 2 1 7 - 2 5 4 .
Sustainability. L o n d o n a n d N e w York: R o u t l e c c e New Governance. N e w Y o r k : O x f o r d U n i v e r s i t y W i l s o n , J a m e s Q. ( ¡ 9 7 3 ) ' O r g a n i z a t l o n s a n d P u b l i c
Press. Press. Policy', In Política/ Organizations. N e w York: B a s i c
M a z m a n i a n , Daniel A . a n d S a b a t i e r , Paul A. (eds) S t o k e r , R o b e r t P. ( 1 9 9 1 ) Reluctant Partners, Books, pp, 3 2 7 - 3 4 6 .
( 1 9 8 1 } Effective Policy Implementation. Lexington, Implementing Federal Policy. P l t t s b u r g h , PA: Wlnter, Seren (1990) 'Integrating Implementation
University of P i l t s b u r g h P r e s í . R e s e a r c h ' , m D e r m i s J. P a l u m b o a n d D o n a l d J.
M a z m a n i a n , Daniel A. a n d S a b a t i e r , Paul A. ( 1 9 8 3 ) S t o n e , D e b o r a h A. ( 1 9 8 9 ) ' C a u s a l S t o r l e s a n d t h e C a l i s t a (eds), Implementation and the Policy Process,
Implementation and Public Policy. G l e n v i e w , IL: F o r m a t í o n of Policy A g e n d a s ' , Political Science Opening Up the Black Box. W e s t p o r t , CT: G r e e n w o o d
Scott Foresman. Quarterly 1 0 4 (2): 2 8 1 - 3 0 0 . Press, pp. 1 9 - 3 8 .
M o y n i h a n , D o n a l d P„ F e r n a n d e z , S e r g i o , Kim, S o o n h e e ,
e t al. ( 2 0 1 1 ) ' P e r f o r m a n c e R e g i m e s a m i d s t
G o v e r n a n c e C o m p l e x i t y ' , Journal of Public
Administraron Research and Theory, 21 (Suppl 1):
¡141-Í155.
N s k a m u r a , R o b e r t T , a n d S m a l l w o o t í , F r a n k ( 1 9 8 0 } The
Poütics of Policy Implementation. N e w York: St.
Martins Press,
O ' T o o i e , Jr., L a u r e n c e J. ( 1 9 9 3 ) ' I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
Policy S t u d i e s : L e s s o n s D r a w n F r o m I m p l e m e n t a t i o n
R e s e a r c h ' , Journal of Public Administraron Research
and'heory, 3 : 2 3 2 - 2 5 1 .
O ' T o o i e , L a u r e n c e J. Jr. ( 2 0 0 3 } ' I n t e r o r g a n i z a t i o n a l
R e ' a t i o n s in I m p l e m e n t a t i o n ' , in B. G u y P e t e r s a n d
iohnPme'sísds) HandbookofPublicAdministration.
T h o u s a n d O a k s , CA: S a g e , p p . 2 3 4 - 2 4 4 .
P a t a s h n i k , Eric M. ( 2 0 0 8 ) Reforms at Risk: What
Happens After Major Policy Changes Are Enacted.
P r i n c e t o n , NJ: P r i n c e t o n University P r e s s .
P e t e r s , B. G u y ( 2 0 0 5 ) ' T h e P r o b l e m of Policy P r o b l e m s ' ,
Journal of Comparative Policy Analysis, 1 (4):
349-370.
P r e s s m a n , J e f f r e y L a n d W i l d a v s k y , A a r o n B. ( 1 9 7 3 }
implementation, How Great Expectations in