Shifting Sands in South Asia Analysing I

The Indian Journal of Politics
[ISSN: 0303-9951]
A Peer-Reviewed Journal
VOL. 57, NO. 1-2, JAN.– JUNE, 2023

https://www.amu.ac.in/nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Published by
DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE
ALIGARH MUSLIM UNIVERSITY
ALIGARH – 202002, INDIA
CHIEF EDITOR
Iqbalur Rehman
EDITOR
Mirza Asmer Beg
EDITORIAL COMMITTEE
Mohd. Nafees A. Ansari
Upendra Choudhury
Arshi Khan
Rachana Kaushal
Iftekhar Ahemmed
M. Mohibul Haque
Farhana Kausar
Md Aftab Alam
Mohammad Naseem Khan
Khurram
EDITORIAL ADVISERS
Rajeev Bhargava
Centre for the Study of Developing Societies, Delhi
Mahmood Mamdani
Columbia University
Mohammad Ayoob
University of Michigan
Pritam Singh
Oxford Brookes University
A Peer-Reviewed Journal
Volume 57, No. 1-2, 2023
Contents
Shifting Sands in South Asia: Analysing 1-20

India’s Role in the Region with the
Increasing Chinese Presence
Chhotelal Kumar
Justifications for Using Torture in 21-42
Counterinsurgency (COIN) Operations in
India’s Northeast, and the COIN Strategy?
Aashmani Ghosh
Role of Transnational Municipal Network in 43-63

Urban Climate Governance in India: A Case
Study of ICLEI-Local Government for
Sustainability
Ali Kaif
Transnational Corporations and 64-80

Administration in India: When Transnational
Corporations Rule the World
Mohammad Aslam
The International Legal Status of 81-108

Afghanistan’s Ambassadors Representing a
Defunct Government
Sayed Qudrat Hashimy
Democracy Promotion in Pakistan by EU 109-131

During Pervez Musharraf’s Regime: How
Security Interests Trumped Over the
Promotion of Democracy
Masih Ullah Khan
China’s Ambition in the Indian Ocean 132-149
Region and its Implications on India’s
Maritime Security
Moika ad Mohd Amin Khan
Multi-Party System and Coalition Era in the 150-163

Politics of Jammu and Kashmir Since 2002
Jameelun Nisa
Taliban’s Rise to Power: Afghanistan Crisis 164-188

and India’s Strategic Dilemma
Md. Rahat Hasan
The Sixth Schedule of Indian Constitution: 189-205

Its Genesis and Demand in the Contemporary
Politics.
Mohammad, Gukhu Mega and Sartik
Bagh
Towards Democratic Deepening: The Link 206-226

Between Democratic Decentralization and
Women Empowerment
Syed Tahseen Raza
Editor’s note 127-127

Correction
Shifting Sands in South Asia: Analysing…. 1
Shifting Sands in South The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-1-20
Asia: Analysing India’s https://www.amu.ac.in/
Role in the Region with nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
the Increasing Chinese
Presence
Chhotelal Kumar*
ABSTRACT
This paper looks to draw and analyse the larger
shift in the geo-strategic equation in South Asia. It
shows a clear shift in China’s approach towards
South Asia and looks to frame it through its greater
ambition of becoming a global hegemon. Further,
by situating Chinese multi-layered engagement with
smaller South Asian countries, it analyses the effect
on their democratic nature. It also tries to gaze at
the Chinese presence in South Asia from internal
national stability. A shift of the centre of power
politics from Europe to Asia in the twenty-first
century makes South Asia a vital strategic location.
India has an ambition of becoming an important
pole in multipolar global order, its foothold in
South Asia becomes very central to its ambition.
This paper frames its arguments using all these
important emerging elements in South Asia.
Key Words: Emerging China, Multi-layered engagements, Small
Countries, Internal Sovereignty, Power Politics, Democratic
Ethos, India-China, South Asia;
Introduction
The strategic significance of South Asia has grown significantly
as the centre of political power has shifted from the West to Asia.
South Asia is a southern part of the Asian continent.
In the south, the Arabian Sea, Indian Ocean, and Bay of Bengal
*PhD Scholar at the Centre for Political Studies, JNU

2 The Indian Journal of Politics 2023, Vol. 57, No.1-2
encircle South Asia, and in the north, it is hemmed by the

Himalayan Mountains. India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Afghanistan,
Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan are the eight nations that make up
South Asia. In terms of geography and demographics, India is the
largest country. South Asia occupies 3.5% of the world's land mass
and one-fourth of the total population, making it the world's most
densely populated region.
The Indian Ocean Region and South Asia have been under the
Indian sphere of influence since the British left the subcontinent in
1947. Because of its central location and close political, economic
and cultural ties with its neighbours, India enjoys significant
influence and projects itself as a natural leader in the Region.
However, since the beginning of the twenty-first century, a shift
has been occurring with increasing Chinese involvement in South
Asia.1 Increasing presence has threatened India's hegemonic
position and its security in the region. China has emerged as a
major developmental partner and regional balancer for smaller
countries in South Asia.2 It has taken advantage of the chance and
space provided by the fear among smaller nations that India could
well interfere in their social, economic, and political affairs. With
the changing equations in global power dynamics, more and more
South Asian countries are eager for deeper engagement with
China. In recent decades, that has led China to emerge as an
alternate pole in South Asia.
Being in contiguity, China has historically shown an interest in
South Asia. Prior to 2000, China's South Asia policy was viewed
as ‘single dimensional’ and ‘limited’ by analysts of China. China
selectively forged close ties with a few South Asian countries to
carry out this strategy. Prominently, from the 1960s to the 1990s,
China's South Asia policy was based on its "all-weather friendship
and all-dimensional cooperation"3 with Pakistan. China's entry
into South Asian countries has been remarkable in the last two
decades. From the natural-backyard-based traditional engagements
with India, most South Asian countries, including Bangladesh,
Pakistan and Sri Lanka, have recorded sharp increases in their
trade exchanges with China.4 The relative predominance of India
for decades together in Bangladesh and Sri Lanka has now been
outsmarted and outmatched by China in these two countries' total
trade. Even Nepal has taken a significant turn toward China
despite being landlocked from one side by India. In South Asia,
China's influence has significantly grown throughout the Region
through trade, investment, military ties, diplomatic efforts, and

cultural initiatives. In recent years, the most potent sources of
Chinese influence in South Asian countries have been commercial
and financial. Some would extend this as a global phenomenon for
China when it trying to influence other countries (African
countries are the best examples).This is reflected in high-value
project finance and operations partnerships, not least for the Sri
Lanka Hambantota and Colombo port projects and the Bangladesh
Padma Multipurpose Bridge Project. China's massive economic
strength is its principal instrument of influence, and it has used it
actively to secure its interest. Its export-oriented economy has
made it the leading trade exporting partner of multiple South
Asian countries, providing a foundation for its engagements based
on social and political matters. Furthermore, It has also made
significant progress in military engagements. China has used
military, political, economic, and cultural tactics to expand its
influence in South Asia since the turn of the century.
From a strategic standpoint, South Asia is critical for China for a
number of reasons, especially at present. First, South Asia has a
geographical vicinity to the Middle East and North Africa, which
are rich in oil and energy resources. Second, China's trade and
economy are heavily dependent on the Indian Ocean's sea lanes,
including the strategically important Malacca Strait. China imports
more than 70% of its oil through this narrow strait.5 Third, China's
South Asia policy has a vital domestic element. Its most
vulnerable western parts, Xinjiang and Tibet, share boundaries
with five South Asia countries: Afghanistan, Pakistan, Nepal,
Bhutan, and India. The Western Region of China, in particular,
feels the effects of the political and security instability of South
Asian countries.6 Fourth, China's westward journey towards South
Asia has strategic significance. On the east, it is besieged by
critical U.S. allies like South Korea and Japan, and in the north by
Russia. So, through South Asian countries, it is seeking a
favourable route (to the Indian Oceans and the larger world).
Nearly 40 per cent of the world's offshore petroleum is produced
in the Indian Ocean region. China has been building ports that
protect this route.7 Several China-led or assisted ports in South
Asian countries and even in some East African countries can be
read as a strategic placing of the Chinese army for protecting not
just important trade routes but also leveraging the security of the
hosting country and the larger region. It aligns with and
complements the Chinese ambition of dominant world power.

Furthermore, this quest finds South Asian port cities, which could
act as gateways to Gulf countries, Africa and Europe, beneficial.
These maritime hubs will be connected to the Chinese mainland. It
has been funding various infrastructure projects with this goal in
nations like Pakistan, Sri Lanka, and Myanmar.8 These
infrastructure initiatives connect mainland China to West (Europe)
and South Asia. A large number of nations border China on land
or at sea. Its rivals include potentially strong ones like Japan,
India, and Russia. Their security concerns might not align with
China's. Its other neighbours, including North Korea and the
Central Asian republics, are fragile and unstable, posing a threat to
civil unrest or regime collapse. With Pakistan's assistance, China
is able to counterbalance India, which serves as its main regional
rival. China believes that the success of CPEC and the Pakistani
port of Gwadar will assist it in resolving its Malacca problem.9
Pakistan now occupies a central position in Chinese geopolitical
and geoeconomic strategy. Additionally, it will contribute to
enhancing China's energy security. To get a more nuanced picture,
we need to look at the country level of how China is doing in these
countries.
China in South Asian Countries
Bangladesh
China’s engagement with Bangladesh is central to its attempt to
win over South Asia. China's ties with Bangladesh had a hostile
history, and during the independence of Bangladesh, China sided
with Pakistan. Also, It was the first nation to utilise its veto power
in the United Nations (UN) against Bangladesh. In January 1976,
diplomatic ties were established between China and Bangladesh.
By the middle of the 1980s, Bangladesh and China had established
close military and commercial ties, and around this time, China
began supplying Bangladesh with military equipment. After Wen
Jiabao, the premier of China paid an official visit to Bangladesh,
the two nations proclaimed 2005 to be the 'Year of Bangladesh-
China Friendship.' But during these times, China only engaged
with Bangladesh in more economic and military terms.
A new phase in China and Bangladesh ties began with President Xi
Jinping's trip to Bangladesh in October 2016.10 During the visit,
China pledged Bangladesh its largest economic assistance and
investment, amounting to 38.05 billion USD. It was widely argued
that Xi's visit transformed the two countries' bilateral ties from a
"comprehensive partnership of cooperation" to a "strategic
partnership of cooperation." Most notably, the two parties formally
agreed to advance China's flagship project, the 'One Belt, One
Road' (OBOR) initiative.11 Bangladesh is a crucial link in China's
Maritime Silk Road, and Dhaka actively participates in it.
China was a latecomer to the economic scene, but it moved quickly
to establish itself as a significant player in Bangladesh's trade,
economic, and infrastructure development. China had a small share
of Bangladesh's imports in 1992, performing worse than India,
with 215 million USD compared to 397 million USD for India. In
2005, China emerged as Bangladesh's largest trading partner.
Defence partnership has become a vital attribute of the two
countries' ties since bilateral relations were normalized. Since the
1980s, the leaders of the two armies have held military talks,
exchanged regular visits, and participated in joint drills and
exercises, all of which have yielded strengthened cooperation.
Bangladesh is now the second-largest buyer of Chinese military
equipment after Pakistan. Over 70% of Bangladesh's major arms
purchases come from China. Bangladesh has the most
infrastructure projects built in South Asia with Chinese
assistance.12 In recent years, China has diversified its relations and
made it more profound. Political coordination has improved along
with the growing economic engagement. Since at least 2015, the
CCP has reached out to and met with both the ruling Awami
League and its main rival, the Bangladesh National Party (BNP).
The Awami League and the CCP signed an MoU in 2019 to
explore ways in which they could share knowledge and work
together. China has launched numerous programs in recent years to
expand its so-called "soft influence." China's preferred channels
include friendship centres, cultural events, and interactions with
think tanks, newspapers, and regional governments all across the
nation. In recent years, China has also increased the number of
scholarships to Bangladeshi government officials, students, and
students for higher education, training, and exchange programs.13
China has helped establish several Confucius Institutes in various
universities, including the University of Dhaka, North South
University, and BRAC University, to encourage Bangladeshi
students to learn the Mandarin language. It has become
Bangladeshi students' top choice for studying abroad. Even in the
health sector, China has provided medical assistance, equipment,
and other supplies to public and private organisations. A team of

medical experts was dispatched to Bangladesh in June 2020 to help
with COVID-19. However, despite all these, Bangladesh has a
huge trade deficit with China. Bangladesh's trade deficit with
China has been much larger than its trade deficit with India, which
has become a point of contention between the two countries.
Today, bilateral trade between China and Bangladesh is worth
USD 10 billion, with a trade deficit of USD 9 billion, favouring
China.14 Recently, the unfolding Rohingya crisis in Myanmar and
the position of China put some strain on the relationship between
the two. China's quiet diplomacy demonstrates its desire to take a
leadership role in the regional crisis, undermining India's role as
South Asia's security manager.
Bangladesh is crucial for India, not just as a connecting bridge
between mainland and north-east India but also for the security
and success of the Act East foreign policy. Bangladesh has been
consistently given the status of special invitee in high-profile
multinational platforms by India. The recently concluded G-20
summit in India was one such instance. India has friendly relations
with the current ruling party, Awami League and its government
led by PM Sheikh Hasina. The second of two dominant parties of
Bangladesh, the Bangladesh Nationalist Party, has been close to
China and favoured anti-India activity in Bangladesh. The friendly
government in Bangladesh serves multiple interests of India,
ranging from the alliance on the global stage to security. India
needs to continue its encouragement of the friendly government in
Bangladesh. It should actively keep positive engagements (speedy
resolving bilateral issues) with the Bangladesh government and
extend multiple possible benefits (scholarships, etc.) to the people
of Bangladesh. China still enjoys a highly positive perception
among the Bangladeshi population.
Nepal
Nepal is among the countries in South Asia with which China
share a land border. The Sino-Nepalese Treaty of Peace and
Friendship, which the two nations signed on April 28, 1960,
governs the bilateral relationship between Nepal and China. Since
then, with the rise of China on the global stage, Nepal has built
close cautious relations with China. Nepal was a major supporter
of Chinese inclusion in South Asian Associations of Regional
Cooperation (SAARC). The earlier relationship of China with
Nepal was more of a need-based engagement than, like at present

ambitious leverage building. In recent years it has expanded its
relationship to multi-level engagements.
In 2015, China took over India as Nepal's biggest Foreign Direct
Investment (FDI) investor. China has funded several vital
infrastructures in recent years through its Belt and Road Initiative
(BRIs). Nepal joined BRI in 2017 under PM Pushpa Kamal Dahal,
a pro-China leader.15 Nepal has asked China for financial support
for significant projects like the upper Marsyangdi Hydropower
Station, a cross-border optical fibre link, and the Pokhara
International Regional Airport. The cross-border railroad between
Kerung and Kathmandu is one of the most important projects.
Chinese investors have been the largest foreign direct investors in
Nepal for six years, providing more than half of all FDI. The
relationship between China and Nepal is becoming more
politically intertwined, with discussions held on extradition,
border management, and mutual legal aid during Xi Jinping's 2019
visit. However, there are doubts about the economic feasibility of
using Chinese facilities for transporting goods to and from Nepal.
The Communist Party of Nepal is a major political party in Nepal
which enjoys close relations with the Chinese Communist Party.
On political and ideological issues, the two parties have worked
closely together. The CPN-UML frequently hosts symposiums,
including one on "Xi Jinping Thought" in September 2019,
attended by prominent Chinese and Nepali leaders. From leaders
to cadres at the ground level, the CCP regularly funds visits for
members of political parties in Nepal.
China has had some of the weakest security exchanges and
military ties in the Region with Nepal. But since 2017, new
initiatives, such as the yearly Sagarmatha Friendship joint military
exercise, have been announced. China has had some of the
weakest security exchanges and military ties in the Region with
Nepal.16 Since 2017, new initiatives, such as the yearly
Sagarmatha Friendship joint military exercise, have been
announced. China has been able to advance its idea of a Health
Silk Road in Nepal thanks to the COVID-19 pandemic.17 By
March 2020, Kathmandu had agreed to the "Chinese model
against COVID-19" and had begun collaborating with China on
the best ways to combat the pandemic, employing Chinese testing
kits and other tools. China also wants to engage the general public.
A framework agreement was signed between the Social Welfare

Council of Nepal and the China NGO Network for International
Exchanges in 2018. As a result, thirty Chinese NGOs have been
operating in Nepal. Beijing has been covering the cost of hiring
teachers since 2017, making it more appealing for schools to offer
Mandarin courses. Several institutions, including Tribhuvan
University, the top university in Nepal, have signed contracts to
launch Confucius Institutes. India has traditionally been the
preferred location for Nepali students seeking higher education
abroad. However, thanks to financial aid and scholarships, China
has increasingly replaced India as the preferred location for those
seeking technical skills and graduate degrees. Additionally, there
has been an upward trend in media cooperation and content
coordination.18 Journalist teams from the two nations frequently
travel to one another for consultations and knowledge exchange.
In 2014, the Kantipur Media Group members, one of Nepal's most
prominent media organisations, visited the country and briefed a
team of Chinese journalists. China Radio International runs special
Nepali programs as well as Chinese language classes.
These developments were not common a few years back, but with
China's rising global ambition, it started multiple layers of
engagements to secure its interest. With these diversified
engagements, China has emerged as an alternate pole in Nepal
politics. But India’s shared culture and history with Nepal give it
extra leverage. India has managed to secure its interest by
encouraging democratic actors and government in Nepal.
Sri Lanka
China and Sri Lanka began diplomatic relations on February 7,
1957. Since then, China has been able to build very close ties with
Sri Lanka, especially during the reign of the Rajapaksha family.19
In addition to serving as a welcoming stepping stone for China to
increase its influence in South Asia, the nation sits astride sea
lanes that China's energy imports from the Middle East pass
through, making it a potential strategic asset. Prior to the launch of
the BRI in 2013, Sri Lanka served as a model for Chinese
economic engagement in South Asia. Direct investments and
policy loans backed by the government have helped this gradually
grow. The Rajapaksa family, which was in power from 2005 to
2015 and again from 2019 to 2022, with brothers Mahinda and
Gotabaya serving as president, respectively, has played a
significant role in developing the economic relationship. But

China has not just reached out to the Rajapaksas. In 2015, after
their bitter rival, Maithripala Sirisena, beat Mahinda Rajapaksa for
the president, Beijing swiftly welcomed a ministerial team from
his new administration. Sirisena's administration eventually
authorised the China-funded projects it had previously criticised
and halted. Sirisena praised the BRI in a 2017 address to Xi,
expressing optimism that it will usher in a new era of bilateral
relations. China continues to emphasise that, regardless of the
political hue of the Colombo administration, it sees Sri Lanka as a
friend.
China, in recent years, has been organising activities and
sponsoring people-to-people organisations, such as the Sri Lanka-
China Friendship Association and the Sri Lanka-China Youth
Friendship Association.20 In 2016, Chinese visitors accounted for
13.2% of all foreign tourists in Sri Lanka, up from 1.8% in 2010,
before declining to 8.8% in 2019. China established the Sri Lanka-
China Buddhist Friendship Association in 2015 and funded a
Buddhist television network to capitalise on the two nations'
shared Buddhist
history. China encourages Sri Lankan journalists, academics, and
policy experts to visit the country and collaborates with them
through venues such as the Sri Lanka-China Journalists' Forum.
CCP-affiliated academic institutions and think groups have
relations to research institutes deemed close to the Rajapaksas.
Wang Yi added the Maldives and Sri Lanka to the list of nations
that the Chinese foreign minister typically visited at the beginning
of each new year in 2022. This endeavour illustrates that policy
circles in Beijing recognise South Asia's strategic significance.
Recently, they also celebrated the 65th anniversary of the
establishment of diplomatic relations between China and Sri
Lanka, as well as the 70th anniversary of the Rubber-Rice Pact,
which is recognised as the commencement of their bilateral
commerce. Since May 2021, when Colombo enacted the Colombo
Port City Economic Commission Act, China's infrastructure
cooperation with Sri Lanka has advanced significantly. The
legislation offers a statutory assurance for the China-led Colombo
Port City project. The island nation has agreed to collaborate with
China on the Colombo Port East Terminal Project, which had
previously been allotted to India but was cancelled in 2021.21
Maldives
Due to their vital geopolitical and strategic position in the Indian
Ocean, the Maldives play a crucial part in China's Maritime Silk
Road Initiative (MSRI).22 In 1972, seven years after the Maldives
obtained independence from Britain, formal diplomatic ties were
established between the two nations. However, the 2011 opening
of a Chinese embassy in Male under the administration of former
president Mohamed Nasheed provided the impetus for the current
expansion of bilateral ties. However, in May 2009, The Maldives
opened an embassy in Beijing. High-level bilateral discussions on
political, economic, and military topics followed that. During
President Yameen's four-day visit to China on December 8, 2017,
the Maldives and China inked a Free Trade Agreement (FTA).
Pakistan is the only other SAARC nation to have signed a free
trade agreement (FTA), which was the Maldives' first FTA. In
addition, China has supported major infrastructure projects in the
nation, such as the recently completed 'China-Maldives Friendship
Bridge' connecting Male to Hulhule Island, the development of the
airport, and the building of a 1,000-unit housing complex on
Hulhumale Island. China engages in a variety of other activities in
addition to renewable energy, hotel construction, and the
expansion of telecommunications networks. President Abdulla
Yameen came to office in 2013 as the consequence of a "soft
coup" that deposed Mohammad Nasheed, the first democratically
elected president of the Maldives, who had been living in exile in
neighbouring Sri Lanka and did not return until the 2018 election.
The Yameen government imprisoned opposition figures, including
former president Mohamed Nasheed, but the nation's highest court
ruled in February 2018 that this was illegal and ordered their
release. China advised against India's involvement, arguing that it
did not want the coup to become another "flashpoint," even though
opposition leader Mohamed Nasheed pleaded with India to engage
militarily and end the conflict. The Maldives' then-government
defied Indian pressure by enlisting Beijing's help. While
opposition leader Mohamed Nasheed urged India to intervene
militarily and resolve the crisis, China counselled against India's
participation, claiming that it did not want the coup to become
another "flashpoint." By seeking Beijing's support, the former
Maldives administration rebuffed Indian pressure.
Due to their struggle for influence in this strategically significant
island nation, China and India cannot afford to alienate the
Maldivian government. The Maldives' interactions with its

neighbours during the last several years indicate that a full pivot
away from China and toward India is not achievable; rather, it is
possible for it to move flexibly within the regional political
chessboard. In two respects, China is essential to the Maldives'
hedging plan. It is, first and foremost, an essential source of
substantial financial investments. Second, a sizable portion of the
Maldives' political elite supports China's hostility to Indian
hegemony, particularly when it comes to Indian meddling in
internal affairs there.23 But despite all these, India has managed to
maintain a friendly government in Male and that has served its
interest by keeping China out.
Pakistan
Xi's meeting with Pakistan's Imran Khan before his summit with
Modi in 2019 was intended to underscore Pakistan's importance in
Chinese decision-making in South Asia. Both sides reaffirmed
their commitment to supporting each other's essential problems,
and Beijing reiterated its support for Pakistan's territorial
sovereignty, independence, and security. Pakistan is an all-weather
friend of China, and it is already in the lap of China.
Afghanistan
The majority of nations shut down their diplomatic representation in
Kabul and began evacuating their nationals when the Taliban gained
control of the country in August 2021. There were four major
exceptions, though, and one of them was China. China has
maintained direct contact with the Taliban over the years, and the two
sides have met several times, both bilaterally and internationally,
highlighting China's improving relations with the Islamist movement
(ICWA 2022). Being a single-party authoritarian country, China does
not find it difficult to engage with authoritarian countries, and it
favours stability over the nature of its rule. Stability in Afghanistan
has a multi-level benefit for China. The success of CPEC is closely
associated with stability in Afghanistan. Peace in the Western
province of China, Xinjiang, depends on peace in Afghanistan. These
are among the several factors which led China to approach the early
changed regime in Afghanistan. Chinese policymakers feel Pakistan
is a beneficial partner in ensuring stability in Afghanistan in order to
profit from economic growth there in the future. China views
Pakistan as a useful tool for gaining a better knowledge of the
situation in Afghanistan.
Recently, Wang Yi made a surprise visit to Afghanistan after

Pakistan. He was the first senior Chinese official to do so since
August 2021, when the Taliban seized control of the nation. The
Islamic State-Khorasan Province and the East Turkistan Islamic
Movement pose threats to China's western border security.24
Beijing is afraid that Uyghur separatists may be absorbed by new
and existing terrorist groups, which would then launch cross-
border assaults on Xinjiang and imperil Chinese-led projects in
Afghanistan.
Bhutan
Bhutan lacks diplomatic ties with China, resulting in far less
interaction with China than with other South Asian states.25
Nonetheless, at a meeting in February 2019 between the visiting
Chinese ambassador to India, Luo Zhaohui, and the Bhutanese
prime minister, Lotay Tshering, Beijing highlighted the need to
continue working with Bhutan to settle the border issue. Possible
reference to the Doklam region, where China and India fought in
2017. In any event, the most recent round of border discussions
between China and Bhutan happened in 2016. But this August
2023, Bhutan and China have engaged in boundary resolution,
which is Independent of India. These are not read as Bhutan's shift
toward China rather, Bhutan focus on boundary conflict
resolution. India should not react to these but rather help Bhutan to
take decisive decisions in its interest.
Smaller Countries and India-China Power Tussels: An
Analysis
China's regional presence grew while India's strategic space in
South Asia shrank. Between 2005 and 2020, China's exports to the
area increased by more than five times. India's exports to the area,
in contrast, have increased barely three times over the same time
span.26 Beijing has made significant investments in the area in
response to China's economic growth. South Asia's and China's
economic interests closely align in dealings at the national level.
In terms of commerce, investment, tourism, and infrastructure
projects, China and South Asian nations have significantly
integrated at the national level during the previous two decades.
From a meagre 1.18 billion USD in 1990 to 5.57 billion USD in
2000, and then another 25-fold increase to 140.43 billion USD in
2018, China's commerce with South Asia saw an increase of more
than five times.27 In contrast to the 33-fold rise in India's
commerce with China from 2000 to 2018, Bangladesh witnessed a

more than 20-fold boom, Pakistan more than a 17-fold increase,
and Sri Lanka nearly a 10-fold gain. Even smaller countries like
Afghanistan, Nepal, and Bhutan have amassed considerable trade
with China. Many South Asian nations (including Afghanistan,
Bangladesh, the Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka) have
formally joined China's Belt and Road Initiatives (BRI) in the
hope that it would help to stimulate their emerging economies. To
retain its recently created strategic space, China aims to court and
interact with these nations continually. This is especially important
since academics and the media in these nations are investigating
the BRI. Thus, when India ceased its COVID-19 vaccine
shipments, even to its neighbours, claiming internal requirements,
China used the opportunity to portray itself as a good neighbour
and supplied these nations with lifesaving vaccines. This improved
the regional climate for collaboration between South Asian nations
and China. This has allowed China to increase its soft power and
political influence, presenting itself as a responsible great power
and challenging India's political and economic dominance in the
area. India perceives China's planned initiatives, especially the
centrepiece Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), as a tactic to offset its
dominance. A South Asia in which India is the unchallenged
hegemon poses a danger not just to China's place in the area but
also to its domestic security, such as in Tibet.
Physically as a globalization agent, temporally as a development
model, and strategically as a 'courageous and resolute' force, China
is pervasive throughout South Asia. There has been a significant
shift in its approach, strategy, and objectives. In the last 60 years,
China has shifted from being a shrewd promoter of ideological
influence and a clandestine backer of insurgency to a constructor
of contemporary cross-border infrastructures, a ruthless market
grabber, and a tenacious player of strategic repositioning. China's
interests and links with other nations, particularly areas of Europe
and South Asia, have become more diverse and numerous than
ever in the last decade. With these additional avenues of influence,
the organization has come to anticipate special respect for its
interests and is ready to use pressure to achieve this. China's most
valuable asset is its economic influence levers, and Chinese
players are aggressive in their use. China is assisting in the
construction of big infrastructure projects in every nation in the
area, in the majority of instances, by lending them money. In
2020, its loans to Sri Lanka were $4.6 billion, while the Maldives
are estimated to have received between $1.1 billion and $1.4
billion. Chinese actors see chances and make proposals without
waiting for the nation to initiate contact. Chinese embassies, state-
owned enterprises (SOEs), private companies, journalists, and
other players present in a nation exchange information and
coordinate insights to discover and refine these future engagement
possibilities. These might include creating local capability, finding
a commercial relationship, or providing technology packages and
money for 5G communications, for instance. Numerous Chinese
corporations working in the area have assessed the significance of
certain large-scale projects to the governments they are seeking
and the role Chinese investments may play for incumbents who
must face the electorate. Oftentimes, the completion of a project is
timed to coincide with forthcoming elections, giving parties in
power an accomplishment to highlight and, therefore, enhancing
their chances of gaining approval for a planned Chinese project.
In contrast to the past, China is making substantial expenditures
and undertaking transformational initiatives in the neighbourhood.
They create growth poles, employment reservoirs, and worldwide
brand identities for the awardees. However, they are not devoid of
severe conditionality, far-reaching socio-environmental
consequences, and pervasive governance manipulations by
investor-donor nations.
Relatively smaller nations, such as Bangladesh, Nepal, Sri Lanka,
and Afghanistan, are tremendously enticed to expand
infrastructure with Chinese funding and improve cross-regional
market links. These nations also feel that China's presence might
contribute to political stability by visibly affecting economic
initiatives and using these instruments of cooperation to undermine
India's dominance. India has responded in four key and distinct
ways. First, it proclaimed clearly a "neighbourhood first" policy
and began re-engaging the neighbours with a much more lenient
attitude and tools. Second, it initiated highly aggressive and
transformative infrastructure project interventions, including the
construction of canals and railroads in Nepal and energy grid links
with Bangladesh. Thirdly, it zealously revitalized counterbalancing
structures centred on regionalism, such as the BBIN and
BIMSTEC. As an act of external balance, it began addressing
China on a new level, but without band wagoning, while
maintaining its tactical alignment with the United States, Japan,
Australia, and Russia. South Asia, home to roughly two billion

people and some of the world's most dynamic economies, is
crucial to Indo-Pacific geopolitical issues. The maritime potential
of South Asia is of growing relevance to bigger strategic
frameworks and has become a battleground for both minor and
great nations. The Belt and Road Initiative have allowed China to
progressively expand its contacts in South Asia. But this, together
with the ongoing tensions on the India–China border, placed
Beijing in direct competition with New Delhi's regional ambitions,
as articulated in Prime Minister Narendra Modi's "neighbourhood
first" strategy.
The bulk of South Asian countries, with the exception of Bhutan
and India, joined the Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB)
and the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) lately (AIIB). Four very
potent but long-lasting objectives may be at the heart of China's
rapidly evolving yet speedy "advance strategy" in the Region of
South Asia. Extending military base and strategic access through
high mountain roads and maritime routes, expanding its economic
and commercial penetration into the vast South Asian market and
through it to the Middle East, and finally effectively addressing its
potential internal instabilities, particularly in the south-western
and western regions are some of these. Due to South Asia's
increasing strategic significance and China's meteoric rise as a
political, military, economic, and cultural superpower on the
international stage, the countries of this Region face a variety of
policy options that will impact their future economic prospects
and level of national security. China's rise has substantial
consequences on foreign policy, especially for the smaller states
of South Asia, Southeast Asia, and Central Asia. Managing ties
with the great powers in terms of their national security and
autonomy is one of the most important issues for small nations in
international politics.
China's economic and political influence has increased so rapidly
that many nations, even those with relatively robust state and civil
society institutions, have struggled to comprehend the
repercussions. But "vulnerable" countries—where the gap between
the extent and intensity of Chinese action and the local ability to
manage and mitigate political and economic risks is greatest—face
unique problems.
China has been encouraged to push its interests in South Asia more
directly as a result of dramatic shifts in its ties with regional

governments. It has acquired a larger diversity of interests and
relationships than ever before during the previous decade.
Simultaneously, China has built more avenues of influence, a
higher expectation of respect for its interests, and a greater
readiness to use pressure in pursuit of its objectives.
Conclusion
In the last decade, China has paid a great deal more attention to its
South Asian periphery, shifting from economic and development
engagements to broader political and security engagements.
China's economic expansion and increased participation with South
Asian states in infrastructure and security have prompted South
Asian nations, particularly India's smaller neighbours, to reassess
their relationship with India. China has the benefit of being
geographically near South Asia, unlike other major overseas
powers. In addition, it is able and willing to provide finance for
large-scale infrastructure projects. Numerous concerns have been
voiced about Chinese investment in South Asia, notwithstanding
China's role in the building of extensive infrastructure and other
projects. These include 1) onerous lending terms, 2) inflated
project costs, 3) a lack of transparency in either the negotiation for
or final execution of projects, 4) hobnobbing with the governing
regime, and 5) the creation of surplus capabilities that burden these
economies. On the other hand, these smaller nations have recently
begun to experience a "balancing crisis." They are diplomatically
attempting to
create the appearance of non-alignment. The expense of alignment
might engender a new feeling of rivalry and competitiveness, even
at the level of perception. India's familiarity with the governing
elites in these nations and their institutional orientation at home
allows them to rapidly comprehend any substantial change in their
foreign policy. For example, Nepal's inclination toward China may
be plainly identified, even in the absence of large official
agreements or projects. Later, as Nepal signed MOUs pertaining to
port access, a collaboration in BRI efforts, and other trade and
investment endeavours, India had no choice but to resuscitate and
revert to the traditional topic of historico-cultural interplay.
However, occurrences such as India's third economic embargo in
the immediate aftermath of the 2015 Nepal earthquake forced
Kathmandu to join forces with China.
As with Nepal, the majority of South Asian nations are now

attempting to find strategies for balancing the presence and
engagement of both India and China. Bipolar dominance is more of
a 'given' than a choice. This implies that decisions and methods
must be indigenous and not eternally determined. Even a peripheral
island nation such as the Maldives urgently seeks platforms and
methods that would allow it to balance the presence of these two
nations without jeopardising its national interests or offending its
people. New strategic alliances are now improbable.
Simultaneously, none of these nations can see military strength as a
tool. At times, the balancing act becomes too intricate to be neatly
categorised and replicated by others Though there is an intense
political debate, and high-sounding statements have been issued
expressing concerns that even the sovereignty of some of these
countries could be at risk and that there is a "debt trap to hook
countries into China's sphere"28, the discourse is becoming
increasingly unilateral, hegemonic, and generally raised by
political oppositions in these countries. Nevertheless, a number of
research have reached the conclusion that debt traps resulting in
significant misery, including loss of livelihood, are unavoidable.
For instance, US-based think tanks such as the Centre for Global
Development give a graphic picture of how China has contributed
to the debt load of certain South Asian nations and the potential
repercussions of this action.
The political turmoil in the Maldives demonstrates that massive
Chinese investments may weaken democratic institutions. This is a
warning to India that Chinese investments in South Asian states
have the potential to influence India's geopolitics by exploiting
underlying, unresolved tensions.29 The manner in which China
draws a massively networked connectedness with a severe scalar
effect and cascade effects is likely to be more sophisticated and
complex. For instance, one fear that has gained traction is that of
the rapidly constructed Hambantota Port in Sri Lanka in 2010, with
a big Chinese loan from the state-owned China Harbour
Engineering Company. Even after the government decreed that
ships carrying car imports bound for Colombo port would instead
offload their cargo at Hambantota to launch a business there, only
34 ships berthed at Hambantota in 2012, compared to 3,667 ships
at the Colombo port. This project has already begun facing sever
underutilization in its operational capacity, which could actually
turn out to be greatly detrimental to Sri Lanka and
South Asia. The island country was included as one of the 23

nations for whom there may be a significant risk of financial
difficulty as a result of more BRI-related finance.
Overall, it is safe to say that China has become an important
partner in South Asian politics despite not being officially part of
South Asia. India’s policy on South Asia should take important
consideration being the partner of smaller South Asian countries
than dominating or intervening in their internal politics.
References
1. Shabbir, Talat. 2017 “Rising China and its South Asian Neighbors:
Evolving Dynamics and the Outlook.” Policy Perspectives: The Journal of
the Institute of Policy Studies. 2017. Vol. 14(2):137-152. Accessed
September 23, 2023. DOI: 10.13169/polipers.14.2.0137;
2. Paul, V. Thazha. 2019. "When Balance of Power Meets Globalization:
China, India and the Small States of South Asia." Politics, (2019). Vol. 39,
Issue 1. Accessed December 8, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.1177/0263395718779930;
3. Kumar, Sanjeev. "China’s South Asia Policy in the
‘New Era’." India Quarterly, (2019). Accessed July 28,
2023. https://doi.org/10.1177/0974928419841769;
4. Pal, Deep. 2021. “China’s Influence in South Asia: Vulnerabilities and
Resilience in Four Countries.” Carnegie Endowment for International
Peace. October 13, 2021.
https://carnegieendowment.org/2021/10/13/china-s-influence-in-south-
asia-vulnerabilities-and resilience-in-four-countries-pub-85552;
5. Paszak, Paweł. 2021. "The Malacca Strait, the South China Sea and the
Sino-American Competition in the Indo-Pacific." Journal of Asian
Security and International Affairs, (2021). Accessed December 2, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.1177/23477970211017494;
6. Xi, Jinrui, and Primiano, Christopher. 2020. “China’s Influence in Asia:
How Do Individual Perceptions Matter?” East Asia 37, 181–202 (2020).
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12140-020-09334-x;
7. Jaishankar, Dhruva. 2016. “Indian Ocean region: A pivot for India’s
growth.” Brookings. September 2016 12
https://www.brookings.edu/opinions/indian-ocean-region-a-pivot-for-
indias-growth/;
8. Shullman, O. David. 2019. “Protect the Party:
China’s growing influence in the developing
world.” Brookings. January 22, 2019.
https://www.brookings.edu/articles/protect-the-
party-chinas-growing-influence-in-the-develop i
ng-world/;
9. Khursheed, Ambreen, Syed K. Haider, Faisal Mustafa, and Ayesha Akhtar.
"China – Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Harbinger of Economic Prosperity

and Regional Peace." Asian Journal of German and European Studies 4, no.
1 (2019): 1-15. Accessed August 28, 2023. https://doi.org/10.1186/s40856-
019-0044-2;
10. Hang, Nguyen Thi Thuy. “The Rise of China: Challenges, Implications, and
Options for the United States.” Indian Journal of Asian Affairs 30, no. 1/2
(2017): 47–64. http://www.jstor.org/stable/26465816;
11. Robayt Khondoker, Rashed Uz Zama. 2020. “Coping with the Dragon:
Small States of South Asia and Their Foreign Policy Responses to
China’s Rise.” Stosunki Międzynarodowe – International Relations,
56(2). 2020. doi: 10.7366/020909612202005 ;
13. Yuan, Tingting. 2022. "Higher Education beyond SDG 4: China’s
Scholarship Provision in the Global South." International Journal of
Chinese Education, (2022). Accessed December 03, 2023.
https://doi.org/10.1177_2212585X221136735;
14. Bhattacharjee, Joyeeta. 2018. “Decoding China-Bangladesh
relationship.” ORF. June 27,2018.
https://www.orfonline.org/expert-speak/41935-decoding-china-
bangladesh-relationshi/;
15. Sigdel, Anil. 2018. “China’s growing footprint in Nepal: Challenges and
opportunities for India.” ORF. October 3, 2018.
https://www.orfonline.org/research/chinas-growing-footprint-in-nepal-
challenges-and-opportun ities-for-india/;
16. Sharma, Prasad, Buddhi. 2021. “Nepal-China Security Issue in the
Context of Belt and Road Program Implementation.” Open Journal
of Social Sciences, 09(08), 91–107. August 16, 2021.
https://doi.org/10.4236/jss.2021.98008;
17. Pal, Deep, Rahul Bhatia, and Suchet Vir Singh. 2020. “Health Silk Road
— How China Plans to Make BRI Essential in Covid-hit South Asia.”
ThePrint. June 11, 2020. https://theprint.in/opinion/health-silk-road-how-
china-plans-to-make-bri-essential-in-covid-hit south-asia/439603/;
18. Gokhale, Vijay. 2022. “China’s Influence in Nepal Isn’t
Limitless.” Carnegie India. April 6, 2022.
https://carnegieindia.org/2022/04/06/china-s-influence-in-
nepal-isn-t-limitless-pub-86811;
19. Shah, Saeed. And Uditha Jayasinghe. 2020. “China Regains Clout in
Sri Lanka With Family’s Return to Power.” WSJ. November 28,
2020. https://www.wsj.com/articles/china-regains-clout-in-sri-lanka-
with-familys-return-to-power-11 606568404;
20. Freedom House. “Sri Lanka. In Freedom House” Accessed

March 15, 2023. https://freedomhouse.org/country/sri-
lanka/beijings-global-media-influence/202;
21. Revi, Vinitha. 2022. “Colombo Port City project: Controversial since its
inception.” ORF. January 9, 2022. https://www.orfonline.org/expert-
speak/colombo-port-city-project/;
22. Khan, Maliha Zeba. 2022 “Strategic Posturing of China in IOR:
Implications for Regional Peace and Stability.” Policy Perspectives 19, no.
1 (2022): 13–33. https://www.jstor.org/stable/48676293;
23. Rajagopalan. Pillai, Rajeswari. 2017. “China in Sri Lanka: The Colombo
Port Conundrum.” The Diplomat. May 7, 2017.
https://thediplomat.com/2021/05/china-in-sri-lanka-the-colombo-port-
conundrum/;
24. Xu, Beina. Holly Fletcher, and Jayshree Bajoria. 2014. “The East
Turkestan Islamic Movement (ETIM).” Council on Foreign Relations.
September 4, 2014. https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/east-turkestan-
islamic-movement-etim;
25. Nitasha, Kaul. “Beyond India and China: Bhutan as a Small State in
International Relations”. International Relations of the Asia-Pacific,
Volume 22, Issue 2, May 2022, Pages 297–337.
https://doi.org/10.1093/irap/lcab010;
26. Fazli. Zeba, Delwar Hossain, Achyut Bhandari et al. 2022. “India-China
Competition: Perspectives from the Neighbourhood.” ORF. August 16,
2022. https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-china-competition/;
28. Pal, Alasdair. “Maldives’ Chinese Debt and Political Risk Could Lead to
Trouble in Paradise.” Reuters Japan, September 18, 2018.
https://jp.reuters.com/article/us-maldives-election-debt-
idUSKCN1LY1QR/;
29. Fazli. Zeba, Delwar Hossain, Achyut Bhandari et al. 2022. “India-China
Competition: Perspectives from the Neighbourhood.” ORF. August 16,
2022. https://www.orfonline.org/research/india-china-competition/;
Justification for Using Torture in …. 21
Justifications for Using The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-21-42
Torture in https://www.amu.ac.in/
Counterinsurgency nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
(COIN) Operations in
India’s Northeast, and the
COIN Strategy?
Aashmani Ghosh*
ABSTRACT
Despite the universal condemnation of torture,
theoretical and psychological justifications have
been offered to support its use, particularly in
scenarios like ticking bomb situations. This
phenomenon has resulted in a dangerous erosion of
international treaties by politicians, military
officials, and lawyers. This research study explores
the rationales provided for the use of torture within
the framework of counterinsurgency operations in
the North East region of India, despite the presence
of internationally recognised legal norms and
human rights standards that explicitly forbid such
actions. Using materialist perspectives held by
neorealists and ideational perspectives held by
constructivists, the paper analyses the definitions of
torture recognised by international law, investigates
arguments for torture in the region, and evaluates
claims that torture is necessary for intelligence
gathering, deterrence, and insurgency resolution.
The study reveals the intricate dynamics underlying
torture in counterinsurgency operations and
emphasises the ethical and practical challenges
associated with justifying such actions.
*Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, AMU

Keywords Torture; Counterinsurgency; North East India;

International law; Human rights; Materialist perspectives;
Ideational perspectives; Security forces; Justifications; Ethical
implications
The 9/11 and the War on Terror led to debates on the use of torture,
its efficiency and whether it could ever be ethically justifiable,
especially the widespread use of torture on terrorist suspects. It led
to arguments for principled torture, meaning that torture in specific
catastrophic cases is morally acceptable to prevent a greater evil.
The U.N. Convention against Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment as well asthe U.N. Declaration of Human
Rights, the International Convention of Civil and Political Rights1,
the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights2, and
the Geneva Convention3all prohibit torture and cruel, inhuman or
degrading treatment at all times.
Despite the general acceptance that torture is abhorrent, many
theoretical and psychological justifications like consequentialist
and utilitarian arguments and support have been given for torture
and torture methods. The panic induced by ticking bomb scenarios
has allowed politicians, military officials, and lawyers to
undermine international treaties ratified by the nations. For
example, American politicians defended President Bush's policy of
waterboarding Al Qaeda leaders and attempted to distinguish
between waterboarding as enhanced interrogation technique and
not torture.4Pre-emptive detentions without trial of foreign
nationals suspected of terrorism were enthusiastically endorsed
rather than condemned. The idea of torturing one person to gain
information that may potentially save thousands of lives became
condonable.5It is crucial to study the key arguments put forward in
favour of torture, arguments that seem to be a moral rationale for
torture but, on closer inspection, are simply a sidestep for
international treaty obligations, and recognise the pitfalls of the
arguments from both ethical and practical perspectives.
In spite of international law and human rights norms prohibiting
the use of torture, the Indian government has justified the use of
torture in the context of counterinsurgency operations in the North
East of India. This paper attempts to answer the question, ''Why do
the Indian government and security forces justify the use of torture
in the COIN strategy in the North East, despite the existence of
international legal norms and human rights standards that prohibit
such practices?'' using materialist perspectives held by neorealists

and ideational perspectives held by constructivists.
Understanding 'Torture'
Torture is a complicated and contentious practice that has been
defined and revised by legal and ethical frameworks, international
institutions, and scholars over time and understanding all the
various definitions of torture is essential to comprehend the
implications of its use in multiple contexts. The United Nations
Convention Against Torture (CAT) of 1984 contains the most
widely accepted definition of torture, which prohibits the use of
any justification for torture, including national security concerns,
and declares that "no exceptional circumstances whatsoever" can
be used to justify torture.6Article 7(2)(e) of the Rome Statute
defines torture as "intentional infliction of severe pain or suffering,
whether physical or mental, upon a person in the custody or under
the control of the accused; except that torture shall not include pain
or suffering arising only from, inherent in or incidental to, lawful
sanctions"7
Torture has been defined in more sophisticated ways by other
academics. Torture, for example, is defined by Darius Rejali in his
book Torture and Democracy (2007) as the "systematic infliction
of physical torment on detained individuals by state officials for
public purposes, for confession, information, or intimidation."
Rejali contends that modern torture has been perfected into
invisibility- inflicting pain while leaving no scars. He also
emphasises the role of the torturer, who has full control over the
victim and utilises a range of tactics to extract information or a
confession, such as sleep deprivation and sensory
deprivation.8Legal scholar David Luban defines torture as an
intentional act that causes severe pain or suffering, both physical
and mental, to a person who is under the control of the torturer. He
emphasises that torture involves a deliberate disregard for the
victim's dignity and autonomy and is frequently conducted in
secrecy, out of public scrutiny. Luban's definition also emphasises
the legal and moral ramifications of torture, as well as the necessity
for responsibility for those who participate in such practices.9
The definition and use of torture in India have been the topic of
much controversy and discussion. In the case of D.K. Basu v. State
of West Bengal (1996), the Supreme Court of India decided that
torture encompasses not only physical abuse but also mental
harassment and intimidation. The court further stated that "mental

trauma, agony, and anguish which a person undergoes cannot be
measured by any scale."10
JineeLokaneeta's book 'Transnational Torture: Law, Violence, and
State Power in the United States and India' explores the use of
torture in interrogations within liberal democracies. While torture
is often seen as an exception, a result of the actions of a few bad
apples or as justifiable in the context of terrorism, Lokaneeta
challenges this idea. She argues that torture is a manifestation of
the tension between law and violence and is constantly negotiated
and accommodated within the legal system itself. Despite this,
states deny the use of torture by pointing to the existence of laws,
effectively using the law to negate its presence, regardless of
whether the act can be considered torture or not. Lokaneeta also
emphasises the state's 'containment' argument, in which torture is
perceived as a one-off incident carried out by uneducated and
inexperienced police officers, deflecting attention away from the
reality that violence is tolerated at all levels of the state. This
reduction of the problem to one of lower-level police misses the
more significant issue at stake.11
Indian academics emphasise the role of state actors in perpetuating
torture, as torture is frequently used to maintain social control and
suppress dissent.Torture, according to Indian experts, is not just a
violation of human rights, but also a method of maintaining social
control and suppressing opposition. Consequently, the use of
torture in COIN operations is a reflection of the state's insecurity
and its inclination to violate human rights to maintain control.12In
contrast, Western scholars emphasise the broader human rights
implications of torture, contending that torture is an offence to
human dignity and a violation of basic human rights.They
emphasise the universality of these rights and the necessity of
international standards to address torture.
Justifications
Counterinsurgency (COIN) is a strategy that uses military,
political, and socioeconomic measures to suppress insurgency or
insurrection within a country. For decades, India has struggled with
insurgency in multiple regions, including the Northeast. The
insurgency in the Northeast originates in the era of colonial rule
when the British occupied the region and imposed their
administrative and legal systems on the indigenous population. The
Indian government's neglect of the Northeast region after

independence contributed to a sense of alienation and
marginalisation among the local population. The insurgency in
India's Northeast can be roughly divided into two categories: ethnic
and separatist. Ethnic insurgencies are motivated by local
communities' demands for greater autonomy, whereas separatist
insurgencies seek to secede from India. The insurgent
organisations in the Northeast have resorted to explosives,
assassinations, and kidnappings to achieve their objectives.13
One of the main reasons given for using torture in COIN strategies
is the need to extract information from the insurgents. Insurgent
organisations frequently work in small units and keep their
activities hidden to escape detection by security authorities. To
obtain information from militants, security forces have resorted to
torture. Torture is frequently permissible in COIN operations as a
form of deterrent. The theory is that if security forces can instil fear
within insurgents, they would be less inclined to engage in violent
behaviour.
A. Deterrence:
Deterrence, in the context of COIN operations, refers to the use of
torture as a means to instil fear and discourage insurgents from
engaging in violent activities. Proponents argue that the fear of
torture will act as a deterrent, preventing insurgents from planning,
executing, or supporting acts of insurgency. According to this
argument, crime is a decision based on assessing costs and
advantages, where raising the cost deters the activity, punishment
deters offenders, and humans are rational and self-interested.
However, if insurgents are more concerned with their larger
objective and less concerned with their own punishment than a
typical criminal, the argument for deterrence becomes
invalid.14During the implementation of the Armed Forces (Special
Powers) Act (AFSPA), security forces were accused of using
torture to deter insurgents in the region.15The deterrence
justification for torture is not unique to the Northeast region of
India; it has also been used in other regions. To deter potential
insurgents and sympathisers in regions plagued by Naxalite
insurgency, security forces have resorted to "encounter killings"
and extrajudicial torture.16
B. Extraction of Information
Torture is often used as an interrogation tool, with supporters
defending it as a means of extracting critical information from
insurgents. This justification is primarily based on the belief that
such information is essential to assuring the security and protection
of the population.17Torture can be tempting — particularly for
democracies — as a response to terrorism when information is
limited to acquire intelligence that could prevent future attacks due
to its speed and low cost. Mark Thiessen, a Bush administration
official, argues that the "enhanced interrogations" of Khalid Sheikh
Mohammed yielded intelligence that thwarted terrorist plans to
crash a plane into a California skyscraper.18Torture, critics believe,
often results in inaccurate or untrustworthy intelligence because
victims can provide misleading information under duress. This
affects the credibility of the intelligence acquired and may result in
targeting innocent people.19
C. Punishment
Punishment is yet another justification for torture used in
COIN operations in India. This justification is based on the belief
that those who indulge in insurgent activity should be severely
punished to deter future acts of violence. This, however, ignores
the reality that torture violates detainees' fundamental human rights
and can lead to a vicious cycle of violence and revenge.20Torture
has been utilised as a form of punishment in counterinsurgency
operations in North East India.
For example, in 1994, the Assam Rifles, a paramilitary group,
tortured and killed 21-year-old Ajit Mahanta, who was considered
a part of the United Liberation Front of Assam (ULFA). The
officers who tortured him said they were punishing him for his
involvement in insurgent operations.21Prisoners were frequently
dehumanised and expected to have information, making it simpler
for interrogators to engage in torture despite legal restrictions.
Countries, including democracies, implicitly condone torture by
fostering conditions conducive to its use and neglecting to sanction
its perpetrators.22
D. Schadenfreude and retribution
In connection with the justification of punishment, torture has been
justified based on emotions such as schadenfreude, retribution, and
vengeance. Schadenfreude23, frequently coupled with revenge and
retribution, is a psychological phenomenon in which individuals

receive joy from observing or inflicting misfortune on others.
Proponents claim torture serves as a manner of exacting retribution
on insurgents for their actions, bringing a feeling of vindication
and emotional closure.This justification dehumanizes the victims
and perpetuates cycles of violence and resentment.24In the context
of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, for example, incidents of torture
have been justified based on vengeance and the assumption that it
will discourage future acts of violence.25Torture as a form of
punishment and retribution against insurgents has been
accompanied by schadenfreude and vengeance in the context of
Northeast India. For example, the tragic case of Manorama Devi in
2004 exemplifies the use of torture as a form of retribution.
Manorama, a Manipuri lady, was apprehended by the Assam Rifles
on suspicion of ties to rebel organisations. She was eventually
discovered dead, with evidence of torture, sparking significant
demonstrations against the use of excessive force and the desire for
revenge.26The use of schadenfreude and revenge as justifications
for torture raises significant ethical concerns. It diminishes the
humanity of both criminals and victims and undermines the ideals
of justice, fairness, and human rights respect. Not only does
seeking vengeance through torture perpetuate cycles of violence,
but it also erodes trust between the state and its citizens, impeding
efforts to create a lasting peace.
Neo-realism, often known as structural realism, is an international
relations school of thought that emphasises the relevance of the
structure of the international system in driving state behaviour.
According to neo-realists, states are rational actors motivated
primarily by the anarchic character of the international system. In
this context, materialism refers to the belief that material factors,
such as military power, economic resources, and strategic interests,
are the most significant determinants of state behaviour.The
materialist perspective by neo-realists offers insights into the
justifications given for the use of torture for COIN. From a neo-
realist perspective, the use of torture for COIN can be justified if it
is seen as serving the state's strategic interests. According to neo-
realists, states are obligated to safeguard their citizens and their
interests, which frequently necessitates the use of force against
insurgent threats. Torture can be viewed as a necessary evil in this
sense, justifiable if it serves to prevent future attacks and defend
national security objectives. Kenneth Waltz, a well-known neo-
realist scholar, asserts that the balance of power is the most

important factor in how a state acts27. In the context of COIN, this
means that states are likely to use torture if they think it will help
tip the balance of power in their favour. They contend that the
strategic benefits of using torture in COIN exceed the drawbacks,
particularly if it offers vital intelligence that aids in the prevention
of future terrorist acts.
Constructivism is a school of thought in international relations that
emphasizes the importance of ideas, norms, and identities in
shaping state behaviour. States, according to constructivists, are
affected not just by material interests but also by social norms,
values, and identities. In this context, the ideational perspective
refers to the belief that ideas and norms play a significant role in
determining state behaviour. Torture for COIN may be viewed as a
reflection of a society's dominant ideals and norms from a
constructivist standpoint. According to constructivists, ideas and
norms are not immutable but are instead influenced by social
interactions and discourses. Torture, in this context, might be
understood as a by-product of the dominant rhetoric on national
security and the necessity to resistinsurgent threats. For
constructivists, the decision to use torture in COIN is influenced by
the prevalent discourse on national security and the legitimacy of
torture as an intelligence-gathering method. According to
constructivist scholar Jutta Weldes, national security, terrorism,
and torture discourses are central in moulding state behaviour.28In
this context, the use of torture can be viewed as a reflection of the
prevalent discourse on torture's efficiency in intelligence gathering
and averting future attacks.Moreover, ideas and discourses
surrounding insurgency and counterinsurgency also shape the
justifications for torture. Notions like portraying insurgent
organisations as dangers to the state's identity or the narrative of
the government as the protector of the nation, influence the
justifications for torture. For example, the government and security
forces may defend the use of torture as a deterrent to insurgent
organisations viewed as a danger to the Indian state's identity,
culture, or political stability. Justifications for the use of torture in
COIN operations in India's North East are shaped by these
concepts and discourses. Constructivist researchers emphasise the
importance of identity in influencing state conduct, such as the
historical and cultural backdrop of the region. For example, the
government and security forces in the North East area may
consider insurgent groups as undermining the Indian state's

authority and legitimacy and may justify the use of torture as a
method of reasserting state control and preserving the prevailing
identity and culture.Moreover, the identity of the state itself, as
well as its perception of its function in the international system,
influences the justifications for torture. The Indian state, for
example, may regard itself as a regional or global power, and may
defend the use of torture as a necessary weapon to retain its
dominance and influence in the region, despite international human
rights laws outlawing such practices.
Discussion and Interpretation
Torture as a tactic of gathering intelligence or silencing opposition
is a difficult subject in COIN operations, particularly in India's
North East. Torture arguments are shaped by some political,
historical, and identity-based factors. The perceived danger to
national security presented by insurgent groups in the region is a
crucial consideration. The Indian government views insurgency as
a threat to its sovereignty and territorial integrity and justifies using
torture to combat such threats.This viewpoint is frequently
reinforced by historical and political narratives that emphasise the
need of maintaining law and order and preserving the integrity of
the Indian state.29The political climate, notably the government's
attitude on national security and law and order concerns, might
influence the reasons presented for the use of torture in
counterinsurgency operations. Political factors such as election
politics, public opinion, and government stability may influence
security forces and officials' decisions to legitimise the use of
torture.30In addition, the power dynamics between the central
government of India and the state governments in the North East
region influence the justifications for torture. The North East states
have significant autonomy and special provisions under the Indian
Constitution, which gives them certain political privileges and
protections. However, the central government may regard
insurgency in the North East as a threat to its authority and thus
justify the use of torture to restore control and maintain
dominance.31
The legacy of colonialism, ethnic conflicts, armed insurgency, and
the relationship between the central government and state
governments shape the narrative and discourse around the use of
torture as a tool in COIN in the region as well.One significant
factor is the legacy of colonialism and its impact on the region's

socio-political dynamics. The North East area was administered
independently from the rest of India during British colonial control,
with restricted access to governance and development prospects.
This legacy of neglect and marginalisation has resulted in
resentment and alienation among the local communities, which
insurgent groups seeking autonomy or independence have
exploited. As a result, the Indian government may be able to
rationalise the use of torture as a means of repressing dissent and
maintaining control over the region.32The history of ethnic clashes
and community tensions in the North East area is another historical
aspect influencing arguments for torture. Numerous ethnic and
tribal communities live in the region, each with its own history and
grievances. Historical tensions, disputes over land and resources,
and competition for political authority have frequently sparked
violent conflicts between these communities. As a means to
suppress these conflicts and preserve communal harmony, the
Indian government could justify the use of torture.33
Identity politics is also significant in influencing justifications for

torture in India's North East. Issues of identity, nationalism, and
separatism are intricately intertwined with the insurgency. The
justifications for using torture to suppress dissent and maintain
control may be influenced by political factors such as perceived
threats to the identity of the dominant group or fear of
secession.34Another significant factor is the ethno-nationalistic
aspirations of communities in the region. Ethnic and tribal
communities in the North East have distinct identities and goals
and may desire autonomy from India due to their distinct culture,
language, and history. These communities often perceive
themselves as distinct from the rest of India in terms of culture,
language, and history, and may seek autonomy or independence
from the Indian state.The Indian government may view these
aspirations as a threat to national integrity and thus justify the use
of torture to suppress such movements and maintain control over
the region.35
An examination of the grounds for torture in India's North East
reveals several similarities and tendencies worth mentioning. To
begin, a trend of justifying torture in the context of national
security and counterinsurgency operations exists. Torture is
frequently justified by the state as a necessary tool for combating

insurgent or separatist activities in the region. The state may claim
that using torture to elicit information from suspects or discourage
others from joining insurgent groups is justifiable. This pattern
shows a militarised approach to conflict resolution in which
security concerns take precedence over human rights concerns, and
the use of force is viewed as an acceptable way of achieving state
objectives.36
Secondly, there is a trend of justifying torture based on the
perceived "otherness" of certain communities in the North East
region. In terms of culture, language, and history, these
communities are frequently considered as separate from
mainstream Indian identity. The state may regard these groups as
"foreign" or "different," and torture may be justified as a technique
of controlling or assimilation into the prevailing national narrative.
This trend illustrates the influence of identity-based factors on the
justifications for torture in the region, where the perception of
otherness contributes to a dehumanising view of certain
communities.37
There is a pattern of impunity and lack of accountability for
perpetrators of torture in the North East region. Despite the
existence of legal and judicial mechanisms to address torture, there
is often a failure to hold perpetrators accountable for their actions.
Torture justifications may promote a culture of impunity in which
security personnel and state actors are shielded from legal
repercussions while victims are denied access to justice and
restitution. This pattern demonstrates a systemic failure to address
the issue of torture in the region and highlights the need for more
robust accountability mechanisms to ensure torturers are held
accountable for their actions.38
Effectiveness of torture in COIN operations
While proponents of torture argue that it can elicit valuable
information, there is substantial evidence suggesting otherwise.
The use of coercion can distort or mislead information, resulting in
incorrect decisions by security forces. Using untrustworthy
intelligence gained through torture can jeopardise COIN operations
and jeopardise the safety of both security troops and the civilian
populace.
A. Questionable reliability
Torture frequently results in the extraction of coerced confessions,
which are intrinsically untrustworthy. Individuals can provide
incorrect or exaggerated facts under extreme physical and
psychological pressure in order to end their suffering.39According
study findings, acute stress and trauma can cause memory
distortion, resulting in the formation of false memories or the
inability to recall facts properly. This undermines the accuracy of
intelligence obtained through torture.40
Torture may also result in the dissemination of false or fake
information. When subjected to intense agony and misery, people
may provide wrong details or offer false information in order to
placate their tormentors or protect innocent people. Relying on
such information would potentially divert resources and impede
counterinsurgency objectives.41
B. Lack of Cooperation in Intelligence Collection
The lack of cooperation and information sharing hinders the
effectiveness of torture in accomplishing intelligence objectives in
COIN operations in the northeast of India. Torture instils fear and
distrust in the local populace, reducing cooperation and damaging
information-collecting operations.When trust is broken, people are
less likely to come forward with important information, hampering
intelligence collecting operations.42When the local populace
witnesses or experiences torture, it can stoke resentment and anger
against the security forces, leading some to support or join
insurgent groups.43Torture's effectiveness as a method is further
undermined by the loss of community support and the accidental
boosting of rebel support. It is critical to acknowledge that torture
not only violates human rights but also undermines the core goals
of counterinsurgency operations.
C. Reinforcing opposition
Torture perpetrated by security forces can serve as a recruitment
tool for insurgent groups When individuals witness or experience
torture, it generates a profound sense of wrath, resentment, and
injustice, which may cause them to sympathise with or join the
insurgency.44Torture may be used as propaganda by insurgent
organisations to raise support and recruit new members, ultimately
boosting their numbers. Torture can intensify communities'
perceptions of injustice, promoting the idea that the state and its
security agencies are tyrannical. Insurgent organisations use this

view to position themselves as advocates of justice and protectors
of the community's interests. They are able to garner sympathy and
attract those who feel marginalised and alienated as a result of the
acts of the state by capitalising on the grievances that have arisen
as a direct result of torture.There is a narrative of oppression and
victimization, which insurgent groups exploit to recruit new
members. Torture becomes a potent propaganda weapon for these
organisations, galvanising support and radicalising those who have
watched or experienced torture personally.
Torture has a significant psychosocial influence on the community,
inflicting severe physical and psychological pain on individuals
and leaving lifelong scars. Individuals and communities hurt suffer
from trauma and a profound feeling of unfairness.45
Alternatives
The need for alternatives to torture as a COIN strategy by state
forces in northeast India is imperative.Ethical and legal
imperatives, operational inefficiency, and the erosion of
governmental legitimacy highlight the importance of using non-
tortuous tactics. The state can encourage long-term stability in the
region by pursuing alternative measures like as information
collection, rehabilitation and reintegration, and socioeconomic
growth.By doing so, the state can break the cycle of violence in
northeast India, resolve grievances, and strive towards a peaceful
and inclusive future.
A. Intelligence Gathering through Community Engagement
One alternative to torture is intelligence gathering through
community engagement. Positive connections with local
populations, as well as creating trust and promoting collaboration,
can yield important information regarding insurgent operations.
Engaging with community leaders, engaging in dialogues, and
establishing mechanisms for reporting suspicious activities can
generate reliable intelligence without the use of torture.46
Security forces get vital insights while establishing confidence and
collaboration by incorporating the community as partners in
information collecting.In addition, community policing efforts play
an important role in information collecting. Community policing
places an emphasis on collaboration, trust-building, and
partnership between law enforcement and local communities.
Through proactive participation and problem-solving, it tries to

address the underlying causes of conflict and preserve law and
order.47
B. Training and Professionalism of Security Forces
Training and professionalism of security forces offer viable
alternatives to torture in counterinsurgency operations in northeast
India and beyond. Specialised training programmes concentrating
on human rights and international law are helpful in providing
security personnel with the skills and knowledge needed to handle
difficult operations circumstances. By emphasising a code of
conduct and professionalism, it fosters a culture of discipline and
accountability, thereby ensuring that actions adhere to ethical
standards. Furthermore, strong supervision procedures and
accountability structures help to avoid abuses and retain public
trust. Long-term effectiveness of counterinsurgency initiatives
requires ongoing investment in training, human rights education,
and accountability procedures.
This includes training in intelligence gathering, counterinsurgency
tactics, cultural sensitivity, and human rights law training. Security
personnel may create non-coercive ways to achieve their goals and
gain a better understanding of the intricate dynamics of insurgency
if they receive extensive training.48
Furthermore, integrating human rights and international law into
the training curriculum is critical for encouraging ethical behaviour
in counterinsurgency operations. Security forces should be
educated on human rights values, the prohibition of torture, and the
legal framework that governs their conduct. This understanding
contributes to the development of a culture of human rights respect
and fosters the belief that torture is never acceptable under any
circumstances.49To be professional means to observe professional
ethics, to act with integrity, and to make certain that one's activities
are governed by the principles of legality, necessity, and
proportionality.50
Finally, creating robust oversight mechanisms and accountability
frameworks is essential to prevent abuses and ensure transparency.
When it comes to monitoring the actions of security forces and
resolving complaints, the participation of independent entities such
as human rights commissions can be of critical importance. The
integrity of the security forces can be maintained in part by the
implementation of regular internal evaluations, disciplinary
processes, and investigations into complaints of improper

conduct.51
C. Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programs
Rehabilitation and reintegration programs offer viable alternatives
to torture in countering insurgency in northeast India and other
regions. These programmes target the core causes of insurgency
and empower individuals to lead productive lives by concentrating
on psychological rehabilitation, skill training, education,
socioeconomic assistance, and communal reconciliation. To
provide comprehensive support and effective reintegration of
former insurgents, the effective implementation of rehabilitation
and reintegration programmes necessitates coordination between
government agencies, civil society organisations, and the local
population. Continued investment in these alternative techniques is
critical for long-term peacebuilding initiatives and conflict
prevention.
Psychological rehabilitation programmes are critical in assisting
ex-insurgents in overcoming trauma, psychological suffering, and
radicalization. Individual counselling, group therapy, and support
networks are used in these programmes to provide psychological
support and assist individuals in developing alternative coping
methods. By addressing the underlying psychological factors that
contribute to insurgency, rehabilitation programmes reduce the
likelihood of violent re-engagement.52
Furthermore, socioeconomic support programmes seek to address
the socioeconomic issues that frequently fuel insurgency by giving
access to livelihood possibilities, microcredit schemes, and
financial assistance for income-generating enterprises. These
programmes aid in the alleviation of poverty and inequality, which
are frequently triggers for insurgency. The reintegration initiatives
help to the general stability and development of the region by
focusing on reducing the socioeconomic imbalances that exist
within it.53
Conclusion
In conclusion, this paper has examined the justifications given by
the Indian government and security forces for the use of torture in
the COIN strategy in the North East region, despite the existence of
international legal norms and human rights standards that prohibit
such practices.
The examination of torture definitions in international law,

including the UN Convention against Torture (UNCAT), and
perspectives from Western and South Asian scholars provides a
comprehensive understanding of the conceptual framework
surrounding torture. The UNCAT and ICC Rome Statute establish
widely accepted definitions prohibiting justifications for torture,
with scholars like Darius Rejali and David Luban offering nuanced
perspectives, highlighting its systematic nature and disregard for
human dignity. In the Indian context, the Supreme Court's decision
in the D.K. Basu case and the Prevention of Torture Bill, 2010
broaden the definition to include mental damage and establish a
legal framework against torture. Lokaneeta's study explores
torture's complexity, focusing on its accommodation within legal
systems and the state's role in endorsing violence. A comparison of
Indian and Western viewpoints reveals differing emphases, with
Indian academics highlighting state actors' role in social control,
while Western scholars stress human rights implications and
international norms. These distinctions trace back to India's
historical encounters with colonialism and authoritarianism,
shaping its political culture and government practices.
Torture in counterinsurgency (COIN) operations is justified for
several reasons. First, it is a deterrent that discourages insurgents
from engaging in violent activities. Torture is used to induce fear
and enhance the cost of insurgency. Second, torture is being
utilised to acquire information from militants. Supporters say that
critical intelligence is required to ensure the population's security.
However, many question the veracity of information collected
through torture. Thirdly, torture is justified as a form of
punishment in order to deter future violent acts. This explanation
ignores human rights violations and the risk for repeating cycles of
violence. Finally, emotions such as schadenfreude and retaliation
are invoked to justify torture, disregarding justice and human rights
norms. These explanations have been witnessed in the Indian
Northeast and other contexts, but they create serious ethical and
practical difficulties.
Critically examining the arguments for torture in India's North
East, this study has identified recurring justifications that
emphasize the necessity and expediency of employing torture. The
claims that torture is essential for procuring information, serves as
a deterrent, and expedites the end of an insurgency have been
evaluated and analysed through both materialist and idealist lenses.
Torture may be viewed as necessary in counterinsurgency

operations for realpolitik reasons, such as gaining actionable
intelligence or protecting national security objectives, according to
materialists. On the other hand, ideational perspectives emphasise
the role of norms, identities, and discourses in shaping the
justifications for torture, including considerations of legitimacy,
maintaining control, and countering the narratives of insurgents.
While this research has presented a thorough examination of the
grounds for torture in India's North East, there are several limits to
be aware of. The study has largely focused on the viewpoints of
neorealists and constructivists, although future investigation of
other theoretical frameworks might yield further insights.
Furthermore, the empirical data employed in this study is subject to
the limits and biases inherent in the available literature and sources.
Torture is used in counterinsurgency operations in India's North

East due to political, historical, and identity-based reasons. Among
the justifications for torture are the perceived threat to national
security, historical grievances, and the desire to maintain control
over the region. Torture is frequently justified as a means of
gathering intelligence, deterring violence, or punishing militants.
These explanations are formed by colonialism's legacy, ethnic
conflicts, and ambitions for autonomy or independence. The
tendency of rationalising torture reveals a militarised approach to
conflict resolution and a contempt for human rights. There is also a
trend of impunity and a lack of accountability for torturers. To
address the issue, accountability, openness, and the rule of law
must be promoted, while alternative techniques that respect human
rights and encourage a more inclusive approach to security
concerns must be sought.
This research focuses on the use of torture in counterinsurgency
operations in northeast India, giving unique insights into this
region. However, it is important to acknowledge that further
research is needed to explore other regions and conflicts in order to
gain a more comprehensive understanding of the subject. Such
study would enable comparative comparison and a broader view of
the use of torture in insurgent operations. This paper relies
significantly on existing literature and sources, which may have
limitations in terms of bias, dependability, and representation.
While attempts have been made to incorporate a variety of sources,
more primary research, including as interviews and fieldwork,

would give more nuanced insights and direct experiences from
many stakeholders involved in counterinsurgency operations. In
terms of theoretical approaches, this study focuses on materialist
and ideational frameworks in order to analyse the subject of torture
in counterinsurgency operations. Even though these viewpoints
have provided helpful insights, it is essential to investigate
different theoretical frameworks, such as feminist perspectives and
postcolonial theories. These alternate frameworks may provide
new insights and perspectives on the complex dynamics of torture,
adding to an in-depth knowledge of the topic.Further study should
focus on performing comparative studies between different
counterinsurgency scenarios to acquire a more thorough knowledge
of the effectiveness of alternatives to torture and their effects on
human rights and security results. Exploring the gender dimensions
of torture in counterinsurgency operations is critical, given the
disparities in the consequences for men, women, and marginalised
groups. The evaluation of current policies and practises aimed at
preventing torture in counterinsurgency operations would reveal
gaps, challenges, and development opportunities. Furthermore,
researching the viewpoints and experiences of impacted
populations in counterinsurgency situations would give useful
insights into local dynamics, the effects of torture, and the efficacy
of alternative techniques. Conducting a comparative legal analysis
of the treatment of detainees during counterinsurgency operations
in various countries would contribute to the development of
comprehensive and rights-based legal frameworks.
References
1
"International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, 1966," International
Human Rights Law Documents, October 25, 2018, 70–85,
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316677117.012.3.
2
"The European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or
Degrading Treatment or Punishment (CPT)," Yearbook of the European
Convention for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment/Annuaire de La Convention Européenne Pour La Prévention de
La Torture et Des PeinesOuTraitementsInhumainsOuDégradants, May 30,
2019, 5–22, https://doi.org/10.1163/9789004381490_003.
3
Elaine Webster, “From Degrading Treatment to Torture, Cruel and Inhuman
Treatment,” Dignity, Degrading Treatment and Torture in Human Rights Law,
April 27, 2018, 125–37, https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315719443-7.
4
David Luban, “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,” Intervention,
Terrorism, and Torture, 2005, 249–62, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-
4678-0_15.
5
“THE IMPACT OF 7 JULY 2005 LONDON BOMB ATTACKS ON MUSLIM
COMMUNITIES IN THE EU,” European Monitoring Centre on Racism and
Xenophobia, November 2005, 4–31.
6
"Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment
or Punishment," OHCHR, https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-
mechanisms/instruments/convention-against-torture-and-other-cruel-inhuman-
or-degrading.
7
"Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court," OHCHR, July 17, 1998,
https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/rome-statute-
international-criminal-court.
8
Darius M. Rejali, Torture and Democracy (Princeton University Press, 2007).
9
David Luban, “Liberalism, Torture, and the Ticking Bomb,” Intervention,
Terrorism, and Torture, 2005, 249–62, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-1-4020-
4678-0_15.
10
Shri D.K. Basu, Ashok K. Johri vs State Of West Bengal, State Of U.P. on
December 18 1996 (Supreme Court of India December 18, 1996).
11
JineeLokaneeta, "Introduction: Do the Ghosts of Leviathan Linger On?: Law,
Violence, and Torture in Liberal Democracies," introduction, in Transnational
Torture: Law, Violence, and State Power in the United States and India (New
York: New York University Press, 2016).
12
"Torture in India," Asian Human Rights Commission,
http://www.humanrights.asia/tortures/torture-in-india/.
13
SubirBhaumik, "Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Co-Option &
Change," East-West Center Washington, no. 10 (July 2007).
14
Martha Crenshaw, "Theories of Terrorism: Instrumental and Organisational
Approaches," Journal of Strategic Studies 10, no. 4 (December 1987): 13–31,
https://doi.org/10.1080/01402398708437313.\
15
SailajanandaSaikia, "9/11 of India: A Critical Review on Armed Forces
Special Power Act (Afspa), and Human Right Violation in North East India
," Journal of Social Welfare and Human Rights 2, no. 1 (March 2014): 265–79.
16
"Modus Operandi : Target, Detain, Torture and Execute without Any
Witness.," essay, in The State of Encounter Killings in India (New Delhi, India:
Asian Centre for Human Rights, 2018).
17
RUTH BLAKELEY, "Why Torture?," Review of International Studies 33, no.
3 (July 2007): 373–94, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210507007565.
18
Courtenay R. Conrad et al., “Who Tortures the Terrorists? Transnational
Terrorism and Military Torture," Foreign Policy Analysis, September 2014,
https://doi.org/10.1111/fpa.12066.
19
RUTH BLAKELEY, "Why Torture?," Review of International Studies 33, no.
3 (July 2007): 373–94, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0260210507007565.
20
Kurt Gray and Daniel M. Wegner, "Torture and Judgments of Guilt," Journal
of Experimental Social Psychology 46, no. 1 (January 2010): 233–35,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jesp.2009.10.003.
21
Kranti Kumara, "Assam: Police Kill at Least 10 during Protest against Indian
Army Murder," World Socialist Web Site, February 20, 2006,
https://www.wsws.org/en/articles/2006/02/assa-f20.html.
22
Will H. Moore, "Incarceration, Interrogation, and Counterterror: Do (Liberal)
Democratic Institutions Constrain Leviathan?," P.S.: Political Science &
Politics 43, no. 3 (June 30, 2010): 421–24,
https://doi.org/10.1017/s1049096510000661.
23
Shensheng Wang, Scott O. Lilienfeld, and Philippe Rochat, "Schadenfreude
Deconstructed and Reconstructed: A Tripartite Motivational Model," New Ideas
in Psychology 52 (January 2019): 1–11,
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.newideapsych.2018.09.002.
Also see- "The Secret Joys of Schadenfreude," The Guardian, October 14, 2018,
https://www.theguardian.com/global/2018/oct/14/the-secret-joys-of-
schadenfreude-why-it-shouldnt-be-a-guilty-pleasure.
24
Peter Liberman, "Retributive Support for International Punishment and
Torture," Journal of Conflict Resolution 57, no. 2 (June 6, 2012): 285–306,
https://doi.org/10.1177/0022002712445970.
25
"Israelis Gather on Hillsides to Watch and Cheer as Military Drops Bombs on
Gaza," The Guardian, July 20, 2014,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/jul/20/israelis-cheer-gaza-bombing.
26
“Counting the Dead in Manipur’s Shoot-to-Kill War,” BBC News, July 3,
2017, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-india-40271353.
27
Kenneth N. Waltz, "6. Anarchic Structures and Balances of Power ," essay,
in Theory of International Politics (Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press, 2010).
28
JUTTA WELDES, "Constructing National Interests," European Journal of
International Relations 2, no. 3 (September 1996): 275–318,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1354066196002003001.
29
Rajat Ganguly, introduction, in Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and
Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
2003).
30
Mona Bhan, "Introduction," Introduction, in Counterinsurgency, Democracy,
and the Politics of Identity in India: From Warfare to Welfare? (Abingdon,
Oxfordshire: Routledge, 2015), 1–27.
31
Sanjib Baruah, “Gulliver’s Troubles: State and Militants in North-East India,”
Economic and Political Weekly, October 18, 2002, 37 edition, sec. 41.
32
N. Somorendro Singh, “INTEGRATION AND DEVELOPMENT IN
NORTH-EAST INDIA : AN ASSESSMENT,” The Indian Journal of Political
Science 67, no. 2 (2006): 329–42.
33
Walter Fernandes, “Conflict in North-East: A Historical Perspective,”
Economic and Political Weekly 34, no. 51 (December 24, 1999): 3579–82.
34
Rajat Ganguly, introduction, in Ethnic Conflict and Secessionism in South and
Southeast Asia: Causes, Dynamics, Solutions (New Delhi: Sage Publications,
2003).
35
Sanjib Baruah, India against Itself: Assam and the Politics of Nationality (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2010).
36
SubirBhaumik, "Insurgencies in India's Northeast: Conflict, Co-Option &
Change," East-West Center Washington, no. Number 10 (July 2007).
37
Sanjib Baruah, "Section V- Policy as an Invitation to Violence," essay,
in Durable Disorder Understanding the Politics of Northeast India (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2012).
38
R. S. Saini, "CUSTODIAL TORTURE IN LAW AND PRACTICE WITH
REFERENCE TO INDIA," Journal of the Indian Law Institute 36, no. 2 (June
1994): 166–92.
39
AldertVrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on Interrogation,” Perspectives
on Psychological Science 12, no. 6 (September 21, 2017): 927–55,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617706515.
40
Dana Rose Garfin, E. Alison Holman, and Roxane Cohen Silver, “Exposure to
Prior Negative Life Events and Responses to the Boston Marathon Bombings.,”
Psychological Trauma: Theory, Research, Practice, and Policy 12, no. 3 (March
2020): 320–29, https://doi.org/10.1037/tra0000486.
Also see-
Nayef Al‐Rodhan, “The Wrongs, Harms, and Ineffectiveness of Torture: A
Moral Evaluation from Empirical Neuroscience,” Journal of Social Philosophy,
October 2, 2022, https://doi.org/10.1111/josp.12494.
41
AldertVrij et al., “Psychological Perspectives on Interrogation,” Perspectives
on Psychological Science 12, no. 6 (September 21, 2017): 927–55,
https://doi.org/10.1177/1745691617706515.
42
Sanjib Baruah, “Chapter 5. Discourse of Insurgency and the Pedagogy of State
Violence,” In the Name of the Nation, December 31, 2020, 126–54,
https://doi.org/10.1515/9781503611290-007.
43
Jessica A. Stanton, “Rebel Groups, International Humanitarian Law, and Civil
War Outcomes in the Post-Cold War Era,” International Organization 74, no. 3
(May 7, 2020): 523–59, https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818320000090.
44
Randy A. Borum, “Psychology of Terrorism,” University of South Florida,
2020.
45
Joan Simalchik, “Disrupting Legacies of Trauma,” Health and Human Rights
Journal, June 23, 2021, 11–25.
46
SaundaryaShrotriya, “Community Policing as a Tool for Internal Security
Management - Part 1,” ORF, June 2, 2022, https://www.orfonline.org/expert-
speak/community-policing-as-a-tool-for-internal-security-management/.
47
Pathak, Samarth. “United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime.” Bangladesh:
UNODC Promotes Community Policing to Counter Terrorism and Violent
Extremism, March 25, 2023.
https://www.unodc.org/southasia/en/frontpage/2023/March/bangladesh_-unodc-
promotes-community-policing-to-counter-terrorism-and-violent-extremism.html
Also see-“Welfare & Community Policing,” Official Website of Meghalaya
Police, Government of Meghalaya, India, https://megpolice.gov.in/welfare-
communitypolicing#:~:text=COMMUNITY%20POLICING%20THROUGH%2
0VILLAGE%20DEFENCE%20PARTIES%20%3A&text=The%20VDP%20con
duct%20regular%20vice,against%20the%20militants%20in%202008.
48
Ministry of Home Affairs , Annual Report 2021-2022. Chapter - 2 Internal
Security
49
Megan M. Thompson and Rakesh Jetly, “Battlefield Ethics Training:
Integrating Ethical Scenarios in High-Intensity Military Field Exercises,”
European Journal of Psychotraumatology 5, no. 1 (August 14, 2014),
https://doi.org/10.3402/ejpt.v5.23668.
50
Ibid
51
“Preventing Torture: The Role of National Preventive Mechanisms,”
Professional Training Series in Human Rights, March 5, 2019,
https://doi.org/10.18356/63e0ac91-en.
52
Malkanthi Hettiarachchi, “Sri Lanka’s Rehabilitation Programme: The
Humanitarian Mission Two,” Insurgency and Terrorism Series, April 6, 2015,
103–31, https://doi.org/10.1142/9781783267446_0005.
53
Deben Bachaspatimayum on April 8, “Surrender & Rehabilitate: Insurgent
Demobilization & Reintegration in Northeast,” Indian Defence Review,
February 16, 2017, http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/surrender-
rehabilitate-insurgent-demobilization-reintegration-in-northeast/.
Role of Transnational Municipal Network…. 43
Role of Transnational The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-43-63
Municipal Network in https://www.amu.ac.in/
Urban Climate nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Governance in India: A
Case Study of ICLEI-
Local Government for
Sustainability
Ali Kaif*
ABSTRACT
Cities across the world are emerging as critical
actors in climate change governance. It is the result
of the failure of intergovernmental climate
negotiations inaction at the national level and more
importantly increasing the localized impact of
climate change. India is witnessing a rapid
urbanization process and is expected to have 46%
of its population in cities by 2025 which makes
cities more vulnerable to climate change. However,
cities being challenged by climate change impact,
also have the potential for dealing with the climate
risks. This requires the creation of strong
institutionalization of urban governance around
climate change. There has been a number
ofattempts to decentralize the climate change
governance at the city level but failed to bring any
substantial change. The concentration of power at
the central and regional level on the one hand and
the lack of financial resources and technical
competence on the other make cities merely an
implementing agency. This is an entry point for the
non-state actors to counter these barriers.
Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs), one of
the major non-state actors, has emerged as one of
the major instruments in urban climate governance.
*Junior Research Fellow, MMAJ Academy of International Studies, JMI, New Delhi
TMN’s seek to provide cities with an “extra-legem”

empowerment to mitigate and adapt climate change
policies. This paper aims to explore the influence of
TMN’s on endeavors of Indian citiesin the fight
against the climate change. I conclude that TMN’s
are playing a substantial role in capacity building
through financial assistance and providing
technical competence.
Keywords: Transnational Municipal Networks, Climate Change,
Urban Governance, ICLEI – Local Government for Sustainability
1. Introduction
Climate change has evolved into a complex and challenging issue,
often referred to as a “wicked problem,” as it spans and impacts
various facets of human life1. Its major effects include rising global
temperatures, extreme weather events, sea-level rise, disruptions to
ecosystems and biodiversity, threats to food and water security,
and adverse impacts on human health. Additionally, the social and
economic dimensions of climate change pose challenges such as
displacement of communities, increased vulnerability of
marginalized populations, and potential conflicts over resources.
Within this context, cities have emerged as most vulnerable space
to the climate change. They face disproportionate exposure to
environmental threats and exhibit greater vulnerability compared to
rural areas.2 The study of cities became more crucial aswe witness
urbanization process in much rapid pace in last decades that
scholars widely recognized it as “urban century”.3 The urban
population outnumbered the rural population by 2000. Further, it is
estimated that urban population would go up to 6 billion by 2050
which in more than double of the 2000.4 The concentration of a
large population in the urban space brings a number of governance
challenges.
There are economic and social benefits of urbanization, but the
problems of rising inequality, informal settlement, heat wave,
urban flooding, and over exploitation of water resources cannot be
ignored. However, on the other hand, urban space has the potential
to achieve reduced resource consumption and waste production,
leading to a more sustainable and environmentally friendly urban
environment. By adopting innovative technologies, sustainable
urban planning, and resource-efficient practices, cities can decrease
their ecological footprint and contribute to global efforts to combat
climate change. Urban space can emerge as a promising site for the
action.5 There is an option of catalyzing behavioral and
technological transformation that will lead towards the sustainable
urban future. This is the reason a number of efforts have been taken
in the field of urban climate change adaptation and mitigation
governance by end of last century.6 These responses strive to find
ways for the innovation and experimentation in the field of climate
governance. Public actors like city governments, state, and regional
authorities along with the non-state actors like NGOs, civil
societies, multinational corporation, Transnational municipal
networks got involved in governing the urban climate change.7
These arrangements break the traditional national-regional-local
hierarchal relations and establishes transnational governance.8
Consequently, diverse form of agents and novel form of agency got
space in the urban responses to the climate change governance. The
involvement of all these actors builds transnational climate
governance structure for urban spaces.9 This new arrangement,
involving diverse array of actors claim to adopt the bottom-up
approach.
One of the major developments in this reference was the
development of Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs). From
simple collaboration among the municipalities towards more
complex networked governance,10 this newly emerged governance
arrangement perceived to have the potential to shape and reshape
urban governance, strategies, and our understanding of cities, their
policies, and politics in an era of global urbanization.11 TMNs
provide Cities with benefit such as engaging in global dialogues
between municipalities and exerting global influences by aligning
it to the networks.12 Domestically, TMNs play a vital role in
fostering the ambition of their associated cities by establishing
environments for peer-to-peer learning and healthy competition.13
The emergence of municipal networks in climate governance has
gained recognition, marking a notable shift towards cities playing a
more influential role in global affairs.14 This shift became evident
during the 2015 Paris Conference of Parties (COPs), particularly
with the establishment of the Compact of Mayors among urban
leagues at the 2014 UNSG Climate Summit. The
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change acknowledges the
crucial role of city climate networks in engaging citizens in
addressing climate change and disseminating climate policies
globally.1516 However, the impact of these network in
strengthening the climate policy of cities is contested.There are

some literatures on the subject which is much optimistic about their
functioning and conceive the transnational arrangements as the
saviors of the planet in the face of climate change.17 However,
there is skepticism among scholars regarding their actual impact on
climate governance. Some view them as pseudo-clubs rather than
viable alternatives to international governance. The limitations
stem from their voluntary nature and constrained resources.18 This
paper seeks to highlight the impact of these networks in
institutionalization of climate change politics in the cities in India.
2. Research Questions
This paper seeks to enhance our understanding of how
Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs) impact urban
responses to climate change in the global south, with a specific
focus on India. The primary objective is to look at the extent to
which TMNs influence urban climate politics and governance in
India. For an in-depth analysis, this study undertakes a case study
of one such TMN, namely ICLEI – Local Governments for
Sustainability. Specifically, the study aims to explore two main
questions.
(a) What are the major functionals of TMNs in India?
(b) How TMNs affect the climate policy of urban India?
3. Literature Review
In the last fifteen years, there has been a significant increase in the
amount of literature on transnational municipal networks (TMNs).
To begin, it recognised Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs)
as a relatively new global governance entity that was particularly
noticeable in areas of environmental concern. The concept of TMN
is an extension of the phenomenon of transnationalism in
International Relations (IRs) which challenges the monopoly of
state in the world politics.19It marks a subtle difference from the
traditional view of transnationalism and recognises the relative
importance of subnational entities like cities and regional
governments and encouraging their participation, independent from
the state, in the global forum and negotiations. In its early stages
TNMs has been explored in various discipline by different scholars
who discussed its policy making implication but didn’t explicitly
address environmental concerns.20Studies of TMNs appear to have
developed a variety of definitions for this global governance entity.
Bulkeley et al. examine TMNs from a local perspective in a

seminal study on the topic.21 According to him ‘TMNs, are
networks of municipalities which operate nationally and
transnationally, so that TMNs represent and involve cities directly
in policy issues at the international and European levels, and across
national borders. He distinguishes TMNs from local governments
associations working at the national level and transnational
associations gathering national associations. Thus, he delineates
TMNs as emergence of a new space in politics that shapes how we
manage the environment.
Early studies on TMNs also include two publications authored in
the mid-2000s by Betsill and Bulkeley from an international
relations perspective. Betsill and Bulkeley define TMNs as a subset
of transnational networks in the first one.22 They emphasize the
nation-state bias of epistemic communities and approaches by
transnational advocacy networks. They highlight the ‘need to shift
away from considering transnational networks as primarily directed
at the state, and toward a more multilevel understanding of
governance.’23 In another piece, they establish that regime theory
and transnational networks approaches are insufficient for
analyzing TMNs and argue once more for the employment of a
multilevel governance approach.24Based on these core papers,
others have attempted to define TMNs with greater specificity and
accuracy.Kern and Bulkeley emphasis the network aspect of cities'
transnational operations, referring to TMNs as a structure within
which cities operate25. One of the major theorizations is done by
Keiner and Kim who identified three major defining criteria for
TMNs as, (1) members are free to leave the network at any time;
(2) networks are nonhierarchical; and (3) network decisions are
directly implemented by the members.26Busch using these
structural understanding defined TMNs as ‘institutionalized
spaceswhere local governments from different countries come
together as equitable partners in an exchange on climate change
related issues.’27 Using all the information mentioned earlier to
grasp the concept of TMN, the climate related TMNs we’re
focusing on in this study can be summed up as structured
interactions among various actors, mainly from cities but also
beyond, involved in urban, transnational, and global climate
governance. These networks facilitate the exchange of information,
sharing best practices, and encourage collaboration among cities
for climate action.
4. Theoretical framework
To comprehend Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs) more
thoroughly, researchers have delved into exploring their roles and
functions within the broader context of global environmental and
climate governance. The functions of TMNs are largely divided in
two categories of Internal and external functions.28 The internal
functions are those which ensure that network works effectively to
reach its goals for members and explains how TMNs operate
within their organization. These internal functions are further
divided into three categories: information and communication,
funding and cooperation, and recognition, benchmarking, and
certification. Information and communication refer to the practice
of TMNs where they make case studies of their function and
disseminates their experiences to other cities. The main goal for
both the network and cities is to learn from successful practices in
other cities. Cities facing similar governance and environmental
challenges are more likely to be interested in joining the network.
The second function, fundingand cooperation, involves the efforts
made by TMNs to secure resources and foster collaboration among
cities aiming to implement and replicate environmental programs.
The third function, recognition, benchmarking and certification, is
an strategy to keep the constituent members motivated for the
participating actively in the network to ameliorate climate change.
It is a valuable tool for elevating standards and ensuring
compliance. Another functional aspect of the TMNs is external
dealing with the involves the interaction of the network with
various other stakeholders. These activities seek not only to lend
support to the internal governance of the TMN but also deftly
navigate external pressures, strategically positioning the network’s
operations within the intricate web of the multi-level
environmental governance system. First kind of external function
is Influence toward governmental organization, refers to the ability
of TMNs to exert an impact on governmental bodies. Their goal is
to persuade stakeholders and the international community to
heighten environmental awareness and take more active measures
in addressing environmental issues, particularly by providing
financial resources, considering that environmental policies are
often costly to implement. The second function, interdependence
with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other
Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs), encompasses the
intricate connections and interactions among various TMNs and
between TMNs and non-state entities such as NGOs. This function

delves into the nature of collaboration and competition among
TMNs and the broader network of non-state organizations. Third
function, ‘intermediation toward member cities,’ refers to the
function of TMNs as an intermediary actor, typically a policy
entrepreneur with local political support, who acts as a bridge
between Transnational Municipal Networks (TMNs) and member
cities. The effectiveness of this intermediary actor plays a vital role
in determining whether TMN initiatives are recognized and
implemented within a city.
Apart from above studies, there are other studies mentioning
similar kind of functions of TMNs. As Andonova et al., 2009
broadly classify the functions as information sharing, capacity
building, and rule-setting. Information sharing involves the
exchange of information as the primary resource within these
networks to guide members toward achieving network goals.29
This category of information sharing encompasses various roles,
including cognitive functions, discursive activities, knowledge
generation, and the dissemination of knowledge. Essentially, it
highlights the importance of sharing relevant information to foster
collaboration and collective efforts within the network. Capacity
building refers to the resources that the networks provide to enable
cities to take action against climate change. These resources can
include advice, knowledge, labour, technology, or monitoring
tools. It is not just about transferring information but involves
empowering entities to take effective action in response to
challenges, considering the complexities of the issues at hand. Rule
setting involves creating a set of standards, defining guidelines,
and establishing constraints for the network’s constituents. The
function of transnational governance networks in rule setting is
comparable to traditional intergovernmental and domestic
governance systems. However, it often operates with a different
power structure, relying on “softer” agreements rather than the
strict enforcement seen in international or domestic law. In the
historical context, the ability to establish and enforce norms has
traditionally been associated with a hierarchical, sovereign
authority, often backed by the potential imposition of penalties.
Following the major theorisation of functions done leading
scholars and reviewing working of numerous TMNs. we find that it
adopted a multifunctional approach. To understand the working of
the network and its effect on the climate policy of city or nation
one needs a comprehensive model that cover all the nuances of

networks. We identifiedsix main categories(see Table 1) to
understand the function and effect of TMNs on climate change
adaptation and mitigation.
Table 1: Major functional Categories of Transnational
Municipal Categories
S.No Functional Category Explanation
1. Knowledge Production Production of necessary

and Dissemination information, knowledge on
basic mandate of the
climate initiatives and
dissemination of the same.
2. Implementation and Using technologies, plans,
‘On the Ground’ and policies that already
Actions exist, and putting them into
action through pilot and
demonstration projects.
3. Capacity Building Systematically enhancing
the knowledge, skills, and
competencies of
individuals, social entities,
or students, particularly
through educational
training.
4. Campaigning Promoting and raising
awareness on a specific
topic, often with the aim of
educating the broader
public.
5. Financial Management Allocating and mobilizing
funds for the climate
projects.
6. Service Delivery Pertains to the
development of new or
renewed services that align
with climate-friendly
practices.
Based on these functional categories, this study looks at the

functioning of the TMNs like ICLEI, which has been discussed in
the section that follows.
5. A Case study of ICLEI—Local Government for
Sustainability
ICLEI is one of the oldest city networks that established in 1990,
involving regional, local and city governments for achieving
environmental sustainability. Its aim is to govern the problem of
climate change by fostering the sustainable practices at the local
level, contributing to broader efforts in mitigating the impacts of
climate change. In present time it comprises of over 2500 local and
regional governments worldwide. It covers more than 125
countries and around 25 percent of world’s urban population. All
its actions are predominantly guided by five major pathways which
are low emission development, nature-based development,
equitable and people-centred development, resilient development,
and circular development. ICLEI collaborates with cities, receiving
financial support from a range of national and international
partners. This collaboration provides cities with diverse
opportunities, including involvement in programs and projects,
access to technical guidance, information services, training
sessions, conferences, and workshops. Moreover, ICLEI shares its
expertise, engages with cities, facilitates interactions, mobilizes
funds, promotes peer learning, city-to-city exchanges, and
networking. Through these initiatives, ICLEI enhances the
capacities and technical know-how of the cities it collaborates
with, fostering their development and the implementation of
demonstration projects. ICLE adopted an inclusive membership
programme and welcomes all cities without specific membership
requirements. However, cities interested in joining ICLEI are
subject to a membership fee, which is determined based on the
Gross National Income or Gross National Product per capita. This
differentiated fee structure ensures that the financial contribution
aligns with the economic capacity of each city.
In India, ICLEI commenced its operations in 2008, with Pune
being its inaugural member. Currently, it boasts a membership of
54 Indian municipalities. The regional secretariat of ICLEI – South
Asia, located in Delhi, provides an advantageous operational
environment. Following these pathways, ICLEI is actively
involved in various projects to assist its members in addressing the
challenges of climate change. Prominent projects include the

Capacity Building Project on Low Carbon and Climate Resilient
City Development in India (CapaCITIES) in both Phase I (2016-
19) and Phase II (2019-23). These initiatives aim to integrate
climate change considerations into urban planning and
implementation. Other noteworthy projects include UrbanShift,
focusing on sustainable integrated investments for low carbon,
resilience, and land restoration, and the Climate Change
Adaptation Project Preparation and Financing in Urban India,
preparing cities for climate adaptation. The regional branch of
ICLEI appears particularly beneficial for Indian cities. The central
organization encompasses a diverse range of members and
objectives, making it potentially challenging to directly observe the
benefits for building city climate resilience without concerted
effort.
Table 2: Featured Programmes of ICLEI South Asia Active in
India
S No. Programm City Funding Focus
es Involved Partners
1 Alliance + Surat, Alliance to Circular

ICLEI Warangal End Plastic development
Developing Waste
Plastic
Waste-Free
Cities
2 Building Municipal Clean Air Low emission

City Corporation Fund development
Leadership s in Delhi
on Clean NCR
Air Action
in Delhi
National
Capital
Region
(NCR)
3 UrbanShift Pune, Global Low emission

Surat, Environment development
Chennai, Facility
Agra,
Patna,
Mysuru/Coi
mbatore
4 Transformin Delhi and ClimateWork Low-
g adoption Kochi s Foundation emission
of E- development
Rickshaws
in Indian
Cities
5 Mainstream Vijayawada Children’s Low-
ing Climate , Kakinada, Investment emission
Action in Tirupati Fund development
Indian Foundation
Cities
6 Young Kharagpur, Bernard van Equitable and

Children Gandhi Leer people-
and Climate Nagar, Foundation centred
Roorkee, development
and Delhi pathway
7 CDKN All cities International Resilient
Knowledge Development development
Accelerator Research
Project Centre, and
the Royal
Netherlands
Ministry of
Foreign
Affairs
8 EcoLogistic Panaji, Federal Low emission
s: Low Kochi, Ministry for development
carbon Shimla the
freight for Environment,
sustainable Nature
cities Conservation
and Nuclear
Safety
9 INTERACT Kochi, ICLEI South Nature-based

-Bio: Mangaluru, Asia Development
Integrated Panaji
Sub-
national
Action for
Biodiversity
10 Coimbatore Swiss Low emission
, Udaipur, Agency for development
Capacity
Siliguri, Development
Building
Rajkot and
Project on
Cooperation
Low
Carbon and
Climate
Resilient
City
Developme
nt in India
(CapaCITIE
S Phase I)
11 Capacity Tiruchirapp 2019- Swiss Low emission
Building alli, 23 Agency for development
Project on Tirunelveli, Development
Low Coimbatore and
Carbon and , Vadodara, Cooperation
Climate Ahmedabad
Resilient , Rajkot;
City Siliguri,
Developme and
nt in India Udaipur.
(CapaCITIE
S Phase II)
1. Results
1.1 Knowledge Production and Dissemination
The ICLEI South Asia in the Indian region extensively engages in
knowledge production and dissemination. Through its diverse
programs implemented in various cities, it concentrates on
generating, sharing, and simplifying knowledge related to climate
change. Among its various project two are noteworthy namely the
Young Children and Climate and CDKN (Climate and
development knowledge network) Knowledge Accelerator Project.
The Young children and climate project was started with the
partnership with Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Gandhi
Nagar, Indian Institute of Technology (IIT) Kharagpur, Indian

Institute of Technology (IIT) Roorkee and Jawaharlal Nehru
University (JNU) with support from the Bernard van Leer
Foundation (BvLF). It conducted a study aimed to understand the
relationship of young children and climate change. It further
analyses the impact of climate change on open spaces and parks,
street, health, neighbourhood, and spaces around Early Childhood
Development (ECD) services particularly with reference to young
children and their caregivers. The another Project, CDKN, was
established in 2010 with an aim to support the developing nations
in achieving development goals while concurrently addressing the
challenges posed by climate change. It produced a report, “Nature-
based Solutions for urban climate resilience in South Asia: Cases
from Bangladesh, India and Nepal”, in 2022 which covers a
detailed case study on the 7 cities of India apart.
1.2 Capacity Building
The ICLEI works well in the field of capacity building by
providing resource to the cities to empower them to make effective
response to climate change. ICLEI, through its‘Alliance + ICLEI
Developing Plastic Waste-Free Cities’ programme, empowered
aligned cities. This project involved two Indian cities Surat and
Warangal. In Surat it worked closely with the Surat Municipal
Corporation (SMC) to address the issue of plastic waste
management. A capacity building function is spotted here in the
working of ICLEI as it conducted a detailed discussion with the
SMC officials on the collection of both primary and secondary
plastic waste. Subsequently, an extensive 15-day survey was
carried out between November and December 2021, covering 28
locations, including residential and commercial areas, hotels,
transfer stations, and dumping sites. This survey aimed at
enhancing the knowledge base regarding plastic waste in the city.
city to tailor waste management plans, implement effective
recycling initiatives, and address environmental concerns
specifically related to solid waste, with a focus on plastic waste. It
also organized a two-day training session on waste quantification
and characterization, with a specific emphasis on plastic waste. The
participants included waste pickers, sanitary staff, and women from
self-help groups, totalling 22 individuals. The capacity-building
efforts, in this case, involved empowering the city officials with the
necessary knowledge and tools to take effective action against the
challenges posed by plastic waste in Surat.
1.3 Implementation and ‘On the Ground’ Actions

ICLEI supports the cities in implementing the existing policies and
plans, and putting them into action through pilot projects and
demonstration projects.There are some projects, exemplify the
network's commitment to practical implementation through pilot
and demonstration projects. The capacity project, supported by
Swiss Agency for Development and Cooperationis actively
involved in crafting the Local Biodiversity Strategy and Action
Plan (LBSAP) for Udaipur. Under this plan it became mandatory
for the to develop comprehensive strategies for optimal
biodiversity governance and management. It resulted in the growth
of 900 sq.m spanning forest, comprising 3000 trees representing 38
native species. An attempt on implementation was seen in another
project of ICLEI that is EcoLogistics which was supported by
German Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Climate Action
through the International Climate Initiative program. This project
focuses on showcasing the viability and performance of electric
cargo three-wheelers. The Project aims not only to demonstrate the
financial feasibility of transitioning to electric vehicles but also to
influence consumer behaviour for widespread adoption. The recent
introduction of 18 electric cargo three-wheelers in Kochi stands as
a tangible demonstration of the project's commitment to reducing
emissions in the urban logistics sector and promoting sustainable
transportation.
1.4 Campaigning
ICLEI South Asia works closely with the cities in India to make
effort to propagate awareness about the various dimensions of the
climate change and policy making with reference to climate
change. It involves common masses, policy maker, officials and
almost all the possible stakeholder to raise awareness on diverse
issues like on resource management, conservation, sustainable
development and biodiversity. ICLEI, under the project
CapaCITIES, organized a training session for the drivers. The
training session aimed to aware them about resource consumption,
wastage, and the associated costs due to a lack of awareness. It also
addressed safe driving habits and provided information on
practices to save fuel. The session included a question-and-answer
segment where participating drivers raised queries and concerns
about the concepts introduced. ICLEI South Asia through its
INTERACT-Bio project developed a Nature Interpretation Zone in
Subhash Bose Park, Kochi. This zone aimed to raise the awareness
about the various ecosystems in Kochi and the biodiversity they
harbour. The nature interpretation zone serves as a campaign to
educate the public about the rich ecological diversity within the
city. In the context of climate change campaigning, the
CapaCITIES project implemented a 'Climate Week' to heighten
awareness and encourage sustainable practices.It began with a
training session on climate action planning and awareness
generation, focusing on the 75 recommended actions of India's
Mission LiFE. This initiative equips officials with tools to address
climate challenges, contributing to a broader environmental
campaign. All these projects demonstrate ICLEI South Asia's
proactive engagement in campaigning and awareness-raising
efforts, contributing to environmental education and sustainable
practices among diverse stakeholders.
1.5 Service Delivery
ICLEI South Asia has undertaken service delivery activities
through projects such as INTERACT-Bio and EcoLogistics. These
initiatives encompass the introduction of an inventive model for
commercial vehicle electrification in Panaji and the launch of
ecosystem service-based tree cards. These actions, embedded
within the broader projects, align with the principles of service
delivery by fostering environmentally sustainable practices and
contributing to climate-friendly objectives. They align with the
concept of service delivery by implementing measures that
promote environmentally sustainable practices and contribute to
climate-friendly principles. The ecosystem service based tree cards
developed by INTERACT-Bio project, supported by the German
Federal Ministry for the Environment, Nature Conservation, and
Nuclear Safety through the International Climate Initiative, these
tree cards showcase the different ways trees contribute to the
environment. The innovative model for accelerating commercial
vehicle electrification developed under the ICLEI project
EcoLogistics seeks to aggregate customer demand to overcome
number of barriers.
Asia
1.6 Funding
Securing adequate funding is crucial for effective climate action,
and ICLEI South Asia addresses this challenge with strategic
policies. In various projects, the organization actively engages in
the funding process. However, its approach predominantly

involves collaboration with international stakeholders, such as
business associations and multinational corporations through
corporate social responsibility initiatives, international NGOs, civil
societies, international banks, and other global funding agencies. A
notable instance of this commitment is observed in Rajkot under
the CapaCITIES project, where ICLEI launched the Rajkot Green
Mobility Programme. This initiative provides financial support for
the purchase of e-autos, offering gap funding of INR 30,000 to
facilitate the initial payment.
2. Discussion and Conclusion
The widespread emergence of Transnational Municipal Networks
(TMNs) presents a significant departure from the conventional
notion that nation-states exclusively dictate global, regional, and
national policies on climate change. TMNs, represented here by
initiatives such as the International Council for Local
Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI), constitute a paradigm shift in
climate governance. By forging connections between cities and
engaging various actors, these networks transcend traditional
boundaries, fostering a global collaborative framework for
combatting climate change.This form of collaboration underscores
the emergence of horizontal governance, challenging established
hierarchical structures. In this context, cities assume a proactive
role, surpassing national policies or commitments and establishing
collaborations with a diverse array of foreign actors30. This
departure from vertical governance models signals a dynamic shift
towards a more inclusive and interconnected approach, wherein
municipal entities actively contribute to the global discourse and
action on climate change. An in-depth examination of the
composition of TMNs, with a specific focus on entities such as
ICLEI, unveils a nuanced interplay that blurs the conventional
demarcation between state and non-state actors. The governance
system fostered by these networks represents a hybrid model,
amalgamating state and non-state entities into a cohesive
framework. This hybridity is indicative of a collaborative effort
wherein both state and non-state actors collectively steer their
endeavours towards effective climate actions. The rise of TMNs
challenges established norms in climate governance, ushering in a
new era characterized by collaborative, horizontally structured
initiatives. As evidenced by the ICLEI and similar networks, this
evolution not only transcends traditional state-centric approaches
but also showcases a blurring of the boundaries between state and

non-state actors. The resultant governance model signifies a
cooperative and integrative effort to address the complex
challenges posed by climate change on a global scale.
ICLEI South Asia, operates in India across multiple dimensions to
address the intricate challenges of climate change within the
context of Indian cities. The functions undertaken by ICLEI in
India underscore its commitment to ameliorating the impact of
climate change, especially in second-tier cities such as Agra, Patna,
Rajkot, and others. This strategic shift in focus towards these cities
becomes particularly significant given the ongoing demographic
trends marked by a substantial migration towards second-tier urban
centres31. The expansive reach of ICLEI’s initiatives across
diverse urban landscapes, notably targeting cities beyond the
primary metropolitan centres, serves to encompass substantial
population groups. This inclusivity is pivotal in recognizing and
responding to the vulnerabilities of these cities, which are acutely
susceptible to the adverse effects of climate change. The
imperative lies in formulating and implementing robust plans
tailored to the specific challenges faced by these urban areas.
Moreover, these second-tier cities often grapple with an
institutional deficit in effectively addressing climate change.
Herein, the recent initiatives launched by ICLEI play a crucial role
in bridging this institutional gap. The programs developed by
ICLEI demonstrate a forward-looking approach that holds promise
in mitigating the vulnerabilities of these cities by providing them
with the necessary tools and frameworks to confront the
multifaceted challenges posed by climate change. Thus, this
engagement not only recognizes the unique vulnerabilities of these
urban centres but also seeks to fill institutional gaps, thereby
fostering resilience and sustainability in the face of climate change.
A predominant aspect of the ICLEI program active in India,
constituting more than 60 percent, centres on mitigation
endeavours aligned with the objective of achieving net-zero
emissions in the near future, aligning with the Paris commitments.
These initiatives specifically target low-emission growth,
positioning India favourably in its pursuit to attain the ambitious
goal of reaching net-zero emissions by 2070. Despite this
commendable progress, the pressing concerns of adaptation and
addressing the losses and damages, especially emphasized by
South Asian countries in recent COP meetings of the UNFCCC,
demand immediate attention. Cities in this region face heightened

vulnerability to the impacts of climate change, compounded by
limited adaptive capacities. It is imperative for networks like
ICLEI to redirect their focus and allocate concerted efforts towards
climate adaptation and resilience, addressing the urgent needs of
these vulnerable cities.
This research aimed to scrutinize the operational dynamics of the
International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives (ICLEI)
by delving into the intricacies of its programs and actions, thereby
elucidating its functional framework and thematic concentrations.
The examination of ICLEI’s initiatives aims to uncover not only
the tangible outcomes but also the underlying principles that
govern its operational modality and strategic focal points.
However, it is imperative to acknowledge that the comprehensive
evaluation of the on-the-ground impact of these initiatives
necessitates a nuanced approach. The complexity of the real-world
implications demands a qualitative assessment, involving in-depth
qualitative studies that delve into the contextual nuances,
stakeholder perceptions, and the multifaceted dynamics influencing
the effectiveness of ICLEI’s initiatives. Networked initiatives, such
as ICLEI, indicate significant shifts in the dynamics of climate
governance and politics, thereby playing a substantial role in
climate governance in India.
References
1
See, Gerda Roelvink and Magdalena Zolkos. "Climate Change as Experience of
Affect." Angelaki, 16 (2011): 43; Fünfgeld, Hartmut, and Darryn McEvoy.
“Frame Divergence in Climate Change Adaptation Policy: Insights from
Australian Local Government Planning.” Environment and Planning C:
Government and Policy 32, no. 4 (January 1, 2014): 603–22.
3
Refer to, Hall, Peter, and Ulrich Pfeiffer. Urban Future 21. Routledge, 2013;
Heynen, Nik. “Urban Political Ecology I.” Progress in Human Geography 38,
no. 4 (August 30, 2013): 598–604. https://doi.org/10.1177/0309132513500443 .
4
“UN-Habitat Launches the World Cities Report.” UN-Habitat. UN, 2016.
https://unhabitat.org/un-habitat-launches-the-world-cities-report-2016
5
Acuto, Michele. Global Cities, Governance and Diplomacy. Routledge, 2013.
6
Bulkeley, Harriet, and Michele Merrill Betsill. Cities and Climate Change.
Psychology Press, 2003; Bulkeley, Harriet, Vanesa CastanBroto, and Gareth
Edwards. “Bringing Climate Change to the City: Towards Low Carbon
Urbanism?” Local Environment 17, no. 5 (May 2012): 545–51.
https://doi.org/10.1080/13549839.2012.681464
7
Bulkeley, Harriet, Gareth A.S. Edwards, and Sara Fuller. “Contesting Climate
Justice in the City: Examining Politics and Practice in Urban Climate Change
Experiments.” Global Environmental Change 25 (March 2014): 31–40.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.009
Heijden, Jeroen van der. “Opportunities and Risks of the ‘New Urban
Governance’ in India.” The Journal of Environment & Development 25, no. 3
(July 24, 2016): 251–75. https://doi.org/10.1177/1070496516642500
8
Acuto, Michele, And Steve Rayner. “City Networks: Breaking Gridlocks or
Forging (New) Lock-Ins?” International Affairs 92, no. 5 (August 31, 2016):
1147–66. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12700.
9
Andonova, Liliana B., Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley. “Transnational
Climate Governance.” Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 2 (May 2009): 52–
73. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2009.9.2.52
10
Davidson, Kathryn, Lars Coenen, and Brendan Gleeson. “A Decade of C40:
Research Insights and Agendas for City Networks.” Global Policy 10, no. 4
(November 2019): 697–708. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12740
11
Merrifield, Andy. “The Urban Question under Planetary
Urbanization.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37, no. 3
(September 11, 2012): 909–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2427.2012.01189.x
12
Acuto, Michele. “Give Cities a Seat at the Top Table.” Nature 537, no. 7622
(September 2016): 611–13. https://doi.org/10.1038/537611a.
Toly, Noah J. “Transnational Municipal Networks in Climate Politics: From
Global Governance to Global Politics.” Globalizations 5, no. 3 (September
2008): 341–56. https://doi.org/10.1080/14747730802252479.
13
Davidson, Kathryn, and Brendan Gleeson. “New Socio-Ecological Imperatives
for Cities: Possibilities and Dilemmas for Australian Metropolitan
Governance.” Urban Policy and Research 36, no. 2 (September 13, 2017): 230–
41. https://doi.org/10.1080/08111146.2017.1354848
Bulkeley, Harriet, and Vanesa CastánBroto. “Government by Experiment?
Global Cities and the Governing of Climate Change.” Transactions of the
Institute of British Geographers 38, no. 3 (July 10, 2012): 361–75.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1475-5661.2012.00535.x
14
Bulkeley, Harriet, Gareth A.S. Edwards, and Sara Fuller. “Contesting Climate
Justice in the City: Examining Politics and Practice in Urban Climate Change
Experiments.” Global Environmental Change 25 (March 2014): 31–40.
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.gloenvcha.2014.01.009
15
AR5 Climate Change 2014: Mitigation of Climate Change. IPCC, 2014.
https://www.ipcc.ch/report/ar5/wg3/
16
FALKNER, ROBERT. “The Paris Agreement and the New Logic of
International Climate Politics.” International Affairs92, no. 5 (August 31, 2016):
1107–25. https://doi.org/10.1111/1468-2346.12708.
17
Brescia, Ray, and John Travis Marshall. How Cities Will Save the World.
Routledge, 2016.
Merrifield, Andy. “The Urban Question under Planetary
Urbanization.” International Journal of Urban and Regional Research 37, no. 3
(September 11, 2012): 909–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-
2427.2012.01189.x
18
Bulkeley, Harriet. Cities and Climate Change. Routledge, 2013.
Van Der Heijden, Jeroen. Innovations in Urban Climate Governance.
Cambridge University Press, 2017.
19
Strange, Susan, and Scholar Of International Relations Susan Strange. The
Retreat of the State. Cambridge University Press, 1996.
Krasner, Stephen D. International Regimes. Cornell University Press, 1983.
20
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In. Cambridge
University Press, 1995. Newell, Peter. Climate for Change. Cambridge
University Press, 2000.
21
Bulkeley, Harriet, and Michele Merrill Betsill. Cities and Climate Change.
Psychology Press, 2003.
22
Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. “Transnational Networks and
Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program.”
International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 (June 2004): 471–93.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00310.x.
23
Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. “Transnational Networks and
Global Environmental Governance: The Cities for Climate Protection Program.”
International Studies Quarterly 48, no. 2 (June 2004): 471–93.
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.0020-8833.2004.00310.x.
24
Betsill, Michele M., and Harriet Bulkeley. “Cities and the Multilevel
Governance of Global Climate Change.” Global Governance: A Review of
Multilateralism and International Organizations 12, no. 2 (August 3, 2006): 141–
60. https://doi.org/10.1163/19426720-01202004.
25
Kern, Kristine, And Harriet Bulkeley. “Cities, Europeanization and Multi‐level
Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal
Networks*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 2 (January 28,
2009): 309–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.00806.x.
26
Keiner, Marco, and Arley Kim. “Transnational City Networks for
Sustainability.” European Planning Studies 15, no. 10 (September 28, 2007):
1369–95. https://doi.org/10.1080/09654310701550843.
27
Busch, Henner. “Linked for Action? An Analysis of Transnational Municipal
Climate Networks in Germany.” International Journal of Urban Sustainable
Development 7, no. 2 (July 2, 2015): 213–31.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2015.1057144.
28
Kern, Kristine, And Harriet Bulkeley. “Cities, Europeanization and Multi‐level
Governance: Governing Climate Change through Transnational Municipal
Networks*.” JCMS: Journal of Common Market Studies 47, no. 2 (January 28,
2009): 309–32. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-5965.2009.00806.x.
29
Andonova, Liliana B., Michele M. Betsill, and Harriet Bulkeley.
“Transnational Climate Governance.” Global Environmental Politics 9, no. 2
(May 2009): 52–73. https://doi.org/10.1162/glep.2009.9.2.52.
30
Busch, Henner. “Linked for Action? An Analysis of Transnational Municipal
Climate Networks in Germany.” International Journal of Urban Sustainable
Development 7, no. 2 (July 2, 2015): 213–31.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2015.1057144.
31
Fisher, Susannah. “Exploring Nascent Climate Policies in Indian Cities: A
Role for Policy Mobilities?” International Journal of Urban Sustainable
Development 6, no. 2 (March 12, 2014): 154–73.
https://doi.org/10.1080/19463138.2014.892006.
Transnational The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-64-80
Corporations and https://www.amu.ac.in/
Administration in India: nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
When Transnational
Corporations Rule the
World
Mohammad Aslam*
ABSTRACT
The Limited-liability shareholder-owned
corporation as an imagined reality has proven
throughout its history to be an institutional form, It
is ideally suited to concentrating economic power
under unified management stripped of human
conscience and insulated from accountability for
the harms it inflicts on people and nature. The late
twentieth century witnessed a rapid growth in the
size, consolidation, and global reach of corporate
power that has continued into the twenty-first
century. The most successful corporations absorb
or displace their competitors extend their reach far
beyond any State’s borders and shed any
reasonable presumption of commitment to the
interests of any place, nation, or people.
Transnational Corporations, helped by favourable
government policies, have been the chief
instruments of controlling man and material
resources. Limited-liability companies are
increasingly being forced to operate in a framework
not just determined by the laws of supply and
demand, although tempered by growing national
interventionism and governmental response to the
economic crisis, but also by a proliferating set of
intergovernmental arrangements specifically
targeted at them. The TNCs, like invisible hands,
*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, AMU

Transnational Corporations and Administration…. 65
have produced worldwide social progress and

immense profits for their corporate owners. This
paper is an attempt to examine the origin and rise
of TNCs from a historical perspective and the role
of the Indian administration in response to these
TNCs/MNCs in the past and the present. The author
has examined the role of TNCs in the global
economy and methods of consolidating their hold
on world resources and exploitation with or without
political control.
Keywords: TNCs, MNCs, Sovereignty, Corporations, Rule
Today’s business corporation is an artificial creation, shielding
owners and managers while preserving corporate privilege ad
existence. Artificial or not, corporations have won more rights
under the law than people have rights that the government has
protected with armed force.
(Richard L. Grossman and Frank T. Adams 1993)
The journey to conquer heaven that started with Newton (1642-
1727) and Einstein (1879-1955) has reached its zenith with the
discoveries of Leon M. Lederman (1922-2018), Jack Steinberger
(1921-2020), and Melvin Schwartz (1932-2006). However, the
efforts to establish hegemony over world resources started with the
publication of Adam Smith’s (1723-1790) ‘The Wealth of Nations’,
which was advanced by David Ricardo (1772-1823), and reached
its pinnacle with the efforts of Karl Marx (1818-1883), Keynes
(1883-1946), and Paul A. Samuelson (1915-2009).
Human beings started their journey as foragers, and at one point in
time, they entered into selective farming of food grains which
paved the way for an era of civilisations that flourished and
reached its zenith and claimed hegemony over world resources
through a highly centralised military rule. However, in the age of
automation, we observe the rise of technological and financial
giants, Transnational Corporations that control every aspect of
human life and have established their hegemony over man and
material resources.
The “imagined reality”1 of social contractualists [Thomas Hobbes
(1588-1679), John Locke (1632-1704), and Jean Jack Rousseau
(1712-1778)] and our belief in their story of ‘state of nature’ gives
birth to modern liberal democratic states2. However, ancient
hunter-gatherer societies tended to be more communal and

egalitarian than modern societies based on social contractualists
like Hobbes3. The “imagined reality” of social contractualists and
our belief in it challenged the myth of kings’ divine right, and
overnight, we started believing in the myth of the people’s
sovereignty4. Luther (1483-1564) and Calvin (1509-1564) played a
significant role in transforming authority and political sovereignty
from political and religious institutions to people5. However,
theories of State sovereignty emerged from the philosophical
writings of Machiavelli, Hugo Grotius, and Thomas Hobbes, who
argued that it was not GOD but the King who was true sovereign.
However, States are coercive, domineering, and hierarchical, so
Friedrich Nietzsche called the State the “coldest of all cold
monsters”6. According to Nietzsche, “centralised modern state,
dominating and determining culture, worshipped as God and ruling
like a Sultan”7. Thus, he disliked the modern State as it threatened
to acquire the position of an earthly God. Deliberating on the future
of democratic societies after the collapse of religion, Nietzsche
predicted that as the chaos of factional disputes grows, people will
become distrustful of governments, leading to the superseding of
the State’s concept of transcending the antithesis between private
and public. Step by step, private organisations draw the business of
the State into themselves: even the stickiest residue from the
ancient work of the State remains behind (that activity, for
instance, which protects one private person from another) is taken
care of by private entrepreneurs”8. Modern-day Transnational
Corporations as an ‘imagined reality’ reminds us of the
clairvoyance of Nietzsche, “the time will come when institutions
will arise that are superior to both the Church and State”9. In the
Global Reach: The Power of the Multinational Corporation,
Richard J. Barnet and Ronald E. Muller observed that men who run
global corporations are the first in history with the organisation,
technology, money, and ideology to make a credible try at
managing the world as an integrated economic unit…What they
are demanding, in essence, is the right to transcend the nation-
state and, in the process, transform it.10
Like the State, the most ingenious invention of a limited liability
company, called a corporation, a term derived from the Latin word
‘corpus’ (body), which it lacks, is treated as legal persons, as they
are flesh-and-blood human beings11. As per the recorded history
and scriptures, only flesh-and-blood human beings could own
property12. However, the invention of corporations and our shared

belief in them as legal entities allow these corporations to own
property, enjoy liberty, and other rights, generally termed human
rights. They are bound by the laws of the land, and they operate
like human beings13. However, the corporation represented an
essential institutional innovation to overcome barriers to
international trade. It opened enormous opportunities to advance
the interests of the shareholders of these corporations. England
used these corporations (East India Company and Hudson’s Bay
Company) to maintain control over colonial economies.14 These
corporations were chartered by the King and functioned as
extensions of the crown’s power15. David C. Korten observed that
corporations establish their internal agendas as they expand in size
and influence, aligned with imperatives inherent in their existence
and structure that are not entirely under the control of the people
who own and run them. These plans focus on raising their
profitability while shielding them from market volatility. They are
the product of competitive market forces, financial market
demands, and initiatives by individuals within those markets to
advance their careers and income. Corporate executives often tend
to create shared political and economic goals. Corporations in the
United States have been reforming the laws and structures of
government to meet their needs for more than 150 years.16
To understand the factors responsible for the rise of corporations as
an economic institution, which has become inevitable to the
nations’ economic growth, one should know the origin of the
modern economic, political and social institutions. The origin of
the modern economic, political, and social systems can be traced
back to an unprecedented event in the Italian peninsula that
occurred in the 15th and 16th C.E., which was regarded as the
Renaissance by Jacob Burckhardt (1818-1897) in his book Die
Kulter Renaissance in Italien, published in the year 1860.17
The fifteenth century viewed the transformation of guild-based
industry into machine-based commodity production-oriented
manufacturing industry18 that laid the foundation for the emergence
of Multinational Corporations (MNCs). Asrar Alam, in his book
Alam e Islam ki Iqtisadi Surat-e-Hall (The Economic Scenario of
the Islamic World), mentioned excerpts of a book chapter titled
Who Keeps the World that might be very insightful to understand
the transformation of medieval Europe into an economic power
based on international commercialisation and evolution of modern

MNCs/ TNCs.
“Every country, of course, was once a developing country.
However, formidable their resources and people, most nations
depended initially on foreign money and bankers to help them to
finance their trade. In medieval Europe, the interaction between
capital and enterprise began to transform the continent and
produced the new profession of bankers, as opposed to mere
money lenders, who were international in their origins. Medieval
laws forbade the practice of usuary and treated money lenders as
out-casts, but the merchants who developed into bankers could
make profits by dealing between currencies and could lend money
for international expeditions, armies and trade, which made them
indispensable to their rulers. By the late Middle Ages, the
expanding European trade, encouraged by the Crusades against
Islam, had produced the first international bank. The wool workers
in Florence, who imported bales of wool from Spain, England and
even Africa, were financed by Florentine merchants whose savings
helped finance the Renaissance”.19
Thus, the corporations like East India Company, Dutch East India
Company, and London Company emerged and successfully
established their commercial colonies to harness world resources to
further their shareholders’ interests and serve their respective
countries’ political and economic interests. However, these
business entities are not equated with modern MNCs or TNCs as
they were state-licensed monopolies20. They were a product of the
industrial revolution, responsible for developing technology and
increasing shareholder value. These corporations were created
through a corporate charter, a grant of privilege protracted by the
State to a group of investors to serve a public purpose21. The
corporate charters granted by the crown limited an investor’s
obligation for losses of the corporation to the amount of his or her
invested capital in it, a right not extended to individual citizens22.
Thus, the beginning of private international business enterprise in
an organised form dates back to the early fifteenth-sixteenth
centuries when European business organisations started moving
out to various parts of the globe. The corporation was a significant
structural innovation in overcoming foreign trade barriers23.
Gradually these chartered corporations established the hegemony
of European merchants over the world. For example, the English
East India Company (1599-1858), an organisation of London

merchants, was created to trade with the East Indies and was
granted monopoly rights of this trade by a charter from Queen
Elizabeth I in September 1600. The East India Company, in
collaboration with the Dutch East India Company after the 1688
glorious revolution, worked as an instrument to bring the world
under the realm of the British Empire. During the 17th and 18th
centuries, the British Parliament, which was made up of wealthy
landowners, traders, and manufacturers, passed several laws to
protect and extend the monopoly interests of these chartered
corporations24. However, it would be wrong to comprehend that
the Anglo-Dutch merger handed India over to the British East India
Company. Both Dutch and English traders were minor players in a
vast Asian Mughal Empire25. Madras, Bombay and Calcutta were
tiny trade outposts on the edge of a vast and economically
advanced Indian subcontinent. English and Dutch companies were
merely parasites on the periphery, reliant on partnerships with
Indian people in business, such as dubashes in Madras and
banyans in Bengal26. The Mughals’ Empire was wealthy and
mighty, and the European nation-states had no match for it. As per
data, in 1700, India’s population was twenty times that of the
United Kingdom, while its share was 24 per cent of total world
output. However, the United Kingdom’s total world output share
was just 3 per cent27. Thomas Munroe, in his testimony before the
House of Commons in 1813, stated that “Among the causes which
precluded the extended sale of British goods in India is the
religious and civil habits of the natives, and more than anything
else, I am afraid the excellence of their own manufacturers. I have
never seen a European Shawl that I would use, even if it were
given to me as a Present”. 28 This testimony of Thomas Munroe
signifies the superior performance of the Indian manufacturing
sector. James Mill elaborated the wrong done to India by Britain in
his famous book History of British India in the following words:
“It is also a melancholy instance of the wrong
done to India by the country on which she has
become dependent. It was stated in evidence (in
1813) that the cotton and silk goods of India up
to the period would be sold for a profit in the
British market at a price of 50 to 60 per cent,
lower than those fabricated in England. It
consequently becomes necessary to protect the
latter by duties of 70 and 80 per cent, on their

value or by positive prohibition. Had this not
been the case, had not such prohibitory duties
and decrees existed, the mills of Paisley and
Manchester would have been again set in motion,
even by the power of steam. They were created by
the sacrifice of the Indian manufacturer. Had
India been independent, she would have
retaliated, would have imposed prohibitive duties
upon British goods, and would thus have
preserved her own productive industry from
annihilation. This act of self-defence was not
permitted to her; she was at the mercy of the
stranger. British goods were forced upon her
without paying any duty, and the foreign
manufacturer employed the arm of political
injustice to keep down and ultimately strangled
competitor with whom he could not have
contended on equal terms”.29
Thus, India is reduced from the State of manufacturing to that of
an agricultural country30. The Mughal Empire had started to
decline by 1740 AD, and Mughal India entered into a struggle for
mastery like the European struggle for mastery after the Habsburgs
in the seventeenth century. Subsequently, this struggle for mastery
in Mughal India provided the competing business enterprises with
an opportunity to establish their control over Indian territory. Thus,
the East India Company, the Dutch East India Company, the
Company of Royal Adventurers into Africa, the Hudson Bay
Company, the Scotland Trading to Africa and the Indies Company,
and the South Sea Company were the predecessors of the modern
MNCs and TNCs.
History does not repeat, but it instructs us31. The Great Bengal
Famine was one of the episodes caused by the British East India
Company’s egoism over the lives of 10 million Bengalis. The
Industrial Revolution in Europe enriched bankers and owners of
wealth but resigned millions of workers to a life of abject
poverty32, leading Europe to the 1848 revolution. In the twenty-
first century, corporations are unfolding massive social,
technological, and economic changes that will create a massive
unproductive class of people of any economic, political or even
artistic value. However, the redundant or ‘useless class’33 will not
be employable. In this context, Julie Friedman Steele asked a

critical question: can we afford to be passive about our future,
entrusting the defining decisions of our time to the corporations
and institutions that have brought us here?34
In his article, The Need for a Futurists Mind-Set, Julie Friedman
Steele, founder and CEO of the 3D Printer Experience, stated that
there are many possible future scenarios, and it is impossible to
predict at this juncture what will happen. However, consider a
scenario in which the technological revolution makes the world
unrecognisable in the approaching decades. Imagine powerful,
omnipresent artificial intelligence forestalling our every move, our
physical and digital spaces swarming with life and the collective
knowledge of our civilisation. Envision that we will enhance our
bodies, extend our life spans, augment our brains, and expand our
minds, enabling us to transcend the most vexing human conditions
and accomplish more than we could even imagine35.
Thus, in view of the above discussion, Corporations have risen to
become the world’s most potent governance institutions, with the
largest operating in nearly every nation and outstripping most
governments in scale and influence. While this and its
consequences have gone largely unnoticed and unaddressed,
corporate interests increasingly define states’ and foreign bodies’
policy priorities rather than human interests.
David C. Korten exposed the mystery behind the genesis of
liberalisation, privatisation, and globalisation. According to him,
the roots of the modern economic system in which MNCs and
TNCs play an inevitable role in controlling the world economy go
back to the U.S. economic recession that preceded World War II.
On July 1-22, 1944, representatives of 44 nations attended the
Bretton Woods Conference in New Hampshire to develop an
institutional framework for the post World War II global economy.
The purpose was to create an open world economy unified under
the leadership of the West that would ensure unchallenged access
to the world’s markets and raw materials for the West. The MNCs
and TNCs have become instruments of economic coercion and the
West’s political domination36. The systematic use of TNCs and
MNCs as a potent tool to accomplish geopolitical objectives has
been the West’s main instrument to sustain Western World
Order37.
The rise of TNCs and MNCs as powerful institutions reminds the

visionary observations made by President Abraham Lincoln just
before his death: Corporations have been enthroned…An era of
corruption in high places will follow, and the money power will
endeavour to prolong its reign by working on the prejudices of the
people…until wealth is aggregated in a few hands… and the
Republic is destroyed38. President Rutherford B. Hayes
complained, “this is a government of the people, by the people and
for the people no longer. It is a government of corporations, by
corporations, and for corporations”39. In his classic The Robber
Barons, Matthew Josephson wrote that “The halls of legislation
were transformed into a mart where the price of votes was haggled
over, and laws, made to order, were bought and sold”40. As a
result, corporations gained enough power over crucial state
legislative bodies to effectively rewrite the laws that regulate their
existence41. Gradually, corporations got the rights of a natural
person and protections of their rights under the Bill of Rights,
including the right to freedom of expression and other
constitutional safeguards that are extended to only individuals.
Consequently, these corporations influence the government in their
interest.
William Greider, in his book Who Will Tell the People: The
Betrayal of American Democracy, made a very critical
observation:
“[The corporations’]…tremendous financial
resources, the diversity of their interests, the squad
of talented professionals-all these assets and some
others are now relentlessly focused on the politics
of governing. This new institutional reality is the
centrepiece in the breakdown of contemporary
democracy. Corporations exist to pursue their own
profit maximisation, not the collective aspirations of
the society”.42
The twenty-first century is witnessing the transfer of sovereignty
from the people to the Corporations. Human societies are facing
the question of analysis: location of power to rule, whether the
power to rule should reside with the people or the artificial persona
of the corporation? In 1989, in his famous article, The End of
History, published in the National Interest, Francis Fukuyama
celebrated the free-market system’s victory over the socialist
utopia and declared that human evolutionary history had reached

its culmination point- a universal homogenous state. As a result,
the world intelligentsia imbibed the myth of an “end of history”43,
which allowed the West’s governments and corporations to
penetrate States quickly to embrace the libertarians’ story of
Western success. Armies of Western professionals were sent
worldwide to assist developing and underdeveloped countries in
introducing reforms that would pave the way for Western
corporations to enter their economies.
In July 1991, when the Government of India (GOI) had to take a
loan from IMF to tide over an outstanding Balance of Payments
crisis, a package of measures called “economic reforms” based
primarily on the “Washington Consensus” had to be adopted of
which “privatisation” was an integral part. The U. S. dominated
World Bank, and International Monetary Fund moved to
restructure debt-ridden India’s economies to open herself to
penetration by foreign corporations. IMF and World Bank imposed
the “structural adjustment” programme rolled back government
involvement in economic life in support of domestic industries,
eliminated protectionist barriers to import from the Western World,
lifted restrictions on foreign investment, and integrated Asian
economies more tightly into the Northern dominated world
economy44. Consequently, India’s Government proclaimed a new
Industrial Policy in July 1991 containing several decisions to
honour her commitment to privatisation besides opening up several
areas previously reserved exclusively for the public sector for
private investment and inviting foreign capital45. Under the U.S.
dominated World Trade Organization, trade policy became the
weapon of choice for imposing structural reforms in developing
countries like India. The West dominated World Bank, IMF, and
WTO are leading proponents of economic rationalism and free
market, export-led growth strategies46. They have been lauding
South Korea, Taiwan, Singapore, and Hong Kong as examples of
success stories of the free-market economy for years. In the
Western World, it has been argued that Strong growth in the
developing and underdeveloped worlds is highly desired to sustain
enough growth in the West to maintain sufficient levels of jobs and
allow Western governments to address pressing social issues47.
Under the liberalisation policy in 1991, the Government of India
declared that existing companies in India with foreign shareholding
were allowed to increase their stake to 51 per cent as long as the
enhanced equity was for the manufacturer in high priority

industries. This may be regarded as the starting point for global
private companies to take over the commanding heights in the
Indian industry. Due to the amendment in Foreign Exchange
Regulation Act, these companies were free to opt for 51 per cent
and more holding to take over complete control of joint ventures in
India48.
One of the reasons for TNCs/MNCs to operate in India is to seek
their help in export promotion, mainly to earn foreign exchange.
However, many studies have revealed that the amount spent in
foreign exchange by foreign-controlled companies in India is
considerably more than the amount they earn in foreign exchange;
as an aggregate, the net balance of payments effect is thus
consistently negative49. The TNCs/MNCs have very strong
advantages. They can generate much capital from their internal
sources-retained profits, etc., and mobilise resources from outside
easily, so badly needed for rapid transformation and overcoming
the Forex crisis in the short term. Most of the FDI comes through
TNCs/MNCs. Moreover, TNCs/MNCs are big technological
giants, and therefore, they can bring advanced technology to the
country and help in the technological up-gradation of the Indian
industry. Further, they have vast access to international markets
due to their superior marketing and distribution skills and thus,
they can help stimulate exports50.
There are some myths about TNCs/MNCs ushering in general
economic welfare, such as:51
1. The TNCs/MNCs have tended to dominate the national
economy with direct adverse effects on the domestic
industry. Comparatively speaking, Indian industries are
handicapped by a liquidity crunch, high-interest rates,
differential capital gains tax, restrictions on inter-corporate
loans and investments, stringent labour laws etc.
2. The TNCs/MNCs are not content with the mere majority
stake of 51 per cent concession in joint ventures: they are
phasing out the Indian partners. Sony, for example, has set
up a 100 per cent Japanese giant of $78 billion to produce
telecom goods by the wholly-owned Japanese industry.
Thus, the premise that collaboration with the TNCs/MNCs
would benefit the Indian industries instead drives the latter
out of business.
3. The TNCs/MNCs are driven by one overriding motive, the

motive of profitable sales. Instead of employing the latest
technology, obsolescent technology is finding its way into
India.
4. The headlong pursuit of profits by the TNCs/MNCs to
produce more and sell more is causing India’s natural
resources depletion.
5. These corporations are merely consolidating their global
economy and are not concerned with countries’ national
goals.
6. MNCs are not keen to share technology either. They do not
want to share their technology—this is one of the most
important lessons of liberalisation and globalisation policy.
The Ministry of Science & Technology appears to have
woken up because corporations may be keen on direct
investments but are incredibly unwilling to share
technology.
The industry was delicenced in 1991 but is still highly regulated.
Between 40 and 60 inspectors visit each industrial unit in a month.
The World Bank’s world business environment survey finds that
management spends as much as 16% of their time dealing with
government officials in India. There is too much of a bureaucratic,
rule-based environment rather than a market-based environment in
this country52. The economy needs to become globally competitive
if it is to organise itself against the MNCs firmly.
The country’s politics are likely to change under the new
dispensation. MNCs are known to bribe politicians and bureaucrats
for getting things done their way. There are umpteen instances
from Latin America, Africa, and Asia where powerful MNCs have
held real political power and dire consequences for the polity and
economy. Only the form has changed; East India Company
Syndrome has not ceased to be relevant in the present-day Indian
economic colonisation is not less outrageous than political
colonisation. In today’s world, commercial credit and FDI do not
depend on the recipient country’s creditworthiness but upon their
government’s capacity and willingness to compromise their
national interests and avowed policies on vital concerns to the
MNCs and their countries. This explains MNCs’ preference for
Deng’s China and Yeltsin’s Russia, Singapore, Thailand,
Philippines, and Korea-the success stories of the market economy
have got pseudo-growth. India must, therefore, desist from

jeopardising its long-term interests and economic sovereignty for
ephemeral gains.
With liberalisation, one thought that the official machinery would
be more flexible than under a regulatory regime. Under a regime of
growing liberalisation, the official machinery has a role in terms of
intervention, but to be effective, this has to be quick. While the
political leadership can find fault with the administrative
mechanism, the response is very clumsy. The administrative
machinery always takes decisions ultimately, but faultfinding will
not improve; the bureaucracy’s integrity is already under pressure
for not taking to heart the liberalisation process. It is
straightforward to assault the administrative mechanism for not
responding to the market movements. However, in an economy so
long accustomed to political decision-making, unless a strong
signal is sent out that the officials are free to act without being
questioned later, it would not be easy to foster desired flexibility.
In practical or political terms, the idea of a powerless State not only
ignores the continued capacity of the State to regulate capital, but it
ignores the role of the State as a primary agency for imperialist
expansion and the imperial as well as the class character of the
State at the centre of the system. The international circuits of
capital and commodity flows are controlled by TNCs whose
headquarters are based in the United States or Europe. Moreover,
globalisation theorists tend to ignore or play down the political
dynamics involved in opening markets, overthrowing recalcitrant
nationalist regimes and invading countries.
According to most advocates of ‘globalisation’ theory, we are
entering a new epoch of interdependency in which stateless
corporations transcend national frontiers, spurred by the third
technological revolution and facilitated by the new information
systems. According to globalisation theorists, the result is a
progressive, dynamic, modernising world of prosperous nations.
However, the contrast between the premises and promises of
globalisation theorists and contemporary realities could not be
starker. Instead of interdependence nations, we have dramatic
contrasts between creditor and debtor nations; multi-billion-dollar
corporations appropriating enterprises, interests, royalties and trade
surpluses while billions of workers and peasants reap poverty
miserable existences. Structurally we find that over 80 per cent of
the major TNCs control their investment, research and technology

decisions out of their home offices in the United States, Germany,
and Japan. TNCs are based on worldwide operations, but their
control is centralised.
It is argued that all public international organisations and fora,
including the U.N Security Council, NATO, the Group of Seven,
the World Bank and the IMF, UNCTAD and the newly formed
World Trade Organization, which replaces GATT, are generally
used for the establishment of a globalised economic system
dominated by the Western World, by the decision-makers in a
systematic and coordinated manner. The world is becoming
multipolar, and the MNCs, the carriers of the West’s industrialised
culture, will show future work organisations’ nature. The practice
of exploitation by TNCs/MNCs, particularly economic exploitation
and domination of independent but economically less developed
countries, may be called neo-imperialism, and TNCs/MNCs have
become tools of the western world to exploit the world economy.
This era can be termed neo-imperialism, where corporations will
govern world affairs. From the above study, it is evident that
further research is required to analyse the role of all international
fora like IMF, World Bank, WTO, and UNO in the establishment
of TNCs/MNCs control over world resources and their exploitation
which can have immense implications for the humankind.
Corporate efforts to shape our culture and politics through control
of television, social networks, and communication bring to mind
George Orwell’s 198453 and his view of an authoritarian society
ruled by ever-present television monitors and mobile phones that
monitor and manipulate citizens’ perceptions of the world. The
authority is shifting away from human beings into highly organised
corporations powered by intelligent algorithms. Soon, we will find
ourselves in a world controlled by corporations managed and
owned by a superhuman race, as stipulated in Brave New World of
Aldous Huxley54. The age of the people’s sovereignty will be over,
and the dream of corporations’ sovereignty will be realised. A few
upgraded superhumans will control these corporations. Soon,
inequalities will reach a point where the world will be divided
between a microscopic community of superhumans and
subhumans. The corporations pull strings for this change; however,
the twenty-first-century reality is more subtle, and the techniques
are more sophisticated than Orwell and Huxley anticipated. We
found ourselves to be governed by oppressive corporations rather

than oppressive states.
References:
1
Harari, Yuval N. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, Penguin Random
House, London, 2014
2
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origin of Political Order from Prehuman Times to the
French Revolution, Profile Books, London, 2012
3
Ibid
4
Harari, Yuval N. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, op.cit.
5
Watson, Peter. Ideas: A History of Thought and Invention, from Fire to Freud,
Harper Perennial, London, 2006
6
Fukuyama, Francis. The Origin of Political Order from Prehuman Times to the
French Revolution, op. cit.
7
Hunt. Lester H. 1985. ‘Politics and Anti-Politics: Nietzsche’s View of the
State’, History of Philosophy Quarterly. Oct., 1985, Vol. 2, No. 4. pp. 453- 468.
https://www.jstor.org/stable/27743745
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Barnet Richard J. and Muller Ronald E. Global Reach: The Power of the
Multinational Corporation, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1974
11
Harari, Yuval N. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, op. cit.
12
The New Jerusalem Bible, Deut. 25:4, 21:16; Lev. 19:13; Prov. 19:14
13
Harari, Yuval N. Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, op. cit.
14
Ferguson, Niall. The Ascent of Money: A Financial History of the World,
Penguin Books, London, 2007
15
Korten David C. When Corporations Rule the World, Berrett-Koehler
Publishers, San Francisco, 1995
16
Ibid.
17
Alam, Asrar. Alam-e-Islam Ki Akhlaqi Surat-e-Hall, Qazi Publishers and
Printers, New Delhi, 1996
18
Aslam, Mohammad. “Multinational Corporations and Administration in India:
The Road Ahead to an Era of New Imperialism”, Indian Journal of Politics, Vol.
46, Number 1-2, January-June 2012, ISSN: 0303-9957
19
Alam, Asrar. Alam-e-Islam Ki Iqtisadi Surat-e-Hall, Dar-Al-Ilm, New Delhi,
1994, Minutes of Evidence & Co. on the Affairs of the East India Company
(1813). PP-123, 172, 196)
20
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, Penguin
Books, London, 2004
21
Korten David C. When Corporations Rule the World, op.cit.
22
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, op.cit.;
Korten David C. When Corporations Rule the World, op.cit.; Harari, Yuval N.
Sapiens: A Brief History of Humankind, op. cit.
23
24
Ibid.
25
Dalrymple, William. The Anarchy: The East India Company, Corporate
Violence, and the Pillage of an Empire, Bloomsbury Publishing, London, 2019;
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, op.cit.
26
Ferguson, Niall. Empire: How Britain Made the Modern World, op.cit.
27
Ibid.
28
Alam, Asrar. Alam-e-Islam Ki Iqtisadi Surat-e-Hall, Dar-Al-Ilm, New Delhi,
1994, Minutes of Evidence & Co. on the Affairs of the East India Company
(1813). PP-123, 172, 196)
29
Ibid.
30
Tucker, Henry St. George. Memorials of the Indian Government, 1853, quoted
in Asrar Alam’s Alam-e-Islam Ki Iqtisadi Surat-e-Hall, Darul-Ilm, New
Delhi,1994
31
Snyder, Timothy. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century,
The Bodley Head, Penguin Random House, London, 2017.
32
Harari, Yuval N. 21 Lessons for the 21st century, Penguin Random House,
London: Jonathan Cape, 2018
33
Ibid.
34
Steele, J. Friedman. ‘The Need for a Futurist Mind-Set’, Encyclopedia
Britannica, March 22, 2021. https://www.britannica.com/topic/The-Need-for-a-
Futurist-Mind-Set-2119786. (accessed on March 23 2021).
35
Ibid.
36
The Road Ahead to an Era of New Imperialism”, op.cit.
37
Blackwill Robert D. and Harris Jennifer M. War by Other Means:
Geoeconomics and Statecraft, The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press,
Massachusetts, 2016
38
39
Wasserman, Harvey. America Born and Reborn, Collier Books, New York,
1983, p. 291
40
Ibid., pp-92-93
41
42
Greider, William. Who Will Tell the People: The Betrayal of American
Democracy, Simon and Schuster, New York, 1992
43
Snyder, Timothy. On Tyranny: Twenty Lessons from the Twentieth Century,
op. cit.
44
45
Aslam, Mohammad. Impact of Liberalisation and Economic Reforms on
Administration: With Special Reference to Public Sector Undertakings, 2006
http://hdl.handle.net/10603/51967
46
47
Rohatyn, Felix. ‘World Capital: The Need and the Risk’, New York Review of
Books, July 14, 1994, World Capital: The Need & the Risks | by Felix G.
Rohatyn | The New York Review of Books (nybooks.com) accessed on 22 April
2021
48
The Road Ahead to an Era of New Imperialism”, op. cit.
49
Administration: With Special Reference to Public Sector Undertakings, op. cit.
50
The Road Ahead to an Era of New Imperialism”, op. cit.
51
Pandey Shridhar. ‘Liberalisation, Globalisation and the State in Indian
Economy’, in K. R. Gupta (ed.), Liberalisation, Globalisation and the State in
Indian Economy, Atlantic Publishers, New Delhi, 2002.
52
Administration: With Special Reference to Public Sector Undertakings, op. cit.
53
Orwell, George. Nineteen Eighty Four, Rupa Publication, New Delhi, 1949
54
Huxley, Aldous. Brave New World, RHUK, New Delhi, 1932
The International Legal Status of…. 81
The International Legal The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-81-108
Status of Afghanistan’s https://www.amu.ac.in/
Ambassadors nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Representing a Defunct
Government
Sayed Qudrat Hashimy*
ABSTRACT
This study explores the international legal status of
Afghan ambassadors representing a defunct
government and the complexities it entails for
diplomatic recognition and authority. It focuses on
clarifying how Afghan embassies function without a
chain of command after the collapse of the previous
government. The paper emphasizes the diplomatic
actions of Afghan embassies in countries like the
USA and India, as well as their engagement with
international organizations such as the United
Nations. It also discusses the challenges faced by
diplomats representing a dissolved government and
examines the diplomatic engagement of the Taliban.
The study concludes by presenting the current
scenario of diplomatic relations in Afghanistan,
considering the unique challenges faced by the
defunct government's representatives. Lastly, it
delves into the concept of virtual embassies and
consulates and their relevance in the modern
diplomatic landscape.
Keywords: Ambassador Immunity, Diplomatic Relations,
Diplomatic Missions, Recognition under the International Law
1.0 PROLOGUE
Overnight, Afghan diplomats stationed abroad suddenly found
themselves representing a defunct government. Each Afghan
*Ph.D. Scholar (Law), Department of Studies in Law, University of Mysore

ambassadorprima faciefunctions independently, without a

hierarchical chain of command.The government, led by President
Ashraf Ghani (hereafter called the then government), is no longer
in existence in Afghanistan or in exile. President Ghani fled the
country, conceding defeat, and is currently living in exile.1The
status of the elected but deposed then government, which is
recognised by some, is now de facto non-existent.Initially, Vice
President Amrullah Saleh claimed to be the "legitimate caretaker
president" based on the Article 67 of the Constitution
2004.2However, he too fled the country, and the collapse of the
then-government has become apparent. This situation leads to
changes in the political considerations and the continuous
ofrecognising the then government. It is important to consider the
funding sources for the Afghan Embassy and the validity of
documents issued by Afghan embassies. The contracts made by the
Afghan diplomatic mission and the recognition of the Afghan
diplomatic mission by the host countries are also areas of concern
that need to be taken into account.
This situation raises several legal inquiries regarding the legitimacy
of Afghan diplomatic missions acting on behalf of the former
government. The legal status, including the privileges and
immunities conferred upon diplomatic representatives, is subject to
examination. A particular concern pertains to Diplomatic
Passports, which are conventionally issued by the Foreign Ministry
of the sending state. In the event that a diplomatic passport expires,
there arises a question as to the entity or authority possessing the
jurisdiction to issue a renewed passport. There is a possibility of
uncertain situations for embassy personnel who served the then
government and expressed their opposition to the Taliban
government.
Navigating diplomatic representation under such circumstances
adds complexity and raises questions about refugee laws. Some
diplomatic envoys may seek asylum protection, and this situation
brings forth issues related to international law, diplomatic
immunities, and responsibilities, as well as the doctrine of persona
non grata. It is crucial to determine their status after their
diplomatic roles end and whether they will be allowed to stay in
the countries they are stationed in. This becomes an important
matter, especially for those who do not have dual citizenship or
residency permits in other countries, and alternative solutions need
to be considered.Additionally, there are concerns regarding Afghan
individuals living in host countries who require various services.

These services include extending passports, obtaining travel
documents, issuing and certification of marriage certificates,
verifying educational documents, and facilitating multiple consular
services. It is essential to address these issues in order to provide
the necessary support to Afghan individuals affected by the current
situation.
2.0 RECOGNITION OF DIPLOMATIC ENVOYS
Governmental recognition entails formally acknowledging a
specific regime as the legitimate governing body of a nation.
Nonetheless, this acknowledgement raises crucial questions
concerning the legitimacy of diplomats and their true allegiances.
In cases where a government has been dissolved, the ultimate
authority guiding diplomatic actions becomes questionable. Are the
ambassador's decisions solely based on their personal discretion, or
is there a higher, divine authority influencing their choices? This
issue is particularly relevant in the context of recognizing Afghan
embassies after the collapse of the previous government, where a
chain of command no longer exists. The historical practice of
granting immunity and privileges to envoys dates back to ancient
civilisations like the Roman, Greek, Babylonia, Indian, Egyptian,
Chinese, and Israel.3These envoys were granted diplomatic
immunity and protection wherever they travelled. However, it was
during the Renaissance era that modern diplomacy began to take
shape with the establishment of permanent diplomatic missions in
Europe, with Italy being among the first to recognise its
benefits.4Venezia, a neighbouring country of Italy,5sent the first-
ever ambassador to Italy, leading to the establishment of more
permanent missions in cities like London and Paris, signifying a
significant step in the evolution of modern diplomacy.
State recognition is a complex issue in international law,
categorised into constitutive and declaratory theories. The
Montevideo Convention sets criteria for statehood, including a
permanent population, defined territory, government, and capacity
for international relations. 6The declaratory theory asserts that
recognition confirms existing statehood and promotes stability.
Government recognition involves political complexities, especially
when multiple governments claim representation, often resolved
through the effective control doctrine. The emergence of
democratic entitlement introduces a legally binding framework in
government recognition.Despite the complexities, state recognition

gives states discretionary power to accept or reject entities seeking
statehood. Denying recognition may lead to the denial of state
rights, intervention, and disregard for nationality, which is
considered unacceptable. However, this discretion can be
manipulated for political dominance, resulting in some potential
states remaining unrecognised even if they meet the necessary
criteria. Establishing and applying statehood criteria face
challenges due to the lack of consensus and political biases. Some
propose involving international organisations like the UN in this
process, but relying solely on practice has limitations, highlighting
the importance of thorough consideration and debate in navigating
state recognition effectively.
Government recognition is primarily a political decision and not
strictly governed by legal criteria. International law recognises that
governments have the right to be recognised if they effectively
control the state's machinery. The denial of recognition to a
government in control is seen as a hostile act and may potentially
justify a casus belli.7The passage does not directly address the
legal status of an unrecognised government regarding its ability to
sue or be sued. However, recognition by other states often impacts
a government's ability to engage in international legal
actions.Several examples illustrate the controversy surrounding
state recognition. Kosovo's recognition as a new state in 2008
triggered disagreements due to its unilateral declaration of
independence from Serbia.8The International Court of Justice ruled
that the declaration was not illegal under existing international law
principles but did not provide clear guidelines for recognizing new
states. Many third-world countries refrained from recognizing
Kosovo, fearing it could set a precedent for secessionist
movements. South Sudan, after gaining independence in
2011,9faced post-conflict challenges, raising questions about
coherence in state practices regarding recognition for entities
exercising their right to self-determination. The cases of Crimea's
secession from Ukraine and joining Russia,10as well as Catalonia's
attempted secession from Spain in 2017,11highlighted the lack of
uniformity in state practices in recognising new states, potentially
affecting the sovereignty of third-world countries influenced by
former colonial powers.
3.0 CURRENT SCENARIO OF AFGHANISTAN EMBASSY IN THE USA

3.1 US- Afghanistan Diplomatic Relations
The recognition of governments and ambassadors from
Afghanistan has posed similar situations for the United States in
the past. During the period of 1978-1992, the Democratic Republic
of Afghanistan was established after a Soviet-aligned party seized
power through a coup. The Soviet military intervention from 1979
to 1989 caused several violent upheavals. The United States ceased
recognising the regime but maintained diplomatic relations and
embassy staffing until the evacuation in 1989.From 1992 to 1996,
the Islamic State of Afghanistan was formed as the Mujahedin
resistance took control. However, there was extensive infighting
among factions within the newly established Rabbani government.
Although the Rabbani government secured a U.N. seat and staffed
the Afghan embassy, the United States chose not to recognise
it.Between 1996 and 2001, the Taliban gained control over most of
Afghanistan, while the Rabbani government continued to assert its
legitimacy and initiated the Northern Alliance resistance effort
from the northeastern Panjshir Valley. The Rabbani regime
retained its U.N. seat, but the U.S. did not recognise any faction as
the legitimate government, resulting in the closure of the Afghan
embassy.From 2001 to 2021, a U.S.-led regime change led to the
establishment of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, which
gained widespread recognition. The United States reopened its
embassy, claiming it as a restaffing effort under existing diplomatic
relations. However, the government collapsed when President
Ashraf Ghani fled and surrendered.
On March 23, 2022, the U.S. Department took over Afghanistan
diplomatic Missions in Washington, New York and Beverly Hills
as they had ceased their diplomatic activities in the USA.12The
closure of the U.S. Embassy in Afghanistan has made the U.S. the
first country to take these steps. In contrast, Afghan embassies in
different countries like Canada, Russia, Australia and other nations
continue to operate. Additionally, Citibank froze the Aghan
Embassy's Bank account to prevent violating U.S.sanctions against
the Taliban.13
The act of Citibank seizing the Afghan Embassy account violates
Articles 22 (3)* and 45† of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
*
Article 22 stipulates:
Relations and Immunities of Diplomatic Agents, commonly

referred to as the Vienna Conventions. Afghanistan ratified this
Convention on October 6, 1965, and the United States, which is
also a signatory, ratified it on November 13, 1972,14after signing it
on June 29, 1961. Therefore, according to international law,
Citibank is not allowed to freeze the Afghan Embassy Account. In
accordance with banking law, Citibank should fulfil its role as the
banker and bailee for the legitimate customer.
Considering the traditional practice is Quicquid plantatur solo,
solo cedit. Whatever is affixed to the soil belongs to the soil. The
Afghan Embassy in the USA belongs to Afghanistan. Legally
speaking, the matter regarding the recognition of Afghanistan
remains unchanged, given that Afghanistan obtained recognition as
an independent and sovereign nation in 1919. Consequently, the
Afghan embassies retain their status as official diplomatic entities
representing Afghanistan.
The main concern is the intent behind the United States' actions in
Afghanistan, whether they seek to safeguard Afghan assets against
misappropriation by the defunct government's diplomats or impose
sanctions on the Taliban. Notably, the Taliban regime lacks
recognition and accreditation in both the US and the UN, yet the
freezing of assets in the IMF and Embassy account under the
Taliban name adds complexity to the situation. This suggests a lack
of interest in establishing diplomatic relations with Afghanistan
through either the previous government or the Taliban. However,
1.The premises of the mission shall be inviolable. The agents of the receiving
State may not enter them, except with the consent of the head of the mission.
2.The receiving State is under a special duty to take all appropriate steps to
protect the premises of the mission against any intrusion or damage and to
prevent any disturbance of the peace of the mission or impairment of its dignity.
3.The premises of the mission, their furnishings and other property thereon and
the means of transport of the mission shall be immune from search, requisition,
attachment or execution.
†
Article 45 stipulates that: If diplomatic relations are broken off between two
States or if a mission is permanently or temporarily recalled:
(a) The receiving State must, even in case of armed conflict, respect and protect
the premises of the mission, together with its property and archives;
(b) The sending State may entrust the custody of the premises of the mission,
together with its property and archives, to a third State acceptable to the
receiving State;
(c) The sending State may entrust the protection of its interests and those of its
nationals to a third State acceptable to the receiving State.
the US secretary of state announced that Qatar agreed to establish

U.S. interest in Afghanistan.15This move aims to enhance
communication and coordination with the U.S. State Department
and signifies a step forward in diplomatic relations between the
two nations. The agreement is set to facilitate a smoother
engagement on mutual interests, security, and regional stability
despite the complex political landscape in Afghanistan. Notably,
this decision comes amidst the international community's
reluctance to formally recognise the Taliban government, making
the interest section a practical approach to engaging with
Afghanistan and maintaining open channels of communication.
President Biden aims to strike a delicate balance between engaging
with the nation, addressing its concerns, and urging the Taliban to
adhere to international standards. The establishment of the U.S.
interest section represents a significant diplomatic move,
demonstrating the commitment to finding avenues for dialogue and
cooperation in the evolving situation in Afghanistan.
The closure of Afghanistan's embassy and the freezing of its assets
have sparked legal complexities amid a dire humanitarian crisis
and widespread human rights violations. The US intervention in
Afghanistan's affairs has faced scrutiny, raising questions about
accountability and the effectiveness of the United Nations in
finding solutions to the ongoing crisis.
There are additional concerns regarding the status of Afghan
nationals living in the US for various purposes. When an Afghan
national's passport expires or is lost, resolving their situation poses
challenges, as the US government is not inclined to extend their
passport or provide travel documents. Furthermore, citizenship
issues for many Afghans in the US remain unresolved.
The presence of the US in Afghanistan raises legal issues
concerning potential war crimes, such as civilian killings,
indiscriminate bombing, environmental destruction, exploitation of
natural resources, and poisoning of agricultural land, all of which
significantly impact Afghan citizens in the long run.
Deporting Afghan diplomats carries legal implications, particularly
concerning refugee laws and the principle of non-refoulment.16If a
diplomat faces political persecution upon deportation due to a lost
passport and alleged illegal stay, invoking humanitarian law, such
as refugee laws, may become necessary. However, achieving
refugee status requires fulfilling specific factors and tests as

determined by refugee laws and the UNHCR.17
Looking into the provision of the Vienna Conventions, Article 45
stipulates that, during the armed conflict or diplomatic relations
collapse also, the host states or receiving state bounds to protect the
diplomatic mission. There is Ambiguitas contra stipulatorem
est,18while examining the implementation of the Vienna
Convention 1961. Afghanistan has a position of Jus ad rem not
against the USA but towards all the member states who signatory
and ratified the aforementioned conventions.
The suspension of authorised Afghan Embassy bank accounts may
have a detrimental effect on Afghanistan and the USA's diplomatic
relations. The Take over of the Afghan Embassy by the USA has
plunged Afghan envoys, who saw their assignments to the United
States as the pinnacle of their diplomatic careers, into distressing
uncertainty.The closure of the embassy and consulates serves as
evidence of the United States' costly and unsuccessful endeavours
in nation-building and counterterrorism in Afghanistan. Despite an
expenditure of nearly $2 trillion over a span of twenty years to
develop the country as an emerging democracy and a stronghold
against terrorism, the Afghan diplomatic outposts in the United
States, specifically the embassy in Washington, D.C., and consular
offices in New York and Los Angeles, have encountered
significant challenges. The suspension of their official bank
accounts has had a detrimental impact on the embassy's financial
operations, including salary disbursements, rent payments, and
healthcare insurance. Consequently, numerous Afghan diplomats
have experienced unpaid wages since October and have had to rely
on personal savings or loans to sustain themselves. In some cases,
diplomats have been compelled to downsize their living
arrangements in order to meet their financial obligations.
Similarly, the previous Afghan government deposited an asset
worth over $7 billion at the Federal Reserve Bank in New
York.19However, the United States seized these assets, despite the
IMF not serving as a custodian for sovereign nations. This unfair
seizure of Afghanistan's assets after 9/11 disproportionately affects
innocent Afghan people who were not part of armed war puzzles.
The U.S. Constitution under section 1701 authorise the President to
seize foreign assets under a national emergency,20but section 1702
(b) Para 2 does not authorise withholding donations for
humanitarian relief.21The freezing of innocent people's assets by

executive order is unconstitutional, violating Afghanistan's
sovereignty and human rights. The President must consult with
Congress and demonstrate the decision's national importance, as
stated in Section 1703 of the U.S. Constitution. At the same time,
the U.S. president has abused his dominance of position over
Afghans, who experience poverty and suffer high death rates.
According to Article 38(1)(c) of the ICJ Statute, the Court must
apply the general principles of law recognised by civilised nations
when treaties or customary law cannot resolve a matter. One of the
most important of these principles is good faith, which underpins
many international legal rules. As such, the United States is
obligated to act in good faith with Afghanistan and consider the
human rights violations and civilian suffering resulting from
prolonged proxy wars and bipolar power politics. However, it
appears that the US interests in Afghanistan lead to varying
applications of good faith in international law.
The principle of sovereign equality of nations in international law
dictates that all states are legally equal, even if there are differences
in power and territory. Therefore, good faith acts to balance
unequal sides in municipal law, but this asymmetrical power
balance is absent in international law. To invoke the principle of
good faith, the US government should treat all states as sovereign
equals and act as a role model in its application of international
law. Unfortunately, the US has been known to violate international
law, including its own domestic laws, when dealing with
Afghanistan. Good faith in international law has specific aspects,
such as the maxim 'PACTA SUNT SERVANDA', which emphasizes
the binding nature of treaties, and the prohibition of the abuse of
rights and discretion. These aspects are subject to examination and
clarification by scholars and have been applied in important
judicial decisions.
In treaty law, good faith is crucial during treaty formation,
performance of treaty obligations, and treaty interpretation, as
reflected in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(VCLT). The VCLT recognizes the principles of free consent, good
faith, and pacta sunt servanda as universally recognized. Therefore,
good faith is a fundamental aspect of international law, and the US
must adhere to it in its actions and relations with Afghanistan and
other states. Violations of good faith can have far-reaching
consequences, and invoking this principle is essential to ensure the

predictability and consistency of the international legal order.
Recognition of governments varies among states, and "effective
control" is a key criterion. In 1790, the US enacted laws granting
diplomatic immunity to foreign representation, aligning with
international law. In 1972, the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic
Relations became effective, setting stricter immunity standards.
Despite this, the 1790 statute still applied when the Convention did
not provide solution to the diplomatic issues.US follows a monist
approach, treating ratified treaties as domestic law. The DRA
brought the US in line with other nations, reducing blanket
immunity while preserving essential diplomatic functions. The
U.S. engagement in Afghanistan has faced criticism for lacking
legal justification for a prolonged and contract-based war.
Diplomatic engagement in the region has also been questioned for
its vagueness. Since 1776, the United States has engaged in
military interventions worldwide, aiming to safeguard national
security and promote democracy and human rights. Interventions
have occurred in various countries across continents. Notable
examples include Albania, Algeria, Angola, Argentina, Bosnia,
Burma, Cambodia, Chile, China, Colombia, Cuba, Dominican
Republic, Egypt, El Salvador, France, Germany, Greece, Grenada,
Guam, Guatemala, Haiti, and Hawaii. These interventions have left
a lasting impact on international relations and global politics.
Debates over the legality and justifications of certain interventions,
particularly in Afghanistan, persist. Critics argue that some actions
lacked proper legal authorization, raising concerns about adherence
to international law and norms. While some interventions have
received support, others continue to face scrutiny. The legacy of
U.S. military interventions remains a complex and debated aspect
of international relations in an ever-changing world.
The US intervention in Afghanistan aimed to establish diplomacy
and democracy but resulted in a challenging situation from 2014 to
2021, with two power-sharing rulers. This experiment in
governance set a bad precedent for democracy and revealed the
complexities of nation-building in a war-torn country. The US
Secretary of State intervened, suggesting a power-sharing
arrangement between Abdullah Abdullah and Ashraf Ghani to
form a dual government.22
4.0 THE UNITED NATIONS AND AFGHANISTAN DIPLOMATIC

DIALOGUE
The United Nations and the international community have faced
similar dilemmas in the past when dealing with the recognition of
governments and ambassadors from Afghanistan. During the
Taliban's previous rule from 1996 to 2001, the U.N. refused to
recognise their government and instead recognised the
government-in-exile, led by President Burhanuddin Rabbani, who
was later assassinated in Kabul in 2011. Now, the question of who
speaks for Afghanistan has fallen upon the U.N. General
Assembly, with both the Taliban and the currently accredited
ambassador appointed by former President Ashraf Ghani seeking
to represent the country at the United Nations.In September 2021,
the United Nations Secretary-General, Antonio Guterres, received
a letter from the "Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan," nominating
Suhail Shaheen, the Taliban's spokesman based in Doha, as its new
ambassador to the U.N. The U.N. does not formally recognise
governments but instead recognises the official representatives of
its member states. If the U.N. General Assembly accepts Shaheen's
credentials, the Taliban will have formal representation at the U.N.,
although it does not imply international recognition. There have
been cases in the past where rival governments' bids for U.N.
representation were rejected.For instance, after the Communist
revolution in 1949, China, a founding member of the United
Nations, was denied U.N. representation. The defeated Nationalist
government in Taiwan held China's seat until 1971 when the
General Assembly voted to expel Taiwan and recognise the
Communist government in Beijing. In 1997, Cambodia had two
rival representatives for its seat, and the committee chose not to
accept or reject the submitted credentials, resulting in Cambodia's
seat remaining vacant, a unique occurrence in the U.N.'s history.
South Africa faced suspension by the General Assembly in 1974,
and its U.N. representation was only fully restored 20 years later
when apartheid was abolished.Russia and China, two of the five
permanent members of the U.N. Security Council, will formally
recognise a Taliban-led government, with both countries
maintaining open embassies in Afghanistan. China has been
particularly proactive in investing in Afghanistan.
The main challenge lies in the fact that most countries are
unwilling to grant de jure recognition to the Taliban government or
accredit their ambassadors in receiving states. Similarly, the U.N.
has not allowed the Taliban's Ambassador to the U.N. General

Assembly to represent Afghanistan.
Since 1946, Afghanistan has had a voice and voting rights on
global issues, and its elections have influenced global decision-
making on matters such as climate change and global warming.
However, Afghanistan is currently facing a catastrophic
humanitarian crisis, with two-thirds of its population, about 28
million people, in need of humanitarian assistance to survive.
Additionally, 20 million people are experiencing severe food
insecurity, requiring $4.62 billion in funding. Therefore,
Afghanistan requires an ambassador to advocate for the concerns
of its people in the global forum.
Can Afghanistan be referred to as stateless? While Afghans do not
have a recognised government, they lack a state to be officially
acknowledged by all nations. It is a challenging reality that the
world must accept as the Taliban now controls significant portions
of Afghanistan. The Taliban has expressed a genuine intention to
involve other authorities or former officials from the Ghani
administration in any new government they establish.
In the case of Afghanistan, the concept of recognition is complex
and often misunderstood. It is frequently misconstrued as
signifying the normalisation of relations between states or the
endorsement of one government by another.In the realm of
international law and diplomacy, "recognition" is a technical term
used to refer to the acknowledgment of the existence of a state by
another state, along with its associated government's ability to
represent that state in international affairs. The current situation in
Afghanistan primarily raises questions regarding the recognition of
the government. It is widely accepted that Afghanistan still exists
as a state, at least for now. The key question is who has the
authority to speak on behalf of Afghanistan.
Recognition holds significant importance in international law as it
helps determine whether an entity, as a state, possesses rights and
responsibilities under international law, and whether a regime, as
the government of that state, can exercise those rights and fulfill
those responsibilities on behalf of the state.
John Austin's perspective on international law as weak and lacking
effective sanctions, akin to "soft corner law," raises important
questions about its implementation and effectiveness. It is crucial
to emphasize that even domestic law, if not properly enforced, can
become ineffective and inappropriate.Drawing parallels with

domestic criminal law, when crimes such as theft and rape go
unpunished, it weakens the authority of the legal system and
undermines the rule of law. Similarly, if international law and
treaties are not effectively implemented, it can lead to violations of
human rights and humanitarian law, as seen in cases involving the
US forces, Soviet Union, the Taliban, and Afghan armed forces in
Afghanistan.
The lack of decisive action by the International Criminal Court
(ICC) or the UN Security Council in addressing gross violations of
international humanitarian law (IHL) in Afghanistan highlights the
challenges faced in enforcing international law. These violations
have caused immense suffering for the Afghan people, and the
UN's inaction in resolving these issues diplomatically raises
questions about its ability to achieve its stated purpose.
The United Nations was established to promote peace, harmony,
and socio-economic prosperity among member states, as outlined
in Articles 1 and 2 of the UN Charter. However, when the UN
remains silent in the face of violations by powerful nations, such as
the US in Afghanistan, it raises doubts about whether the
organization is effectively fulfilling its purpose.
International law requires Afghanistan's consent for a treaty to be
legally binding, and domestic legal procedures are irrelevant.
Governments follow legal criteria when recognizing other states,
and such recognition declares their legal status. The UN
Credentials Committee plays a crucial role in shaping the norm
against recognizing coup regimes. To join the UN, a state must
meet specific conditions, subject to the organization's judgment.
Recognition is a tool used to deter or sanction states, as seen in
Crimea's annexation. The effective control doctrine governs
recognition practices. Laws governing international organizations
and special missions are found in their treaties and agreements.
Diplomatic relations don't require recognition, but recognition
opens channels for aid and loans. Afghanistan's current situation
with the Taliban may impact diplomatic relations and
representation in international forums.
In conclusion, John Austin's views on the weaknesses of
international law find relevance in situations where enforcement
and accountability are lacking. The UN's role in promoting peace
and resolving conflicts becomes questionable when violations of
international law persist without appropriate actions. For the UN to

achieve its intended purpose, there must be a commitment to
enforcing international law and holding all parties accountable for
their actions.
5.0 AFGHAN DIPLOMATIC MISSION IN INDIA
The Afghanistan embassy in New Delhi has become a focal point
of contention between the former Afghan democratic government
and the Taliban regime, On April 28of 2023, while theAmbassador
was away visiting his family in London, the trade counsellor, sent a
letter to the MEA asserting his appointment as the charges
d'affaires (CDA) of the embassy in Delhi.23These diplomatic
tussles led both sides to seek the intervention of the Indian
Ministry of External Affairs (MEA). The MEA has described it as
an internal issue that the embassy should address and resolve it
internally.24
India has maintained friendly relations with Afghanistan since
1947, solidified by the "Friendship Treaty" in 1950.25Despite
diplomatic challenges and changes in governments, India has
consistently engaged with Afghanistan, including during the Soviet
invasion and the rise of the Taliban. India's investments in
development projects continue to foster closer ties between the two
nations.
The diplomatic relations between Afghanistan and India exhibit
different facets. India has provided assistance to the Afghan
Embassy in New Delhi by extending a passport and granting a
scholarship to an Afghan student through the Embassy's
recommendation letter and verification of passport and educational
documents. India reopened its embassy in Kabul in August 2022
and has deployed a technical team to oversee the distribution of
humanitarian aid under the guise of UNAMA.26However, despite
the close engagement of India with Afghanistan, there have been
diplomatic complexities concerning the issuance of visas to Afghan
nationals in need. The Indian government cites security concerns
and the absence of consular services in Afghanistan as the reasons
for this approach. Every nation prioritises the security and national
interests of its own country. Nevertheless, to demonstrate India's
unwavering support for the Afghan people, India could have
outsourced the issuance of student visas to the Russian embassy in
Kabul or issued visas through a third country like Dubai, Iran, or
Tajikistan. However, this has not occurred.India's refusal to issue
visas has affected more than 2,500 students who were granted
ICCR scholarships to study in various Indian institutions.27Many of
these students had already commenced their education but were
stranded in Afghanistan due to COVID-19 and the country's
collapse. They now find themselves facing numerous difficulties
with an uncertain future.
6.0 AFGHANISTAN DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS IN PRE – TALIBAN
2.0
The concept of "conflict states lacks a universally accepted
definition in international law. To clarify, it typically refers to
countries experiencing armed conflicts and ongoing hostilities.
Different types of armed conflicts are recognised under
humanitarian law, and identifying the specific type of conflict is
crucial as it determines which laws apply for resolution. In a tragic
incident in southern Afghanistan, five diplomats from the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) were killed in a bombing, making it the
deadliest attack on the nation's diplomatic corps. The perpetrators
behind the attack and their motives remain uncertain. The bombing
occurred on January 11, 2017, targeting a guesthouse in Kandahar,
where UAE Ambassador Juma Mohammed Abdullah al-Kaabi was
present. In addition to the diplomats, 11 other people lost their
lives, and 18 were injured in the attack, including Kandahar's
police chief.
Several other attacks on foreign diplomatic establishments in
Afghanistan have been reported. For instance, the German
Consulate in northern Afghanistan was attacked on November 11,
2016, resulting in six fatalities and over 120 injuries. Another
incident involved the Spain Embassy in Kabul in December 2015,
where a car bomb was detonated near a guest house, and gunfire
ensued. Furthermore, the United States Consulate was targeted on
September 13, 2013, leading to casualties among the attackers and
security personnel. Afghanistan has ratified two diplomatic
conventions: the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of
1961 and the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
Crimes against Internationally Protected Persons, including
Diplomatic Agents of 1973. These conventions serve as the legal
basis for analysing the protection of diplomats in the country.
Based on the cases discussed, Afghanistan appears to have violated
certain provisions of the diplomatic conventions. In the attack on
UAE diplomats, Article 29 of the Vienna Convention on
Diplomatic Relations was breached, indicating the failure of

Afghan officials to protect the diplomats. Additionally, in the other
attacks targeting the premises of sending states, Afghanistan
seemed to have violated Article 22, which pertains to the protection
of such premises.
Regarding state responsibility, Afghanistan's status as a non-party
to the Optional Protocol concerning the Compulsory Settlement of
Disputes under the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations of
1961 restricts the use of certain mechanisms as a legal basis for
prosecution. However, all relevant parties are contracting states to
the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes
against Internationally Protected Persons, including Diplomatic
Agent of 1973, enabling its use as a legal basis for addressing state
responsibility.
Apart from the mentioned attacks, there have been other instances
of violence against Indian diplomatic establishments in
Afghanistan. The Indian embassy in Kabul was targeted by a
suicide car bombing in 2008, resulting in numerous casualties.
Additionally, the Indian consulate in Jalalabad and Mazar-e-Sharif
faced attacks, leading to fatalities and injuries.
More recently, on July 30, 2021, the main UN compound in Herat,
Afghanistan, was attacked by anti-government elements, resulting
in the death of a security guard and injuries to other officers.
7.0 TALIBAN DIPLOMATIC ENGAGEMENT
Most of the Afghan diplomats posted in certain receiving states
refuse to represent the Taliban government.28 The majority of host
countries have chosen not to comment on which entity they
recognise as the government of Afghanistan and which Afghan
diplomatic mission they recognise. The question is whether
thesestateswithdraw recognition from the then government.It is
crucial to identify the states or governments that politically
engaged with the Taliban as the defacto government; certain
countries engaged in discussions with the Taliban on matters of
mutual importance, regardless of formal recognition. Following
diplomatic missions are open in Afghanistan viz;
India,29Indonesia,30Iran, Japan, Kazakhstan,31Kyrgyzstan,
Pakistan,32Qatar,33Russia, Saudi Arabia,34Tajikistan, Turkey,
Turkmenistan and UAE.35However, the absence of formal
recognition poses challenges in conducting such exchanges and
diplomatic relations effectively.
8.0 ESSENCE AND AMBIT OF THE DISCOURSE

Recognition of a government today depends on factors like human
rights, democracy, and international obligations.36It is strict,
especially if a regime takes power unlawfully. Revoking
recognition is discouraged and may not happen even if criteria are
no longer met. A government-in-exile is recognised as the
legitimate government despite losing control (e.g., Aristide in
Haiti, Hadi in Yemen). Competing claims occur when multiple
regimes have valid arguments (e.g., Maduro vs. Guaido in
Venezuela). A sole claim lacks legitimacy if a previous
government is dissolved and one new regime seeks recognition
through illegitimate means (e.g., post-coup Egypt). Sometimes, no
factions are recognised as having control or deserving recognition
(e.g., Somalia).
The Montevideo Convention of 1933 defines a state based on its
territory, population, government, and capacity to enter into
relations with other states.37Recognition in international law can be
de jure or de facto, express or tacit, and can pertain to the state or
its government.Taiwan, despite lacking de jure recognition, meets
the criteria for statehood and enjoys de facto recognition through
cultural and trade relations.38The People's Republic of China
conditions diplomatic relations with other states by terminating
recognition of Taiwan. Recognition is crucial for a state to be
considered an international person under international law.
According to Oppenheim, a state's existence is not recognized until
it is accredited. Kelsen argued that recognizing a community as a
state without meeting international law requirements violates
international law and infringes upon other states' rights.
Recognition is the official acceptance of one geopolitical entity (a)
as a separate state (b) within specific territorial limits, while
acknowledging its governing regime (c). It involves three
interconnected forms: state recognition, territorial recognition, and
governmental recognition. Usually, only a recognized state enjoys
legal rights and obligations in international law, with its
government representing and being responsible for the state's
actions. There are two types of recognition: de facto and de jure.
De jure recognition has implications on diplomatic relations,
control of assets, UN representation, and potential authorisation of
foreign military intervention to maintain peace in the country. On
the hand, on de facto recognition, diplomatic relations can be
severed without de-recognition, and control over foreign property

may be limited by sanctions.
Even if a government changes, the state can still be held
accountable for the actions of its previous government.The
situation regarding Afghan diplomats and their privileges and
immunities is complex due to the political changes in Afghanistan.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations provides certain
rights and immunities to diplomats, but it doesn't explicitly address
defunct governments or political changes. The recognition and
treatment of Afghan diplomats by receiving States may vary, and
their specific privileges and immunities depend on the
circumstances and agreements between the parties involved. The
control of the Afghan embassy by the USA could impact access to
diplomatic archives and documents, which would be determined by
the authorities in control. The application of privileges such as
inviolability of communication and personal inviolability depends
on the recognition of diplomatic status by the receiving State. The
termination of diplomatic functions is usually notified by the
sending State, but in the case of the Taliban takeover, it would be
up to the new authorities to decide. The provision for departure
facilities applies to diplomats and their families if needed. The
enforcement of erga omnes obligations, obligations owed to
international law, is challenging in the decentralised international
legal system, and responsibility lies with the international
community as a whole.
9.0 THE CURRENT SCENARIO OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
The Law of Recognition is incomplete and lacks codification,
leading to its manipulation by diplomats for their own agendas. It
has been abused as a tool for diplomatic pressure, causing
conflicting court decisions. According to the constitutive theory, an
entity becomes a state only upon recognition by others, aligning
with the traditional positivist conception of international law. The
Montevideo Convention outlines state qualifications and premature
recognition without meeting these criteria violates the principle of
non-intervention.39
The principle of effectiveness plays a significant role in state
recognition, contributing to the stability of the international legal
order. However, tension remains between normativity and
pragmatism in the recognition process.Present diplomacy follows
Consent-Based Diplomacy, where envoy recognition is subject to
the pleasure of the receiving state based on potential strategic

benefits. In cases of derecognised or defunct states, diplomatic
practices become uncertain, with unclear implications for Persona
non-grata declarations and possible deportations. Diplomatic
immunity grants accredited officers and their families freedom
from local jurisdiction, but its application varies among nations.
The duty of non-recognition prevents accepting situations arising
from serious breaches of international law, regardless of the
emerging entity's effectiveness.The Balkans conflict triggered
fundamental changes in international law due to nationalistic
tensions and calls for independence.40
Various international issues remain unclear, including matters
related to same-sex marriage in diplomatic contexts, issues with
immunities of virtual embassies, and the status of embassies and
diplomatic envoys representing defunct governments like
Afghanistan's Ghani government. Currently, no country has
explicitly declared the Ghani government as derecognised, and no
government has officially recognised the Taliban as the legitimate
government of Afghanistan. However, in reality, the Taliban
exercises effective control over the country and has the capacity to
engage in diplomatic relations. The presence of UN offices in
Afghanistan and political engagement by some countries indicate
the Taliban's ability to interact internationally. Despite the
complexities surrounding these issues, there are certain
requirements under international law, such as human rights
obligations, democratic principles, and inclusivity, that could
potentially be addressed through alternative dispute mechanisms in
Afghanistan.
10.0 VIRTUAL EMBASSIES AND CONSULATES
Virtual embassies and consulates have emerged as a novel
approach to conducting diplomatic and consular functions,
especially in situations where there are no permanent missions or
diplomatic relations between countries. Virtual missions are
established through electronic means, offering targeted
presentations of the sending State's viewpoints and providing
practical assistance to citizens of the receiving State, like visa
applications. However, it is essential to ensure the protection of
communications for these virtual missions to be effective.
The establishment of virtual embassies does not bypass the
requirement of inviolability for diplomatic premises and personnel.
If diplomatic relations exist between the sending and receiving

States, virtual missions may be treated similarly to permanent
missions, receiving protection for their online communication as
long as it serves official purposes. However, in the absence of
formal diplomatic relations, a receiving State can block access to a
virtual mission without breaching the Vienna Conventions.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) and the
Vienna Convention on Consular Relations (VCCR) have been
highly successful in creating international law through multilateral
treaties.41These conventions gained widespread participation by
States shortly after their adoption and are generally considered
effective without requiring replacement or revision. They serve as
reference points for granting immunities to other entities like
special missions and international organisations and can be
complemented by regional or bilateral agreements. Some of their
rules reflect customary international law, while others have become
customary over time, even respected by non-participating States.
10.1 Rules on Cyber Infrastructure
Cyberinfrastructure located on the premises of diplomatic missions
or consular posts is protected by the inviolability of those missions
or posts.42However, the traditional concept of premises is typically
associated with a physical location, which means that "virtual
embassies" or social media accounts, for instance, are not protected
by inviolability. Nonetheless, it is the responsibility of Receiving
States to safeguard the cyber infrastructure located within the
foreign missions' premises against intrusion or damage, regardless
of the source of the cyber attack. The extent of this duty is not
absolute and depends on the level of threat and the Receiving
State's ability to respond. Receiving States are not obligated to take
action against mere online expressions of criticism towards the
mission or the sending State, as long as these expressions do not
impede the mission's operations.
Diplomatic representatives and consular officers benefit from
immunities concerning their cyber activities, shielding them from
criminal, civil, and administrative jurisdictions. However, this
immunity is not without exceptions. They may become subject to
the host country's jurisdiction under certain circumstances, such as
when they commit cyber crimes while physically present in the
Receiving State or engage in personal commercial activities. It's
worth noting that consular officers enjoy more limited immunity
compared to diplomatic agents and may not have absolute

protection from criminal jurisdiction.
The US may consider virtual diplomatic relations, third-country
diplomacy, or diplomatic outsourcing with Afghanistan, influenced
by political, security, and technological factors. Social media, like
Twitter and Facebook diplomacy, could also play a role, but
traditional diplomatic channels remain essential for formal
negotiations. For instance, nowadays, the verified Facebook
Twitter page serves as a formal means of communication. The
chosen approach will balance modern technology with established
diplomatic practices.
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) does not
address social media use in diplomacy, but its principles can apply
to cyber incidents involving diplomatic communication. The
primary responsibility would lie with the individuals or entities
responsible for the hacking. If state-sponsored, it would be
considered a serious violation of international law and diplomatic
norms. As a receiving state (Afghanistan). If the hacking occurs
within Afghanistan's jurisdiction, questions about the level of
security provided by the receiving state may arise. Therefore,
diplomatic relations are complex and nuanced, and countries
generally seek peaceful and diplomatic solutions to cyber incidents
and other challenges that arise in their interactions.
10.2 Families
The Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR) provides
privileges and immunities to family members of diplomatic envoys
as long as these family members are not nationals of the receiving
State.43However, the definition of "family members forming part of
the household" has evolved over time due to shifts in social
practices and family laws. Some countries have acknowledged
same-sex partners, unmarried partners, and polygamous
relationships as family members entitled to immunities, aligning
with their legislative changes. On the other hand, certain countries
do not recognise same-sex marriages, creating inconsistencies
between international and domestic laws. This situation can lead to
legal issues concerning the protection and diplomatic immunities
of the families of diplomatic envoys. For instance, if the US can
appoint an ambassador who is married to a same-sex partner.
However, whether Afghanistan accepts the ambassador depends on
its domestic laws and cultural norms. If a dispute arises, diplomatic
channels would be used for negotiation. If accredited, the

ambassador would have diplomatic immunity and privileges, as
outlined in the VCDR is mentioned the family however, under the
Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations (VCDR), the issue of
same-sex diplomats has not been discussed.
In Islam, marriage is seen as a sacred union between a man and a
woman based on religious texts. Conservative interpretations
disapprove of same-sex relationships, citing Quranic and Hadith
references. Many Muslim-majority countries do not recognize
same-sex marriages, and homosexuality can be criminalized with
severe penalties. However, there is diversity within Islam, with
some advocating for LGBTQ+ acceptance through more inclusive
interpretations. Attitudes vary globally, and recognition of same-
sex marriage remains contentious in many places.
11.0 CONCLUSION
In conclusion, the collapse of the Afghan government has given
rise to a web of intricate issues for Afghan diplomats stationed
abroad. The uncertainty surrounding the legitimacy of diplomatic
representation and the status of Afghan diplomats adds complexity
to an already challenging situation. State recognition and
government recognition are not mere formalities; they carry
profound political decisions that have significant legal
implications. The lack of uniformity in practices regarding state
recognition, as evidenced by past controversies, underscores the
need for a thoughtful and coherent approach to addressing the legal
inquiries raised by Afghanistan's current state. This includes
ensuring the welfare and safety of embassy personnel and Afghan
citizens residing in host countries, who find themselves in
vulnerable positions due to the political upheaval.
In navigating diplomatic representation, it is imperative to carefully
consider the interplay of refugee laws and diplomatic immunities.
Engaging international organizations, such as the United Nations,
in discussions is crucial to establish a common framework for
recognition decisions and to uphold principles of international law.
The United States' history of recognizing various Afghan
governments and intervening in Afghanistan has not been without
complexities and legal challenges. The decisions made, driven by
political considerations, have at times raised legal issues, like
potential violations of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic

Relations. However, the establishment of a US interest 44section in
Afghanistan signifies a potential step forward in diplomatic
relations, despite the intricacies surrounding the recognition of the
Taliban government.
To foster trust and cooperation, it is vital for the US to act in good
faith and adhere to international law principles in its actions and
relations with Afghanistan and other states. The legacy of US
military interventions in Afghanistan and elsewhere remains a
contentious aspect of international relations and calls for continued
scrutiny and debate. Currently, diplomatic relations with
Afghanistan are fraught with complexity and uncertainty. The
Taliban's takeover has led to questions about the recognition of
their government and their potential representation at the United
Nations. While no government has officially recognized the
Taliban yet, the UN's consideration of their nomination for an
ambassadorial position adds further complexity to the situation.
Countries like India have faced their own challenges, grappling
with the issuance of visas to Afghan nationals, affecting students
granted scholarships to study abroad. The overall security situation
in Afghanistan adds an additional layer of intricacy to diplomatic
engagement. The concept of recognition in international law is not
straightforward; it is complex and often contested, carrying
significant and far-reaching implications. The situation in
Afghanistan raises serious concerns about the effectiveness of the
international legal system in addressing violations of humanitarian
law and protecting vulnerable populations.
In light of the humanitarian crisis in Afghanistan, it is incumbent

upon the international community to navigate these complexities
with utmost care and sensitivity. Engaging effectively with
Afghanistan and addressing the ongoing crisis requires a concerted
effort to uphold international law principles and protect the rights
and welfare of those impacted by the collapse of the Afghan
government. Only through cooperative and well-considered actions
can the international community hope to alleviate the suffering and
promote stability in the region.
REFERENCES
1
“Ashraf Ghani: Afghanistan’s Exiled President Lands in UAE,” BBC News,
August 18, 2021, sec. Asia, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-58260902.
2
“Afghan First Vice President Amrullah Saleh Declares Himself as Caretaker
President,” The Times of India, August 18, 2021,
https://timesofindia.indiatimes.com/world/south-asia/afghan-first-vice-president-
amrullah-saleh-declares-himself-as-caretaker-
president/articleshow/85407569.cms.
3
Craig Benjamin, ed., “Global Histories,” in The Cambridge World History:
Volume 4: A World with States, Empires and Networks 1200 BCE–900 CE, vol.
4, The Cambridge World History (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press,
2015), 27–268, https://www.cambridge.org/core/books/cambridge-world-
history/global-histories/A78B80F9257D3F3F158AFC15EC9E985D.
4
Louis J. Nigro and J. Boone Bartholomees, “Theory and Practice of Modern
Diplomacy: Origins and Development to 1914,” VOLUME I: (Strategic Studies
Institute, US Army War College, 2012),
https://www.jstor.org/stable/resrep12116.17.
5
“Renaissance Diplomacy: Compromise as a Solution to Conflict - Diplo,”
August 29, 2021, https://www.diplomacy.edu/histories/renaissance-diplomacy-
compromise-as-a-solution-to-conflict/.
6
Sean D. Murphy, “Democratic Legitimacy and the Recognition of States and
Governments,” The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 48, no. 3
(1999): 545–81.
7
H. Lauterpacht, “Recognition of Governments: I,” Columbia Law Review 45,
no. 6 (November 1945): 815, https://doi.org/10.2307/1117910.
8
Nina Caspersen, “The Pursuit of International Recognition After Kosovo,”
Global Governance 21, no. 3 (2015): 393–412; Kwang-Ho Chun, “Kosovo: A
New European Nation-State?,” Journal of International and Area Studies 18, no.
1 (2011): 87–101; “United States Recognizes Kosovo as an Independent State,”
The American Journal of International Law 102, no. 3 (2008): 638–40,
https://doi.org/10.2307/20456653; Philippe Roseberry, “Mass Violence and the
Recognition of Kosovo: Suffering and Recognition,” Europe-Asia Studies 65,
no. 5 (2013): 857–73.
9
“South Sudan Country Profile,” BBC News, July 7, 2011, sec. Africa,
https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14069082; “South Sudan - Countries -
Office of the Historian,” accessed July 26, 2023,
https://history.state.gov/countries/south-sudan.
10
Luke Harding and Shaun Walker, “Crimea Votes to Secede from Ukraine in
‘illegal’ Poll,” The Guardian, March 16, 2014, sec. World news,
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/mar/16/ukraine-russia-truce-crimea-
referendum; David M. Herszenhorn, “Crimea Votes to Secede From Ukraine as
Russian Troops Keep Watch,” The New York Times, March 16, 2014, sec.
World, https://www.nytimes.com/2014/03/17/world/europe/crimea-ukraine-
secession-vote-referendum.html.
11
“Catalonia’s Bid for Independence from Spain Explained,” BBC News,
October 14, 2014, sec. Europe, https://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-
29478415; Daniel Grütters, “Catalonia: The Right to Secede and the Right to
Self-Determination | OHRH,” accessed July 26, 2023,
https://ohrh.law.ox.ac.uk/catalonia-the-right-to-secede-and-the-right-to-self-
determination/.
12
“U.S. Takes Control of Afghan Embassy, Consulates in D.C., New York,
California,” The Hindu, May 18, 2022, sec. World,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/international/us-takes-control-of-afghan-
embassy-consulates-in-dc-new-york-california/article65425582.ece.
13
Akmal Dawi, “US Bank Freezes Accounts of Afghanistan’s US Embassy,”
VOA, January 25, 2022, https://www.voanews.com/a/us-bank-freezes-accounts-
of-afghanistan-s-us-embassy-/6412424.html.
14
“1961 Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations,” Centre for International
Law (blog), accessed July 16, 2023, https://cil.nus.edu.sg/databasecil/1961-
vienna-convention-on-diplomatic-relations/.
15
“Blinken Says Qatar to Act as U.S. Diplomatic Representative in Afghanistan |
Reuters,” accessed July 26, 2023, https://www.reuters.com/world/exclusive-
qatar-act-us-diplomatic-representative-afghanistan-official-2021-11-12/;
“Blinken Says Qatar to Act as U.S. Diplomatic Representative in Afghanistan |
Reuters”; “Remarks by President Biden on Afghanistan - U.S. Embassy in
Qatar,” accessed July 26, 2023, https://qa.usembassy.gov/remarks-by-president-
biden-on-afghanistan/.
16
Elisabetta conforti, “The Principle of Non-Refoulement in the Migration
Context: 5 Key Points,” Humanitarian Law & Policy Blog, March 30, 2018,
https://blogs.icrc.org/law-and-policy/2018/03/30/principle-of-non-refoulement-
migration-context-5-key-points/.
17
Michelle Foster, “Protection Elsewhere: The Legal Implications of Requiring
Refugees to Seek Protection in Another State” 28 (n.d.); “Refugees In India:
Legal Framework, Law Enforcement And Security - [2001] ISILYBIHRL 7,”
accessed July 20, 2023,
http://www.worldlii.org/int/journals/ISILYBIHRL/2001/7.html; “1.2
Determining Refugee Status under UNHCR’s Mandate | UNHCR Resettlement
Handbook,” accessed July 20, 2023, https://www.unhcr.org/resettlement-
handbook/1-refugee-status-and-resettlement/1-2-determining-refugee-status-
under-unhcrs-mandate/; Vincent Chetail, “Are Refugee Rights Human Rights?
An Unorthodox Questioning of the Relations between Refugee Law and Human
Rights Law,” in Human Rights and Immigration, ed. Ruth Rubio-Marín (Oxford
University Press, 2014), 0,
https://doi.org/10.1093/acprof:oso/9780198701170.003.0002; “Report to
Congress on Proposed Refugee Admissions for Fiscal Year 2023,” United States
Department of State (blog), accessed July 20, 2023,
https://www.state.gov/report-to-congress-on-proposed-refugee-admissions-for-
fiscal-year-2023/; “Afghan Refugees in US Face Uncertainty as Legislation
Stalls | AP News,” accessed July 20, 2023,
https://apnews.com/article/afghanistan-politics-united-states-government-
political-refugees-fddb9f66f09f133c6365823df9e28743.
18
Aaron X. Fellmeth and Maurice Horwitz, “Ambiguitas Contra Stipulatorem
Est,” in Guide to Latin in International Law (Oxford University Press, 2011),
https://.
19
“U.S. to Move Afghanistan’s Frozen Central Bank Reserves to New Swiss
Fund,” United States Institute of Peace, accessed July 16, 2023,
https://www.usip.org/publications/2022/09/us-move-afghanistans-frozen-
central-bank-reserves-new-swiss-fund.
20
“50 U.S. Code § 1701 - Unusual and Extraordinary Threat; Declaration of
National Emergency; Exercise of Presidential Authorities,” LII / Legal
Information Institute, accessed July 16, 2023,
https://www.law.cornell.edu/uscode/text/50/1701.
21
“50 USC 1702: Presidential Authorities,” accessed July 16, 2023,
https://uscode.house.gov/view.xhtml?req=(title:50%20section:1702%20edition:p
relim).
22
“Afghanistan: Ghani and Abdullah Sign Power-Sharing Deal | Ashraf Ghani
News | Al Jazeera,” accessed July 26, 2023,
https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2020/5/17/afghanistan-ghani-and-abdullah-
sign-power-sharing-deal; “Afghan Election Crisis Talks Stall over Release of
Vote Results | Reuters,” accessed July 26, 2023,
https://www.reuters.com/article/uk-afghanistan-election-
idUKKBN0HC2CJ20140917; Mujib Mashal, “Afghan Rivals Sign Power-
Sharing Deal as Political Crisis Subsides,” The New York Times, May 17, 2020,
sec. World, https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/17/world/asia/afghanistan-ghani-
abdullah.html.
23
Pia Krishnankutty, “Afghan Embassy in Delhi Becomes Battleground for
Taliban & Previous Republic. MEA Keeps Mum,” ThePrint (blog), May 17,
2023, https://theprint.in/diplomacy/afghan-embassy-in-delhi-becomes-
battleground-for-taliban-previous-republic-mea-keeps-mum/1578940/.
24
“‘An Internal Matter of the Embassy’: MEA on Power Struggle in Afghan
Embassy,” The Hindu, June 2, 2023, sec. India,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/an-internal-matter-of-the-embassy-
mea-on-power-struggle-in-afghan-embassy/article66923723.ece; “India Urges
Internal Resolution As Tensions Mount At Afghan Embassy In Delhi,”
https://www.outlookindia.com/, June 2, 2023,
https://www.outlookindia.com/national/india-urges-internal-resolution-as-
tensions-mount-at-afghan-embassy-in-delhi-news-291549.
25
Fahmida Ashraf, “India-Afghanistan Relations: Post-9/11,” Strategic Studies
27, no. 2 (2007): 90–102.
26
“Deployment of a Technical Team in Embassy of India, Kabul,” accessed July
16, 2023, https://mea.gov.in/press-
releases.htm?dtl/35437/Deployment+of+a+technical+team+in+Embassy+of+Ind
ia+Kabul.
27
“No India Visa, Afghan Students Hang in Limbo,” The New Indian Express,
accessed July 16, 2023,
https://www.newindianexpress.com/nation/2022/oct/03/no-india-visa-afghan-
students-hang-in-limbo-2504431.html; “Taliban Government to Request India
for Visas to Stranded Afghan Students,” The Wire, accessed July 16, 2023,
https://thewire.in/south-asia/taliban-government-to-request-india-for-visas-to-
stranded-afghan-students; Why India’s Refusal to Give Afghan Students Visas Is
Causing Confusion, Strain in Ties, 2022,
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=KLSlOMViiv0; “Indian Scholarship
Winners Complain About Not Receiving Visas,” TOLOnews, accessed July 16,
2023, https://tolonews.com/afghanistan-180137; “Afghan Students Are Unable
to Resume Studies in Indian Universities,” accessed July 16, 2023,

https://thediplomat.com/2022/09/afghan-students-are-unable-to-resume-studies-
in-indian-universities/; Jyoti Malhotra, “India-Afghanistan Ties under Strain
over Delhi’s Silence on Students’ Visa Renewal,” ThePrint (blog), October 9,
2022, https://theprint.in/opinion/global-print/india-afghanistan-ties-under-strain-
over-delhis-silence-on-students-visa-renewal/1160710/; “‘Final Warning’ for
Afghan Students Unable to Return to India,” Times Higher Education (THE),
March 31, 2023, https://www.timeshighereducation.com/news/final-warning-
afghan-students-unable-return-india; “Nobody Can Doubt India’s Feelings for
Afghans, Says Jaishankar on Student Visas,” The Hindu, October 2, 2022, sec.
India, https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/nobody-can-doubt-indias-
feelings-for-afghans-says-jaishankar-on-student-visas/article65962211.ece;
Quratulain Rehbar, “Afghan Students Feel Abandoned as India Restricts Visas,”
accessed July 16, 2023, https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2023/6/8/afghan-
students-feel-abandoned-as-india-restricts-visas; “Denied Visa, No Online
Exams, Afghan Students in India Stare at a Bleak Future,” The Indian Express
(blog), June 11, 2023,
https://indianexpress.com/article/cities/chandigarh/afghan-students-india-bleak-
future-denied-visas-online-exams-8656616/.
28
Jack Detsch Gramer Robbie, “Afghanistan’s Diplomats Refuse to Represent a
Terrorist Group,” Foreign Policy (blog), January 7, 2022,
https://foreignpolicy.com/2022/01/07/afghanistan-diplomats-representation-
terrorist-group/.
29
“India Reopens Embassy in Kabul,” The Hindu, June 23, 2022, sec. India,
https://www.thehindu.com/news/national/india-reopens-embassy-in-
kabul/article65558557.ece.
30
The Jakarta Post, “Indonesia Reinstates Embassy in Kabul but Holds off
Official Recognition of Taliban,” The Jakarta Post, accessed July 15, 2023,
https://www.thejakartapost.com/world/2022/01/16/indonesia-reinstates-
embassy-in-kabul-but-holds-off-official-recognition-of-taliban.html.
31
“Kazakhstan Assumes Measures to Ensure Safety of Kazakh Embassy’s Staff
in Kabul – President,” accessed July 15, 2023,
https://www.inform.kz/en/kazakhstan-assumes-measures-to-ensure-safety-of-
kazakh-embassy-s-staff-in-kabul-president_a3824171/amp.
32
“Pakistan Embassy Kabul | Afghanistan,” accessed July 15, 2023,
http://www.pakembassykabul.org/en/home/.
33
“Qatar to Formally Represent US Interests in Afghanistan | The Hill,” accessed
July 15, 2023, https://thehill.com/policy/international/middle-east-north-
africa/581282-qatar-to-formally-represent-us-interests-in/.
34
Asian News International, “Saudi Arabia to Reopen Embassy in Kabul,” The
Siasat Daily, December 1, 2021, https://www.siasat.com/saudi-arabia-to-reopen-
embassy-in-kabul-2234023/.
35
“UAE Reopens Embassy in Afghanistan after Power Change in Kabul,” Daily
Pakistan Global, November 22, 2021, https://en.dailypakistan.com.pk/22-Nov-
2021/uae-reopens-embassy-in-afghanistan-after-power-change-in-kabul.
36
Lauterpacht, “Recognition of Governments.”
37
Herbert Wright, “The Montevideo Conference and Organization for Peace,”
World Affairs 97, no. 2 (1934): 100–103.
38
Anthony Murphy and Vlad Stancescu, “State Formation and Recognition in
International Law,” Juridical Tribune 7 (2017).
39
Daniel Krcmaric, “Should I Stay or Should I Go? Leaders, Exile, and the
Dilemmas of International Justice: LEADERS, EXILE, AND
INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE,” American Journal of Political Science 62, no. 2
(April 2018): 486–98, https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12352.
40
Daniel Bell and Leon Dennen, “The System of Governments in Exile,” The
ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 232, no. 1
(March 1944): 134–47, https://doi.org/10.1177/000271624423200121.
41
Anthony Murphy and Vlad Stancescu, “State Formation and Recognition in
International Law.”
42
“Diplomatic and Consular Law,” in Tallinn Manual 2.0 on the International
Law Applicable to Cyber Operations, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017), 209–31, https://doi.org/10.1017/9781316822524.013.
43
Lauterpacht, “Recognition of Governments.”
44
Ibid.
Democracy Promotion in Pakistan by EU…. 109
Democracy Promotion in The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-109-131
Pakistan by EU During https://www.amu.ac.in/
Pervez Musharraf’s nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Regime: How Security
Interests Trumped Over
the Promotion of
Democracy
Masih Ullah Khan*
ABSTRACT
The current democratic recession in the West may
have resulted in decline in promotion of democracy
by these Western countries. However, the backlash
against Western democracy promotion is not recent.
It was first witnessed after the debacle of invasion
of Iraq for promotion of democracy in the decade
2000s. However, even then the European Union
was thought to be a model promoter of democracy.
2000s, though, is also the decade when Pakistan
witnessed the military dictatorship under General
Pervez Musharraf (1999-2008). So, how did the
European Union fare in terms of promotion of
democracy in Pakistan during the reign of
Musharraf? Is the European Union effective in
promotion of democracy only in its neighborhood
as was the case with central and eastern European
countries which transitioned from autocracy to
democracy while acceding to the Union in 2004 and
2007? Or, the European Union has an impact
beyond its neighboring areas too? This research on
European Union’s democracy promotion efforts in
Pakistan during the military rule of Musharraf
shows that despite considerable heft, Union –
except in the initial two years before the September
*Assistant Professor, Barasat College, West Bengal State University, West Bengal
11 2001 terrorist attacks – pursued its security

interests over promotion of democracy.
Keywords: Democracy; Democratization; Democracy Promotion;
Democracy Promotion by the EU; EU Policies, Strategies, and
Instruments for Democracy Promotion.
INTRODUCTION
In the last one decade, there has been a certain decline in
democracy in the Western countries too.1 This became evident with
the election of Donald Trump as the president of the United States
and Brexit in 2016. Rightwing authoritarian populism has gained
considerable ground throughout the West at the expense of liberal
democracy. This Western democratic recession, apart from other
factors, has caused a decline in democracy promotion too.2
However, decline in and backlashagainst the Western democracy
promotion is not recent. In fact, it was first observed when the
futility and reality of the American efforts to promote democracy
in the Middle East via invasion of Iraq (2003) became apparent by
the second-half of the decade 2000s.3 However, the European
Union has been always viewed as a different and even a better
promoter of democracy than the United States.4 Moreover, the
decade of 2000s is also the heyday of the European Union as an
external actor and a promoter of democracy.
On the other hand, 2000s is the time when Pakistan witnessed the
military dictatorship of General Pervez Musharraf. Pakistan – a
country in South Asia – has been long blighted by repressive
military men, and Musharraf was not much different from his
predecessors like General Zia-ul-Haqand Field Marshall Ayub
Khan.5 Musharraf came to power orchestrating a coup d’état
against the government of Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, elder
brother of the current Prime Minister Shahbaz Sharif, on October
13-14 1999. Subsequently, Musharraf entrenched himself in power
through decrees, him-serving oaths for the judiciary, arbitrary laws,
co-option of political parties, imposition of Emergency and
suspension of democratic rights of Pakistani people before being
forced out in August 2008.
Therefore, what role did the European Union play in promotion of
democracy in Pakistan during the reign of General Musharraf
(1999-2008)? During the decade of 2000s, basking in the glory of
democratization of a dozen of Central and Eastern European
countries through their accession, the European Union was viewed
as a model promoter of democracy particularly in contrast to the

United States.6However, has the European Union been an effective
promoter of democracy primarily in its neighbourhood or has it an
impact for democratization of countries beyond its own region too?
A large number of studies either testifying or dismissing European
Union’s democracy promotion efforts have been done mainly on
Central and Eastern European countries or on countries in the
European neighbourhood.
There is a burgeoning body of literature on bilateral relationship
between the European Union and the South Asian countries and the
former’s promotion of democracy and human rights in the latter.7
However, the literature on European Union’s promotion of
democracy in Pakistan – a country which has been ruled by armed
forces during half the time of its total existence and which
experiences constant intervention of military in politics – is very
thin.8 Moreover, these works, instead of critically analysing
European Union’s democracy promotion efforts, have been mostly
authored for policy recommendations purposes. There is almost a
complete absence of academic works scientifically studying the
role and impact of European Union’s promotion of democracy in
Pakistan particularly during the last spell of military rule under
General Pervez Musharraf. This paper intends to fill this gap in
literature.
The study of the role and impact of the European Union for
democratization of Pakistan from the authoritarian regime of
General Musharraf is all the more important because in cases of
these far-flung countries the Union is not having the ‘golden
carrot’ of membership to offer, as was the case for countries in
Central and Eastern Europe which helped the consolidation of
democracy after the collapse of communist regimes in late 1980s.
Removal of this variable of attraction of membership for
democratization will make the analysis and validation of the
European Union as a promoter of democracy either more robust or
will weaken it i.e. the Union is indeed an effective global promoter
of democracy or rather its influence is limited to Europe and its
neighbourhood.
Before we move any further, let me state the plan of this paper. The
first section will briefly explain the meaning of democracy,
democratization, and promotion of democracy. The second section
describes European Union’s policies, strategies, and instruments
for promotion of democracy beyond its own borders. The third

section presents the military dictatorship in Pakistan during the
regime of General Musharraf. The fourth section studies the role
and impact of the European Union for democratization of Pakistan
after almost a decade of military rule. The fourth section is divided
in three parts whereby the first part analyzes the military-
diplomatic aspects of European Union’s intervention and impact,
and the second and the third parts scrutinize the commercial-
economic and humanitarian-developmental aspects respectively.
The fifth section does a comparative study of the role and impact
of the European Union and the United States for democratization
of Pakistan. At the end comes the conclusion which summarizes
and explains the findings of the paper.
DEMOCRACY, DEMOCRATIZATION and PROMOTION
of DEMOCRACY
Democracy is a process of government formation through
competitive election whereby the views and interests of the people
are taken into account and articulated by the political parties
outside and/or inside the government. This must guarantee voting
equality, effective participation, enlightened understanding of
policies undertaken including their alternatives and consequences,
control of agenda and inclusion of adults among the citizens.9 A
good number of scholars add that along with regular and
participative elections a real democracy should have unhindered
civil and political liberties especially for various kinds of
minorities generally ensured through an independent and robust
civil society.
Democratization, on the other hand, is a three-step process
whereby, first, the undemocratic regime is put to an end, second, a
democratic government is introduced in the given former
authoritarian polity and, third, this process of democratic
government formation and governance is continued and
deepened.10 Therefore, democratization is an on-going and even
never-ending process aimed at increasing the quality of the
democratic process and institutions.11
As for the promotion of democracy, it “is about creating the
conditions that allow the principles of democracy to be put into
practice.”12 Generally, external actors with firm belief in
democracy as a universal model for governance support the civil
society organizations, opposition political forces and even the
political institutions in fragile countries for democratization.

Among those external actors promoting democracy beyond their
borders are mainly the United States and hardly any less the
European Union though both of them have stark difference in their
approach and strategies.
EUROPEAN UNION’S POLICY, STRATEGIES and
INSTRUMENTS for DEMOCRACY PROMOTION
European Union’s democracy promotion policies can be traced
back to the late 1970s when the European Council meeting at
Copenhagen in 1978 declared that “respect for and maintenance of
representative democracy and human rights in each member-states
are essential elements of membership of the European
Communities.”13 It was meant for the imminent membership of
Greece, Portugal and Spain.14 Promotion of democracy became a
concrete plank of the European policy in 1991 when the European
Council and the member-states made democracy a condition for
European Unions’ development cooperation with third countries.15
This democracy condition was later incorporated in European
Union’s external affairs policies through the Maastricht Treaty.
Stating the objective of European Union’s Common Foreign and
Security Policy, the Treaty reads, “the objectives of the Common
Foreign and Security Policy shall be: […] to develop and
consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect for human
rights and fundamental freedoms.”16 Similarly, the development
policy of the European Union in the Maastricht Treaty states that it
“shall contribute to the general objective of developing and
consolidating democracy and the rule of law, and to that of
respecting human rights and fundamental freedoms.”17The next
and the most important time when the European Union made
democracy promotion a part of its external conduct was during the
Copenhagen European Council meeting in 1993. The meeting
concluded that a country aspiring for the European Union
membership should have “[…] achieved stability of institutions
guaranteeing democracy […].”18 In 1995, the European Union
came up with a standard “human rights and democracy clause” for
respect of democratic principles and fundamental human rights to
be tucked in all of its bilateral trade agreements or any other
association and cooperation agreement between itself and third
countries or with any other regional organization.19 Later in 2001,
the European Commission produced an important Communication
on European Union’s role for promotion of democracy and human
rights. The document titled The European Union’s Role in

Promoting Human Rights and Democratization in Third Countries
stated that promotion of democracy and human rights should be
mainstreamed with a priority in all of Euopean Union’s policies,
programs and projects in the field of external affairs, and without
undermining their coherence.20 The 2003 European Security
Strategy, A Secure Europe in a Better World, says, “[t]he best
protection for our [Europe’s] security is a world of well-governed
democratic states.”21 Article 21 under the general provisions of the
European Union’s external action of the Treaty on the European
Union (TEU) from the Lisbon treaties says:
The Union’s action on the international scene shall
be guided by the principles which have inspired its
own creation, development and enlargement, and
which it seeks to advance in the wider world:
democracy, the rule of law, the universality and
indivisibility of human rights and fundamental
freedoms, respect for human dignity […].22
Similarly, Article 21 (2-b) of the TEU reads, “the
Union shall define and pursue common policies and
actions […] to consolidate and support democracy,
the rule of law, human rights […].”23 Therefore,
one can conclude that through explicit mention in
policy documents and the treaties, the European
Union attaches great importance to the promotion
of democracy in third countries while carrying out
its external relations with them.
EUROPEAN UNION’S STRATEGIES for DEMCOCRACY
PROMOTION
The European Union does not have any unified and coherent
strategy for the promotion of democracy.24 But these can be found
by studying the various European Union treaties, its international
agreements and many policy documents. Unlike heavy-handed top-
down American approach directed at political elite, the European
Union has a bottom-up process supporting the non-governmental
and civil society organizations working for promotion of
democracy and human rights. To categorize the European
strategies more neatly, there are mainly three: 1) dialogue and
socialization 2) political conditionality, diplomatic pressures and
use of punitive measures 3) financial assistance.25
The first strategy based on political dialogue and socialization is

premised on the logic of introducing the democratic vocabulary
into authoritarian and undemocratic countries, even if the
authoritarian regime pays only the lip service to democracy.26 It is
meant to embed the discourse on democratic norms in the target
country and then push for a shared common democratic identity
which is supposed to be done through a kind of peer pressure
instead of lure or threat of material gain or loss.27
The second strategy, which can be discerned in European Union’s
approach, is that of tying of political conditionality in its
agreements for trade and development aid with third countries. The
political conditionality attached is the standard and essential clause
for the respect of the democratic principles and human rights
developed in 1995. If the contracted country fails to respect
democratic principles and human rights then there are specific
provisions for the suspension of the agreement. Apart from
suspension of preferential trade agreements like the Generalised
System of Preferences (GSP) and development cooperation, the
European Union has used some coercive but civilian strategies to
promote democracy or, sometimes, to halt its reversal.28 These are
asset freeze of and travel ban on authoritarian leaders and officials,
economic sanctions against the country and international isolation
of the regime or junta deemed and declared undemocratic.
The third strategy is that of financial assistance mainly to the civil
society organizations working for respect of human rights and
democracy and sometimes for the reform of target country’s
political institutions like courts, parliaments, and election
commission.29
Last but not the least, there are two distinct features of the
European strategy for promotion of democracy, which deserve a
mention. First – though applicable only in Europe – is enlargement
which has been almost unanimously accepted by the academic
community as playing a role in the democratization of the
candidate countries or countries aspiring for the European Union
membership. Second, the European strategy for promotion of
democracy does not include military means like the United States
as was on display in Iraq during 2003-11.
EUROPEANUNION’S INSTRUMENT for DEMCOCRACY

PROMOTION
Established on the initiative of the European Parliament in 1994,
European Instrument for Democracy and Human Rights (EIDHR),
a grouping-together of initiatives and funds, is a European
instrument specifically for the global advancement of democracy
(and human rights) through financial support to the European
Union election observation missions and international NGOs. The
EIDHR had a fund of €1.10 billion and €1.33 billionfor the
multiannual financial framework of 2007-13 and 2014-20,
respectively.30
MILITARY DICTATORSHIP in PAKISTAN (1999-2008)
Accusing Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, of trying to “politicise the
army, destabilise it and create dissension within its ranks,” General
Musharraf orchestrated a coup d’état and booted him out on
October13 1999.31 The next day he declared a state of Emergency,
suspended the parliament and the constitution, and issued a
Provisional Constitutional Order which made him the ‘Chief
Executive’ of Pakistan.32 In January 2000, Musharraf issued an
Oath of Office (Judges) Order 2000, which had to be taken by all
the judges of Pakistani higher courts. This oath effectively
curtailed the independence of the judiciary and brought it under the
‘Chief Executive.’33 Later Musharraf dismissed President Rafiq
Tarar and himself assumed the presidency in June 2001 along with
the military post of the Chief of Army Staff, which was
unconstitutional.34 Before October 10 2002 when the national
elections were held, Musharraf came up with a raft of controversial
and extra-constitutional orders to weaken the opposition parties
and leaders, and to help those allied with him.35 On June 28 2002
came the Political Parties (Amendment) Order 2002, meant, on
flimsy charges of crime and corruption, to explicitly prevent the
two most popular opposition leaders, deposed Prime Minister
Nawaz Sharif and former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto from
participating in the elections.36 The Qualification to Hold Public
Offices Order 2002 debarred those who have been the prime
minister and/or chief minister (provincial executive head) twice
from holding the posts again; again targeted at Sharif and Bhutto.37
Furthermore, the government used a National Accountability
Bureau to harass prominent opposition leaders.38 On August 21
2002, President Musharraf issued an extra-constitutional Legal
Framework Order, appropriating himself the power to dissolve the

elected parliament, to appoint military officials, and to create a
military dominated National Security Council to oversee the
country’s security policies, and even to monitor the process of
democracy and governance in the country.39 Not surprisingly, the
election, which had “serious flaws,” brought military loyalists to
power ensuring subservient parliament for the next five years.40
In 2007, after seven years in power, when General Musharraf
announced his desire to continue as president for five more years,
he was extremely unpopular with the Pakistani populace and
political class alike.41 But despite the constitutional illegality of
holding two posts,i.e. those of the president and the Chief of Army
Staff at the same time, Musharraf on October 6 2007 got himself
re-elected as president from the same old electoral college, which
had stamped his presidency in 2002. Though declared as president,
Musharraf apprehensive that the court may declare his re-election
as unconstitutional and illegal, again imposed an Emergency on
November 3 2007 and asked the judges to take another Oath of
Office (Judges) Order, 2007, resubmitting the judiciary to himself.
Having been validated again as president by the pliant judges,
Musharraf lifted the Emergency and called for the parliamentary
election. But unlike the year 2002, it was the Pakistan Peoples’
Party and the Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, which won the
majority seats and not Musharraf’s loyalists Muttahida Majlis-e-
Amal and Pakistan Muslim League-Quaid. Though reluctant but
weak and unpopular, Musharraf was forced to resign on August 18
2008.42
ROLE and IMPACT of the EUROPEAN UNION
DIPLOMATIC and POLITICAL ASPECTS
Diplomatic relations between the European Union and Pakistan
were first established in 1962 and were later upgraded through the
Commercial Cooperation Agreement in 1976.43At present the
relationship is based upon the third-generation Cooperation
Agreement on Partnership and Development (2004) and EU-
Pakistan Strategic Engagement Plan (2019), and it is steered
through a Joint Commission attended by political heads from both
the sides.44
Immediately after the military takeover onOctober 13-14 1999, the
European Council and the Council on General Affairs condemned
the coup and asked Musharraf for a “speedy restoration of
democratic civilian rule” within a “binding timetable.”45 However,

finding no significant change in Musharraf’s attitude and intention
to restore democracy, the European Union froze its diplomatic
relations with the Islamic Republic of Pakistan for almost two
years.46 The annual political dialogues were canceled, aid reduced,
and the new trade and cooperation agreement to be signed was
suspended.47
But the European policy and approach towards Musharraf and
Pakistan changed drastically after the September 11 2001 terrorist
attacks on the United States.48Musharraf was no more viewed as an
authoritarian military dictator but rather an indispensable ally in the
Global War on Terrorismthanks to his support to the West against
the Al-Qaida and Taliban based in bordering Afghanistan.
Therefore, with the focus almost exclusively on the fight against
terrorism, the promotion of democracy was put on the backseat
except some declaratory encouragements. In a couple of months
after 9/11, there was a flurry of visits by the European leaders like
Poul Nielsen, Chris Patten, Guy Verhofstadt and Romano Prodi not
only to Pakistan but obviously to Afghanistan too. The process of
socialization was stepped up but it is unlikely that it was meant
more for promotion of democracy than fight against
terrorism.49The Cooperation Agreement, which was suspended due
to the military takeover, was signed soon on November 24 2001 at
Islamabad. Though the Agreement did have the “essential
elements” clause for “respect, protection and promotion of human
rights and democratic principles,” the highlight of the agreement
was fight against terrorism.50 Moreover, though the “essential
elements” were not respected as it has been amply demonstrated in
the previous section, the European Union neither issued any show-
cause notice nor started the consultation process as is required in
Article 1 and 19 of the Cooperation Agreement.51
The European Union called the October 10 2002 election for the
federal parliament a “step in the gradual transition to full
democracy” and election of Zafarullah Khan Jamali as prime
minister onNovember 22 2002 was termed as “transfer of power to
a civilian administration.”52 This was not totally true given all the
malpractices done by Musharraf before the election. Moreover,
European Union’s own team sent for the observation of election
concluded that the election process had “deep flaws” and “the
powers that have been reserved to the President and the National
Security Council raise serious questions as to whether or not this
[transition to civil administration and restoration of full

democracy] will happen.”53
The year 2007 and 2008 were very tumultuous for Pakistani
politics and no less from the point of view of democracy.
Therefore, European Union’s declaratory foreign policy machine
was in full swing in these two years. When Musharraf re-imposed
Emergency, suspended the constitution and basic freedoms of the
Pakistanis, quite expectedly, the European Union did condemn
them and expressed its concerns.54 But the European response was
limited to condemnations and concerns. No other strategies of
democracy promotion like suspension of preferential trade access
or development cooperation were tried. The robust response of
year 1999-2001 when Musharraf first made the coup was absent.55
However, what is laudable was the fact that the European Union
until now dealing with Musharraf with soft hands realized his
greed and games for power as the General was desperately trying
to hang to power for five more years. Thus, the European Union, at
last and at least, asked Musharraf to step down from the post of the
Chief of Army Staff.56 On the other hand, highly involved Javier
Solana, the then High Representative of the Common Foreign and
Security Policy, expressed his concern on re-imposition of
Emergency and rejected Musharraf’s bluff that Emergency was
imperative to fight terrorism.57 Later, visiting Pakistan on
January212008, Solana exhorted Musharraf to conduct a free and
fair, peaceful and safe election if the latter wanted Pakistan to have
a strong partnership with the European Union.58
Hoping that the election process will be free and fair, the European
Union again sent an election observation mission but rather
observed that it was not the case.59 The observation mission
reported that “there were serious problems with the framework and
conditions in which the elections were held,” therefore, “the overall
process fell short of a number of international standards for
genuine democratic elections.”60 However, it has been noted that
the very dispatch of an election observation mission by the
European Union “contributed to the general acceptance of the
results in difficult circumstances, and resulted in increased public
confidence in democracy in Pakistan.”61
COMMERCIAL and ECONOMIC ASPECT
When Pervez Musharraf finally relinquished power in 2008, the
European Union was Pakistan’s biggest trade partner accounting
for around 15% of its total trade.62 During 2003-2007, the EU-
Pakistan bilateral trade grew at a rate of eight percent every year
and was one-fifth of Pakistan’s global trade in 2007.63 This shows
that the European Union had considerable economic leverage with
Pakistan during Musharraf rule. However, except for the period
from the coup till the 9/11 terrorist attacks when the European
response was strict as the European Union withheld the
international financial institutions lending programs for Pakistan,
Union’s democracy promotion efforts through economic
instruments were just the opposite of what they should have been.64
Following 9/11, sanctions imposed due to coup were not only
removed but rather Pakistan was rewarded with economic benefits
for becoming a frontline ally in the war against terrorism, and at
the cost of democracy. It received preferential access for its
products through a special GSP scheme meant for countries
combating drug trafficking, which removed the duty from 7% to
zero and increased the Pakistani quota for textiles – comprising
60% of its exports to the European Union – by 15% bringing a
benefit of up to €1 billion for Pakistan.65
HUMANITARIAN and DEVELOPMENTAL ASPECT
From 1976 till 2009, the European Union has given a total €500
million as development aid to Pakistan.66 But more than two-third
of this amount was given after 9/11 during the authoritarian rule of
Musharraf thanks to his support for West’s war against terrorism.
For example, for the year 2001-02, there was an immediate and
steep rise in European Union’s development assistance, which
reached up to €100 million.67 Out of €338.138 million donated in
the period 2002-06, a meagre sum of €5.043 million was given to
be spent on the thematic line of human rights.68 For the year 2007-
13, half of the total assistance meant for democracy and human
rights was given for the rights of minorities and women.69 The
other half was allocated for programs to strengthen the capacity of
parliamentarians at the federal level.70 Overall, the money provided
through development assistance for democratization may not have
been enough – around €18 million for a time period of eight to ten
years – to have a concrete impact.
During the decade of 2000s, Europe has contributed generously
during the natural disasters in Pakistan. DG ECHO gave around
€100 million while the total European contribution including the
member-states was up to €600 million for the 2005 earthquake
victims.71 Similarly, the total European contribution during the

2010 flood was €423 million.72 However, since the humanitarian
assistance by the European Union is always unconditional, these
funds could not have directly contributed to the promotion of
democracy. But, again, any help during the natural calamities do
bring political stability as it could have brought for Musharraf
during the 2005 earthquake and as for the civilian government
during the 2010 flood.
ROLE and IMPACT of OTHER INTERNATIONAL
ACTORS
UNITED STATES
Among all the external actors, historically, the United States has
had the maximum influence in the domestic politics of Pakistan.
Therefore, the saying for long has been that nothing gets decided in
Pakistan without the consent of Allah, Army and America.73 But
after the end of Soviet Union’s war in Afghanistan throughout till
late 1990s, Pakistan was neglected by the United States. When
Musharraf orchestrated the coup and captured the power in mid-
October 1999, the Bill Clinton administration imposed the routine
economic sanctions with those related to the 1998 nuclear
explosions already there. However, the political situation changed
dramatically after the 9/11 terrorist attacks. Threatened to be
bombed back to the Stone Age by being against the United States if
not with the United States, Musharraf made boon out of bane and
soon became indispensable in the Global War on Terror.74 Thus,
the military and economic sanctions related to the 1998 nuclear
explosions were immediately dropped on September 22 2001 and
those imposed due to the 1999 military coup were continuously
lifted till March 2008 as it was important for the “United States
efforts to respond to, deter, or prevent acts of international
terrorism.”75 Moreover, the American democracy promotion efforts
were put on the backburner for the fight against the Al-Qaida
operatives who crisscrossed the Durand Line – the border between
Afghanistan and Pakistan – and the Taliban based in Kabul.76
Therefore, instead of pressurizing Musharraf to restore democracy,
the United States brought him diplomatic support, political
protection and international legitimacy.77 Once asked about the
controversial extra-constitutional changes brought about by
Musharraf before the 2002 parliamentary elections, Bush
commented, “[…] my reaction about Musharraf, he’s still tight
with us on the war against terror, and that’s what I appreciate […]”
adding importance of democracy only as an afterthought.78 Up
until the end when Musharraf was forced out in August 2008, the
then Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice was expressing its “deep
gratitude” for him.79 Support to military dictator Musharraf was
justified by presenting unlikely apocalyptic series of events like the
terrorists seizing the nuclear weapons, radical Islamists coming to
power and widespread instability.80 Therefore, the more insecure
Musharraf appeared, the more he was propped up.81
As politically so financially; instead of continuing with the
sanctions, the United States heaped Pakistan with aid. In the year
2001, American assistance to Pakistan was paltry US$5 million,
excluding the food aid.82 But once Pakistan became the frontline
ally in the Global War on Terrorism, for the period 2002-08, the
United States gave a whopping sum of US$11.25 billion, out of
which a trivial US$17 million was meant for human right and
democracy.83 A majority aid of around US$8.1 billion was for
military-security purposes while US$3.121 million was donated for
humanitarian relief, development and budget support.84 However,
US$11.25 billion is just the publicly known amount; covert
financial transfers can be as much as another US$10 billion85.
Moreover, the United States using its global clout got Pakistan
grants, loans and debt-rescheduling agreements with other
countries and international financial institutions.86 In fact, the
United States aid to Pakistan has generally been very less to do
with democracy as it has been always higher during the military
reigns than civilian governments.87
CONCLUSION
Except during the initial two years from October 1999 till
September 2001 when the European Union was quite strict in
dealing with the junta using measures like suspension of political
relations and trade agreement, the two election observation
missions sent in 2002 and 2008, and the socialization strategy of
continuous engagement and encouragement of the Pakistani leaders
by their European Union counterparts which may have had a slight
impact in making the former understand the importance of
democracy or at least the democratic legitimacy; the European
Union prioritized combating perceived or real security threats over
promotion of democracy. After the September 11 2001 terrorist
attacks, for the next seven years up till 2008, combating the
terrorist threats emanating from the AfPak region trumped over the
promotion of democracy. Political dialogues were used more for
fight against terrorism than promotion of democracy. Instead of
economic sanctions and pressures, Pakistan was rewarded for its
support to the Global War on Terror. Thanks to the European
Union being the biggest export market of Pakistan during the time
of Musharraf, the former had considerable commercial-economic
heft with the latter. But this commercial-economic heft was not
used for promotion of democracy. Similarly, there was ample
developmental assistance from the European Union to Pakistan but
little of it was available for democracy promotion.
The European Union failed to promote democracy in Pakistan not
because it was not an international actor in South Asia. Recent
research have shown that the European Union “does not suffer
from any ‘actorness deficit’ when it comes to democracy
promotion.”88 European Union institutions taken together are
among the biggest donors for promotion of democracy.89 During
the middle of 2000s, when Pakistan was experiencing military
dictatorship of General Musharraf, the European Union was
annually spending around €1.5 billion for democracy-related
initiatives which is almost equal to what was spent by the United
States around the same time.90 Therefore, when it comes to
democracy promotion, the European Union often does not lack
money or actorness but rather consistency or cohesiveness.91
Moreover, thanks to its internal economic success and its
humanitarian assistance to Pakistan during the 2005 earthquake,
the European Union had considerable credibility in Pakistan
particularly in comparison with the United States which was
constantly violating the territorial sovereignty of Pakistan during
this time.92 Despite all this, the European Union decided to pursue
security interests over promotion of democracy once the Global
War on Terror began.
However, this change in European Union’s priority can be
understood because the security threats for it arising from the
troubled Afghanistan and Pakistan became very evident after the
9/11 attacks. Therefore, limited to its neighbourhood prior to the
9/11, the security-radius for the European Union was extended up
till southwest Asia to include Afghanistan along with Pakistan.93
The security threats arising from the region were unconventional
but real and huge. In fact, the terrorists did target the European
Union as two of its member-states, Spain and the United Kingdom,
were attacked in 2004 and 2005 respectively. Combating this threat

was bigger priority for the European Union than promotion of
democracy. But it has often been the case that if there is a conflict
between security interests and democratic principles, the European
Union has always prioritized security interests over democratic
principles.94 This prioritization of security over democracy should
not surprise anyone particularly when democracy is promoted as a
means to security (as per the democratic peace theory) and not as
an end in itself.95
However, this shift in priority from democracy to security was also
due to influence of the United States on the European Union and its
member-states. The European Union has been shepherded by its
security gurarantor, the United States, on many foreign and
security affairs playing the role of a junior partner with minor
difference in policy and approach. It was no different this time
either in Pakistan or during the Global War on Terror.96 Given the
strategic geopolitical location of Pakistan, the United States badly
needed the former for political, operational, intelligence, and
logistical support.97 Secular minded, relatively much more popular
in late 2001 and fully backed by the military establishment,
Musharraf had total control over Pakistan. This is why it is no
surprise that former Deputy Secretary of State Richard Armitage
once called Musharraf as “the right man in the right place at the
right time.”98Thus, when and once the United States put its weight
behind Musharraf in spite of his undemocratic credentials, the
Europeans – obliged by the profound transatlantic relationship and
the necessity of supporting the United States in its hour of crisis –
marginalized their own agenda of democracy promotion in
Pakistan, and Musharraf who was to be struggled against was
treated with soft hands. Therefore, despite having considerable
influence, neither the United States nor the European Union
promoted democracy. Instead they pursued their security interests.
References
1
Y. Mounk, The People vs. Democracy: Why Our Freedom Is in Danger and
How to Save It, Harvard University Press, Cambridge (Massachusetts), 2018;
and T. Smolka, “Decline of Democracy: The European Union at a Crossroad,”
German Journal of Comparative Studies, vol. 15, no. 1, 2021, pp. 81-105.
2
A. Pintsch, D. Hammerschmidt and C. Meyer, “Introduction: The Decline of
Democracy and Rise of Populism in Europe and Their Effect on Democracy
Promotion,” Cambridge Review of International Affairs, vol. 35, no. 4, 2022, pp.
405, 415, 418; S. Grimm, “European Democracy Promotion in Crisis: Conflicts
of Objectives, Neglected External–Domestic Interactions and the Authoritarian

Backlash,” Global Policy, vol. 6, 2015, pp. 73-81; S. Grimm, “Democracy
Promotion and the European Union” in “Democracy Promotion in Times of
Uncertainty: Trends and Challenges,” Report 13/2018, Peace Research Institute
Frankfurt, Frankfurt (Germany), 2018, pp. 16-19; T. Carothers and S.
Brechenmacher, “Closing Space: Democracy and Human Rights Support Under
Fire,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington (D.C.), 2014;
and A.E. Poppe, S. Richter and J. Wolff, “Democracy Promotion in the 21st
Century,” in “Democracy Promotion in Times of Uncertainty: Trends and
Challenges,” Report 13/2018, Peace Research Institute Frankfurt, Frankfurt
(Germany), 2018, pp. 1-5; and F.G. Isa etal., “Challenges to the Effectiveness of
EU Human Rights and Democratisation Policies,” Work Package No. 12 –
Deliverable No. 3, European Commission, Brussels, pp. 8-10.
3
T. Carothers, “The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion,” Foreign Affairs,
vol. 85, no. 2, 2006, pp. 55-68.
4
M. Acuto, “Wilson Victorious? Understanding Democracy Promotion in the
Midst of a ‘Backlash,’” Alternatives: Global, Local, Political, vol. 33, no. 4,
2008, pp. 461, 472; A. Magen and M. McFaul, “Introduction: American and
European Strategies to Promote Democracy – Shared Values, Common
Challenges, Divergent Tools?” in A. Magen, T. Risse, and M. McFaul (eds.),
Promoting Democracy and the Rule of Law: American and European Strategies,
Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (Hampshire, United Kingdom), pp. 16-20; and
M. Leonard, “Chapter 8: Europe at 50” in Why Europe Will Run the 21st
Century? HarperCollins, London, 2005.
5
C. Jaffrelot, The Pakistan Paradox: Instability and Resilience, Oxford
University Press, New York, 2015, pp. 299-371.
6
F. Schimmelfennig and H. Scholtz, “EU Democracy Promotion in the European
Neighbourhood: Political Conditionality, Economic Development and
Transnational Exchange,” European Union Politics, vol. 9, no. 2, 2008, pp. 187-
215.
7
R. Jain (ed.), The European Union and South Asia, KW Publishers, New Delhi,
2015; A. Vandeplas, “The EU-India FTA Negotiations: A Closer Look at the
Fundamentals from a European Perspective”; J. Schöttli, “India-EU Strategic
Relations: Prospects for Cooperation in the Indian Ocean”; J. Zajaczkowski and
S. Wolf, “EU-Pakistan Relations: European Perspectives at the Turn of the
Twenty-First Century”; and S. Aarten and S. Wolf, “The EU in Afghanistan’s
Regional Security Complex” in S. Wolf. et al. (eds.), The Merits of Regional
Cooperation: The Case of South Asia, Springer, Heidelberg (Germany), 2014;
G. Sachdeva, “India and the European Union: Broadening Strategic Partnership
Beyond Economic Linkages,” International Studies, vol. 45, no. 4, 2008, 341-
367; S. Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations,” Pakistan Horizon, vol. 61, no. 3, 2008,
pp. 19-28; R. Jain, India, Europe and Conflict Resolution in South Asia, KW
Publishers, New Delhi, 2015; S. Khatri, “The European Union’s Support for
Democracy Building in South Asia: An Overview” in I. Wetterqvist (Director),
“Democracy in Development: Global Consultations on the EU’s Role in
Democracy Building,” International Institute for Democracy and Electoral
Assistance, Stockholm, 2009, pp. 93-106; R. Jain, “The European Union and
Democracy Building in South Asia,” International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 2009; and R. Jain, India, the European Union
and Human Rights,” India Quarterly, vol. 73, no. 4, 2017, pp. 411-429.
8
N. Abbasi, “The EU and Democracy Building in Pakistan,” International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 2009; S. Wolf,
“State of Democracy in South Asia: The Cases of Bangladesh, India, and
Pakistan” in S. Bandyopadhyay et al. (eds.), Regional Cooperation in South Asia
Socio-economic, Spatial, Ecological and Institutional Aspects, Springer, New
York, 2017; and G. Stang, “The EU and Pakistan’s Turbulent Democratisation,”
Fundación para las Relaciones Internacionales y el Diálogo Exterior (FRIDE),
Madrid, 2012.
9
R. Dahl, On Democracy, Yale University Press, New Haven (Connecticut), p.
37.
10
S. Huntington, The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth
Century, University of Oklahoma Press, Norman (Oklahoma), 1991, p. 35.
11
I. Wetterqvist, “Democracy in Development: Global Consultations on EU’s
Role in Democracy Building,” International Institute for Democracy and
Electoral Assistance, Stockholm, 2009, p. 17.
12
Ibid.
13
European Council, “At the European Council in Copenhagen, 7-8 April 1978,”
No. 3/1978, Copenhagen, 1978.
14
K. Smith, “The Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with
Third Countries: How Effective?” European Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 3, no.
2, 1998, p. 258.
15
Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy: Europe's
Mediterranean and Asian Policies, Oxford University Press, New York, 2001,p.
355.
16
European Union, “Treaty on the European Union,” Official Journal of the
European Union, C191, 29 July 1992, Art. J.1-2, TEU.
17
Ibid., Art. 130u-2, TEU.
18
European Council, “European Council in Copenhagen: Conclusions of the
Presidency,” SN 180/1/93 REV 1, Copenhagen, 1993, p. 13.
19
Youngs, The European Union and the Promotion of Democracy, op. cit. pp.
34-36.
20
G. Crawford, “Evaluating European Union Promotion of Human Rights,
Democracy and Good Governance: Towards a Participatory Approach,” Journal
of International Development, vol. 14, no. 6, 2002, p. 913.
21
European Union, “A Secure Europe in a Better World: European Security
Strategy,” Brussels, 2003, p. 10.
22
European Union, “Consolidated Versions of the Treaty on European Union
and the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union,” Official Journal of
the European Union, C 115, 9 May 2008, Art. 21, TEU.
23
Ibid., Art. 21-2.B, TEU.
24
M.K. Köhring, “Beyond ‘Venus and Mars’: Comparing Transatlantic
Approaches to Democracy Promotion,” EU Diplomacy Papers, College of
Europe, Bruges, 2007, p. 13.
25
R. Youngs, “Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane,” Working
Document No. 292, Centre for European Policy Studies, Brussels, 2008, p. 1.
26
R. Youngs, “Democracy Promotion: The Case of the European Union
Strategy,” Working Document No. 167, Centre for European Policy Studies,
Brussels, 2001, p. 42.
27
Ibid., pp. 41-43.
28
In reality, the European Union has suspended its agreement only in a limited
number of cases, mainly with weak and not so important African, Caribbean and
Pacific countries, and only rarely in case of democratic failures; see Smith, “The
Use of Political Conditionality in the EU’s Relations with Third Countries,”op.
cit. In case of agreement with China, the above-mentioned standard essential
clauses are not even included; See: F. Schimmelfennig, “Europeanization
Beyond Europe,” Living Reviews in European Governance, vol. 4, no. 3, 2009,
p. 15.
29
Youngs, “Democracy Promotion,” op. cit. p. 6.
30
European Commission (DG DevCo), “European Instrument for Democracy &
Human Rights (EIDHR),” 2 July 2012; and A. Khakee, “Global Player Status?
EU Actorness and Democracy Promotion” in M.R. Freire, P.D. Lopes, D.
Nascimento, and L. Simão (eds.), EU Global Actorness in a World of Contested
Leadership, Palgrave Macmillan, Basingstoke (Hampshire, United Kingdom),
2022, p. 59.
31
“Pakistan’s New Old Rulers,” The Economist, 14 October 1999, last accessed
on 31 March 2023 at [https://www.economist.com/asia/1999/10/14/pakistans-
new-old-rulers].
32
Ibid.
33
Supreme Court of Pakistan (Islamabad), “Oath of Office (Judges) Order, 2000
(1 of 2000) (Dated 25-1-2000),” 2000, last accessed 1 July 2012.
34
Z.K. Maluka, “Reconstructing the Constitution for a COAS President:
Pakistan, 1999-2002,” in C. Baxter (ed.), Pakistan on the Brink: Politics,
Economics and Society, Maryland, Lexington Books, 2004, pp. 61-62.
35
I. Talbot, “Pakistan in 2002: Democracy, Terrorism, and Brinkmanship,”
Asian Survey, vol. 43, no. 1, 2003, p. 203.
36
Maluka, “Reconstructing the Constitution for a COAS President,” op. cit., pp.
83-84.
37
Supreme Court of Pakistan (Islamabad), “Qualification to Hold Public Offices
Order 2002,” 2002, last accessed on 1 July 2012.
38
M. El-Khawas, “Musharraf and Pakistan: Democracy Postponed,”
Mediterranean Quarterly, vol. 20, no. 1, 2009, pp. 99-101.
39
“Pakistan: Entire Election Process ‘Deeply Flawed,’”Human Rights Watch,
New York, 2002.
40
European Union, “Pakistan: National and Provisional Assembly Election, 10
October 2002, European Union Election Observation Mission, Final Report,”
Brussels, 12 October 2002, p. 7.
41
“A Mess in Pakistan,” The Economist, 9 August 2008, last accessed on 31
March 2023 at [https://www.economist.com/asia/2007/08/09/a-mess-in-
pakistan].
42
“Exit the President,”The Economist, 21 August 2008, last accessed on 31
March 2023 at [https://www.economist.com/asia/2008/08/21/exit-the-president]
and El-Khawas, “Musharraf and Pakistan,”op. cit., p. 114.
43
Delegation of the European Union to Pakistan, “Political and Economic
Relations,” 23 July 2012 and European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper:
Pakistan, 2002-2006,” Brussels, 2002, p. 8.
44
European Union External Action, “EU-Pakistan Relations,” 25 June 2019 and
Delegation of the European Union to Pakistan, “Chronology of Bilateral
Relations,” 23 July 2012.
45
European Council, “Declaration on Pakistan,” 16.10), SN 164/2/99 Rev 2, (Or.
EN), Tampere, 16 October 1999 and European Union, “2217th Council
Meeting- General Affairs - Brussels, 15 November 1999,” last accessed on 3
July 2012.
46
Ibid.; and Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations,” op. cit., p. 23.
47
Jain, “The European Union and Democracy Building in South Asia,”op. cit., p.
9.
48
Ibid.
49
European Union, “Commissioner to visit Afghanistan and Pakistan,”
IP/02/718, Brussels, 15 May 2002.
50
European Union, “Joint Statement on the Occasion of the Signature of the EU-
Pakistan Cooperation Agreement,” P/01/183, 14350/01, (Presse 435), Islamabad,
24 November 2001.
51
Council of the European Union, “Council Decision of 29 April 2004
Concerning the Conclusion of the Cooperation Agreement Between the
European Community and the Islamic Republic of Pakistan,” Official Journal of
the European Union, L 378/22, 23 December 2004, p. 24 and 29.
52
European Union, “Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of the European
Union on the General Elections in Pakistan,” P/02/155, 13081/02 (Presse 325),
Brussels, 15 October 2002; and European Union, “Declaration by the Presidency
on Behalf of the European Union on the Election of New Prime Minister in
Pakistan,” P/02/172, 14669/02, (Presse 366), Brussels, 22 November 2002.
53
European Union, “Pakistan,” op. cit., p. 90.
54
Council of the European Union, “Declaration by the Presidency on Behalf of
the European Union on Imposition of Emergency Rule in Pakistan,” P/07/97,
14670/1/07 REV 1 (Presse 254), Brussels, 8 November 2007.
55
Youngs, “Is European Democracy Promotion on the Wane,” op. cit., p. 9.
56
Ibid.
57
European Union, “Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP,
Voices Concern at State of Emergency in Pakistan,” S313/07, Brussels, 4
November 2007.
58
European Union, “Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, met
President Musharraf of Pakistan,” S018/08, Brussels, 21 January 2008.
59
Council of the European Union, “Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of
the European Union on the general elections in Pakistan,” P/08/20, 6558/08
(Presse 42), Brussels, 15 February 2008.
60
European Union, “Islamic Republic of Pakistan: National and Provisional
Assembly Election, 18 February 2008, European Union Election Observation
Mission, Final Report,” Brussels, 16 April 2008, p. 3.
61
Abbasi, “The EU and Democracy Building in Pakistan,” op. cit., p. 7.
62
European Commission (DG Trade), “Pakistan: EU Bilateral Trade and Trade
With the World,” Brussels, 21 March 2012; and Noor, “Pakistan-EU Relations,”
op. cit., p. 22.
63
European Commission (DG Trade), “Countries: Pakistan,” 30 July 2012.
64
European Council, “Declaration on Pakistan,”op. cit.
65
European Commission, “European Commission Proposes Comprehensive
Trade Package for Pakistan,” IP/01/1426, Brussels, 16 October 2001.
66
B. Mikail, “Assessing Democracy Assistance: Pakistan,” Project Report for
the Foundation for Future, FRIDE, Madrid, 2011, p. 5.
67
European Union, “EU Response to the 11 September: European Commission
Action,” 3 June 2002, Brussels, Memo/02/122.
68
European Commission, “Country Strategy Paper: Pakistan, 2007-2013,”
Brussels, 2007, p. 31.
69
Ibid., pp. 23-24.
70
European Union, “Multiannual Indicative Programme 2007 – 2010: Pakistan,”
25 April 2012 and European Union, “Summary of EU-Pakistan Cooperation,”
November 2011.
71
European Commission, “One year on: the European Commission Response to
the South Asian Earthquake,” MEMO/06/366, Brussels, 6 October 2006.
72
European Commission, “The Commission to Provide Shelter, Food, Water
and Healthcare to Victims of Pakistan's Floods,” Press Release, 17 October
2011.
73
Allah here signifies the Islamized opinion of Pakistani people and politicians
alike.
74
R. Hathaway, “Leverage and Largesse: Pakistan’s post-9/11 Partnership with
America,” Contemporary South Asia, vol. 16, no. 1, 2008, p. 20 and O. Bennet-
Jones, “US Policy Options Toward Pakistan: A Principled and Realistic
Approach,” Policy Analysis Brief, The Stanley Foundation, Muscatine (Iowa),
2008, p. 6.
75
Congressional Research Service (US), “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” CRS Report
for Congress, Washington (D.C.), 25 August 2008, pp. 95-96.
76
F. Ajami, “Pakistan and America,” Policy Review No. 164, HooverInstitution,
California, 2010/11, p. 34.
77
Hathaway, “Leverage and Largesse,” op. cit., p. 1.
78
“Democracy as an Afterthought,” 25 August 2002, The Washington Post, last
accessed on 13 April 2023 at
[https://www.washingtonpost.com/archive/opinions/2002/08/25/democracy-as-
afterthought/faac913f-5e11-4239-99ad-fa5ad5a54acd/].
79
Congressional Research Service (US), “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” op. cit., p.
17.
80
“Winding Back Martial Law in Pakistan,” Asia Briefing No. 70, International
Crisis Group, Brussels, 2007, p. 9 and “Elections, Democracy and Stability in
Pakistan,” Asia Report No. 137, International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 20.
81
Hathaway, “Leverage and Largesse,” op. cit., p. 13.
82
Congressional Research Service (US), “Pakistan-U.S. Relations,” op. cit., p.
13.
83
Ibid., pp. 99-100.
84
Ibid.
85
Hathaway, “Leverage and Largesse,” op. cit., p. 14 and Bennet-Jones, “US
Policy Options Toward Pakistan,” op. cit., p. 2.
86
“Pakistan: Transition to Democracy?” Asia Report No. 40, International Crisis
Group, Brussels, 2002, p. 18 and Hathaway, “Leverage and Largesse,” op. cit.,
p. 13.
87
M. Ali, “US Foreign Aid to Pakistan and Democracy,” Pakistan Journal of
Social Sciences, vol. 29, no. 2, 2009, p. 247 and pp. 252-256.
88
Khakee, “Global Player Status?” op. cit., p. 53.
89
Ibid., p. 58.
90
A. Wetzela, J. Orbieb, and F, Bossuyt, “One of What Kind? Comparative
Perspectives on the Substance of EU Democracy Promotion,” vol. 28, no. 1,
2015, p. 25.
91
Khakee, “Global Player Status?” op. cit., p. 55; and E. da Conceição-Heldt and
S. Meunier, “Speaking with a Single Voice: Internal Cohesiveness and External
Effectiveness of the EU in Global Governance,” Journal of European Public
Policy, vol. 21, no. 7, 2014, pp. 961-979.
92
Abbasi, “The EU and Democracy Building in Pakistan,” op. cit., p. 5; and
Khatri, “The European Union’s Support for Democracy Building in South Asia,”
op. cit., p. 99.
93
M. Knodt and S. Urdze, “Beyond Carrots and Sticks: Explaining the EU’s
External Democracy Promotion in Countries Beyond the Neighbourhood,” Paper
presented at the SGIR 7th Pan-European International Relations Conference on
IR, Stockholm, 9-11 September 2010, p. 10.
94
Ibid., p. 8; G.R. Olsen, “Promotion of Democracy as a Foreign Policy
Instrument of ‘Europe’: Limits to Liberal Idealism,” Democratization, vol. 7, no.
2, 2000, p. 163 and Khatri, “The European Union’s Support for Democracy
Building in South Asia,” op. cit., p. 97 and p. 104.
95
G. Crawford, “Promoting Democracy in Central Asia: What's Needed and Why
It Won't Happen,” Security and Peace, vol. 25, no. 3, 2007, p. 134.
96
Khatri, “The European Union’s Support for Democracy Building in South
Asia,” op. cit., p. 97.
97
Hathaway, “Leverage and Largesse,” op. cit., p. 13; and Jain, “The European
Union and Democracy Building in South Asia,” op. cit., p. 9.
98
As cited in J. Kosterlitz, “Pakistan Paradox,” National Journal, vol. 36, no.
25, 2004, p. 1931.
China’s Ambition in the The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-132-149
Indian Ocean Region and https://www.amu.ac.in/
its Implications on India’s nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Maritime Security
Monika* and Mohd Amin Khan**
ABSTRACT
China has engaged itself significantly in various
Sea lanes of communication, i.e., the South China
Sea, Indo pacific region, and the Indian Ocean
region. Through soft diplomacy and heavy
investment in the Indian Ocean region, China is
trying to attract the littoral countries of the region.
It creates a challenge to the maritime security of
India. India is ambitious toward the blue economy,
and in between, the increasing Chinese presence in
the Indian Ocean may not imply a positive sign. So
being a vast geographical entity of South Asia,
India must dominate the region. This paper will
deal with the geopolitical potential of the Indian
Ocean region. The text will also elaborate on
Chinese intentions and ambitions in the Indian
Ocean region and China’s naval strategy, and how
Chinese presence will affect India's maritime
security. We will look at India's maritime doctrine
and strategy and how India should respond to
maintain its dominating position in the Indian
Ocean region. With the help of satellite images, we
also tried to show China’s reach in the ocean. The
concluding section will deal with India’s initiatives
and step to counter Chinese presence in the Ocean.
*&
** Research Scholar, Indian Institute of Technology, Indore
China’s Ambition in the Indian…. 133
Keywords: Maritime Security; Indian Ocean; Blue Economy; India;

China
Introduction
The post-cold war era has witnessed the arousing of many small and
big powers to challenge the unipolarity of the global world1. China,
among them, has grown much faster than any other major power.
Modern China aspires to be a worldwide superpower and sever US
global hegemony's roots. China has expanded and engaged in every
way conceivable, including foreign aid, development cooperation,
diplomatic missions, and peacekeeping operations2. The country
heavily invested in numerous sea routes to become the world's
hegemonic force. AT Mahan once asserted, ‘To be a dominant
power in the global world, one must have control over the sea or
ocean’3. China's influence may now be felt from the South Pacific
to South and Central Asia, the broader Middle East, Latin America,
and beyond.
Since reorienting production inside global capitalism in the 1980s,
China's ascent has resulted from a confluence of circumstances.
First, unlike the Soviet bloc, China has discovered a means to profit
from its colonial heritage in a historical irony. Until 1997, Hong
Kong was under British rule, and Macau was governed by Portugal
until 1999. Additionally, Taiwan has been utilized by the United
States as a protectorate. Prior to China's full integration into the
global economy, these colonies and protectorates played a crucial
role in connecting China to the international economic landscape.
During Mao's leadership, Hong Kong accounted for nearly one-third
of China's foreign currency earnings, proving to be a significant
contributor to China's economic activities4. The availability of
advanced technology through imports, made possible by Hong
Kong's presence, greatly benefited China. Subsequently, during
Deng Xiaoping's tenure after the Cold War, Hong Kong played a
vital role in China's economic prosperity5. The utilization of Hong
Kong allowed China to attract foreign capital, access a wide range
of goods, particularly high-tech equipment, and benefit from a
skilled labor force, including managerial experts. As China's leaders
sought to modernize the economy, they were also determined to
prevent a recurrence of past invasions and colonization experienced
a century ago. While the Communist Party aims to regain its
position as a potent force, desiring to restore its historical influence
known as the "celestial dynasty," it has also contributed to China's
transformation into a capitalist economy within a relatively short

period, a feat that would have taken other countries centuries to
achieve.
Over the last thirty years, China has significantly enhanced its
engagement within the Indian Ocean region, causing concern
between several American and Indian political operatives that its
rapidly increasing naval fleet, combined with so-called "debt-trap
diplomacy," may offer it valuable military benefits far away from its
coastlines6. Though China's overall intentions regarding the Indian
Ocean are unknown, the Chinese leadership is aggressively seeking
capabilities that would allow it to carry out various military tasks in
the region.
China stresses its critical position in its own domestic territory.
However, India is the primary hurdle to China achieving hegemony
in the Indian Ocean region. That is why China is constantly
attempting to undermine India's national security. India and China
have frequently competed for geopolitical supremacy in the world
and regional order. Despite their differences, the two have
previously collaborated in bilateral, regional, and multi-nation
forums. India and China continue to wield power in the area and
further their respective agendas. For India, South Asia and the
Indian Ocean are the first lines of defense against any invasion;
having clout among its neighbors enables India the distinction of
being a 'regional power.' This mindset has traditionally influenced
India's foreign policy, albeit in many forms. At the moment, India is
focused on numerous connectivity projects to offset China's
diplomatic and economic influence while also developing multiple
interdependencies to maintain its position in the area.
China is employing a strategy of soft diplomacy, non-threatening
measures, and substantial investments in the Indian Ocean region
with the aim of attracting littoral countries that surround India7. This
approach includes the establishment of critical assets and
infrastructural projects, such as the construction of Gwadar port in
Pakistan, Hambantota port in Sri Lanka, and Chittagong port in
Bangladesh8. These initiatives pose a considerable challenge to
India's regional stability and its maritime security. In response to
China's "String of Pearls" policy, India has acted by joining the
QUAD group and participating in numerous joint naval exercises to
curb Chinese influence in its neighboring region. Furthermore, India
has initiated the Diamond Necklace policy, which focuses on
enhancing maritime security in the Indian Ocean area as a

countermeasure to China's "String of Pearls" approach9.
Both India and China place a high value on the Indian Ocean
region. This region is home to a high number of oil and gas
pipelines. Chinese involvement and increased activity in the region
may not pose a positive indication for India's marine security. As a
rival and a former historical link, it is easy to conclude that the
India-China relationship is more about confrontation than
cooperation. As a result, China's engagement and presence are
major security issues for India. Chinese infrastructure, ports, and
substantial investment and capability initiatives in and around the
Indian Ocean region may limit India's influence in its own local
region, which is bad for India's global reputation10. It may also harm
India’s ambition to be a leading blue economy. With a larger
emphasis on developing India's blue economy and the Indian Ocean
becoming a major arena of activity, the region needs a strong
security infrastructure11. In terms of fisheries and minerals, India is
exploring developing its maritime resources. However, India has
also initiated several strategies to get hold-on of Beijing’s motives,
but still, it has a long road to go.
Geopolitical and Geo Economics significance of the Indian
Ocean region
The Indian Ocean region, being the third-largest ocean on Earth,
remains highly significant in contemporary times12. Spanning from
the Malacca Strait and Australia's western coast to the Mozambique
Channel in the west, and from the Persian Gulf & Arabian Peninsula
in the north to the southern part of the Indian Ocean, this vast
geographical expanse is inhabited by a population of 2.7 billion
people. It encompasses key sub-regions, including South Asia, the
Middle East, Africa's eastern coast, and numerous islands such as
Sri Lanka in the east and the Comoros Archipelago in the west. The
region's considerable size and diverse characteristics account for its
geopolitical and geo-economics importance. Furthermore, its
favorable monsoon weather and wind system as a 'life-affirming and
beneficial climatic phenomenon,' emphasizing that the Indian Ocean
region holds significance beyond its geographical attributes. The
Indian Ocean Rim Association, a regional forum comprising diverse
countries like Australia, Indonesia, Iran, and South Africa, plays a
crucial role in shaping contemporary power dynamics13. Situated at
the crossroads of Africa, Asia, and Australia, the Indian Ocean hosts
numerous littorals that are of utmost importance to the region's

overall dynamics.
The region’s global significance can be associated with the presence
of chokes points in the region. A chokepoint is a natural congestion
point between two larger and vital navigational channels. The
chokepoints of the maritime regions are naturally narrow shipping
channels because of high trafficking and their strategic location. All
over in the world, there are mainly seven chokes point for trade and
energy flows. Three out of the regions mentioned lie within the
Indian Ocean area, rendering it a crucially significant location not
only for regional but also for global powers. The Indian Ocean
region (IOR) holds immense importance due to its role as a vital
maritime passage, featuring strategic choke points like the Strait of
Hormuz, Malacca, and Bab-el Mandeb. These choke points serve as
pivotal strategic assets due to the substantial volume of trade
passing through them. However, they are also susceptible to risks
such as accidents, political instability, international conflicts, and
piracy. Consequently, both regional and external powers assert their
influence to address these challenges and establish or uphold a
robust presence in this resource-abundant area.
The region plays a pivotal role in international trade, particularly for
energy, and boasts an extensive and densely populated coastline,
harboring some of the world's rapidly developing regions14.The
ocean also has abundant fisheries and mineral resources.
Nonetheless, its governance and security are continuously under
threat, whether from non-state actors like pirates, traffickers, and
terrorists or from covert naval competition between nations. One
can classify the significance of IOR for several other major reasons
as well. It is strategically placed at a global commercial crossroads,
connecting the world's primary engines in the North Atlantic and
Asia-Pacific. This is especially important at a time when shipping
worldwide is expanding. Today, the world's commercial fleet of
around 90,000 vessels transports 9.84 billion tonsannually. Since
1970, the volume of commercial shipping has nearly quadrupled.
The Indian Ocean's energy flows are extremely significant. The
Indian Ocean's entry and exit points, including the Straits of
Malacca and Hormuz and the Bab-el-Mandeb, convey 36 million
barrels per day, or nearly 40% of the global oil supply and 64% of
oil trade15. The densely populated littoral, on the other hand, is
vulnerable to natural or environmental calamities. The basin also
accounts for 40% of global offshore oil output.
Fig 1.The above figure shows three major choke points in the Indian
Ocean region. Source: made by author using Arc-GIS
The Indian Ocean is also very crucial in determining the security
architecture of the IOR16. The IOR, "security dynamics," plays an
equally crucial role. In light of this, the Persian Gulf in the Arabian
Sea (North IOR) also plays a vital part in India's security17. By
providing easy access for warships to maintain their presence and
enable them to monitor and secure SLOCs throughout times of
peace and conflict, islands serve a crucial role along the sea lines of
communication (SLOC). Middle Eastern oil is transported through a
junction at the Indian Ocean. This is also why other forces are
attempting to solidify their positions there, to use it to display their
strength and promise. India's ongoing IOR naval policy matches
strongly with global aspirations for protecting the Ocean as a
common resource: a key trade corridor, a sustainable resource base,
and an area secure from rising military conflict, non-state actors,
and severe natural calamities. More capacity investments, improved
accountability and confidence-building initiatives, and supportive
institutional partnership will be required to attain these aims. The
primary goal of India in this region is to defend the SLOCs that are
currently under threat from piracy in the Africa's Horn and the Red
Sea. To defend Indian-flagged ships operating in the region, the
Indian navy deploys vessels in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian
Gulf. To monitor ship movements in the region, India has also
constructed the Information Fusion Centre-Indian Ocean Region
(IFC-IOR). In addition, the IFC-IOR works with partner countries
to gain a comprehensive understanding of the marine sector and to

exchange data on vessels of interest.
Why does IOR matter to India?
India is geographically positioned in the heart of the Indian Ocean
and has a coastline of around 7,500 kilometers. "India is at a
crossroads in the Indian Ocean," said by Indian PM Narendra Modi
in an address in Mauritius in 201518. The Indian Ocean presently
contributes to 95% of India's commerce flow and 68% of its
merchandise trade. Furthermore, nearly 80% of India's crude oil
demand is imported by sea via the Indian Ocean (3.28 million
barrels per day). India's marine dependence on oil is around 93%,
according to the Indian Navy, if we consider offshore oil extraction
and petrochemical exports. The country is also the globally fourth
largest purchaser of liquefied natural gas (LNG), with around 45
percent arriving by sea.
Furthermore, India is significantly reliant on the Indian Ocean's
resources by being ranked sixth in the world in the year 2008 by
catching 4.1 million tons of fish, resulting in providing business
opportunities to 14 million people engaged in fishing and
aquaculture businesses. Fisheries and aquaculture are also
significant exporters. Between 1962 and 2012, India's oceanic
exports expanded 55 folds, and fisheries exports now total Rs.
16,600 crore, or around $2.5 billion. IOR is also significant for
India in terms of the extraction of mineral resources. In 1987, India
was granted sole access to the Central Indian Ocean, and it has since
surveyed four million square miles and built two mining sites. In
2013, the Geological Survey of India expanded its survey
capabilities by purchasing the deep ocean exploration vessel named
“Samudra Ratnakar" from South Korea. In 2014, the International
Seabed Authority granted permits for the Indian Ocean ridge,
opening new opportunities for deep offshore mining. This region is
thought to have vast quantities of manganese, as well as nickel,
cobalt, and copper, all of which are scarce on Indian land.
Finally, India's involvement and deep concern over a matter related
to IOR with the Indian Ocean has a strong security dimension that
extends beyond traditional naval issues20. Terrorists arriving by boat
carried out one of the deadliest terrorist assaults in modern Indian
history, the 2008 Mumbai attack, which killed 164 people. Other
than this, illegal trade, logging, and human trafficking are also
major challenges. A closer look into the Indian Ocean and India's
goals indicates a remarkable convergence of Indian and global

aspirations. Some consider the Indian Ocean to be India's ocean.
The region's shared interests are essentially focused on preserving
commercial shipping autonomy of navigation, trying to harness the
Indian Ocean's natural, sustainable resources in a just and fair
manner, developing protocols for improving disaster resilience and
relief as well as operations for search and rescue, mitigating pirates,
terrorist attacks, illicit trade, and arms trafficking proliferation, and
internal and external stakeholders’ naval competition.
Expansion of China in IOR
China has strategically positioned itself as a significant ally for
island nations and littoral countries in the Indian Ocean Region
(IOR)20. One of the key initiatives that foster collaboration on
economic and military matters is the Maritime Silk Road, which is
part of Beijing's broader Belt and Road Initiative. Notably, China
established a submarine station in Sanya, located at the southern tip
of Hainan, in 2008, deploying Jin-class submarines. These moves
raised concerns in India due to the station's proximity to the
Malacca Strait, an important access point for India to the ocean
region. Adding to the unease is the presence of an underground
tunnel at the base, enabling the concealment of submarine activities
and making monitoring challenging. The concentration of
substantial naval forces at Sanya could potentially empower China
to enhance its influence in the nearby Indian Ocean region21.The
connectivity of tunnels at the underwater base is particularly
troubling for India as it holds strategic implications, enabling China
to control shipping at three critical chokepoints in the Indian Ocean:
Bab el Mandeb, the Strait of Hormuz, and the Strait of Malacca.
China's "string of pearls" policy, which involves expanding strategic
and economic cooperation in India's vicinity, is of significant
importance. China's engagement with countries like Myanmar, Sri
Lanka, the Maldives, and Seychelles primarily revolves around
developmental projects and diplomatic strengthening, allowing
China to capitalize on opportunities for expanding its "Look West
Policy." However, political upheavals in Myanmar and US
involvement may hinder China's influence in the country.
The ramifications of China's involvement in the IOR are extensive
and should be analyzed from various perspectives, including
strategic, financial, and military aspects. The military balance,
though not considered an immediate concern, could be influenced
by China's ability to maintain a continuous naval presence in the

region. This presence is evident through the "string of pearls"
strategy, which involves establishing bases and diplomatic ties in
locations like Gwadar port in Pakistan, naval depots in Burma,
electronic surveillance facilities on Bay of Bengal islands, financial
support for a canal across Thailand's Kra Isthmus, an armed alliance
with Cambodia, and force buildup in the South China Sea. These
strategic bases and diplomatic ties, termed as "pearls," enable China
to strengthen its strategic relationships with several nations.
Additionally, by securing maritime routes from the Middle East to
the South China Sea, China safeguards its energy interests and
security objectives.China's increasing presence in the Indian Ocean
is noticeable, driven by its desire to reduce reliance on the US naval
force for unrestricted access to energy resources. Therefore, China
has been actively enhancing its naval capabilities at key chokepoints
along sea lanes connecting the Persian Gulf to the South China Sea,
with the Strait of Malacca being crucial for carrying almost 80% of
China's oil supply.
China's involvement in the development of cargo ports in
Chittagong, Bangladesh, and Hambantota, Sri Lanka, demonstrates
its strategic partnership with other South Asian countries22.
Moreover, China has committed to financing the construction of the
Hambantota Development Zone in Sri Lanka, encompassing vital
infrastructures such as a container harbor, a bunker system, and an
oil refinery. This move is expected to enhance China's influence in
the Indian Ocean region. The expansion of the Gwadar port on
Pakistan's southwest coast has also attracted considerable attention
due to its favorable geographical location, being situated
approximately 70 kilometers from the Iranian border and 400
kilometers east of the Strait of Hormuz—a significant oil supply
route. There have been speculations that this development could
serve as a "listening post" for China to surveil the activities of the
US Navy in the Persian Gulf, Indian operations in the Arabian Sea,
and potential joint maritime efforts between the US and India in the
Indian Ocean. While Pakistan's maritime capabilities alone are not
seen as a direct threat to India, a cooperative maritime effort
between China and Pakistan could present challenges. Some
observers interpret China's offshore military installations as an
attempt to counterbalance American influence and exert pressure on
India, hinting at China's desire for a permanent military presence in
Pakistan. However, it is challenging for Islamabad to openly permit
China to establish a military post within its territory. But for New
Delhi, the main concern is that Pakistan may enable Beijing to use
its military amenities without making any public disclosure.
On economic and commercial grounds, we can justify China’s rapid
construction or development of these ports and military bases in and
around IOR. But other major power of the region, including the
USA, India, Australia, and Japan interprets China's military and
diplomatic activities in the Indian Ocean as power projection vis-à-
vis contending adversaries.
Country Active Naval Maritime Infrastructure
Vessels developed Developed by China
by China
Bangladesh 46 Chittagong Port
Maldives 0 Ihavanddhippolhu
(Under Ihavan Project )
Myanmar 17 Kyaukpyo Deep water port
Pakistan 15 Gwadar water port
Sri Lanka 17 Hambantota Port
Fig 2.Depicts the total number of naval vessels manufactured or

developed by China in Indian Ocean countries.Source:Analysis by
the authors using available data
Furthermore, the majority of Chinese naval bases in the Indian
Ocean are dual-use, and no plausible strategy can rule out its
possible military involvement23. Indian Ocean region indeed helped
China to be a major naval force in the area, to accelerate the search
for energy & natural resources through which it has developed its
maritime economy. Whatever China's vision, it has made China the
largest global merchant fleet, controller of major ports, and ship-
building infrastructure. As a result, China and India compete for
dominance in the Indian Ocean and around. Despite substantial
progress since the late 1990s, Sino-Indian bilateral ties have stayed
competitive. China has successfully constrained India within South
Asia by cultivating close connections with India's key neighbors,
particularly Pakistan.
India’s concern and tackling strategy

The Chinese footprint in the IOR remains a key source of anxiety in
the area. Beijing aspires to create a significant sphere of influence in
the Indian Ocean region, the African continent, and in other island
countries through the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). The existence
of Beijing's People's Liberation Army Navy which is also known as
PLAN in short and certain other Chinese merchant vessels in the
Indian Ocean, along with the Chinese interpretation of the United
Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, persist in posing
complications to those who adhere to a democratic and free Indo-
Pacific. China’s major project, the "String of Pearls," illustrates
China's capabilities and intentions for establishing commerce and
infrastructure projects in India's vicinity.
China has made investments in a range of projects extending from
the Horn of Africa to ASEAN and nations of the Pacific Island. The
Indian Ocean is a channel for Sea Lanes of Communications
(SLOCs) passing from east to west24. As a result, the Chinese
involvement in the Indian Ocean Region might be attributed to their
desire to further their commercial engagements and ensure the
safety of their marine traffic, particularly oil. The CPEC (China–
Pakistan Economic Corridor), a project under BRI (Belt and Road
Initiative), has been a major source of anxiety for India because it
passes through the region of Kashmir which is presently annexed by
Pakistan. Due to Chinese BRI projects, Shanghai has successfully
convinced many governments of South Asian nations whose
economies are in trouble to accept Chinese investment in their
countries. However, citing security concerns, India has always been
hostile to it. The Chinese dragon is actually impeding Indian
territory and creating a dispute on claims of the Line of Actual
Control (LAC). Among all of them, Beijing's dominant geostrategy
of the big game is majorly in the Indian Ocean, where China has
been making huge investments in development projects.
India's maritime modernization is evident in its strategic doctrines
and plans pertaining to the sea. Over time, there has been a
progressive evolution in India's maritime strategic thinking and
doctrinal approach, with successive papers and revisions reflecting
this progression. The initial release in 2004 titled "Indian Maritime
Doctrine" was subsequently enhanced in 2009 and updated again in
2015. Concurrently, maritime policies such as 'Freedom to Use the
Seas' in 2007 and 'Ensuring Secure Seas' in 2015 further

exemplified this forward-looking approach.
The 'Sagar Mala Project,' introduced in 2015, serves as another
illustrative instance of India's endeavors to encompass the geo-
economic aspects of sustainable growth by bolstering its maritime
capabilities through port-led development. The primary objective is
to revamp the infrastructure of ports, facilitating integrated transport
systems connecting coastal regions to the hinterland. This
comprehensive initiative envisions the establishment of smart cities
and townships, coastal economic zones (CEZs), and special
economic zones (SEZs). Additionally, it entails expanding existing
ports while constructing new ones, thereby enhancing merchandise
shipping and port operations.This project is still in its early stages,
but it demonstrates India's vision for its marine agenda. To offset
China's development, India must step up its marine game. However,
since the Modi government took office in 2014, New Delhi has
increased India's military spending. India has upgraded amenities in
the Andaman as well as a post in Campbell Bay, of Nicobar
Islands, in the Bay of Bengal. In 2019, a 56.5 billion INR
infrastructure development plan was finalized to allow additional
warships, planes, soldiers, and drones to be deployed in the
Andaman and Nicobar Islands. Beijing, however, has defended its
operations in the IOR by claiming that it seeks regional peace and
stability.
Place Development/ Infrastructure Project/

Major Deals
North Andaman Island Extension of Runaway
Mauritius Regional grouping along with Dornier

aircraft and Dhruv helicopters deal
Maldives Coastal Radar System
Sri Lanka Maritime Rescue Coordination Center/

Renovation of Sri Lanka’s Trincomalee
Oil Tank Farm,
Bangladesh Access to Chattogram Port
Myanmar Sittwe Port construction
Seychelles Assumption Island
Oman Access to Duqm Port
Fig 3.Shows all major developments projects and the deal between
India and littoral countries of IOR, Source: Prepared by the authors
using available data
To counter China's expansion in the Indian Ocean, India must
establish itself as a significant maritime force, which is impossible
without the support of the region's island nations of IOR25. India
recently finished projects for infrastructure development in
Mauritius and Seychelles, including dual-use logistics facilities.
India aims to improve the infrastructure on the Agaléga Islands of
Mauritius. In the year 2015, India and Mauritius signed an MoU to
improve aviation and maritime facilities on Agaléga Island26. Even
though the Agaléga islanders are aware that the construction of a
naval facility will result in their displacement, the Mauritian
government has opted to ignore this because it wants Delhi to keep
channeling its money through Mauritius as it is their primary source
of foreign direct investment (FDI). India might take advantage of
this and receive logistical assistance from Mauritius.
Later, India and Seychelles jointly agreed to accelerate development
projects on Assumption Island. India has also helped Victoria with
ocean mapping in order to safeguard the Seychelles' special free
trade zone, as well as supplied aircraft and built a radar project.
Unfortunately, as Mauritius and Seychelles are small islands, they
might not even fully align with India, leaving China isolated in the
IOR. In contrast, the United States can surely provide logistics to
India. The Logistic support Cooperation Memorandum of
Agreement (LEMOA) between both Washington and New Delhi
would enable India to acquire logistics from the multiple US
facilities located throughout the Indo-Pacific region27. In the Indian
Ocean, India also participates in numerous bilateral and multilateral
defense drills. In November 2019, delegates from 17 different fleets
took part in the Indian Navy's latest Naval Exercise MILA28. The
2020 phase of the operation has been delayed due to the COVID-19
outbreak, but it is expected to be the largest iteration yet, with 30

foreign warships expected to participate. Malabar is a trilateral
marine event including India, Japan, and the United States with the
goal of encouraging participant collaboration and interoperability.
In 2020, India intended to broaden the alliance by including
Australia. Earlier, India was cautious about welcoming Australia
since it appeared to be tied to the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue
(Quad), an unofficial strategic gathering of the same four countries
dedicated solely at resisting China's rise29.
Considering the June 2020 Sino-India confrontations at the LAC in
eastern Ladakh's Galwan Valley, India was most likely to invite
Australia to boost its own strong position vis-à-vis China.
Due to the growing danger posed by China, military drills in the
IOR are crucial. Separately, with the Galwan incident as a
backdrop, the Indian Navy increased its monitoring and operational
presence in the IOR. The Indian Navy and its Japanese counterpart
also performed a big drill in the IOR, where Chinese naval vessels
and submarines make periodic incursions. China's actions in the
Indian Ocean region are considered as perhaps the most critical
factors for the Indian Navy to demonstrate its readiness to repel
potential threats in the vicinity.
Fig 4. represents the countries of QUAD Group, Source: Made by

the author using Arc-GIS
Concluding Remark
Over the last twenty years, India has steadily increased its
involvement in the region; however, it continues to pursue its
objectives of attaining greater political influence and control in the
area. India remains wary of China's expanding maritime presence in
the same region. China has been actively expanding its presence in
the Indian Ocean region by developing maritime infrastructure in
countries situated along its coasts, such as Myanmar, Bangladesh,
Sri Lanka, Pakistan, and East Africa. This approach has enabled
China to establish diplomatic and trade ties with Indian Ocean
countries. India and the US view China as a common adversary due
to its growing maneuvers in various spatial dimensions.
Consequently, other regional actors in the Indian Ocean and Pacific
regions are contemplating ways to counter China's actions. The
formation of the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QSD) or Quad is
believed to have been motivated by China's strategic and postural
activities in the Pacific region30. While China had previously
maintained relatively uncomplicated relationships with its regional
neighbors, including India, certain incidents raised concerns among
these neighboring countries, leading to the inception of Quad 1.0 as
a response to China's actions.
Quad 2.0, introduced in 2017 following a decade-long break,
represents another concerted endeavor by four major countries: the
United States, Australia, Japan, and India. Even during Quad's
inactive phase, India, and Australia actively nurtured strategic ties,
exemplified by the 2014 nuclear cooperation agreement and their
inaugural joint naval drill in September 201531. Subsequently,
regular meetings have been held at periodic intervals. Notably, the
Raisina Dialogue in January 2018 brought together the top naval
leaders from the United States, Australia, Japan, and India,
signaling their united stance in countering Chinese maritime
ambitions.
In the Indian Ocean Region (IOR), India has expanded its military
operations from the Malacca Strait to the waters off the African
coasts to bolster its position. As the post-COVID-19 era anticipates
geostrategic shifts, India seeks to further enhance its position in the
IOR32. To achieve this, India aims to strengthen its alliance with
Indian Ocean littoral states like Sri Lanka, the Maldives, Mauritius,
and Seychelles, thereby closely monitoring China's rising influence.
India is also likely to establish a strategic partnership with the
United States, without overtly characterizing these efforts as "anti-

Chinese." The United States and India have forged a comprehensive
strategic partnership in the IOR, facilitating each other through
various agreements and understandings, such as the Logistics
Exchange Memorandum of Agreement (LEMOA),
Communications, Compatibility, and Security Agreement
(COMCASA), and Basic Exchange and Cooperation Agreement
(BECA) for geo-spatial cooperation33.
As more than 75% of global marine commerce and 50% of
everyday world's oil flows continue to pass across the Indian Ocean,
making the arena one of the world's most crucial region. As a
consequence, India's principal objective would be to preserve a
peaceful and stable Indian Ocean, emphasizing economic and
military changes that eliminate the threatening Chinese menace.
If we conclude about India and China's position in the Indian Ocean
region, then through the above discussion and facts we see their
relations as an Imbalance. In which China is taking over space and
India has to walk a long road. However, India’s hard power
projection may not be able to compete with China in IOR, but India
can be benefitted from its soft power projection34. India can utilize
its cultural and historical linkages with the countries present in
Indian Ocean Region. Other than this one worth noting point is that
both India and China being great powers of the Asian continent has
shared responsibilities to maintain peace and stability in the
region35. But their rapid naval modernization, deploying
submarines, and monitoring of the region have already created a
endanger in the region which must be stopped from both sides. And
both should understand the severeness of the region and should
remain in healthy competition.
References
1. T., V., Paul. (2022). The Specter of Deglobalization. Current history: A
journal of contemporary world affairs, doi:
10.1525/curh.2023.122.840.3
2. Jingdong, Yuan., Fei, Su., Xuwan, Ouyang. (2022). China’s Evolving
Approach to Foreign Aid. doi: 10.55163/wtnj4163
3. Mahan, Alfred T. "Discussion of the Elements of Sea Power." In

Geopolitics: An Introductory Reader, pp. 25-31. Routledge, 2014.
4. Su, Yun, Woo. (2021). Introduction: Economic Performance and

Background of the Mao Era. Studies in economic history, 1-26. doi:
10.1007/978-981-19-5410-8_1
5. Lampton, D. M. (2014). Following the Leader: Ruling China, from

Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping. University of California Press.
6. Khan, M. Z. (2022). Strategic Posturing of China in IOR. Policy

Perspectives, 19(1), 13-33.
7. Kumar, A. (2009). China’s Island Strategy in the Indian Ocean:
Breaching India’s Sphere of Influence. p. I.
8. Krupakar, J. (2017). China’s naval base (s) in the Indian Ocean—signs
of a maritime grand strategy? Strategic Analysis, 41(3), 207-222.
9. Panda, J. P. (2020). India’s approach to the “Quad” and the salience of
China. In Conflict and Cooperation in the Indo-Pacific (pp. 12-38).
Routledge.
10. Khurana, G. S. (2016). China as an Indian Ocean power: trends and
implications. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime
Foundation of India, 12(1), 13-24.
11. Sakhuja, V. (2014). Blue Economy: an agenda for the Indian
government. CIMSEC Articles, 19
12. Pattanaik, S. S. (2016). Indian Ocean in the emerging geo-strategic
context: Examining India’s relations with its maritime South Asian
neighbors. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 12(2), 126-142.
13. Ghosh, P. (2020, August 31). India’s Indian Ocean Region Strategy. Air
University (AU).
14. Betchoo, Nirmal Kumar. "Power games and their history in the Indian
Ocean: A Mauritian perspective." (2023).
15. Vermeer, M. (2017). Maritime power politics in the Indian Ocean region
(IOR). ISPSW Strategy.
16. Rao, P. V. (2010). Indian Ocean maritime security cooperation: the
employment of navies and other maritime forces. Journal of the Indian
Ocean Region, 6(1), 129-137.
17. Cordner, L. (2010). Rethinking maritime security in the Indian Ocean
Region. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 6(1), 67-85.
18. Chaturvedi, R. R. (2017). The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi
Government. In Modi and The World: (Re) Constructing Indian Foreign
Policy (pp. 163-184).
19. Scott, D. (2006). India's “grand strategy” for the Indian Ocean:
Mahanian visions. Asia-Pacific Review, 13(2), 97-129.
20. Mahadevan, P. (2014). China in the Indian Ocean Part of a Larger

PLAN. CSS Analyses in Security Policy, 156.
21. Khan, M. Z. (2022). Strategic Posturing of China in IOR. Policy
Perspectives, 19(1), 13-33.
22. Upadhyaya, S. (2017). Expansion of Chinese maritime power in the
Indian Ocean: implications for India. Defense Studies, 17(1), 63-83.
23. Singh, A. (2015). China’s ‘maritime bases’ in the IOR: A chronicle of
dominance foretold. Strategic Analysis, 39(3), 293-297.
24. Rumley, D., Chaturvedi, S., & Yasin, M. T. (2016). Securing Sea Lanes
of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region. In The Security of Sea
Lanes of Communication in the Indian Ocean Region (pp. 19-40).
Routledge.
25. Rajan, D. S. (2011). China and South Asia—an Indian Perspective. New
Delhi, India: South Asia Analysis Group.
26. Ludwig III, W. C. (2016). Drivers of Indian Naval Expansion. In The
Rise of the Indian Navy (pp. 33-54). Rutledge.
27. Mishra, V. (2017). Indo–US Security Cooperation: Implications for the
Indian Ocean. Maritime Affairs: Journal of the National Maritime
Foundation of India, 13(1), 73-81.
28. Ghosh, P. K. (2012). Indian Ocean naval symposium: uniting the
maritime Indian Ocean region. Strategic Analysis, 36(3), 352-357.
29. Jash, A. (2021). The QUAD factor in the Indo-Pacific and the role of
India. Journal of Indo-Pacific Affairs, 4(02), 78-85.
30. Panda, J. (2018). India's continentals connect on Indo-Pacific and Quad
2.0.
31. Chand, N. (2018). The Quad and Future of Indo-Pacific Security. Centre
for Land Warfare Studies Journal, 127-136.
32. Kennedy, G., & Pant, H. V. (2016). Indian Navy’s Maritime Security
Strategy: An Assessment. National Maritime Foundation.
33. Bateman, S. (2016). Maritime security governance in the Indian Ocean
region. Journal of the Indian Ocean Region, 12(1), 5-23.
34. China’s Naval Expansion in the Indian Ocean and India-China Rivalry.
(n.d.). The Asia-Pacific Journal: Japan Focus
35. Hongyuan, S. (2018). The Indian Ocean Policy of the Modi Government.
China Int'l Stud., 69, 86.
Multi-Party System and The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-150-163
Coalition Era in the https://www.amu.ac.in/
Politics of Jammu and nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Kashmir Since 2002
Jameelun Nisa*
ABSTRACT
The party system in the erstwhile state of Jammu

and Kashmir remained hegemonised by National
Conference (NC) till 2002. Earlier, the opposition
parties were not in a position to provide an
alternate government in state, it was only in 2002
Assembly elections, that one party rule was
challenged, and strong oppositional politics started.
Rise of Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and other
regional parties gave tough competition to the
ruling NC and thus a coalition era was started in
the politics of Jammu and Kashmir. The paper
analyses the role of Multi-party politics in the
Jammu and Kashmir. It examines how the
emergence of different parties changed the power
structure in the erstwhile state of Jammu and
Kashmir which resulted in the era of coalition
politics.
Keywords: Party, NC, PDP, Election, State.
Introduction
In 2002, a new era in party politics began when the dominance of
one party in the assembly was first questioned. Multi-party politics
also originates from the state's shifting political landscape since
2002. Such actors were created by a combination of internal and
external circumstances, and they were vital in the democratization
*Ph.D. in Political Science, Political Science Department, University of Jammu

Multi-Party system and…. 151
of state polity. Other parties like the Panthers Party, Peoples

Conference, Awami Itihad, Congress, CPI (M), and Independent
Candidates also participate in the election.1
After this elections, strong opposition emerged in the politics of
Jammu and Kashmir. In the earlier elections, the politics revolved
around one party, the National Conference, but during this phase,
other parties were also in the fray. The Panthers Party, formed in
1982 by Bhim Singh, could not generate people’s loyalty in its
earlier year in Jammu and Kashmir.
The party was formed to safeguard and promote the interest of the
people living in Jammu. This was the first regional party which had
pleaded for a different Chief Minister for each province right in
1982 while launching the party Bhim Singh declared that the goal
of his party was that Jammu should be given an equal share in the
power politics of the state. The party is committed to serving the
Jammu region; its slogan is “Stop Discriminatory Policies toward
Jammu”.2 The party has also demanded the establishment of a
mini secretariat in Jammu and a separate standard of devaluing
power to the block level. The party contested the Parliamentary
elections in 1984 and Assembly elections in 1987 but failed to
come up with strong opposition. But in the 2002 Assembly
election, the party joined the larger PDP-Congress coalition
government led by Mufti Mohd Sayeed. It performed well and won
four seats in the Udhampur district. In the Assembly debate, all the
party members took active participation and forced the government
to democratise the institution. One of its MLAs Harsh Dev Singh
became an education minister in the coalition government for 3
years. It was the first time in the history of Jammu and Kashmir
that a Jammu- based political party has a due share in the power
politics of the state.3After the 2002 Assembly election, the Jammu
and Kashmir Peoples Conference, founded by Abdul Gani Lone,
introduced a competitive spirit to Jammu and Kashmir politics by
advocating a “Poll boycott” against the principle of political
participation. However, it was alleged that in the 2002 Assembly
elections, it was not only the People Democratic Party that
challenged the National Conference but the Peoples Conference of
Abdul Gani lone is believed to drive proxy candidates in the
election to give tough competition to National Conference. After
the passing of Abdul Gani Lone, the party was headed by his son
Sajjad Gani Lone, who contested the Parliamentary elections in
2009. This was considered the end of the separatist movement in

Kashmir. 4
The party also contested the 2014 Assembly elections, won 2 seats,
and joined the PDP-BJP alliance. Yousuf Tarigami of CPI (M)
emerged as one of the strong candidates and influenced the politics
of Jammu and Kashmir. Due to his strong leadership, the party
won the Kulgam Constituency seat in the 1996 Assembly elections.
In the 2002 Assembly elections, the party aroused one of the
potential political forces in Jammu and Kashmir by contesting
seven Assembly seats and winning two seats from south Kashmir.
The party widened its membership all over the state after the 2002
election, but in the 2008 Assembly elections, it failed to repeat its
performance. In the 2014 Assembly elections, the party contested
three seats and won one seat from Kulgam Constituency. Since
2002 it has played an essential role as a responsible opposition
party and criticised the party’s policies in government. In the 2014
election manifesto, the party emphasised the debate on the Kashmir
issue. It also criticised the PDP-BJP coalition in 2014 and termed it
a huge disappointment.5
Coalition Politics
In 1987, the ideologically opposed National Congress (I) and the
local party National Conference came together to create the
coalition administration in Jammu & Kashmir. While the National
Conference continued to hold a firm ideological stance in favor of
giving the state of Jammu and Kashmir more autonomy within the
bounds of Article 370 of the Indian Constitution. It further asserted
that it was the party vowed to uphold and advance Kashmiri
identity and the 1944 New Kashmir Manifesto's call for self-
reliance. Contrarily, the Congress party generally supported the
unification of the state with the union of India from a political and
constitutional standpoint. However, both parties shared the same
values of socialism, secularism, and democracy. After the Rajiv-
Farooq Accord was ratified, the two parties formed a coalition
government. The huge win of the National Conference and
Congress in the 1987 Assembly elections was widely believed to
have been rigged. It only served to confirm the notion that
democratic procedures would never yield a fair outcome for
Kashmiris.6
Consequently, there developed a general sense of disillusionment
not merely with electoral politics but with the entire framework of
the democratic structure. On 26 March 1987, Farooq Abdullah was

sworn in as the Chief Minister of the Congress-NC coalition
government of Jammu and Kashmir. A comprehensive
coordination mechanism was contemplated to ensure the smooth
and purposeful functioning of the ruling alliance. This mechanism
will be operative at various levels to sort out mutual problems and
promote understanding between the two parties. The Rajiv-Farooq
Accord envisages full cooperation between the two parties.7 But
the leaders were said to agree that this objective could be achieved
only by ensuring coordinated functioning at both administrative
and organizational levels. This coalition government was the result
of opportunistic politics of sharing power. It resulted from political
conditionality imposed by the Congress party on the National
Conference for the latter’s return to power. The coalition
government raised the public expectation as for as economic and
developmental issues were concerned. The government with a
party ruling at the centre was projected as the sure road to the
state’s prosperity. Further, the coalition government of two secular
parties was taken as a move towards curtailing and fighting the
forces of religious extremism. However, the accord failed to prove
as effective as expected. The opposition parties in the state
described the accord as another sell-out of the state to Delhi and
called Farooq Abdullah a puppet in the hands of the centre. He was
charged with betraying his father’s fifty years legacy of pride. The
people did not accept this accord, and it was described as anti-
people and undemocratic, and instead of solving the problems of
the people of the state, it would add miseries to the people. The
alliance between the National Conference and Congress further
eroded the state’s internal autonomy and denied the people of the
state their political rights. The Congress regime’s destruction and
Farooq Abdullah’s inability to govern indeed strengthened Muslim
United Front.8
Thus the alliance had some inherent adverse consequences. It
therefore hardly provides the citizens with the much-promised
effective and less corrupt administration. Numerous coalition
leaders were accused of engaging in land grabbing and
encouraging favouritism in recruitment. People’s attention was
focused on these issues, which further widened the gap. There was
no effective coordination or advisory committee to sort out the
differences. The alliance ultimately proved a disaster for the parties
and the state in particular. The second coalition government was
formed in radically different circumstances. The main contestants

in the 2002 Assembly elections were the governing National
Conference, India’s ruling Bharatiya Janata Party, the main
opposition Congress, and the newly emerged PDP. In terms of
seats won the main changes were, firstly the decline of the National
Conference. Till the 2002 Assembly elections, the National
Conference has been the single dominant party of the state. Since
1975 when it was revived under the leadership of Sheikh Abdullah,
it has been emerging not only victorious in every Assembly
election but has also been dominating the electoral space of
Kashmir, leaving a very narrow space for the opposition parties. In
this election, the National Conference had lost its electoral
hegemony, and for the first time, the party adorned the role of an
opposition party. Secondly, the rise of the People’s Democratic
Party and the strong showing of the minor parties says Abdul Haq
Khan(Leader of PDP). Following the announcement of the result
and the resignation of Farooq Abdullah as Chief Minister, there
began a lengthy dialogue between Congress and the People’s
Democratic Party about forming a coalition government. Finally,
after several weeks of negotiation and a great deal of media
speculation, the two parties announced that they were ready to
form the government with the support of minor parties and released
a policy schedule, which was referred to as the Common Minimum
Programme.9 The main objectives of this programme may be
summarised as:
First, the establishment of a rotating Chief Minister, with PDP
leader Mufti Muhammad Sayeed serving for the first three years
and a candidate for Congress serving out the remaining three.
Second, the coalition government placed a strong focus on
protecting people's lives and property and reestablishing people's
sense of honor and dignity in society. The coalition administration
would take all necessary measures to protect all state residents
from militancy and carnage. In order to tackle cross-border
militancy from Pakistan, the state government works in complete
cooperation with the Indian government.
Third, the government shall review the operation of all such laws
that have been used in the past decade to deprive the people of their
fundamental rights to life and liberty for an extended period,
without due legal process. It was decided that there are already
enough laws in place to address militancy. As a result, it will
nullify the Prevention of Terrorism Act (POTA). Investigations

must be conducted into any deaths committed in custody and
human rights breaches, and those responsible must be found and
punished appropriately.
Fourth, the government shall strengthen the State Human Right
Commission to make it an effective instrument for addressing the
grievances of the state’s people. It shall review all cases of
detainees being held without trial for an extended period.
Fifth, the government will reach out to the children, widows and
parents of the deceased militants and endeavour to provide
education to the militancy-affected orphans. The government also
provides relief packages for those families affected by militant
violence over the past decade.
Sixth, the government reaffirms that the return of Kashmiri Pundits
to their motherland is an essential ingredient of Kashmiri.
Therefore, the government will seek the cooperation of all
elements in society to create an atmosphere conducive to their safe
return, take all necessary steps to ensure their safety and formulate
effective measures for their rehabilitation and employment.
Seventh, the government will also set up a commission that will
recommend reform of the Police administration to make it a more
effective and humane instrument for investigating crimes and
enforcement of law and order. In this programme, both parties also
decided to provide compensation to those people from the border
areas of Jammu and Kashmir who suffered the loss of crops and
cattle due to the security operation near LOC and the international
border.
Eighth, the government will also prioritise making state
administration free from corruption and nepotism, especially in
awarding government jobs and contracts. The programme also laid
much importance on the employment and welfare of the youth.
Measures will be taken to assist those young people who are
struggling with unemployment.
Ninth, the government shall also grant full power to the
Autonomous Hill Council for Leh, which has been deprived of its
legitimate powers. Finally, through their programme, the coalition
government also formulated a comprehensive plan to develop
environment-friendly tourism in all the state regions.
Tenth, special provisions should be taken for the promotion of

backward communities, including Gujjars, Bakarwals and tribes.
The government will work to extend scheduled tribe status for the
Pahari-speaking population of the state. Panchayati Raj institutions
will also be strengthened and given financial autonomy and
sufficient financial support to make them effective instruments for
decentralised development.
Eleventh, effective measures will be taken to safeguard the interest
of minorities in the state, and for that purpose, Minority
Commission will be constituted.10
However, both parties remained divided on critical issues, and
there is considerable potential for conflict between the two parties.
The Common Minimum Programme focused on governance issues,
emphasising the breakdown of law and order due to militancy.
However, the implementation of the programme was looked upon
with suspicion because of the strains within the coalition as both
the parties had different positions on issues like engaging the
militants in a dialogue, disbanding the Special Operation Group
and also because the Peoples Democratic Party was a regional
party and Congress a national party. Amarnath land dispute protest
swept the entire state, resulting in violent incidents. Initially, there
was a significant agitation in Kashmir, which was followed by
violence in Jammu. The Amarnath Shrine Board land transfer issue
shattered peace in the state.
The land was transferred temporarily to provide facilities to
pilgrims visiting the Amarnath Shrine in May 2008. However,
widespread protest and political uproar occurred in Kashmir
because the transfer was misinterpreted as a plan to settle Hindus
from outside to change the state’s demography, reducing its
Muslim majority. These events led to the revocation of the land
transfer on 1 July, and it was decided that the government and not
Amarnath Shrine Board was providing facilities to yatris. Thus the
coalition ended in crisis. Peoples Democratic Party breaks the
alliance for the interest of the Jammu and Kashmir people. Transfer
of land was against Article 370. There was no need to transfer the
land as the yatris used the land for thousands of years. The 2008
Assembly elections took place immediately after the Amarnath
agitation. In the valley, separatist politics was the reflection of the
agitation. The separatist leadership had developed a renewed
confidence that people who had participated in massive
demonstrations against the Indian state during the agitation would

not come forward to participate election. Although the voter
turnout was not affected by the Amarnath agitation, the same is not
the case with the electoral outcome. In an intensely contested
election that gave a fragmented verdict, Peoples Democratic Party
and Bharatiya Janata Party emerged as the gainers.11 The result of
the election reflects the divide created during the agitation.
Following their successful and aggressive mobilisation of religious
identities, the BJP and the PDP have seen an increase in their
respective votes and seat shares. In Jammu, where the Bhartiya
Janata Party was able to win 11 seats, the communal polarisation of
the electorate was more overt. National Conference emerged as the
single largest party in this election but did not win a sufficient
number of seats to form government in the state on its own. Thus,
this election led to a hung assembly, and with the result, another
coalition government became a must.
Congress was quick to support National Conference to the visible
dismay and displeasure of other competitors. The bitter experience
of the Congress party of holding hands with the Peoples
Democratic Party in the previous government proved beneficial for
National Conference. Congress and National Conference top
leaders discussed the modalities of the new coalition government,
and it was agreed to give a full-term Chief Ministership to Omer
Abdullah says Abdul Raheem Rather (Leader of NC).It was very
much covenant for National Conference because, in a previous
coalition partnership with Peoples Democratic Party, Congress
strongly demanded Chief Ministership for half of the term.
Looking at the election result, it is clear that the decision of
changing government this time has not come from the public
mandate but from Congress. Still, after the election results were
announced, it was evident that Congress had already made up its
mind to dump Peoples Democratic Party and choose National
Conference. As regards Common Minimum Programme, the Chief
Minister says that the coalition government did not need Common
Minimum Programme as the two parties had complete faith in each
other. The lessons politicians learnt from these results is that
competitive ethnic and religious intolerance had come into Jammu
and Kashmir politics.12 The case of the Peoples Democratic Party
is intrusive. Another lesson that these election results hold is the
age of coalition government in Jammu and Kashmir is set for an
extended stay. Also, back in 2002, contrary to popular perception,
the National Conference was not decisively defeated. The party

remained the largest party both in Kashmir and in the state. The
formation of the coalition government between the National
Conference and Congress led by Omar Abdullah in 2008 infuses
hope and enthusiasm among the masses. Subsequently, the zest of
enthusiasm appears to be damping. Due to antagonistic
ideologies and disparities in the coalition partners’ agendas,
governance suffered, and corruption in the state reached a new
level. Since Omar Abdullah’s leadership, the coalition government
has seen unprecedented violence and political mobilisation in the
state. Shopian rape case, and hanging of Afzal Guru in Feb. 2013.13
However, people in general and political parties, in particular,
alleged that the National Conference and Congress coalition
government has failed to live up to the expectation of the people.
Despite all shortcomings and failures in most fields, this was the
only coalition in Jammu and Kashmir that lasted its full term of six
years before the state delivered a region-based split verdict in the
Assembly election held in 2014. The 2014 Assembly elections,
which was highly competitive, gave a fractured mandate. Most
Muslim-dominated constituencies in Kashmir voted for Peoples
Democratic Party, which won 28 seats. At the same time, the
Hindu-dominated Jammu opted for the Bharatiya Janata Party with
25 seats. This fractured mandate paved the way for the next and the
most controversial coalition government in the state of Jammu and
Kashmir. The People’s Democratic Party and the Bharatiya Janata
Party formed the coalition despite having ideological differences.
A 65 per cent voter turnout in the 2014 Assembly election, a record
for the past 28 years, had reviewed hopes for a definite mandate
and stable government in Jammu and Kashmir. But like in earlier
elections, no party was in a position to form the government on its
own. The mandate is fractured to such an extent that political
parties had not reached any consensus to form the government
even a week after the result was announced. The verdict has
thrown up a challenge for ideologically opposite parties to hammer
out a solution on government formation. A harsh reality that the
state is divided along communal lines has also been brought about
by it. The emergence of the Bharatiya Janata Party as a critical
player in the power politics of Jammu and Kashmir has been a key
development in this election. Rather than being one among the
many parties of Jammu, it has emerged as the region’s dominant
party, leaving the National Conference and the Congress behind.
The victory of the party comes in different shades with different

meanings. Depending on its hue, it can be read differently. On the
one hand, it was viewed that in this election, the verdict in favour
of the Bharatiya Janata Party was because of the popularity of
Narendra Modi. Another view is that the victory was a product of
luck and communal clashes in Kishtwar and Rajouri (2013).
Therefore, the explanation for Bharatiya Janata Party’s victory is
not as simple as they have been made out to be in the mainstream
media.
The “Modi wave” brought the party to the scene as it was entirely
due to this wave that the party could make win both in the
Parliamentary seats of Jammu and the single seat of Ladakh. The
Assembly election results are nothing but a continuation of the
parliamentary wave. As a result, not only the loyal Bharatiya
Janata Party constituency voted for them, even those who are
traditional voters of Congress and other parties voted for Modi.
What made the difference in the popular choices was the slogan
“Mission 44 Plus” by BJP. This slogan may not have had any
impact in Kashmir, but it shifted voting patterns in Jammu. Both
the parties People’s Democratic Party and Bharatiya Janata Party,
have entered into a “Governance Alliance” based on an agreement
which is an effort towards seeking a national resolution on Jammu
and Kashmir. The alliance’s primary purpose is to form a
government that will be empowered to animate resolution and
build confidence within and across the Line of Control (LOC),
thereby ensuring peace and progress in the state.14 The alliance is
to provide a stable and representative government in the state
which respects the mandate given by the people. Through this
alliance, both parties provide innovative governance, strengthen the
institutions, and widen the extent of democracy through inclusive
politics. The main objective of this alliance is the balanced
development of all the state regions. In an interview with
Mehbooba Mufti, former Chief Minister of the state at Gupkar
residence in 2019, when I asked her why did the party decide to
make an alliance with BJP? She said Mufti Mohammad Sayeed
formed the party to resolve the Kashmir issue. The dialogue with
Pakistan was initiated under his tenure. When Congress was in
power, Manmohan Singh wanted dialogue with Pakistan but could
not be succeeded because Bharatiya Janata Party was in opposition.
But when Vajpayee decided to dialogue with Pakistan, nobody
opposed him. Kargil war took place during his tenure, and he
invited Musharraf to India, but nobody pointed the finger at him.

After that Parliament attack happened, again he went to Pakistan,
but nobody dared to question him because of his credentials.
Due to all these factors, Peoples Democratic Party decided to form
a government with Bhartiya Janata Party only to solve the Kashmir
issue through dialogue with Pakistan. Also, when BJP came with a
huge mandate and PDP had no option because in Jammu, BJP got
25 seats and there is a mixed population of Hindus and Muslims,
and the party could not ignore that factor. The most significant
factor of this alliance is to stop the bloodshed in Kashmir. PDP
joined hands with BJP only to forward the peace process started by
Vajpayee and Mufti. In an interview with Naeem Akhtar (Former
Education Minister of J&K) when I asked him Why the Coalition
with BJP ended in crisis? He said, however, the alliance of the two
parties to form the government threw lots of challenges. The two
parties had not only been holding antagonistic political positions
but had been representing mutually exclusive constituencies. Their
fundamental differences started concerning the particular
constitutional position of the state. At the same time, the BJP talks
about the abrogation of article 370, the PDP, on the other hand,
defends this article. The Peoples Democratic Party joined the
Bhartiya Janata Party in forming the government, but there was a
lot of suspicion in Kashmir because Peoples Democratic Party had
mobilised the voters during 2014 Assembly elections by generating
anti-Bharatiya Janata Party emotions. Since Bharatiya Janata Party
has given the slogan of “Mission 44 Plus” seats and sought to enter
the electoral arena of Kashmir in a big way, with such emotions
being raised against the Bharatiya Janta Party, the Peoples
Democratic Party’s act of joining the BJP in forming the
government was seen as an act of disloyalty. Overall, the alliance
between the two parties was projected as unholy. The agenda,
however, remained mostly on paper and the contradictory
expectations of the constituencies that the two parties represented
led to persistent tensions between the coalition partners. Overall,
the coalition seemed fragile, especially in the initial two years. The
issue which became a source of tension between the two parties
was related to the AFSPA. Apart from this, several other issues
became a bone of contention between these two parties.15
A significant challenge was faced by the coalition government with
the passing away of Mufti Mohd. Sayeed, the patron of the Peoples
Democratic Party. The next phase of the PDP-BJP government
with Mehbooba Mufti as the Chief Minister saw similar tension

between the coalition partners says Firdous Tak (Leader of PDP).
Among various issues that caused such tension was the issue of
Article 35A, which was challenged by the Bharatiya Janata Party
associate in the Supreme Court. The 2016 agitation also brought
the differences between the two parties to the surface. There were
fundamental differences between the two parties regarding the
handling of stone palters and mob violence. While the Bharatiya
Janata Party favoured solid tactics against the agitators, the Peoples
Democratic Party insisted on more sympathetic dealing with the
youth on the streets. Among other issues, the issue related to India
- Pakistan dialogue and dialogue with the separatist has remained a
point of continuous discord between the two parties. Both parties
carried different opinions on the issue of Rohingya refugees in the
Jammu region, PDP being seen as soft on them and BJP insisting
on their anti-national role seeking their expulsion from Jammu.
Thus because of these differences between the two parties, the
coalition ultimately collapsed in June 2018.16
Conclusion
Thus, the electoral scene of Jammu and Kashmir was monopolised
by the National Conference. The dominance of the National
Conference was not only in the first Assembly election but also in
other elections. In the 1957 and 1962 elections, the party captured
the maximum seats. In 1965 the National Conference was
dissolved and merged with Indian National Congress. After that,
Congress dominates the electoral scene in the state. It was only
because of the dismissal of Sheikh Abdullah from power politics in
1953. In the 2002 Assembly elections, the dominance of the single
party within the Assembly was challenged for the first time with
the emergence of Peoples Democratic party. After this election, a
competitive spirit evolved in the politics of Jammu and Kashmir. It
was the result of such competition that the phenomena of coalition
politics emerged. The deepening of electoral democracy was aided
by this new change in competitive politics, in which the mandate of
the people rather than the will of the centre mattered. However, this
did not rule out the possibility of separatist politics. Massive
widespread engagement in numerous agitations from 2008 to 2010
demonstrated separatist power. The mainstream parties had
planned their political existence in light of the difficulty of
operating within a more separatist climate. The political parties,
rather than challenging the relevance of separatism, are now
concentrated only in the domain of governance. Politics in this

state become very uncertain with identity-related issues and
assume importance on Kashmir versus Jammu issues. On every
issue, one can see the regionally polarised response. The result of
all the three Assembly elections showed that irrespective of
ideology, local parties in Jammu and Kashmir tend to align with
the party in power at the centre out of convenience. Another
glaring trend in the twenty-first century has been that of the valley
voting for a regional party, while Jammu votes for whichever
national party is in power. Identity politics has always been an
important aspect of Kashmiri politics. However, as the stance of
the national government has changed, the region of Kashmir has
reinforced their need to maintain an independent identity while the
people of Jammu have attempted to balance this identity by
advocating for more integration with the centre.
References
1
Interview with Tak Firdous Ahmed, Leader of Peopled Democratic Party at
Bagwaan Mohalla, Kishtwar, on 5 June 2019.
2
Govind Sharma, “Panthers Fall Flat, Daily Excelsior, 24 December 2014.
3
Nanda Prashan K., “Stable Coalition or Political Uncertainty in Store for
Jammu and Kashmir accessed at www.livemint .com 0n 25-7-2022
4
Lone Sajjad- “From Being Separatist to a Minister”, Indian Express, March
2015.
5
Interview with Para Waheed, Leader of Peoples Democratic Party at Rajbagh,
Srinagar, on 11 June 2019.
6
Puri Balraj, “Fundamentalism in Kashmir, Fragmentation in Jammu”, Economic
and Political Weekly(1987), Vol.22, No.22, p.835.
7
Widmalm Sten, “The Rise and Fall of Democracy in Jammu and Kashmir”,
Asian Survey (1997), Vol.37, No.11, p.1012.
8
Zutshi Chitralekha, “Seasons of Discontent and Revolt in Kashmir”, University
of California Press (2017), Vol.116, No.789, p.128.
9
Webb Matthew J., “Political Change and Prospects for Peace in Jammu and
Kashmir: The 2002 State Election and Recent Trends in India”, South Asia
Journal of South Asian Studies, (2005), No.1, pp.90-91.
10
“Common Minimum Programme of Congress-Peoples Democratic Party
Coalition Government in Jammu and Kashmir “accessed at jkpdp.org.in on 5-9-
2022.
11
Interview with Mufti Mehbooba, Former Chief Minister of Jammu and
Kashmir, at Gupkaar, Srinagar, on 12 June 2019.
12
Chowdhary Rekha, “Electoral Politics in the Context of Separatism and
Political Divergence :An Analysis of 2009 Parliamentary Election in Jammu and
Kashmir”, South Asian Multidisciplinary Academic Journal,(2009) No.3,p.3
13
Chowdhary Rekha, Jammu and Kashmir 1990 and Beyond Competitive
Politics in the Shadow of Separatism, New Delhi: Sage Publications,2019,p.100
14
Chowdhary Rekha, “BJP’s Unprecedented Victory in Jammu”, Economic and
Political Weekly, (2015),Vol.19, pp.70-71.
15
Interview with Mufti Mehbooba, Former Chief Minister of Jammu and
Kashmir, at Gupkaar, Srinagar, on 12 June 2019.
16
Interview with Tak Firdous Ahmed, Leader of Peoples Democratic Party at
Bagwaan Mohalla, Kishtwar on 5 June 2019.
Taliban’s Rise to Power: The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-164-188
Afghanistan Crisis and https://www.amu.ac.in/
India’s Strategic nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Dilemma
Md. Rahat Hasan*
ABSTRACT
The article makes an effort to provide an Indian
viewpoint on the current political and security
landscape in Afghanistan. Moreover, the article
aims to explain the complex and diverse
characteristics of the economic and humanitarian
situation that now exists in Afghanistan under
Taliban, as well as the policy choices that India
could implement to address the Taliban. After
regaining control on August 15, 2021, the Taliban
seems to have cemented its status as the de facto
government authority in Afghanistan. Following the
Taliban’s recapture of Afghanistan, the nation has
faced a multitude of interconnected and complex
humanitarian, economic, security and political
crises. Pervasive human rights violations, such as
limitations on women's rights, suppression of
freedom of expression, and subjugation of minority
ethnic populations, have been hallmarks of the
Taliban's rule. In the midst of this crisis, India is
confronted with a complex dilemma in its dealing
with Taliban.
India has established longstanding relationships
with Afghanistan and has made substantial
investments in the process of Afghan statebuilding
since 2001. The common Afghan appreciates the
non-combative, development-oriented strategies,
*Assistant Professor, Department of Political Science, Aligarh Muslim University

Taliban’s Rise to Power: Afghanistan…. 165
which are referred to as India's soft power

engagements in Afghanistan. Nevertheless, the
resurgence of the Taliban has raised security
apprehensions for India. India faces a hard task in
engaging diplomatically with the Taliban due to
their controversial governance and historical ties to
Pakistan. To effectively address both its
humanitarian concerns and national security
interests, India must engage with the Taliban in
Afghanistan, irrespective of whether or not it
recognises them as the legitimate rulers. India with
a cautious approach should maintain its soft power
strategy to deal with Taliban and remain influential
in Afghanistan.
Failure of State- Building: US - Afghanistan Peace Deal and
Return of Taliban
Seth G. Jones,1 in his book "In the Graveyard of Empires:
America's War in Afghanistan," asserts that Afghanistan has been
referred to as 'The Graveyard of Empire' since the 19th century.
Throughout the past two centuries, many superpowers such as the
British Empire, the Soviet Union, and the United States have
exerted political control over Afghanistan. However, they have
always been eventually ousted by the Afghan people. Afghanistan's
recent history has been dotted with multiple instances of regime
transition due to foreign interventions and internal conflicts
between warlords and political/ethnic elites. These incidents have
often generated political crises in the nation.2 A recurrence of the
same occurred immediately following the collapse of the Afghan
Republic in 2021. The Taliban regained control of Afghanistan on
August 15, 2021, following a twenty-year struggle. The subsequent
events led to a complex and interconnected set of problems in
Afghanistan, encompassing humanitarian, economic, and political
dimension.3
Barnett R. Rubin said that Afghanistan, a landlocked country, has
remarkably been situated at the focal point of global geopolitics for
four decades. Afghanistan has witnessed a series of historical
battles and shifts in political authority, starting from the Mughal
Empire in the sixteenth century and continuing to the present-day
Taliban resurgence. This volatile territory has been a witness to the
shifting nature of political power over time.4 Thomas Barfield5
acquaints readers with the diverse set of tribal and ethnic factions
in Afghanistan, elucidating the commonalities that bind them
together as Afghans, regardless the regional, cultural, and political
disparities that separate them. He highlights not only how
relatively easy it was to rule these peoples when power was
concentrated in the hands of a small dynastic elite, but how this
fragile political structure fell apart in the nineteenth and twentieth
centuries when the Afghan rulers organised rural militias to expel
the British and then the Soviets. Although the armed insurgency
was largely successful in keeping the foreign occupiers at bay, it
also undermined the legitimacy of the Afghan government and
made the country more difficult to rule over time. Barfield provides
a vivid depiction of how the armed factions in Afghanistan caused
the country to descend into a civil war, resulting in the emergence
of clerical rule by the Taliban and Afghanistan's subsequent
isolation from the international community.6
Following the September 11th attacks, the United States ousted the
Taliban's Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan government because they
had provided shelter to Al Qaeda and Osama Bin Laden. Ahmed
Rashid7 contends that the primary objective of America's military
campaign in Afghanistan, as part of the War on Terror initiative,
was to disrupt, deconstruct, and vanquish both al-Qaeda and the
Taliban within Afghanistan. Additionally, the aim was to prevent
the resurgence of terrorist strongholds that represent a threat to
the United States on Afghan territory. However, soon after
toppling the Taliban regime, America and its allies realised that
effectively countering terrorism required more than just pursuing
Al-Qaeda and its associated organisations. In order to eliminate
international terrorism in Afghanistan, it was necessary to
implement state/nation-building initiatives that focused on
comprehensive reconstruction and socio-political reforms.
Subsequently, the Bush administration revised the policy and
transformed Afghanistan into a state-building endeavour by
implementing the Bonn Agreement on December 5, 2001.8 The
Bonn Conference in 2001, supported by the United Nations, laid
the groundwork for the Afghan republic. It reinstated the 1964
Constitution as the temporary fundamental law and appointed
Hamid Karzai as the temporary political head. The progress
achieved by Afghanistan following the Bonn Agreement provided
a basis for optimism. The State Executive, Legislative, and
Judiciary branches were established, although their development
was uneven. A new Constitution featuring a strong Presidential

system and effective Parliamentary supervision was ratified.
Afghanistan also witnessed the formation of the Afghan National
Army and Afghan National Police, as well as Presidential and
Parliamentary elections. 9
For twenty years, the United States and its allies invested
enormous financial resources on the establishment of an Afghan
state. The objective was to facilitate Afghanistan's transition
towards democracy, establish strong institutions, and strengthen
civil society. However, these efforts resulted in a huge failure.
The Taliban reorganised in Pakistan, a bordering country, carried
out several acts of violence, causing instability in the Afghan
government. The United States-backed Afghan regimes were
consistently plagued by corruption and nepotism. Despite huge
efforts and investment, Afghanistan failed to transition into a
stable democracy. The efforts to establish a modern state were
undermined by various factors such as sectarian warfare, tribal
allegiances, limited levels of human development, a fragile civil
society, institutional deficiencies, and a lack of a culture of
tolerance and inclusivity.10 Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili11 stated
that the Afghan state experienced a breakdown due to its
deficiency in garnering legitimacy among the populace. The
legitimacy question stemmed from various interconnected
reasons. First, the 2004 Constitution established a form of
government that gave Afghan people little opportunity to engage
with or exert significant control over their government. However,
in reality, the disparity between the U.S. intervention's rhetoric
and the actual experiences of citizens grew larger as time went
on. Second, the international coalition's priorities were defeating
an insurgency and establishing authority, which is different from
and persistently in conflict with the advancement of democracy
in Afghanistan. Instead of attempting to improve malfunctioning
state institutions, they established alternative ones, which further
eroded the legitimacy of the state. Third, the state's disintegration
was accelerated by President Ashraf Ghani's corrupt
administration from 2014 to 21. Ghani, who maintained a small,
exclusive network and had limited support, inappropriately
controlled both the economy and the state and exhibited bias
towards ethnic minorities. Another contributing factor to the
collapse of the State-building process was the decision to
implement a centralised governance system. However, certain
sections within the Northern Alliance (one of the four Afghan

groups involved in the Bonn conference) opposed this and
requested a more decentralised system that would better fit
Afghanistan's ethnically diverse population. However, both
Afghan politicians and the international world found the old
unified system appealing. Ultimately, the resurgence of the
Taliban as a powerful political and military entity was made
possible solely via the backing of Pakistan. 12
Nearly 157,000 people have died in the war since 2001,
according to Brown University's Costs of War Project.
According to the UN refugee agency, the number of Afghan
refugees globally reached about 2.5 million by 2018, and more
than 43,000 people have lost their lives. A total of 2,400
Americans have lost their lives, while an additional 20,000 have
sustained injuries. More than 1,100 NATO soldiers have lost
their lives. Approximately 45,000 Afghan army and police
officers have been estimated to have lost their lives over the
course of the last five years, according to analysts. Since 2001, it
is estimated that a substantial number of Taliban combatants,
numbering in the tens of thousands, have been killed. The United
States is thought to have spent around $2 trillion on the war,
including money on development initiatives, support for Afghan
security forces, and counternarcotics operations.13 In addition, it
consistently allocated over 80% of the Afghan national budget on
a yearly basis. While the United States contributed a significant
share of the funds allocated to Afghanistan, other NATO and non-
NATO partners also made substantial expenditures in the country.
The United Kingdom contributed approximately US$30 billion
(S$39.7 billion), while Germany allocated an estimated US$19
billion (S$25.1 billion) towards Afghanistan over the duration of
the conflict.14 As there were no other feasible options available,
America was compelled to participate in negotiations with the
Taliban and declared its intention to withdraw from Afghanistan.
Donald Trump's administration initiated formal negotiations with
the Taliban in order to completely withdraw from Afghanistan,
leading to the signing of the Doha Agreement for Achieving
Peace in Afghanistan in February 2020. According to the Doha
deal, the Taliban committed to halting the activities of al-Qaeda
and other terrorist groups in Afghanistan, in exchange for the
complete withdrawal of NATO soldiers from the country.15 The
Doha deal was largely perceived in Afghanistan and other regions
as a highly beneficial pact for the Taliban. While the goal of the
U.S.-Taliban peace process was to bring about peace in
Afghanistan, there were still a number of issues that needed to be
resolved during intra-Afghan negotiations, including power
sharing, disarming and reintegration of Taliban fighters into
society, and the future of Afghan democracy and constitution.16 In
2021, the United States withdrew from Afghanistan. Following
the withdrawal of American military soldiers and the end of their
activities, the Taliban swiftly toppled the government and took
control without encountering any opposition from Afghan
Security Forces. The Afghan government, under the leadership
of President Mohammad Ashraf Ghani Ahmadzai, collapsed
prior to the predetermined pullout date of August 31, 2021.17
Eventually, the notion of a modern, democratic Afghanistan with
young girls walking to school and work, began to appear more like
a faded dream than a real one. 18
Taliban 2.0 and Crisis in Afghanistan
The resurgence of the Taliban has revived previous apprehensions
and tragic warnings. On August 15, 2023, it had been two years
since the Taliban regime gained power in Afghanistan. The
Taliban's policy was initially unclear, especially in regards to how
the group viewed internal concerns like inclusive governance,
political freedom, women's and human rights, counterterrorism
measures, and issues relating to peace and security in the region.
The last two years, however, have shed light on the Taliban's style
of governance, which is best described as a hybrid of selective
pragmatism and authoritarian policies.19
Afghan Sunni Muslim scholars and clerics, most of whom were
from rural Pashtun backgrounds, founded the Taliban organisation
in 1993–1994. The movement was led by Mullah Mohammad
Omar, the founder and spiritual leader, who passed away on 23
April 2013.20 After the Soviet pulling out in 1989 and the
subsequent collapse of the Soviet-backed Afghan government in
1992, a civil war broke out among several mujahideen factions.
The Taliban was primarily composed of disenchanted civil war
fighters. Many of the people involved in the movement had studied
at seminaries in Pakistan. They used the name Taliban in order to
establish a clear distinction from the mujahideen.21 By September
1996, the Taliban, led by Mullah Omar, had taken over Kabul and
many other parts of the country after outlasting and defeating other
factions. But when the group enforced strict adherence to its view
of Islam in regions under its control and used harsh punishments,
such as public executions and television bans, the Taliban rapidly
lost domestic and international support. The group was formally
recognised by only three nations, namely Pakistan, Saudi Arabia,
and the UAE.22 Nabi Misdaq23 highlighted that the Taliban, during
their governance from 1996 to 2001, imposed rigorous
interpretations of Islamic and Afghan/Pashtun cultural customs,
commonly referred to as Pashtunwali. Pashtunwali represents the
traditional way of life and ethical code followed by the Pashtun
community, residing in Afghanistan and Pakistan. The Taliban,
whose policies included the murder of Afghan civilians, severe
discrimination against religious and ethnic minorities, and the
exclusion of women from education and employment, adhered to a
strict interpretation of Sharia, or Islamic law. Women were
restricted to their households and women who were accused of
adultery were executed in public. As a result, they faced global
condemnation. In March 2001, the Taliban faced global criticism
for demolishing ancient sixth-century Buddha statues, which they
deemed as blasphemous and in violation of Islamic principles. In
exchange for the Taliban serving as a safe refuge for Al-Qaeda
recruits and training camps, Osama Bin Laden and his Al-Qaeda
organisation formed an alliance with the Taliban in which Bin
Laden provided millions of dollars in financial aid and military
support to the Taliban. This, nonetheless, ultimately prompted the
United States to intervene in Afghanistan in 2001, resulting in the
Taliban's overthrow.24 However, many of the Taliban's and Al
Qaeda's surviving militants fled to Pakistan after the American-led
NATO operation, regrouping, and starting an insurgency that
threatened both the Afghan government and the military troops of
the United States and other allied countries.25 After twenty years
of fighting, the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan was overthrown
on August 15, 2021, and the Taliban regained control of the
country.
Though the international community has not formally recognised
the Taliban as the de jure ruling body in Afghanistan, the group has
now established itself as the de facto political authority in the
country. The political system of the Taliban is characterised by its
authoritarian nature. The Taliban's self-declared administration in
Afghanistan is referred to as the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan, a
title they adopted from their first governance established in the
1990s. They have consistently used this title to identify themselves

over their twenty-year-long insurgency. A body known as the
Rahbari Shura, or Quetta Shura, has been in charge of the Taliban
for a number of years. This council is named after the city of
Quetta in Pakistan, where it is thought that Mullah Mohammd
Omar and his key associates sought shelter following the U.S.
invasion. Although the precise nature of the Rahbari Shura's tasks
is still unknown, analysts think that it now oversees the operations
of the Taliban government. Mawlawi Hibatullah Akhundzada is
the leader of the group.26 Acting Prime Minister at the moment is
Omar's confidant, Muhammad Hassan Akhund. Akhund's deputy at
the moment is Mullah Abdul Ghani Baradar, a cofounder of the
Taliban who was instrumental in negotiating a peace deal with
America. Sirajuddin Haqqani, the acting head of the Haqqani
Network, an extremist group operating in the northwest and
southeast of Afghanistan and Pakistan with close ties to the
Taliban, al-Qaeda, and Pakistan's intelligence services, is the acting
interior minister. Omar's son Muhammad Yaqoub is the minister
of defence at the moment. Zabihullah Mujahid is the official
spokesperson for the government, while Mawlawi Amir Khan
Muttaqi is the acting minister of foreign affairs. 27
The group still lacks social and political cohesiveness as well as a
governance structure that can accommodate Afghanistan's many
political and ethnic groups. Taliban has not fully achieved or
honoured their commitments to inclusion and ensuring adequate
representation of ethnic minorities. While the Taliban have
included symbolic representatives from a number of ethnic groups,
including Tajiks, Hazaras, and Uzbeks, there are legitimate
concerns about how inclusive the Taliban's processes of
governance and decision-making are. Concerns have been voiced
by ethnic minorities about their involvement and representation in
the administration.28 The Taliban announced the appointment of a
33-member caretaker cabinet, consisting entirely of men, on
September 7, 2021. The cabinet was primarily made up of Pashtun
Taliban and Haqqani veterans, hardliners, and loyalists; just two
Tajiks and one Uzbek were included in the establishment, and there
were no Hazaras. As per the instructions of Mullah Haibatullah
Akhundzada, the provisional cabinet was expanded by 27 members
in November 2022. Remarkably, the government's ethnic and
gender composition remained unchanged as a result of this
increase.29
The Taliban have suspended the implementation of the previous

Afghan constitution of 2004, which served as the governing
framework for Afghanistan prior to their takeover. Currently, the
Taliban has neither declared nor enforced a new Constitution as a
replacement. The lack of a Constitution in Afghanistan creates
concerns regarding the future system of governance and legal
framework. Nevertheless, the present temporary arrangement
shares resemblances with the governing structure adopted by the
Taliban during their prior reign in the 1990s.30 As Hasan Abbas
notes, the Taliban government lacks a cogent theory of governance.
The leaders exhibit a complete disregard for democracy. The
Taliban aims to construct an Islamic Emirate that adheres to
Islamic law, primarily influenced by the Hanafi School of Islamic
jurisprudence. The group asserts its implementation of divine
governance in Afghanistan and perceives itself as the instrument of
this divine authority. The ideology promotes a strict and narrow
understanding of Islam, emphasises religious instruction, and holds
the belief that women lack intellectual capacity and should be
restricted to their households. The Taliban have abolished two
significant ministries, namely the Electoral Commission and the
Ministry of Women's Affairs. The Ministry of Women's Affairs
have been replaced by the Ministry of Vice and Virtue, which
represents a setback for women's rights. 31
Since coming into power, the Taliban assert that they have made
progress in certain domains. There has been a significant decline in
the incidence of violence. Currently, Afghanistan is experiencing a
decrease in armed violence compared to previous years. But a key
contributing factor in this is that the majority of the violence in the
past has been carried out by the group that currently controls
Afghanistan. In addition, the Taliban assert that they have achieved
economic stability in Afghanistan by providing a consistent flow of
income through taxation, customs, and trade. As a result, there was
a moderate improvement in the economy accompanied by a
reduction in corruption. Nevertheless, the Taliban's proclaimed
accomplishments are overshadowed by the dire humanitarian
condition, widespread poverty, oppression of religious minorities,
and the ongoing violation of women's rights. The stability of
Afghanistan and the surrounding region is increasingly in danger
due to the threat posed by transnational terrorist organisations,
particularly Islamic State Khorasan Province (ISKP) and Tehreek-
e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP). Taliban's claims to prevent Afghan
territory from serving as a sanctuary for global terrorist groups

have been undermined by the recent increase in attacks by these
organisations. This has raised additional distrust regarding the
group's dedication to addressing such security threat.32
One of the worst humanitarian catastrophes in the history of the
globe is presently affecting Afghanistan. Over the past twenty
years, Afghanistan has seen a great deal of hardship, including
food shortages, restricted access to healthcare, economic
instability, internal displacement, and warfare. International
economic assistance and billions of dollars' worth of reserves held
by the Afghan central bank were frozen after the US withdrew
from the country to keep them out of the hands of the Taliban.
These events set the stage for serious, complex, and interconnected
economic and humanitarian challenges in Afghanistan.33 Twenty
million Afghans are currently experiencing chronic food shortages,
as Hassan Abbas rightly notes. Malnutrition affected 3.2 million
children in 2022. Since the American financial support ended in
2021, the Afghan economy has decreased by 20% to 30%. An $8
billion annual budget financed by international sources supported
the Ashraf Ghani administration prior to the second Taliban
invasion. Without foreign funding, Afghanistan's budget has now
decreased to $2.6 billion, with a $500 million expected deficits.
Approximately 40% of the population is currently suffering from
acute food insecurity. Within this group, around 3.4 million
individuals, which accounts for 8% of the entire population, are
facing emergency levels of food insecurity.34 Approximately 2.6
million Afghan refugees are officially registered worldwide,
according to UNHCR data. Currently, Pakistan and Iran account
for 55% and 44% of the total number of refugees, which is
approximately 2.2 million.35 The other main issue is the ongoing
mistreatment of religious minorities, particularly Shia Hazaras, for
which Taliban authorities have not done much to defend these
communities against unlawful attacks and suicide bombings, or to
give victims and their families access to essential medical care and
other support.36
Zabiullah Mujahid, the Taliban's spokesperson, made a pledge
during his first-ever press conference to uphold women's rights
within the framework of Islamic law. The group would allow
women to go to school and work in the public sector, he said.
Furthermore, he encouraged women to pursue employment in the
government sector. The Taliban, however, quickly started to
reverse their statements about women's rights. Madrassas or

Islamic schools have been the exclusive educational option
accessible to females of all age groups. The Taliban have not only
prohibited women from attending school, but they have also denied
them access to the most fundamental human rights, such as the
freedom of movement and the right to work. Afghan women were
prohibited from working for foreign and domestic relief
organisations including United Nations agencies by the Taliban.
The de facto government abolished women's political participation
rights by disbanding the Ministry of Women's Affairs and
removing women from all cabinet positions.37 The freedom of
expression and the media have been severely restricted. Peaceful
demonstrators were subjected to unlawful disappearances, torture,
and arbitrary arrests. The Taliban created an environment of fear
by carrying out extrajudicial killings, arbitrary detentions, torture,
and wrongful imprisonment of those they believed to be their
opponents without facing any repercussions. The Afghanistan
Independent Human Rights Commission (AIHRC), the country's
human rights authority, remained closed, leaving significantly less
space for civil society organisations to document and report on
human rights.38
The Taliban have been transitioning from an insurgency to a
government for the past two years since taking control. The group's
efforts to become recognised internationally as the rightful
representatives of Afghanistan are still hampered by their refusal to
honour pledges made about inclusivity, women's and human rights,
adhering to international norms and standards, and providing
assurances regarding preventing terrorism from Afghan soil. There
is a significant disparity between the Taliban's declared policies
and their actual conduct in terms of implementing them. Those
countries and organisations who are carefully working with the
Taliban are growing more suspects as a result of the group's
growing unwillingness to accomplish their promises. Furthermore,
if the Taliban keep going in this negative direction, it will make it
more difficult for them to get diplomatic backing and humanitarian
aid. 39
India - Afghanistan Relation
The ties between Afghanistan and India have a long history that
began during the Mauryan era.40 India's long-standing affinity with
Afghanistan as a "cultural province of India" may be seen in
Rabindranath Tagore's masterwork "Kabuliwala" which illuminates

the political, social, cultural, and emotional connections that exist
between the people of the two nations.41 After India gained
independence in 1947, it grew even more formidable. After gaining
independence, India has consistently upheld the principle of
helping the Kabul government, but from 1996 to 2001, this policy
was abandoned as the Taliban took control of the country. Pakistan
has never desired hostile neighbours on either side of its borders,
which is why it has always been apprehensive of relations between
Afghanistan and India. Once the Taliban took power with its
support, the wish for a friendly administration in Kabul was
realised. New Delhi declined to recognise the Taliban government
and hence abstained from establishing any diplomatic relations
with Kabul. The history of India-Afghanistan relations saw a
diplomatic void during the Taliban era. India revitalised its
relations with Kabul only after the US intervention resulted in the
ousting of the Taliban regime. 42
Jawaharlal Nehru's far-reaching knowledge of Afghan society and
his amicable relationships with numerous Afghan leaders, such as
Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, facilitated the enhancement of the
relationship between India and Afghanistan. The two nations
agreed to recognise and respect each other's independence and
rights when they signed the Treaty of Friendship in 1950 with
Nehru's support. Subsequently, several other treaties were enacted,
including the Treaty of Trade and Commerce (1950), with the aim
of enhancing economic collaboration between the two nations.43
After taking over as prime minister, Indira Gandhi carried on her
father's legacy by keeping friendly relations with the Kabul
administration. It continued without interruption during the Cold
War era and persisted even after the 1978 Saur Revolution, which
led to the establishment of a communist government that was in
favour of the Soviet Union. Following the fall of Mohammed
Najibullah's Soviet puppet government and the ensuing civil war,
India's presence in Afghanistan drastically decreased. During the
Burhanuddin Rabbani regime in Afghanistan from 1992 to 1996,
India maintained a modest presence in the nation. India's situation
worsened tremendously after the Rabbani regime's downfall in
1996 and the subsequent takeover of power by the Taliban.44
India and Afghanistan have seen a marked improvement in their
relations after the US-led international forces overthrew the
Taliban government in 2001. India's consistent support of the
Afghan opposition groups known as the "Northern Alliance,"

which fought the Taliban in the 1990s, earned it favourable
political positions in the foreign policy of the new Afghan
government. This is the context in which New Delhi chose to
approach Afghanistan through a "soft power" approach, or by
sticking to civilian issues as opposed to military ones. 45 India
supports Afghanistan's efforts to establish a modern
democratic state. India engages in proactive efforts to enhance its
diplomatic ties with Afghanistan. India was among the prominent
nations that acknowledged the recently formed Afghan
government. India maintained strict adherence to the principles
outlined in the Bonn Agreement of 2001 in its Afghan policy after
the 9/11 attacks. Furthermore, even after the Taliban began to show
indications of resurgence in 2005-2006, India still saw them as a
crushed army that should not be engaged. 46
India's involvement in Afghanistan, according to Harsh Pant, has
been predicated on four main tenets: first, to counter Pakistan;
second, to contain extremism; third, because Afghanistan is seen as
a gateway to the energy-rich Central Asian region; and fourth, to
maintain robust economic ties with Afghanistan.47 India has taken
steps to establish infrastructure in Afghanistan that can serve as an
efficient 'bridge' to Central Asia. India's endeavours to establish
Chabahar Port in Iran are aimed at creating a crucial hub for a
diverse transportation network, facilitating the movement of
products and passengers between Iran, Afghanistan, and India.
India has also announced plans to construct a railway line from the
central Afghan iron ore resources of Hajigak to Zahedan, with a
connection to Chabahar later on.48 India continues to cause great
concern in Pakistan, particularly with its powerful military
establishment, despite the country's mostly developmental
involvement in Afghanistan. The Pakistan military has been
intensely focused on achieving "strategic depth" in Afghanistan. In
simple terms, this has meant the pursuit of a friendly Afghan
government that Pakistan could rely on to offer refuge to the
Pakistani troops in the case of a major Indian invasion into
Pakistani territory in a future confrontation.49 Afghanistan was
seen by Pakistan as a useful counterbalance to India's dominance in
South Asia. Afghanistan has continued to be the main focus of
Indian regional policy due to its geostrategic position next to
Pakistan, Iran, and the Central Asian States. India is dedicated to
advancing the stability, security, and prosperity of Afghanistan,
recognising its significant political, strategic, and economic value

to India. Moreover, this will provide comprehensive regional
stability and, more specifically, a durable solution to India's
challenges pertaining to extremism, terrorism, and secession.
Assuring an independent, secure, democratic, and undivided
Afghanistan, free from outside pressures, is in India's economic
and security interests.50 India will have a solid base in South, West,
and Central Asia to investigate potential regional economic
connections if Afghanistan remains democratic and stable.51
India’s Taliban Dilemma: Soft Power Strategy to Stay
Relevant
India's influence in Kabul has significantly declined since the
Taliban's assumption of power. This decline can be linked to the
strained nature of India's relationship with the new Taliban
leadership, which has also led to a lack of established channels of
communication. Furthermore, the ascension of the Taliban to
power led to a surge in Pakistan's influence over Afghanistan.
More than Afghanistan, Pakistan and China are the primary
sources of India's border security worries. However, terrorist
organisations like Pakistan's Jaish-e-Mohammed (JeM) had made
Afghanistan their haven during the Taliban's first term in office.
India's main objectives are to protect its territorial integrity and
combat terrorist organisations like Al-Qaeda in the Indian
Subcontinent (AQIS) that may attack Kashmir, therefore going
back to that state of affairs might be extremely dangerous.
Therefore, India seeks to prevent the Taliban from fostering anti-
India sentiments in order to reduce the risk of terrorism within the
country.52 The induction of numerous Haqqani Network leaders in
the interim Taliban government has exacerbated India's situation in
Afghanistan. Among the several groups within the Taliban, the
Haqqani Network has the strongest ties with Pakistan's Inter-
Services Intelligence (ISI). This group is notorious for conducting
assaults against Indian individuals, projects, and personnel in
Afghanistan. An example of such an incident is the act of suicide
bombing that targeted the Indian embassy in Kabul in both 2008
and 2014. 53
The early days of the Taliban regime seemed identical to the
previous Taliban regime of 1996. In contrast to other regional
powers who maintained operations at their embassies in Kabul,
India closed its mission there in spite of demands from the Taliban
to continue operations. In such unlikeable situation, India’s non-

coercive, constructive, developmental and cultural engagement
commonly referred as the terminology coined by Joseph Nye “Soft
power approach” in Afghanistan for more than two decade to
protect its interest there is at stake. Since the Taliban took control
of Afghanistan, the political landscape in the region has drastically
changed, leaving India facing several challenges. India grappled
with the choice of whether to establish communication lines with
the Taliban. Nonetheless, it seems that the sticky position has been
partially handled, since it is currently interacting with Islamic
Emirate officials without recognising or endorsing it.54
A delegation headed by J P Singh, Joint Secretary (Ministry of
External Affairs), “is on a visit to Kabul to oversee the delivery
operations of our humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan,”
according to a June 2 announcement from the Ministry of External
Affairs, as noted by Vivek Katju. 55 Although acknowledging that
the delegation would engage with "senior members of the Taliban,"
the Ministry of External Affairs (MEA) explicitly indicated that
this interaction should be understood solely within the framework
of providing aid to the Afghan people, with whom India shares
historical and cultural connections. The MEA emphasised that
these enduring relationships will continue to shape India's
approach. A representative for the MEA later that day advised the
media not to interpret the visit too broadly. The Taliban has shown
no reluctance to discuss the ramifications of the Singh visit, even
as the government has been cautious about them. It is not
unexpected that the Taliban is eager to gain international
recognition. Their attitude also suggests that they are open to
establishing connections with New Delhi, regardless of any
concerns Pakistan may have about India's presence in Afghanistan.
Following Singh's meeting with acting foreign minister Amir Khan
Muttaqi, a Taliban representative tweeted that the discussions
encompassed diplomatic relations, trade, and humanitarian aid
between the two nations. Muttaqi regarded Singh's visit as a
promising initiation in the bilateral relations between the two
nations. According to reports, Abbas Stanikzai, a former officer of
the Afghan army who received training at the Indian Military
Academy and serves as Muttaqi's deputy, emphasised during
Singh's meeting that the relationship between the two countries
would not be affected by conflicts with other nations. This clearly
demonstrated the Taliban's intention to establish independent
connections with India, regardless of its existing affiliations with

Pakistan. 56
The announcement by the MEA that a delegation will be visiting
Kabul is hardly shocking, in Sushant Sareen's opinion.57 There has
been a rumour circulating for some time now that India was
thinking of reaching out to the Taliban administration.
Furthermore, it was reported that a delegation of Indian officials
visited Kabul in February 2022 to explore the possibility of
reopening the Indian embassy—albeit on a very small scale and
with very specific goals. Prior to the Taliban's capture of Kabul,
there had been ongoing communication between India and the
Taliban. However, the first officially acknowledged encounter
between Indian officials and the Taliban took place in Doha, two
weeks after the Taliban assumed control of Kabul. The Taliban was
also consistently sending out feelers expressing their desire to
mend fences with India. The Taliban have expressed a strong
interest in establishing closer cultural, economic, and security ties
with India. They have made security guarantees contingent upon
India opening its mission. This desire has been conveyed by many
Taliban representatives, including Anas Haqqani, Sher Abbas
Stanikzai, Zabiullah Mujahid, and Foreign Minister Amir Khan
Muttaqi. An important turning point occurred when the Indian
government made the decision to provide 50,000 tonnes of wheat,
pharmaceuticals, and vaccines to Afghanistan as a form of
humanitarian assistance.58
Even though India is currently interacting with Islamic Emirate
officials, challenging issues still remain. India has not formally or
publicly interacted with the Taliban since it does not differentiate
between the “good” and the “bad” or the “old” and the “new”
Taliban, regardless of the reportedly secret channel or limited talks.
Although some analysts have said that it would be beneficial to
work with the Taliban since they believe that the current Taliban is
not the same as the previous one, the Afghan Constitution and the
new political structure still do not favourably reflect the current
situation in the nation. Furthermore, the Taliban continue to be
regarded with suspicion, particularly in regards to human rights,
namely women's rights, and democracy.59
India did not have a diplomatic mission in Afghanistan from 1996
to 2001 and never acknowledged the legitimacy of the first Taliban
government that took office in that nation in 1996. Rather of
engaging in dialogue with Taliban leaders, New Delhi provided

assistance to the Tajik-dominated Northern Alliance led by Ahmed
Shah Massoud as a counterforce against the Taliban.60 The main
reasons for New Delhi's resentment of the first Taliban regime
were its terrible human rights record, its longstanding hostility
towards religious minorities in the country, the fact that most other
countries did not recognise the Taliban regime, and its close ties to
terrorists who opposed India, particularly those who made it
possible for Indian Airlines flight IC-814 to be hijacked in 1999
and land in Afghanistan. In the history of India-Afghan ties, the
Taliban era created a diplomatic vacuum.61 India was adamant that
the national security of the country would be jeopardised by the
Taliban-controlled Afghanistan, and that it may also have
difficulties in fostering relations with the Central Asian region.
India has consistently opposed the Taliban due to its perception of
them as a proxy for Pakistan and their ability to escalate tensions in
Kashmir. 62
Following the Taliban's second takeover, India discontinued
diplomatic ties with Afghanistan and closed its embassies. But in
the nearly two years since Kabul fell, India has taken a few modest
moves in the direction of forging a cooperative relationship with
the Taliban-run government in Afghanistan. This evolution may
have been influenced by a combination of geo-political and
strategic considerations. The decision to send Indian officials back
to Kabul was influenced by several factors. These factors include
Afghanistan's strategic location, India's interest in the region,
expected security guarantees from the Taliban leadership, and the
perception that India cannot afford to stay out of the picture while
regional players like China, Iran, Pakistan, and Russia increase
their presence in Kabul. 63 Experts also assume that the recent
tensions between Kabul and Islamabad as a result of orders from
Pakistan's government to evacuate approximately 1.7 million
Afghan refugees and migrants who are undocumented, as well as
the fact that the Taliban's unwillingness to crack down on the TTP,
a close ideological and organisational ally could be another factor
behind the India-Taliban engagement.64
Given this, India has been gradually changing its approach towards
Afghanistan. In an attempt to interact with the Taliban and
contribute to the stabilisation of Afghanistan, India is now
sincerely re-evaluating its stance and heading towards a balancing
act. Still, New Delhi has not formally recognized the Kabul
government. However, similar to other nations, the crisis-ridden

nation's rapidly shifting dynamics have made it exceedingly
challenging to develop a long-term, viable strategy. Even with the
Taliban in control, how can India restructure its policy in
Afghanistan to regain a strategic position there? Given the current
situation where the Taliban has assumed control, it is imperative
for India to establish communication and cooperation with them in
order to regain a specific degree of strategic influence in
Afghanistan. It appears that New Delhi has made some innovative
humanitarian steps in this direction, which could all work together
to create official channels to interact between the Indian
government and the Taliban.65
Afghanistan confronts numerous obstacles, including severe
economic turbulence, humanitarian crises, and shattered
institutions due to the lack of help from the West. Furthermore, one
of the major issues the Taliban government is facing is a food
scarcity. Given the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian situation and
the urgent requests made by UN agencies, India continues to offer
humanitarian assistance, including food and medical supplies, for
the Afghan people in keeping with its decades-long civilian-centric
strategy, often known as the soft power approach. To distribute
wheat throughout Afghanistan, the Indian government has
partnered with the United Nations World Food Programme
(UNWFP). In accordance with this arrangement, India will have
given UNWFP centres in Afghanistan 47,500 MTs of wheat
support by August 2023. India has so far contributed around 200
tonnes of medical aid, which includes necessary medications,
COVID vaccinations, anti-TB drugs, and surgical and medical
supplies. They were given to the administrators of the Indira
Gandhi Children Hospital in Kabul. India has also kept up its
support for the Habibia School in Kabul, sending tonnes of
supplies for disaster relief, winter clothes, and other items.
Furthermore, the union budget of India for the fiscal year 2023-24
has allocated a specific amount of $25 million as a development
aid package for Afghanistan.66 This provision has been positively
received by the Taliban. It has been reported that the Taliban have
asked India to complete roughly twenty unfinished infrastructure
development projects throughout the nation.67 Currently, there are
around 14,000 Afghan students enrolled in different universities in
India. Over the past 16 years, India has emerged as the top choice
for Afghan students, with more than 60,000 successfully
completing their study there. India's actions on the ground

demonstrate its genuine concern for the welfare of the Afghan
population, as exemplified by its delivery of food grains, COVID
vaccines, and assistance during the devastating earthquake of the
previous year. Regardless of who is in power, people-to-people
contacts have always been the core of Indo-Afghan relations.68
For its own economic reasons, India also recognises Afghanistan's
strategic importance in the area. To sustain its economic clout in
the area, it must continue to make investments like the ones it
made earlier, sell and import goods via the 218-kilometer Zaranj -
Delaram route, and install 202 kilometres of energy transmission
lines from Uzbekistan.69 India has refrained from engaging in
military action or political meddling in Afghanistan; instead, New
Delhi has concentrated on fostering people- to -
people relationships and employing soft power strategies. This is
the reason India still has goodwill with common Afghans and
possibly even with some members of the Taliban leadership. India
provided almost $3 billion in aid for projects in Afghanistan
between 2001 and 2021 following the fall of the first Taliban
government. India has provided assistance to Afghanistan in
constructing several important infrastructure projects, including the
new Parliament building, the Zaranj-Delaram Road, the Afghan-
India Friendship Dam (AIFD), previously known as the Salma
Dam Power Project, and the Pul-e Khumri Transmission Line. 70 A
significant proportion of its aid was allocated towards skill
development initiatives and education. All these development
activities have boosted India's soft power in Afghanistan.
Conclusion
On August 15, 2023, it had been two years since the Taliban
regime gained power in Afghanistan. The Taliban's policy was
initially unclear, especially in regards to how the group viewed
internal concerns like inclusive governance, political freedom,
women's and human rights, counterterrorism measures, and issues
relating to peace in the region. The last two years, however, have
shed light on the Taliban's style of governance. Now, Taliban
seems to have cemented its status as the de facto authority in
Afghanistan. However, Afghanistan under Taliban is facing a
multitude of interconnected and complex humanitarian, economic,
food scarcity, security and political crises. This may be due to the
lack of international support. The group's aspirations to gain
international recognition as Afghanistan's legitimate

representatives are hindered by their failure to fulfil commitments
to establish a governance framework that accommodates the
country's diverse ethnic and political factions, protect women's and
human rights, adhere to international norms and standards, and
provide assurances of preventing terrorism originating from
Afghan soil.
Following the Taliban's second takeover, the dilemma faced by
India is with the choice of whether to engage with the Taliban or
not. India can choose to engage, isolate itself, or oppose. These are
broad alternatives. For the time being, the third alternative is not an
option for India and the International Community. India has only
considered the option of isolation as of now. But analysts say that
there comes a moment at which this strategy will no longer be as
effective, particularly because more nations are beginning to
'engage' the Taliban.71 Nonetheless, it seems that the muggy
position has been partially handled, since India is currently
interacting with Islamic Emirate officials without recognising or
endorsing it. Nevertheless, in Afghanistan today, the Taliban rule is
a reality. Considering the rapidly deteriorating humanitarian
situation and the urgent requests made by UN agencies, India
continues to offer humanitarian assistance, including food and
medical supplies, for the Afghan people in keeping with its
decades-long civilian-centric policy or soft power approach. India,
historically, has contributed to infrastructure, healthcare, and
education projects in Afghanistan. India's commitment to the
stability and growth of Afghanistan is strengthen by this approach,
which also fosters goodwill among the Afghan people and has even
compelled the Taliban to recognise India's positive role.72 Indian
government also recently decided to send Indian officials to Kabul.
There are many factors behind the recent India – Taliban
engagement including Afghanistan's strategic location, India's
interest in the region, expected security guarantees from the
Taliban leadership and the perception that India cannot afford to
stay out of the picture while regional players like China, Iran,
Pakistan, and Russia increase their presence in Kabul. Active
engagement with the Taliban is something that India needs to think
about. If not, it might lose ground in Afghanistan and the region. 73
India has continued to use a soft power approach with the Taliban
in an effort to safeguard its interests, encourage stability in the
region, and persuade the group to operate in accordance with the
terms of the Doha Peace Deal without using force or confrontation.

However, it's essential to note that engagement with the Taliban
comes with risks and challenges, given the group's history and
ideology. Being friendly with the Taliban does not imply support
for their ideology. Engagement encompasses more than just
providing economic, development, and humanitarian help. India,
along with other countries, may contribute to the revival of
development processes in Afghanistan by actively engaging with
the country.74Interacting with the Taliban might also be crucial in
laying the foundation for a diverse government, which is viewed
by the global community as a respectable method to guarantee the
involvement of various ethnic groups in the decision-making
procedures in Afghanistan. India and the other regional neighbours
of Afghanistan need to work towards building a relationship with
the Taliban in order to persuade them to recognise the
establishment of an inclusive government in exchange for
diplomatic recognition. Moreover, India should actively engage in
facilitating dialogue with the Taliban, both independently and
through regional organisations such as SAARC and the Shanghai
Cooperation Organisation. 75 This engagement aims to exert
sufficient influence on the Taliban to ensure their adherence to
democratic governance, respect for human rights, and the inclusion
of women and minority ethnic groups in their government.
References
1. Seth G. Jones, “In the Graveyard of Empires: America’s War in
Afghanistan”, W.W. Norton, New York, 2010
2. Thomas Barfield, “Afghanistan: A Political and Cultural History”,
Princeton University Press, 2010
3. Anwesha Ghosh, “The Crisis in Afghanistan and the Taliban Regime”,
Indian Council of World Affairs (ICWA), January 2023, p. 8
4. Barnett R. Rubin, “Afghanistan: What Everyone Needs to Know”, Oxford
University Press, 2020
5. Thomas Barfield, “Afghanistan: A Political and Cultural History”, N0.2
6. Ibid.
7. Ahmed Rashid, “Descent into Chaos: The United States and the Failure of
Nation Building in Pakistan, Afghanistan, and Central Asia”, Viking, 2008
8. William Maley, “Transition in Afghanistan Hope, Despair and the Limits of
Statebuilding”, Routledge, 2021
9. Ibid
10. Hassan Abbas, “The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan After the Americans
Left”, Yale University Press, 2023
11. Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, “The Collapse of Afghanistan”, Journal of
Democracy, Volume No. 33, Issue No. 1, January, 2022, pp. 40–54
12. Ibid, pp. 40–54
13. Lindsay Maizland, “U.S.-Taliban Peace Deal: What to Know”, Council on
Foreign Relation, March 2, 2020 3
14. Zahid Shahab Ahmed, Faizan Fakhar and Khurram Abbas, “Afghanistan
(2001-2022): Challenges of Nation-Building”, Institute of South Asian
Studies (ISAS) Brief, No. 993, 25 January 2023, pp. 1-3
15. Jennifer Brick Murtazashvili, “The Collapse of Afghanistan”, No. 11, pp.
40-54
16. S Yaqub Ibrahimi, “False Negotiations and the Fall of Afghanistan to the
Taliban”, International Journal: Canada’s Journal of Global Policy
Analysis, Volume 77, Issue 2, June 2022, pp. 168-187
17. Hassan Abbas, “The Return of the Taliban: Afghanistan After the
Americans Left”, No. 10, pp.26 -78
18. Anwesha Ghosh, “The Crisis in Afghanistan and the Taliban Regime”, No.
3, pp. 26-40
19. Amina Khan, “Afghanistan Monitor”, Friedrich-EbertStiftung (FES)
Pakistan, Vol. 4, October 2023, pp. 1-36
20. Ahmad Shuja Jamal and William Maley, “The Decline and Fall of
Republican Afghanistan”, Hurst & Co. (Publishers) Ltd., 2023, pp. 26-30
21. Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia”, Yale University Press, 2000
22. Congressional Research Service, “Taliban Government in Afghanistan:
Background and Issues for Congress”, November 2, 202, pp.1-10
23. Nabi Misdaq, “Afghanistan Political Frailty and External Interference”,
Routledge, 2008
24. Ahmed Rashid, “Taliban: Militant Islam, Oil and Fundamentalism in
Central Asia”, No. 21
25. Antonio Giustozzi, “The Taliban at War: 2001-2018: 2001 – 2021”, Oxford
University Press, 2019
26. Lindsay Maizland, “The Taliban in Afghanistan”, Council on Foreign
Relations, January 19, 2023
27. Ibid.
28. Amina Khan, “Afghanistan Monitor”, No. 19, pp.1-36
29. Anwesha Ghosh, “The Crisis in Afghanistan and the Taliban Regime”, N0.
3, pp.44-45
30. Amina Khan, Afghanistan Monitor, No. 19, pp.1-36

Americans Left”, No.10
33. Anwesha Ghosh, “The Crisis in Afghanistan and the Taliban Regime”, No.
3, pp.8-9
35. Amina Khan, “Afghanistan Monitor”, No. 19, pp- 17-18
36. Human Rights Watch, “Afghanistan: ISIS Group Targets Religious
Minorities”, September 6, 2022
38. Ibid, pp.1-36
40. Sourish Ghosh, “Enemy at the Gates”: An Analysis on India’s Experiences
with the Taliban, Jadavpur Journal of International Relations, Volume 24,
Issue 2, 2020, pp.1-20
41. Avinash Paliwal, “My Enemy’s Enemy: India in Afghanistan from the Soviet
Invasion to the US Withdrawal”, Harper Collins, 2017, pp. 27–46
with the Taliban, No. 40, pp.1–20
43. Ibid, pp. 1-20
44. Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan”, CIDOB Policy Research
Project, January 2012, pp.2-3
45. Reyaz Ahmad Ganaie & Muzaffar Ahmad Ganaie, “India’s Afghanistan
Policy: A Quest for Strategic Space Post the US Withdrawal”, Humanities
and Social Sciences Communications, Vol. 9, No. 462, 2022, p.3
46. Ibid. pp.3-5
47. Harsh V. Pant, “India in Afghanistan: A Trajectory in Motion”, Jadavpur
Journal of International Relations, Volume 17 Issue 1, June 2013, pp. 103-
127
48. Aryaman Bhatnagar, “The Afghanistan Factor in India's Approach to
Central Asia”, ORF Issue Brief, Observer Research Foundation, October
2014, No. 78
49. Sumit Ganguly, “India’s Role in Afghanistan”, No. 44, pp.4-5
50. Sumit Ganguly and Nicholas Howenstein, “India-Pakistan Rivalry in
Afghanistan”, Journal of International Affairs, Volume,63, No.1, pp. 127-
140
51. Ashfaq M. Ali, “India’s Afghan Policy Prospects and Challenges”, The
Journal of Central Asian Studies, Vol. XXI, 2014, pp. 143-144
Americans Left”, No.10, p.227
53. Ibid, pp. 228-229
54. Sushant Sareen, “India’s Outreach to the Taliban: Engage, Don’t Endorse”,
Raisina Debates, Observer Research Foundation, Jun 08, 2022
55. Vivek Katju, “Why India Must Engage Taliban”, The Indian Express, June
7, 2022
56. Ibid.
No. 54
58. Ibid.
59. Rajen Harshé, “India’s Afghan Policy: Challenges and Anxieties”,
Economic & Political Weekly, Vol. 56, Issue No. 35, 28 August, 2021
with the Taliban, No. 40, pp.1–20
61. Avinash Paliwal, “India’s Taliban Dilemma: To Contain or to Engage?”,
Journal of Strategic Studies, 2015, 40(1-2), pp. 35–67
with the Taliban, No. 40, p.9
63. Ashraf Nehal, “Why India is Cautiously Engaging with the Taliban Regime
in Afghanistan”, Scroll, Feb 27, 2023
64. Ibid.
Policy: A Quest for Strategic Space Post the US Withdrawal” No. 45, pp. 3-
5
66. Dipanjan Roy Chaudhury, “India Continues its Humanitarian Assistance to
Afghanistan”, The Economic Times, August 16, 2023
67. Vinay Kaura, “India-Taliban Relations: A Careful Balancing Act, Driven by
Pragmatism”, Middle East Institute, May 30, 2023
68. Shivam Shekhawat, “India’s Taliban Dilemma: Diplomatic Engagement and
Moral Disquietness”, Raisina Debates, Observer Research Foundation, Mar
24, 2023
70. Peerzada Tufail Ahmad, “An Analysis of India’s Soft Power Policy in
Afghanistan”, India Quarterly: A Journal of International Affairs, Volume
78, Issue 4, December 2022, pp. 634 – 653
No. 54
72. Nirupama Subramanian, “Taliban: Asked India to Complete its
Development Projects in Afghanistan”, The Indian Express, 16 August,
2022
73. Ashraf Nehal, “Why India is Cautiously Engaging with the Taliban Regime
in Afghanistan”, No. 63
Policy: A Quest for Strategic Space Post the US Withdrawal” No. 45, pp. 3-
5
75. Ibid. pp.3-5
The Sixth Schedule of Indian Constitution…. 189
The Sixth Schedule of The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-189-205
Indian Constitution: Its https://www.amu.ac.in/
Genesis and Demand in nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
the Contemporary
Politics.
Mohammad, Gukhu Mega and Sartik Bagh*
ABSTRACT
The British policy of segregation and non-
interference was swapped by assimilation and
development policies with the birth of independence
and the approval of the Constitution of free India.
The Indian Constitution provides native
communities with several protections. There are the
Shielding Provisions to protect them from all forms
of social injustice and exploitation, the
Developmental Provisions to endorse education and
developmental activities, the Reservation Provisions
to certify their representation in legislative bodies
and government jobs, and the Administrative
Provisions under the Fifth and Sixth Schedules offer
for special administrative setup to provide
autonomy of self-governance according to their
customary traditions. The tribal people live in
contiguous areas, unlike other communities. So, an
area tactic was adopted for administrative and
developmental purposes. Under the Constitution,
“Scheduled Areas” are declared by the President
after discussion with the State Governors. These
Areas have been selected to protect the benefits of
Scheduled Tribes concerning their land and other
social matters and are administrated through the
Fifth or Sixth Schedule provisions. The Scheduled
Areas of the North East are protected under the
*Department of Political Science, Babasaheb Bhimrao Ambedkar University, Lucknow

Sixth Schedule provisions; the rest of the other

Scheduled Areas are protected by the Fifth
Schedule provisions. This paper’s main objective is
to trace the historical root of the genesis of the sixth
schedule or Autonomous District Council in India
and the demand for the sixth schedule provision by
many tribal-dominated regions in the contemporary
politics of India.
Keywords: Sixth schedule, Autonomy, Democracy,
Decentralization, Development.
Introduction.
When the Conservatives were overpowered, and the Labour Party
won the 1945 elections, the political condition in Britain changed.
Clement Attlee was elected Prime Minister of the United Kingdom.
His government was enthusiastic about observing the cause of
Indian independence with affection. On February 19, 1946,
Patrick-Lawrence, Secretary of State for India, made a
proclamation in the House of Lords announcing His Majesty's
Government's decision to send a special mission of Cabinet
Ministers to India, consisting of himself, Sir Stafford Cripps, and
AV. Alexander, to hold consultations with Indian leaders to
accomplish full self-government in India as soon as possible. On
March 24, 1946, the Cabinet Mission arrived in Delhi. Subsequent
meetings with Indian leaders and British authorities in India *
formulated a strategy for determining India's political issues and
establishing a new constitutional framework.
The Cabinet Mission's proclamation of May 16, 1946, declared the
tribal areas and the excluded areas as requiring the special attention
of the Constituent Assembly. The Constituent Assembly's
Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities, and
Tribal and Excluded Areas was expected to provide a plan for the
governance of these areas to the Constituent Assembly. According
to the resolution passed by the Constituent Assembly on January
24, 1947, the agency's key assignment was to work out a modus
operandi in the constitutional setup for the Excluded and Partially
Excluded tribals Area, permitting them to democratically safeguard
their ethnic identity and culture. Following that, on February 2,
1947, the Advisory Committee established three sub-committees,
which are shown below1
 Excluded and Partially Excluded Areas in provinces other

than Assam.
 North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Area
Committee.
 North-west Frontier Province and Baluchistan Tribal and
Excluded Area Committee.
Setting up this Committee laid down that the Advisory Committee
should appoint Sub-Committee to prepare schemes for the
administration of the North-Eastern Tribal Areas. At its meeting on
27th February 1947, the Advisory Committee set up a Sub-
Committee on North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded
Areas to accompany it analytically and proficiently. The Sub-
Committee was supervised by Gopinath Bordoloi and Rev. J. J.M.
Nichols Roy, A.V. Thakkar, Rup Nath Brahma, and Mayang
Nokcha, whom Aliba Imti later replaced. R.K. Ramadhyani acted
as Secretary, and Sir B.N. Rau, Constitutional Advisor to the
Constituent Assembly, assisted the Sub-Committee. The Sub-
Committee was popularly known as the 'Bordoloi Committee after
the name of its chairman2.
Except for the Garo Hills and the Jowai Sub-Division of the Khasi
Hills, the Bordoloi Committee visited the headquarters of all the
hill areas from 18 April to 14 July 1947, held interviews, and
recorded pieces of evidence from various representations,
organizations, institutions, political parties, and individuals,
including officials. Due to severe weather and challenging
communications, the Bordoloi Committee could not visit the Garo
Hills and Jowai Sub-Division. Representatives from both districts,
however, were interviewed in Guwahati and Shillong, respectively.
The Bordoloi Committee chose two members from each Hill area
they visited. However, no one from the Frontier Tracts was co-
opted. All persons who were directly or indirectly touched by the
probe sent memorandums to the Bordoloi Committee3.
The Bordoloi Committee prepared its Report after scrutinizing and
observing the appeals of the tribal people of North-East India. It
proposes numerous recommendations for the constitutional and
administrative positions of the tribal territories. On July 28, 1947,
the Bordoloi Committee presented its Report to the Chairman of
the Advisory Committee on Fundamental Rights, Minorities,
Tribal, and Excluded Areas. The Report was divided into two
parts. The Committee's views and recommendations were

incorporated into Volume I. The evidence presented to the
Committee was recorded in Volume II. When the Bordoloi
Committee looked into the concerns of the tribal people, it
understood that they needed protection and safeguards to maintain
their way of life while still being able to participate in the country's
political life alongside others. Given the area's backwardness, the
Bordoloi Committee proposed a new administrative structure for
the Lushai Hills, which included forming a District Council for the
Lushai Hills and a Regional Council for the Pawi, Lakher, and
Chakma tribes. From December 7, 1947, to February 24, 1948, the
Advisory Committee discussed the issues. Article 244 of the Draft
Constitution and the Sixth Schedule contain provisions
implementing the proposals. On March 4, 1948, the Advisory
Committee forwarded the Bordoloi Committee's Report to the
President of the Constituent Assembly for debate4.
On September 5, 6, and 7, 1948, the Constituent Assembly debated
the provisions of the Sixth Schedule. The proposals for establishing
District Councils and Regional Councils in Assam's hill areas were
met with opposition. The non-tribal members' stance in the
Constituent Assembly against the Draft of the Sixth Schedule to
the Indian Constitution sheds insight on the nature of the
connection between Assamese hill tribes and plains people.
Kuladhar Chaliha, a member from Assam, criticized the Draft of
the Sixth Schedule as a British product. He said, "If you allow
them (tribals) to rule us or run the administration, it will be a
negation of justice or administration, and it will be something like
anarchy. If you see the background of this Schedule, you will find
that the British mind is still there. There is the old separation
tendency, and you want to keep them away from us. Thus, you will
create a Tribalistan just as you have created a Pakistan. The
ultimate result will be that you will create a Communistan5.
Brajeshwar Prasad, a member from Bihar, opposed the creation of
District Councils and Regional Councils because they would lead
to the establishment of another Pakistan in this country. He said,
"To vest wide political power into the hands of tribals is the surest
method of inviting chaos, anarchy, and disorder throughout the
length and breadth of this country. The existing schedule sixth
bristle with difficulties and it may lead to anarchy and chaos later
on unless it is suitably amended now"6.
Prof.Shibban Lai Saxena, a member of the United Provinces, said

he had no objection to the creation of the District Councils and
Regional Councils, but this separation will take a permanent
character, and it may lead to the division of the province itself. He,
therefore, suggested that there must be some method by which
these autonomous districts should, at some later date at least, be
absorbed in and become part of the normal population of the whole
province7.
Rohini Kumar Chaudhuri, a member from Assam, also opposed the
formation of District Councils. He said, "We want to assimilate the
tribal people. We are not given that opportunity so far, this
autonomous council is a weapon whereby steps are taken to keep
the tribal people perpetually away from the non-tribals and the
bond of friendship that we expected to come into being after the
attainment of Independence would be torn as under" this view of
Rohini K Chaudhari was also supported by B Das8.
Lakshminarayan Sahu, a member from Orissa, said, "The Regional
Councils we propose to set up for them (tribals) will neither benefit
these people nor us. Now, let us consider the likely consequences
of delegating these powers to these Councils. The result would be
that these people would develop on their lines without in any way
being connected with us9.
Jaipal Singh, a member from Bihar, agreed with the formation of
the District Councils and Regional Councils for the hill people of
Assam. He said, "I am very optimistic about the future of Assam,
particularly if the Sixth Schedule, even with all its shortcomings, is
operated in the spirit in which it should be operated, in a spirit of
accommodation and in the real desire to serve the hill people of
Assam, as our compatriots, and as people whom we want to come
into our fold, as people whom we will not let go out of our fold and
for whom we will make any amount of sacrifice so that they may
remain with us10.
A.V. Thakkar, a member from Saurashtra, supported the formation
of the District Councils and Regional Councils. He said, 'There is
no reason why we should fear this autonomous district's business
and not make the most of it, as if it were giving away or making
States within States for or permanent period. It is not for a
permanent period. All Constitutions are changeable, all laws are
changeable, and we can change the law, change the Constitution
when we think the time is ripe for it11.
Rev. J.J.M. Nichols Roy, a Khasi member from Assam, while

countering the arguments of non-tribals members, explained at
length the difference between the hierarchical culture of the plains
people and the egalitarian culture of the hill people of Assam. He
said These people (tribals) have come from outside. They have
never been under Hindu or Muslim rule. They had their own rule,
languages, courts, and culture. To say that another culture must
swallow the culture of these people, unless it is a better culture, and
unless it is by process of gradual evolution, is rather very
surprising to anyone who wants to build up India as a nation and
bring all people together to keep the frontier areas safe, these
people must be kept in a satisfying condition. You cannot use force
upon them. Human nature is such that when you use force to make
a people do something, they run to somebody else. If you want to
win them over for the good of India, you will have to create a
feeling of friendliness and unity among them so that they may feel
that their culture and ways of living have not been abolished and
another kind of culture is thrust upon them by force. That is why
the Sub-Committee thought that the best way to satisfy these
people is to give them a certain measure of self-government so that
they may develop themselves according to their genius and culture.
That will satisfy them, and they will feel that India is their home
and will not think of joining Tibet or Burma. The provision of the
sixth schedule is based on the recommendations of the Sub-
Committee after considering the evidence given by these hill
people12.
Dr. B.R. Ambedkar, Chairman of the Drafting Committee of the
Constitution, supported the formation of the District Councils and
Regional Councils. In his reply to the debate, he observed that the
tribals in Assam differed from those in other parts of India in the
sense that they preserved their own cultures and did not get
assimilated into the cultures of the large communities around them.
He said, "The position of the tribals of Assam is somewhat
analogous to the position of the Red Indians in the United States as
against the white emigrants there. The US created reservations or
Boundaries within which the Red Indians lived. They are a
republic by themselves; we have been creating Regional and
District Councils to some extent on the lines which the United
States adopted for the Red Indians13.
The Constituent Assembly finally accepted the District Councils
and Regional Councils provisions, which were inserted in the Sixth
Schedule and included in Articles 244 (2) and 275 (1) of the Indian
Constitution, following extensive debate and discussion on the
tribal issues in North-East India. Article 244 (2) of the original
constitution, passed into law on January 26, 1950, stated that the
Sixth Schedule would apply to tribal areas of the state of Assam
(Undivided Assam); however, Article 244 (2) now states that the
Sixth Schedule will apply to tribal areas of Assam, Meghalaya,
Tripura, and Mizoram; whereas, 275 (1) specifies the funding
pattern for Autonomous District Councils under the Sixth Schedule
provision. As a result, tribal populated territories covered by the
Fifth Schedule are referred to as Scheduled Areas, while tribal
inhabited areas covered by the Sixth Schedule are referred to as
Tribal Areas14. Even if an area is solely tribal-dominated, it cannot
be considered a Tribal Area until the Constitution of India's Sixth
Schedule clause is applied in that area, according to the
constitution. The Tribal Areas, as listed in the Sixth Schedule in
the early stage of the enforcement of the original constitution of
India, are given below intable 0115.
Table: 01.
Part A Part B
1. United Khasi – Jaintia Hills 1. North East Frontier Tract
District. (Balipara Frontier Tract, Tirap
2. Garo Hills. frontier Tract, Abor Hills
District, and Mishmi Hill
3. Lushai Hills. District).
4. Naga Hills.
5. North Cachar Hills. 2. Naga Tribal Areas.
6. Mikir Hills.
The Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India has undergone

many changes since India’s independence. The Sixth Schedule,
which was listed as Part A and Part B in the original Constitution
of India, has now been listed as Part I, Part II, and Part III since the
North-Eastern Areas Reorganisation Act of 1971. Part I listed the
Territorial Council and Autonomous Councils of Assam, Part II
listed the District Councils in Meghalaya, and Part II (A) has been
added to the list with the extension of the Sixth Schedule in Tribal
Areas of Tripura. The latest list of the different councils in the

Sixth Schedule to the constitution of India shall be shown as given
below in table 0216.
Table: 02.
Part –I Part-II
1. North Cachar Hills 1. Khasi Autonomous District
Autonomous Council Council
2. KarbiAnglong Autonomous 2. Jantia Autonomous District
Council. Council.
3. Bodoland Territorial Council 3. Garo Autonomous District
Council.
Part-II A Part-III
1. Tripura tribal Areas District 1. Chakma Autonomous
Council. District Council.
2. Lai Autonomous District
Council.
3. Mara Autonomous District
Council.
The makers of the Indian Constitution made such arrangements for

the tribals that neither the tribes lost their autonomy nor the
integrity of the nation was affected. The idea behind the Sixth
Schedule was to provide the tribal people with a simple and
inexpensive administrative setup of their own which would
safeguard their tribal customs and ways of life and secure their
management of characteristically tribal affairs17.The spirit of the
Sixth Schedule reflected the wish and determination of the
Constitution of India's framers to allow the tribal people to retain
their identities and a kind of autonomy by which they could
develop according to their genius politically, socially, and
economically. After its formation and implementation in the
Northeastern States of India, this constitution provision triggers
many tribal-dominated regions within or outside the Northeast to
create an autonomous body on this pattern of the Sixth Schedule.
Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) Darjeeling in West
Bengal earlier Darjeeling Gorkha Hill Council was implemented

on 22 August 1988 after a long struggle by the leaders and people
of Nepali speaking native in West Bengal as on the pattern of self-
government by an Act of State Government and tripartite
agreement between the local leaders of Darjeeling, State
government and Central Government. However, the
implementation and functions of this Act in the Hill of Darjeeling
remained in the debate by high-handedness over them by the state
government, which arises the question of whether they are a fully
self-regulated body or not. According to the Memorandum of
Settlement 2005 (signed between the Government of India,
Government of West Bengal, and DGHC), DGHC would now be
converted into a new Council under the Sixth Schedule and would
be christened Gorkha Hill Council Darjeeling (GHCD). Earlier,
DGHC was drawn up along Tripura Territorial Council, whereas
the new GHCD would be drawn on the lines of Bodo land
Territorial Council (BTC). Apart from (GTA) West Bengal rest
tribal-dominated areas that demand this constitutional provision of
the sixth schedule is still in the debates of Indian Politics. The
tribal-dominated areas that demanded the Sixth Schedule of the
constitution have been studied separately under the sub-topic18.
DEMAND FOR THE SIXTH SCHEDULE
There are many tribal-dominated regions that, time by time, raise
their voice to include them under the provision of the sixth
schedule of the constitution. These regions which are engaged in
the process of demanding the sixth schedule are briefly explained
as under.
ASSAM: Under the provisions of the Sixth Schedule to the Indian
Constitution, Assam comprises two Autonomous Councils for hill
tribes and one Territorial Council for plain tribes. The formation of
the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) under the Sixth Schedule
sparked a desire for autonomy and ADCs among Assamese plains
tribes. The incorporation of the Bodo plain tribe under the Sixth
Schedule provision has prompted other Assamese plains tribes to
fight for autonomy and ADCs. However, the various plain tribes of
Assam are dispersed across the state, making it impossible for
them to form territorial councils because people of the same
community do not settle in a limited area. The numerous plain
tribes of Assam, notably the Rabha, Mising, Tiwa, Deori, Sonowal
Kachari, and Thengal Kachari, requested Autonomous Councils in
their separate communities and pressed the Assam government to

form one. The Government of Assam took the plains tribes'
demands seriously and established Autonomous Councils for them
by Acts of the State Legislative Assembly which is under table
0319.
Table: 03.
1. Rabha Autonomous Council
2. Missing autonomous Council
3. Tiwa Autonomous Council
4. Deori Autonomous Council
5. Sonowal Kachari Autonomous Council
6. Thengal Kachari Autonomous Council
As a result, Assam began to have two sorts of Autonomous
Councils: Statutory Autonomous Councils established under the
Assam Legislative Assembly Act, and Territorial Councils
established under the provisions of the Constitution of India's Sixth
Schedule. Executive powers are granted to the satellite
Autonomous Councils, but not legislative or judicial authority.
They are in charge of 34 subjects, although their operations are at
the discretion of the state government. This is because the State
Government can change its status, privileges, and powers at any
time. As a result of the state government's treatment of these
Autonomous Councils, the desire for the constitution's sixth
schedule clause to apply to these satellite Autonomous Councils
grew20.
MANIPUR: The Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971,
was implemented by the Indian Parliament to establish District
Councils in Manipur's Hill Areas. Six Autonomous District
Councils were constituted under the Act based on the Fifth
Schedule to the Indian Constitution, but not under the provisions of
the Sixth Schedule, contradictory to the tribals of Manipur's
demands and aspirations21.The six Autonomous District Councils
are as under table 04:
Table: 04.
1. Churachandpur Autonomous District Council,
2. Chandel Autonomous District Council
3. Sadar Hills Autonomous District Council

4. Tamenglong Autonomous District Council
5. Senapati Autonomous District Council
6. Ukhrul Autonomous District Council.
The District Councils were not given legislative or judicial powers
and were only given limited executive authority. Because tribal
land was not codified and protected under the Sixth Schedule
clause of the Indian constitution, the District Councils constituted
under the Manipur (Hill Areas) District Council Act, 1971, was
impotent and had no jurisdiction over its maintenance and
protection. Furthermore, even the limited powers provided in the
Act were not legally delegated to them by the Government of
Manipur. As a result, Manipur's six District Councils became
nothing more than paper tigers, incapable of doing any beneficial
or constructive service for the Hilly Areas. The tribals renewed
their demand for the District Councils of Manipur to be included in
the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution, but they could not
achieve their goal. The All-Tribal Students Union of Manipur
(A.T.S.U.M.) boycotted the District Council election, postponed
for over two decades, from the late 1980s until 2009. As a result,
The All-Tribal Students Union of Manipur and the Sixth Schedule
Demand Committee of Manipur have increased their demands for
extending the Sixth Schedule provision in Manipur's hill areas
under Articles 244 (2) and 275 (1) of the Indian Constitution.
However, they have yet to accomplish the desired consequence.
The Government of Manipur established the Manipur Hill Areas
Autonomous District Council Act, 2008, as an appeasing gesture,
which is a little improvement to the Act of 1971. As a result, an
election for the six District Councils was held in 2010 after a gap
of more than two decades, but there has been little improvement in
the power and status of the District Council because the Sixth
Schedule provision has not yet been implemented, and the voice
for the sixth schedule continues22.
MIZORAM: The Sinlung Hill Development Council (SHDC) was
established on August 27, 1997, as a consequence of an agreement
struck on August 11, 1994, between the Hmar People Conference
(HPC) and the State of Mizoram. Some HPC leaders created the
HPC (Democratic) at the time of the Memorandum of Settlement
signed in 1994, which has continued an armed fight for autonomy
in Mizoram based on the sixth schedule of the Indian constitution.
Peace Talks were undertaken between the Government of Mizoram

and the Leaders of the Hmar People's Convention to end a lengthy
militancy in Mizoram (Democratic). On April 2, 2018, the State of
Mizoram and the Leaders of the Hmar People's Convention
(Democratic) signed a Memorandum of Settlement giving greater
autonomy to the people's socio-economic, political, and cultural
development under the jurisdiction of the Sinlung Hills Council. It
is indeed a territorial Development Council with defined
jurisdictions, but it continues to serve as an interim body following
the signing of an agreement between the Hmar People Conference
(Democratic) (HPC D) and the State of Mizoram in April 2018 and
the continuation of arms insurgency by revitalizing the autonomy
demand since 1995, with the demand for autonomy being dropped
under the sixth schedule. Sinlung Hill Development Council will
be renamed Sinlung Hill Council soon23.
ARUNACHAL PRADESH. Arunachal Pradesh state legislative
Assembly, on 27th August 2020, unanimously passed a resolution
to bring the entire state under the sixth schedule of the Indian
constitution. The Government responded to the clamor of netizens
over the issues of autonomous regions’ demand and later turned to
six schedules for all the parts of the state. In Arunachal,
autonomous demand mainly started from Mon autonomous region
district council in 2003, particularly from Tawang and West-
Kemeng District in the western part of the state and subsequently,
Patkai autonomous council in the eastern Arunachal which
included Tirap, Changlang, and Longding districts. The demand
from these two regions of the state was not welcome by other
regions because people from other regions believe that particularly
mon regions in the state are far ahead in terms of socio-economic
development and well preserve culture. If autonomous regions
were to be accorded, all tribes of the state should be included, as
the state consists of 68% of its total population are Indigenous,
whose preservation is equally important. The demand for selected
autonomy is overwhelming among community-based
organizations. So rather than selective autonomy for these two
regions, each community-based organization has come out with a
unified voice, advocating for the inclusion of the entire state under
the six schedules. The main reason for this demand is that Article
371(H) of the Indian Constitution prescribes special provisions
concerning the state of Arunachal Pradesh that does not specify to
protect, preserve and safeguard the interest of the indigenous tribal
people of the state. It only empowers the Governor of state to have

special responsibility concerning law and order in the state of
Arunachal Pradesh and discretionary power bestowed to the
Governor of state.
On the contrary, Article 371(A) of the Indian Constitution specifies
that no act of parliament is valid in the state regarding Naga
religious and other particular practices, customary law and
procedural, civil and criminal justice, and landlordism and transfer
of land in the state. The peoples of the state want similar lines of
protection guarantee for an indigenous tribe of the state in the
constitution. As the state is grappling with the refugee issues like
Chakma and Hajong population has rapidly increased in Arunachal
Pradesh24. The Asian Center for Human Rights, quoting the 2011
census, has reported the population of Chakma and Hajongs in
Arunachal Pradesh as 47,471 persons. The Chief Minister of state
Shri Pema Khandu stated that the population of Chakma and
Hajongs was approximately 65,875 as per the special 2015-2016.
This multiplying refugee population becomes a cause of concern
for the state’s indigenous population. Whose population maybe
around 8 to 9 lakh population are very apprehensive about their
number might turn to a minority in near future25. The wave of
massive protest in the Northeast over the Citizenship Amendment
Act and the Abrogation of Article 370 added to the apprehension
of the tribal people of Arunachal Pradesh.
LADAKH: The demand for autonomy for Ladakh in the form of
Union Territory was raised in the immediate post-Accession of
Jammu and Kashmir state to the Indian domain. The Ladakh-based
political leader Kushak Bakula wanted federal status for Ladakh in
195226. Kushak Bakula argued that Ladakh would bear the same
relationship to Jammu & Kashmir state as Kashmir to India, with
the local legislature being the only competent authority to make
laws for Ladakh. The feeling of separation and self-identity was
always there from the very beginning. Leh's Buddhists launched a
violent and massive agitation in August 1989, raising the demand
for Union Territory (UT) status for Ladakh. The Buddhists of
Ladakh see Union Territory status as the only means to become
autonomous from the Kashmiri leadership. In response to this
demand, the Central government agreed to consider an
Autonomous District Council for Ladakh, provided LBA dropped
the demand for UT status. Finally, Ladakh was granted the Ladakh
Autonomous Hill Development Council (LAHDC) in 1995 to the
Leh district through a Presidential Order and later to the Kargil

district in 200327. Under The Ladakh Autonomous Hill
Development Councils Act 1997, the executive powers of the State
Government relating to the management, control, and supervision
of the important departments mainly covering development
functions and activities have been transferred to the Autonomous
Hill Council. The LAHDC Act 1997 outlined matters to be under
the control and administration of the General Council. Later some
more Powers, Functions, and departments were transferred to the
Autonomous Hill Council by The LAHDC (AMENDMENT) ACT,
2018. The Act also established an Inter-District Advisory Council
in Jammu and Kashmir's Ladakh area, which is believed to have
entered into force on June 1, 1995. Both LAHDC consists of thirty
members, twenty-six elected and four nominated members; four
Executive Councillors are elected from among the councilors,
including a Chief Executive Councillor. The Council shall have
executive powers in the district, subject to the provisions of this
Act and any other law in force in the State at the time, as well as
any general or special directive from the Government28.The
LAHDC Act is the creation of the state legislature of the erstwhile
state of Jammu and Kashmir and not on the provision of the Fifth
and Sixth Schedules of the Indian constitution. Thus, the demand
for the sixth schedule is always there in the political debate of
Ladakh. The long-awaited demand for Ladakh to become a Union
Territory was realized on August 5, 2019, when the Indian
government partitioned the state of Jammu and Kashmir into two
Union Territories. The UT of Ladakh administration is run by
Lieutenant Governor and the two districts LAHDC, but within no
time, political leaders and people of Ladakh realize the
bureaucratization of the region. LAHDC, which is governed body
particularly created in terms of the region's autonomy and for the
area's protection and self-regulation after becoming U.T, lacks its
actual power in the region. Numerous accidents happened in these
two years where both Autonomous Hill Councils protested against
the U.T Administration policies and interferences in regulating
LAHDC. The U.T Administration, with its secretaries, runs the
region, and the LAHDC's importance is weakening daily. This
negligence of the central government towards the people of Ladakh
raises the voice of every section of the society for the demands of
the Sixth Schedule and Statehood for Ladakh29. The National
Commission for S.T had on September 11, 2019, recommended
after consultations with the ministries of Home, tribal Welfare, and
Law and Justice that the Union Territory of Ladakh be brought

under the Sixth Schedule of the Constitution as it will help in-
• Democratic decentralization of power.
• Preserve and promote a diverse culture of the region.
• Protection of agrarian rights as well as rights on the land.
• Allocation of funds for speedy development of the Ladakh
region.
The S.T population of Ladakh is above 90% belonging to different
ethnicity, and many political or social activists genuinely say the
demand for the Sixth Schedule of the region. But this demand is
still in political discourse in the country, and the voices for the
sixth schedule from all corner of the society of Ladakh is also
present in the contemporary politics of Ladakh30.
CONCLUSION
One of the most fundamental elements in the formation and
inclusion of the Fifth and Sixth Schedules into the Indian
Constitution was the demand for autonomy. Tribes of the
Scheduled Area are likewise constitutionally safeguarded and
protected under the Fifth Schedule, but they do not have access to a
self-governing constitutional body like the Autonomous District
Council under the Sixth Schedule. Under the Sixth Schedule,
however, three government organs empower Autonomous District
Councils, including the legislative, executive, and judicial.
Incorporating the Bodoland Territorial Council (BTC) and
Gorkhaland Territorial Administration (GTA) in the Sixth
Schedule prompted other Assamese and plain tribes to desire
autonomy, forming six satellite Autonomous Councils and 33
satellite Development Councils in Assam. Furthermore,
Autonomous District Councils have begun to operate in Manipur,
but the Fifth or Sixth Schedules do not cover them. The ADCs in
Manipur, Arunachal Pradesh, and Ladakh are territorial councils,
but their designation and privileges are not comparable to ADCs
under the Sixth Schedule. They, including the Shinlung Hill
Development Council in Mizoram, are all formed by legislation
passed by the respective State Legislative Assembly. ADCs,
Autonomous Councils, and Territorial Councils established under
the Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India have a completely
different status, powers, and functions than ADCs, Autonomous

Councils, Development Councils, and other Councils established
outside the Sixth Schedule provision, which are formed by
legislation of the State Legislative Assembly bond to act by the
respective state, and this bond sparks them to demand a greater a
degree of autonomy.
References:
1
Singh, S.N. (1994).Mizoram. New Delhi:Mittal Publication. p. 113.
2
Hansaria, B.L. (2016).Sixth Schedule to the Constitution of India- A Study.
Gawhati: Jyoti Printers. pp. 9-10.
3
Letter from Chairman, (North-East FrontierofAssam) Tribal and Excluded
Areas Sub Committee to the Chairman, Advisory Committee on Fundamental
Rights, Minorities and Tribal and Excluded Areas, Constituent Assembly of
India, dated 28.
4
Report of the North-East Frontier (Assam) Tribal and Excluded Areas Sub-
Committee. (1949) Vol. II (Evidence), Part I, Constituent Assembly of India,
New Delhi.
5
Constituent Assembly Debate, Vol. IX, No. 26, dated 6th September, 1949, p.
1008.
6
Ibid., pp. 1009 – 1010.
7
Ibid p. 1012.
8
Ibid., p. 1015.
9
Ibid., p. 1016.
10
Ibid., pp. 1018-1019.
11
Ibid., p. 1020.
12
Ibid., pp. 1021 - 1023.
13
Ibid., p. 1025.
14
Government of India, The Constitution of India (As on 1st June, 1996),
Department of Publication, New Delhi, 1996, pp. 148, 151 & 162.
15
Op.cit, pp. 28-30.
16
Bakshi, P.M. (2006).The Constitution of India. Delhi: Universal Law
Publishing Co. Pvt. Ltd. pp. 342 & 346-347.
17
R. Animesh. (1982).Mizoram : Dynamics of Change.Calcutta: Pearl
Publishers.
18
The Sixth Schedule of the constitution (Amendment) bill. (2007). PRS
Legislative Research.
19
https://wrtbc.assam.gov.in/portlets/autonomous development-council, retrieved
on 2.5.2018.
20
Ibid.
21
R. V, Venkata, T.S. Gangte, & KSH. Bimola Devi.A Century of Government
and Politics in North-East India. (1991). New Delhi: S. Chand & Company
LTD.Vol. AV: Manipur. pp. 58- 61.
22
Government of Manipur, Manipur Gazette Extraordinary, No. 250,
Wednesday, October 21, 2009, Imphal.
23
S. Chalsung.Autonomy Movement of the Hmars in Mizoram. (2018)Ph.D
Thesis, Department of Political Science, North Eastern Hill University, Shillong.
24
The Economics Times, Arunachal assembly passes resolution for inclusion of
state in Sixth Schedule, 27, August 2020.
25
D. Sanjay. (2018). Government and Politics in Arunachal Pradesh.New Delhi
:Premiere Publishing House.
26
C. N,Behra. (2000). State, Identity and Violence: Jammu Kashmir and Ladakh.
India:Manohar Publication.
27
B. Mona. (2009). Refiguring Rights, Redefining culture: Hill Council in
Kargil, Jammu and Kashmir. Indian Sociological Society. Vol. 58, No. 1,
Special Issue on Development of Democratic Routes in the Himalayan
'Borderlands' (January-April 2009)
28
LADAKH AUTONOMOUS HILL DEVELOPMENT COUNCILS, ACT
1997. ( Act No. XXXI of 1997)
29
Reach Ladakh, 2020. Student Association demand Sixth Schedule for Ladakh.
30
NCST writes to Union Home minister and Union Tribal Affairs minister
conveying Its recommendation to include Union Territory of Ladakh under Sixth
Schedule of Constitution of India, 11 Sep. 2019, PIB, Delhi.
Towards Democratic The Indian Journal of Politics

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-206-226
Deepening: The Link https://www.amu.ac.in/
Between Democratic nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Decentralization and
Women Empowerment
Syed Tahseen Raza*
ABSTRACT
The democratic wave which captured the
imagination of the world because of its
democratising and liberating impulse has been
found wanting on many counts. The different
sections of society, particularly the marginalized
and downtrodden, have continued to remain at
the margin, despite the promises of democracy.
Women as a deprived group are no exception.
This paper is an attempt to underline the factors
which prevents democracy to pursue its aim of
promoting the empowerment of the weaker
sections of society, particularly the women.
Underlining the idea of deepening of democracy,
the paper highlights the limitation of formal
democracy and engages with the concept of
democratic decentralisation to see its viability for
effecting the empowerment of women in society.
Following analytical approach, this paper is
based primarily on secondary sources.
Keywords: Formal Democracy, Democratic Deepening,
Democratic Decentralisation, Women Empowerment,
Introduction
The modern world with all the apparently visible developments
and grand political arrangements seems to have progressed a lot in
terms of providing adequate democratic space to the different
groups and categories of people. The formal democratic system
*Assistant Professor, Department of Strategic and Security Studies, Aligarh Muslim

University
Towards Democratic Deepening: The Link…. 207
which bases itself on the principle ‘of, for and by the people’ and
in which the political value of each individual, in terms of his/her
stake in the political process is counted on equal footings, arguably
offers enough reasons to believe that this system of governance
provides adequate opportunities to all the sections of society to
register their full development.1 The almost universal acceptability
of the democratic form of government as being possibly the best
form of government for the overall well-being of each section of
the polity, however, is yet to realise its full potential.2 The
prevailing reality is that the fruits of developments till now, have
not been able to percolate down at least evenly if not at all justly,
to different sections of society. Women as a group happen to be
one of the most severely disadvantaged lot in most societies of the
world.3 In the third world countries particularly, their plight is
extremely vulnerable.4
Though, of late, as a result of the efforts of different agencies - like
the United Nations and various women organisations - issues
surrounding the status of women began getting increasing
visibility, like the series of World Conferences by United Nations5,
Commissioning of reports specially on this issue by various
governments, like the famous Towards Equality Report6 by the
Indian government etc., - yet the status of women still continues to
be deplorable.
At the face value, this looks quite paradoxical that women as a
group constituting about half of the population, even in a
democratic set-up which gains its legitimacy from, ‘one person one
vote principle’ remain unable to get their due. The emergent
feminist scholarship has tried to find out the reason for this
systematic deprivation of women in the prevalence and general
acceptance of patriarchy and capitalism the world over7. As a
movement, therefore, the aim of feminism has been to achieve
political, social and economic equality between women and men
by bringing to an end the debilitating practice of women’s
subordination to men. Democratic decentralization as a political
tool with its distinguishing feature of bringing governance closer to
the people provide opportunities to the hitherto unheeded groups
like women whose justified aspirations have not been addressed
until now.
In this paper we will basically analyse theoretically as to how
democratic decentralization may be a good means to achieve the
aim of the empowerment of women. We will begin by undertaking
a theoretical understanding of the term democratic decentralization
and women’s empowerment so as to appreciate the linkages

between the two. We will then try to bring home the point that
democratic decentralization per se cannot achieve the aim of
women’s empowerment rather, with the help of examples, we will
see, how the political mechanism of democratic decentralization
could be worked upon to achieve the aims of the empowerment of
women. With the help pf some practical examples, where the
principle of democratic decentralization has been successful in
ameliorating the condition of the deprived section of the society,
this paper will highlight its potential for the empowerment of
women. This study is based primarily on secondary sources and
follows the analytical approach.
Contextualizing the Case: Formal Democracy and Democratic
Deepening
From the earlier focus on democracy as a means for betterment of
citizens’ lives, the focus has rightly shifted to the real ways in
which citizens who lie at the farthest end of the democratic society
are affected by the democratic processes. As such, from emphasis
on formal democracy, the attention, of late has shifted to the idea
of democratic deepening8. The overwhelming concern with the
formal democracy doesn’t count much in essence, if the
progressive changes expected from democratic set-up are not
reflected in the lives of the marginalized section of the society
particularly. The formal participation in the democratic process of
casting vote in the election for state or central government, though,
an important step in empowering the citizens, requires additional
support. For effective involvement of the citizenry in the
democratic process, and also, for effectively harnessing the
democratic ideal of empowering those group of citizens who stand
at the farthest end of the polity, it is important to proceed in the
direction of ‘direct participation’ of citizens in the democratic
process. Scholars like Amartya Sen and Jean Dreze9 have brought
forth the intrinsic value of democratic participation of citizens, in
the form of the enhancement of their capabilities. This in the light
of variedly existing social dynamics, hitherto existing dominant
groups and historically perpetuated hierarchies, need to be
scrutinized more closely as under such circumstances, mere
participation may not lead to substantive development in the
existing plight of the marginalized group. Therefore, deepening
democracy in such a scenario acquires an urgent priority, if the
development of the marginalized group is sought. Democratic
decentralization is an important aspect of deepening democracy.
Democratic decentralization provides space to the marginalized

group to effectively exercise their agency. It is what the scholars
like Luckham, Goetz and Kaldor10 describe as the domain of
‘democratic politics’ as against the ‘democratic institution’, which
provides the site for the marginalized group for ‘self -
determination, contestation and struggle’- and enable them to
‘maintain a basic level of independence from the myriad social
intrusions that underlie non-democratic regime’.
Decentralisation: Understanding the Concept
Decentralisation as a concept needs to be theoretically understood
as the main thrust of this paper revolves around it. Because of the
multiple meanings with which the term Decentralisation is attached
with, this concept becomes somewhat complex to understand. The
lack of consensus on any one definition of decentralization adds to
the complexity surrounding this concept. Part of the reasons for
this ambiguity is the fact that different writers interpret this concept
in different ways.
We will, however, try to come up with a working definition of
‘Decentralisation’ for this paper. Decentralisation is the transfer of
authority and responsibility for public functions from the central
government to the intermediate or local government. This means
that decentralization is a political process whereby power that is
legal or official authority to exercise control, ‘are transferred from
the central government agencies to lower-level organization of
government or to semi or non-governmental bodies11. For our
convenience, we may understand decentralization in public sector
in terms of its typology as Political decentralization12, Fiscal
decentralization13 and administrative decentralization14. These
three terms are briefly described as follows:
1. Political Decentralisation: It is the transfer of political
power and decision-making authority to sub-national levels
such as elected village councils, district councils and state
level bodies. Where such transfer is made to a local level of
public authority that is autonomous and fully independent
from the devolving authority, devolution takes place
2. Fiscal decentralization involves a level of resource
reallocation to local government which would allow it to
function properly and fund allocated service delivery
responsibility, with arrangements for resource allocation
usually negotiated between local and central authorities.
The fiscal decentralization policy would normally also
address such issues as assignment of local taxes and
revenue-sharing through local taxation and user and market

fees
3. Administrative decentralization involves the transfer of
decision-making authority, resources and responsibilities
for the delivery of selected public services from the central
government to other lower levels of government, agencies
and field offices of central government line agencies.
The different forms of Decentralisation may also be classified
under the two broad categories of ‘Intergovernmental transfer of
power’ and ‘Extra-governmental transfer of power’. Within the
Intragovernmental transfer of power, we may place the concept of
‘Deconcentration’15, ‘Democratic Decentralisation’ and
‘Devolution’. The Extra governmental transfer of power includes
the practice of ‘Delegation’ and ‘Privatisation/Deregulation’.
Decentralisation, therefore, is an umbrella term which in a general
sense is inclusive of all these. The above categories are basically
the means through which decentralization process is affected in
different context. One way of having the ‘Intergovernmental
transfer of power’ is through Deconcentration and the other is
through ‘Democratic Decentralisation/Devolution’. While both
may be considered as Decentralisation, there is a fundamental
technical difference between the two. Whereas in
‘Deconcentration’, power is transferred to lower units within
central line ministries and agencies, the Central government
doesn’t actually give up its power, in the democratic
decentralisation/ devolution, the Centre does give up its power.
Here, the power is transferred to elected subnational units of
government that are, ‘accessible and accountable to the local
citizenry and enjoy a certain degree of autonomy’. The extra-
governmental transfer of power is carried out ‘to organ that are
outside the regular bureaucratic structure and are only indirectly
controlled by the Central government’. Therefore ‘Democratic
Decentralisation’ implies something substantially more than simply
the delegation of authority. It imparts power in the hands of the
local citizens to put an effective check on the functioning of the
local body through democratic means of voicing their concerns and
exercising their right of demanding accountability. Harry Blair in
his work on participation and accountability in democratic local
governance underscores this point which captures the essence of
‘Democratic Decentralisation’16:
‘Democratic Decentralisation can be defined as meaningful
authority devolved to local units of governance that are accessible
and accountable to the local citizenry, who enjoy full political

rights and liberty. It thus differs from the vast majority of earlier
works at decentralization in developing areas, which go back to the
1950s, and which were largely initiatives in public administration
without any serious democratic component.’17
Having cursorily viewed the different modes of decentralization,
we will now focus on the democratic decentralization by specially
focusing on its role in augmenting the political space for the
deprived and marginalized sections of the society. This will enable
us to understand how the status of women could be improved
through the mechanism of democratic decentralization. In other
words, in the developmental paradigm, how as a developmental
approach, democratic decentralization can help associate women
with the political process with a view to bring their empowerment.
In democratic decentralization, unlike the practice in
Deconcentration, power in reality doesn’t lie with the government
appointed bureaucrats rather the exercise of power is carried out by
the elected representatives who get the mandate to do so from their
election.18 Since the local populace is involved in the election of
these people, therefore, there is the existence of immediate
accountability to the people. This mechanism of democratic
decentralization, therefore, opens up the ‘governance’ to the
participation of the local citizens who could exercise their political
right in a convenient manner. In this way, effective transfer of
power to the local communities could possibly be achieved.
Democratic Decentralisation and the ‘Development Strategy’
Debate
In this section we will try to understand the scope of democratic
decentralization in relation to the development of different groups
in society. Beginning with an analysis of the visibly apparent
merits inherent in the principle of Democratic Decentralisation, we
will also analyse the demerits so that, later in this paper when we
try to understand the efficacy of Democratic Decentralisation as a
mechanism for the empowerment of women, our discussion
remains more informed of the prevailing realities. The underlying
aim of this section is to critically analyse the suitability of
Democratic Decentralisation as a developmental approach
intending to achieve the empowerment of women in our society.
Democratic Decentralisation, with its inherent design to move
away from ‘Concentration’ carries the added advantage of
efficiency and effectiveness as compared to other governance
mechanism like Centralisation19. It is so because, being situated
close to the people, this system has much more scope at its disposal
to be aware of the ‘local problems and conditions that require
attention’. When the governance structure becomes aware of the
real needs of the people, an important hurdle of good governance is
solved because knowing the real needs of the people is itself a very
important aspect towards reaching any possible redress. The
mechanism of Democratic Decentralisation by providing avenue
for the local interests and local knowledge to be incorporated in the
governance, enables the system to provide better facilities in
conformity with the local preference. This important aspect of
good governance is not just missing but is entirely absent in the
system of Centralisation where at best only ‘uniform national
solution’ are possible., which remain devoid of the local
peculiarities and sensibilities.20
Apart from this, the very design of Democratic Decentralisation
enables it to ensure improvement in the quality and reach of the
government as compared to the Centralised working. The decision-
making power of the local body enables it to swiftly move to action
which in the case of Centralization would have been quite time
taking as in that case necessary action could only be taken after
approval from higher authorities.21
This system also allows for a better coordination between the Civil
servants and the community. Other important factors which lead
towards the efficiency and effectiveness aspect of governance like
proper utilization of resources, are also ensured in this form of
governance.
Yet other important aspect of Democratic Decentralisation which
gives primacy to it over Centralisation as a form of governance is
the issue of accountability. Being closer to the people, Democratic
Decentralisation provides space for the functioning of governance
under the ‘watchful eyes of the electorate’.22 This accountability
aspect enables the authority to do their work appropriately than
they would have carried out had there been a distant or far off
mechanism to check the working. This also results in better contact
between the citizens, their representatives and state officials in the
governance structure where democratic decentralization is
practiced. Alongwith accountability, this governance structure
provides better accessibility to the citizens which further helps in
strengthening democracy by making the system more responsible
to citizens’ demands and being responsive.23
Furthermore, democratically decentralized governance structures
are more participatory than the centralized one and as such this
provides a better scope for the people to have their say in the
governance process. The increased space for participation for the
citizens enables them to register their needs and aspirations thus
leading to not just the articulation of the dominant voice but the
voice of all hues. One added advantage of increased citizens
participation is the building up of a sense of ownership among the
citizens. This works for the benefit of both, the structure of
government as well as the citizen. The governance structure gains
legitimacy as a result of this and the citizens by their active
participation enhance the effective functioning of the system.
These beneficial aspects of Democratic Decentralisation like more
accountability, efficiency, transparency, enhanced citizenship,
participation in the political process etc., help consolidate the
substantive form of democracy which unlike the procedural one,
creates opportunities for different groups of the constituting society
to take part and effectively become involved in the democratic
processes. It is this aspect of Democratic Decentralisation which
becomes very important in providing a means for not only the
involvement of the hitherto marginalized groups of the society but
also to empower them. The marginalization of women in the
society also could be very effectively dealt with in a governance
mechanism where Democratic Decentralisation is practiced.24
Democratic Decentralisation with its distinguishing advantages of
being closer to the people, its design of intimately involving those
who govern and are governed, its scope of greater citizenship
participation, its level of efficiency, accountability and
responsiveness etc., enable this mechanism of governance to be
very effective in achieving empowerment of women.25 Women,
who constitute almost half of the population, in terms of their
status and position, remain not only just underrepresented in the
structure of governance but also fare quite badly on all parameters
of development.26 Through the means of Democratic
Decentralisation, therefore, the task of bringing positive changes in
the status of women folk of the society could be achieved. Before
seeing how this mode of governance could be best used for
empowering women by taking example of the practice of
Democratic Decentralisation in some countries, in the next section,
we will briefly see the drawbacks of Democratic Decentralisation.
The very first thing which makes the practice of Democratic
Decentralisation very important, namely its existence and operation
closer to the people and under the scrutiny of the people, also
carries the scope of the negation of its emancipatory potential. The
efficient and effective governance aspect of Democratic

Decentralisation could easily be undermined if the informal
political dynamics and social practices, like the prevailing customs
and traditions which are inimical to women’s interest continue to
dominate.27 The existence of social norms has quite a strong
impact on the society and if these continue to have their influence,
the good aspect of Democratic Decentralisation, even though
formally functioning, couldn’t be effective in ameliorating the
status of the marginalized group. These institutions under these
circumstances would continue to serve the dominant interest.28
Democratic Decentralisation may also lead to the widening of
disparities in terms of geographical location particularly if the
different regions of the nation state differ widely in their
developmental trajectory. This mode of governance may also
become too politicised because of its location and functioning
amidst the people. Lack of literacy and education may add to this
problem. These problems aside, yet another debilitating shift,
democratic decentralization could recede to is its capture by the
dominant group of the society. This possibility of this ‘elite
capture’ of the institution of democratic decentralization becomes
more prominent in those areas where widespread inequality and
differences exist.29 However, Democratic decentralisation, if
practiced in a polity where the local citizenry remain informed and
keep their autonomy and accountability right in good stead, it will
not be difficult for them to overcome these challenges.
Decentralisation, Development and Empowerment of Women
Having cursorily discussed the merits and demerits of Democratic
Decentralisation as a mechanism for enhancing democracy in its
true sense i.e., as a means for the betterment of the condition of
each section of the society including the deprived ones, we will
now account for the decentralization and development debate
specially locating the dimension of gender in it.
Notwithstanding the limitations, some of which we have discussed
in the previous section, the popularity of Democratic
Decentralisation as a process of governance which helps in the
strengthening of democracy at all levels and for all sections of
society especially women, continue to gain ground. Part of the
reason for this optimism lie in the idea that, since in Democratic
Decentralisation, governance is carried out closer to the people, it
enhances the power of various groups to exercise effective check
on governance. Women’s participation in the political process are
hindered by a number of socio-cultural as well as structural factors.
One significant way Democratic decentralisation lessens the

hindrance for women to participate in the democratic processes is
the fact that decentralisation brings governance closer to them and
as such it becomes easier for them to participate. Participation in
the process is itself a learning process. Apart from gaining more
political visibility, this process is very educative too. Judith
Tendler30 in the study accordingly underline that, ‘greater
proximity makes government more vulnerable to citizen pressure
and makes it easier for citizens to become more informed and
hence more demanding of good service.’
Those scholars who espouse the view that Democratic
Decentralisation actually brings forth more scope for the
empowerment of women base their arguments on two grounds. To
begin with, Democratic Decentralisation allows the involvement of
women at a local level. For women to be involved in the political
processes at the local level is comparatively much easier because
women could afford to do so along with their other responsibilities.
This process of involvement in political activities, as discussed
earlier, is ‘educative’ and ‘instructive’ in itself because when once
the ceiling of involvement in the public affairs opens up, it leads to
a domino effect.
Echoing these sentiments Annette Evertzen in Gender and Local
Governance31 emphatically brings forth the reasons for local
politics being more convenient for the involvement of women:
‘… (t)he eligibility criteria for the local level are
less stringent, and local government is the closest
to the women’s sphere of life, and easier to
combine with rearing children. It can be the first
level that women can break into and as such it
may serve as a springboard to national politics,
by developing capacities and gaining
experiences. Likewise local politics can be more
interesting to women as they are well acquainted
with their community, being the major users of
space and services in the local community (water,
electricity, waste disposal, health clinics, and
other social services). They also participate
actively in organisations in their neighbourhood,
and it’s easier to involve these organisations in
formal political decision making at the local
level.’32
Though some of the studies which have been conducted exploring

the gender dimension of Democratic Decentralisation do not
conclusively prove that this tool of democratic governance is
beneficial for the women. Studies conducted by Goetz33 for
example points out that except Latin America, in all other regions
of the world, the percentage of women are not considerably higher
in local bodies than their representation at national or central level.
Actually, where there are more number of women at the local level,
it has more to do with the provision of Quota or Reservation at the
local level. The case of India, Pakistan, Uganda, Namibia, France
and many of the Latin American countries fit this reasoning.
Basing themselves on the available data on women’s participation
in local governance, there have been studies which question the
optimistic assumption of the local involvement of women proving
to be a ‘launching pad’ for their involvement in national politics.
These studies highlight the comparatively more embedded and
hierarchical nature of the politics at the local level.
Maitreya and Mukhopadhyaya34 in their study enumerated four
factors which account for the effectiveness or otherwise of
women’s participation at local level governance. This includes the
dependency on the terms of their inclusion (affirmative actions,
Reservations) etc., the role and influence of traditional authorities
in local government, the extent to which the rules and the extent of
decentralization allow for gender specific rights claiming and the
role of women specific groups in organizing and influencing civil
society at the local level.
Democratic Decentralisation and Women Empowerment: A
Closer Look
Decentralisation because of its democratising and educative
potential, is considered to be an important mechanism to bring
about the empowerment of women - one of the most deprived and
neglected section in most societies of the world.35 Here we will
cursorily review some of the extremely relevant studies in order to
gauge how actually Decentralisation has fared in terms of the
empowerment of women. The main aim here will be to basically
decipher the factors which could be learnt from the experiences of
those countries in order to further improve the potential of
decentralization mechanism to ensure the empowerment of women.
In this context Jo Beall has carried out an important study titled,
‘Decentralizing Government and Centralizing Gender in Southern
Africa: Lessons from the South African Experience”36. Beall
begins by extolling the virtues of decentralization as a vehicle for
increasing women’s’ representation and political participation but

cautions to be too optimistic with respect to the empowering
potential of it. The study underlines that the benefits of
Decentralisation for women empowerment are not always obvious.
The local government is that part of the state which remain close to
the people and civil society and, as such, obviously offers more
opportunities to the women to engage more effectively. However,
closeness with the society also means closeness with the social
institutions, which at times as in the case of South Africa are
deeply entrenched and hierarchical and patriarchal. The most
important conclusion of Beall’s study of the effect of
decentralization on women in four countries of Africa viz., Angola,
Mozambique South Africa and Zimbabwe is that, ‘the effective
involvement of women in local governance is predicated both on
the approach adopted by political parties and how women are
organized at the local level37. The final thrust of this study is that
decentralization, of course, provide opportunities for women
empowerment but these opportunities must be tapped and
constructively worked upon.
Another study undertaken on this issue was carried out under the
aegis of Swedish International Centre for Local Democracy.
Entitled, “Gendering Decentralisation in Cambodia”38, this work
basically tries to analyse the Cambodian attempt at Democratic
Decentralisation from gender perspective. With a view to explore
the impact of democratic decentralization on gender equality, this
work tries to find answer to the following question:
How has decentralization altered the condition for women in local
politics?
To what extent is there an increased gender balance in local
political bodies?
How do women manage to articulate and pursue their views in
local politics?
This study empirically examines the general impact of
decentralization on gender issues and female representation in
Commune Council and women’s’ political articulation and
influence in local politics39. Based on empirical evidence, this
work highlights that the decentralization reforms which was carried
out in Cambodia particularly the establishment of the Commune
election did indeed result in the opening up of space for women to
engage with the local politics, considerably from earlier levels. As
regards the female political representation in the Commune
Council, decentralization has led to the increase in women taking
up leadership role and a decline has come in the earlier widespread

notion of denying space to women in leadership role.40 With their
increased numbers in local Council, women are increasingly using
their local influence to affect politics. The overall import of this
study is that, ‘the process of decentralization has begun to change
those norms which hinder women participation in politics and real
gender-based transformation is increasingly becoming a
possibility.
The Initiative for Inclusive Security which advocates for the full
participation of all stakeholders especially women in the peace
process, under its Rwanda Project commissioned a study entitled,
‘Engendering Rwanda’s Decentralisation’41.This project basically
aims at highlighting the importance of women’s’ leadership in
bringing stability and consolidation in post conflict societies. This
report underlines the empowering potential of the decentralization
process by giving the practical example of Rwanda.42 The report
categorically states that Rwanda offers an important example to
other post conflict and developing countries with regard to
decentralization and democratization efforts.43
Under the aegis of the Institute of Social Sciences, a study was
commissioned in India to gauge the extent to which the local
government institution in India has been able to work as an
instrument of social justice and social transformation. Titled as ‘the
level of inclusion of the excluded group’, in the local government
system, the study was conducted in fourteen states in a very novel
manner44. Each study carried extensive research in three
Panchayats in the same taluka/block and the same districts. Out of
the three Panchayats, the selection was done in such a manner that
one of them is headed by a woman, the other one by a scheduled
caste or scheduled tribe and the third one by the member of locally
dominant caste. The study specifically covered the issue of
inclusion and exclusion as well as empowerment of both the
scheduled caste and women. Though this study brings forth varied
result with respect to the empowerment of women as a result of
democratic decentralisation, there are certain positive signs which,
if tapped well, will definitely go a long way in achieving the
empowerment of women. This ground work underlines that the
most noteworthy aspect of the study is that the women throughout
the country have shown great enthusiasm to come forward to
contest the election.45 ‘Nearly five million women candidates file
nomination to contest for one million posts’46. Though there are
challenges of the prevailing caste hierarchy and entrenched
patriarchy, still some women managed to win general seats,

sometimes even defeating opposing men. The state of Karnataka,
this study underlines, accounted for nearly 44 per cent of women in
the Panchayats47.
As regards the relationship between women empowerment and the
role of democratic decentralisation, B.S Baviskar, in his case study
of Maharashtra in this study, enriches the study of the interlinkages
between democratic decentralisation and women empowerment by
underlining the fact that the process of empowerment should not be
expected to be understood as a process of quantum jump. It is a
slow and gradual long-term process. ‘You donot jump from a zero
power situation to an all power situation. Empowerment is a long
journey and there are several stages in its path.’48 There are
different stages in the process of empowerment49:
 Opening up or Coming Out
 Acquiring Symbolic Features of Power status
 Using Power for One’s Self or One’s Family
 Using Power for the benefit of One’s Own Community
 Working for the Whole Community as a Whole
What democratic decentralisation does for the empowerment of
women, is providing a spurt for the beginning of the process of
empowerment of women.
The experience of democratic decentralization in the Indian state of
Kerala provides a convincing example of the immense potential of
democratic decentralization for deepening democracy and
particularly for the empowerment of women. Kerala witnessed one
of the most determined efforts at democratic decentralization,
evidenced by its implementation of the ‘People’s Campaign for
Decentralized Planning’50. It vigorously implemented the strategy
of directly promoting participatory structure by ensuring that both
processes and structures at local levels could effectively involve
local populace in planning, budgeting, as well as implementing the
local programmes. Scholars like Patrick Heller and others describe
this effort of Kerala government as the most ambitious one towards
democratic decentralization. ‘In both its scope and design, the
campaign represents the most ambitious and concerted state led
efforts to build local institutions of participatory democratic
governance ever undertaken in the Indian sub-continent’51. Their
study highlighted that, in terms of empowerment (See Table 1),
almost 82.1 percent of the representative of women responded that
the movement for democratic decentralization led to the drastic
improvement in the empowerment of women. Female respondents

of all category as well as general respondents as well, agreed
overwhelmingly that there was drastic improvement in the
empowerment of women, with 65.7 and 66.5 percent respectively.
There was only a miniscule population around 0.5 percent which
believed there was no real change in the direction of women
empowerment. (See Table 1)
Table 152 Has the campaign helped to bring women into the
public arena and empower them to raise developmental issues
concerning women?
Respondent type Fraction of respondents

(by type) who said
No real Slight Drastic
change change change
All respondents 0.5 32.2 66.5
Representatives of 0.0 17.9 82.1
women’s groups
Female respondents (all 0.0 32.5 65.7
categories)
Similarly, the overwhelming success of Kerala’s Kudumbashree
Programme in the eradication of poverty and imparting socio-
political visibility to the deprived women, also owe its credit to the
success of democratic decentralisation programme in Kerala.53 The
programme very positively impacted women’s participation in the
public space and thus led to participatory citizenship.
Some scholars from the leftist side do highlight the neoliberal
aspect of democratic decentralization and attribute its popularity to
the Structural adjustment programmes of the neo-liberal agenda.54
A detailed discussion of this aspect is beyond the scope of this
paper. However, what has been emphasised in most of the studies,
is that democratic decentralization offers a good platform for
democratic deepening. The paper suggests that the potential
provided by the mechanism of democratic decentralization may be
worked upon to move forward towards the cause of women
empowerment.
Underlining the potential of democratic decentralization, towards
the empowerment of women, the International Union of Local
Administration in its resolution passionately underscored the
importance of democratic decentralization in one of its Annual
Meeting. This sums up the significance of Democratic

Decentralisation for women’s empowerment:
“ …{R}ecognising that the reasons as to why
women are not represented equally in local
government are multiple, and that women and
men throughout the world live under different
conditions and women do not have the same
access to and control over economic and political
resources as men; {and} considering that local
government, as an integral part of the national
structure of governance, is the level of
government closest to the citizens and therefore
in the best position both to involve women in the
making of decisions concerning their living
conditions, and to make use of their knowledge
and capabilities in the promotion of sustainable
development, … IULA… firmly believe that :
 Democratic local self‑government has a critical
role to play in securing social, economic and
political justice for all citizens of every
community in the world and that all members of
society, women and men, must be included in the
governance process;
 Women and men as citizens have equal human
rights, duties and opportunities, as well as the
equal right to exercise them. The right to vote, to
be eligible for election and to hold public office
at all levels are human rights that apply equally to
women and men;
 The problems and challenges facing humanity are
global but occur and have to be dealt with at the
local level. Women have the equal right to
freedom from poverty, discrimination,
environmental degradation and insecurity. To
fight these problems and to meet the challenges
of sustainable human development, it is crucial
that women be empowered and involved in local
government as decision‑makers, planners and
managers;
 Local government is in a unique position to
contribute to the global struggle for gender
equality and can have a great impact on the status

of women and the status of gender equality
around the world, in its capacities as the level of
governance closest to the citizens, as a service
provider and as an employer.”55
Conclusion
Our discussion so far related to the two dominant theme of
Decentralisation and women empowerment provides a critical
understanding which helps us in understanding the nuances
involved in democratic deepening and the role of democratic
decentralization for women empowerment. The irreducible take of
all these points is that attempts towards the empowerment of
women should be directed at multifarious levels and that
democratic decentralization process, if practiced with clear sighted
strategy and definitive goals to achieve women’s empowerment,
achieving the goal of the empowerment of women could be a
reality. The various examples discussed in the paper substantiate
this.
Decentralisation with its inherent design of transferring power to
the local level has brought forth a novel political and institutional
context which provides ample scope and opportunity for the
promotion of full and equal rights of citizens as a whole. All the
citizens irrespective of their caste, creed, religion etc., get an
opportunity to participate and get their representation in local
bodies thus deepening democracy and widening the scope of their
development. Decentralisation, therefore, has the potential to give
voice and representation to the hitherto excluded and marginalized
groups in considerably better manner. Women also get an easily
available opportunity, in this context to register their participation
in the political process at the local level and therefore the process
of empowerment of women could very well be initiated and
consolidated through this process of democratic decentralization.
While underlining this fact i.e., the development potential of
democratic decentralization process for women, it is important to
point out that decentralization in itself can’t bring empowerment of
women automatically rather the mechanism of decentralization has
to be worked through to achieve this goal. In fact, if left to itself,
studies have suggested that decentralization could even lead to the
reinforcement of the parochial and regressive social traditions and
entrenchment of the hold of the dominant group of society.
Therefore, for democratic decentralization, to ensure the
empowerment of women, it is important that along with transfer of
power, attempt should be made to popularize the concept of

Women Empowerment through advocacy, negotiations, collective
mobilization, through grassroot groups and other such
mechanisms. The role of different advocacy group in achieving
empowerment of women in cases of Rwanda and Kerala which
have been discussed earlier, is an instructive case in point. For
democratic decentralization to effectively contribute to women’s
empowerment the importance of special measures like ensuring
quotas, reservation of seats in the electoral bodies can’t be
emphasized more. For decentralization to effectively contribute
towards women empowerment, Central government also need to
play its part by ensuring availability of adequate financial and other
infrastructural resources.
Notes and References:
1
Milja Kurki, “Democracy and Conceptual Contestability: Reconsidering
Conceptions of Democracy in Democracy Promotion”, International Studies
Review, Vol.12, No, 3 (September, 2010), pp.362-386.
2
James V. Schall, “The Best Form of Government: A Perspective on the
Continuity of Political Theory”, The Review of Politics, Vol.40, No.1 (January,
1987), pp.97-123.
3
“Facts and Figures: Rural Women and the Millenium Development Goals”,
Women Watch: Information and Resources on Gender Equality and
Empowerment of Women,
https://www.un.org/womenwatch/feature/ruralwomen/facts-figures.html
(accessed 15 August, 2023).
4
World Conferences on Women, UN Women,
https://www.unwomen.org/en/how-we-work/intergovernmental-support/world-
conferences-on-
women#:~:text=The%20United%20Nations%20has%20organized,1985%20and
%20Beijing%20in%201995. (accessed 16 August, 2023).
5
These world Conferences which have been important milestones towards the
cause of women empowerment have been organized by the Commission on the
Status of Women, established by the United Nations Economic and Social
Council. These conferences aim at uniting the international community behind a
set of common objectives with an effective Plan of action for the advancement
of women everywhere, in all spheres of public and private life.
6
Towards Equality was the report of the Committee on the Status of Women in
India (1974-75), which was appointed by the Government of India. It was a
groundbreaking work exploring the status of women in India and proved to be an
eye-opener for the people and government alike. See the Original Report
Towards Equality, Report of the Committee on the Status of Women in India,

(Government of India, Ministry of Education & Social Welfare, Department of
Social Welfare, New Delhi, December, 1974)
https://pldindia.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/04/Towards-Equality-1974-Part-
1.pdf
(accessed on 15 July 2013)
7
Val Burris, “The Dialectic of Women’s Oppression: Notes on the Relation
Between Capitalism and Patriarchy”, Berkley Journal of Sociology, Vol.27,
Special Feminist Issue (1982), pp.51-74.
8
E. Huber, D. Rueschemeyer and J.D. Stephens, “The Paradox of Contemporary
Democracy: formal, participatory and social democracy”, Comparative Politics,
Vol.29, No.3, (1997), pp.323-342,
J.J.Linz and A.C. Stepan, Problem of Democratic Transition and Consolidation:
Southern Europe, South America and Post-Communist Europe, John Hopkins
(University Press, Baltimore, 1996).
9
Jeane Dreze and Amartya Sen, India: Economic Development and Social
Opportunity, (New Delhi, Oxford University Press, 1995)
10
Robin Luckham, Anne Marie Goetz and Mary Kaldor, Democratic Institutions
and Politics in Contexts of Inequality, Poverty and Conflict: A Conceptual
Framework, IDS Working Paper, 104, Brighton, Institute of Developemnt
Studies, 2000.
11
Craig Johnson, Decentralisation and Poverty: Exploring the Contradiction,
The Indian Journal of Political Science, Vol.63, No.1 (March 2002), pp.6.
12
Guide to Decentralisation, SDDC Decentralization Team, Swiss Agency for
Development and Cooperation, (2000), p.6.
13
Ibid, p. 7.
14
Ibid, p.6.
15
Fidelx Pius Kulipossa, Decentralisation and Democracy in Developing
Countries:An Overview, Development in Practice, Vol.14, No.6 (November,
2004), p.772.
16
“Harry Blair, Participation and Accountabilty at the Periphery: Democratic
Local Governance in Six”, Countries, World Development Vol 28, No.1, 2000,
pp. 21-29.
17
Ibid, p.25.
18
Craig Johnson, No.11, pp.7-10.
19
Craig Johnson, No. 12, pp.6-12.
20
Carlo Mazzaferro and Alberto Zanardi, “Centralisation versus
Decentralisation of Public Pollicies: Does the Heterogeneity of Individual
Preferences Matter? Discal Studies, Vol.29, No.1 (March, 2008), pp. 35-73.
21
Ibid.
22
Craig Johnson, No.18.
23
Ibid.
24
Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim, No Shortcuts to Power: African
Women in Politics and Policy Making, (Zed Books, 2003), pp. 213-240.
25
Jan Edwards, Kate Frieson and Sofi Ospina, Regional: Gender Responsive
Decentralised Governance in Asia: Technical Assistance Consultants’ Reports,
Project no: 40314-012, (Canberra, Asian Developemnt Bank, 2013),
https://www.adb.org/sites/default/files/project-documents//40314-012-reg-tacr-
03.pdf (accessed 12 July 2023)
26
Facts and Figures: Women’s Leadership and Political Participation, UN
Women
https://www.unwomen.org/en/what-we-do/leadership-and-political-
participation/facts-and-figures (accessed 24 September, 2023)
27
J.S. Migdal, A.Kohli and V. Shue, State Power and Social Forces: Domination
and Transformation in the Third World, (Cambridge, Cambridge University
Press, 1994). Pp.7-34
28
Ibid, pp.89-107.
29
G. O’Donnell, On the State, Democratization and Some Conceptual Problems:
A Latin American View with Glances at Some Post-Communist Countries,
World development, Vol.21, No.8 (1993), pp.1355-1359.
30
Judith Tendler, Good Government in the Tropics, (John Hopkins University
Press, 1997), pp.1-19.
31
Annette Evertzen, Gender and Local Governance, Netherlands Development
Organisation, (April 2001)
https://iknowpolitics.org/sites/default/files/genderandlocalgovernance2001.pdf
(accessed on 15 July, 2023)
32
Ibid, p.2.
33
Anne Marie Goetz and Shireen Hassim, No.24, pp.29-81.
34
Maitrayee Mukhopadhyay and Hanny Cueva, Decentralisation and Gender
Equity in South Asia: An Issue Paper, (Amsterdam, Royal Tropical Institute,
2005).
35
UN Facts and Figures, No.3.
36
Jo Beall, Decentralizing Government and Centralizing Gender in Southern
Africa: Lessons from the South African Experience, OPGP 8 (Geneva
Switzerland, 2005)
http://eprints.lse.ac.uk/2962/1/Decentralizing_government_and_centralizing_gen
der_%28UNRISD%29.pdf (accessed on 15 August, 2023).
37
Ibid, pp18-20.
38
Sedara and Ojendal, Gendering Decentralization in Cambodia, (Swedish
International Centre for Democracy, 2014)
https://icld.se/publikationer/kc-ojendal-j-sedara-k-2014-gendering-
decentralization-in-cambodia/
39
Ibid.
40
Ibid.
41
Elizabeth Powley, Engendering Rwanda’s Decentralization: Supporting
Women Candidates for Local Office, Inclusive Security, (Washington Office,
2008).
42
Ibid, pp.11-17.
43
Ibid, p.22.
44
B.S Baviskar and George Mathew (eds), Inclusion and Exclusion in Local
Governance: Field Studies from Rural India, (New Delhi, Sage, 2009).
45
Ibid, p.13.
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid p.14.
48
P.38
49
39
50
Patrick Heller, K.N Harilal and Shubham Chaudhuri, Building Local
Democracy: Evaluating the Impact of Decentralization in Kerala, India, World
Development, Vol.35, No.4, (2007), pp. 626-648.
51
Ibid, p. 626.
52
Ibid, p.642.
53
Glyn Williams, Binitha V. Thampi, D Narayana, Sailaja Nandigama and
Dwaipayan Bhattacharyya, Performing Participatory Citizenship – Politics and
Power in Kerala’s Kudumbashree Programme, Journal of Development Studies,
Vol.47, No.8 (August, 2011), pp. 1261-1280.
54
T.M. Thomas Isaac and Richard W. Franke, Local Democracy and
Development, (New Delhi, Leftword Books, Aug 2017) E-book p.458.
55
IULA Worldwide Declaration on Women in Local Government,
https://council.vancouver.ca/20031209/motionb1.pdf, (accessed on 14 July,
2023).
Correction…. 227

Vol. 57, No. 1-2, 2023, pp-227-227
https://www.amu.ac.in/
nonacademic/UnitPanel1.jsp
Editor’s Note
Correction
The correct details of a research paper published in Volume

56, Number 1-2 of this Journal are as follows:
Title of Paper: From Environmental Evangelist to

Sustainable Sage: Unpacking Gandhi’s Vision of
Environmental Sustainability
Author 1: Ubaid Sidique
Author 2: Ali Kaif
Editor

Shifting Sands in South Asia Analysing I

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Shifting Sands in South Asia Analysing I

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Shifting Sands in South Asia Analysing I

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

The Indian Journal of Politics

VOL. 57, NO. 1-2, JAN.– JUNE, 2023

Volume 57, No. 1-2, 2023

Shifting Sands in South Asia: Analysing 1-20

Role of Transnational Municipal Network in 43-63

Transnational Corporations and 64-80

The International Legal Status of 81-108

Democracy Promotion in Pakistan by EU 109-131

Multi-Party System and Coalition Era in the 150-163

Taliban’s Rise to Power: Afghanistan Crisis 164-188

The Sixth Schedule of Indian Constitution: 189-205

Towards Democratic Deepening: The Link 206-226

Editor’s note 127-127

Shifting Sands in South The Indian Journal of Politics

*PhD Scholar at the Centre for Political Studies, JNU

encircle South Asia, and in the north, it is hemmed by the

through trade, investment, military ties, diplomatic efforts, and

complements the Chinese ambition of dominant world power.

and other supplies to public and private organisations. A team of

Nepal was more of a need-based engagement than, like at present

A framework agreement was signed between the Social Welfare

significant role in developing the economic relationship. But

Maldivian government. The Maldives' interactions with its

Recently, Wang Yi made a surprise visit to Afghanistan after

commerce with China from 2000 to 2018, Bangladesh witnessed a

Australia, and Russia. South Asia, home to roughly two billion

directly as a result of dramatic shifts in its ties with regional

As with Nepal, the majority of South Asian nations are now

South Asia. The island country was included as one of the 23

"China – Pakistan Economic Corridor: A Harbinger of Economic Prosperity

20. Freedom House. “Sri Lanka. In Freedom House” Accessed

Justifications for Using The Indian Journal of Politics

*Research Scholar, Department of Political Science, AMU

Keywords Torture; Counterinsurgency; North East India;

such practices?'' using materialist perspectives held by neorealists

harassment and intimidation. The court further stated that "mental

Indian government's neglect of the Northeast region after

retribution, is a psychological phenomenon in which individuals

realist scholar, asserts that the balance of power is the most

consider insurgent groups as undermining the Indian state's

factor is the legacy of colonialism and its impact on the region's

Identity politics is also significant in influencing justifications for

frequently justified by the state as a necessary tool for combating

security agencies are tyrannical. Insurgent organisations use this

Through proactive participation and problem-solving, it tries to

processes, and investigations into complaints of improper

The examination of torture definitions in international law,

Torture may be viewed as necessary in counterinsurgency

Torture is used in counterinsurgency operations in India's North

more primary research, including as interviews and fieldwork,

Role of Transnational The Indian Journal of Politics

TMN’s seek to provide cities with an “extra-legem”

strengthening the climate policy of cities is contested.There are

Bulkeley et al. examine TMNs from a local perspective in a

between TMNs and non-state entities such as NGOs. This function

one needs a comprehensive model that cover all the nuances of

1. Knowledge Production Production of necessary

Based on these functional categories, this study looks at the

challenges of climate change. Prominent projects include the