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Hypermnesia and total retrieval time

a
Neil W. Mulligan
a
University of North Carolina , Chapel Hill, NC, USA
Published online: 17 Feb 2007.

To cite this article: Neil W. Mulligan (2006) Hypermnesia and total retrieval time, Memory, 14:4, 502-518, DOI:
10.1080/09658210500513438

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 MEMORY, 2006, 14 (4), 502
/518

Hypermnesia and total retrieval time

Neil W. Mulligan
University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC, USA

Recall performance sometimes improves over repeated recall attempts, a phenomenon dubbed
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014

hypermnesia. A critical theoretical issue is whether hypermnesia is due to repeated testing per se or
increased retrieval time. The present experiments investigated by contrasting five testing conditions. All
participants were presented with the same study list followed by either two shorter recall tests or a single
longer test. In the multiple test conditions, the tests were either separated by a (filled) 7-minute interval
(the multiple-split condition), or presented consecutively, with no break (the multiple-immediate
condition). In the single test conditions, the test either began at the start of the recall session, after a
(filled) 7-minute delay, or with a 7-minute interruption inserted in the middle. The multiple-split
condition produced more reminiscence and hypermnesia than the multiple-immediate condition. More
importantly, the multiple-split condition produced greater cumulative recall than any of the other
conditions (which did not differ among themselves). That is, single and repeated recall tests of equal total
duration are not functionally equivalent.

Hypermnesia refers to the increase in recall that
is sometimes observed over multiple recall at-
tempts. In typical experiments, participants study
a set of materials (e.g., a list of words or pictures)
and are then presented with a series of memory
tests in which they repeatedly attempt to recall
the studied information. Across tests, some items
are recalled on later tests that were not recalled
earlier (reminiscence, also referred to as item
gains) while other items recalled on earlier tests
may not be recalled later (item losses). If item
gains exceed item losses, hypermnesia is obtained
(i.e., there is a net increase in the number of items
recalled across tests) whereas if losses exceed
gains, net forgetting results (see Erdelyi, 1996;
Payne, 1987, for reviews). Hypermnesia repre-
sents an increase in memory performance over
tests in contrast to the typical course of forgetting
over time, and so is of great interest to memory
researchers (e.g., Erdelyi & Kleinbard, 1978;
Roediger & Challis, 1989).
Modern research on hypermnesia is marked by
the experiments of Erdelyi and colleagues (e.g.,
Erdelyi & Becker, 1974; Erdelyi, Finkelstein,
Herell, Miller, & Thomas, 1976) who provided
unambiguous demonstrations of hypermnesia
(see Payne, 1987, for a discussion of early,
equivocal, research on hypermnesia). Subsequent
research has demonstrated hypermnesia in a
variety of list-learning experiments (Erdelyi,
1996; Payne, 1987). Hypermnestic recall occurs
with prose passages and films (Montangero,
Ivanyi, & deSaint-Hilaire, 2003; Otani & Griffith,
1998; Wheeler & Roediger, 1992). Hypermnesia
has also been reported for eyewitness memory
(e.g., Bornstein, Liebel, & Scarberry, 1998; Dun-
ning & Stern, 1992) and autobiographical mem-
ory (Bluck, Levine, & Laulhere, 1999).
One important issue raised early on in modern
research on hypermnesia is whether hypermnesia
is a function of multiple, discrete recall tests or
whether it is produced by the increased retrieval
time afforded by multiple tests. Roediger and

Address correspondence to: Neil W. Mulligan, Department of Psychology, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, NC 27599-
3270, USA. E-mail: nmulligan@unc.edu
I gratefully acknowledge the assistance of Mike Steele and Shannen Bowen.

# 2006 Psychology Press Ltd

http://www.psypress.com/memory DOI:10.1080/09658210500513438

Thorpe (1978) examined this issue by comparing
recall performance across multiple recall tests
with a single test of equal total duration. In this
study, participants were presented with a list of
pictures or words, followed by either a succession
of three 7-minute recall tests or a single 21-
minute test. With multiple tests, the number of
items recalled increased across tests, demonstrat-
ing hypermnesia for both pictures and words.
More importantly, cumulative recall (the number
of different items recalled across the entire recall
period) did not differ between the multiple and
single test conditions. Furthermore, Roediger and
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Thorpe were able to plot cumulative recall as a
function of retrieval time across the entire 21-
minute period because participants were required
to mark the test sheets at 1-minute intervals. The
recall functions indicated that multiple and single
tests produced equivalent cumulative recall not
only at the end of the 21-minute interval, but
throughout the recall period. Roediger and
Thorpe concluded that hypermnesia is a function
of total retrieval time rather than of multiple
recall tests and that a single long test is function-
ally equivalent to several shorter tests of equal
total duration.
These results have been replicated several
times. In Roediger, Payne, Gillespie, and Lean
(1982, Experiment 1), participants encoded study
words under a variety of encoding conditions,
followed by three 7-minute recall tests or a single
21-minute test. In all cases, the cumulative recall
functions of the multiple and single test condi-
tions were equivalent. This result also held for
lists of nonsense syllables (Roediger et al., 1982,
Experiment 2). Payne (1986) reported similar
results with picture and word lists. Finally, Turtle
and Yuille (1994) presented participants with a
videotape of a mock armed robbery. Subse-
quently, participants were given three successive
7-minute recall tests or a single 21-minute recall
test. The total number of event details recalled
was equivalent in the two groups.
The equality in cumulative recall between
repeated recall tests and a single test of equal
total duration is a critical finding in several ways.
First, it has been taken to indicate that hyperm-
nesia may be explained in terms of total retrieval
time, rather than in terms of discrete recall tests
(e.g., Madigan & Lawrence, 1980; Payne, 1986;
Roediger, McDermott, & Goff, 1997; Roediger &
Thorpe, 1978; Turtle & Yuille, 1994). Second, it
implies that a single long test is functionally
equivalent to several shorter tests of equal total
HYPERMNESIA AND TOTAL RETRIEVAL TIME 503
duration (e.g., Payne, 1986; Roediger & Thorpe,
1978; Roediger et al., 1997; Turtle & Yuille, 1994).
Third, this finding is a critical result for a
prominent theory of hypermnesia, the cumulative
recall hypothesis (e.g., Roediger et al., 1982;
Roediger & Challis, 1989), which has helped
shape much of the research on hypermnesia
(e.g., Madigan & O’Hara, 1992; McDaniel,
Moore, & Whiteman, 1998; Mulligan, 2001,
2002; Otani, Widner, Whiteman, & St. Louis,
1999; Payne, 1986; Payne, Anastasi, Blackwell,
& Wenger, 1994; Payne, Hembrooke, & Anastasi,
1993; Roediger & Payne, 1985; Rose, 1992;
Widner, Otani, & Smith, 2000).
The cumulative recall hypothesis accounts for
hypermnesia in terms of the function relating
recall to retrieval time. It has long been known
that this function is well described by a negatively
accelerated approach to an asymptote (e.g.,
Bousfield & Sedgewick, 1944). The cumulative
recall hypothesis argues that the first recall test in
a hypermnesia experiment can be considered an
interruption of the recall function (say, at the 7-
minute mark). If an experimental condition has
not yet reached its asymptotic level of recall, then
the additional retrieval time afforded by a sub-
sequent test are expected to produce gains (i.e.,
reminiscence) and hypermnesia (see Roediger &
Challis, 1989, for details; see also Mulligan, 2005).
According to the cumulative recall hypothesis,
the recall functions from a single long test, or
equivalently the cumulative recall functions from
a series of shorter tests of an equal total duration,
are germane to the explanation of hypermnesia.
Because these functions are interchangeable for
the analysis of hypermnesia, a functional equiva-
lence between the two testing conditions is
implied (Roediger & Challis, 1989). Indeed the
equality of cumulative recall is an explicit as-
sumption of this theory (Payne, 1987; Roediger &
Challis, 1989): ‘‘Hypermnesia, or increased recall
across repeated tests, produces equivalent total
recall as compared to performance of participants
given a single test of the same duration’’ (As-
sumption #1, Roediger & Challis, 1989, p. 186).1
Critically, at present, all published results support
this assumption (e.g., Payne, 1986; Roediger et al.,
1982; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978; Turtle & Yuille,
1994) and no published result directly contradicts
it (although, as we see next, some implications of
this assumption have recently been challenged).
1
An revised version of the cumulative recall hypothesis
(Payne, 1986) embodies the same assumption.
 504 MULLIGAN
The cumulative recall hypothesis has had great
success in accounting for results in the hyperm-
nestic literature (Payne, 1987; Roediger & Challis,
1989; Roediger et al., 1997). However, recent
research questions the functional equivalence of
the single and multiple test conditions. Mulligan
(2005) found that compared to items recalled in a
single long recall test, items recalled across multi-
ple recall tests (of equal total duration) were
more resistant to later forgetting. Mulligan (2005)
conducted several experiments, each of which
consisted of two sessions. The first session began
with the presentation of the study materials
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(which varied across experiments: a list of un-
related words, a list of categorically related words,
or a short story). This was followed by either a
series of short recall tests or a single long test of
equal total duration (e.g., four 5-minute tests vs a
single 20-minute test). The second session took
place 2 days later and consisted of a final recall
test. The results of the first experimental session
were consistent with prior research: the multiple
and single test conditions produced equivalent
cumulative recall. However, the multiple-test
group exhibited less forgetting and fewer item
losses on the final test.
This research was motivated by two related
findings in the research literature. First, retrieval
strategies become increasingly organised over
multiple recall tests (as evidenced, e.g., by in-
creased category clustering across recall tests;
Mulligan, 2001). Importantly, the development
of stable and organised retrieval strategies ap-
pears to contribute to hypermnesia by limiting the
number of items lost between tests (Hunt &
McDaniel, 1993; McDaniel et al., 1998; Mulligan,
2001). Second, research on retrieval practice
indicates that prior retrieval makes items more
accessible on subsequent tests (e.g., Bjork, 1988;
Morris & Fritz, 2000; see Dempster, 1996, for a
review). Alternatively stated, retrieval practice
retards the course of forgetting. Mulligan (2005)
argued that both of these factors should be more
pronounced for multiple recall tests than for a
single test of equivalent duration. Furthermore,
Mulligan argued that prior research failed to find
differences between single and multiple recall
tests (Roediger et al., 1982; Roediger & Thorpe,
1978; Turtle & Yuille, 1994) because these studies
did not assess subsequent item losses or differ-
ential forgetting between the two conditions. The
standard procedure for comparing the multiple
and single tests was motivated by the cumulative
recall hypothesis, which focuses on total retrieval
time and item gains (reminiscence) rather than
item losses. The results of Mulligan (2005) in-
dicate that although single and repeated recall
tests appeared equivalent in the initial session,
repeated recall tests produce fewer item losses
and less net forgetting. In this sense, single and
repeated recall tests of equal total duration are
not functionally equivalent.
Demonstrating this lack of equivalence was
important for two reasons. First, as noted above,
an important theory of hypermnesia implies
equivalence between multiple and single recall
tests. Second, prior studies have failed to demon-
strate this lack of equivalence (e.g., Payne, 1986;
Roediger et al., 1982; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978;
Turtle & Yuille, 1994). However, it should be
noted that the results of Mulligan (2005) indi-
cated a lack of equivalence only in certain
regards. Single and multiple recall tests were not
equivalent in subsequent item losses and forget-
ting, but the two testing conditions produced
equivalent recall in the initial session and pro-
duced equivalent item gains between the two
testing sessions.
Thus, the results of Mulligan (2005) do not
falsify the core assumption of the cumulative
recall hypothesis, that single and multiple tests
of equal total duration produce the same amount
of reminiscence and cumulative recall. That is, the
cumulative recall hypothesis makes its clearest
predictions regarding the initial testing session.
The present experiments complement Mulligan
(2005) by demonstrating that single and multiple
recall tests are not equivalent in this regard
either.
This study was motivated by an early experi-
ment on hypermnesia by Madigan and Lawrence
(1980), who reported that inserting a brief (5- or
15-minute) delay between two recall tests in-
creased the number of item gains (also see Smith
& Vela, 1991). Madigan and Lawrence (1980;
Smith & Vela, 1991) proposed that as recall in
the initial test proceeds, output interference
builds up, limiting access to previously unrecalled
items (that is, limiting further item gains). In
addition, Madigan and Lawrence (1980; Smith &
Vela, 1991) argued that output interference
reduces with the passage of time, so that a delay
should render previously inaccessible items more
accessible. Indeed, the notion that accessing
some items in a set can limit accessibility of
other items has long featured in accounts
of related phenomena (e.g., part-set cueing,
retrieval-induced forgetting; Anderson, Bjork, &

Bjork, 1994; Roediger, Stellon & Tulving, 1977) as
well as in formal models of memory search (e.g.,
Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981; Rundus, 1973).
Furthermore, the notion that output interference
dissipates with time has also received support
(e.g., MacLeod & Macrae, 2001; Madigan, 1976;
Saunders & MacLeod, 2002).
Regardless of the adequacy of this account, the
empirical result has implications for the equiva-
lence of single and repeated tests. The typical
multiple-test condition presents tests consecu-
tively, with no intervening delays, and produces
equivalent reminiscence and cumulative recall as
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a single test of equal total duration (Payne, 1986;
Roediger et al., 1982; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978;
Turtle & Yuille, 1994). The results of Madigan
and Lawrence (1980) imply that if a delay was
inserted between tests, the multiple-test condition
would produce more reminiscence and greater
cumulative recall than a comparable single-test
condition. That is, the multiple- and single-test
conditions would not be equivalent, in contrast to
the assumption of the cumulative recall hypoth-
esis.
Thus, a primary goal of the present experi-
ments was to compare recall performance on a
single longer test to performance on two shorter
tests separated by a delay. The study phase of
Experiment 1 was modelled on Roediger and
Thorpe’s (1978) experiments, using a study list of
pictures (line drawings) of unrelated objects.
These encoding conditions are known to produce
hypermnesia, a critical prerequisite for the inter-
pretation of the rest of the results. After a brief
distractor task, participants began the recall
session, presented in one of several ways. The
primary multiple-test condition (the multiple-split
condition) consisted of two 5-minute recall tests
separated by a 7-minute interval (an interval
chosen on the basis of prior research, Madigan
& Lawrence, 1980). The interval between the
recall tests raises several methodological issues
and necessitates several control conditions.
The first issue is the timing of the single-test
condition. Three single-test conditions were used.
The first two control for the start time and end
time of the multiple-test condition. In the single-
immediate condition, a single (10-minute) recall
test was given at the start of the recall phase. The
beginning of this single test coincided with the
beginning of the first test in the multiple-split
condition but ended 7 minutes before the end of
the second test. In the single-delayed condition,
the recall phase began with a 7-minute distractor
HYPERMNESIA AND TOTAL RETRIEVAL TIME 505
task (the same used in the multiple-split condi-
tion) followed by a single (10-minute) recall test.
This single test began 7 minutes after the start of
the first test in the multiple-split condition but
ended at the same time as the second test.
The third single-test condition addresses the 7-
minute interval between tests. If the multiple-split
condition produces greater cumulative recall than
the single-test conditions, it could be due to the
break between tests rather than presence of two
discrete recall tests. For instance, it may be that
participants in the single-test conditions grow
tired of attempting to recall additional informa-
tion over the extended recall period. A few
minutes’ break might reduce this fatigue. To
control for this, a third single-test condition was
implemented (the single-split condition) in which
the single recall test began at the start of the
recall phase but was interrupted at the 5-minute
mark. At this point, the recall test was collected
and participants were given a 7-minute distractor
task (the same task used in the multiple-split
condition). At the end of the distractor task, the
test sheets were returned to the participants and
they continued the recall test. In contrast to the
multiple-split condition, participants had access
to the words they had previously recalled (on the
returned test sheet) and were not asked to begin
recalling the words anew.
Another issue raised by the multiple-split
condition is the potential of covert retrieval
during the interval between tests. Erdelyi and
Becker (1974) showed that an interval of covert
retrieval can enhance hypermnesia. In the present
case, if the multiple-split condition produced
greater cumulative recall than the single-immedi-
ate or single-delayed condition, it is reasonable to
wonder if the enhanced recall is due to covert
retrieval during the break between tests.
This issue is addressed in several ways. First,
participants in the multiple-split (or single-split)
condition were not told about the second recall
test prior to its administration. The task instruc-
tions encouraged participants to believe that the
memory experiment was over at the end of the
first recall test, and that subsequent activities
were part of an unrelated study. Second, the
intervening distractor task was relatively demand-
ing, diminishing the ability of participants to
engage in covert retrieval even if they suspected
an additional test (cf. Smith & Vela, 1991). Third,
at the end of the experiment, participants were
asked if they had anticipated a second test and, if
so, whether they had thought about the studied
 506 MULLIGAN
pictures during the distractor task. Any partici-
pant anticipating a second test was removed from
the analysis. Fourth, the single-split condition
provides a useful comparison condition. If the
multiple-split produces greater recall than the
single-split condition, the case for covert retrieval
is weakened. In particular, the single-split and
multiple-split conditions are identical until the
second recall period begins. Consequently, the
amount of covert retrieval (if any) during
the distractor interval should be equivalent across
the two conditions.
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Finally, the typical multiple test condition is
also required. In this condition (called the multi-
ple-immediate condition), the recall session con-
sisted of two consecutive (5-minute) recall tests
with no intervening break. This condition was
required for two reasons. First, the multiple-
immediate and single-immediate conditions
were compared to determine if the present
experiment replicates the results of Roediger
and Thorpe (1978; also, Payne, 1986; Roediger
et al., 1982; Turtle & Yuille, 1994) in demonstrat-
ing equivalent cumulative recall across these two
conditions. Second, the comparison of the multi-
ple-immediate and multiple-split conditions de-
termines whether the intervening delay enhances
gains and hypermnesia relative to the typical
multiple-testing condition, as found by Madigan
and Lawrence (1980). It should be noted that the
concern about covert retrieval also applies to the
original results of Madigan and Lawrence (1980;
cf. Smith & Vela, 1991). That is, if covert retrieval
occurred during the interval between the tests,
then the enhancing effects of the interval found
by Madigan and Lawrence (1980; Madigan, 1976)
might be tantamount to increased retrieval time.
The present experiment provides an opportunity
to evaluate this issue by eliminating participants
who suspected a second test before it was
presented.2
2
It should be noted that it is unnecessary to include a
condition with two consecutive tests administered after an
initial 7-minute delay (a multiple-delay condition). Roediger
and Payne (1982) presented participants with a study list
followed by a sequence of three consecutive recall tests. The
initial test was administered immediately, 9 minutes, or 18
minutes after the study session. The delay affected neither the
initial test performance nor the amount of hypermnesia. In the
present case, this indicates that a multiple-delayed condition
would produce results indistinguishable from the multiple-
immediate condition.
EXPERIMENT 1
Method
Participants: A total of 186 undergraduates at
University of North Carolina participated in
exchange for credit in psychology courses.
Design and materials: Test condition (multiple-
immediate, multiple-split, single-immediate, sin-
gle-delayed, or single-split), was manipulated
between participants. In the multiple-test condi-
tions, recall test (1 and 2) was varied within
participants.
The critical study pictures were drawn from the
normed line drawings of Snodgrass and Vander-
wart (1980), from which 44 pictures were chosen
that: (1) elicited very high name agreement (98
/
100% according to the Snodgrass & Vanderwart
norms); and (2) had single-word names. Four
additional pictures with similar properties served
as primacy (2) and recency (2) buffers, yielding a
study list of 48 pictures. The study stimuli were
copied to slides and presented via a slide projector.
Procedure: Participants were tested in groups
of three to eight. Test conditions were randomised
at the group level such that all participants in the
same group were in the same test condition. Prior
to the study phase of the experiment, participants
were informed that they would see a series of
pictures and that they should try to remember the
pictures for a later (unspecified) memory test.
Each picture was presented for 5 seconds and the
entire list was presented twice in immediate
succession (Madigan & Lawrence, 1980).
The test session followed the study phase
(Figure 1 provides a schematic of the various
test conditions). The multiple-immediate condi-
tion consisted of two consecutive 5-minute recall
tests. Participants were presented with a test sheet
and asked to recall the names of the pictures from
the study phase. Participants were encouraged to
use the entire time to remember as many pictures
as possible. At the end of the first test, the test
sheets were collected and the participants were
presented with the second test (and a new test
sheet). Participants were again asked to recall as
many pictures from the study list as possible. The
instructions emphasised that participants were to
write down any picture names recalled, including
names recalled on the first test as well as any
additional names that could be recalled.
The multiple-split condition consisted of two 5-
minute recall tests separated by a 7-minute
 HYPERMNESIA AND TOTAL RETRIEVAL TIME 507

Test

Condition

Test 1 Test 2
Multiple (5-min.) (5-min.)

Immediate

Test 1 Distracter Task Test 2

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Multiple (5-min.) (7 min.) (5-min.)

Split

Test 1
Single (10-min.)

Immediate

Distracter Task Test 1

Single (7 min.) (10-min.)

Delayed

Test 1 Distracter Task Test 1 cont’d

Single (5-min.) (7 min.) (5-min.)

Split
Figure 1. Summary of the test conditions.

distractor task. The first recall test was identical
to the multiple-immediate condition. After the
initial test, participants were told that the first
part of the experiment was over. They were told
that the second half of the experiment focused on
visual imagery and problem solving. They were
then given a visual-imagery task in which times
were presented in digital form (hour:minute, e.g.,
10:15). Participants were asked to imagine an
analogue clock showing each time and determine
the number of minute spaces between the hour
and minute hands. They were told to report the
shortest distance between the hands (i.e., no
answer should be greater than 30). The clock
task consisted of 168 problems and participants
were asked to complete as many problems as
possible in 7 minutes (no participant finished all
the problems in the allotted time). The clock task
was chosen because it does not interfere with
hypermnesia (whereas other filler tasks may, see
Payne et al., 1994, Shaw & Bekerian, 1991). After
7 minutes the clock task was collected and the
second recall test was administered, as in the
multiple-immediate condition.
The single-immediate condition consisted of a
single recall test lasting 10 minutes. Participants
were presented with a test sheet and asked to
recall the names of the pictures from the study
 508 MULLIGAN
phase. Participants were asked to use the entire
time to try to recall pictures. They were informed
that people continue to remember the pictures
over the entire time period, even after they feel
they can no longer recall any more. Consequently,
the participants were told, it was important to
continue trying. In the single-delayed test condi-
tion, the test phase began with a 7-minute
distractor task, the clock task described above.
After the distractor task, a single, 10-minute
recall test was administered as in the single-
immediate condition.
The single-split condition consisted of a single
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014
recall test interrupted by a 7-minute distractor
task. At the start of the test session, participants
were presented with the recall test. After 5
minutes, the test sheets were collected and
the participants were informed that the first part
of the experiment was over. They were then given
the clock task for 7 minutes. After the clock task,
the recall test sheets were handed back to the
participants, who were told that the recall task
would now continue. They were asked to read over
their test sheets to see which picture names had
previously been recalled. They were then asked to
use the next 5 minutes to try to recall more picture
names from the study list. As in the other single-
test conditions, the participants were informed
that people continue to remember pictures over
the entire recall period and that they should use
the entire time. In all the test conditions, partici-
pants were instructed to draw a line on their test
paper every 60 seconds. Any items recalled subse-
quently were to be written below the line, enabling
computation of the number of items recalled in
each 1-minute interval.
In the multiple-split and single-split conditions,
the test phase was followed by a brief (two-item)
questionnaire designed to assess covert retrieval.
The first question asked if the participant had
anticipated the second test (or second half of the
test). The second question asked if the participant
thought about the study pictures during the clock
task. That is, did they try to keep the picture
names in mind or remember the picture names in
anticipation of the second (or second half of the)
recall test.
Results
The total numbers of participants in the multiple-
immediate, multiple-split, single-immediate, sin-
gle-delayed, and single-split conditions were 34,
44, 32, 32, and 44, respectively. More participants
were run in the split conditions in anticipation of
eliminating those who claimed to expect the
second test (or the second half of the test)
or who claimed to engage in covert retrieval
during the distractor task. The numbers of
participants answering either of the questions
affirmatively were 11 and 10 in the single-split
and multiple-split conditions, respectively. To
limit the potential impact of covert retrieval in
the split conditions, these participants were elimi-
nated from all subsequent analysis, yielding
effective sample sizes of 33 and 34.3
The recall protocols were scored in two ways, a
strict scoring in which the recalled name had to
match the picture name given in the Snodgrass
and Vanderwart norms, and a lenient scoring in
which the scorer decided if the recalled name
corresponded to a picture from the study list,
even if the name was a variant of the normed
name. Given the high name agreement of the
pictures chosen for this study, it is not surprising
that the two scoring methods produced equiva-
lent results. The data from the strict scoring are
reported below. The first analyses contrasted the
multiple recall conditions to determine if a delay
between the tests affected hypermnesia, or gains
and losses. Net recall (the number of picture
names recalled on a given test, Table 1) was
analysed with a 2/2 ANOVA, using recall test (1
vs 2) as a within-participants factor and test
condition (multiple-immediate vs multiple-split)
as a between-participants factor. First, net recall
increased over tests, F (1, 66) /72.92, MSE /2.58.
That is, significant hypermnesia was obtained.
Second, hypermnesia was greater in the multiple-
split condition than in the multiple-immediate
condition, as indicated by the recall-test by test-
condition interaction, F (1, 66) /21.07, MSE /
2.58 (the main effect of test condition was not
significant, F B/1). Hypermnesia was significant in
both the multiple-immediate and the multiple-
split conditions, t (33) /3.56 and t (34) /7.89,
respectively. Thus, both multiple testing condi-
tions displayed hypermnesia but the amount of
hypermnesia was greater when there was a delay
between the tests.
Gains (or reminiscence) were items recalled on
the second test that had not been recalled on the
first test, and losses were items recalled on the
3
In fact, all analyses were performed with and without this
set of participants, and the pattern of significant findings
remained the same.
 HYPERMNESIA AND TOTAL RETRIEVAL TIME 509

TABLE 1
recall is comparable across conditions for the first
Experiment 1: Net recall, gains, and losses in the multiple-
immediate and multiple-split conditions 5 minutes but not for minutes 6
/10, over which
the multiple-split condition shows a greater
Recall test increase in recall than do the other conditions.
Testing condition 1 2 Gains Losses
Table 2 presents increases in recall on a minute-
by-minute basis (as well as total intrusions, which
Multiple-immediate 22.2 23.3 2.76 1.68 did not differ across test conditions, F /1.22).
Multiple-split 21.9 25.5 5.56 1.97
Minute 1 represents initial recall (the number of
studied items recalled in the first minute, equiva-
first test but not on the second. As can be seen in lent to cumulative recall for minute 1). Subsequent
Table 1, the multiple-split condition increased the minutes represent the number of items recalled in
number of gains, t (66) /5.59 but did not affect that minute that were not recalled earlier (gains).
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014

the number of losses, jt jB/1, relative to the
multiple-immediate condition. Thus, the inter-
test delay increased reminiscence without appre-
ciably increasing losses.
Next, we compare performance across all
testing conditions. Figure 2 presents cumulative
recall. In the single-test conditions, cumulative
recall is simply the number of studied items
recalled by the end of each 1-minute interval. In
the multiple-test conditions, cumulative recall is
the number of different studied items recalled
by the end of each minute, treating the first test as
the minutes 1
/5 and the second test as minutes
6
/10. The figure indicates that the growth of
For the multiple-test conditions, minutes 6
/10
represent the number of gains on test 2 as a
function of the minute in which the items were
recalled (thus for the multiple test conditions, the
gains over these minutes sum to the total gains on
Test 2 reported in Table 1). Initial recall (at minute
1) was not expected to differ across test conditions,
and did not differ, F B/1. Ignoring initial recall,
gains (or reminiscence) can be analysed over
minutes 2
/10 with a 5/9 ANOVA, using test
condition (single-immediate, single-delayed, sin-
gle-split, multiple-immediate, or multiple-split) as
a between-participants factor and retrieval time
(minute 2
/10) as a within-participants factor. The

35

30

25
Cumulative Recall

20

Single-Del
15 Single-Immed
Single-Split
Mult-Immed
Mult-Split
10

5
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Retrieval Time (min)
Figure 2. Experiment 1: Cumulative recall as a function of retrieval time and test condition.
 510 MULLIGAN

TABLE 2
Experiment 1: Gains (as a function of retrieval time) and total intrusions

Retrieval time (minutes)

Testing condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total intrusions

Single-delayed 15.28 3.16 1.53 1.44 0.78 0.81 0.50 0.41 0.28 0.25 1.72
Single-split 14.65 3.62 2.03 1.65 0.82 0.59 0.50 0.56 0.50 0.38 1.44
Single-immediate 14.22 3.56 1.94 1.41 0.88 0.84 0.75 0.56 0.31 0.47 2.06
Multiple-immediate 14.41 3.62 1.79 1.38 0.97 1.24 0.65 0.50 0.21 0.18 2.06
Multiple-split 14.03 3.38 2.47 1.50 0.62 2.62 1.26 0.91 0.59 0.18 1.29

For the multiple-test conditions, total intrusions are the number of different intrusions recalled on either Test 1 or Test 2.

main effect of test condition was significant, F (4, 0.50, indicating that the advantage of the multi-
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014

161) /5.57, MSE /1.70, indicating that the
amount of reminiscence varied across conditions,
with planned contrasts indicating greater gains in
the multiple-split condition than in any other
condition. The time by test-condition interaction
was also significant, F (32, 1288) /2.71, MSE /
1.17, indicating that the advantage of the multi-
ple-split condition varied over retrieval time. The
significant effect of retrieval time, F (8, 1288) /
142.88, MSE /1.17, is not of interest (it merely
indicates that gains decrease across time).
The significant interaction is illuminated by
several planned comparisons. First, the preceding
analysis was repeated, eliminating the multiple-
split condition. In this analysis, neither the main
effect of test condition nor the time by test-
condition interaction was significant, F B/1.1. This
indicates that the differential growth in recall was
due to the multiple-split condition, and that the
other conditions did not differ from one another.
A second analysis made use of all the test
conditions, but was restricted to the initial 5
minutes of recall (through the end of test 1 in
the multiple test conditions). This encompasses
the retrieval time prior to the critical manipula-
tion of delay. In this analysis, gains were sub-
mitted to a 5 /4 ANOVA using test condition and
retrieval time (minutes 2
/5) as factors. The effect
of test condition and the interaction were non-
significant, F s B/1. Thus, over the first 5 minutes
of retrieval, before the critical delay in the multi-
ple condition, gains were indistinguishable across
the test conditions. Finally, an analysis restricted
to the last 5 minutes of recall, after the critical
delay manipulation, revealed a main effect of test
condition, F(4, 161) /20.00, MSE /0.65, with
planned contrasts indicating greater gains in the
multiple-split condition than in any other condi-
tion. This analysis also revealed a time by test-
condition interaction, F (16, 644) /8.15, MSE /
ple-split condition was greatest in the first one or
two minutes of Test 2 (i.e., largely minutes 6 and
7).
A final set of planned contrasts compared final
cumulative recall (i.e., cumulative recall at minute
10, Figure 2) in the multiple-split condition with
each of the other testing conditions. The results
indicated that the multiple-split condition pro-
duced significantly greater cumulative recall than
any of the other conditions, t s /2.00. Further-
more, no other two conditions differed in cumu-
lative recall, jt jsB/1.
Discussion
The present experiment examined whether single
and multiple recall tests of equal total duration
are equivalent. The most important finding was
that introducing a delay between tests in the
multiple-test condition produced greater reminis-
cence and cumulative recall than a comparable
single test. Before discussing this central result, a
few other results deserve comment.
Embedded in the present results are some
important replications of earlier research. First,
consider the multiple-immediate condition, a
typical experimental condition for assessing hy-
permnesia. As expected (e.g., Mulligan, 2005;
Roediger & Thorpe, 1978) net recall in this
condition improved over tests; hypermnesia was
obtained. In addition, cumulative recall across the
two tests was equivalent to cumulative recall in a
single 10-minute test (the single-immediate con-
dition being the most comparable), replicating
earlier results (Payne, 1986; Roediger et al., 1982;
Roediger & Thorpe, 1978; Turtle & Yuille, 1994)
and the results of the initial recall sessions in
Mulligan (2005).

A second set of results, the comparisons of the
multiple-immediate and multiple-split conditions,
converges with earlier results (Madigan & Lawr-
ence, 1980; Smith & Vela, 1991). Inserting a delay
between two recall tests increases both the
number of gains and the amount of hypermnesia.
In addition, the present study attempted to limit
the influence of covert retrieval during the inter-
test delay through the use of a post-test ques-
tionnaire (cf. Madigan, 1976; Madigan & Lawr-
ence, 1980; Smith & Vela, 1991). From the
perspective of the cumulative recall hypothesis,
it is important to rule out the effects of covert
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014
retrieval during this interval, otherwise the effects
of delay might simply be attributed to additional
retrieval time. It is worth noting in this regard that
over 20% of the original participants (10 out of
44) in the multiple-split condition reported ex-
pecting the second test or engaging in covert
retrieval. If similar levels existed in earlier
research using this paradigm (Madigan, 1976;
Madigan & Lawrence, 1980), it is reasonable to
wonder if covert retrieval contributed to the
multiple-split advantage. The present result ar-
gues against this interpretation. The advantage
for the multiple-split over the multiple-immediate
condition persisted even when the ‘‘covert
retrieval’’ participants were excluded from the
analysis.4
Finding correspondence between present and
prior results strengthens the interpretability of
the central comparisons, between the multiple-
split condition and the single-test conditions. The
first thing to note is that there were no significant
differences among the single-test conditions, and
that the multiple-split condition produced greater
reminiscence and cumulative recall than any of
the three. The equivalence of the single-immedi-
ate and single-delayed conditions is not too
surprising. Given a relatively short delay (of 7
minutes) little forgetting is to be expected (e.g.,
Roediger & Payne, 1982). The fact that the
multiple-immediate condition produced greater
4
Smith and Vela (1991, Experiment 3) came to a similar
conclusion by different means. In this experiment, the inter-
test interval was either filled with a demanding task or was
unfilled (10 minutes of ‘‘quiet time’’). Smith and Vela
reasoned that if covert retrieval was responsible for the
positive effect of the delay, then the effect should be more
pronounced when the interval was unfilled rather than filled
with a demanding task that should limit participants’ ability to
engage in retrieval. Contrary to the covert-retrieval
hypothesis, the unfilled interval produced numerically (but
not significantly) less reminiscence than the filled interval.
HYPERMNESIA AND TOTAL RETRIEVAL TIME 511
cumulative recall than either of these conditions
indicates that the exact timing of the single test
(either beginning with the first of the multiple
tests, or ending with the second) is unimportant to
the results. The multiple-split condition was also
superior to the single-split condition, indicating
that the 7-minute break in retrieval, per se, was
not the operative factor. This argues against
fatigue in the single-test conditions as the critical
determinant of the multiple-split advantage. Par-
ticipants in the single-split condition had the same
break from retrieval yet produced lower cumula-
tive recall. Rather, it seems, the break must be
followed by a fresh start on retrieval. This result
conforms with a retrieval practice/output inter-
ference account to be described in the general
discussion.
The present results indicate that multiple recall
tests are not equivalent to single recall tests of
equal total duration in terms of reminiscence or
cumulative recall. This result was obtained using
pictures as the study materials. Experiment 2
demonstrates the same results for words.
EXPERIMENT 2
Hypermnesia is readily found when the study
materials are pictures (e.g., Erdelyi & Kleinbard,
1978; Madigan, 1976; Payne, 1987). However,
verbal materials often do not produce hyperm-
nestic recall unless the materials are presented
multiple times, or are encoded under instructions
that encourage elaboration or the formation of
mental images (e.g., Belmore, 1981; Erdelyi et al.,
1976; LaTour & McKelvie, 1994; Payne, 1986;
Roediger & Thorpe, 1978; Shaw & Bekerian,
1991). Because words and pictures sometimes
produce different results regarding hypermnesia,
it is important to repeat the first experiment using
words as study materials. More specifically, Ex-
periment 2 has two goals. First, earlier research
on the effects of delay on reminiscence (Madigan
& Lawrence, 1980; Smith & Vela, 1991) used
pictures. This experiment determines if the de-
layed reminiscence effect generalises to verbal
materials. Second, and more importantly, the
central result of Experiment 1 was that multiple
recall tests produced greater reminiscence and
cumulative recall than single recall tests of equal
total duration. The present experiment demon-
strates that this result is replicable and generalises
to words. As in the first experiment, the inter-
pretation of the critical results is enhanced if the
 512 MULLIGAN
standard multiple-test condition produces hy-
permnesia. Thus, the study words were presented
under encoding conditions known to produce
hypermnesia (e.g., Roediger & Thorpe, 1978), a
list of unrelated words presented under imagery-
encoding instructions.
Method
Participants: A total of 177 undergraduates at
University of North Carolina participated in
exchange for credit in psychology courses.
Design and materials: Experiment 2 used the
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014
same design as Experiment 1. The critical words
were 44 common, high-imagery words, four to ten
letters in length (chosen from the MRC Psycho-
linguistic Database, Coltheart, 1981). The words
had imagery ratings between 600 and 700 on the
MRC Psycholinguistic scales, with mean imagery
of 633, mean concreteness of 618, and mean
Kucera
/Francis (1967) frequency of 46.9. The
critical words were randomly ordered. Four words
with similar properties served as primacy (2) and
recency (2) buffers, yielding a study list of 48
words. The study stimuli were copied to slides and
presented via a slide projector.
Procedure: Participants were tested in groups
of two to seven. Test conditions were randomised
at the group level such that all participants in the
same group were in the same test condition. Prior
to the study phase of the experiment, participants
were informed that they would see a series of
words and that they should try to remember these
words for a later (unspecified) memory test.
Participants were informed that the words re-
ferred to concrete objects and that it would be
useful to create a mental image of each word to
help remember it (Roediger & Thorpe, 1978). As
in Experiment 1, each study item was presented
for 5 seconds and the entire list was presented
twice. The test procedures were identical to
Experiment 1.
Results
The total numbers of participants in the multiple-
immediate, multiple-split, single-immediate, sin-
gle-delayed, and single-split conditions were 33,
40, 30, 34, and 40, respectively. In the single-split
and multiple-split conditions, the numbers of
participants who expected the second (half) test
or claimed covert retrieval were eight and nine,
respectively. These participants were eliminated
TABLE 3
Experiment 2: Net recall, gains, and losses in the multiple-
immediate and multiple-split conditions
Recall Test
Testing condition 1 2 Gains Losses
Multiple-immediate 19.9 20.7 2.21 1.42
Multiple-split 20.4 23.5 4.84 1.81
from all subsequent analysis, yielding effective
sample sizes of 32 and 31.
Net recall (Table 3) was analysed with a 2 /2
ANOVA, using recall test (1 vs 2) and test
condition (multiple-immediate vs multiple-split)
as factors. The main effect of recall test was
significant, F (1, 62) /38.93, MSE /3.25, as was
the recall-test by test-condition interaction, F (1,
62) /13.50, MSE / 3.25 (the main effect of test
condition was not significant, F /1.79). The effect
of recall test was significant in both the multiple-
immediate and the multiple-split conditions,
t (32) /2.31 and t (30) /5.87, respectively. As in
Experiment 1, both test conditions produced
significant hypermnesia, and delaying the second
test increased the size of this effect. As in
Experiment 1, the number of gains was signifi-
cantly higher in the multiple-split condition than
in the multiple-immediate condition, t (62) /5.04,
but the number of losses was unaffected by test
condition, t /1.01.
Cumulative recall (Figure 3) exhibits the same
results as Experiment 1: the growth of recall was
comparable across test conditions for the first 5
minutes but not for minutes 6
/10, over which the
multiple-split condition shows a greater increase
in recall than do the other conditions. Table 4
presents increases in recall on a minute-by-
minute basis (as well as total intrusions which
did not differ across test conditions, F B/1). Initial
recall (at minute 1) did not differ across test
conditions, F B/1. Gains were analysed over
minutes 2
/10 with a 5 (test condition) /9 (re-
trieval time: minutes 2
/10) ANOVA. The main
effect of test condition was significant, F (4,
155) /4.06, MSE /2.43, indicating that the
amount of reminiscence varied across conditions,
with planned contrasts revealing significantly
greater gains in the multiple-split condition than
in any other condition. The time by test-condition
interaction was also significant, F (32, 1240) /
1.82, MSE /1.36*/as was the main effect of
retrieval time, F(8, 1240) /110.64, MSE /1.36,
indicating that gains decrease over time.
 HYPERMNESIA AND TOTAL RETRIEVAL TIME 513

30

25

20
Cumulative Recall

15
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014

Single-Del
10 Single-Immed
Single-Split
Mult-Immed

5
Mult-Split

0
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Retrieval Time (min)

Figure 3. Experiment 2: Cumulative recall as a function of retrieval time and test condition.

As in Experiment 1, the significant interaction indicating greater gains in the multiple-split

was followed by several planned comparisons.
First, the preceding analysis was repeated, elim-
inating the multiple-split condition. In this ana-
lysis, neither the main effect of test condition nor
the time-by-test-condition interaction was signifi-
cant, F sB/1. A second analysis made use of all
the test conditions, but was restricted to gains
during the initial 5 minutes of recall (i.e., minutes
2
/4). The effect of test condition and the inter-
action were non-significant (F sB/1). Finally, an
analysis restricted to the last 5 minutes of recall
revealed a main effect of test condition, F (4,
155) /17.94, MSE /0.63, with planned contrasts
condition than the other conditions */as in Ex-
periment 1, the time-by-test-condition interaction
was significant, F (16, 620) /4.85, MSE / 0.47,
indicating that the advantage of the multiple-split
condition was greatest in the first few minutes of
Test 2. This set of analyses indicates that in-
creases in recall did not differ across test condi-
tions during the first 5 minutes of retrieval,
before the critical delay in the multiple-split
condition. Following this, the differential growth
in recall was due to the multiple-split condition;
the other conditions did not differ from one
another.

TABLE 4
Experiment 2: Gains (as a function of retrieval time) and total intrusions

Retrieval time (min.)

Testing condition 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 Total intrusions

Single-delayed 12.43 3.13 1.77 1.30 0.63 0.43 0.63 0.37 0.10 0.57 2.30
Single-split 13.34 2.97 1.31 1.28 0.72 0.69 0.34 0.19 0.09 0.16 1.63
Single-immediate 12.03 3.82 1.88 1.44 0.74 0.44 0.38 0.12 0.47 0.44 1.26
Multiple-immediate 12.97 3.48 1.52 1.09 0.82 0.82 0.55 0.45 0.18 0.21 2.36
Multiple-split 12.90 3.16 2.32 1.29 0.68 1.81 1.26 0.97 0.58 0.23 1.68

For the multiple-test conditions, total intrusions are the number of different intrusions recalled on either Test 1 or Test 2.
 514 MULLIGAN
A final set of planned contrasts indicated that
the multiple-split condition produced significantly
greater cumulative recall than any of the other
conditions, t s /2.28. Furthermore, no other two
conditions differed in cumulative recall, jt js B/1.
Discussion
The results of this experiment are thoroughly
consistent with Experiment 1, indicating that the
results are replicable and generalise to words.
First, the multiple-immediate condition (the typi-
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014
cal condition for assessing hypermnesia) demon-
strated the expected increase in net recall. This
result replicates prior research indicating that
words can produce hypermnesia when accompa-
nied by imagery-encoding instructions (e.g., Mul-
ligan, 2005; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978). In
addition, cumulative recall across the two tests
was equivalent to cumulative recall in a single 10-
minute test (the single-test conditions), replicat-
ing earlier results (Payne, 1986; Roediger et al.,
1982; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978; Turtle & Yuille,
1994) and the results of Experiment 1.
A second set of results demonstrates that
words, as well as pictures, can produce the
delayed-reminiscence effect. In particular, the
comparison of the multiple-immediate and multi-
ple-split conditions shows that a delay between
two recall tests increases both the number of
gains and the amount of hypermnesia, the same
result as obtained with pictures in Experiment 1
(Madigan & Lawrence, 1980; Smith & Vela,
1991). As in Experiment 1, the present study
attempted to limit the influence of covert retrie-
val during the inter-test delay through the use of a
post-test questionnaire. The percentage of parti-
cipants in the multiple-split condition expecting
the second test or reporting covert retrieval was
similar to Experiment 2 (9 out of 40). Again, the
same advantage for the multiple-split over the
multiple-immediate condition persisted when
the ‘‘covert retrieval’’ participants were excluded
from the analysis. As in Experiment 1, there were
no significant differences among the single test
conditions. Finally, the most critical replication is
the finding that the multiple-split condition pro-
duced greater reminiscence and cumulative recall
than any of the single-test conditions. Words do
not always produce the same results as pictorial
stimuli in research on hypermnesia. However, the
present results indicate that words and pictures
can both produce the delayed-reminiscence ef-
fect, as well as the multiple-split advantage over
single-test conditions.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
An important issue in research on hypermnesia is
whether hypermnesia is a function of multiple,
discrete recall attempts or simply a product of the
increased retrieval time provided by multiple
tests. Based on extant data (Payne, 1986; Roedi-
ger et al., 1982; Roediger & Thorpe, 1978; Turtle
& Yuille, 1994) one would be justified in con-
cluding that multiple recall tests are equivalent to
a single test of equal total duration. These results
are central to the cumulative recall hypothesis,
which is predicated on this assumption, and
formed the basis of Turtle and Yuille’s (1994)
speculation that hypermnesia is due to increased
retrieval time and is ‘‘not a memory phenomenon,
per se’’ (p. 268).
The present results provide the first demon-
stration that this is not the case. When a delay is
inserted between multiple tests, the tests pro-
duced greater reminiscence and cumulative recall
than comparable single tests of equal total dura-
tion. These results complement those of Mulligan
(2005), who found that multiple recall tests also
retard subsequent item loss and forgetting. The
present results and those of Mulligan (2005)
provide strong evidence that multiple and single
recall tests matched on total retrieval time are not
functionally equivalent. This central result is
important for a more complete understanding of
hypermnesia. First, it indicates that hypermnesia
is not simply a product of total retrieval time (e.g.,
Roediger & Thorpe, 1978; Turtle & Yuille, 1994).
There are effects of multiple recall tests that go
beyond the total retrieval time afforded by these
tests. Second, this result undermines one of the
key assumptions of the cumulative recall hypoth-
esis. Furthermore, the present results weaken the
case that hypermnesia can be understood primar-
ily in terms of cumulative recall (cf. McDaniel
et al., 1998). Finally, these results motivate addi-
tional research on the effects of multiple vs single
recall tests with other types of materials (e.g.,
eyewitnessed events, text, autobiographical infor-
mation). For example, although hypermnesia has
been reported for eyewitness memory (e.g.,
Bornstein et al., 1998), there is a question as to
whether the effect represents anything more than
increased retrieval time (Turtle & Yuille, 1994).
The present results suggest that introducing a

delay between recall tests will increase the total
recall of witnessed material and will demonstrate
that multiple recall tests are functionally distinct
from a single, time-matched test.
Although the primary focus of the present
study is empirical (i.e., the assessment of the
equivalence of multiple and single tests), the
results have bearing on several theoretical and
methodological issues. First, the present results
and those of Mulligan (2005) might be under-
stood in terms of the multiple effects of retrieval
on subsequent retrieval. On the one hand, retrie-
val practice makes the retrieved items more
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014
accessible on subsequent tests (e.g., Bjork, 1988;
Dempster, 1996; Morris & Fritz, 2000). To the
extent that retrieval practice is greater in multi-
ple-test than single-test conditions, multiple tests
should exhibit fewer losses and less forgetting on
subsequent tests, as was shown in Mulligan
(2005). On the other hand, retrieving some items
may make competing items less accessible, via
mechanisms such as output interference, retrieval
blocking, or retrieval-induced forgetting (e.g.,
Anderson et al., 1994; Madigan & Lawrence,
1980; Rundus, 1973; Smith & Vela, 1991). Such
mechanisms have long played an important role
in explanations of temporary forgetting, in ex-
planations of the ‘‘self-limiting’’ nature of recall
(e.g., Roediger, 1978), and in formal models of
recall (e.g., Raaijmakers & Shiffrin, 1981). The
corollary notion is that output interference dis-
sipates over time or via intervening activity,
permitting later accessibility of material pre-
viously rendered inaccessible (Bower, 1972;
Madigan & Lawrence, 1980; Mensink & Raaij-
makers, 1988; Rundus, 1973; Smith & Vela, 1991).
Consistent with this view are several studies in
which output interference and retrieval-induced
forgetting decreased with delay (MacLeod &
Macrae, 2001; Madigan, 1976; Madigan &
Lawrence, 1980; Saunders & MacLeod, 2002;
Smith & Vela, 1991). This analysis indicates that
introducing a delay between recall tests reduces
output interference, stimulating gains and cumu-
lative recall on the post-delay test, as was seen in
the multiple-split condition of the present experi-
ments. In addition, the results from the single-
split condition imply that the positive effects of
the delay can be undone by re-presenting the
already-retrieved items. One obvious possibility is
that output interference is reinstated when the
participants look over their original responses.
This account raises an important issue about
the relative time-course of gains and losses. The
HYPERMNESIA AND TOTAL RETRIEVAL TIME 515
delay in the multiple-split condition enhanced the
amount of hypermnesia, net recall, and gains on
Test 2 relative to the multiple-immediate condi-
tion (see Tables 1 and 3). For the delay to have
these positive effects, the dissipation of output
interference must operate more quickly than any
forgetting that might occur over the delay. There
is some research to support this characterisation.
Several studies indicate that output interference
effects can dissipate over relatively short delays
(e.g., 25 minutes in Chandler, 1993; 5 minutes in
Smith & Blankenship, 1991). Over similarly short
delays, little forgetting is found on recall tests
(e.g., Roediger & Payne, 1982; the equivalence of
the single-immediate and single-delayed condi-
tions of the present experiments). These empiri-
cal results render it plausible that over short
delays, the positive effects of the release from
output interference outweigh the negative effects
of forgetting. However, the time-course of remi-
niscence and losses in the multiple-recall para-
digm needs to be explored in greater detail. For
example, it seems obvious that the positive effects
of the inter-test delay have some limit. With a
sufficiently long delay, the amount of forgetting
(losses) on Test 2 would presumably produce
lower net recall (and less hypermnesia) than the
comparable immediate (no delay) condition.
Likewise, the positive effects of delay on reminis-
cence would at some point be outweighed by the
decreasing accessibility of previously unrecalled
items (i.e., potential or unrealised gains). Thus,
this analysis predicts a nonmonotonic effect of
delay on hypermnesia: over relatively short de-
lays, increasing delay should increase hypermne-
sia and net recall on Test 2, but over longer
delays, increasing delay should decrease hyperm-
nesia and net recall, eventually below the levels
found in the multiple-immediate condition.
Second, the present results raise a methodolo-
gical issue. Several researchers have suggested
that the patterns of gains and losses across multi-
ple recall tests can be used to draw inferences
about encoding processes, specifically item-speci-
fic vs relational encoding. Item-specific proces-
sing involves the encoding of information unique
to an item (compared to items in the surrounding
encoding context) and is thought to enhance
distinctiveness in memory; relational encoding
refers to the processing of shared features of
items, and is thought to foster organised retrieval
strategies (see Hunt & McDaniel, 1993, for a
review). Klein, Loftus, Kihlstrom, & Aseron
(1989) related the item-specific
/relational dis-
 516 MULLIGAN
tinction to research on hypermnesia, arguing that
more item-specific processing at encoding en-
hances later gains across recall tests, whereas
more relational encoding reduces the number of
losses across tests. Several studies have used gains
and losses to index the relative amounts of item-
specific and relational encoding, respectively
(e.g., Burns, 1993; Burns & Gold, 1999; Engelk-
amp & Seiler, 2003; Klein, Loftus, & Schell, 1994;
McDaniel et al., 1998; Mulligan, 2001). The
present results (and those of Madigan & Lawr-
ence, 1980, and Smith & Vela, 1991) provide a
caution for a strict encoding interpretation of
Downloaded by [Chinese University of Hong Kong] at 20:39 18 December 2014
gains in hypermnesia. These results indicate a
retrieval component as well, in which gains are
influenced not just by the amount of item-specific
processing during encoding but also by the
particulars of inter-test delay. On other grounds,
Burns and Hebert (2005) have recently critiqued
the use of gains to measure item-specific proces-
sing, concluding that cumulative recall curves
provide a better assessment. The present results
provide the same caution for this analysis: cumu-
lative recall is likewise influenced by retrieval
dynamics and inter-test delay, which may under-
mine the use of cumulative recall curves to infer
encoding processes.
Finally, there are several related areas of
research in which the dissipation of interference
results in improved memory or problem solving.
We mention two such examples. The first is
research on incubation in problem solving
(Dodds, Ward, & Smith, 2003; Smith & Blanken-
ship, 1991). For certain types of problems, addi-
tional work on an unsolved problem is more
likely to yield success if the additional work does
not immediately follow the unsuccessful attempt
but rather occurs after a delay (the ‘‘incubation
effect’’ in problem solving). Smith and Blanken-
ship (1991) have argued that incubation can be a
product of reduced output interference. Initially,
wrong answers block retrieval of correct answers,
a type of interference that dissipates with delay.
Smith and Blankenship simulated this situation
by providing misleading (wrong) answers to items
from the Remote Association Test (RAT). Parti-
cipants were then given the RAT either immedi-
ately or after a brief (e.g., 5-minute) delay. The
delay increased the recall of correct answers as
the influence of the interfering, misleading an-
swers was reduced. Smith and Blankenship pro-
posed that this result is similar to naturally
occurring incubation, in which self-generated
wrong answers initially block access to correct
solutions. The present results appear similar to
these results, supporting the contention that the
positive effects of (at least short) delays in recall
and problem solving may have a common basis
(Smith & Vela, 1991).
A second example is Finger and Pezdek’s
(1999) study on memory for faces. These
researchers found that more extensive verbal
description of a face impaired accuracy on a
subsequent face-identification test (an example
of the verbal overshadowing effect). However, if
the face-identification test was delayed (by as
little as 25 minutes), groups providing more or
less verbal description produced comparable
identification accuracy (release from the verbal
overshadowing effect). The authors concluded
that verbal descriptions did not permanently
disrupt memory for the face but rather tempora-
rily diminished access, a form of output inter-
ference that is similar to the way in which wrong
answers can disrupt access to correct answers in
problem solving, or that earlier retrieved items
block access to later items in recall.
Manuscript received 3 June 2005
Manuscript accepted 28 November 2005
PrEview proof published online 19 April 2006
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