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 Kings of Tabal 85

CHAPTER 5
Kings of Tabal: Politics, Competition, and Conflict
in a Contested Periphery
Sarah C. Melville, Clarkson University

Introduction

In the southeastern end of the Anatolian plateau a loose collection of culturally

allied city states, known in Assyrian sources as TabΩl, developed during the centu-
ries following the fall of the Hittite Empire. Although the political geography and
archaeology of the Iron Age in this region are not well known and the monumental
art and Luwian inscriptions that have so far been recovered shed little light on his-
torical events,1 external sources such as Assyrian royal inscriptions and letters help
to illuminate the otherwise murky picture.2 Taken as a whole, the evidence reveals
an intriguing concurrence. In the eighth century b.c., Tabal experienced a period of
significant change marked by some political cohesion and the appearance of monu-
mental sculpture and inscriptions. During precisely the same period, Tabal was subject
to increasing encroachment from the competing foreign powers Assyria, Urartu, and
Phrygia. In this paper, we identify Tabal as a contested periphery; that is, “a peripheral
region for which one or more core regions compete,”3 and we explore the patterns
of interaction between the imperialistic cores and the peripheral polities over which
they competed.

1. For recent assessment of the evidence from Tabal, see Hawkins 2000 (hereafter HLI); Aro
1988; Melchert, ed., 2003. For a brief assessment of Assyrian activity in Anatolia, see Grayson
1998.

2. In fact, with the exception of one Urartian royal inscription (see below) and mentions of
Tabal in the Bible (as “Tubal” in Gen. 10, I Chron. 1, Isa. 66, Ezek. 27, 32, 38, 39), all our external
sources are (so far) Assyrian. While it is true that Assyrian royal inscriptions are at least as much
purveyors of ideology as they are historical documents, it is not within the scope of this paper to
include a painstaking analysis of their veracity. Suffice it to say, I have kept in mind the ideological
bent of the sources.

3. The term was first proposed by Allen 1997; for a refined definition, see Chase-Dunn and
Hall 1997.

85
86 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

Theoretical Considerations

Since its introduction by Wallerstein in the 1970s, World-Systems Theory has

engendered a great deal of critical analysis and several new approaches to the mechan-
ics of imperialism and core-periphery relations in the ancient world.4 The first mil-
lennium has proven a particularly fruitful field of investigation since it produced not
only the first true territorial empires in Mesopotamia, but also unparalleled material
and textual evidence. Recent studies have proposed various models of (especially Neo-
Assyrian) imperialism,5 investigated the role of frontiers in imperial world-systems,6
and examined the notion of “contested peripheries.” Core-periphery studies have gen-
erally emphasized economic exchange, often to the exclusion of political and military
considerations. Moreover, the notion that contested peripheries “are also likely to be
areas of intense military activity” overstates the predominance of warfare and omits
the utility of core political strategies and the ability of peripheral elites to determine
their own destinies.7 In the following we develop a modified paradigm for interpreting
contested peripheries based on core principles of strategic defense and the exploitation
by peripheral elites of competing cores.
Because the cost of any military, economic, or political action generated by a
core power grew in proportion to its distance from the core, economy of effort was
always essential. 8 As a given core expanded territorial security became an increas-
ingly difficult problem as well. Ancient borders tended to be approximate and because
ancient states could not mount effective perimeter defenses of their home territory
they had to develop more flexible and economical ways to defend their lands. 9 The
best security arrangements included military, economic, and political components,
which were implemented with strict attention to their cost-to-benefit ratios: wherever

4. Wallerstein 1974. For the application and modification of Wallerstein’s model to the Ancient
Near East, see, for example, M. Rowlands, et al., eds. 1987; Algaze 1993; Stein 1999. For a brief,
recent critique of Wallerstein, see Smith 2003: 100–01.

5. See in particular Liverani 1988; Parker 2001 and 2003.

6. See, for example, Parker and Rodseth, eds., 2005.

7. Cline 2000: 8.

8. For more on distance-decay and distance-parity models, see Stein 1999: 165–66.

9. For a study of ancient borderland dynamics, see Parker 2006. For a military analysis of impe-
rial border processes, see Luttwak’s classic (1976) work on the Roman Empire.
 Kings of Tabal 87

possible the military favored deterrence over direct action;10 economic development
tempered resource exploitation,11 and patron-client relationships obviated the need for
direct annexation.12 However, peripheral states were not simply the passive victims
of imperial exploitation, but were perfectly capable of capitalizing on their situations
and negotiating the conditions under which they interacted with the core states.13 In
the next section, we investigate three distinct stages of Tabal’s interaction with preda-
tory foreign powers.

Tabal as a Contested Periphery

The term “Tabal” is something of an Assyrian administrative convenience. A

regional designator rather than a political one, Tabal encompassed a number of city-
states, whose porous, shifting borders no doubt made the generalization expedient.14
The exact location and extent of the ancient polities remain stubbornly elusive, but
sources indicate that greater Tabal was bounded in the north by the southern bend
of the Halys River, in the west by Phrygia, in the east by Tilgarimmu, MelÏd, and
Urartu, and in the south by Hilakku and Quwê.15 By the late eighth century b.c., the
Assyrians recognized two main states in the region: Tabal proper, called BÏt-Pur„taå
during Sargon II’s reign, centered on the Kayseri plain in the north; and Tuæana to the

10. All successful ancient states, including the Assyrians, acted on the economy of force prin-
ciple. It is important to remember that battle was usually not the first resort of conflict resolution, nor
was violence the primary means of dominance. The threat of force played a key role: by seeming to
be invincible, by making examples of defeated enemies, by appearing to be able to strike anywhere
at any time, and by being obviously richer and more technologically advanced, the Assyrians (and
other imperial states) were able to focus their military efforts only on trouble spots or places of
their choosing.

11. Parker 2003: 526.

12. For a thorough explanation of these strategies, see Luttwak 1976: especially pp. 13–40.

13. One of the chief criticisms of classic core-periphery theory was that it ignored the possibility
of a periphery’s agency; see Stein 1999.

14. For convenience, I use “Tabal” as a general inclusive toponym when referring to the whole
region (Tabal proper / BÏt-Pur„taå, Atunna, Tuhana, and the other small states), but Tabal proper
or BÏt-Pur„taå when referring to the specific state located on the Kayseri plain. Independent polities
are named individually as needed. The sources contain numerous variant spellings of both personal
and place names. In particular, Luwian and Assyrian renditions vary. In order to avoid confusion, I
generally use normalized spellings of personal names (e.g., Sargon or Tuatti). Toponym spellings
follow Parpola and Porter 2001.

15. For maps, see Parpola and Porter 2001; for argumentation concerning the locations assigned
to these toponyms, see Aro 1998.
88 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

south. 16 The status of smaller principalities such as Istuanda, Atunna, and Hubiåna,
which continued to compete for power and independence, is less clear. This part of
Anatolia is naturally isolated; terrain is rugged, and correspondingly easy to defend,
making internal political cohesion and external conquest a real challenge. Because it
commanded the approaches to the northern side of the Cilician Gates as well as the
eastern routes to the Anatolian plateau and boasted an abundance of natural resources,
Tabal inevitably drew the attention of the powers of the day: Assyria, Urartu, and
Phrygia.

Stage One: First Foreign Encounters

Tabal makes its first appearance on the wider near eastern political scene in the
ninth century b . c . as the object of Assyrian aggression. 17 The reasons for Assyrian
penetration into the area are complex. In the tenth and early ninth centuries b.c., Assyr-
ian kings strove to re-establish the traditional “land of Aåå„r” by recovering territories
in Syria and the north that had been lost at the end of the second millennium b.c.18
Aååurnaœirpal II did much to achieve this goal and set the stage for further Assyrian
gains. Subsequently, Åalmaneser III was able to consolidate his father’s conquests
and then move against frontier states, including Quwê, MelÏd, and Tabal.19 Although
Åalmaneser might have been drawn into Anatolia by the prospect of natural resources
such as silver, alabaster and wood, it is likely that the need to gather intelligence and
assess any risk to his borders was also a priority. In order to secure the land recently
restored to Assyria, Åalmaneser had to neutralize the threat from adjacent territories
through intimidation or diplomatic agreement. In effect, he aimed to create a buffer
zone subject to Assyria, but not directly ruled by it.20
The Assyrians entered Tabal in 836 b.c. in order to make a show of force, extort
whatever goods they could, and most importantly, stabilize their presence in Syria by
intimidating the lands beyond it. What transpired is described briefly and formulai-
cally in the Annals as follows:

I crossed Mount Timur (and) went down to the cities of Tuatti, the Tabalite.
I razed, destroyed, (and) burned their cities. The fearful radiance of Assur,

16. Hawkins, HLI: 425.

17. According to Hawkins, HLI: 426, there is no information, “archaeological, historical or

epigraphic” which can be securely dated to the period from 1200 to 900 b.c., and the only certain
ninth-century evidence is Assyrian.

18. Liverani 1988; Postgate 1992: 249.

19. Yamada 2000: 300–08.

20. Ibid.: 305.

 Kings of Tabal 89

my lord, overwhelmed Tuatti and he remained confined in his city to save

his life. I surrounded Artulu, his royal city. Kikki, his son, was afraid to
fight and submitted to me. I received tribute from him. I received gifts from
twenty kings of the land Tabal.21

The number of kings referred to in Åalmaneser’s account broadly corresponds to the

number of early Iron Age sites so far identified in Tabal. The fact that Åalmaneser
claims to have besieged a city (Artulu) confirms that some of these settlements were
already fortified by the time the Assyrians arrived, so it is likely that fortifications
were built in response to local conditions, rather than foreign invasion.22 The large
number of kings mentioned implies that the area was divided into city-states controlled
by autonomous or semi-autonomous rulers. Since Tuatti is referred to by name and
apparently held sway over several towns, one suspects that he was the most powerful
of these kings.
Åalmaneser entered Tabal in the east through MelÏd and encountered Tuatti’s
kingdom, which was probably located in the vicinity of Kululu-Sultanhan-Kültepe,
the area which would later be recognized as Tabal proper/BÏt-Pur„taå.23 Åalmaneser’s
strategy here is clear and demonstrates a typical Assyrian attention to economy of
effort. Upon entering Tabal, he moved against the largest polity there and bullied it
into submission as an example to the other kingdoms in the area. The numerous petty-
kings of Tabal, unable to mobilize effectively against the larger power and cowed by
Assyria’s military capabilities, had little choice but to “pay up.” From an Assyrian
point of view the campaign was a complete success; the army acquired booty and a
measure of local influence with (apparently) minimal effort and little loss of life.
Unfortunately, Åalmaneser’s account does not specify the quantity or form of the
tribute, or how often it was collected. While there is good evidence that the Assyrians
remained dominant in Quwê during Åalmaneser’s reign, there is nothing to indicate
that Tabal became a true Assyrian client with full client-state responsibilities.24

21. Grayson 1996: 79; Yamada 2000: 211.

22. Aro 1998: 160–71. Note, for example, that Gölluda©, Topakli, Calapverdi, Karaburun, and
Havuz were all walled, although the dates for the fortifications have not yet been firmly established
through excavation.

23. Hawkins, HLI: 427; see n. 14, above.

24. Yamada 2000: 305–06 takes Åalmaneser’s claims at face value and assumes that all states
that “paid tribute” (whatever that actually entailed) achieved true client status “consitutionalized by
some form of political agreement between the kings.” While this was the case for some states (e.g.,
rulers of Carchemish, Samºal and Quwê, who sent princesses to the Assyrian court, while Tabalian
rulers did not), we must allow for a greater range in state relations. Those polities closest to Assyria
proper (Carchemish) or of particular strategic importance (Quwê) received the full force of Assyrian
suzerainty, but it is likely that the Assyrians maintained a looser hold on more distant places such as
90 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

Political turmoil in Assyria at the end of Åalmaneser’s reign ushered in a period

marked by civil strife and political weakness, which in turn allowed Assyria’s northern
rival Urartu to intensify its own process of consolidation and expansion. Under the
leadership of Menua (ca. 810–785/80 b.c.), the Urartians pushed west, claiming tribute
from MelÏd and campaigning in the “Hatti lands.”25 Argiåti I was able to continue his
predecessor’s policy and lead his army west through MelÏd and into Tabal (“the land of
the sons of Tuatti”), demanding pay-offs just as Åalmaneser had earlier.26 At this point,
the Urartian strategy was similar to that of Assyria. Argiåti campaigned west into the
peripheral areas beyond his borders in order to gain valuable resources and enhance
his territorial defense, which he augmented further by building a network of fortresses
within Urartu.27 Argiåti’s annals do not include any information about the inhabitants
and conditions in Tabal, but the reference to the descendants of Tuatti demonstrates
continuity (ideal or actual) in the dominant ruling family of northeastern Tabal.
This first phase of interaction between Tabal and foreign powers is consistent with
the early stages of empire. That is, the developing imperial state, represented here
by both Assyria and Urartu, consolidates its home provinces — an area determined
as much by ideology as geography or ethnicity — which it then proceeds to secure
and enhance by establishing political and economic dominance over states beyond its
borders.28 Assyria and Urartu could not guarantee the integrity of their own territories
without dealing with frontier lands. Neither could they mount the sustained military
effort and logistical support that long-distance rule requires. Consequently, they had
to settle for demonstrations of military might and brief periods of economic exploita-
tion. At this stage, the relationship between the aggressor state (Assyria or Urartu)
and the victim state (Tabal) appears to have been unilateral, with the profit going
to the former. The economic impact of these sporadic foreign incursions was prob-
ably transient, but the persistent threat of further intervention might have encouraged
city-states within Tabal to band together to form larger polities.29 Therefore, this first

Tabal. Whereas Åalmaneser was repeatedly involved with more accessible states like Quwê, Hilakku
and MelÏd, he only ventured into Tabal twice during his reign.

25. König 1957: 64, Text 25, III.11.

26. Ibid.: 89, Text 80, §3 VII.16.

27. Smith 1999: 49.

28. See Sinopoli 1994; Luttwak 1976: 20–30.

29. The configuration of political power in Tabal is not well understood. However, by the
mid-eighth century the Assyrians consistently recognized no more than nine kings in the area (see
below nn. 33 and 34). Even accepting that Åalmaneser’s claim of 20+ kings may be overly generous
(perhaps he counted some vassals as independent rulers?), the evidence suggests that over time the
distribution of power tended toward cohesion. Until further evidence becomes available the question
of Tabal’s political structure in the ninth century must remain unresolved.
 Kings of Tabal 91

phase of interaction may have stimulated secondary state formation in central Anatolia.
Whatever happened in Tabal at this point, the unfolding international situation made
future foreign involvement there inevitable.

Stage Two: Becoming a Client State

By the time Tiglath-pileser III ascended the Assyrian throne in 745 b.c., Urartu
had become a serious rival, vying for Assyria’s client states in north Syria, and expand-
ing south to the borders of the Assyrian heartland.30 In order to prevent Urartu from
gaining access to its western flank, Assyria had to assert control over key Anatolian
city-states such as Tabal. Urartu, of course, would not welcome Assyrian expansion
into this area for a similar reason. Thus Tabal became the focus of escalating interstate
competition. Neither power was in a position to conquer and hold this distant territory,
therefore their only viable course of action involved a combination of diplomacy and
limited military intervention.
Tiglath-pileser III managed to reverse Urartian gains in Syria by defeating a
Urartian-led coalition (which included MelÏd, but not Tabal) in battle in 743 b.c., and
by taking Arpad itself three years later.31 In classic Assyrian imperial fashion, over the
next few years he extended Assyria’s territory and influence by annexing the lands he
could control directly (e.g., Arpad, Ulluba, and Damascus), and imposing client status
on those he could not (e.g., Samºal, MelÏd, and Judah). 32 Tiglath-pileser’s success
prompted several non-belligerent states to submit and pay tribute in the hope of avoid-
ing conflict with Assyria. Among these were the Tabalian states,33 which by now had
coalesced into two fairly large polities (Tabal proper and Tuæana) and several smaller,
independent city-states located on their peripheries (Atunna, Istuanda, Åinuætu, and
Æubiåna).34 By making Tabal a client, Tiglath-pileser III effectively outmaneuvered

30. Under Sarduri II, Kummuh, hitherto controlled by Assyria, was forced to capitulate to Urartu
and thus joined Arpad, MelÏd, and Gurgum in a pro-Urartian, anti-Assyrian alliance; see especially
Astour 1979.

31. Ibid.: 75–76.

32. Garelli 1991: especially p. 49 notes that Tiglath-pileser’s methods were very much in line
with those of Åalmaneser III.

33. Assyrian texts attest to the subordinate status of Tabal during Tiglath-pileser’s reign. A
fragmentary tablet from ca. 740 b.c. lists nine kings from the region who had paid their yearly tribute
of mules, horses and perhaps other items. Tiglath-pileser’s annals list tributary kings for 738 b.c.,
including five kings from Tabal. See Fales and Postgate 1995: 30; Hawkins and Postgate 1988.

34. The exact number and status of the smaller city-states during this period are not known. The
TOPADA inscription of Uassurme attests to at least eleven “kings” in the area as opposed to the nine
included in Assyrian sources. For the most recent treatment of this inscription, see Dillo 2003.
92 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

Urartu, which thus lost the initiative against Assyria and for the time being ceased
to be a factor in this part of Anatolia. Tiglath-pileser’s strategy here — employing
political maneuver in conjunction with carefully chosen military engagements — of-
fers a fine example of the pragmatic Assyrian modus operandi. For Tabal itself, the
assumption of client status was a turning point.
The eighth century was a crucial time for Tabal. The first datable Luwian inscrip-
tions and monuments from the area belong to this period, indicating the benefits gained
through client status.35 Indigenous inscriptions, coupled with Assyrian sources, allow
us to reconstruct the sequence of Tabalian kings and their relations with Assyria (see
Charts 1 and 2). The earliest inscriptions date to the reign of Tuatti (ca. 750), who
also appears on a list of kings paying tribute to Tiglath-pileser III. 36 Both Tuatti and
his son and successor, Uassurme, receive the epithet “Great King” in inscriptions,
the majority of which were commissioned, not by the kings themselves, but by their
“servants” or vassals.37 That the Tabalian elite were powerful enough and rich enough
to endow self-aggrandizing monuments at exactly the same time they began to pay
tribute to Assyria is no mere accident, but suggests a political and cultural florescence
made possible by external patronage.38 The exchange between client and patron was
not all unidirectional, but included some benefits to the client.39 Although the pay-
ment of tribute may have been a burden to the local populace, causing resentment and
even unrest,40 it would ultimately have put more power in the hands of local elites.41

35. According to Hawkins, HLI: 429 and 432, none of the Luwian inscriptions from Tabal date
before the eighth century b . c . except for the controversial Hartapu group from the Konya plain,
which is outside the area under consideration here in any case.

36. Hawkins, HLI: 442–51. Note, however, that Aro 2003: 324 prefers to be more cautious about
assigning these inscriptions to the father of Uassurme.

37. Hawkins, HLI: 429.

38. The need for local elites to declare allegiance to their shared past and culture might also
have played a part in the production of monumental sculpture and inscriptions. The fact that the As-
syrians effectively put themselves at the top of the local hierarchy, replacing local elites, could also
explain (at least in part) the impetus for reviving the grandiose epithet, “Great King.” For analysis
of a comparable situation in Gurgum, see Dodd 2005: 253–54.

39. Diplomatic delegations to the Assyrian court received presents. See for example SAA VII
58 in which a Tabalian delegation receives gifts.

40. Parker 2001: 91 notes, for example, that Assyrian economic exploitation may have contrib-
uted to uprisings in Kumme; see also Elat 1982.

41. Brown 1986: 114–15. Brown also comments that those polities with better land and resources
would have the advantage over neighbors whose land was not as good, thus enabling one client to
become more powerful than another.
 Kings of Tabal 93

Ideally, from the point of view of the imperial power, judicious extraction of tribute
and other obligations would neither ruin a client nor allow it to grow too strong for
the patron to control. Since the whole purpose of maintaining clients was to stabilize
and develop areas without having to rule them directly, it would have been counter-
productive to overburden them. It appears that the ruling elites of Tabal thrived under
the patronage of Tiglath-pileser III.
Nonetheless, the Tabalian states were still inclined to fight among themselves.
As long as internecine warfare did not threaten Assyria’s objectives in the region, it
was tolerated.42 From Assyria’s point of view a certain amount of divisiveness among
Tabalian states was more desirable than their unity anyway.43 For example, a Luwian
inscription from Topada describes a border conflict in which Uassurme and his three
allies fought against a coalition of seven unnamed enemy kings. 44 Since this clash did
not affect Assyrian interests, there was no need for Tiglath-pileser III to interfere.
Conversely, a few years later in ca. 730 b.c., when Uassurme passively rebelled by
withholding his tribute, the Assyrians reacted immediately by removing Uassurme from
the throne and replacing him with a puppet ruler of their choosing, Hulli, the “son of
nobody.”45 We do not know what prompted Uassurme to rebel — perhaps he was not
able to pay his tribute, perhaps he felt strong enough to throw off the Assyrian yoke
— but significantly, none of the other Tabalian kings came to his aid. Internal disunity
and the fear of Assyrian reprisal, both of which Assyria perspicaciously encouraged,
had effectively isolated Uassurme. It is also noteworthy that the Assyrians replaced
Uassurme with someone who, in spite of his derogatory epithet, was probably Uas-
surme’s competitor — a local elite whose desire for power the Assyrians could exploit,
but who would be dependant on Assyrian backing to maintain his position.46

42. For a general treatment of how Assyria dealt with conflicts between clients, see Galil
1992.

43. A general principle of the client-patron state relationship was that each client should be just
strong enough to maintain internal security, but not strong enough to threaten its patron’s interests.
See Luttwak 1976: 25.

44. See above, n. 34. The inscription cannot be dated, but one can assume that since both
Uassurme and his father paid tribute to Tiglath-pileser III, Tabal remained a client of Assyria until
Uassurme’s removal. Thus the action described in the TOPADA text had to have occurred at a time
when Uassurme (and probably the other kings mentioned in it) were clients of Assyria.

45. Tadmor 1994: Summ. 7:14 and Summ. 9: rev. 27–28.

46. The identification of Assyrian named Hulli as an elite depends on equating him with the
Luwian Hulis, who set up a grave stele for his uncle, Ruwas, a ruler in his own right and a vassal
of Uassurme. For the text, see Hawkins, HLI: 445–46. For the argument making the identification,
see Dillo 2003: 319.
94 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

The removal of Uassurme reveals the grim reality of client kingship. Once Uas-
surme became the client of a more powerful state, his position became vastly more
complicated and precarious. On the one hand, he could now claim powerful military
support and undoubtedly reap some economic benefit from the arrangement. On the
other hand, tribute and corvée demands could instigate popular rebellion and provide
a raison d’être for any rival political factions to move against the king.47 Uassurme
was essentially caught between the demands of his patron state and the ambitions of
his own subjects. Whether his “rebellion” involved any outside agency (Phrygia, for
instance), we cannot say. Nor do we know the fate of Uassurme, but the Assyrians’
peremptory response to his disobedience certainly made it clear that they would toler-
ate no dissent. Above all, it sent a message to other client kings that peace with Assyria
did not depend on any local individual, but on Assyria’s continued beneficence.
The enthronement of Hulli was the first in a series of direct Assyrian interventions
in Tabal, and it established the pattern for future relations between the states. Hav-
ing effectively dislodged Urartu from the area, Tiglath-pileser III could concentrate
on cultivating and exploiting his dependencies there. The Tabalian client states were
expected to maintain internal security, keep the Assyrians informed, provide access to
natural resources,48 pay tribute, and support Assyrian endeavors as required. In return,
the Assyrians granted the kings favors and presumably promised to help them in the
event of an emergency. Tiglath-pileser was fully aware of the nuances of client-patron
relations, and managed his clients with a judicious balance of threat and subsidy. 49
Once again, it was the changing face of international politics that dictated the next
phase of Tabal’s history.

Stage Three: From Client State to Province

By the time Sargon II took the Assyrian throne in 721 b.c., the political situation
in the Near East had changed. Urartu was resurgent and a relatively new player, Phry-
gia, seemed intent on expanding into the Taurus region. Together these states posed
a serious threat to Assyria’s northern borders and so the obstruction of a Phrygian-

47. By analogy, this is what we would expect to happen. Note, for example, how the possibility
of Persian funding exacerbated factional rivalry within Greek city-states during the Peloponnesian
War, and the destabilizing effect that Caesar's presence had on the Gallic tribes. Unfortunately, the
dearth of information about Tabal allows only conjecture.

48. For example, see SAA V 255 which, although in very fragmentary condition, concerns the
removal of trees from Tabal during the reign of Sargon II.

49. See above, n. 39; kings sometimes rewarded loyal clients with land as well: see, for example,
The Panamuwa Inscription, II. 14–15 in which Tiglath-pileser takes territory from Gurgum and gives
it to the ruler of Samºal (Landsberger 1948: 69–72).
 Kings of Tabal 95

Urartian alliance became a priority for Assyria. For their part, Phrygia and Urartu
each saw the danger of an Assyrian presence in Anatolia and naturally plotted against
Assyrian interests there. By maintaining control of Tabal, MelÏd, and Quwê, Assyria
could prevent easy communication between Phrygia and Urartu, while also thwarting
their efforts to subvert Assyria’s clients in Syria. During the reign of Sargon II, Tabal
experienced sustained pressure from these three powers, though it remained nominally
under Assyrian control.
Now that there were alternatives to Assyrian dominance, the kings of Tabal could
consider their options and support whichever power offered the best chance of success
or the biggest rewards for loyalty. It stands to reason that under these circumstances,
political power would have become more difficult for the Tabalian rulers to maintain.
Assyria naturally proscribed contact between its clients and enemies, yet Tabalian
kings would have had little choice but to entertain Urartian or Phrygian diplomatic
advances when they came, for if they refused, the foreigners might approach (or indeed
create) a rival political faction. Assyria’s enemies were in an enviable position: for
minimal risk and moderate cost,50 they might lure Tabal’s kings away from Assyria, or
at least make life difficult for them. This possibility forced Assyria to get ever more
involved in Tabal, which it still hoped to control indirectly. In this situation, the kings
of Tabal had to be politically deft indeed, for each had to handle threats from multiple
external (and possibly internal) sources. Nevertheless, an ambitious ruler could take
advantage of foreign aid to increase his power at the expense of his neighbors. The
very existence of multiple foreign powers attempting to gain control of Tabal increased
the level of competition within and between the Tabalian states.
Assyrian sources testify vividly to the continuous progress of the international
struggle for control of Tabal. According to his inscriptions, Sargon II campaigned
in the region in ca. 718 b . c . when he deposed Kiakki of Åinuætu for withholding
tribute, gave Åinuætu to Kurti of Atunna, and restored Hulli to the throne of Tabal
proper/BÏt-Pur„taå, from which he had evidently been removed by Åalmaneser V. 51

50. Allowing for distance-decay and the fact that rival powers had to offer the same or bet-
ter benefits than Assyria, we can infer that for Phrygia, which was geographically closest to Tabal
(Gordion is just under 200 miles from Kayseri as the crow flies), the cost-to-benefit of wooing Tabal
would have been greater than for Urartu, which was much farther away (the Ararat plain is ca. 480
miles from Kayseri as the crow flies).

51. Fuchs 1994: Ann. 68–69, 194–95. Sargon refers to the area of Tabal proper as BÏt-Pur„taå,
and to avoid confusing the smaller state with the general area (which included the free city-states
in the region), I will follow Sargon’s terminology in this section. There has been some discussion
about why Sargon introduced BÏt terminology at this time. See Hawkins, HLI: 442 and Lanfranchi
2003: 87, for his suggestion that the Assyrians sometimes used BÏt designators for polities that had
a more primitive political organization than the major states.
96 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

Not long after, Sargon allowed Hulli’s son, Ambaris, to become king of BÏt-Pur„taå.
Sargon affirmed the new alliance with a diplomatic marriage marking the first (and
apparently last) time the Assyrians used matrimony as a means to secure client ties
in the area. Ambaris married Sargon’s daughter, Ahat-abiåa, and received Æilakku, a
Cilician polity to the southwest of Tabal, as a dowry.52
The way that Sargon distributed lands and favors among his clients in Tabal re-
veals a deliberate “divide and conquer” strategy. By making Ambaris his son-in-law,
Sargon seemingly raised him above his other clients in the area. All the same, the
fact that the dowry-lands of Hilakku were adjacent to the Assyrian province of Quwê,
but not to BÏt-Pur„taå suggests that Sargon wanted to check any territorial ambitions
Ambaris might have. The same principles motivated Sargon’s gift of Åinuætu to Kurti.
Since Atunna and Åinuætu were discontiguous and lay on either side of Tuhana, Sar-
gon could keep Tuhana in check by flanking it with Atunnan territory. By carefully
distributing power and territories among several Tabalian kings, Sargon established a
balance of power aimed at preventing any one state from becoming too strong. In this
way, the Assyrians sought to control greater Tabal, an area of fundamental strategic
importance, without making a sustained military commitment.
Things did not go according to plan for the Assyrians, however. Just a few years
later, in 713 b.c., news reached Sargon that some of his clients in Anatolia, including
both Ambaris and Kurti, were defecting. According to Sargon’s inscriptions, Ambaris
plotted with Rusa of Urartu, Mitâ of Muåki (Midas of Phrygia), and other kings of
Tabal to drive the Assyrians from the region.53 It is difficult to imagine why Ambaris,
who evidently had full Assyrian support, had grown up in Assyria, and married an
Assyrian princess, would risk everything by plotting with Assyria’s enemies, but he
clearly realized that he could not win freedom without outside help. Sargon’s success-
ful campaign against Urartu in 714 b.c. seemingly neutralized the Urartian threat, and
it is unlikely that Rusa could have contributed military support to Ambaris. Midas
of Phrygia, on the other hand, proved to be a clever and resourceful opponent, who
plotted continuously to win the Neo-Hittite states from Assyria. 54 According to his
annals, Sargon responded vigorously to Ambaris’ alleged treason by laying waste to
Tabal “to its furthest border,” deporting Ambaris to Assyria, and making BÏt-Pur„taå

52. Fuchs 1994: Ann. 196-98; Prunk. 28–30. Fuchs notes the possibility that Sargon simply
validated a conquest that Ambaris had carried out on his own account (428), but this does not explain
how, or indeed why, Ambaris would have conquered lands that were not adjacent to his own.

53. Fuchs 1994: Ann. 198–200; Prunk. 31.

54. For example, in 717 b . c ., Midas colluded with Pisiri of Carchemish against Sargon. See
Fuchs 1994: Ann. 72.
 Kings of Tabal 97

an Assyrian province.55 Kurti of Atunna, who had also been negotiating with Midas,
returned post haste to the Assyrian fold, and as far as we know, neither Phrygia nor
Urartu sent any troops in aid of their alleged allies.
If the Assyrians made BÏt-Pur„taå a full-fledged province, there is frustratingly
little evidence to prove it: superficial motifs such as Assyrian-style curls on sculpture
fragments only point to a general (and perhaps indirect) artistic influence; the cu-
neiform finds in the area have been minimal, and pottery appears to be indigenous.56
Although in his Annals Sargon claims to have settled foreign deportees in Tabal, no
exogenous communities have yet been discovered and corroborating textual evidence
is unclear. This may simply reflect the natural time lag between the nominal Assyrian
takeover (reported in the annals) and full investment of the area, which Sargon’s death
probably prevented anyway.57 Exactly who the Assyrians put in charge of BÏt-Pur„taå
is also uncertain. Postgate and others have suggested that Ahat-abiåa remained as the
chief administrator there;58 however, since the Display Inscription states explicitly that
Sargon took Ambaris to Assyria with his family (itti kimti niå„ti zËr bÏt abiåu)59 and
then made a eunuch governor over the region, the proposal is unacceptable.60
In any case, Ambaris’ removal did not solve Assyria’s problems in Tabal. An
almost complete (and justly famous) letter from Sargon II to Aååur-åarru-uœur at-

55. Fuchs 1994: Ann. 201–04; Prunk. 31–32.

56. Özgüç 1971: 123.

57. Fuchs 1994: Ann. 202–03. Outside of the statement in the annals there are no clear refer-
ences to Assyrian deportations into BÏt-Pur„taå. Oded 1979: 45 n. 24 assumes that SAA I 1, lines
66–71 (“…let your messenger bring him and his people to me, whether citizens of Babylon, Bor-
sippa, Kish, Nippur, Der, or…”) refers to the removal of people from Babylon to BÏt-Pur„taå, but in
context this statement must refer to the transportation of people from Quwê to Assyria. A preceding
passage (“if he wants, he may take them (his people) over the mountains and settle them there…”)
could refer to movement from Quwê into BÏt-Pur„taå, but the move was to be voluntary, and we
don’t know how many people were involved. The Assyrians certainly settled deportees in Quwê and
Gurgum (SAA I 257).

58. Postgate 1973: 31 and n. 19; see also Hawkins, HLI : 428 n. 46.

59. Fuchs 1994: Prunk. 31–32.

60. A possible candidate is Nabu-leºi, whose report from Tabal is mentioned in SAA I 31. In
this letter, his identification as the majordomo of Ahat-abiåa may simply be a way to distinguish
him from a second Nabu-leºi referred to in the same letter. After Ambaris’ recall to Assyria, Nabu-
leºi might well have stayed behind in Tabal to administer the area (without his mistress). See also
SAA XVII 82, which refers to trouble that (the same?) Nabu-leºi is experiencing presumably in
Tabal (but note that Baker, ed. 2001: 844, published before the SAA volume, assigns this letter to
the reign of Esarhaddon).
98 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

tests to the continuing political volatility of the area in ca. 710/709 b.c.61 According
to the letter, Urikki of Quwê62 sent an embassy to Urartu only to be betrayed by the
Phrygians, who used news of Urikki’s plans as leverage to negotiate peace with the
Assyrians (lines 3–6). Meanwhile, two of the smaller Tabalian polities, Atunna and
Istuanda, had taken some territory from Assyria’s longtime client, Urpalaºa of Tuæana.
The relevant passage warns Sargon that “Urpalaºa [may defect] from the king, my
lord, because the Atunneans and Istuandaeans took the cities of BÏt-Pur„taå from
him” (lines 43–48). The fact that Urpalaºa had somehow acquired lands that were
allegedly part of an Assyrian province, coupled with the openly aggressive behavior
of Atunna and Istuanda, indicates that Assyria did not exert tight control over these
kings. Moreover, Urpalaºa had also clearly been in close contact with the Phrygians,
for his messenger accompanied theirs to Quwê (lines 26–27).63 The Tabalian kings,
perhaps recognizing that none of the three powers could fully annex their lands, took
advantage of any opportunity to augment their own holdings.
As we have seen, Assyria’s laissez-faire policy toward its Tabalian clients tol-
erated and even encouraged a certain amount of conflict among them. This policy
was intended to prevent any client from becoming powerful enough to challenge
Assyrian authority, but it did not stop the client states from pursuing their own inter-
ests — even if that meant disobeying Assyria. As long as Assyria felt the threat of a
Phrygian-Urartian alliance and Phrygia sought to limit Assyrian presence in Anatolia,
the Tabalian city-states could play one side against the other, all the while maneuver-
ing to get the best deal out of whichever prevailed. This situation, in which multiple
patrons competed for control of multiple clients, resulted in a high incidence of local
intrigue and internecine conflict.

61. SAA I 1. On the date of the letter, see Hawkins 1982: 418; Lanfranchi 1988. I do not agree
with Lanfranchi’s dating of the letter to ca. 715 for several reasons: 1) Sargon’s comment about Midas
seeking peace without a fight does not necessarily ignore the Assyrian raids on Phrygia mentioned in
the Annals, but could simply mean that Midas’ overtures came as a surprise and not in the immediate
aftermath of battle as was more usual. 2) If, as Lanfranchi asserts, Quwê became a province only
after Urikki was punished for colluding with Urartu, then surely Sargon would have mentioned it
in his Annals (as he does when he punishes Ambaris and annexes BÏt-Pur„taå). 3) Lanfranchi does
not consider what the letter says about BÏt-Pur„taå, Tuhana, Atunna, and Istuanda, which does seem
to fit an earlier date.

62. Urikki was king of Quwê during the reign of Tiglath-pileser III, but his status during Sargon's
reign is not certain since Quwê was probably an Assyrian province ruled by an Assyrian governor
by that time. If Urikki still held a formal position in Quwê, the Assyrians would have regarded his
embassy to Urartu as an act of open rebellion. For a different view of when Quwê became an Assyr-
ian province, see Lanfranchi 1988: 62–63.

63. Not surprisingly, the monuments of Urpalaºa include artistic elements typical of all three
powers. This is likely to have been intentional — in effect, stating both his cordial connection to the
three powers and his artistic erudition. See Barnett 1982: 369, but note that Aro 2003: 319, 335–36,
sees much more Assyrian than Phrygian or Urartian influence in these works.
 Kings of Tabal 99

The Tabalian kings were instantly marginalized, however, by Midas’ entente

with Sargon II reported in the letter to Aååur-åarru-uœur. That the Phrygian move was
especially welcome to the Assyrians is evident from Sargon’s exultant tone when
he states, “now that the Phrygian has made peace with us … what can all the kings
of Tabal do henceforth? You will press them from this side and the Phrygian will
press them from that side….”64 With Assyria and Phrygia now in alliance and Urartu
apparently occupied with its own problems, there was no alternative to Assyrian
dominance. Assyria’s triumph was short-lived, however, and in 705 b.c. Sargon was
required to campaign there once again. Sargon’s subsequent death in battle (possibly
fighting against the Cimmerians) put an end to Assyrian hegemony over Tabal. The
withdrawal of Assyria, the increasing Cimmerian threat, and the decline of Urartu
and Phrygia changed the whole balance of power in the Taurus region and freed the
Tabalian kingdoms from the imperial aims of the three powers, if not from foreign
incursions altogether.
Freedom from imperial hegemony came at a price, however. The loss of subsidies,
foreign markets, and the overproduction needed to fulfill tribute quotas evidently took
their toll on Tabalian elites. By the early seventh century b.c., after the Assyrian de-
parture from the area, the collapse of Phrygia, and more Cimmerian incursions, both
Hieroglyphic Luwian inscriptions and monumental art disappear from Tabal.65 This
disappearance reflects an economic decline rather than a sudden or comprehensive
demographic change, for we know the kingdoms of Tabal continued well into the
seventh century.66 Competition between Assyria, Phrygia, and Urartu for control of
the central Anatolian states seems to have encouraged rather than depressed Tabalian
economies, whereas the withdrawal of external commercial, military, and political
interest had an overall negative effect.

Conclusions

During the initial stage of foreign interference in Tabal, first Assyria and then
Urartu campaigned there in order to intimidate area polities into paying them tribute.
In this case, the aggressor states apparently operated alone, without interference or
competition from one another. That is, neither Åalmaneser III nor Argiåti I were par-

64. SAA I 1, lines 47–49.

65. Hawkins, HLI: 432–33 identifies the storm-god stele of Muwaharanis, the son of Urpalaºa
as the latest datable monument from Tabal.

66. Esarhaddon (680–669 b . c .) campaigned against the Cimmerians in Tabal (Borger 1956:
Nin A III 49). By the time Ashurbanipal ruled (668–ca. 627 b.c.), Mugallu of MelÏd had apparently
taken over parts of Tabal. Mugallu sought help from Assyria to fight the Cimmerians (Borger 1996:
Aååurbanipal prism A II 68–80).
100 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

ticularly motivated by the need to outmaneuver one another, but apparently sought
natural resources and political assurances. Because the advantage to be gained from
making Tabal a client state (access to resources and tighter security) did not outweigh
the cost (time, energy, and the price of maintaining a presence there), neither state
took more than a fleeting interest in Tabal. At this point, Tabal was a simple periph-
ery, a land to be exploited and dominated, but not worthy of concentrated military or
political effort. Nevertheless, the threat of invasion may have provided the impetus
for internal political cohesion within Tabal. Sources indicate that the twenty kingdoms
encountered by Åalmaneser had sorted themselves into a hierarchy of about nine kings
and an unknown number of vassals by the mid-eighth century b.c.
The growing rivalry between Assyria and Urartu in the second half of the eighth
century b.c. prompted Assyria to make the Tabalian kingdoms clients. However, now
that Tabal was a contested periphery, the Tabalian kings and elites had more than one
external patron from which to seek support. Under these circumstances, the elites of
Tabal acquired enough capital to raise self-promoting monuments and inscriptions at
the same time competition between them became more intense. Promoting the Tabalian
states to client status required Assyria to commit more resources (personnel, time,
and materiel) to the area — something it could not have done earlier. Yet, no power,
including Assyria, was prepared to annex Tabal, although by replacing Uassurme, As-
syria made it clear that it would intervene whenever necessary. When Phrygia began
insinuating itself into Tabalian affairs, the Tabalian kingdoms became surrounded by
stronger foreign powers competing to take control.
Under these circumstances, the Assyrians struggled to manage the increasingly
volatile situation. Sargon II’s strategy in Tabal needed to fulfill several imperatives:
to prevent any one Tabalian state from becoming too strong; to thwart the unifica-
tion of the separate polities, and to obstruct Phrygian and Urartian operations. A
diplomatic marriage, gifts of lands to different clients, and diplomacy bought the
Assyrians some time, but eventually proved unsuccessful when they discovered their
most favored client, Ambaris, plotting with Urartu and Phrygia. At this point, Assyria
had no alternative but to intervene by making an example of Ambaris and annexing
his lands. Thus, for the first time, one of the contesting foreign powers incorporated
a Tabalian state into its provincial system. That it had taken more than a century for
this to happen attests to the difficulty and cost of the operation. Quite simply, this
was not a desirable outcome for Assyria. When Midas of Phrygia became an ally of
the Assyrians, however, direct administration of Tabal was no longer necessary, and
it is likely that the Assyrians did not complete their investment of BÏt-Pur„taå. The
death of Sargon II in battle and the concomitant demise of Phrygia and Urartu left
Tabal in isolation once again and resulted in the disappearance of grand monuments
and Luwian inscriptions from the area.
From the three stages of foreign-Tabalian relations outlined above we derive
the following general principles: 1) The level of imperial organization achieved by
 Kings of Tabal 101

a foreign state dictated the strategy it employed against a target area. 2) Distance,
topography, and general threat assessment were also important factors in imperial
strategy. 3) When more than one foreign power sought control over an area containing
more than one polity, inter-polity conflict intensified. 4) Foreign competition to secure
the support of client states simultaneously made client elites richer and more prone
to civil conflict. 5) The withdrawal of all external economic support and stimulation
had a negative impact on peripheral societies (or at least their elites). Since these
observations are based on documentary evidence from non-local (Assyrian) sources
and indigenous material evidence often recovered out of archaeological context, our
conclusions must be provisional.67 Nevertheless, they suggest an improved paradigm
for inter-empire competition over a contested periphery as well as peripheral states’
responses to foreign intrusion.

67. Some monuments and Luwian inscriptions have been found carved into rock outcroppings,
but many sculpture fragments and some text fragments have been re-used in more modern buildings
such as mosques. For details, see Aro 2003.
 102

Chart 1. Rulers of Tabal, Tabal states, Assyria, Urartu, and Phrygia

Tabal /
Tuwana Atunna Istuanda Æubiåna Åinuhtu Assyria Urartu Phrygia
BÏt-Pur„taå
Åalmaneser III
(858–824)
Tuatti Puæamme
(ca. 837) (ca. 837)
Argiåti I
(ca. 786–ca. 756)
Tuatti Urpalaºa Tiglath-pileser III
(ca. 750–ca. 740) (ca. 750–ca. 709) (745–727)
Uassurme Uåitti Tuæamme Urimme Kiakki Midas
(ca. 738–ca. 730) (ca. 738) (ca. 738) (ca. 738) (ca. 738–718) (ca. 738–696)
Kurti
(ca. 732–713)
Æulli Åalmaneser V Rusa I
(ca. 730–ca. 720) (727–725) (ca. 730–ca. 713)
Sargon II
(721–705)
Ambaris
Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

(ca. 719–ca. 713)

 Chart 2. Key rulers of Tabal proper/BÏt-Pur„taåa

Tuattib (ca. 836 b.c.)

Kikkic (ca. 836 b.c.)

(?)
?
“sons of Tuatti”d (ca. 780 b.c.)

Tuattie (ca. 750 b.c.) Ruwasf, “servant of Tuatti” a brother

?
Uassurmeg (ca. 740–730 b.c.) Hulish = Hulli “son of nobody” Sargon II
(ca. 730–725? b.c.) (722–705 b.c.)

Ambarisi marries Ahat-abiåa

(ca. 720)–713 b.c.
Kings of Tabal

a. After Dillo 2003: 318.

b. Known only from Assyrian inscriptions: Grayson 1996: 79 and Yamada 2000: 211.
c. Ibid.
d. Known only from a Urartian inscription: König 1957: 80, §3 VII.16.
e. Known from Assyrian and Luwian inscriptions: Hawkins, HLI: 442–47 and Hawkins and Postgate 1998: 31–35.
f. Known from two inscriptions: kululu 1 and kululu 4 as a vassal of Tuatti. See Hawkins, HLI 442–47.
g. Known from Assyrian and Luwian inscriptions. See Hawkins, HLI: 451–75 and Tadmor 1994: Summ. 7:14 and Summ. 9: rev. 27–28.
h. On a grave inscription found at Kululu (kululu 4), Hulis is the nephew of Ruwas, vassal of Tuatti. The text is dated on orthographic grounds to the
eighth century b.c. For the text, see Hawkins, HLI 445–46. For the equation of Hulis and Hulli, see Dillo 2003: 319. Hulli appears in Assyrian sources for
Tiglath-pileser III and Sargon II: Tadmor 1994: Summ. 7:14 and Summ. 9: rev. 27–28 and Fuchs 1994: Ann 195,196,197; Prunk. 30.
i. Known only from Assyrian sources: Fuchs 1994: Ann 194, 201; Prunk. 29, 31; Zyl. 33.
103
104 Rebellions and Peripheries in the Cuneiform World

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