American Political Science Association The American Political Science Review

Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in
Afghanistan
Author(s): RENARD SEXTON
Source: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 110, No. 4 (November 2016), pp. 731-
749
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American Political Science Review Vol. 110, No. 4 November 2016
doi:10.1017/S0003055416000356 © American Political Science Association 2016
Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Cont

Controlled Territory in Afghanistan
RENARD SEXTON Department of Politics, New York University
W bindings in political science, economics, and security studies suggest that during
he used to help establish control of contested areas and reduce insurgent violence by
-X " hearts and minds " of the population. These accounts typically ignore the strat
of aid distribution by progovernment forces, namely that rebel groups should resist the i
of aid projects that would undermine their position. Using a new dataset of fine-grained a
violence incidents in Afghanistan and random variation in the administration of som
surgency aid, I show that insurgents strategically respond to counterinsurgency aid in con
by resisting through violent means. The results indicate that civilian aid only reduces insu
when distributed in districts already controlled by progovernment forces ; when allocated
districts civilian aid in fact causes a significant increase in insurgent violence. The res
that the effect of counterinsurgency aid on violence varies by project type, and can be ov
macrolevel strategic changes in the conflict.
INTRODUCTION to the aid debate by highlighting the importance of

strategic responses by actors opposed to aims of aid
expenditures, as well as the contingency of aid effects
on quickly changing local conditions.
Findings
Findings rity usedused
studiestotohelp ritysuggest
in helpestablish
political studies
control suggest
establishof that
contested that
science, control
areas duringcivil ofcivil
during economics, contestedwar aidcan can
war aid and areas secu-bebe This study employs a new dataset of fine-grained
and reduce insurgent violence by winning the "hearts and geolocated violence incidents to examine the ef-
and minds" of the population. These accounts typically fects of a major U.S. military program that used civil-
ignore the strategic implications of aid distribution by ian development aid to counter the Taliban insurgency
progovernment forces, namely that rebel groups should in Afghanistan. Crucially for theories of counterinsur-
resist the implementation of aid projects that would gency, the program was administered in districts that
undermine their position. were secured by U.S. military forces as well as those that
In this article, I show that insurgents strategically were not under U.S. military control. Exploiting varia-
respond to counterinsurgency aid in contested districts
tion in the approval of counterinsurgency aid spending
by resisting through violent means, calling into ques- by the U.S. military in Afghanistan that is independent
tion the utility of counterinsurgency aid as a strategy of week-on-week violence, I am able to identify the ef-
for extending progovernment control to contested ar- fect of such spending on local level violence. Using data
eas. My results indicate that civilian aid only reduces on the positions of American battalion-level forward
insurgent violence when distributed in districts already operating bases (FOBs) and larger military installa-
controlled by progovernment forces; when allocated to tions, I demonstrate how the effects of aid spending
contested districts civilian aid in fact causes a significant on violence are determined by the degree of military
increase in insurgent violence. control.
I also show that the type of aid projects, such as hu- This study offers several contributions. First, these
manitarian aid or upgrading of security infrastructure, findings suggest that military control is a vital prerequi-
matters a great deal to the strategic reaction of insur- site for development aid to have an insurgent violence-
gents. Humanitarian aid projects, for example, have no reducing effect. In contrast to claims previously put
effect on insurgent violence in controlled or contested forward in scholarly and policy publications, aid on
districts, while military defense infrastructure projects its own seems incapable of winning over civilian public
in contested areas greatly magnify the aforementioned opinion when it is distributed on contested terrain. This
violence-increasing effects. study confirms that aid spending is capable of reducing
These findings speak to the ongoing global discus- insurgent violence in places already under progovern-
sion about the role of international aid in civil conflicts
ment military control, suggesting that aid functions as
around the world. With both scholarly and policy im-a force protection and pacification tool once progov-
plications, the results of this study should contributeernment forces have demonstrated control.
Second, the article demonstrates that the type of aid
Renard Sexton is doctoral candidate, Department of Politics,
project can matter greatly to the effect of aid on in-
New York University, 19 West 4th Street, New York, NY 10012
(renard.sexton@nyu.edu). surgent violence. On one hand, "Protective Measures"
The author thanks four anonymous reviewers, Neal Beck, Drew projects, which build military defense infrastructure in
Dimmery, Oeindrila Dube, Mike Gilligan, Sandy Gordon, Saad local districts, provoke attacks and bombings against
Gulzar, Niamatullah Ibrahimi, Mai Nguyen, Harsh Pandya, AndrewAfghan and U.S. military targets in both contested
Peterson, Pablo Querubin, Cyrus Samii, Jake Shapiro, David Stasav-
age, participants in NYU's Empirical Methods Seminar, and others
and secured districts. Humanitarian aid projects, on
for comments and suggestions. All remaining errors are AALIMS, the other hand, do not have a significant effect on
author's. violence.
731
Aid as a Tool against Insurgency November 2016
insurgent
Third, the effects we observe controlled
are notregions,
due though
to athey may seek a
change
negotiated peace if it becomes too
in effort on the part of counterinsurgents. Aid costly.
spending
does not affect the number Insurgents endeavor to achieve the opposite,
of progovernment aim-
opera-
tions and airstrikes against insurgent
ing to expel governmenttargets
military forcesnor does
and political
it change the number of officials.
IED clearances by
While their end goal may Afghan
be to eventuallyor
NATO forces in either controlled or contested districts. overthrow the government and establish themselves as
This suggests that aid projects are not provoking civil- the sovereign authority, as is the case for the Taliban
ians to immediately begin informing on insurgents, as in Afghanistan, rebels may also have secession or au-
it has been hypothesized in previous work, at least not tonomous devolution of power in mind.
in a way that provides actionable intelligence. Scholars and practitioners have long argued that a
Fourth, I rule out geographic spillovers of violence key element to establishing control (from the perspec-
between neighboring districts as a driver of the relative of either side) is winning the goodwill of the civil-
tionship between aid and insurgent violence. Incor-ian population. Galula (1964) and Trinqiuier (1964),
porating a spatial lag into the main regressions only among others, argue that political power in civil war
strengthens the effects of interest, even though vio- flows from the population, with the people essentially
lence is correlated across districts (Beck et al. 2006;deciding who wins the conflict based on their evalua-
Buhaug and Gleditsch 2008). I further demonstratetion of the competing sides in terms of their own well-
that there is no direct effect of aid spending on vio- being. Berman, Felter, and Shapiro (2011) formalize
lence in neighboring districts, whether that aid is ad- this logic by presenting the conflict between progov-
ministered in a controlled or contested district. While ernment forces and insurgents as essentially a contest
it is common to assume "labor mobility" when devel- for information that is adjudicated by the public.
oping models of insurgency, this suggests that at least One common tool used to win the support of the pop-
in Afghanistan, militants are constrained in terms of
ulation is development aid spending on the part of pro-
where they can move and operate. government actors. Aid has been deployed as a coun-
Fifth, I find that macrolevel strategic events canterinsurgency technique by intervening forces to great
quickly wipe out the violence-changing effects of aid
fanfare, including the U.S. -led coalitions in Afghanistan
and Iraq (Kilcullen 2010; U.S. Army 2009a), in the
spending. Using the case of the Northern Distribution
Network, a NATO supply line established in early 2009, Philippines, Colombia, and a generation earlier in Viet-
I show that the reorientation of violence towards the
nam and Algeria. The logic is that aid will win over
the "hearts and minds" of the civilian population,
new high-value target causes insurgents to stop re-
sponding to local counterinsurgency aid projects,which
at will lead them to stop collaborating with insur-
least in the short term. gents, whether through material support, information,
This study is the first analysis of civilian aid spending or other means. Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011)
in a conflict zone to use outcome data that are not also hypothesize that civilians will respond to aid by
sourced from military forces and include violence that
beginning to share information with counterinsurgents,
affects nonmilitary targets. While I do also use outcome
allowing progovernment forces to become more effec-
data from the U.S. military to provide a full profile of at eliminating militants.
tive
violence, new outcome data are sourced from reports Recent empirical studies have found evidence that
by an independent NGO network in Afghanistan.as a counterinsurgency strategy aid improves troop se-
This article begins with a discussion of theories of a key indicator of incumbent territorial control.
curity,
rebel violence and development aid, followed by the
Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011) find that hearts and
specific context of Afghanistan and the aid program minds-oriented
in aid spending in Iraq led to a short and
question: the Commander's Emergency Responselong Pro-term reduction in violence against Iraqi and coali-
gram (CERP). The next section describes the datation usedmilitary forces. Beath, Christia, and Enikolopov
in the study. I then explain the empirical approach (2016)
for find evidence in Afghanistan that civilian de-
velopment aid improves troop security in surround-
the study, including the identification strategy, followed
by a presentation of the main results. This is followed
ing areas, though not in the communities themselves.
by an interpretation of the main results, three setsCrost,
of Felter, and Johnston (2016) show experimen-
tal evidence in the Phillippines that conditional cash
secondary results, an analysis of mechanisms, a placebo
check, and a conclusion. transfers reduce local violence. Iyengar, Monten, and
Hanson (2011) propose a labor market mechanism,
finding that aid spending that increases employment
COUNTERINSURGENCY AID AND REBEL reduces "labor-intensive" insurgent violence. Bohnke
RESISTANCE and Zürcher (2013) do not find any evidence that aid
affects perceptions of security, however, their survey
gives
In traditional cases of civil war, where an armed op-evidence of an improvement in perceptions of
state legitimacy. Two previous studies on counterinsur-
position clashes with a government, there is a struggle
gency aid in Afghanistan, by Chou (2012) and Child
for the control of territory. Kalyvas (2006) articulates
this as "division of sovereignty in civil war . . . between
(2015), on the other hand, find no average effect of aid
zones of incumbent control, zones of insurgent control,
on violence against U.S. military forces.
and zones where control is contested." Progovernment
These accounts, while important contributions, ig-
forces seek to extend their control to contested and
nore several important strategic dynamics between
732
American Political Science Review Vol. 110, No. 4
that counterinsurgency
government and rebel forces.1 Most aid would be predicted to have when
importantly,
a violence
counterinsurgents engage in increasing effect in contested
spending and Taliban-
targeted to win
over the affections of controlled
the districts,
civilian population,
while maintaining a violence reduc- we
should expect insurgents ing to oppose
effect them-
in districts controlled violently, if
by U.S. forces.
necessary -whenever possible. Furthermore, the strategic Felter,
Crost, responses of insurgents
and John-
ston (2014) illustrate thisto dynamic aid should vary with thein type ofthe Phillippines,
project that is being
showing that aid projectsimplemented. distributed Several factors may be influentialthe
from in the central
government increase violence, context, including as opposition
the visibility of the project, whethergroups
sabotage projects in their early
the project implies anstages to
increase in military undermine
capacity for
any goodwill the central government progovernment actors, whether might insurgents can
earn effec- in the
local area. A study on a similar tively interfere with program in India by
the project using the techniques
Khanna and Zimmermann (2015)
they have access to. We also finds
would expect, for example, that aid
drives short run increases in violence related to Maoist that insurgents would respond aggressively to projects
insurgency. Lyall (2014) finds a similar dynamic with investing in military infrastructure, or that build the
respect to U.S. Air Force airstrikes in Afghanistan, withcapacity of local government partners. On the other
insurgents responding to coalition strikes and showshand, we would not expect them to attack projects
of force with attacks against progoverment forces to involving humanitarian aid, in part because handing
fight back against any loss of reputation among the out food, water, and tents is difficult to interdict, in
populace. part because violence against such a project would be
A second strategic element is that insurgents, with directly against civilians, and lastly because this aid is
finite resources, must decide where to carry out acts far less visible to insurgents than, for example, the con-
of sabotage and nonviolent resistance to counterin- struction of a new military watchtower by the district
surgency projects. Where costs and the likelihood of government headquarters.
immediate retaliation are low, as in the Phillippines The Afghanistan case provides us with an oppor-
case, rebels can attack many aid projects, scuttling tunity to test each of these claims using detailed,
their impacts. In a more contested environment, like geocoded violence data and random variation in coun-
Afghanistan or Iraq, guerillas must make trade-offs. terinsurgency aid spending by the U.S. military dur-
The ability of insurgents to carry out sabotage is in ing the 2008-10 period. While the specific dynamics
part related to the degree of control that each side has of spending, resistance, and violence are unique to
in a given territory (Harmon 1992; Kilcullen 2010). The Afghanistan, the strategic relationship they illustrate
costs of attacking aid projects are similarly related to travels well to other civil war contexts. Particularly as
zones of control; sabotaging a hearts and minds project international "stabilization" missions of the sort de-
in an incumbent-controlled area is much more likely to scribed in the next section continue to be deployed
result in rapid retaliation by progovernment forces. by NATO and others, these insights will only become
Third and finally, as noted by Kaly vas (2006), citizens more relevant.
stuck between warring sides in a civil conflict often
"shift endogenously towards the army" that controls
their environs. Particularly when counterinsurgents WARTIME AFGHANISTAN AND THE
make costly investments in military infrastructure, COMMANDER'S EMERGENCY RESPONSE
bring in equipment and regularly patrol incumbent-
PROGRAM (CERP)
controlled areas, the population can quite rationally
become ambivalent towards insurgents, even if pre- The seeds for Afghanistan's present-day conflict were
conflict preferences might predict sympathy towards sown as far back as the 1870s, when the second Anglo
guerillas. This suggests that the civilian population in Afghan war allowed Britain to take over Afghanistan'
progoverment controlled zones should more consis-. foreign relations and establish a partial protectorate,
tently respond to hearts and minds programs. in opposition to the expanding Russian Empire. A
Berman et al. (2013) find some evidence for this final century later, after numerous foreign interventions
claim in Iraq, noting that aid and troop concentration and proxy battles, the Soviet Union did what British
are complements in the provision of troop security, colonial officials feared in the 19th century, invading
while Biddle, Friedman, and Shapiro (2012) suggest Afghanistan in December 1979 in support of the new
that the "surge" of troops was as significant a factor in communist government in Kabul.
reducing violence in Iraq as any aid spending. Since the 1970s a parade of governments have passed
These three factors point to an important implica- through the doors of power in Kabul: royalists, com-
tion: counterinsurgency aid spending on "hearts and munists, mujahedeen, Pashtun nationalists, fundamen-
minds" projects should provoke violent and nonvio- talist Islamists, and finally, the most recent NATO-
lent retaliation from rebels, except in locations where sponsored administration. Each has, sooner or later,
progovernment forces have full military control. As found themselves at odds with violent insurgents. In-
we look towards the Afghanistan case, this implies deed, when one group is thrown from power, they often
become the next leader's armed opposition.
1 The international relations literature on bilateral aid has identified The past three decades of conflict are typically bro-
strategic behavior on the part of both bilateral donors and recipient ken up into four periods: the Soviet/communist war
governments; Wright and Winters (2010) review this literature. (1979-1992; also referred to as "the jihad"), the "civi
733
war" (1992-1996), the Taliban period (1996-2001), and

the current "American" war TABLE 1 . CERP Project Frequency by
(2001-present).
Project since
The conflict in Afghanistan Type, 2008-2010
2001 has been
marked by the intervention of the United States, which
ADR Project Category Frequency Percent
began after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001.
Soon after, U.S. special forces supported
Advisory Services the 30opposi-
0.5%
tion Northern Alliance in deposing the Taliban
Agriculture 23 0.4% regime
in Kabul, installing Hamid Karzai as president
Construction 191 3.2% soon
Education
after. Since 2006, growing armed opposition560 9.4% to the
Karzai government and itsElectricity
NATO allies 152has2.6%trans-
formed Afghanistan into a Food Production and again.
battlefield DistributionThis
170 2.9%has
included the "Neo-Taliban," Healthcare
Haqqani Network, 397 6.7%
Hezb-
Irrigation 189 3.2%
e Islami, local warlords and guerillas, and foreign spon-
Logistical Support 319 5.4%
sors of armed groups (Giustozzi 2008, Dorronsoro
Maintenance and Repair 159 2.7%
2009). Other 1,129 19.0%
To combat growing armed opposition to the Karzai Other Urgent Humanitarian 1 ,1 63 1 9.6%
government, the U.S. Congress authorized "hearts and Protective Measures 1 1 8 2.0%
minds" spending by U.S. commanders, as part of a Repair of Civic or Cultural Facilities 1 31 2.2%
broader counterinsurgency strategy known as COIN. Repair of Damages 66 1.1 %
Civilian aid projects administered by U.S. military com- Rule of Law and Governance 1 79 3.0%
manders were previously used in Iraq, under the Com- Self-Help 34 0.6%
mander's Emergency Response Program (CERP). It is Service Delivery 22 0.4%
random variation in the administration of the CERP Telecommunications 62 1 .0%
Transportation 404 6.8%
program in Afghanistan, which I detail below, that I will Water and Sanitation 438 7.4%
use to identify the effect of aid on violence in contested
and controlled Afghan districts. Total 5,936 100%
As put in the U.S. Army's Handbook "Comman-
der's Guide to Money as a Weapons System," CERP
is intended as a "nonlethal weapon to urgent, small-
scale, humanitarian relief, and reconstruction projects TABLE 2. Appropr
and services that immediately assist the indigenous Afghanistan
population."
"Warfighters at brigade, battalion, and company Year Appropriated
level in a counterinsurgency (COIN) environment em- 2005 $136
ploy money as a weapons system to win the hearts 2006 $215 58%
and minds of the indigenous population to facilitate 2007 $209 -3%
defeating the insurgents" (U.S. Army 2009b). 2008 $488 133%
Between 2004 and 2011, more than $2.64 billion was 2009 $551 13%
spent through CERP in Afghanistan, with projects that 2010 $1,000 81%
ranged from road construction, cash-for-work, agri- 201 1 $400 -60%
cultural assistance to water projects, and militia pay-
offs (Johnson, Ramachandran, and Walz 2011). Table 1
summarizes the frequency of various projects types
from May 2008 to December 2010. Obama, intense pressu
The U.S. COIN strategy during this period encom- funds fell on all levels o
passed a broad range of civilian and military activi- Table 2 illustrates the
ties, of which CERP was one. Ranging from cultural Afghanistan during t
sensitivity training, coordination with the host govern-2013).
ment and military, focus on infrastructure development At the level of local commanders, there was ad-
and services, and the "Clear, Hold and Build" method, ditional pressure to produce proposals for CERP
COIN doctrine is to counter an insurgency in a holis- projects. How much money a unit could get "out
tic manner. This includes challenging insurgents with the door" was strongly considered in evaluations
respect to rule of law, governance and public goodsfor promotion.2 As it was put in an internal ISAF
provision, far beyond the traditional security sectorreview in 2011, "current incentives promote spend-
tasks often assigned to a military occupation. ing CERP funds without sufficient accountability"
As part of the overall U.S. counterinsurgency(Weggeland 2011). The impacts of the projects barely
(COIN) approach, the CERP program was ramped upmeasured, the only observable metric for evaluating
extensively and rapidly in Afghanistan after 2007, in-
creasing in appropriated funds from just over $200 mil-
2 Interview with SIG AR and ISAF staff indicated that for most of the
lion in 2007 to nearly $1 billion in 2010. As U.S. foreign
2008-2010 period, gross CERP expenditures were the only de-facto
policy priorities switched from Iraq to Afghanistan,indicator for the "governance" heading for performance evaluations
and the so-called "surge" was authorized by President
(SIGAR 2011; Weggeland 2011).
734
contributions to governance was

in aid being the
exploited is in factamount of CERP
independent of local vi-
money a commander had spent. olence, military This
control, and pressure,
other local characteristics.in addi-
tion to limited local contextualWhile many observers have questioned on
information the utility
the of part
of overstretched commanders, meant
CERP spending that
in Afghanistan for itsthe decision
chaotic nature,
to put a district into CERP as scholars
treatmentthis random variationduring allows us to aexamine
partic-
ular period or not was pushedthe effectup to exogenous
of locally the bureaucratic
changes in CERP spend-
level as a slew of projects weaved
ing on local their
violence outcomes.
way By through
examining week-by-
the
approval process (Kilcullen week changes in
2010; CERP expenditures 2011).
Weggeland and changes in
On the approval side, pressure
several classes to get spending
of violence, we can identify how done
civilian
was not lost on higher levelaid spending affects local
leadership in level
theviolence.
U.S. mili-
tary, who were eager to implement the well-publicized
COIN strategy (SIGAR 2011; DATA Weggeland 2011). Ex-
tensive discussions in theater at ISAF headquarters and
with civilian aid workers for the U.S. over a six-month Violence is not the only means of measuring the effect
period by the author in 2012 indicate that during theof aid on an antigovernment insurgency. The legitimacy
2008-10 period, numerous rejections, delays in projectand popularity of the insurgency in the eyes of influ-
approval, last minute budget changes, or adjustmentsential civilians and public support for the institutions
in the siting of CERP were due to procurement andof the incumbent government are important factors
bureaucratic technicalities, as opposed to strategic con- that may dictate the political settlement of a conflict
siderations.3 In addition, the timing of CERP project(Lyall, Blair and Imai 2013). Unfortunately, they are
approvals was reportedly often difficult to predict, ac- both difficult to measure at a fine-grained level, and
cording to the office of the Special Inspector General are indeed ephemeral concepts to measure even un-
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR) in Kabul.4 der favorable conditions.6 Accordingly, the dependent
Even if projects were known to be coming to an area,variables of interest for this study are local level vio-
it was uncertain when funds would actually arrive, and lence of several types. While violence against progov-
be able to be disbursed, due to highly technical andernment (counterinsurgency) forces is important and
legalistic currency transfer and procurement rules.5 easy to measure- international forces keep track of
Even if the approval and timing of CERP funds isit themselves- it is not the only violence of interest.
plausibly independent of local week-on-week violenceWe want to account for insurgency violence against all
trends, it is possible that some commanders synchedtargets, as well as noninsurgency related violence.
other military actions with the start of CERP projects. This study introduces a new dataset of fine grained,
For example, a unit might use the start of a CERP geocoded violence in Afghanistan during the period of
project to undertake anti-Taliban clearing operations,May 2008 to December 2010 that fills this gap. In con-
or engage in outreach with local government partners. trast with previous studies, this dataset includes local
In this case, the "treatment" would be not only aid violence against all targets during that interval, includ-
spending alone, but a bundle of CERP spending and ing bombings not against international or local security
some other activities. In the Mechanisms section, how- forces, as well as operations against insurgents carried
ever, I show that CERP spending is not associated with out by international and domestic military forces.7
an increase in anti-insurgent raids, airstrikes, or IED The new data on bombings and operations by pro-
clearances by international or national security forces, government forces are compiled from detailed weekly
suggesting that at least visible operations and outreach incident reports from the Afghanistan NGO Safety
to security partners were not, on average, synched withOrganization, an independent nonprofit organization
CERP project starts. that has kept track of security incidents throughout
It is also important to take account for the continuingAfghanistan since October 2002. With more than 100
nature of both violence and aid expenditure. Violencestaff spread throughout Afghanistan, ANSO collects
tends not to increase in just a single period, insteadreported security incidents first hand, from human-
following longer term trends, including seasonality, per- itarian and development NGO (foreign and domes-
sistant offensives, and pacification efforts. Similarly, aid tic), triangulated SMS and phone-in reports, and lo-
projects, even if they include some random variation in cal news media.8 The organization is funded by Swiss
approval and timing, are distributed over a period ofDevelopment Cooperation, the Norwegian Ministry
weeks or months. In the empirical specification that
follows, I address serial correlation in violence and aid 6 Work by Weatherford (1992), Gilley (2006), and Levi, Sacks, and
spending, unobserved conditions in Afghan districts,Tyler (2009) provide important strides on this topic but the data to
concerns about reverse causality and selection into apply these techniques to Afghanistan are not yet available.
treatment, in order to remain secure that the variation 7 Berman, Shapiro, and Felter (2011), Berman et al. (2013), and
Crost, Felter, and Johnston (2014) include violence against secu-
rity forces and casualties resulting from incidents initiated by secu-
rity forces, reported by security forces, while Beath, Christia, and
3 Author interview with U.S. official in Kabul (April 2012) (SIGAR
Enikolopov (2016) rely on voluntary survey responses from local
2011). respondents long after events took place.
4 Author interviews with SIGAR official in Kabul (March, April, 8 ANSO's data collection process likely misses some events that
June 2012) (SIGAR 2011). occurred during the sample period due. This is more likely in rural
3 U.S. Army (2009) Handbook 09-27 "Commander's Guide to locations and locations with fewer civilian aid organizations, police
Money as a Weapons System," pp. 13-22. presence, and/or journalists. Nonetheless, this would contribute to
735
Aid as a Tool against Insurgency
of Foreign Affairs, and the

Directorate for Humanitarian Affairs and Civil Pro- FIGURE 1 . Annual Casualty-Causing
tection (ECHO) and is registered as a nonprofit and
Security Incidents per 10,000 Inhabitants
(ANSO data), Afghanistan, May
independent charity in the UK.9 Each weekly report2008-December 2010
contains the date, province, district, and precise loca-
tion of each reported incident, along with a one- to
two-sentence description of the incident. The incident
narratives follow a set of conventions regarding ter-
minology, spelling, acronyms, and shorthand. For ex-
ample, coalition forces are referred to as IMF, mean-
ing "international military forces." To illustrate, the
following are two entries from the dataset, the first
a bombing incident and the second an operation by
progovernment forces:
Date: 2010 April 25

Location: Paktya Province, Shwak District, Main
Gardez-Khost Road
Incident Narrative: An IED (improvised explosive

device) planted on the road detonated while 4.
an IEDs defused/cleared by international milita
ANA EOD team was attempting to defuse it. forces.
Date: 2010 April 6 The violence data are collapsed into 138 weekly bin
across Afghanistan's 398 districts for a total of 53,
Location: Kunar Province, Chapa Dara District,
Badigram Area observations in the time series cross section from M
2008 to December 2010.13 Figure 1 illustrates the g
Incident Narrative: IMF/ANSF conducted a joint op-
ographic distribution of casualty-causing security
eration targeting suspected AOG locations, killing
cidents from the ANSO dataset (annually per 10,0
six suspected AOG.
inhabitants).
Data on the CERP treatment come from an un-
Using keyword text analysis, the more than 46,000 se- classified database, entitled "Afghanistan Comman-
curity incidents that were reported by ANSO during ders Emergency Response Program (CERP) Spending
the 138 weeks of the study period (May 2008 to De- Data 2010-2011," publicly released by the U.S. mili-
cember 2010)10 are coded using regular expressions tary's Central Command (CENT-COM) at the end of
from ANSO documents.11 This study includes the fol- 2010. The files come from the Combined Information
lowing three categories of violence, and two variables Data Network Exchange (CIDNE), the U.S. military's
measuring IEDs cleared/defused12: internal management system for collecting tactical data
from troops. The CERP dataset includes completed,
1. bombings and attempted bombings by insurgents ongoing, planned, and cancelled CERP projects in
(against all targets); Afghanistan; in this study both completed and active
2. operations against insurgents by international mili- projects are included.14
tary forces and the Afghan National Army; The CERP database includes the start and end dates
3. IEDs defused/cleared by the Afghan National Po- of CERP projects, the budget, sector, and global po-
lice or Afghan National Security Forces; sitioning of each project. Using GIS software and a
project's latitude and longitude, I coded each CERP
project with its appropriate district and province. In the
classical measurement error in the outcome variables, which would study period, 5,843 CERP projects across all districts
inflate the variance of the estimates in this analysis but not change of Afghanistan are included. Figure 2 shows CERP
the point estimates. This would bias against finding statistically sig-
spending per capita.
nificant effects, so the results in this study would then be conservative
estimates.
9 The organization's website is at present http://www.ngosafety.org/.13 Due to unclear coding in some of the CERP and SIGACT, there
10 The ANSO weekly reports were collected from multiple sources,are two pairs of neighboring districts that are merged for estimation
rather than a single file. All the source material was overlapping,purposes; this is the conservative solution as it reduces the number
however, in the end four random weeks were not found among the of clusters from 398 to 396. The 50292 effective sample shown in the
sources: 17-23 July 2008, 30 October-5 November 2008, 25 February- summary statistics takes into account the two periods of lags included
3 March 2010, and 24-30 June 2010. They are dropped from thein the ADL-2 specification.
sample; a robustness check in the Appendix demonstrates that they 14 I also had access to a subsample from the Afghan Ministry of Rural
are not influential on the results. Reconstruction and Development civilian aid dataset. Unforunately,
11 The event coding is detailed in the Appendix. these data only represent a nonrandom sample of just 30 percent of
12 These will be referred to in shorthand, respectively, as bombings, the civilian aid distributed through the MRRD during the study
progovernment operations, and IED clearances (by ANP/ANSF andperiod, and only include project start dates (no end dates). I include
by NATO). In addition to these four, I also coded armed criminal these data as a covariate and interacted with the CERP treatment as
group incidents, and crimes against NGOs. robustness checks, with the main results unchanged.
736
for an injured soldier. In order to identify the uni

FIGURE 2. Annual CERP Spending per number of events, I collapse the SIGACT data, dr
Capita (U.S. military data), Afghanistan, May ping duplicate observations that occurred in the sa
2008-December 2010
location at the same time. The study period contain
total of 62,944 unique SIGACT events, of which 44,
are "enemy actions" or "explosive hazards" (the fi
coding of the event applies for the duration so th
there is no double counting).
Using monthly reports published by the Institu
for the Study of War (ISW) on the order of battle
Afghanistan, the positions of battalion-level and large
ISAF installations is coded by month into the tim
series. A battalion is the smallest sized unit that is con-
sidered by the US. military to be both "tactically and
administratively self-sufficient."15 With around 1,000
soldiers and typically commanded by a Lieutenant
Colonel, a battalion has the resources to control the
district around them, including logistics, easy access to
air support, regular patrols, and training of local allies.
FIGURE S. Annual Attacks Against U.S. Larger installations, like brigade headquarters- often
in provincial capitals, or divisions (in charge of regional
Troops per 10,000 Inhabitants (U.S. military
data), Afghanistan, May 2008-Decembercommands),
2010 have even greater resources to maintain
control of the district within which they sit.
The ISW reports indicate where "white" units are
positioned, that is, regular military units as opposed to
special forces units and other "black" operations. The
locations of battalion-level forward operating bases
(FOBs) and major installations and their primary listed
areas of responsibility (AOR) are coded as "secured"
with a dummy variable. These data are available at the
district-month level of resolution. During the period
under study, only two FOBs are decommissioned, oth-
erwise it is a strictly additive process. The number of
districts with battalion-level troop bases increases from
28 in May 2008 to 49 in December 2010.16
Using battalion-level and larger installations as a
measure of progovernment troop control is not ideal,
as there may be some misclassifications where there
are secure
In addition to information on CERP spending, theareas (progovernment sovereignty) without
bases and areas with bases that do not necessarily have
CIDNE database contains information on "Significant
Activities" (SIGACT), which are defined as progovernment
"events of sovereignty. We might worry that as
levels
significance in the operational environment," that of are
violence change in a district, the ability of the
reported by U.S. military units. SIGACT data measure
range to correctly classify progovernment control
might med-
from enemy engagements, friendly fire events, change.
ical evacuations, requests for air support from Following
local the logic of Imai and Yamamoto (2010), I
units and IED (improvised explosive device) argue discov-
that there are three primary reasons why mea-
eries, and explosions. "Enemy actions" and surement
"explosive error should not be correlated with the out-
hazards" are included in this study as the measure of case. First, control, as characterized in
come in this
this study
SIG ACT-reported violence events. Figure 3 depicts theusing the Kalyvas (2006) definition of "divi-
sion of sovereignty,"
annual number of SIGACT per 10,000 inhabitants in is slow moving by nature, while
each Afghanistan district. violence is deliberately measured in the short term
"Enemy actions" are defined as live fire (week-on-week).
attacks Sovereignty over a given district, in
by insurgents against progovernment troops that are
recorded by international military forces. These may
15 A public portal of the U.S. military, located at http://www.army.
be against fixed installations, military units on pa-
mil/info/organization/unitsandcommands/oud/ provides simple info-
trol, or others. "Explosive hazards" refer to IEDsthat
graphics andsummarize the size and function of the different unit
bombs that are encountered by progovernment levels. forces,
whether they explode or not. 16 In April 2014, the author initiated a Freedom of Information
In many cases there are several entries inAct request with the National Geospatial Agency (NGA) to re-
CIDNE
lease monthly maps of company-level FOBs and Combat Outposts
that relate to a single violence incident; for example
(COPs) in if a to have additional resolution on troop positions.
order
U.S. military unit engages in combat with an AOG unit, to date NGA has not been willing to release these
Unfortunately,
then calls for air support and then requests a med-evac
maps.
737
on the following period. Third, the model also includes

TABLE 3. Summary Statistics
unit and time fixed effects to eliminate confounding
Variable Obs. Mean S.D. from any remaining non-time-varying characteristics
of districts and nationwide trends in spending and
violence.18
Population (in 10 K) 50292 6.28 16.49
Secured (dummy) 50292 0.09 0.29 To verify this approach I carry out a battery of ro-
Number of CERP Projects 50292 1.35 3.58 bustness checks, located in Appendix C. In addition, I
CERP Spending (in 10 K) 50292 0.22 1.22 carry out a placebo test at the end of the Results section
Bombings 50292 0.05 0.19 to confirm that there is no selection into treatment or
Operations 50292 0.03 0.11 "reverse-causality."
Enemy Actions 50292 0.08 0.41 For the purposes of each district-week observation,
Explosive Hazards 50292 0.07 0.30
the presence or absence of a battalion-size or larger
ISAF installation is treated as a covariate, which is
Note : Observations are 396 Afghan districts over 138 weeks
interacted with CERP aid spending. In order to avoid
from 2008 to 201 0 and adjusted per 1 0,000 inhabitants.
post-treatment bias concerns, the "secured" variable is
lagged by one period.19 While long-term violence and
aid trends may be endogenous to the decision-making
general, does not swing back and forth on a weekly
process regarding where and when to extend large U.S.
basis, particularly where occupation forces have major
military installations, such decisions are not made with
military installations in place. Second, the expectations
a week-to-week turnaround. That is, changes in vio-
and sympathies of the population, key to sovereignty,
lence in a given district in a given week should not
do not typically react to short-term shifts in violence,
make that district any more or less likely to have a
especially in civil war contexts where endemic violence
large U.S. military installation put in place or taken
is a common phenomenon. Last, because the variable
away.
(both the conceptual understanding of control and ac-
I estimate the effect of CERP spending, moderated
tual military presence) is binary, as opposed to a con-
by FOB presence, on three violence outcomes using
tinuous measure, it is less susceptible to week-to-week
the following specification, using OLS:
fluctuations (see Table 3). I conduct two additional ro-
bustness checks in Appendix C to give further evidence
in favor of the measurement. Summary statisticsYit = ßo for
+ ftCERP
theu -F /*2CERP*secured/,_i
data used in the study are presented in Table-I-
3.ß3secured/,_i + ß4CERP/,_i
+ )05CERP*secured;,_2 + /?6secured/,_2
EMPIRICAL APPROACH
+ ßi Yit-i + ^District/ + /^Month + €¡t,
Identifying a causal relationship in the study of
military-led aid is challenging. Unlike civilian where
devel- Yit is the violence outcome in levels per capita
opment aid, which has been relatively easily manipu-
for district / in week ř, ß' and ßi are the coefficients of
lated in an field experimental context, there have been
interest for the first period, CERP/, is CERP spending
no such experimental studies on counterinsurgency aid
per capita in levels, CERP*secured/,_i ,_2 are the inter-
spending by military forces. As a result, we must rely
action of CERP spending with the troop dummy, and
on observational data to examine the effect of CERP
secured/,_i,,_2 are dummies for whether a district had
and other programs.
a battalion FOB or larger installation in a weeks t - 1
In order to isolate the variation in CERP spendingand t - 2 District and week fixed effects follow, along
that is independent of local violence trends in the with
dis- €it , the district-week error term.
trict in which the spending is taking place, I focus the The effects of interest are then ß' for the effect of
analysis on week-by-week levels of CERP spending
CERP spending in unsecured districts and ß' + ß2 for
that are in part due to the bureaucratic and operational
the secured districts in the first period. For the second
hurdles described two sections ago. To isolate this plau-
period effects, the coefficient of interest is ß4 H- (ßjßi)
sibly exogenous spending, I employ an empirical strat-
for unsecured districts and ß^ + ß$ + [ßj(ß' + ßi)' for
egy that has three main features. First, I use individual
secured. In order to estimate the predicted effects of
district-weeks as the unit of analysis, allowing for a
a given project, for example CERP spending worth
fine-grained examination of variation in CERP spend-
$500,000 over four weeks, the period one effects are
ing and violence. Second, I employ a lagged variables
summed with period two effects for each week of
model (autoregressive distributed lag, or ADL; Beckspending, providing a predicted cumulative effect.
and Katz 2011) that addresses serial correlation in the
time series,17 ensures that previous weeks' spending
and violence are not confounding the estimates, 18 As noted by Nickell (1981), OLS is biased when fixed effects and a
and
lagged dependent variable are included, however, this bias decreases
allows us to observe the dynamic effects of spending
with a large number of time periods. In this study we have 138 time
periods, so this bias is not a problem. For further robustness, I show in
Appendix B that the results are consistent using the Arellano-Bond
(1991) estimator.
17 Appendix B includes a discussion of serial correlation and model
selection, and results from the relevant Lagrange multiplier testsiyfor
A robustness check in Appendix C shows that the results are
four potential models. robust to at least 12 lags in the "secured" variable.
738
TABLE 4. Main Results
(1) (2) (3)

Bombings Enemy Actions Explosive Hazards
CERP 0.08** 0.05+ 0.10+

(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
CERP * L.Controlled - 0.08* - 0.07* -0.16*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
L.Controlled -0.01 -0.04 0.06
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
L.CERP -0.05 -0.07* -0.10
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
L.CERP * L2.Controlled 0.06 0.12* 0.17*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
L2.Controlled 0.04* 0.11 0.03
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
L. Violence 0.16*** 0.59*** 0.44***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
Districts 396 396 396
r2 0.21 0.57 0.47
N 50292 50292 50292
Notes : SE clustered at the d

included. Outcome incidents
Standard errors for these

are FIGURE 4.
estimated Bombings: Predicted Effects
using simula of
$500,000 of Aid Over Four Weeks
RESULTS
In this section I present the main results of the study,

followed by a placebo test and exploration of mecha-
nisms and secondary results that further elucidate the
main results.
Table 4 presents the regression coefficients for each
of the outcomes, while the predicted effect plots in
Figures 4-6 illustrate the cumulative predicted effect
of hypothetical CERP spending of $500,000 over four
weeks; in practice this could be several smaller projects
or one large project, and in many cases includes spend-
ing from multiple overlapping projects.
For these tables, CERP spending levels have been
divided by $100,000 in order to make easier visual in-
ferences. The results indicate that CERP spending has
dramatically different effects on violence depending on
whether the aid is distributed in controlled or contested
aid spending in a contested district- week results in 0.05
districts. In Table 4 we see that a significant negativemore enemy actions against progovernment troops,
effect of CERP spending on insurgent violence against while in a controlled district-week this causes a 0.07
progovernment targets in secured districts in the first attack reduction. In the following, across outcomes,
period. On the other hand, when spending is done in there is some attenuation of the effect in the week
contested districts, it causes a significant increase inafter spending is done, whether it is in a controlled
insurgent violence in the week of spending. In terms of or a contested district. Looking across the outcomes
magnitude, $100,000 of aid spending results in increasethe first week effects of $100,000 of aid spending is a
of 0.08 bombings in a contested district, with no change increase of 0.23 attacks, while in controlled districts it
in a controlled district. At the same time, $100,000 inis a reduction of 0.31 attacks.
When there is spending multiple weeks in a row,
as is the case for the vast majority of CERP projects,
20 The standard errors are generated via 1000 simulated models using
the violence effects accumulate. In Figures 4-6 I show
the coefficients and variance-covariance matrix of the regression es-
the predicted cumulative effects of $500,000 over four
timates. The simulated coefficient estimates then provide the bounds
for a confidence interval. weeks. In an unsecured district, this spending results
739
clear that aid on its own does not appear to win over
FIGURE 5. Enemy Actions: Predicted
contested terrain. Effects
of $500,000 of Aid Over Four Weeks
These findings have important implications, both for
scholarship on insurgency and policy-making with re-
spect to counterinsurgency programs. First, these find-
ings suggest that the distribution of aid on its own
is not able to extend territorial control in the short
term. Indeed, as Kalyvas (2006) notes, "although con-
trol and collaboration interact, control may trump the
political preferences of the population in generating
collaboration." We find that where districts are being
heavily contested between incumbents and insurgents,
this cuius region eius religio dynamic comes quickly to
the fore.
Second, given that the U.S. Congress appropriated
nearly $ 2.7 billion to CERP in Afghanistan between
2004 and 2011, there is substantial scope for policy
change on this topic. During the period of study, about
$120 million was spent on completed CERP projects.
Of these funds, nearly 60 percent ($ 71.6 million)
was spent in unsecured districts, whereas 40 percent
FIGURE 6. Explosive Hazards: Predicted
($47.7 million) was spent in secured districts. If we ac-
Effects of $500,000 per Capita of Aid Over
Four Weeks cept the predicted cumulative effects estimated above,
and consider the measured events to be independent
incidents, the $71.6 million spent in unsecured dis-
tricts would have led to 33 additional bombings, 20
additional enemy actions, and 57 explosive hazards,
together equaling 110 attacks. Considering secured
districts, $47.7 million in CERP spending in secured
districts is estimated to have reduced by a total of 42
attacks: 6 bombings, 18 enemy actions, and 18 explosive
hazards.
Project Categories
The CERP program included a wide array of aid cat-
egories, including construction, healthcare and rule of
law. While the record-keeping by the U.S. military for
CERP has been criticized for often obscuring project
in 0.23 more bombings, 0.14 more enemy actions, aimsand(whether deliberately or not) by having quite
0.40 explosive hazards, for a total of 0.77 attacks. broadIn project categories, we do have broad informa-
tion
contrast, in a secured district, this level of spending is for just over 80 percent of projects during the
predicted to cause a reduction of 0.06 bombings,study 0.18 period. Where the project category is known,
enemy actions, and 0.19 explosive hazards, in total however,
0.43 it is often difficult to ascertain exactly what
attacks. activities were conducted under the spending category,
and how quickly we would expect strategic responses
The results from this study offer important evidence
in the debate regarding the counterinsurgency effect from insurgents could occur. The official U.S. CERP
of civilian aid. We see that in districts where the U.S. handbook explains that one of 20 categories may be
military has already established control, aid spending used to log projects, with a wide range of potential
drives a reduction in insurgent violence against security activities (U.S. Army 2013).
forces, but no effect on bombing violence against civil- For example, in the "healthcare" category, we do
ians. In unsecured districts, aid spending instead causes not know if the associated CERP projects involved
an increase in insurgent violence with both civilians and providing medicine, upgrading existing health facili-
security forces as targets. These results indicate that in- ties, building or converting new health facilities, paying
surgents indeed respond strategically to aid spending medical workers, or subsidizing care. In these cases of
on the part of progovernment forces, as predicted by mixed potential project activities we would expect the
theory. These short run changes in violence in contested average effects of the projects to be the same as over-
districts do not necessarily mean that aid cannot be part all CERP spending. Accordingly, subsample analyses
of a longer-term strategy to win, as violence may spike of these more vague categories, including healthcare,
and then fall later, however as a short run strategy, it is education, telecommunications, and transport, are the
740
TABLE 5. Protective Measures Projects: Predict
Control Status Weeks After Bombings Enemy Actions Explosive Hazards
Unsecured 2 0.35* 0.97** 0.36

(0.17) (0.41) (0.25)
4 0.59+ 2.03* 0.96+
(0.39) (0.87) (0.72)
Secured 2 0.22 0.13 0.33*
(0.17) (0.18) (0.16)
4 0.41 0.30 0.50
(0.40) (0.43) (0.38)
Note : Standard errors estimated from 1 000 simulated draws of the coefficients
TABLE 6. Humanitarian Projects: Predict
Control Status Weeks After Bombings Enemy Actions Explosive Hazards
Unsecured 2 0.35 0.15 0.27

(0.21) (0.31) (0.17)
4 0.79 0.30 0.59
(0.49) (0.70) (0.38)
Secured 2 0.89 0.79 1 .39
(0.45) (0.62) (0.89)
4 1.52 2.09 3.31
(0.79) (1.36) (2.10)
Note: Standard errors estimated from 1 000 simulated draws of the coefficients.
same as the average effects reported earlier in this humanitarian projects. The associated regression tables
section.21 are reproduced in the Appendix. We see that for pro-
Two categories lend themselves to a more nuanced tective measures projects in unsecured districts there
analysis, as both the relevant strategic interaction is is a large and significant increase in violence, both in
more clearly defined and sufficient projects exist to attacks against U.S. troops and bombings against all tar-
conduct a subsample analysis. The first is "Protective gets. In secured districts the predicted effects are also
Measures," which are projects designed to improve positive, though smaller and less likely to be statistically
the security of critical infrastructure like Afghan gov- significant. This suggests that insurgents are willing to
ernment buildings and power stations; projects under attack these military capacity-building projects, even
"protective measures" include guard towers, protective when secured by U.S. troops.
fencing, security lighting, and walls/barriers. The sec- Other Humanitarian projects do not have a statisti-
ond category is "other urgent humanitarian" projects, cally significant effect on the three outcomes, though
which include small, direct transfers to communities: in secured districts this may be in part due to noise.
primarily goods like tents, food, and fuel, as occasion- These results support the contention that type of
ally cash-for-work schemes. counterinsurgency aid project matters to the strategic
"Protective measures," which are projects most interaction that occurs between insurgents and progov-
closely linked to the counterinsurgent capacity of a ernment forces. Projects that boost the fighting and de-
district, would be expected to provoke the strongest vi- fense capacity of the government and progovernment
olent reaction from insurgents, especially in unsecured forces are heavily and swiftly targeted by insurgents.
districts. We would expect humanitarian projects to At the same time humanitarian projects that are less
provoke little or no insurgent violence, as the projects visible in the short term and do not raise the fighting
are, at least initially, only partially observable, and capacity of the government do not result in any changes
sabotage difficult in practice. Short of attacking the in violence.
communities in punishment or taking the goods given
by American troops, there is little insurgents can do to
directly respond to such a project. Geography of Violence
Table 5 displays the predicted effects of $100,000 per
week in protective measures spending over two and In this subsection I consider several features of geog-
four weeks, while Table 6 shows the same for other raphy that could impact the relationship between aid
and insurgent violence. First, I explore the possibil-
21 The regression tables for healthcare, education, transportation, ity of spillovers among neighboring districts, both of
and telecommunications are reported in Appendix A. violence and counterinsurgent effects of aid. Second,
741
TABLE 7. Main Results Including Neighbor Violen
(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.08** 0.04 0.10

(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
CERP * L.Controlled - 0.07* - 0.05 - 0.15*
(0.03) (0.04) (0.07)
L.Controlled -0.02 -0.04 0.04
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
Neighbor Violence 0.20*** 0.34*** 0.28***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.05)
L.Neighbor Violence 0.09** - 0.04 0.1 5***
(0.03) (0.05) (0.04)
L.CERP -0.05 -0.09** -0.09
(0.03) (0.03) (0.07)
L.CERP * L2.Controlled 0.07 0.14** 0.17*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
L2.Controlled 0.04* 0.07 0.01
(0.02) (0.06) (0.05)
L. Violence 0.15*** 0.56*** 0.38***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
r2 0.22 0.59 0.49
N 49022 49022 49022
Notes : SE clustered at th
included. Outcomes inciden
I consider the
how outcome
the effe
affected by large-scale
effect beyond
of terrain, As
in this
seen case
in T
ISAF's Northern
ing Distr
Afghan
ply line. Last, results
indicated by in
main "neighbor
findings displayed v
two important
results
geograp
are s
tun Southern and Easte
geographic s
the relationsh
trates this fu
Geographic ship Spillovers between
within the bounds
districts of
is weak. There is some evidence in Table 8 i
Afghan districts.
that spending in unsecured districts Nume may drive a small
geographic increase
proximity
in violence in neighboring districts in theto
fol-
tor of conflict
lowing week. breaking
most findings have been
Anselin Strategic Terrain:
and The Northern Distribution
O'Loughlin
2002). Network. A second important geographic consider-
Accordingly, in t
be ation is how particular
concerned that areas of terrain become
insurmore
a nationalor less valuable over the course of a conflict. Themo
guerilla
across case of the Northernboundar
district Distribution Network (NDN) in
ing in one Afghanistan shows how strategic
district interactions betwee
might
districts, progovernment forces and
while atinsurgents thein a local area
district relate to the overall
might affect strategic environment its within
To country and indeed outside
investigate this the country.23que
of "neighbor As the U.S. government
violence" began to increase its military
variables. engagement in Afghanistan in 2008 and 2009,
"Neighbor viothe mi
of violence itary's reliance on supply lines through
among the Pakistan wac
district in a given week
the neighbor measure as
22 One district is excluded due to name matching problems.
sion specification to
23 The Center for Strategic and International sh
Studies (CSIS) has
from neighbor
program on the NDN indistricts
Afghanistan, including a primer report by
neighbor district
Kuchins et al. (2010). level
742
TABLE 8. Effect of CERP Spending on Neighb
(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.01 0.01 -0.01

(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
CERP * L.Controlled - 0.03 - 0.01 - 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.01)
L.Controlled 0.01 -0.04 0.01
(0.01) (0.03) (0.02)
L.CERP -0.01 0.03* 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
L.CERP * L2.Controlled 0.00 - 0.03* 0.00
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
L2.Controlled 0.01 0.08* 0.05
(0.01) (0.04) (0.03)
L.Neighbor Violence 0.23*** 0.67*** 0.63***
(0.02) (0.02) (0.03)
r2 0.40 0.70 0.70
N 49022 49022 49022
Notes : SE clustered at the d

Outcomes incidents per 10,0
identified asis operational

a to key zero effect on violencevulnera
after the NDN
of planning, shipments
start date, except in the case of explosive hazards where v
Network began in
spending tends to increase violence. late F
supplies traveled through
This evidence suggests that aid spending's relevance
into Afghanistan
to the local battlefield can be swamped by viamajor strate- the
Termez, Uzbekistan.
gic changes, like the introduction of a new major supply Fro
route proceeds
line. On the other hand, southeast
in a relatively stable local
through four
environment, aid hasprovinces:
highly significant effects on vio-
Parwan. Fromlence; in the case of Parwan
the Northern Distribution Net- go
country: work provincesto
east before the introduction
Kabul, of the new so
tifying an supply line, CERP on average reduced violence against supp
alternative
was a priority
U.S. troops and against for
all targets, includingcoaliti
bombing
specific timing
against Afghans. and routi
publicly broadcast ahea
part due to the strategic i
supplies that could be su
Mechanisms
groups.
Using the same regression specification as earlier, I While the main results provide strong evidence that
then estimate the effect of CERP spending on the three progovernment aid indeed affects violence in ways that
violence outcomes in the 24-week subsample, a period are consistent with strategic responses from insurgents,
where violence increased dramatically on the whole as it has not been established by what channels this ef-
the NDN came into operation.24 This subset analysis fect manifests. Previous work on the subject (Berman
suffers from a lack of variation in the extent of secured
Shapiro, and Felter 2011) has hypothesized that there
districts in those four provinces during the NDN pe- is an information sharing mechanism, whereby aid ef
riod, meaning that the results are not fully comparable fectively buys information from the citizenry, which
to the main regression specifications. On average, the counterinsurgents then use to snuff out rebels. Recent
districts were secured, so the negative effects of CERPempirical studies provide some evidence for civilian
on violence are consistent with the full-sample effects.
information sharing. Shapiro and Shaver (2015) show
Nonetheless, when looking only at the total effects of evidence in Iraq that civilian casualties causes by coali
CERP spending (not fully accounting for secured vs. tion forces reduce the number of tips received from
unsecured), we see in Table 9 that in the period after the population, while collateral damage from insurgent
20 February 2009 CERP's effect on violence shrinks attacks increases the number of tips. Berman et al.
from an average reduction in violence before the NDN find differential treatment effects for small and large
aid projects, with small projects (<$50,000) having a
24 Details on violence trends in the NDN provinces are presented in larger violence-reducing effect against U.S. troops in
Appendix E. Iraq than large projects. They attribute this to closer
743
TABLE 9. Northern Distribution Network
(1) (2) (3)

Bombings Enemy actions Explosive hazards
CERP -0.04* -0.08*** 0.05

(0.02) (0.01) (0.04)
CERP * Post-ND 0.04*** 0.05*** 0.02***
(0.01) (0.00) (0.01)
Post-NDN 0.02 - 0.00 0.00
(0.02) (0.00) (0.00)
L.Violence - 0.09* - 0.09** - 0.05***
(0.04) (0.02) (0.01)
L.CERP 0.07* -0.03** 0.02
(0.03) (0.01) (0.01)
Districts 45 45 45
r2 0.09 0.24 0.08
N 966 966 966
Notes : SE clustere
Outcomes incident
relations between
the effect of CERP spending on informing by the public
lies, who then
may be slower sha
moving that these data can account for.
Since weTables 11 anddo not
12 display the effects, respectively, of
betweensmall and large CERP projects on the three violence
progove
spect to insurgen
outcomes. It turns out that small projects, rather than
variables that
having a stronger violence reducing effect, wo
in fact in-
ations against
crease the magnitude of attacks in both controlled andi
sible by inform
contested districts, suggesting that small projects, per-
CERP spending.
haps viewed as easier targets for insurgents, actually
and airstrikes aga
attract more insurgent violence (per dollar spent) than
idea is that with better information about rebel loca- large projects. The vast majority of projects are large
ones, however, which is why the large project effects
tions, and the relative immobility of insurgents in the
are about the same as the overall effects.
short term (as shown earlier in this section), progov-
ernment forces will launch more raids and airstrikes to
take advantage of the information advantage. ThosePlacebo Test
attacks must be launched swiftly, before insurgents
find out they have been compromised and move. InIn order to strengthen our belief that the above results
addition, IEDs are often hidden from plain view,are credible, I perform a placebo test.26 This approac
whether on the roadside, in cars, or buried in dirt examines the effect of the treatment, in this case CERP
roads. Tips from civilians as a result of CERP spend-spending, on a dependent variable known to be unaf
ing would allow counterinsurgents to find and defusefected by the causal pathway in question.
these IEDs before they explode. These IEDs may be I estimate the same specifications as presented in
cleared by Afghanistan National Police, Afghanistanmain results (Table 4) with the independent variables
National Security Forces, or international coalition at t - hi, in addition to the independent variables a
troops. t and t- 1. The identifying assumption of the study
Table 10 shows that there is no effect of CERP
is that neither insurgents nor counterinsurgents can
spending on NATO and Afghan Army raids and
anticipate the arrival or departure of CERP funds,
airstrikes against insurgents, nor on IEDs cleared by the treatment as locally random.
rendering
Afghanistan National Security Forces/Police or NATO. Table 13 shows that there is no significant reported
These results provide evidence that neither the byinfor-
the t H- 1 coefficients (reported as F.), providing ev-
mation sharing mechanism nor synched visible mili-for the exogeneity claim with respect to CERP
idence
tary operations explains the changes in violence due
spending, and for the main results in general. While
to CERP spending that we observe in Afghanistan. the lack of statistical significance is noteworthy, th
That said, these results do not rule out black or special
more important evidence from the table is the smal
operations carried out by progovernment forces that
coefficients, indicating the null result is not simply the
may not be captured by the ANSO data. In addition, result of large standard errors or sample size issues
(Imai, King, and Stuart 2008).
25 This variable only captures visible operations by progovernment

forces, and thus excludes black or special operations. 26 Thanks to Andrew Bertoli for the suggestion.
744
TABLE 10. Effect of CERP on NATO Operations
(1) (2) (3)

NATO and Afghan ANP and ANSF NATO
Army Operations IED Clearances IED Clearances
CERP 0.02 0.01 0.00

(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
CERP * L.Controlled -0.02 -0.00 0.01
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
L.Controlled 0.02 0.01 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.00)
CERP -0.01 -0.00 0.01
(0.01) (0.01) (0.00)
L.CERP * L2. Controlled 0.02 0.00 -0.00
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
L2.Controlled 0.00 0.00 0.02*
(0.02) (0.01) (0.01)
L.Operations 0.07*** 0.08*** 0.05*
(0.02) (0.02) (0.02)
r2 0.08 0.10 0.06
N 50292 50292 50292
Note : District and week f
TABLE 1 1 . Only
(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.15+ 0.11 0.05

(0.09) (0.09) (0.05)
CERP * L.Controlled 0.01 0.07 0.05
(0.17) (0.31) (0.21)
L.Controlled -0.01 -0.04 0.06
(0.02) (0.05) (0.05)
L.CERP -0.07 -0.13 0.01
(0.06) (0.07) (0.04)
L.CERP * L2.Controlled 0.06 0.12* 0.17*
(0.04) (0.05) (0.07)
L2.Controlled 0.05 0.31 0.26
(0.13) (0.22) (0.24)
L. Violence 0.16*** 0.59*** 0.44***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.06)
r2 0.21 0.57 0.47
N 50292 50292 50292
Notes : SE clustered at the

Outcome incidents per 10,0
CONCLUSION aid spending provokes insurgents to carry out mor

bombings, as well as live fire attacks against progov
In this article, I show evidence that militaryernment
controlforces.
dictates the effect of aid spending on insurgent It turns
and out that aid does have an insurgent
violenceIn
noninsurgent violence during an active rebellion. reducing effect when distributed in dis-
contrast to previous formulations of the "heartstricts and
already controlled by progovernment military
minds" hypothesis that exclude rebels as strategic
forces, ac-
reducing bombings, attacks against coalition
troops, and IED placements against progovernment
tors, the results indicate that insurgents in Afghanistan
respond to aid spending in contested districtsforces.
throughThis suggests that hearts and minds spend-
violent and nonviolent resistance. In contested districts,
ing does indeed function as a means of solidifying
745
TABLE 12. Only Large Projects (>$50,000)
(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.08" 0.04 0.12

(0.03) (0.03) (0.08)
CERP ł LControlled -0.09" -0.05 -0.20*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.09)
LControlled 0.04* 0.11 0.03
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
L.CERP -0.04 -0.05 -0.13
(0.04) (0.04) (0.10)
L.CERP * L2.Controlled 0.04 0.09 0.17
(0.04) (0.05) (0.11)
L2.Controlled 0.05 0.31 0.26
(0.13) (0.22) (0.24)
L. Violence 0.16*** 0.59*** 0.44***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
r2 0.21 0.57 0.47
N 50292 50292 50292
Notes: SE clustered at the dist

and week fixed effects includ
TABLE 1 3. Placebo Test of Main Results
(1) (2) (3)

F.CERP -0.01 0.03 0.04

(0.02) (0.03) (0.08)
F.CERP * Controlled 0.02 0.03 - 0.03
(0.03) (0.06) (0.08)
Controlled -0.02 0.13 0.04
(0.02) (0.11) (0.09)
CERP 0.09** 0.03 0.06*
(0.03) (0.03) (0.03)
CERP * LControlled - 0.09** - 0.07+ - 0. 1 3***
(0.03) (0.04) (0.04)
LControlled 0.01 -0.17 0.03
(0.02) (0.15) (0.10)
L.CERP -0.05 -0.08* -0.12
(0.04) (0.04) (0.09)
L.CERP * L2.Controlled 0.06 0.11 0.18
(0.04) (0.06) (0.09)
L2.Controlled 0.04* 0.11 0.03
(0.02) (0.06) (0.06)
L. Violence 0.16*** 0.60*** 0.44***
(0.03) (0.06) (0.07)
/2 0.21 0.58 0.47
N 49896 49896 49896
Notes. SE clustered at the dis

Outcome incidents per 10,000
control an
an area after
effect on mi of
taken it.
signed to boo
In addition,ment
this study in
building
of violence depends
in on
contested th a
ing implemented;
changes, human
for ex
746
progovernment supply line,

tween disrupt
scholars and these the ability
groups has of aid
been weak, with
operational NGOs concerned
projects to affect the local conflict that their data may be
environment.
Important policy implications come
used to promote a militaryfrom
or donor aid the anal-
agenda that
would bethe
ysis in this study. First, from negativeperspective
for their operations. In ofaddition,
an in-
cumbent government, aid there spending like
are worries about leaking the
event data in CERP
a way that pro-
gram are unlikely to quickly pacific
puts informants, a contested
staff members, or projects in danger area,
though the data do not allow for
with no real any
benefits to their inferences
mission: keeping aid work-about
the long term impacts. It ers
issafe. Scholars of conflict
worth noting across thethat
social sciences
CERP
was explicitly designed for "quick
should work togetherimpacts," however,
to find ways to build cooperative
with a strong focus on short-term
initiatives that opportunities
allow for data sharing that rather
also produce
actionable
than long-term strategy. That results for
said, humanitarians.
counterinsurgency
aid in areas under progovernment In addition, moving control seems
beyond violence to
as the measure
have a fairly strong force ofprotection and
progress or effectiveness is angeneral
important next paci-
step.
fication effect. Perhaps more Scholars andimportantly
practitioners have longfor policy
considered how to
makers, the analysis of the measure establishment of the
legitimacy, state presence, North-
and control (incum-
ern Distribution Network bent suggests
or insurgent), that
but we havethe relatively
struggled to effectively
small CERP-type aid projects do so in a are
civil war easily
context. overwhelmed
by major battlefield shifts. Military-led
With counterinsurgency
the aforementioned is a global phe-
evidence about the importance nomenon,ofwith active insurgencies taking
pre-existing militaryplace on
control, this implies that while numerous continents.
aid mayAsbe notedaby Harbom and
useful Wal-
sec-
ondary tool to consolidate or lensteen (2007), most
bolster of today's armed
military conflicts are
activities,
it is not capable of supplanting or that
intrastate affairs preceding military
tend to last for years. In recent
operations. years, we have seen insurgencies with direct military
As with other microlevel studies of violence, it is counterinsurgency efforts in nearly 40 countries, rang-
important to ask how well results from Afghanistan ing from Mali to Turkey to Colombia to the Philip-
travel to other contexts (Blattman and Miguel 2010). pines. The results of this study indicate the effect of
While Afghanistan has its peculiarities, the dynam- aid in a local counterinsurgency environment is highly
ics in play in the Afghan case map well onto other contingent on local and national conditions, especially
insurgencies, present and historical. Like most insur- military control, project type, and a changing macros-
gencies, the neo-Taliban war has been asymmetric in trategic situation. While much is still up for debate, we
nature, with progovernment forces maintaining objec- can safely say that there is no single average effect of
tively superior military capabilities. Like Algeria, Iraq, aid on insurgent violence.
Syria, and Vietnam, the government in Afghanistan
has been assisted by an outside military intervention,
SUPPLEMENTARY MATERIAL
as well as by international civilian aid. The insurgents
in Afghanistan have too have attracted foreign fight- To view supplementary material for this article, pleas
ers and support, much like recent cases of insurgent visit http://dx.doi.org/10.1017/S0003055416000356
in Mali, Syria, Chechnya, and Kashmir, and historical
cases like the Cuban expedition in the Congo and the
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Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Contested and Controlled Territory in

Aid as a Tool against Insurgency: Evidence from Cont

INTRODUCTION to the aid debate by highlighting the importance of

war" (1992-1996), the Taliban period (1996-2001), and

contributions to governance was

of Foreign Affairs, and the

Date: 2010 April 25

Incident Narrative: An IED (improvised explosive

for an injured soldier. In order to identify the uni

on the following period. Third, the model also includes

TABLE 4. Main Results

(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.08** 0.05+ 0.10+

Notes : SE clustered at the d

Standard errors for these

In this section I present the main results of the study,

TABLE 5. Protective Measures Projects: Predict

Control Status Weeks After Bombings Enemy Actions Explosive Hazards

Unsecured 2 0.35* 0.97** 0.36

TABLE 6. Humanitarian Projects: Predict

Control Status Weeks After Bombings Enemy Actions Explosive Hazards

Unsecured 2 0.35 0.15 0.27

TABLE 7. Main Results Including Neighbor Violen

(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.08** 0.04 0.10

TABLE 8. Effect of CERP Spending on Neighb

(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.01 0.01 -0.01

Notes : SE clustered at the d

identified asis operational

TABLE 9. Northern Distribution Network

(1) (2) (3)

CERP -0.04* -0.08*** 0.05

25 This variable only captures visible operations by progovernment

TABLE 10. Effect of CERP on NATO Operations

(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.02 0.01 0.00

Note : District and week f

(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.15+ 0.11 0.05

Notes : SE clustered at the

CONCLUSION aid spending provokes insurgents to carry out mor

TABLE 12. Only Large Projects (>$50,000)

(1) (2) (3)

CERP 0.08" 0.04 0.12

Notes: SE clustered at the dist

TABLE 1 3. Placebo Test of Main Results

(1) (2) (3)

F.CERP -0.01 0.03 0.04

Notes. SE clustered at the dis

progovernment supply line,

U.S. Army. 2009b. Handbook Weggelartd,

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