Landmark Cases (1) 5348640

c o m
rs .
k e
r an
o p
LANDMARK CASES
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
©Judiciary Gold Page 1 of 105

Replication or other unauthorized use of this material is prohibited by the copyright laws of India
INDEX
S. No. Contents Page No.

1. Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 03
2. Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 24
3. Indian Penal Code, 1860 46
4. Indian Evidence Act, 1872 54
5. Indian Contract Act, 1872 66
6. Specific Relief Act, 1963 74
7. Limitation Act, 1963 75
8. Sale of Goods Act, 1930 80
m
9. Arbitration 82
10. Tort 84
11.
12.
Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881
Partnership Act
.c o 90
93
rs
13. Transfer of Property Act, 1882 94
14. Hindu Law 98
e
15. Muslim Law 104
an k
p r
To tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE, 1908 - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO. Topics Case Details
Code is designed to facilitate justice and
hence too technical construction of
Sangram Singh v. Election
1. General Principles provisions should not be made. Provisions
Tribunals, 1955
should be construed liberally and technical
objections should not be taken up
The preamble of the code states that the
object of the code is two fold; (1) To
consolidate and (2) to amend the laws
Salem Advocates Bar
relating to the procedure to be followed in
2. Association (II) V. Union of
India, 2005
m
civil courts. It is a procedure designed to
facilitate justice and further its ends; not a
o
penal enactment for punishment and
c
.
penalties.
rs
Code is exhaustive on the matters
specifically dealt in it. However, the
e
legislature is incapable of contemplating all
possible circumstances that may arise in
3.
n
1962
a k
Mahohar Lal v. seth Hiralal, civil litigation therefore, with regard to
those circumstances the court has inherent
powers to act according to principles of
p r justice, equity and good conscience. Such

inherent powers of the court is saved under
section 151 of the code.
4.
To Westarly Dkhar v. Sehekaya

Lyngdoh, 2015
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
In the areas to which the code does not
extend, the courts in such areas shall be
guided by spirit of the code.
The Supreme court has observed that
irregularity in the report of the Local
Ram Lal and others v. Salig
5. commissioner appointed for local
Ram And others 2019
investigation cannot be a ground for
dismissal of a civil suit.
A party4Ocannot
0M be refused relief merely
Jai jai Ram Manhor v. tr-5U3S4R8U6M
because of some mistake, negligence,
6. tr-5D3F4A8G6B
4A0E National Building Material
inadvertence or even infraction of the rule
Supply 1969
of procedure.
The code consolidates and amends the laws
relating to the procedure of the courts of
Prem LalaNahata v. Chandi civil judicature. No Doubt it also deals with
7.
Prasad Sikaria, 2007 certain substantive rights. But it essential
object is to consolidate the law relating to
civil procedure
The term ‘cause of action’ connotes all
State of Madras v. C.P. categories of facts which it is necessary for
8.
Agencies, 1960 the plaintiff to prove, if traversed, in order
to entitle him to a decree in suit.

The word ‘code; includes not only sections
State of U.P. v. C.B. Mishra, but also rules in the First Schedule and
9.
1980 Rules made by High courts amending the
Rules in First Schedule.
‘Cause of action’ is a bundle of facts, which
South East Asia Shipping
with the law applicable to them, gives
10. Co. Ltd. v. Nav Bharat
plaintiff a right to claim relief against the
Enterprises Pvt. Ltd., 1996
defendant.
A preliminary decree is one which declares
the rights and liabilities of the parties
leaving the actual result to be worked out in
Shankar v. Chandrakant
11. DEFINITIONS further proceedings. As a result of the
1995
m
further enquiries pursuant to preliminary
o
decree rights of the parties are fully
determined and final decree is passed.
c
12.
Dhani Ram v. Lala Sri Ram,
1980
rs .
A decree-holder need not necessarily be
plaintiff. A person who is not a party to the
suit but in whose favoure an order capable
k e of execution has been made is also a decree

holder.
The difference between preliminary decree
13.
r an
Renu Devi v. Mahendra
and final decree lies in its purpose. A
preliminary declares the rights and
liabilities of the parties and leaves the actual
o p Singh, 2003 result to be worked out for a later stage.

Final decree determines the rights of the
decree finally and decree is passed in
14.
T Deep Chand v. Land
Acquisition3SOfficer,
tr-5U 4R8U6M
1994
4O 0M
accordance with such determination.
A decision on a matter of administrative
nature is not a decree.
In order to determine whether an order of
the court is a decree or not court must take
Shiv Shakti Cooperation into account the pleadings of the parties and
15. Housing society v. Swaraj the proceedings leadings upto the passing
Developers, 2003 tr-5U3Sof
4Ran
8U6Morder.
4O0MCircumstances under which an
4A0E
order is made should also be taken into
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
account.
There is nothing in the code which prohibits
Phoolchand v. Gopal Lal, the passing of more than one preliminary
16.
1967 decrees if circumstances justify the same
and where it is necessary to do so.
Since passing of preliminary decree is only
a stage prior to passing of final decree, if an
Sital Prasad Saxena v. appeal preferred against a preliminary
17.
Kishori Lal 1967 decree succeeds, the final decree
automatically falls to the ground as there
will be no preliminary decree to support it.

Rachakonda Venkar Rao v. It is a settled law that more than one final
18.
R. Satya Bai, 2003 decree can be passed.
Hansraj Gupta v. Official
Liquidators of Dehradun-
The term ‘suit’ has been defined in the code.
Mussorie Electric
The Supreme court held that ‘suit’ means a
19. Trarnways Co. Ltd., 1933 &
civil proceeding instituted by the
Pandurang Ramchandra v.
presentation of a plaint.
Shantibai Ramchandra,
1989
Liability to pay mesne profits goes with the
actual possession and enjoyment of the
immovable property. but, where the
20.
Lucy Kochuvareed v. P.
Mariappa Gounder, 1979
o m
plaintiff’s dispossession can be regarded as
a joint or concerted act of several persons,
each of them who participates in the
c
rs .
commission of that act would be liable for
mesne profits even though he was not in
actual possession.
21.
Balraj Taneja v. Sunil
Madan, 1999
k e In judgment the whole process of reasoning

has to be set out in deciding the case one
way or the other. It must not merely say
r an ‘suit decreed’ or ‘suit dismissed’.

Defect of jurisdiction goes to the root of the
decree or order A decree passed without
22.
JURISDICTION & SUITS
o
OF CIVIL NATURE
p Kiran Singh v. chaman
Paswan , 1954
jurisdiction is a nullity. Supreme court held
that a decree passed without jurisdiction is
a nullity. A defect of jurisdiction strikes at
23.
T 1969
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
Dhulabhai v. state of M.P.,
the very authority of the court and it cannot
be cured even by the consent of the parties.
Every presumption is made in favour of
jurisdiction of the court, provision of
exclusion of jurisdiction of the courts must
Kamla Mills v. state of be strictly construed. In case of doubt as to
Bombay, 1965 jurisdiction the courts will lean in favour of
jurisdiction.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4A0E
When two or more courts have jurisdiction
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
to entertain a suit, an agreement by the
Hakam Singh v. Gammon
24. parties to submit to the jurisdiction of any
(India) Ltd. 1971
one of such courts to the exclusion of other
is valid and binding
The supreme court interpreted section 17
of the code of C.P. and observed that, a suit
in respect to immovable property or
Shivnarayan (D) by LRS v. properties situate in jurisdiction of different
25.
Maniklal (D) by LRs 2019 courts may be instituted in any court within
whose local limits of jurisdiction, any
portion of the property or one or more
properties may be situated. The

interpretation be understood in a limited
and restrictive sense of being portion of one
property situated in jurisdiction of two
courts.
The jurisdiction of the court has to be
decided on the allegations made by the
Abdulla Bin Ali v. Galappa,
26. plaintiff in the plaint and not on the
985
allegations made by the defendant in the
written statement.
Every court or tribunal is not only entitled
but bound to determine whether the matter
M.S. Hasnuddin v. State of
27. in which it is asked to exercise its
Maharashtra, 1979
not.
c m
jurisdiction comes within its jurisdiction or
o
When a court limited jurisdiction has
28.
LIC v. India Automobiles,
1991
rs .
jurisdiction to decide only a particular
dispute, it has jurisdiction to consider
collateral issue only prima facie and the
Most Rev. P.M.A.
k e jurisdiction of a civil court to decide such

issue finally is not taken away.
29.
r n
Metropolitan v. Moran
a
Marthoma, 1995
Shashi Prakash Khemka
No court refuse to entertain a suit if it is of
the description mentioned in the section 9.
The supreme court observed that the
30.
o p (Dead) Through LRs. V.

NEPC Micon (Now called
NEPC India Ltd.) & Ors.
jurisdiction of the civil court is completely
barred in matters in respect of which power
has been conferred on the National
31.
T 2019
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Corporation, 1993
4O
Shiv Kumar v. Municipal
0M
Company Law Tribunal.
Where statutory enactments only create
rights or liabilities without providing for
remedies, any person having a grievance,
can approach the ordinary civil court on the
principle of law that where there is a right
there is a remedy.
tr-5U3SThe
4R8Uwords
6M4O0M ‘civil nature’ are wider than the
words ‘civil proceedings.’ Section 9 would
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
4A0E Most Rev . P.M.A.
be available in every case where the dispute
32. Metropolitan v. Moran Mat
has the characteristics of affecting one’s
Marthom, 1995
rights Which are not only civil but of civil
nature.
A suit is said to be ‘impliedly barred’ when
it is barred by general principles of law.
Jitendra Nath v. Empire
Where a specific remedy is given by a
33. India and Ceylone Tea CO.
statute, it thereby deprives the person who
1990
insists upon a remedy of any other form
than that given by statute.

Court laid down following principle with
regard to the determination of jurisdiction
:- 1. A Court can be held to have jurisdiction
to decide a particular matter if the court is
Official Trustee v.
34. competent to try the suit and at the same
Sachindra, 1965
time it has jurisdiction to pass the order
sought. 2. Jurisdiction of a court must
include the power to hear and decide the
question in issue.
A person having grievance of civil nature
State of U.P. v. Moradhway
35. has a right to institute a civil suit unless its
Singh 1960
cognizance is expressly or impliedly barred.
m
Supreme court laid down the following
o
guidelines to decide whether a right a
religious office would be a right or civil
c
36.
Sinha Ramanuja v. Ranga
.
nature :- 1. A suit for declaration of
rs
religious honours simpliciter will not lie. 2.
Suit to establish one’s right to an office in a
Ramanuja, 1961
k e
temple and honours, privileges etc. attached
to that office will be maintainable. 3. The
condition for existence of office is that the
r an holder of the office should be under a legal

obligation to discharge the duties attached
to the office
o p Union of India v. Ladlu Lal

Section 20 is designed to ensure that the
defendant should not be put to trouble and
expense of travelling long distance in order
T
37.
Jain, 1963 to defend himself. Section 20 is a residuary
section and covers all the cases not dealt in
4O0M by sections 15-19.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
The policy underlying section 21 of the code
of civil procedure is that when the case has
been tried by a court on merits and the
judgment has been rendered, it should not
be liable
6M4Oto
0Mbe reversed purely on technical
Om Prakash Agrawal v. tr-5U3S4R8U
38. grounds, unless it has resulted in failure of
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
4A0E Vishan Dayal Rajpoot, 2019
justice. If the objections as to territorial or
pecuniary jurisdictions are not taken at the
earliest possible opportunity then it cannot
be allowed to be taken at a subsequent
stage.
Section 21 of the code of civil procedure
makes it clear that an objection as to the
Sneh Lata Goel v. Pushplata,
39. want of territorial jurisdiction does not go
2019
to the root of the jurisdiction. It does not
constitute inherent lack of jurisdiction.
There is difference between inherent lack of
40. Hiralal v. Kalinath, 1962
jurisdiction and mere lack of territorial or

pecuniary jurisdiction. Inherent lack of
jurisdiction goes to the root of the matter.
An objection regarding the lack of territorial
or pecuniary jurisdiction is merely technical
and does not go to the root of the matter.
The power under section 24 does not
authorize a High court to transfer any suit,
Durgesh Sharma v.
41. TRANSFER OF SUITS appeal etc from a court subordinate to that
Jayshree, 2008
High court to a court not subordinate to that
High court.
The power to transfer must be exercised
with extreme caution and circumspection
42.
Arvee Industries v. Ratan
Lal, 1977
o m
and in the interest of justice. The court
while deciding the question must bear in
mind two conflicting interests: (1) the right
c
rs .
of the plaintiff to choose the forum and (2)
the power and duty of the court to assure
fair trial.
k e Balance of convenience is prime

consideration for transfer of a suit. Balance
of convenience is neither convenience of
43.
r an
Indian Overseas Bank v.
Chemical Construction,
plaintiff alone nor of the defendant alone,
but of both. Further, convenience of
witnesses required for a proper trial of the
o p 1979 suit, and, the convenience of the particular

place of trial having regard to the nature of
the evidence on man points involved in the
44.
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
Jitendra Singh v. Bhanu

Kumari, 2008
suit and doctrine of forum convenience are
relevant factors.
Section24 does not prescribe any ground
for ordering the transfer of case. It merely
gives a discretionary power on the court.
The court is required to issue a notice to the
other side before directing the transfer.
Since rule
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
under section 10 applies to the
4O0M
Indian Bank v. Maharashtra trial of the suit and not the institution it
RES
tr-5DSUB
3F4AJUDICE & RES
8G6B4A0E
45. state Coop. Marketing does not precluded the courts from passing
JUDICATA
Federation 1998 interim orders such as grant of injunction,
appointment of receiver etc.
The test for applicability of section 10 is
whether the decision in a previously
Radha Devi v. Deep
46. instituted suit would operate as res judicata
Narayan, 2003
in the subsequent suit. If it is so, the
subsequent suit must be stayed.
The object of section 10 is to prevent the
Pukhraj D. Jain v. G. Gopal, courts of concurrent jurisdiction from
47.
2004 simultaneously trying two parallel suit in
respect of the same matter in issue. The

decree passed in contravention of this
section is not a nullity as it enacts a mere
rule of procedure.
Section 10 would apply only if there is
National Institute Of M.H. &
identity of the matter in issue in both the
48. N.S.. v. C. Parameshwara,
suits. The whole subject matter in both the
2005
suits should be identical.
The principle of res judiciata is based on the
Satyadhyan Ghosal v. need of giving finality to judicial decisions.
49.
Deorijin Debi, 1969 Primarily it applies between past litigation
and future litigation.
Where any matter which might and ought to
50.
Workmen v. Board of
Trustees, Cochin Port Trust,
1978
c o m
have been made a ground of defence or
attack in a former proceeding but was not
so made then such a matter is deemed to
51. Daryao v. State of U.P., 1961 .

have been constructively in issue to avoid
rs
multiplicity of ligation.
Doctrine of res judicata is of universal
k e application and it is a part of rule of law.

A matter may be res judicata between co-
plaintiffs and co0defendants also if the
r an following conditions are satisfied.

➢ The must be a conflict of interest
between co-plaintiffs and co-
52.
o p Iftikar Ahmed v. Syed

defendants;
➢ It must be necessary to decide such
conflict in order to give relief to the
T
Meharban Ali 1974
plaintiff
➢ The questions between co-
4O 0M defendants and co-plaintiffs must
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
be finally decided;
➢ Co-defendants/plaintiffs were
necessary or proper parties in the
former suit.
tr-5U3SLiberty
4R8U6M4O0M granted by court to avail
4A0E
‘appropriate remedies’ to a party does not
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
53. Asgar v. Mohan Verma 2019 bar application of principle of constructive
res judicata when the person invokes such a
remedy.
Rule of res judicata would apply to all
judicial proceedings whether civil
Sulochana Amma v. (including arbitration, taxation etc.) or
54.
Narayana Nair, JT 1993 criminal. It equally applies to all quasi
judicial proceedings of the tribunal’s
administrative order.
Pandurang v. Shantabal, A matter in respect of which no relief is
55.
1989 claimed cannot become ‘directly and

substantially’ in issue, even if a decree is
passed by a competent court.
Where there are findings on several issues
Vithal Yeshwant v. or where the court rests decision on more
56.
Shikandarkhan 1963 than one points, the findings on all issues or
points will be res judicata.
Decision the former suit must have been on
merits and so matter cannot be said to be
finally decided when the former suit was
Sheodhan Singh v. Daryo
57. dismissed by trial court for want of
Kumar, 1966
jurisdiction or for default of plaintiff’s
appearance, or on the ground of non-
m
joinder or mis-joinder of parties etc.
o
The words ‘might and ought’ have wide
c
amplitude. The word ‘might’ conveys the
58.
Forward construction Co v.
Prabhat Mandal, 1986
rs .
idea of possibility of joining all grounds of
attack or defence and ‘ought’ carries the
idea of propriety of so joining. The test is
k e whether the parties had the opportunity of

raising the plea and if they had, the matter
will be treated as actually raised and
59.
r an
State of U.P. v. Nawab
Hussain,
decided.
The general principles of res judicata and
constructive res judicata will be applicable
o p to writ petitions.
Section 11 is not exhaustive. Rules of res
judicata enacted in section 11 have some
60.
T Gulam Abbas v. State of
Uttar Pradesh, 1981
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O 0M
technical aspects. The general doctrine is
founded on considerations of high public
policy to achieve objectives i.e. there must
be finality to litigation and that individual
should not be hasrassed twice over with the
same kind of litigation.
A matter directly in issue in the former suit
Raj Lakshmi Dasi v. tr-5U3Swould
4R8U6Mnot
4O0Moperate as res judicata unless it
61.
4A0E
Banamali Sen, 1953 was also substantially in issue in former
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
suit.
A conjoint reading of section 11 and
Explanation IV shows that a plea which
Konda Lakshmana Bapuji v. might and ought to have been taken in the
62.
Government 2002 earlier suit, shall be deemed to have been
taken and decided against the person
raising the plea in the subsequent suit.
Rules laid down in section 13 are rules of
Sardar Maloji, Nar Singh
63. FOREIGN JUDGMENTS substantive law and not merely procedural
Roa v. Sankar Saran, 1962
law.

Judgment pronounced must be by a
competent foreign court both by law of the
Vishwanathan v. Abdul state which constituted it an in
64.
Wajid 1963 international sense. It must also directly
adjudicate upon the matter which is
pleaded as res judicata.
Foreign judgment in matrimonial matters
will be recognized by India courts, if the
jurisdiction assumed by the foreign court as
Narsimha Rao v. Venkata
65. well as the grounds on which the relief is
Lakshmi 1991
granted is in accordance with the
matrimonial law under which the parties
are married.
o m
The rules of private international law of
each state vary on different things in
c
rs .
different sense but by the comity of nations
certain rules are recognised as common to
civilized jurisdiction. Such recognition is
66. Satya v. Teja Singh, 1975
k e accorded on the considerations of justice,

equity and good conscience. It is well
established principle of public International
r an Law that if a foreign judgment is obtained

by fraud, it will not operate as res judicata.
Fraud vitiates all judicial acts.
o p Swapna Mohanty v. state of

Necessary party is a person whose presence
is necessary in order to effectually and
completely adjudicate upon and settle all
T
Odisha, 2018
issues raised in a dispute. It is a party in
Globe Ground (India)
67. PARTIES TO SUIT absence of whom no effective order can be
Employees Union v.
4O0M made. A proper party is one in whose
Lufthansa
tr-5UGerman
3S4R8U6MAirlines,
absence effective order can be made, but
2019
whose presence is necessary for complete
and final decision.
Supreme court laid down following two
tests to4O0Mdetermine whether a party is
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
necessary party:-
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Kasturi v. Iyyamperunmal i) There must be right to some relief against
68.
2005 such party n respect of the matter involved
in the proceeding in question; and
ii) It should not be possible to pass effective
decree in absence of such a party.
Suprme court has observed that the object
of rule of necessary party is to bring on
Anil Kumar v. Shivnath, record all persons who are parties to the
69.
1995 dispute relating to the subject-matter so as
to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and
inconvenience.

In order to compromise in a representative
Aliyasthammuda suit, it is necessary to obtain leave of the
Beethathebiyyappura court. Before the grant of leave, the court
70.
Pookoya v. Pattakal has to give notice in such manner as it may
Cheriyakoya, 2019 think fit to such person s as may appear it to
be interested in the suit.
The principal consideration that should
weigh with the court in granting permission
Kalyan Singh v. Chhoti, for representative suit is whether it is
71.
1990 satisfied that there is community of interest
to justify the adoption of procedure laid
down in order 1. Rule 8.
72.
Aliyathammuda
Beethathebiyyappura
Pookoya v. Pattakal
m
Supreme court held that a compromise
o
decree in a representative suit obtained
without the leave of the court and without
c
Cheriyakoya and Ors
(2019),
rs
would be void.
.
issuing notice to the parties interested
Embargo in order 2 Rule 2 will arise only of
73. ORDER2 RULE 2

Pramod kumar v. Zalak
Singh2019
k e the claim, which is omitted or relinquished

and the reliefs which are omitted and not
claimed, arise from one cause of action then
r an order 2Rule 2 will not apply

Before the bar of order 2. Rule 2 is invoked
the following three questions are to be
o p asked:-
1. Whether the cause of action in the
previous suit and subsequent suit is
74.
T Kewal Singh v. Lajwanti,
1980
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
identical?
2. Whether the relief claimed in the
subsequent could have given in a previous
suit on the basis of pleadings made in a
plaint?
3. Whether the plaintiff omitted to sue for a
particular relief on the cause of action
which was4O0Mdisclosed in the previous suit?
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Provision relating in civil cases are meant to
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B give each party an intimation of the case of
Ganesh Trading Co. v. Moji
75. PLEADINGS the other so that it may enable the court to
Ram, 1979
determine the real issue between the
parties.
All primary facts which must be proved at
Udhav Singh v. Madhav Rao the trial by a party to establish the existence
76.
Scindia 1976 of a cause of action or defence are material
facts.
Civil suits are decide on the basis of
PONNAYAL v. pleadings and issues framed parties to suit
77.
Karuppannan, 2019 cannot be permitted to travel beyond
pleadings.

‘Material facts’ are fact upon which the
Virendra Nath v. Satpal
78. plaintiff’s cause of action or defendant’s
Singh 2007
defence depends.
In cases of fraud, undue influence and
coercion, full particulars must be set forth in
Raja Ram v. Jai Prakash pleadings and case can only be decided on
79.
Singh, (2019) the particulars as laid. Parties are supposed
to plead precise nature of the influence
unfair advantage obtained by another.
Pleadings should not be construed very
Harish Chandra v. Triloki strictly. They have to be interpreted
80.
Singh 1957 liberally and regard must be had to the
81.
Sath Vijay Kumar v. Tota
c o m
substance of the matter.
The power to strike out pleadings is
extraordinary in nature and must be
Singh 2006
rs .
exercised by the court sparingly and with
extreme caution.
Supreme court, held that while considering
82.
M. Revanna v. Anjanamma
k e the amendment application

commencement of trial the courts have to
after
consider whether it is bona fide or mala fide
r an
2019
and whether it causes such prejudice to the
other side which cannot be compensated
adequately in terms of money.
83.
o p The merits of the amendment sought to be

Usha Devi v. Rijwan Ahmad, incorporated by way of amendment are not
2008 to be judged at the stage of allowing prayer
84.
T M/S M tr-Laxmi 8U6M
And
5U3S4R
4O 0M
Co. v. Dr.
Anand R. Deshpande, 1973
for amendment.
While considering amendment application
the courts can take notice of subsequent
event to shorten the litigation, preserve
rights of both parties and to sub-serve ends
of justice
The power to grant amendment is not
governed
3S4R8U6M4O0Mby technical limitations A.
Jai Jai Ram Manoharlal v. tr-5U
85. amendment of plaint for the purpose of
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
4A0E National Building Co. 1969
rectification of the mis-description of the
name of the party is allowable.
Court should be extremely liberal in
Haridas Alidas Thadani v
granting prayer of amendment of pleadings
86. Godrej Rustom Kermani
unless serious injustice or irreparable loss
1983
is caused to the other side.
Amendment of plaint to rectify inadvertent
procedural mistake by advocate describing
Varun Pahwa v. Renu
87. parties in cause title of suit/ memo of
Chaudhary, 2019
parties is permissible, Rules of procedure
cannot defeat substantive rights of parties.

Leave to amend may be refused if it
introduces a totally different, new and
inconsistent case or challenges the
fundamental character of the suit.
M. Revanna v. Anjanamma,
88. The burden is on the person who seeks an
2019
amendment after commencement of trial to
show that in spite of due diligence, such an
amendment could not have been sought
earlier
When the plaint is filed in the proper court
after getting returned from the wrong court,
ONGC v. Modern
89. it cannot be said to be continuation of suit.
Construction Co., 2014
m
The suit must be deemed to commence
o
when a plaint is filed in the proper court.
Supreme court held that plaint can either be
c
90.
.
rejected as a whole or not at all. It is not
rs
Madhav Prasad Aggarwal vs permissible to reject plaint qua any
Axis Bank 2019 particular portion of a plaint including
Shaukat Hussain Mohd.
k e against some of the defendant(s) and

continue the same against the others.
While dealing with the application for
91.
r an
Patel v. Khatunben
Mohmmedbhai polara,
2019
rejection of plaint, entirety of plaint
averments have to be taken into
consideration.
o p The Supreme court has observed that a

plaint can be rejected order VII Rule 11 of
the code of civil procedure, when it is
92. T Colonel Shrawan Kumar
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
Nandan Singh and another
2019
manifestly vexatious, meritless and
Jaipuriyar @ Sarwan Kumar groundless, in the sense that it does not
Jaipuriyar v. Krishna disclose a clear right to sue. A mere
contemplation or possibility that a right
may be infringed without any legitimate
basis for that right, would not be sufficient
to hold that the plaint discloses a cause of
action. 4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
The Supreme court has observed that a
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Raghwendra Sharan Singh plaint can be rejected under order 7 Rule 11
93. v. Ram Prasanna singh (d) (d) of the code of civil procedure, if by
through Lrs, 2019 considering the averments, it is found that
the suit is clearly barred by law of limitation
The grounds for rejection of plaint specified
in 0.7. R. 11 are not exhaustive. A plaint can
Mayar H.K. Ltd. v. Owners
be rejected on other relevant grounds also.
94. and parties, Vessel M.V.
Where the plaint is found to be vexatious or
Fortune Express, 2006
meritless, not disclosing a clear right to sue,
the court may reject the plaint.

Only a part o the plaint cannot be rejected
Roop Lal sath v. Nachhatter
95. and if no cause of action is disclosed, the
Singh Gill, 1982
plaint as a whole must be rejected.
Shaukathussain Mohammed The entirety of the averments in the plaint
Patel v. Khatunben have to be taken into account while
96.
Mohmmedbhai polara, considering a plea seeking rejection of
2019 plaint
Re-presentation of petition in court which is
Oriental Insurance Co. Ltd. indicated in order for return of plaint
97. Tejparas Associates and cannot be considered as fresh filing in all
Exports (p) Ltd, 2019 circumstances when it is returned to
plaintiff for such re-presentation.
Kailash v. Nankhu, 2005

m
Outer time limit of 90 days for filing the
o
written statement is not mandatory. Court
c
can extend the time for filing written
98.
Salem Advocate Bar
Association (2) v. Union of
India 2005
rs .
statement beyond 90 days but it should only
be done in an exceptional circumstances
and routine orders cannot be passed. The
k e court harmoniously constructed 0.8 R. 1,9

and 10.
Clear definite and mandatory provisions of
r an order 5 Rule 1 r/w order 8 Rule 1 and 10

CPC [as amended for suits relating to
commercial disputes of specified value by
o p SCG Contracts (India) (P)

Act 4 of 2016] cannot be circumvented by
recourse to inherent power under section
151 CPC.
99.
T Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar

Infrastructure (p) Ltd.,
2019
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
The Supreme court observed that proviso
added to the code of civil procedure by
Commercial Courts, commercial Division
and Commercial Appellate Division of High
courts Act, 2015, is mandatory and no
written statement can be taken on record in
commercial suits, if it is not filed within 120
days from the date of service of summons of
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
the suit.
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B The Supreme court has held that a court can
exercise its discretion and permit the filing
of a counter-claim after the written
Ashok kumar Kalra v. wing
statement, till the stage of framing of the
100. Cdr Surendra Agnihotri and
issues of the trial. Order VIII Rule 6A of the
others, 2019
CPC does not pose an embargo on filing the
counter-claim after filing the written
statement.
APPEARANCE & NON- If the court is satisfied that there was
Madhumilan Syntex Ltd. V.
101. APPEARANCE OF sufficient cause for the non-appearance of
Union of India, 2007
PARTIES the plaintiff, the court may set-aside the

order of dismissal and fix a day for
proceeding with the suit.
The words ‘sufficient cause’ must be
liberally construed to enable the court to
exercise power ex debito justite. ‘Sufficient
cause’ for the purpose of 0.9 R.13 has to be
construed as elastic expression for which no
G.P. Srivastava v. R.K.
102. hard or fast rule can be laid down. The
Raizada 2000
material date for deciding the ‘sufficient
cause’ for non-appearance by the defendant
is the date on which ex parte decree was
passed and not his previous negligence or
Arjun Singh v. Mohinder

past defaults
o m
There is no material difference between
facts established for satisfying the two tests
c
103.
Kumar, 1964
rs .
of ‘good cause’ under 0.9 R. 7 and ‘sufficient
cause’ under 0.9 R. 13. There cannot be a
‘good cause’ which is not ‘sufficient’.
104.
Sangram Singh v. Election
k e Ex parte proceedings do not mean that

defendant cannot be allowed to appear at all
in subsequent proceedings of the suit. It
r an
Tribunal, Kotah, 1955
only relates to the particular day of hearing
on which the defendant remains absent.
The Supreme court observed that a decree
105.
o p G. Ratna Raj by LRs v. Sri

Muthukumaraswamy
passed after taking plaintiff’s evidence,
without the appearance of defendant at the
trial stage, is an ex-parte decree. Such a
T
Permanent Fund Ltd., 2019
decree could be set aside under order IX
Rule 13 of the code of civil procedure
4O0M Executing court cannot travel beyond the
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
S. Bhaskaran v. Sebastain scope of decree or order. Any order passed
106. EXECUTION
2019 by the executing court by travelling beyond
the decree or order is without jurisdiction.
The Supreme court observed that an
tr-5U3Sexecuting
4R8U6M4O0Mcourt has no jurisdiction to decide
4A0E
whether the court which passed the decree
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
Sneh Latha Goel v. had territorial jurisdiction. An objection to
107.
Pushplata 2019 the want of territorial jurisdiction does not
travel to the root of or to the inherent lack
of jurisdiction of a civil court to entertain
the suit.
Supreme court observed that it is not
Sir Sobha Singh and sons
necessary to file a copy of the decree along
Pvt Ltd v. Shashi Mohan
108. with execution application unless the court
Kapur (d) through LRs
directs the decree holder to file a certified
2019
copy of the decree.

The supreme court has reiterated a settled
s. Bhaskaran v. Sebastian proposition that an executing court cannot
109.
(Dead) through LRs 2019 travel beyond the order or decree under
execution
The court which actually passed the decree
Merla Ramanna v. does not lose its jurisdiction to execute it by
110.
Nallaparaju, 1956 reason of the subject matter being
transferred to another court’s jurisdiction
A court executing a decree cannot go behind
the decree and must execute it as it stands.
It has no power to entertain any objection
as to the validity, legality or correctness of
Kiran Singh v. Chaman
111.
Paswan, 1954
o m
the decree. In case of inherent lack of
jurisdiction the decree of the court is a
nullity and its invalidity can be enforced,
c
rs .
whether in execution or collateral
proceedings.
It is the duty of the court which passed the
112.
Ghantesher v. Madan
k e decree to get it executed with the view to

see that rights and obligations flowing from
such decree is finally complied with. Till
r an
Mohan 1997
that stage is reached, the court which
passed the decree does not become functus
officio.
113.
o p State of Punjab v. Dina Nath,

1984
The proviso to section 60(1) is in the nature
of exception to the general rule laid down in
the main provision.
114. T
SPECIAL SUITS
Raghunath Das v. Union of
India, Bihari Chowdhary
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
state of Bihar, 1969
4O 0Mv.
The Primary object of the notice under
section 80 is to afford an opportunity to the
Government or public officer to settle the
claim put forward by the prospective
plaintiff and to avoid unnecessary litigation.
Notice under section 80(1) of civil
Y. Savarimuthu v. state of procedure code does not have to state the
115.
Tamil Nadu, 2019 tr-5U3Ssection
4R8U6M4O in0M
which it is made so long as the
4A0E
ingredients of section 80(3) are met.
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
The object of notice under section 80 is to
give to the government or public servant an
Bihar Chowdhary v. state of opportunity to reconsider the legal position
116.
Bihar, 1984 and to make amends if necessary to avoid
litigation. The object of section 80 is
advancement of justice.
The expression ‘act’ also includes illegal
Pukhraj v. state of omissions, if the suit relates to the act done
117.
Rajasthan 1973 by public officer in his individual capacity,
no notice is required.

The Supreme court has held that rejection
of application by a plaintiff under order 33
Rule 1 of the code of civil procedure
(seeking permission to institute the suit as
an indigent person) by the trial court in the
Sushil Thomas Abraham v.
118. earlier round of litigation is not a bar
M/s Skyline Builders, 2019
against the plaintiff to file an application/
appeal under order 44 Rule 1 of the code
and seek permission from the appellate
court to allow him to file an appeal as an
indigent person.
Ram Chandra Arya v. Man If a decree is passed against a minor without
119.
Singh and others, 968
Union Bank of India v. m

appointing a guardian the decree is nullity.
o
The word ‘persons’ mentioned in O.33 R. 1
should b given liberal interpretation. It
c
120. Khader International
construction 2001
rs .
must refer to natural persons as well as
legal persons. A public limited company can
very well maintain the application under
k e this provision.
Supreme court held that a prima facie case
does not mean a case proved to the hilt but
121.
TEMPORARY
INJUNCTIONS
r an
Martin Burn Ltd. v. R. N.
Banerjee 1958
a case which can be said to be established if
the evidence which is led in support of the
same were believed.
122.
o p Manohar Lal Chopra v. Seth

Supreme court held that even if the case is
not covered under the grounds mentioned
in order 39 interim injunction can be
T
Hiralal, 1962
granted by the court in exercise of inherent
powers under section 151 of the code.
4O0M Supreme court observed that a person can
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
U.C. Surendranath v.
123. be held guilty of willful disobedience’ but
Mambally’s Bakery 2019
only for ‘willful disobedience’
Supreme court laid down following factors
which must guide the court before granting
tr-5U3Sex parte interim injunction:
4R8U 6M4O 0M
4A0E
a) whether the refusal of ex parte interim
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
injunction would involve a greater injustice
than the grant of it would involve;
Morgan Stanley Mutual b) The court would expect utmost good
124.
Fund v. Kartick Das 1994 faith from the party applying for grant of ex
parte interim injunction;
c) General principles like prima facie case,
balance of convenience and irreparable loss
would also be considered by the court;
e) Even if ex parte interim injunction is
granted it would be for a limited period.

Interim mandatory injunction can only be
granted in circumstances which are clear
and the prima facie material clearly justify a
finding that the status quo has been altered
Samir Narayan Bhojwani v.
by one of the parties and the interest of the
125. Aurora Properties and
justice demands that the status quo ante be
Investment 2018
restored.
The moulding of relief can be considered at
the time of consideration of final relief and
not at the interlocutory stage.
When a court restrains a party to a suit or
Modi Entertainment proceedings before it from instituting or
126. Network v. W.S.G. Cricket,
2003
o m
prosecuting a case in another court
including a foreign court it is called ‘anti-
suit injunction.’
c
127.
Manohar Lal v. Seth Hiralal
1962
rs .
When the case is not covered by order 39,
interim injunction can be granted by court
in exercise of inherent power under section
128. APPEALS v. Municipal Corporation,
k
Gujarat Agro Industries Ltd.
e 151 of the code.
Appeal is a creature of statute and it is not
r an
1999
an inherent right.
Supreme court held that the right of appeal

under section 96(2) CPC is a statutory right
129.
o p Bhivchandra Shankar More

vs. Balu Gangaram 2019
and the defendant cannot be deprived of the
statutory right of appeal merely on the
ground that the application filed by him
130.
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
R.S. Anjayya Gupta v.
Thippaiah Setty 2019
4O0M
under order IX Rule 13 CPC has been
dismissed
In first appeal the parties have the right to
be heard on both question of law as well as
on facts. The court is required to address
itself to all the aspects and decide the case
by ascribing reasons.
Tek Singh v. Shashi Verma, tr-5U3SSupreme

4R8U6M4O0M court reiterated that revision
131. petitions filed under section 115 are not
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
4A0E (2019)
maintainable against interlocutory orders.
Where a review petition is dismissed, the
doctrine of merger will have no application
whatsoever. It is one thing to say that the
Manohar Shankar Nale v. judgment debtor was entitled to file an
132. Jaipalsing shivlalsing application for review in Terms of S. 114
Rajput, 2008 read with O. 47 , R, 1 of C.P.C. But another
thing to say that the decree passed in favour
of the decree holder merged with the order
dismissing the review application

Interference with the concurrent findings of
facts by High court in second appeal is
permissible when the material or relevant
Thulasidhara v.
133. evidence not considered or when the
Narayanappa, (2019)
findings are arrived at by relying on
inadmissible evidence by the first appellate
court.
Formulation of substantial question of law
Thulasidhara v.
134. is sine qua non for exercising jurisdiction in
Narayanappa, 2019
second Appeal.
In second Appeal the High court cannot
substitute its own opinion for that of the
Gurnam Singh v. Lehna m

first appellate court, unless it finds that the
o
conclusions drawn by the lower court were
erroneous being:-
c
135.
Singh 2019
the law
rs .
1) Contrary to the mandatory provisions of
2) Contrary to the law as pronounced by the
k e Supreme court
3) Based on inadmissible evidence or on
evidence.
r an Exercise of power by High court in second

Appeal: principles summarized:-
1) Second appeal can be entertained only
o p when the High court is satisfied that the

case involves ‘substantial question of law’.
2) Once the High court is satisfied that there
136.
T Narayana 3S4R8U6Mv.4O
Gramani
tr-5U
Mariammal, 2018
0M
is ‘substantial question of law’, It shall frame
it and then issue notice to the respondent.
3.) Jurisdiction of the High court is
restricted only to decision on such
‘substantial question of law’.
4) Any finding on issue without framing the
substantial question of law on that issue
would render
4O0M it without jurisdiction.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
5) Generally the ‘substantial question of
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B law’ is framed in the absence of the
respondent. He is given the liberty to urge
that the case does not involve substantial
question of law.
The Supreme court held that High court is
under an obligation to frame substantial
Sreedevi & Ors v. Sarojam &
137. question of law, while considering a second
Ors, 2019
Appeal even if lower court’s findings are
perverse per se.
The supreme court has observed that a High
State of Rajasthan v. Shiv
138. court cannot dismiss a second appeal
Dayal 2019
merely on the ground that that there is a

concurrent finding of two courts (whether
of dismissal or decreeing of the suit), and
thus such finding becomes unassailable.
The Supreme court has observed that mere
error in framing a question of law would not
Illoh Volappil Ambunhi (d) render a judgment in second Appeal liable
139. through Lrs v. Kunhambu to be set aside, if it is found that a
Karnavan substantial question of law existed and such
question has in fact been answered by the
High court.
The object of section 97 is to prevent
preliminary questions being raised in the
140.
Sital Prasad v. Kishori Lal,
1967
o m
form of appeal after a case has been decided
on merits. Since passing of preliminary
decree is only a stage prior to the passing of
c
rs .
final decree, if an appeal is preferred against
a preliminary decree succeeds, the final
decree automatically falls to the ground.
k e Supreme court laid down the following

principles regarding ‘substantial question
of law’-
141.
r an
Chunnilal Mehta v. Century
Spinning and Mgf. Co. Ltd.,
1962
1. If the question is of general public
importance, or it directly and substantially
affects the rights of the parties
o p 2. It is an open question, that is to say it is

not finally settled by Supreme court privy
council or Federal court.
142. T Pandurang Ramchandra

Mandli v. Maruti
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
Ramchandra Ghatge, 1966
An erroneous decision on a question of law
reached by the subordinate court which has
no relation to the question of jurisdiction of
that court, cannot be corrected by High
court under section 115.
A decree passed by a court of higher grade
Kiran Singh v. Chaman
143. MISCELLANEOUS is a mere irregularity covered by section 99
Paswan, 1954
and it is4O
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
not
0Ma nullity.
4A0E
The supreme court while examining the
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
scope of Rule 1A of order XXIII CPC
observed that, if the plaintiff is seeking to
withdraw or to abandon his claim under
R Dhanasundari @ R Rule 1 of order XXIII and the defendant
144. Rajeswari v. A.N. Umakanth seeking transposition is having an interest
and others, in the subject-matter of the suit and
thereby, a substantial question to be
adjudicated against the other defendant,
then the defendants can be transposed as
plaintiffs

The supreme court has reiterated that, in a
Gurmit Singh Bhatia v. suit, the plaintiff is the dominus litis and
145. Kiran Kant Robinson and cannot be forced to add parties against
others, 2019 whom he does not want to fight unless there
is a compulsion of the rule of law.
The Supreme court has observed that the
Mayandi v. Pandarachamy decree against plaintiffs by default bars
146.
and another 2019 fresh suit on the same cause of action by
their successor in title.
The Supreme court has observed that the
provisions of section 144 of the code of civil
procedure will not be attracted when there
147.
Bansidhar Sharma (Since
Deceased) v. The state of
Rajasthan 2019
o m
is no variation or reversal of a decree or
order. The principle of doctrine of
restitution is that on the reversal of a
c
rs .
decree, the law imposes an obligation on the
party to the suit who received the benefit of
the decree to make restitution to the other
Indian Bank v. Maharashtra
k e party for what he has lost.

A court has inherent power to ‘consolidate’
different suits between the same parties in
148.
r an
state Coop. Marketing
Federation Ltd. 1998
which the matter in issue is substantially
the same.
The report of the commissioner would
o p furnish prima facie evidence of the facts and

data collected by the commissioner It will
Tushar Kanti v. Savitri Devi, constitute an important piece of evidence
T
149.
1996 and cannot be rejected except on sufficient
ground. It would be open to the court to
4O0M consider what weight is to be attached to
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
the data collected by the commissioner.
The sole object behind the order of
attachment before judgment is to give
assurance to the plaintiff that his decree if
Sardar Govindrao v. Devi tr-5U3Smade
4R8U6Mwould
4O0M be satisfied. It is a sort of
150.
Sahai, 1982 guarantee against the decree becoming
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B infructous for want of property available
from which the plaintiff can satisfy the
decree.
A court passing a compromise decree
performs a judicial act and not a ministerial
act. Therefore, the court must satisfy itself
Banwari Lal v. Chando Devi,
151. that the agreement is lawful and it can pass
1993
a decree in accordance with it an decree can
be enforced against all the parties to the
compromise.
Shankar v. Balakrishna A compromise decree is not a decision on
152.
1954 merits and it cannot be said that the case

was; heard and finally decided’ it is based
on consent and therefore, will operate as
‘estoppel’.
Supreme court held that a transferee
pendent lite has locus standi to file an
Menka Gupta v. Umashree
153. application seeking substitution of the
Devi 2019
original defendant who filed a petition to set
aside ex parte decree under order 9 Rule 13.
Supreme court observed that ‘Judgment on
Hari steel and General
Admission’ can be ordered only when there
154. Industries Ltd. v. Daljit
are categorical and unconditional
Singh, 2019
admissions made in the pleadings.
155.
Dharma Singh v. Prem
Singh, 2019
o m
Enteries in the revenue records can be
challenged on the ground that it was made
c
fraudulently or surreptitiously.
rs .
Court enumerated the case in which ADR
Processes can be resorted to:-
1. All cases relating to trade commerce and
k e contracts
2. All case arising from strained
relationship, such as matrimonial cases.
156.
r an
Afoons Infrastructure Ltd. v.
Cherian Varkey
Constructions Co (p) Ltd.,
3. All cases where there is need for
continuance of pre-existing relationships.
4. All cases relating to tortuous liability,
o p 2010 including motor accidents claims

5. All consumer disputes.
Civil courts should invariably refer cases
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
falling in above category to ADR processes.
Only in certain recognized excluded
categories the court need not refer to ADR
Process.
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE, 1973 - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO Topics Case Details

Provisions of the code are to be interpreted in
Shivjee Singh v.
GENERAL light of recognized principles of construction
1. Nagendra Triwari,
PRINCIPLES that procedural laws are meant for doing
2010
substantial justice
1) Mowu v.
Superintendent
special Jail,
Nowgong Assam
Supreme court held that though the provisions
2.
1971
2) Saptawana v.
state of Assam
m
of Cr. P.C. are not applicable in certain districts
o
of the state of Nagaland, it only means that the
c
rules of Cr.P.C. would not apply but the
1972
3) Naga People’s
movement of
of these rule
rs .
authorities would be governed by the substance
Human Rights v.
Union of India
1998
k e
3.
r an
Extra-judicial
Execution Victim
Families Assn v.
Other enactments which prescribe procedure
would not be affected by the Cr.P.C. if such
o p Union of India
2016
statute specifically provides for the applicable
procedure and derogates from the code.
T
Default sentence must be in excess of or in
Sharad Hiru
addition to the substantive sentence,
4. POWER OF COURTS Kolambe v. State of
concurrent running of default sentence inter se
Maharashtra 2018 4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M or with substantive sentence is not permissible
The Supreme court held that it is a mandatory

Gagan Kumar v. legal requirement to specify whether sentences
5. state of Punjab, awarded to an accused convicted for two or
2019 more5Uoffences, 4Owould
0M run concurrently or
tr- 3S4R8U6M
4A0E
consecutively.
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
A civil judge cannot be invested with the powers
Premnath v. State of additional sessions judge unless he is
6.
of Rajasthan 1967 appointed as Additional sessions judge under
section 9 of the code.
Judgments pronounced by sessions judge
Gokarau v. cannot be challenged on the ground that his
7.
Rangaraju, 1981 appointment was subsequently held to be
invalid
Social Action 1) The law of arrest is one of balancing
8. ARREST
Forum for Manav individual rights liberties and privileges, on one

Adhikar v. Union hand and individual Duties, obligations and
of India, 2018 responsibilities on the other hand.
Amesh kumar v. 2) No arrest can be made in a routine manner on
state of Bihar 2014 a mere allegation of commission of an offence
made against a person.
3) No arrest should be made without reasonable
satisfaction reached after some investigation
and a reasonable belief both as to the person’s
complicity and even so as to the need to effect
arrest.
4) A person accused of offence punishable with
imprisonment for a term which may be less than
m
seven years or which may extend to seven years
o
with or without fine, cannot be arrested by the
c
police unless conditions mentioned in section
rs .
41(1)(b) have been fulfilled.
Custody and arrest are not synonymous terms.
e
In every arrest there is custody but not vice-
versa. Custody may amount to arrest in certain
9.
State of Haryana v.
n
Dinesh kumar,
a
2008 k
cases but not in all cases. custody in physical
control or presence of accused in court coupled
with submission to the jurisdiction of the court.
p r A person can be in custody when police arrests

him or when he surrenders before the court.
10.
To Joginder Kumar v.
state of U.P. 1994
Sheela Barse
tr-5U3Sv.
The registration OF FIR and arrest of accused
person are two different things. It is not correct
to say that merely because FIR is registered the
accused can be arrested.
4R8U6M Supreme
4O 0M
court held that accused person must
11. state of be informed by Magistrate about his right to be
Maharashtra, 1983 medically examined.
Police officers were directed not to
automatically arrest
4O0M
where a case is registered
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
under section 498-A IPC and also in case where
4A0E Amesh kumar v.
tr-5D3F4A8G6B offence is punishable with imprisonment for a
12. state of Bihar,
term which may be less than seven years or
2014
which may extend to 7. They have to satisfy
themselves about the necessity for arrest under
the parameters laid down in section 41, Cr. P.C.
Provisions contained in sections 125-128 are
Nanak Chandra v.
applicable to all person belonging to all religions
13. MAINTENANCE Chandra Kishore,
and have to relationship with personal law of
1969
the parties.
Yamunatbai v. Supreme court held that a wife, who has been
14.
Anantrao, 1988 divorced by the husband, on the ground that the

Savitaben v. state wife has deserted him, is entitled to claim
of Gujarat 2005 maintenance under section 125 of the code of
criminal procedure.
Woman who is in marriage like relationship,
though not legally married, can claim
maintenance, the court held that not all live-in
relationship will amount to relationships in
fulfil following conditions:-
D. Velusamy v. D.
a) The couple must hold themselves out to
15. Patchaiammal,
society as akin to spouses;
2010
b) They must be of legal age to marry:
c) They must be otherwise qualified to enter
into a legal marriage;
o m
d) They must have voluntarily cohabited for a
c
.
significant period of time.
rs
Vijay Manohar v.
Daughter whether (married or not) would also
16. Kashi Rao Raja
be liable to pay maintenance.
e
Ram, 1987
The phrase “Unable to maintain herself” would
17.
an
Chaturbhuj v. sita
Bai 2008 k
man that means available to the deserted wife
while she was living with her husband and
would not take within itself the efforts made by
p r the wife after desertion to survive somehow.

For fulfilling true spirit of beneficial legislation
18.
To Kamala v. M. R .
Mohan Kumar
2019
of section 125 Cr. P.c. strict proof of marriage is
not required. Long cohabitation between
woman and man may lead to presumption of
marriage entitling maintenance for woman and
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M children born to them. This presumption is a
rebuttable presumption.
In deciding the quantum of maintenance of wife
under section 125 Cr. P.C the wife is entitled in
Reema Salkan v
law to lead life in a similar manner as he would
19. sumer singh tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
have lived in house with her husband. It is a
4A0E salkan,
tr-5D3F4A8G6B statutory obligation of husband to see that the
wife does not become destitute.
Before ordering for use of force to disperse
unlawful assembly Magistrate needs to satisfy
himself that:-
PREVENTIVE Anita Thakur v. 1. There is an unlawful assembly with object of
20.
ACTION state of J & K. 2016 committing violence or assembly of five or more
persons likely to cause disturbance to public
peace; 2. Executive Magistrate must order for
unlawful assembly to disperse; and

3. Even after such order unlawful assembly does
not disperse
The investigation of offence generally consists
of
i) Proceeding on the spot;
ii) Ascertainment of facts and circumstances of
the case
iii) Discovery and arrest of offence;
H.N. Rishbud v.
21. INVESTIGATION iv) Collection of evidence relation to the
state of Delhi 1955
commission of the offence. It may consist of
examination of various persons and search and
seizure of various things
o m
v) Formation of opinion whether on the basis of
materials collected the accused has committed
c
.
the offence or not.
rs
The purpose of FIR is:
i) To set the criminal law in motion
Habib v. state of
e
22. ii) To obtain early information of the alleged
Bihar, 1972
offence from the informant and put into writing
an
State of U.P. v. k
before his memory fades.
Delay in lodging FIR is normally viewed with
suspicion because of possibility of concoction
23.
p rRaghuvir, 2018 and court subject the evidence with close

scrutiny.
24.
To State of M.P. V.
Chhaakki 2019
Satpal v. state of
Haryana 2018
Latesh v.tr-state
5U3S4Rof
FIR is not an encyclopedia requiring every
minute details of occurrence to be mentioned
therein.
8U6M4O0M
Maharashtra, 2018
Sunil Khergade v. First information report need not necessarily
25. state Maharashtra, contain details of each and every injury
2016 sustained by the4Odeceased
0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Motiram padu Omission as to the names of assailants or
4A0E
26. tr-5D3F4A8G6B joshi v. state of witnesses may not at all times be fatal to the
Maharashtra 2018 prosecution if the FIR is lodged without delay
Soma bhai v. State Even telephonic message if it discloses a
27.
of Gujarat, 1973 cognizable offence may constitute FIR.
In order for the Information to be qualified as an
Patai alias Krishna FIR there must be something in the nature of
kumar v. state of complaint or accused regarding commission of
28.
Uttar Pradesh a cognizable offence. A cryptic message
2010 recording an occurrence cannot be termed as an
FIR.

The word information’ in section 154 is not
qualified by the term ‘reasonable’. By omitting
State of Haryana v.
29. the word ‘reasonable’ and credible’ the intent of
Bhajan Lal 1992
legislature is clear that no discretion is given to
the police to lodge the FIR.
Preliminary inquiry before registration of FIR
Social Action may be held in cases relating to matrimonial/
Forum for Adhikar family disputes. Preliminary inquiry does not
30.
v. Union of India, mean to verify the veracity if information but to
2018 ascertain whether the information discloses any
cognizable offence
Gajanan Dashrath The object of insisting upon prompt registration
31.
Kharate v. state of
o m
of FIR is to obtain early information not only
Maharashtra, 2016 regarding the accused but also the part played
c
.
Mukesh v. State of by the accused, nature of incident and name of
rs
NCT of Delhi 2017 witnesses.
FIR is an important document and it sets the
Damodarprasad v.
e
criminal law in motion. It is not a substantive
32. state of
piece of evidence i.e. evidence of the facts
Maharashtra 1972
an k
recorded in it.
FIR can used to corroborate the information
Aghnoo Nagesia v. under section 157 of Indian Evidence Act
33.
p rstate of Bihar,
1966
(Evidence Act) or to contradict under section
145 of Evidence Act if the informant is called as
34.
To State of Orissa v.
Sharat Chandra
Sahu 1996
witness at the time of trial.
While investigating a cognizable offence, police
are not debarred from investigating any non-
cognizable offence arising from the same facts.
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M Section 156(2) makes it clear that any
H. N. Rishbud v.
35. irregularity in investigation will not vitiate the
state of Delhi 1955
trial.
Even if an FIR has been registered and even if
the police 8Uhas 4O
made
0M the investigation, or is
tr-5U3S4R 6M
actually making the investigation which the
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Dilawar Singh v. aggrieved person feels is not proper, such a
36.
state of Delhi 2007 person can approach the Magistrate under
section 156(3) and if the Magistrate is satisfied,
he can order a proper investigation and take
suitable steps
Srinivas Gundluri
v. SEPCO Electric Even if a complaint is filed then also Magistrate
37. power instead of taking cognizance on complaint can
construction order investigation under section 156(3).
corpn. 2010

A. R. Antulay v. R.S.
Nayak, 1992 The court shall not interfere in the investigation
38. P. Ramchandra proceedings as that is the prerogative of the
Rao v. state of executive
Karnataka 2002
Suresh Chandra
Supreme court held that the Magistrate has the
Jain v. state of
39. authority to treat application under section
Madhya Pradesh
156(3) as a complaint.
2001
State of Rajasthan The purpose of ‘forthwith’ communication of
40. v. Daud Khan, the information is to check the possibility of
2016 manipulation.
41.
Bathula
Nagamalleswara
o m
The conjoint reading of section 157 and 159
clearly postulates that the purpose of sending
c
.
the occurrence report is to avoid possibility in
Rao v. state, 2008
rs
improvement of prosecution story
Area covered by Article 20(3) and section
42.
Nandani Satpathy
v. P.L. Dani, 1978
e
161(2) is substantially same and section 161(2)
is a parliamentary gloss on the constitutional
k
clause.
r an
Raghunandan v.
Section 162 is limited in it scope to the sue of
parties only. A court can ask any question
whether in nature of corroboration or
p
43.
State of U.P. 1974 contradiction under section 165 of Indian
44. To tr-5U3S
Sheeshpal, 2016
Evidence Act. Section 162 does not control
section 165 of Indian Act.
Delay in recording statements of witnesses does
not necessarily discredit their testimonies. The
Harbeer Singh4Rv.8U6M4O0M
court may rely on such testimonies if they are
cogent and credible and delay is explained to the
satisfaction of the court.
State recorded under section 161 does not
Virender Singh v.
constitute evidence
4O0Mthat can be relied upon by
45. state of Haryana tr-5U3S4R8U6M
the court to convict the accused in absence of
4A0E 2017
tr-5D3F4A8G6B substantive evidence.
Significant omissions in statements before the
Tehsildar Singh v. police during the course of investigation are
46.
state of U.P., 1959 deemed to be part of the statement and may
amount to contradiction
CBI v. Anupam Police remand should not be resorted to after 15
47.
Kulkarni 1992 days of arrest
Hussainara
It is the duty of the Magistrate to inform the
Khatoon (5) v.
48. accused that he has a right to be released on bail
state of Bihar,
under section 167 proviso.
1980

Sanjay Dutt v.
Bail granted under section 167 proviso remains
state, 1994
valid till it is cancelled and the receipt of charge
49. Aslam Babalal
sheet in the court by itself is no ground for
Desai v. State of
cancellation of bail.
Maharashtra 1992
So long as the police report is not filed under
section 173 (2) the investigation remains
Dinesh Dalmia v.
50. pending. The submission of report under
CBI, 2007
section 173(2) does not preclude further
investigation under section 173 (8).
The formation of opinion whether there is a
sufficient evidence or reasonable ground of
51.
Union of India v.
Prakash Hinduja
2003 m
suspicion to justify the forwarding of the case
o
the Magistrate or not is to be that of the officer-
c
.
in-charge of the police station and the
rs
Magistrate has no role to play
Abhinandan Jha v.
Magistrate cannot compel the police officer
e
52. Dinesh Mishra,
submit the charge-sheet.
1968
53.
Sampat Singh v.
n
state of Haryana
a
1993 k
In case final report filed the court should
scrutinize the final report and take a decision
either to accept or reject it.
54.
p rBhagwant Singh v.
Commission of
Supreme court held that complainant should be
heard before the Magistrate drops the case.
55. To police, 1985
Youth Bar
tr-5U3S
India v. Union of
It was held that an accused is entitled to get a
copy of the FIR at an earlier stage than as
prescribed under section 207 of the Cr. P.c. FIR
Association of4R8U6M4O0M
must be uploaded on police website within 24
houre unless the case is sensitive in nature i.e.
India, 2016
like sexual offences, offences pertaining to
insurgency, Terrorism.
The role of 8U
the investigator
4O0M is well-defined and
tr-5U3S4R 6M
the jurisdictional scope of interference by the
4A0E Parvinderjit Singh
tr-5D3F4A8G6B court in the process of investigation is limited.
56. v. state (U.T.
The court ordinarily will not interfere with the
Chandigarh) 2008
investigation of a crime or with the arrest of
accused in a cognizable offence.
Failure to conduct DNA tests of samples taken
from the accused or to prove the report of DNA
Sunil v. state of
57. profiling. Would not necessarily result in failure
M.P. 2017
of prosecution case. Conviction may still be
possible based on the remaining evidences.
Kathi David Raju v. Direction for identification of person by DNA
58.
state of A.P, 2019 test should be based on satisfaction of police

authorities on some material collected on basis
of substantial investigation. DNA test can not be
requested or directed as a step towards roving
or fishing inquiry.
The obligation of maintenance of the General
Diary is a part of the course of conduct of the
State v. H. Srinivas, officer concerned. Non-maintenance of General
59.
2018 Diary may not itself have any bearing on the
criminal trial unless some grave prejudice going
to the root of the matter is shown
No external agency can dictate the course of
investigation in a criminal case. It is within the
60.
Ishwar Pratap
Singh v. state of
m
exclusive jurisdiction of the police. Courts
o
cannot supervise investigation. Only in
c
.
U.P, 2018 exceptional circumstances superior courts can
rs
monitor investigation but that is not the same as
supervision.
e
Where the investigation is not completed within
60 days or 90 days, as the case may be, and no
61.
Rakesh Kumar
n
Paul v. state of
a
Assam 2017 k
police report is filed on 60th or 90th day then the
accused gets indefensible right to default bail.
The accused must apply for default bail and he
p rAmrutbhai
should be prepared to furnish bail
The Magistrate can direct further investigation
62.
To Shambhubhai
Kantibhai patel
2017
even after the police report has been submitted
patel v. Sumanbhai under section 173(2). Such direction of further
investigation can be made under section 156(3)
at pre-cognizance stage.
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M Supreme court held that a judicial magistrate
Ritesh Sinha v. can direct an accused to proved his voice
63.
state of U.P. 2019 samples for investigation even without his
consent.
Vinubhai Haribhai 4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Malaviya and Magistrate can invoke power under section
64. 4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B others v. The state 156(3) Cr. P.C. even at post-cognizance stage.
of Gujarat 2019
State of Telangana
The supreme court observed that a preliminary
v. Sri Managipet @
inquiry before registration of First Information
65. Mangipet
Report (FIR) is not required to be mandatorily
Sarveshwar
conducted in all corruption cases.
Reddy. 2019
The Supreme court observed that a Magistrate
Bikash Ranjan has no jurisdiction to suo moto pass an order for
66.
Rout v. state 2019 further investigation/reinvestigation after he
discharges the accused.

The Supreme court reiterated that a magistrate,
Ramswaroop Soni
upon receipt of a closure/refer report, cannot
67. v. state of M.P.
direct the police to file charge sheet. Such a
2019
direction is wholly unsustainable.
Supreme court held that the court at the place
where the wife takes shelter after leaving or
driven away from the matrimonial home on
Rupali Devi v. state
account of acts of cruelty committed by the
68. JURISDICTION of Uttar Pradesh
husband or his relatives, would, dependent on
2019
the factual situation, also have jurisdiction to
entertain a complaint alleging commission of
offences under section 4 98A of the IPC.
69.
State (NCT of
Delhi) v. Brijesh
o m
Even if the crime is committed in one state it can
be tried in another state if the detrimental effect
c
.
is in that state. The principle of ‘crime is local’ is
Singh 2017
rs
not applicable in such cases.
The expression ‘taking cognizance’ has not been
e
defined in the code. The expression is used
M.L. Sethi v. R. L.
70. COGNIZANCE indicate a point when the Magistrate takes
Kapur, 1967
an k
judicial notice of an offence with a view to
initiate criminal proceedings
The words ‘may take cognizance’ in section
p r 190(1) cannot be equated with ‘must take

cognizance.’ The word ‘may’ gives the discretion
71.
To HDFC Securities
Ltd. v. State of
Maharashtra
tr-5U3S2017
to the Magistrate in the matter. The Magistrate
on receiving complaint is not bound to take
cognizance if the facts alleged in the complaint
do not disclose the commission of a cognizable
0M
4R8U6M4Ooffence. If on perusing the complaint the
Magistrate finds that the allegations disclose the
commission of a cognizable offence and that
forwarding the complaint to the police for
investigation under4O0M
section 156(3) will be
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
conducive to taking cognizance.
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Supreme court held that cognizance is taking
Subramanian
judicial notice by the court of law, possessing
Swamy v.
72. jurisdiction, on a matter presented before it so
Manmohan Singh
as to decide whether there is any basis for
2012
initiating proceedings.
When magistrate applies his mind and is
satisfied that the allegations, if proved, would
Fakhruddin
constitute an offence and decides to initiate
73. Ahmad v. State of
proceedings against the alleged offence, then it
Uttaranchal, 2008
can be positively stated than he has taken
cognizance of the offence.

Manhari Bhai v.
Taking cognizance does not mean issuance of
74. Shailesh Bhai
process.
20112
The Magistrate in exercise of its power under
section 190 can refuse to take cognizance if
material on record warrants so Magistrate
Ajay kumar
performs judicial function but he cannot
75. parmar v. state of
appreciate the evidence on record to reach the
Rajasthan, 2012
conclusion. It is impermissible for the
Magistrate to weight the evidence and balance
the probability of the case at this stage.
Magistrate conferred with the power of taking
Mahendra Singh
Dhoni v.
o m
cognizance and issuing process must carefully
scrutinize whether allegations made in the
c
.
76. Yerraguntla complaint meet the basic ingredients of offence,
rs
Shyamsundar whether the concept of territorial jurisdiction is
2017 satisfied and whether the accused needs to be
e
summoned.
It is a settled law that court take cognizance of
77.
n
of Punjab 2008
a k
Bholu Ram v. state an offence only and one the cognizance is taken
the court becomes functus officio. There can be
no recall of order of cognizance.
p r Before taking cognizance of an offence the

Magistrate can direct investigation under
78.
To Mohd. Yusuf v.
Afaq Jahan, 2006
section 156(3). It is open for the Magistrate to
direct police officer to register FIR. Even if
Magistrate does not say so in many words while
directing investigation under section 156(3) the
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M FIR should be registered, It is the duty of the
concerned officer-in-charge of police station to
register FIR.
Supreme court held that in order to attract rigor
Devendra Prasad of section 197 4O the
0M offence alleged against a
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
79. Singh v. state of Government officer must have some nexus with
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Bihar, 2019 the discharge of his official duties as
Government officer.
All acts done by a public servant in the
purported discharge of his official duties cannot
as a matter of course be brought under the
Choudhury
protective umbrella of section 197. The
Parveen sultana v.
80. underlying object of 197 is to enable the
state of West
authorities to scrutinize the allegations made
Bengal 2009
against a public servant to shield him/her
against frivolous, vexatious or false prosecution
initiated with the main object of causing

embarrassment and harassment to the said
official. However, if the authority vested in a
public servant is misused for doing things which
are not otherwise permitted under the law, such
acts cannot claim the protection of section 197
Section 195(1)(b) (ii) is applicable only in case
offence enumerated therein have been
committed with respect to document after that
Vishnu Chandra
document ha been produced ir given in
81. Gaonkar v. N.M.
evidence in a proceedings in any court. That is
Desai, 2018
to say the offence must have been committed
when the document was in custodial egis and
not prior to that.
o m
In order to avail remedy under section 199(2)
c
.
and 199(4) statements must not only be
K.K. Mishra v. state
rs
82. defamatory by there has to be a nexus between
of M.P. 2018
the statement and the discharge of public duties
e
of office.
The rationale for special procedure provided
83.
an
P.C. Joshi v. state of k
under section 199(2) is that the offence of
defamation committed against the functionaries
mentioned therein is really an offence
p rU.P. 1961
committed against the state as the same relates
to the discharge of public functions by state
84.
To S. K. Miglani v.
state NCT of Delhi,
2019
functionaries.
The Supreme court observed that a public
servant working in a nationalized bank cannot
claim benefit of section under section 197 of the
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M criminal procedure code.
Where the Magistrate decides not to take
Minu Kumari v. cognizance and drop the proceedings then
85.
state, 2006 notice to the information and opportunity of
hearing must be4O granted.
0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Supreme court held that section 202 of the code
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B has following to objects:
1) It enable the Magistrate to scrutinize the
COMPLAINTS TO Manhari Bhai v. allegations in the complaint with a view to
86.
MAGISTRATE Shailesh Bhai 2012 prevent harassment to the accused.
2) It helps the Magistrate to find out whether
there is some material to support the allegations
in the complaint.
The order of dismissal of complaint is neither an
Poonam chand Jain order of acquittal nor an order of discharge,
87.
v. Fazru 2010 therefore, principle incorporated under section
300 is not applicable. The Supreme court held

that only in exceptional circumstances the
second complaint can be entertained. These
circumstances may be
1) Previous order of dismissal was passed on
incomplete record:
2) Previous order was result of
misunderstanding of the nature of complaint or
was manifestly absurd or unjust,
3) Where the new facts are adduced in second
complaint which could not, with reasonable
diligence, have been brought on record in the
previous proceedings.
o m
There is no enabling provision in the code which
permits the amendment of complaint. However,
c
.
Supreme court held that if the amendment
rs
sought to be made relates to a simple infirmity
S. R. Sukumar v. S. which is curable by means of a formal
e
88. Sunaad Raghuram, amendment and by allowing such amendment,
2015 no prejudice could be caused to the other side,
an k
side, then notwithstanding the fact that there is
no enabling provision in the code for
entertaining such amendment, the court may
p r permit such an amendment to be made

The requirement of conducting inquiry or
89.
To Abhijit Pawar v.
directing investigation under section 202 before
issuing process is not an empty formality . No
specific mode or manner of inquiry is provided
Hemant Madhukar in section 202. In inquiry envisaged under
Nimbalkar,
tr-5U2017
3S4R8U6M4Osection 202 the witnesses are examined,
0M
whereas under section 200, examination of

complainant only is necessary with the option of
examining the witnesses, if any
Chand Devi Daga v. Legal heirs of deceased complainant have right
4O0M
5U3S4R8U6M
90. Manju K. to continue proceedings after the death of
tr-
4A0E Humatani, 2018 complainant in a warrant case.
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
At the stage of issuing process, the Magistrate is
mainly concerned with the allegations made in
the complaint and only to be prima facie
India Carat (p) Ltd.
satisfied that there are sufficient grounds for
91. ISSUE OF PROCESS v. State of
proceedings against the accused. It is not the
Karnataka, 1989
province of the Magistrate to enter into a
detailed discussion of the merits or demerits of
the case.

The object of furnishing the accused person
Gurbachan Singh v. with copies of the statements and documents as
92. state of Punjab, mentioned above is to put him on notice of what
1957 he has to meet at the time of inquiry or trial and
to prepare himself for his defence.
At the stage of summoning accused on the basis
of a private complaint, all that is required is
Prabhu Dutt
satisfaction by Magistrate, that there is
93. Tiwari v. state of
sufficient ground to proceed against the accused
U.P., 2018
in the light of the records made and the evidence
adduced by the accused.
The Supreme court observed that a Magistrate a
P. Gopalkrishnan m
Magistrate cannot withhold any document
o
submitted by the investigating officer along
c
.
with the police report except when it is
94. @ Dileep v. state of
rs
voluminous. In case of Voluminous documents,
Kerala, 2019
the accused can be permitted to take inspection
e
of the concerned document either personally or
through his pleader in court.
95. CHARGE
an
Birichh Bhuian v.
state of Bihar, k
Charge can be defined as a precise formulation
of specific accusation made against a person of
an offence alleged to have been committed by
p r1963
him.
Framing of charge is the first major step in the
To criminal trial where the court is expected to

apply its mind to evidence placed before it an
consider possibility of discharging the accused
or requiring him to face trial. At the stage of
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M framing of charge the trial court is not to
examine and assess in detail the materials
State v. Anup
produced by prosecution or sufficiency of
96. Kumar Srivastava,
material to establish offence alleged.
2017
Where the court4Ofinds
0M that there is ground for
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
presuming that the accused has committed
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B offence, it shall frame the charge. This
presumption is not the presumption of law as
such.
At this stage there cannot be a roving inquiry
into the pro and cons of the matter
The charge serves as a purpose of notice or
intimation to the accused giving a clear and
V. C. Shukla v.
97. unambiguous notice of the nature of accusation.
state, 1980
It is to enable the accused to have a clear idea of
what he is being tried for. It is an important step

in criminal trial and it separates the stage of
inquiry from trial.
The object of the charge is to give accused notice
of the matter he is charged with. If the necessary
Willie staney v. information is conveyed to him and no prejudice
98.
state of M.P, 1956 is caused to him because of the charges, the
accused cannot succeed by merely showing that
the charges framed were defective
The purpose of framing the charge is to give
Mohan singh v. intimation to the accused regarding the nature
99.
state of Bihar 2011 of the accusation which he will be called upon to
meet in the course of trial.
100.
Jaswinder Saini v.
state (Govt. of NCT
m
The code gives ample power to the court to alter
o
or amend a charge whether by the trial court or
c
.
OF Delhi) 2013 by the appellate court.
rs
There is no scope for the accused to produce any
evidence in support of the submissions made on
Rukmini Narvekar
101. v. Vijaya
Sarardekar 2009
e
his behalf at the stage of framing of charge and
only such material as are indicated in Section
k
227 Cr. P.c. can be taken into consideration by
r an
Vinubhai
Ranchhodbhai
the Magistrate at that stage.
Erroneous, irregular or absence of specific

102.
o p Patel v. Rajivbhai
Dudabhai Patel
2018
charge does not render conviction invalid
unless failure of justice has occasioned.
103.
T tr- 5U
v. Lalu Prasad
Yadav, 2017
3S
Separate trial is a rule and joint trial is an
exception. Joint trial would be improper if the
4O0M
State of Jharkhand court allows innumerable offences spread over
4R 8U 6M
long period of time and committed by large

number of persons to be tried jointly under the
protective wings of an all-embracing
conspiracy. 6M4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U
At the time of framing of charge probative value
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B of material on record has to be gone into which
proceeds on presumption that materials
produced by prosecution is true but the court is
State v. S. Selvi not expected to go deep into the matter. If two
104.
2018 view are equally possible and the judge is
satisfied on the basis of evidence produced that
there is some suspicion but not grave suspicion
then he will be justified in discharging the
accused.

The convict has a right to be heard on the
question of sentence, but there is no mandate to
B.A. Umesh v. High
fix a separate date for hearing on a sentence. It
105. TRIAL court of
depends upon facts and circumstances of the
Karnastaka 2017
case whether a separate date is required for
hearing on sentence or not.
While considering the question of framing of
charges under section 227 the court ha power to
Union of India v.
106. sift and weight the evidence for limited purpose
Prafulla Kumar,
of finding out whether or not prima facie case
against the accused has been made out.
Hearing on sentence is not confined merely to
o m
oral hearing but it is also intended to afford and
opportunity to the prosecution as well as the
c
.
accused to place before the curt facts/ Material
Malkiat Singh v.
rs
relating to various factors on the question of
107. state of Punjab,
sentence and if interested by either side, to have
1991
e
evidence adduced to show mitigating
circumstances to impose lesser sentence.
an k
Therefore, sufficient time should be given to the
accused to hear on the question of sentence.
The distinction between the procedures
p rState of Goa v.
adopted for cases instituted on police report
and cases instituted otherwise than on police
108.
To Hose Maria Albert

Vales, 2018
report, lies in the fact that in the former, there is
no scope for the prosecution to examine any
witness at the stage where the Magistrate is to
consider, whether the charge is to be framed or
tr-5U3S4R8U6M not
4O0M
Constitutional obligation to provide free legal

INQUIRIES & TRIAL aid does not arise only when the trial
Khatri (2) v. state
109. : GENERAL commences but when the accused it for the first
of Bihar 1981
PRINCIPLES time produced 4O before
0M a Magistrate and also
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
when he is remanded from time to time.
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B The provisions of section 300 are also based on
the principle of res-judicata, or issue estoppels.
Pritam Singh v.
It means the verdict of acquittal given by a
110. state of Punjab,
competent court, will be binding on the parties
1956
to the adjudication in all subsequent
proceedings.
Supreme court held that though the magistrate
Amir Hamza is not bound to grant permission to a victim to
111. Shaikh vs. state of conduct prosecution at the mere asking but the
Maharashtra 2019 victim has a right to assist the court in a trial
before the Magistrate, if the magistrate is

satisfied that the victim is in a position to assist
the court and the trial does not involve such
complexities which cannot be handled by the
victim, the magistrate would be within its
jurisdiction to grant permission to the victim.
Supreme court held that the power of court to
recall any witness or witnesses already
Mohanlal Shamji
examined or to summon any witness can be
112. soni v. union of
invoked even if the evidence on both sides is
India 1991
closed so long as the court retains seisin of the
criminal proceedings
When an application under section 321 is made
o m
it is not necessary for the court to assess the
Sheodhan Paswan evidence to discover whether the case would
c
.
113. v. state of Bihar, end in conviction or acquittal. The court has to
rs
1987 see whether the application is made in good
faith, in the interest of public policy and justice
e
and not to thwart or stifle the process of law.
Abdul Karim v. Withdrawal from prosecution cannot be
114.
2000
a
Suk Das v. Union k
state of Karnataka, allowed when it will stifle or thwart the process
n of law or cause manifest injustice.

Conviction of an accused ordered in a trial
115.
p rTerritory of
Arunachal
which the accused wad not provided legal aid
has to be set aside as being in violation of Article
116.
To Pradesh, 1986
Rajesh v. state of
Haryana, 2019
21.
Supreme court held that a trial court can
summon under section 319 those persons
named in FIR, but who were not charge-sheeted,
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M even if the stage of giving opportunity to the
complainant to file a protest petition is over
Section 319 is meant to rope in those persons
who were not implicated when the charge sheet
S. Mohammad was filed but during
4O0Mthe trial the court finds that
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Ispahani v. sufficient evidence has come on record to
117. 4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Yogendra Chandak summon them and face the trial.
2017 Power under section 319 is discretionary and an
extraordinary power and it has to be used
sparingly.
Article 20(2) of the constitution stipulates that
no person shall be prosecuted and punished for
State of Jharkhand the same offence more than once. This is called
118. v. Lalu Prasad doctrine of double jeopardy. The objective of
Yadav, this Article is to avoid harassment which may be
caused by the successive criminal proceedings
where a person has committed only one crime.

It is based on the maxim nemo debet bis vexari,
which means no person shall be put twice in
peril for the same offence There are two aspects
of doctrine of double jeopardy i.e. Autrefois
convict and autrefois acquit. Autrefois convict
means a person has been previously convicted
in respect of the same offence. Autrefois acquit
means that the person has been previously
acquitted in respect of the same offence.
Section 311 has been enacted to enable the
court to find out the truth and render just
decision. According to this provision the court
o m
may at any stage of inquiry, trial or other
proceedings can summon any person as a
c
.
Ratanlal v. Prahlad witness or examine any person in attendance
119.
rs
Jat, 2017 though not summoned as a witness or recall or
re-examine any person already summoned.
e
The object of this provision is to do justice from
the point of view of accused, prosecution and
an k
society. Power has to be exercised only for
strong and cogent reasons.
Conviction of the accused cannot be sustained
p rEdmund S.
merely on the basis of the statements under
section 313. Such statements are only the
120.
To Lyngdoh v. State of version of the accused stating the incriminating

Meghalaya, 2016 circumstances against him. Such statements
must not be considered in isolation but in
conjunction with other prosecution evidence.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M The term ‘personally’ used in section 313 if
4O 0M
given strict and restrictive interpretation would

mean that the accused had to be physically
Basavaraj Pillai v. present in the court. This section has to be
121. state of Kamataka, considered in light0M of the changes in technology
4O
5U3S4R8U6M
2000 of tr- communications and transmission.
4A0E Accordingly the court held that it was not
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
necessary that in all cases the accused must
answer by remaining present in the court.
The Supreme court observed that, though a
Rekha Murarka v. victim can engage a private counsel to assist the
122. state of West prosecution, such counsel could not be given the
Bengal 2019 right to make oral arguments or examine and
cross-examine witnesses.
Swapan Kumar
The supreme court observed that filing of
123. chatterjee v CBI,
successive applications for recall of a witness
2019

under section 311 of the code of criminal
procedure should not be encouraged.
The supreme court observed that a court has
Bhagyan Das v. discretion to reject a plea to compound and
124. state of offence having social impact, even if the offence
Utarakhand, 2019 is compoundable under section 320 of the code
of criminal procedure
Supreme court held that bail is a process to set
a person free who is under arrest or detention
by taking security for his appearance.
Expression ‘bail’ covers both release on one’s
Moti Ram v state
125. BAIL own bond with or without sureties. The right to
of M.P. 1978
o m
be released on bail cannot be nullified indirectly
by fixing too high the amount of bond or bail-
c
.
bond to be furnished by the person seeking
rs
release.
Personal liberty is one of the most valuable
e
Fundamental Right given under the
constitution. The principle underlying the
126.
Sunil Fulchand v.
n
Union of India
a
2000 k
release on bail is that the accused is presumed
innocent until proven guilty. A person released
on bail is that the accused is presumed innocent
p r until proven guilty. A person released on bail is

considered to be in constructive custody of the
127.
To Gudikanti v. Public
court.
Supreme court held that basic rule should be
‘bail not jail except where there are
circumstances suggesting accused fleeing from
prosecutor 19788U6M4O0M
tr-5U3S4R justice, possibility of repeating the offences and
like.
Supreme court held that an accused after
Sharad vs. vs state
withdrawing his bail application before the High
128. of Maharashtra,
court can file a4O0M subsequent bail application
2019 tr-5U3S4R8U6M
before the session court,
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B The term ‘anticipatory bail’ has not been defined
in the code, the bail is granted in anticipation of
Union of India v.
arrest. When anticipatory bail is granted then in
129. Padam Narain
the even of arrest the person arrested in
2008
released on bail. Only after arrest the order
granting anticipatory bail becomes operative
Two paramount consideration for granting bail
Gurudaran Singh v.
are likelihood of the accused fleeing from justice
state (Delhi
130. ad tampering with the evidence. It is essential
Aministration)
that due and proper weight should be bestowed
1978
on these two factors apart from others.

circumstances where the bail can be cancelled:-
➢ Hampers investigation;
Raghubir v. state ➢ Tampers with evidence;
131.
of Bihar, (1986) ➢ Commits same or similar offence;
➢ Absconds or goes beyond the control of
sureties
➢ Misuses liberty granted to him;
The applicant must show that he has ‘reason to
believe’ that he may be arrested in a non-
bailable offence. Use of the expression ‘reason to
believe’ shows that the applicant may be
132.
Naresh Kumar
Yadav v. Ravindra
m
arrested, must be founded on reasonable
o
grounds. Mere ‘Fear’ is not ‘belief’ for which
c
.
Kumar 2008 reason it is not enough for the applicant to show
rs
that he has some sort of vague apprehension
that some one is going to make an accusation
e
against him in pursuance of which he may be
arrested.
an k
Court granting bail should exercise its
discretion in a judicious manner and not as a
matter of course. At the stage of granting bail a
p r detailed examination of evidence need not be

undertaken. Following factors should be
133.
To Prasad Srikant
Purohit v. state of
considered before granting bail
a) The nature of accusation and severity of
Maharashtra, 2018 punishment in case of conviction
b) Reasonable apprehension of tampering with
tr-5U3S4R8U6M the witness or apprehension of threat to
4O 0M
complainant
c) Prima facie satisfaction of the court in
support of the charges.
Relevant consideration for grant of bail
4O0M
5U3S4R8U6M
a) Whether there is any prima facie or
tr-
4A0E reasonable ground to believe that the accused
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
had committed offence;
b) Nature and gravity of the charge
Anil Kumar Yadav
c) Severity of punishment in event of conviction;
134. v. State (NCT of
d) Danger of accused absconding or fleeing:
Delhi), 2018
e) Character, behaviour, means, position and
standing of the accused;
f) Likelihood of offence being repeated;
g) Reasonable apprehension of witness being
tampered with:

h) Danger of justice being thwarted thwarted by
grant of bail
If accused are more than one then execution of
separate bail bond should be insisted. The duty
of the surety is the production of the accused for
Mohd. Kunju v.
bail. If any change in terms and conditions
135. state of Karnataka
under which the accused is granted bail is not
1999
acceptable to surety then he should
communicate the same to the court failing
which he will be held liable.
Rejection of bail when bail is applied is one thing
and cancellation of bail is another. It easier to
136.
State (Delhi
Administration) v. the bail once granted.
c o m
reject a bail in non-bailable cases than to cancel
.
Sanjay Gandhi Cancellation of bail involves reviewing the
rs
1978 earlier decision granting bail. It should be
sparingly exercised and only in supervening
e
circumstances.
Rejection of bail in a non-bailable cases at the
an k
initial stage and cancellation of bail so granted
have to be considered and dealt with on
different basis. Very cogent and overwhelming
137.
p rX V. State of
Telangana 2018
circumstances are necessary for order directing
cancellation of bail. Bail once granted should not
To be cancelled in a mechanical and routine

manner. Supervening circumstances should be
considered before cancelling bail
The supreme court reiterated that bail cannot
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M be granted without assigning any reason as to
Mauji Ram v. state
138. on what grounds, even though of a prima facie
of U.P. 2019
nature, it is considered just and proper to grant
bail.
In this case two persons were convicted for
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
committing murder. Only one of the accused
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B filed appeal against conviction and was
acquitted. Conviction of second accused who did
Md. Sajjad @ Raju not file appeal was also set aside. Court held that
139. APPEAL @ Salim v. state of if on evaluation of the case, a conclusion is
West Bengal 2017 reached that no conviction of any accused was
possible the benefit of the decision must be
extended to the similarly situated co-accused
even though he had not challenged the order by
way of the appeal

Kartar Singh v.
Supreme court held that benefit of set-off under
140. MISCELLANEOUS state of Haryana
section 428 is not available to life convicts.
1982
State of The bank accounts of accused or any of his
Maharashtra v. relations is ‘property’ within the meaning of
Tapas D. Neogy, section 102 of the code.
141. 1997 The police officer in the course of investigation
Teesta Atul can seize or prohibit the operation of the said
setalvad v. state of account if such assets have direct links with the
Gujarat, 2018 commission of the offence.
The supreme court held that police does not
have the power to attach immovable property
Nevada properties
private Limited v. m
during investigation under section 102 of the
o
code of criminal procedure. However, police
c
.
does have authority to freeze movable
142. state of
rs
properties of the accused. The Supreme court
Maharashtra And
held that the expression ‘any property’
Anr. 2019
e
appearing in section 102 of the code of criminal
procedure would not include ‘include
143.
an
Raju Jagdish
Paswan v. state of k
immovable property’.
The Supreme court held that a death sentence
can be imposed only when the alternative
p rMaharashtra, 2019 option is unquestionably foreclosed.

Accused X v. state The Supreme court held that post conviction
144.
145. To of Maharashtra,
2007
New India
Assurance co.4R
mental illness will be a mitigating factor while
considering appeals of death convicts.
The supreme court has observed that the High
court has inherent power under section 482 of
Ltd. 4O0M
tr-5U3S 8U6M the code of criminal procedure to recall an order
v. Krishna Kumar
and the provisions of section 362 Cr. P.C. would
Pandey, 2019
not bar it from exercise of such powers.
The supreme court held that where a claim is
made before 6M the court the property does not
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U
Bharat Sanchar belong to the person from whom it was seized,
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Nigam Ltd. v. section 452 of the Cr. P.c. Does not mandate that
146.
Suryanarayanan & its custody should be handed over to the person
Anr. from whose possession it was seized, overriding
the claim of genuine title which is asserted on
behalf of a third party.
The Supreme court observed that the limitation
Mahesh Dube v. of 30 days would not apply in preferring an
147. Shivbodh Dubel, application under section 456 of the criminal
2019 procedure code seeking restoration of
immovable property, if the Trial court had

passed an order directing to handover the case
property, while convicting the accused.
The Supreme court observed that solitary
Union of India v. confinement of a person sentenced to death
148.
Dharam Pal, 2019 prior to the rejection of mercy petition is
palpably illegal.
Judicial officers shall not visit the police station
on their own except in connection with their
Delhi judicial official or judicial duties. In case it is necessary
Service for a judicial officer or a subordinate judicial
149.
Association v. state officer to visit the police station in connection
of Gujarat 1991 with his official work, he must do so with prior
judge.
c o m
information of his visit to District and sessions
.
Wherever the probation of offender Act, 1958 is
Chhanni v. state of
rs
150. in force, in those areas section 360 and 361 Cr.
U.P., 2006
P.C. are not applicable.
k e
r an
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

INDIAN PENAL CODE, 1860 - LANDMARKS CASES
S. No. Topic Case Details
It was held by the court that as a general rule there
GENERAL
must be a guilty mind before there can be a crime but
1. PRINCIPLES, MENS Queen v. Tolson (1889)
a statute may make an act criminal whether there has
REA
been any intention to break the law or not.
Supreme court considered the application of the
principle of mens rea in statutory offences. The court
GENERAL State of Maharashtra v.
held that unless the statute either clearly or by
2. PRINCIPLES, MENS M.H. George, AIR 965 SC
necessary implication rules out mens rea as a
REA 722
constituent part of the crime the accused should not be
GENERAL
Sherras v. De Rutzen
o m
held guilty of an offence unless he has a guilty mind.
There is a presumption that mens rea is an essential
element of every offence. But this presumption is liable
c
.
3. PRINCIPLES, MENS to be displaced either by the words of the statute
(1895)
rs
REA creating the offence or by the subject matter with it
deals.
e
Bachan Singh v. State of Supreme court held that death sentence should not be
4. PUNISHMENTS
Punjab, AIR 1980 SC passed except in ‘Rarest of the rare case’.
5. PUNISHMENTS
Gopal Vinayak Godse v.
n
state, AIR 1961 SC 600
a
Md. Munna v. Union of k
Life imprisonment means an imprisonment that
continues till the life of the convict and is nothing less.
Supreme court has held that imprisonment for life
r
6. PUNISHMENTS
India and others (2005) means rigorous imprisonment for life .
7.
GENERAL
EXCEPTIONS
o p
K.M. Nanawati v. state of
Maharashtra AIR 1962
Supreme court observed that if an accused pleads
exceptions contained in Indian penal code then there
is a presumption against him and the burden to rebut
T
SC605
that presumption is on him.
The accused has to prove that his case falls within the
general
4O0M exceptions. The standard of proof is not the
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
GENERAL T.N. Lakshmaiah v. state same as expected from the prosecution. It is sufficient
8.
EXCEPTIONS of Karnataka, (2002) that the accused makes his case in any of the general
exceptions by standard of preponderance of
probabilities.
The nature of burden
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0Mof proof on the accused is not
GENERAL Srikant Bhosale v. state of
9. higher than that which rests upon a party in a civil
EXCEPTIONS
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Maharashtra, (2002)
4A0E
proceedings.
The court laid down the following propositions
regarding insanity: 1. Every man is presumed to be
sane and possess a sufficient degree of reason to be
responsible for his crime until the contrary is proved.
2. To establish the defence of insanity it must be clearly
GENERAL
10. McNaughten’s Case shown that at the time of committing the act, the party
EXCEPTIONS
accused was laboring under such defect of reason as
not to know the nature and quality of the act he was
doing or if he did know this, that he did not known that
what he was doing was wrong. 3. If the accused was
conscious that the act was one which he ought not to

do and if that act was at the same time contrary to the
law of the land, he is punishable. 4. Where a person is
under an insane delusion as to the existing facts
commits an offence in consequence thereof, the
answer must depend on the nature of the delusion, but
making the assumption that he labours under partial
delusion only and is not in other respects insane, he
must be considered in the same situation as to the
responsibility as if the facts with respect to which the
delusion exists were real.
Not every form of unsoundness of mind would exempt
one from criminal responsibility. It is only that
GENERAL Queen Empress v. K.N.
11.
EXCEPTIONS Shah, (1896)
o m
unsoundness of mind which materially impairs the
cognitive faculties of the mind that can form the
ground of exemption from criminal liability.
c
rs .
What section 84 lays down is not that the accused
claiming protection under it should not know an act to
be right or wrong but that the accused should be
12.
GENERAL
EXCEPTIONS
Lakshmi v. State, Air
1959 All 534
k e
incapable of knowing Whether the act done by him is
right or wrong. The capacity to know a thing is quite
different from what a person knows. Inherent or
r an organic incapacity is protected and not the Wrong or

erroneous belief.
When a plea of insanity is setup the court has to
GENERAL
o p
Dayabhai Thakkar v.
consider whether at the time of commission of the
offence the accused by reason of unsoundness of mind,
was incapable of knowing the nature of the act or that
T
13. state of Gujarat, AIR 1964
EXCEPTIONS he was doing was either wrong or contrary to law. The
sc 1563
crucial point of time for ascertaining the state of mind
of4Othe
0M accused is the time when the offence was
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
committed.
House of Lords laid down three rules regarding
drunkenness: 1. Insanity, Whether produced by
drunkenness or otherwise is a defence to the crime
charged;5U2.3SEvidence
4R8U6M4O0Mof drunkenness which renders
tr-
the accused incapable of forming the specific intent
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B essential to constitute the crime should be taken into
Director of Public consideration with the other facts proved in order to
GENERAL
14. Prosecutions v. Beard, determine whether or not he had the intent; 3.
EXCEPTIONS
1920 Evidence of drunkenness falling short of a proved
incapacity in the accused to form the intent necessary
to constitute the crime, and merely establishing that
his mind was affected by drink so that he more readily
gave way to some violent passion, does not rebut
presumption that a man intends that natural
consequences of his acts.
GENERAL Basudev v. state of Pepsu, So far as the knowledge is concerned we must
15.
EXCEPTIONS AIR, 1956 sc 488 attribute to the intoxicated man the same knowledge

as if he was quite sober, but as far as intent is
concerned it must be gathered from the attending
general circumstances of the case paying due regard to
the degree of intoxication.
The Right to private Defence rests on three ideas:- 1.
That there must be no more harm inflicuted than
necessary for the purpose of the defence. 2. That there
GENERAL Dominic Varkey v. state
16. must be reasonable apprehension of danger to the
EXCEPTIONS of Kerala, AIR 1971
body from the attempt or threat to commit the offence
3. The right does not commence until there is a
reasonable apprehension.
Supreme court gave following test of grave and sudden
m
provocation:- 1) Whether a reasonable man, belonging
o
to same class of society as that of accused and placed
in same situation would be provoked to lose his self-
c
17.
GENERAL
EXCEPTIONS
K.M. Nanavati v. state of
Maharashtra, AIR 1962
rs .
control; 2) Words and gestures may also, in certain
circumstances, amount to grave and sudden
provocation; 3) Mental background created by
k e
previous acts of victim may be taken into
consideration; 4) Fatal low should be traced to the
influence of passion and not after passing has cooled
r an down.
The court laid down the following criteria as to the
nature of possession which may entitle a trespasser to
o p exercise the right of private defence of the property

and person:- 1. The trespasser must be in actual
physical possession of the property over a sufficiently
18.
GENERAL
EXCEPTIONS
T Punjab AIR 1975
tr-5U3S4R
long period. 2. The Possession must be in the
Knowledge, either Express or implied, of the owner or
Puran Singh v. State of 8U6M
without
4O0M any concealment and which contains an
element of animus – Possidendi. – 3. The process of
dispossession of the true owner by the trespasser
must be complete and final. 4. One of the usual tests to
determine settled possession of the true owner by the
trespasser in the case
4O0Mof cultivable land, would be
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
whether any crop has been grown on the land. If the
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B crop has been grown, even the true owner has no right
to destroy the crop grown by the trespasser.
According to section 102, the right to private defence
of the body commences as soon as a reasonable
apprehension of danger to the body arises from an
attempt or threat to commit the offence, though the
GENERAL Deo Narain v. State of
19. offence may not have been committed. Such right
EXCEPTIONS U.P., AIR 1973
continues so long as such apprehension of danger to
the body continues. The threat, however, must
reasonably give rise to present and imminent danger
and not remote danger.

Section 97 recognizes the right of a person only to
defend his own or another’s body but to defend his
own or another’s property. It is well settled that the
GENERAL Mahavir Chowdhary v. rule of retreat which common law courts have
20.
EXCEPTIONS State of Bihar, 1996 recognized is not relevant under I.P.C. In India there is
no rule which expects a man to run away when
confronted with a situation where he can exercise his
right of private defence
Supreme court observed that it is not essential that
more than one person should be convicted of the
Bimbadhar Pradhan v.
21. CONSPIRACY offence of conspiracy. It is enough if the Court is in a
State of Orissa, AIR 1954
position to find that two or more persons were
Yogesh Alias Sachin

m
actually concerned in the conspiracy.
o
Supreme court held that to constitute an offence of
conspiracy, meeting of mind of two or more persons is
c
22. CONSPIRACY Jagdish v. State of
Maharashtra 2008
.
sine qua non. Conspiracy can be inferred from
rs
surrounding circumstances as direct proof is difficult
to find.
23. CONSPIRACY
State of Tamil Nadu v.
Nalini 1999
k e
Supreme court held that association of the accused
with the main accused or knowledge of conspiracy
would not make the accused a conspirator. Agreement
24.
OFFENCES
AGAINST THE
r an
State (N.C.T of Delhi) v.
is sine qua non for the offence.
Supreme Court held that to constitute offence of
waging war under section 121 of the code the
STATE
OFFENCES
o p
Navjot Sandhu 2005 intention and purpose of the warlike operations
directed against the government is sine qua non
Supreme court held that section 124-A does not violate
T
Kedar Nath v. State Air
25. AGAINST THE Article 19(1) (a) of the constitution as it is a reasonable
1962
STATE restriction.
The
4O0Mcourt held that common intention implies a pre-
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
arranged plan, prior meeting of minds or prior
consultation between all person constituting the
group. The court laid down the following principles
under section 34:- 1) Essence of liability under section
COMMON Mahboob Shah v.
34 is found in4R‘common
tr-5U3S intention’ 2) To invoke section
8U6M4O0M
26. INTENTION AND Emperor, (Indus River
34 it must be shown that act was done in furtherance
COMMON
tr-5DOBJECT
3F4A8G6B4A case) Air 1945
0E
of common intention; 3) Common intention implies
pre-arranged plan and it must be proved that criminal
act was done in concert pursuant to pre-arranged
plan; 4) For Intention to be common it must be known
to all members and must also be shared by them.
The court held that even if a person who does not do
COMMON Barendra Kumar Ghosh v.
anything but if he has common intention he will be
27. INTENTION AND Emperor, (Post office
liable. The court said ‘They also serve who only stand
COMMON OBJECT case)
and wait’.

COMMON Supreme court held that common intention can
Rishidev Pandey v. state
28. INTENTION AND develop on the spot also during the course of the
U.P. AIR 1955
COMMON OBJECT commission of the offence.
Supreme court held that physical presence and active
COMMON participation in crime is necessary. But in J.N Desai v.
Shree Kantia v. State of
29. INTENTION AND state of Bombay Supreme court observed that the
Bombay AIR 1955
COMMON OBJECT physical presence and active participation is not
necessary in all cases.
Supreme court differentiated between similar
intention and common intention. The court held that
several persons can simultaneously attack a man and
COMMON each can have the same intention, namely, the
Pandurang v. State of
30. INTENTION AND
COMMON OBJECT
Hyderabad Air 1955
o m
intention to kill, and each can individually inflict a
separate fatal blow and yet none would have the
common intention required by the specific section
c
COMMON
a pre-arranged plan.
.
because there was no prior meeting of minds to form
rs
The Supreme court observed that, while convicting
31. INTENTION AND

COMMON OBJECT
Mala Singh v. state of
Haryana 2019
k e
accused by altering charge from Section 149 IPC to
section 34 IPC, their ‘common intention should be
proved.
32.
COMMON
INTENTION AND
COMMON OBJECT
r an
Muthu Naicker v. state of
Tamil Nadu, AIR 1978
A person who is present in the unlawful assembly as a
curious spectator does not become one of the
members of that unlawful assembly.
33.
COMMON
INTENTION AND
o p
Rajesh Govind v. State of
Maharashtra, Air 2000
Common intention may develop on the spur of the
moment However, in such cases there has to be cogent
material to arrive at the finding to hold all accused
T
COMMON OBJECT
guilty.
Section 34 does not envisage the separate act by all the
accused
4O0M persons for becoming responsible for the
COMMON tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Tukaram Ganpat v. State ultimate criminal Act. Establishment of an
34. INTENTION AND
of Maharashtra, Air 1974 independent overt act on the part of each accused is
COMMON OBJECT
not the requirement of law to allow section 34 to
operate.
Mere presence
tr-5U3S4R8Uin6M
an4O
unlawful
0M assembly cannot render
COMMON a person liable unless there was a common object and
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Madan Singh v. State of
4A0E
35. INTENTION AND he shared the same or was actuated by that common
Bihar, 2004
COMMON OBJECT object and that object is one of those set out in section
141 Indian penal code.
The test for determining whether the act constituted
COMMON attempt or preparation is whether the overt act
Malkiat Singh v. State of
36. INTENTION AND already done are such that if the offender changes his
Punjab, Air 1970
COMMON OBJECT mind and does not proceed further in its progress, the
acts already done would be completely harmless.
OFFENCES
R v. Swindall and Two car drivers after getting drunk began race with
37. AGAINST HUMAN
Osborne 1846 each other and drove over an old man. Both were
BODY

charged with contributing to death of deceased by
their negligence and improper conduct.
Under clause 3 of section 300 culpable homicide is
murder if both of the following are satisfied:- 1) The
OFFENCES act which caused death is done with the intention of
State of U.P. v. Virendra
38. AGAINST HUMAN causing death or is done with the intention of causing
Prasad, 2004
BODY a bodily injury; 2) The injury intended to be inflicted is
sufficient in the ordinary course of nature to cause
death.
OFFENCES Supreme court held section 303 unconstitutional, as, it
Mithu v. State of Punjab,
39. AGAINST HUMAN is against the spirit of Articles 14 and 21 of the
1983
BODY constitution.
OFFENCES
40. AGAINST HUMAN
Jacob Mathew v. State of
Punjab 2005
c o m
The word ‘gross’ has not been used in section 304A,
but it is settled that in criminal law, negligence or
recklessness must be of such high degree as to be
BODY
OFFENCES Mustafa Shahdal Shaikh .

gross’. The expression ‘rash and negligent act’ is to be
rs
qualified by the word ‘grossly’.
Supreme court interpreted the expression ‘soon
41. AGAINST HUMAN

BODY
v. state of Maharashtra,
AIR 2013
k e
before death’ and held that there must be existence of
proximate and live link between the effect of cruelty
based on dowry demand and the concerned death.
OFFENCES
r an
Girish Singh vs. of
Supreme court held that conviction under section
304B can be made only if the woman was subjected to
cruelty or harassment by her husband or his relatives
p
42. AGAINST HUMAN
Uttarakhand(2019) which must be for or in connection with any demand
BODY
o
for dowry, soon before her death. Cruelty must be in
connection with, demand for dowry.
OFFENCES
T
43. AGAINST HUMAN
BODY
Om prakash v. State of
Punjab, AIR 1961
A person commits an offence with the intention to
commit murder and in pursuance of such intention
does
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0Man act towards its commission, he will be liable to
attempt to murder. It is not necessary that bodily
injury capable of causing death should have been
caused.
OFFENCES
P. Rathinam v. Union of The Supreme court observed that section 309 violates
44. AGAINST HUMAN 3S4R8U6M4O
0M
India, AIR 1994 Article 21 of the constitution.
tr- 5U
BODY 6B4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G
The Supreme court overruled previous decisions and
OFFENCES
Smt. Gyan Kaur v. state of held that section 309 is not violative of Article 14 and
45. AGAINST HUMAN
Punjab 21 of the constitution. Right to die is not included in
BODY
Right to life.
The Supreme court said that there was a distinction
OFFENCES between the ‘taking’ and allowing a minor to
Vardarajan v. State of
46. AGAINST HUMAN accompany any person’. Something more has to be
Madras AIR 1962
BODY shown, some kind of inducement or active
participation of the accused in ‘taking’ the person.

OFFENCES Supreme court held that the word ‘entice’ seems to
T.D. Vadgama V. State of
47. AGAINST HUMAN involve the idea of inducement or allurement by giving
Gujarat AIR 1973
BODY rise to hope or desire on the other.
Supreme court read down Exception 2 of section 375.
The court held that sexual intercourse with wife below
OFFENCES
Independent Thought v. the age of 18 years constitutes rape. Therefore, after
48. AGAINST HUMAN
Union of India, 2017 the decision of Supreme Court in this case ‘Fifteen
BODY
years’ in Exception 2 of section 375 should be read as
‘eighteen years’.
Supreme court held section 377 of IPC, held
OFFENCES unconstitutional to that extent it criminalizes
Navtej Singh Johar & Ors.
49. AGAINST HUMAN consensual homo-sexual acts in private. Supreme
v. Union of India, 2018
BODY
kumar Kaushal v. Naz Foundation.
c o m
court overruled its previous 2013 judgment in Suresh
The expression ‘soon before her death’ used in the
rs .
substantive S.304-B IPC and s. 113-B of the Evidence
Act is present with the idea of proximity test. No
definite period has been indicated and the expression
50.
OFFENCES
AGAINST HUMAN
BODY
Baldev Singh v. State v.
State of Punjab, 2008
e
‘soon before’ Is not defined. The expression ‘soon
k
before’ would normally imply that the interval should
not be much between the Concerned cruelty or
r an harassment and the death in question. There must be

existence of a proximate and live-link between the
effect of cruelty based on dowry demand and the
OFFENCES
o p
State of Madhya Pradesh
concerned death.
The Supreme court observed that offence under
section 307 of the IPC (Attempt to Murder) cannot be
51.
52.
BODY
OFFENCES
T
AGAINST HUMAN
AGAINST HUMAN
v. Kalyan Singh & Ors.
2019
quashed, even when there is any settlement between
the complainant and the accused, as it is a non-
compoundable
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M offence.
Dr. Dhruaram Muralidhar If the promise to marry wasn’t made with sole
Sonar v. State of intention to seduce woman to indulge in sex, it isn’t
BODY Maharashtra, 2018 rape.
The Supreme court reiterated that conviction under
sectiontr-306 of8U
5U3S4R the IPC,
6M4O 0M (abetment of suicide) is not
OFFENCES
Rajesh v. State of sustainable on the allegation of harassment without
53. AGAINST
tr-5DHUMAN
3F4A8G6B4A
0E
Haryana, 2019 there being any positive action proximate to the time
BODY
of occurrence on the part of the accused, which led or
compelled the person to commit suicide.
The Supreme court observed that if the provocation
OFFENCES
State of Uttar Pradesh v. was voluntary on the part of the accused, it would not
54. AGAINST HUMAN
Faquirey, 2019 attract exception 1 to section 300 of the IPC,
BODY
(Exception to the offence of murder).
The Supreme court reiterated that the consent for
OFFENCES
Anurag Soni v. state of sexual intercourse obtained by a person by giving false
55. AGAINST HUMAN
Chhattisgarh 2019 promise of marriage would not excuse him from rape
BODY
charges.

OFFENCES
R. S. Nayak V. A. R. Supreme court held that for an offence of extortion,
56. AGAINST
Antulay and Anr 1986 fear or threat must be used.
PROPERTY
The words of section 405 is wide enough to include the
OFFENCES case of a partner, if it be proved that he was in fact
R.K. Dalmia v. Delhi
57. AGAINST entrusted with the partnership property, or with a
Administration, AIR 1962
PROPERTY dominion over it, and had dishonestly
misappropriated it or converted it to his own will
The Supreme observed that inability of a person to
Satishchandra Ratanlal
OFFENCES return the loan amount cannot give rise to a criminal
Shah v. of Gujarat
58. AGAINST prosecution for cheating unless fraudulent or
criminal Appeal No. 0009
PROPERTY dishonest intention is shown right at the beginning of
of 2019
OFFENCES
59. AGAINST
Joseph Shine v. Union of
India, 2019
the transaction.
o m
Supreme court struck down section 497 of IPC, Which
c
criminalizes adultery as unconstitutional.
MARRIAGE
OFFENCES
rs .
Supreme court reiterated that the courts at the place
where the wife takes shelter after leaving or driven
60. AGAINST
MARRIAGE
Nitika v. Yadwinder
Singh, 2019
k e
away from the matrimonial home on account of acts of
cruelty also have jurisdiction to entertain a complaint
alleging commission of offences under section 498A of
OFFENCES
r an the IPC.
Supreme court held that section 498A does not
Rashmi Chopra v. state of contemplate that complaint for offence under section
p
61. AGAINST
U.P. 2019 498A should be filed only by women, who is subjected
MARRIAGE
o
to cruelty by husband or his relative.
Supreme court held that a person commits the offence
62. ATTEMPT T Abhayanand Mishra v.

state of Bihar, AIR
of attempt when- 1) He intends to commit that
offence; 2) Having made preparations and with the
intention
3S4R8U6M4O
1961
tr-5U
0M to commit the offence does an act towards its
commission; 3) Such act need not be penultimate act
towards the commission of offence but must be an act
during the course of committing the offence.
Supreme court held that some act must be done
towards the commission
3S4R 8U6M4O0M of offence and such act must
State of Maharashtra v. tr-5U
63. ATTEMPT be ‘proximate’ to the intended result. Proximity need
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Mohd. Yakub AIR 1980
4A0E
not be in relation to time and action but in relation to
intention.
It was laid down that if a man attempted to do an
64. ATTEMPT Queen v. Collins impossible act he would not be liable R. v. McPherson
and R v. Dodd Where decided on same lines.
In this case ‘A’ gave certain pills for causing abortion.
It was found that pills were innocuous. It was held that
65. ATTEMPT R v. Osberon 1920
since the person was not on the job he is not liable for
attempt. This case has been overruled in R v. Spicer.

INDIAN EVIDENCE ACT, 1872 - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO. TOPICS CASE DETAILS

While analyzing the evidence on record the court
GENERAL Khurshid Ahmed v. state should not adopt a hyper technical approach. The
1.
PRINCIPLES of J & K, 2018 court should not reject the evidence on minor
contradictions.
The maxim falsus uno, falsus in omnibus is not
applicable in India. It is the duty of the court to
separate the grain from the chaff. It is the duty of
Kameshwar Singh v. the court to separate the grain from the chaff. It is
2.
state of Bihar 2018
c o m
the duty of the court to find the truth. Minor
contradictions and omissions in the evidence are
to be ignored if there is ring of truth in the
testimony of witness.
rs .
The supreme court, reiterated the well settled
position that the maxim falsus in uno, falsus in
3.
Mahendran v. state of
Tamil Nadu, 2019
k e
omnibus has no application in India. Court held
that if the testimony of the witness is found to be
unreliable in respect of part of the statement,
r an then the other part of the statement cannot be

made basis to convict the accused.
Evidence obtained through undesirable means
p
Pushpadevi M.L.
4. can also be taken into consideration provided it is
Wadhawan, 1987
o
relevant.
Alxlul Razak v. state Discovery of a fact with the help of tracker dog is
T
5.
1969 scientific evidence.
The expression ‘proved’, ‘disproved’ and ‘not
proved’
4O 0M lays down the standard of proof, namely,
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
about the existence or non-existence of
circumstances from the point of view of a prudent
Kuna v. state of Odisha
6. man, so much so that while adopting the said
2018
requirement as an appropriate concrete standard
to measure
tr-5U3S4R‘proof,
8U6M4Ofull
0M effect has to be given to the
4A0E circumstances or conditions of probability or

tr-5D3F4A8G6B
improbability.
Municipal Corporation, Arbitrators have to follow the principles of
7. Delhi v. Jagan Nath Ashok natural justice but they are not bound by the law
Kumar 1987 of evidence.
Evidence is required to be appreciated to find out
Ganesh K. Gulve v. State what part of it represents the true and correct
8.
of Maharashtra, 2002 state of things. It is a function of separating grain
from the chaff.
Ashish Batham v. State of In civil cases a matter is said to be proved when
9.
M.P., 2002 the balance of probability suggest it but in

criminal cases the court requires the proof
beyond reasonable doubt.
Evidence obtained in investigation of other
Ronny v. State of
10. crimes can also constitute good evidence in any
Maharashtra, (1998)
other case provided it is relevant,
Bain v. White Raven and Law of evidence is a lex fori which governs the
11.
Fumes Junction 1850 courts.
The court held that when shortly after murder,
the person suspected of murder described the
RELEVANT Basanti v. state of
12. absence of the deceased by saying that he had left
FACTS Himachal Pradesh, 1987
the village, the court held that statement as part
of the same transaction and thus relevant.
13. R. v. Foster 1834
c o m
The witnesses had seen only speeding vehicle and
not the accident. The injured person explained
him the nature of accident. He was allowed to give
part of res gestae.
rs .
evidence of what the deceased said because it was
For a statement to be part of transaction, it must
14.
G. Vijayvardhan Rao v.
state of Andhra Pradesh,
1996
e
be spontaneous and must be contemporaneous
k
with the fact. If the statement is made after the act
is over and its maker has had time for reflection
r an then it is not relevant.

The rule res gestae is an exception to the general
rule that hearsay evidence is not admissible. The
15.
o p
Gentela Raov. State of
Andhra Pradesh 1996
rationale in making certain statement admissible
or fact admissible under section 6 is on account of
the spontaneity and immediacy of such
16.
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Sukhar v. state of U.P.,
1999
statements or facts in relation to the fact in issue
Section 6 is an exception to general rule that
hearsay
4O 0M evidence is not admissible. For bringing
hearsay evidence within the provision of section
6 it must be established that the act was
contemporaneous with fact in issue and there
should not be an interval which would allow
fabrication.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4A0E Ram Lochan v. State of Superimposed photograph of the deceased over

tr-5D3F4A8G6B
17. the skeleton of human body was admissible to
West Bengal, 1963
prove that skeleton was that of the deceased.
Pammi v. Govt. of M.P., Holding test identification parade is not
1998 compulsory. Failure to hold it is not fatal to the
18.
Jadunath singh v. state of prosecution case where the accused persons
U.P. 1971 were previously known to the witness.
Abdul Waheel khan v. It is desirable that identification parade should be
19.
State of A.P., 2002 conducted soon after the arrest of the accused.
Police has to hold the identification parade for the
Har Nath Singh v. State of
20. purpose of enabling the witnesses to identify the
M.P., 1970
properties which are subject matter of the offence

or to identify the persons who are concerned with
it Identification parade has following twin objects
1. To satisfy the investigating authorities that
certain persons not previously known to the
witnesses were involves in the crime
2. To furnish the evidence to corroborate the
testimony of the witness before the court.
Holding a identification parade is not compulsory
Surendra Narain v. state
21. even when the accused demands it. Prosecution is
of U.P.,
not bound to do so.
Identification parade is a weak sort of evidence. It
is not a substantive evidence. The failure to hold
Malkhan Singh v. state of
22.
M.P., 2003
court
c o m
identification parade would not make
inadmissible the evidence of identification in
23.
Amar Nath Jha v. Nand
Kishore Singh 2018
rs .
Non-conduct of TIP is not by itself fatal to the
prosecution case but it will be weighted by the
courts while considering the facts and
Sukhpal Singh v. state of

e
circumstances of the case.
k
The inability of the prosecution to establish
motive in a case of circumstantial evidence is not
24.
Punjab
r an always fatal to the prosecution case, held the

Supreme court.
Plea of alibi is a rule of evidence recognized in
25.
o p
Jayantibhai Bhenkarbhai
section 11. The burden of proving commission of
offence is on prosecution and would not be
lessened by mere fact that accused had taken the
T
v. state of Gujarat 2002
plea of alibi. The plea of alibi taken by accused
needs to be considered only when the burden on
prosecution
4O 0M has been discharged satisfactorily.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Plea of alibi postulates the physical impossibility
Dudh Nath Panday v.
26. of the presence of accused at the scene of crime
state of U.P., 1981
by reason of his presence at another place.
Failure on part of accused to establish plea of alibi
Dasari Siva Prasad Reddy
doestr-not
5U3Shelp
4R8U6Mprosecution.
4O0M Thus mere failure on
v. Public prosecutor,
27. 4A0E High court Andhra
part of accused to establish alibi will not lead to
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
an inference that accused was present at the
Pradesh 2004
scene of crime.
Kehar Singh v. Delhi Only a prima facie case of conspiracy has to be
28.
Administration, 1980 made out to bring section 10 into operation.
Section 10 has been enacted to make
Badri Rai v. state of
29. acts/statement of co-conspirators, because of the
Bihar, 1958
nature of the crime.
Underlying principle on which section 10 is based
Sardul Singh v. state of is the principal of agency. It confines the principal
30.
Bombay 1957 of agency in criminal matters to the acts of the
conspirator within the period during which it can

be said that the acts were in reference to their
common intention.
Under section 10 the words ‘common intention
‘signify a common intention existing at the time
when the thing was said, done or written by one
of them. Things said, done or written while the
Mirza Akbar v. King
31. conspiracy was on foot are relevant as evidence
Emperor, 1940
of the common intention. Any statement,
narrative or confession made after the common
intention or conspiracy was no longer operating
is not admissible under section 10.
Ordinarily a person cannot be made responsible
32. C.B.I. v. V.C. Shukla 1998
o m
for the acts of others, unless they have been
instigated by him or done with his knowledge or
consent. Section 10 provides exception to this
c
rs .
rule by laying down that an overt act, committed
by one of the conspirators is sufficient on the
principles of agency
33.
Sardul Singh v. State of
Bombay, 1957
k e
The principle underlying evidence under section
10 is the ‘theory of agency’
Tope recorded conversation is admissible
34.
r an
R.M. Malkani v. state of
Maharashtra, 1973
provided that the conversation is relevant to the
matters in issue and there is identification of the
voice and that the accuracy of the conversation is
o p proved by eliminating the possibility of erasing

the tape record.
The supreme court held that terms ‘relevancy’
35.
T
RELEVANCY &
ADMISSIBILITY of Bihar 1994
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
and ‘admissibility’ are not co-extensive or
Ram Bihari Yadav v. State interchangeale terms. Their legal incidents are
4Odifferent.
0M All admissible evidence are usually
relevant, but all relevant evidence are not
admissible.
Where a judge is in doubt as to the admissibility
Collector of Gorakhpur v. of a particular piece of evidence he should declare
36.
Palakdhari Singh 1890 in tr-favour of 4O0M
5U3S4R8U6M admissibility rather than
4A0E
inadmissibility.
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
There is a distinction between admissibility f
evidence and the weight attached to it. The court
Sahoo v. State of U.P.
37. must apply the double test – First, whether the
1966
confession was perfectly voluntary and second, if
so whether it is true and trustworthy.
DIRECT &
Rishipal v. state of In a case based on circumstantial evidence motive
38. CIRCUMSTANTI
Uttarakhand, 2013 assumes great significance.
AL EVIDENCE
Sometimes it is very difficult to direct evidence. In
State of U.P. v. Ravindra
39. such cases the courts rely on circumstantial
Prakash Mittal, 1992
evidence. They provide evidence from the

Ganpat Singh v. state of surrounding circumstances of the case. Supreme
M.P., 2017 court has held that while appreciating
circumstantial evidence following points must be
kept in mind:-
1. The circumstances from which the conclusion
is drawn should be fully established.
2. Circumstances should be conclusive in nature.
3. All the facts so established should be consistent
only with the hypothesis of guilt and inconsistent
with innocence.
4. The circumstances should, to a moral certainty,
exclude the possibility of any person other than
40.
ADMISSION & Bharat Singh v.
the accused.
o m
Supreme court held that admission is substantive
evidence of the fact admitted and admission duly
c
41.
CONFESSION Bhagirathi 1966
Hanumant Narain v.
rs .
proved are admissible irrespective of whether
the party making them appears as witness or not.
Admission cannot be used in parts. It can be
State of M.P., 1975
k e
either used as a whole or rejected as a whole.
The term ‘confession” was defined by Lord Atkin.
The definition given by privy Council was
42.
r an
Pakla Narayan Swami v.
Emperor 1939
Palvinder Kaur v. state of
Punjab 1952
approved by Indian Supreme court in Palvinder
Kaur’s case. The court held that’s confession must
either admit in terms the offence, or at any rate
o p substantially all the facts which constitute the

offence’.
The court held that confession made by accused
43.
T Abdul Rashid v. state of
Bihar 2001
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
to Superintendent of Excise under provisions of
Bihar and Orissa Excise Act held to be
4Oinadmissible
0M because Excise officer was held to be
police officer within meaning of section 25.
Supreme court held that the statement that the
accused had committed the offence or that he had
hidden the object at some place are not
Aghnoo Nagesia v. state
44. admissible. What
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
is admissible is only that
4O0M
of Bihar, 1966
portion of the statement that reveals the
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B information about the place of hiding of the
object.
Supreme court held that it is essential to prove
that the object was discovered from a place of
hiding. If the object is lying in an open place, there
Mohd. Inatatullah v. state are chances that others may know about and it
45.
of Maharashtra, 1976 will be difficult to prove that object was
discovered at instance of information provided
by the accused. Supreme court held that section
27 is an exception to section 24 to 26.

Panduranga Kallu Patil v.
Supreme court held that section 27 is an
46. state of Maharashtra
exception to section 25 and 26.
2002
State of U.P. v. Deo,am
47. Constitutional validity of section 27 was upheld
Upadhyay 1960
Supreme court held that there is nothing wrong
in relying on a part of the confessional statement
Nishikant jha v. state of
48. and rejecting the rest when there is enough
Bihar 1952
evidence to reject the exculpatory part, the court
may rely on incubatory part
Supreme court held that a retracted confession
may form the basis of conviction if the court is
49.
Pyare Lal v. state of
Rajasthan 1963
o m
satisfied that it was true and voluntarily made.
Thereby as a matter of law, corroboration is not
c
necessary if court is convinced about truthfulness
rs .
and voluntary nature of confession; however
prudence require that retracted confession
should not be acted upon without corroboration.
50.
State of Punjab v.
Gurdeep Singh, 1999
k e
Extra judicial confession is admissible in evidence
and the court in appropriate cases, can rely on it
and convict the accused
51.
r an
State of Karnataka v. P.
Ravi Kumar 2018
Extra-judicial confession is a weak piece of
evidence and it cannot form the basis for
conviction, unless supported by other
o p substantive evidence
The Supreme court observed that there is no
evidentiary value to an involuntary confessional
52.
T Ashish jain v. Makrand

Singh 2019
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
statement made under undue pressure and
compulsion from the investigating officer, even
when
4O 0M it leads to the recovery of material objects
in relation to a crime.
A statement which is of the nature of an
Ram Bharorse Sharma v. admission on a mixed question of fact and law
53. Mahant Ram Swaroop cannot be treated as an admission under section
2001 17 because
tr-5U3S4R8Uonly
6M4Oan0Madmission of fact binds the
4A0E
maker and not an admission on question of law.
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
Satrucharla Vijaya Ram Where a person’s self serving statement
54. Raju v. Nimmaka jaya subsequently become adverse to his interest, it
Rajy, 2006 may be proved against him as an admission.
An admission is a substantive piece of evidence of
Bharat Singh v.
55. the fact admitted and the admission duly proved
Bhagirath, 1966
are admissible evidence
Confessions are considered highly reliable
State (N.C.T. of Delhi) v. because no rational person would make an
56.
Navjot Sindhu, 2005 admission against himself unless prompted by his
conscious to tell the truth.

Palvinder kaur v. state ofConfession must either be accepted as a whole or
57.
Punjab 1952 rejected as a whole.
Extra judicial confession is admissible in evidence
State of Punjab v.
58. and the court can reply on it as a substantive
Gurdeep Singh 1999
evidence and convict the accused.
propositions w.r.t. section 27-
1. There should be a discovery of fact in
consequence of the information received from a
Mohd. Inayatullah v. person accused of an offence
59.
Maharashtra, 1976 2. Discovery of such fact must be deposed to.
3. At the time of receipt of the information the
m
accused must be in the custody of police
o
4. Only so much of the information as it relates to
the fact discovered is admissible.
c
60. CBI v V.C. Shukla 1998
.
An admission is not an evidence against others.
rs
An Admission may become evidence against
others only if it amounts to confession. It may
k e
then be used as an evidence under section 10 or
under section 30 as confession of co-accused.
Important feature of police officer is that he must
61.
r an
Raj kumar Karwal v .
Union of India, 1991
not only have the power of investigation but also
to file report against the accused. Unless he has
the power to investigate and file charge sheet he
o p cannot be called a police officer within the

meaning of section 25
Under section 27 it is not necessary that when the
62.
DYING
T Md. Dastagiri v. state
1960
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Uka Ram v. state of

statement was made then he should be accused, it
is sufficient if he is an accused when such
statement
4O 0M is sought to be proved in court.
No person will die with a lie on his lips. The
Supreme court held that a sense of impending
63. death produces in man’s mind the same feeling as
DECLARATION Rajasthan 2001
that of a virtuous man under oath and chances of
falsehood are
tr-5U3S4R 8Utotally
6M4O0Mnullified
4A0E
The court held that the statement made by the
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
Pakla Narayan Swami v. deceased to his wife that he was going o the
64.
Emperor 1939 accused place to collect money from him was
admissible under section 32(1).
There is neither rule of law nor prudence which
states that dying declaration cannot form the sole
Kaushal Rao v. state of
65. basis of conviction unless it is corroborated by
Bombay. 1958
independent evidence. A true and voluntary
declaration needs no corroborated
Sampat Babso kale v. Supreme court held that though conviction can
66. State of Maharashtra solely be based on dying declaration,
2019 corroborative evidence may be required when

there is doubt as to whether the victim was in a fit
state of mind to make the statement.
Queen Empress v. It was held that dying declaration made by signs
67.
Abdullah 1885 and nods is also relevant.
There is no absolute rule that the dying
declaration cannot form the sole basis of
Suresh Chandra Jana v.
68. conviction unless it is corroborated. Rule
State of W.B., 2017
requiring corroboration is merely a rule of
prudence
If the dying declaration is found to be voluntary,
Bhadragiri Venkata Ravi
reliable and made in a fit mental condition, it can
v. Public Prosecutor High
69. be relied upon without any corroboration. In case
court of Andhra Pradesh
2013
Sanjay v. state of
upon them.
c o m
of any discrepancies, it would not be safe to rely
If there are apparent discrepancies in two dying

70.
71.
Maharashtra, 2007
K. Ramachand Reddy v.
accused
rs .
declaration, it would be unsafe to convict the
When the injured person lodged F.I.R. and then

Public Prosecutor, 1976
k e
died it can be held as relevant dying declaration.
There is no absolute rule of law that a dying
declaration cannot be a sole basis of conviction
72.
r an
Kauhal Rao v. state of
Bombay, 1958
unless corroborated. It is not a weaker kind of
evidence than any other evidence. It stands on a
same footing as any other evidence.
73.
o 1980
p
Kusa v. state of Orissa,
When a dying declaration is believed to be true
and consistent it can be relied upon for conviction
even if there is no corroboration.
74.
T Laxman v. state of
Maharashtra 2019
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Dying declaration can be oral or in writing and
any adequate method of communication, by
words
4O 0M or otherwise will suffice provided that
indication are definite and positive
An expert is a person who by his training and
experience has acquired the ability to express an
Bal Krishna Das Agrawal
EXPERT opinion which an ordinary witness does not
75. v. Radha Devi and others,
EVIDENCE possess. The
tr-5U3S4R evidence
8U6M 4O0M of an expert is such
1989
4A0E evidence which is based on expertise and
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
experience.
The opinion of a professional sold smith as to the
purity of the gold in question was held to be
Abdul Rahman v. state of
76. relevant as the opinion of an expert, though he
Mysore 1972
had no formal qualifications. His only
qualification was experience.
Supreme court held that an expert evidence is a
weak type of evidence. Courts do not consider it
S. Gopala Reddy v. state
77. as conclusive and there fore, it is not safe to reply
of Andhra Pradesh 1996
upon it without seeking independent and reliable
corroboration.

Supreme court held that where there is
inconsistency between eye witness on the point
Darshan Singh v. state of
78. how the injury was caused, the evidence of doctor
Haryana, 1997
cannot override the unimpeachable testimony of
eye witness.
It was held that handwriting may be proved by
the evidence of a witness in whose pesence the
Fakhruddin v. State of
79. writing was done was done and this would be
M.P. 1967
direct evidence and if it is available then evidence
of any other kind is rendered unnecessary.
Oral evidence takes precedence over medical
Latesh v. state of
80. evidence, unless the medical evidence completely
Maharashtra 2018
Ashish Jain v. Makrand m

refutes any possibility of such occurrence.
o
The supreme court observed that merely due to
c
the absence of a magisterial order authorizing the
81.
Singh 2019
rs .
police to obtain fingerprints of the accused, it
cannot be held that the fingerprint evidence was
illegally obtained
82.
State of H.P. v. Jai Lal and
e
In order to bring the evidence of a witness as that
k
of an expert it has to be shown that he has made
a special study of the subject or acquired a special
others 1999
r an experience or in other words he is skilled and has

an adequate knowledge of the subject.
There is no rule of law or prudence which says
83.
o
1980
p
Murari Lal v. state of M.P. that opinion of the expert must never be acted
upon unless corroborated. In appropriate cases
corroboration must be sought.
84.
85.
T Vilayat Khan v. state
1962
M.P. 2010
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Musheer Khan v. state of
Expert opinion is not to be believed if it is in
conflict with direct evidence.
The
4O 0M evidence of a fingerprint expert is not
substantive evidence. It can only be used to
corroborate some items of substantive evidence
which are on record
DOCUMENTARY P Gopalakrishnan @ Supreme court held that the contents of a
86. & ORAL Dileep v. state of memory
tr-5U3Scard In 4O
4R8U6M relation
0M to a crime amount to a
EVIDENCE 6B4A0E Keralaand others 2019 document’ and not a material object’.
tr-5D3F4A8G
State of Maharashtra v. Evidence can be produced by way of electronic
87.
Praful B. Desai, 2003 records. This would include video conferencing.
Section 91 and 92 are based on recognition of the
Roop Kumar v. Mohan jural act of integration in case of written
88.
Thedani 2003 instruments and applies even on a third party
seeking to establish a contract
Section 92 applies when a party to the instrument
seeks disprove its terms. It does not apply when
R. Janakiraman v. state
89. anyone including a party to the instrument seeks
2006
to establish that instrument itself is a sham and
fictitious.

A presumption is an inference of fact drawn from
PRESUMPTION
State of A.P. v. Vasudevaother known or proved facts. It means a rule of
90. & BURDEN OF
Rao 2004 law that court and judges shall draw a particular
PROOF
inference from a particular fact.
The presumption under section 112 applies with
91. Sethu v. Palani, 1926 equal force even where the child is born within a
few days after marriage.
Supreme court held that only way to rebut
Gautam Kundu v. state of presumption under section 1122 is by proving
92.
W.B. 1993 non-access and biomedical evidences like blood
test, DNA test etc. cannot be allowed.
It was held that conclusive proof of legitimacy
93.
Smt Kanti Devi v. Poshi
Ram, 2001
c o m
once raised under section 112 cannot even be
rebutted by a genuine DNA test. If the husband
and wife fiving together during the time of
rs .
conception but DNA tests reveals that child was
not born to the husband the conclusiveness in law
would remain un-rebutted.
Nand Lal Wasudeo

e
Supreme court opined that conclusive proof
k
under section 112 is final and in general cannot
be rebutted by any other fact, However DNA
94.
r an
Badwaick v. Lata Nandlal
Badwaick 2014
testing is an accurate science and once DNA test
report is available, it can rebut the presumption
of section 112
95.
o p Presumption under section 113B does not stand

Alamgir v. state of Assam automatically rebutted merely because the
2002 accused had been acquitted under section 302
96.
T Rabindra Kumartr-5UDey
3S4Rv.
state of Orissa, 1976
IPC.
The Evidence Act does not contemplate that
8U6M accused
4O 0M should prove his case same strictness
and vigour as prosecution. It is sufficient if he
proves his case under section 105 by the standard
of preponderance of probabilities.
When the presumption of innocence is reversed
97. Sanjay Dutt v. state1994 by statutory provision,
tr-5U3S4R8U 6M4O0M the burden should not be
4A0E
as heavy as that of prosecution
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
PRIVILEGED Union of India v. Orient
The privilege under section 121 is also available
98. COMMUNICATIO Engineering and
to an arbitrator.
NS commercial co. 1978
The court held that under section 122 the acts or
conducts of spouses apart from communications
Ram Bharose v. state of
99. are not protected A. wife can testify as to what her
U.P.
husband did on a certain occasion, though not as
to what he said to her.
The question was whether a communication sent
Queen Emperess v.
100. by the accused to his wife recovered by police
Donoghue 1899
during search of house is admissible. It was held

it can be relied upon as wife was not being
examined in the case and was neither compelled
to disclose nor being permitted to do so.
It was held that bar under section 122 is only
applicable on spouses and ot on third persons.
Further the bar under section 122 would even
M. G. Verghese v T.J.
101. continue after dissolution of marriage. The
Ponnn, 1970
statute at the time of communication has to be
seen rather than the status at time of giving of
evidence.
Section 123 is based on the maxim salus populi
est suprema lex which means that regard for
102.
State of U.P. v. Raj Narain
1975
o m
public welfare is the higher law.
With respect to section 123 court held that the
foundation of law is based on public interest.
c
rs .
Public interest which demands evidence to be
withheld must be weighed against public interest
It was held that a child is also a competent
103. WITNESSES
Mohamed Sugal v. The
King 1946
k e
witness, if it can understand the questions put to
it and give rational answer, even though he does
not understand the meaning of oath and its
r an
BhagwanSingh v. state of
implications.
Supreme court held that the evidence of child is
required to be evaluated carefully because he is
104.
o p
M.P. 2003
an easy prey of tutoring. Therefore, the court
always looks for adequate corroboration from
other evidence to his testimony.
105.
106.
T Ratan Singh Dalsukh
Bhai Nayak v. state of
Guajrat 2004
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Krishna Pillai v. state of

Child of tender age can be allowed to testify if he
has intellectual capacity to understand questions
and
4O 0M give rational answers.
Evidence of an interested witness should be
scrutinized carefully. However, where such
Kerala 1981 scrutiny establishes reliability, evidence ought
not to be rejected.
Supreme court
tr-5U3S4R 8U6Mheld
4O0M that there is no antithesis
4A0E
between section 133 and illustration (b) of
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
section 114. Illustration uses the word ‘may’
Dagdu v. state of
107. therefore, the discretion lies with the court. The
Maharashtra, 1997
court has to look into the facts and circumstances
of the case for seeing whether the accomplice is
reliable or not.
The supreme court held that the whole testimony
of an accomplice need not be rejected nor such
Rabinder Kumar Dey v.
108. witness can be regarded as a wholly unreliable
state of Orissa, 1977
witness. The court can rely upon that part of the
testimony which inspires confidence and credit.

The court held that it is not necessary that there
should be independent confirmation in every
109. R. v. Baskerville 1916 detail of the crime related by the accomplice. It is
sufficient if there is confirmation as to material
circumstances of the case
The supreme court held that the testimony of a
hostile witness requires close scrutiny because he
State of U.P. v. Ramesh
110. is contradicting himself, and that partition of his
Pal, 1996
statement, which is consistent with the
prosecution or defence, may be accepted
A witness may be called an interested witness’
Ganapathi v. State of only when he or she derives some benefit from
111.
Tamil Nadu, 2018
c o m
the result of the litigation. Therefore ‘related
witness’ is not equivalent to ‘interested witness’.
When a party to the suit does not give evidence
112.
1999
rs .
Vidya Dhar v. Manik Rao, and does not offer himself for examination, a
presumption would arise that a case set up by him
is not correct.
113.
Chacko v. state of Kerala,
2004
k e
One credible witness outweighs the testimony of
number of other witnesses of indifferent
character.
114.
r
M.P. 1981
an
Juwar Singh v. State of
If the oral testimony of witnesses is on the face of
it unacceptable then the courts are not bound to
accept it merely because there is no cross
115.
o p
Gopal Sarvan v. Satya
examination
If the witness after being examined in chief does
not appear to subject him to cross examination
T
Narayan, 1989
his evidence becomes valueless.
The fact that some f the witnesses have been
Leela Srinivasa 5URao v. declared
4O 0M to be hostile does not result in automatic
tr- 3S4R8U6M
116. state of Andhra Pradesh, rejection of their evidence. Evidence the evidence
2004 of the hostile witness if it finds support from
other evidence may be taken into account.
It is the duty of the presiding judge to explore
every avenue
tr-5U of 4O
3S4R8U6M justice.
0M For that purpose, he is
4A0E Ramchander v. state of expressly invested with section 165 with the right
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
117. to put questions to witnesses. This right is so wide
Haryana 1981
that he may ask any question he pleases, in any
form, at any time, about any fact, relevant or
irrelevant

INDIAN CONTRACT ACT, 1872 - LANDMARK CASES
S.NO. Topic Case Details
To the extent Indian contract Act deals with a particular
Satyabrata Ghose v.
GENERAL subject it is exhaustive upon it. In such case it is not
1. Mugneeram Bangur
PRINCIPLES permissible to import principles of English law. Decisions of
and Co., AIR 1954 SC
English courts possess only persuasive value.
If the transaction is of commercial nature the presumption is
GENERAL CWT v Abdul Hussain, that the parties intended legal consequences. The onus is on
2.
PRINCIPLES 1988 the party asserting the absence of legal consequences. The
Test of intention is objective one and not subjective
Banwari Lal v.
GENERAL Supreme court held that intention to create legal relations is
3.
PRINCIPLES
GENERAL
Sukhdarshan Dayal
1973
Carlill V. Carbolic
c o m
essential in order to create a contract.
The test of determination of such intention is objective. It is

4.
PRINCIPLES Smoke Ball 1893
rs .
not what parties had in mind but what a reasonable man
would think in the circumstances is to be inferred.
Supreme court pointed out the significance of reducing a
5.
GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
RooP Kumar v. Mohan
Thedani 2003
e
contract into writing. The court observed that when persons
express their agreements in writing it is for the express
k
purpose of getting rid of any indefiniteness and to put their
6.
GENERAL
PRINCIPLES
r an
State of Uttar Pradesh
v. Murari Lal, 1971
ideas in such shape that there can be no misunderstanding.
Supreme court held that provisions of Article 299(1) are
mandatory. If contract is made in contravention of the
7.
GENERAL
o p
Bank of India v. O.P.
provisions of Article 299 the contract would be invalid.
If the contract of employment is not governed by statute or
statutory rules then provisions of contract Act will be
T
PRINCIPLES Swamkar, 2003
applicable.
Lalman Shukla v. Gauri A proposal cannot be accepted unless it comes to the
8. OFFER
Dutt 1913 knowledge
4O0M of the person accepting it.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
The court observed the following points with regard to
general offers: a) Offer can be made to the world at large and
contract is made with the person who comes forward and
Carlill v. Carbolic
accepts the offer; B) In such cases communication of
9. OFFER Smoke Ball Company
acceptancetr-is not
4Rnecessary.
8U6M4O0M Performance of conditions is a
Ltd 1893 5U3S
sufficient acceptance without communication. C) General
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B offer is continuing in nature and it is open for acceptance to
any number of persons until it is retracted.
McPherson v. Appana, Court held that mere statement of the lowest price at which
10. OFFER
1951 the offeror would sell does not amount to contract
Pharmaceutical society
It was held that display of goods in a shop with a price
of Great Britain v. Boots
11. OFFER attached is not an offer even if it is a self service shop. It is an
Cash Chemists Ltd.
invitation to offer.
1952
12. OFFER Hyde v. Wrench, 1840 Counter offer puts an ends to the original offer

U.P. Rajya Nirman
Nigam Ltd. v. Indure
Pvt. Ltd. 1996
Supreme court held that when the offer is conditional, the
offeree has the choice of whether accepting the offer or
Food Corporation of
rejecting the offer or making a counter offer. Offeree cannot
13. OFFER India v. Ram Kesh
accept a part of conditional offer which results in the
Yadav, 2007
performance by the offer and reject the condition subject to
which the offer is made.
The contract can be express or implied. In this case the fire
Upton Rural District broke out in defendant’s farm and he summoned the fire
14. OFFER Corporation v. Powell, brigade service thinking them to be free. Defendant’s house
15. OFFER
1942
Harris v. Nickerson,
m
was not in the free service Zone. The court held that services
o
were rendered upon an implied promise to pay.
c
An advertisement for auction is mere invitation to offer.
16. OFFER
1873
Spencer v. Harding,
1870
rs .
An advertisement inviting tenders and quotations is an
invitation to offer.
17. OFFER
Henderson v.
Stevenson, 1875)
k e
There must be reasonable notice to the oferee of the printed
terms and conditions. If such notice is not given then the
oferee is not bound by such terms and conditions.
18. OFFER
r an
Union of India v.
Maddalla Thattiah,
A standing offer may be revoked at any time provided that it
has not been accepted in the legal sense. Acceptance in legal
sense is complete as soon as requisition for definite quantity
p
1966
of goods is made.
19. ACCEPTANCE
20. ACCEPTANCE
To Brogden v.
Metropolitan Railway
Co. 1877
A mere mental manifestation is not essential for acceptance.
There has to be intimation to the other party.
Communication must be received from the authorized

person
Powell v. Lee 1908tr-5U3S4R8U
only. It should be communicated by the person who
6M4O0M
has authority to accept. Communication from unauthorized
person is no communication in the eyes of law.
Acceptance must be communicated to the offeror only.
Communication to any other person is no communication in
Felthouse v. Bindley
21. ACCEPTANCE the eyes oftr-law.
5U3SA
4Rofferor
8U6M4Ocannot
0M impose upon the offeree the
1863
4A0E burden of refusal or duty to reply. In order words silence
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
cannot be prescribed as made of acceptance.
A provisional acceptance is acceptance subject to final
Union of India v. S.
22. ACCEPTANCE approval from higher authority. It does not bind either party
Narain Singh 1953
and offeror can revoke his offer.
Specific offer can be accepted only by a person to whom it is
23. ACCEPTANCE Boulton v. Jones, 1857
made.
When the offer is conditional the acceptor has the choice of
Food Corporation of either accepting the conditional offer or rejecting the
24. ACCEPTANCE India v. Ram kesh conditional offer or making a counter offer. But he cannot
Yadav, 2007 accept a part of offer which is beneficial to him and reject that
part which imposes conditions

Bharat Petroleum
Under certain circumstances the acceptor’s silence coupled
Corporation Ltd. v.
25. ACCEPTANCE with his conduct which takes form of a positive act may
Great Eastern Shipping
constitute an acceptance
Co., 2008
When a contract is made by instantaneous communication,
Entores Ltd. v. Miles Far the contract is complete only when the acceptance is received
26. ACCEPTANCE
East Corporation 1955 by the offer. The same rule is applied in case of
communication by telax.
In case where contracts are concluded by postal
Bhagwandas v. communications the place of contract is where the letter of
27. ACCEPTANCE Girdharilal and Co. acceptance is dispatched. In case of instantaneous
1966 communications the place of contract is where the
acceptance is heard.
o m
The court has held that a valuable consideration in eyes of
c
law may consist either in some right, interest, profit to or
28. CONSIDERATION Currie v. Misa 1875
.
benefit accruing to one party or some forbearance and
rs
detriment, loss or responsibility given, suffered or
undertaken by the other.
29. CONSIDERATION
Durga Prasad v. Baldeo,
1880,
k e
If act is done at the desire of the promisor then it will furnish
a good consideration. If the act is not done at the desire of the
promisor then it will not be considered to be a consideration.
30. CONSIDERATION
r a
Mohammad, 1887
n
Kedar Nath v. Gorie
A promise to pay subscription is enforceable if the party to
whom the promise has been made has incurred liability on
the basis of the promise.
31. CONSIDERATION
o p
AAbdul Aziz v. Masum
Ali and ors., 1914
Tweedle v. Atkinson,
A promise to pay subscription for charitable cause is not
enforceable if the other party has not incurred any liability.
English Law: it is necessary that consideration must move
T
32. CONSIDERATION
1861 from the promisee. Stranger to consideration cannot sue.
Chinnaya v. Ramya,
1881 Indian
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4OLaw:
0M Consideration for a contract need not necessarily
33. CONSIDERATION
Nihal Singh v. State of flow from the parties to the contract.
Punjab 2013
Chidambara v. P.S. Consideration must be something which not only party
34. CONSIDERATION
Ranga, 1965 regards but law also regards as having some value.
A promisetr-to
5Udo thing
3S4R 8U6Mwhich
4O0M the promisee is already bound
35. CONSIDERATION Scotson

4A 0E v. Pegg, 1861 to do under a contract can be a good consideration to support
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
the contract.
Tweddle v. Atkinson, Position under English law: The doctrine of privity of contract
PRIVITY OF Dunlop Peumatic Tyre was followed and it was held that no stranger to the
36.
CONTRACT Co. Ltd. v. Seifridge Co. consideration can take advantage of a contract although
Ltd., 1915 made for his benefit.
M.C. Chacko v. State
Bank of Travancore,
Position under Indian law: Supreme court held that the
PRIVITY OF 1970
37. doctrine of privity of contract is applicable in India and
CONTRACT Jamma Das v. Pandit
stranger to the contract cannot sue
Ram Avtar Pandey
1911-12

Nawab Khwaja
PRIVITY OF Mohammad v Nawab A person in whose favour a trust or charge has been created
38.
CONTRACT Hussaini Begum, 1909- may enforce it, even though he is stranger to contract.
10
A person who buys the land with a notice that the owner is
PRIVITY OF
39. Tulk v. Moxhay 1919 bound by certain duties then the purchaser will also be bound
CONTRACT
even though he was not a party to the contract
Indian contract Act does not specifically lays down the fate of
agreement if it has been entered into by a minor. However, it
was authoritatively settled that minor’s agreement is
Mohiri Bibee v.
CAPACITY TO absolutely void. A minor cannot make a promise enforceable
40. Dharmodas Ghose,
CONTRACT by law. Indian law with respect to restitution is slightly
1920-03
m
different from English law. The court held that minor is not
o
liable under section 64 and 65 of contract Act to repay any
money or compensate for any benefit.
c
rs .
There can be no estoppels against the minor even if he has
acted fraudulently and misrepresented his age. Minor is not
stopped from setting up the defence of minority. The reason
CAPACITY TO
e
behind this is that there can be no estoppels against the law.
k
The court held that minor cannot be held liable under the
Khan Gul v. Lakha Singh agreement on the basis of estoppels. The court held that
41.
CONTRACT 1928
r an doctrine of restitution finds place in section 41 of specific

Relief Act (Section 33 of NEW Act). False representation by
minor about his age gives rise to equitable liability. Court held
o p that grant of restitution is not enforcement of contract but

restoration of state of affairs as they existed before the
formation of contract
42.
CAPACITY TO
T The court laid down the following propositions regarding
doctrine of restitution in English law:
1. If the
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Leslie Ltd. v. Sheill,

minor obtains property or goods by misrepresenting
4O0M
his age he can be made liable to restore it but only so long it
is traceable in his possession;
CONTRACT 1914 2. If the minor has sold the goods or converted them, he
cannot be made to repay the value of the goods;
3. Doctrine of restitution
4Ohas
0M no application where the minor
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
has obtained money or cash instead of goods because
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B ‘restitution stops where repayment begins’.
Mortgage executed in favour of minor who has advanced the
CAPACITY TO Raghav Chariar v.
43. whole of the mortgage money was enforceable by him or any
CONTRACT Srinavasa, 1917
person on his behalf.
Chikam Amiraju v.
44. FREE CONSENT Chikam Seshamma Threat to suicide amounts to coercion.
1918
Askari Mirza v. Bibi Jai A contract made to avoid threatened prosecution was held to
45. FREE CONSENT
Kishori 1912 be not coercion.
There are certain cases in which higher duty is imposed upon
46. FREE CONSENT Moody v. Cox 1917
the parties to not only tell the truth but to tell the complete

truth. Those are the cases where the relations are such that
there is confidence reposed by one party and influence
exerted by another.
Andhra Sugars Ltd. v. Mere statutory compulsions are not regarded as undue
47. FREE CONSENT
State of A.P. 1968 influence.
Ladli Prasad Jaiswal v.
Supreme court held that section 16 is substantially based on
48. FREE CONSENT Karnal Distillery Co.
rules of English Common Law.
Ltd. 1963
Privy council laid down following principles regarding AIR
undue influence-
i) The relations between the parties must be such that one is
able to dominate the will of another.
Ragnunath Prasad sahu
49. FREE CONSENT v. Sarju Prasad sahu
1924
bargain is to be considered;
c o m
ii) One this position is determined then only Unconscionable
iii) Between parties of equal footing mere unconscionable

influence;
rs .
iv) Mere fact that the bargain is a hard bargain is no ground
in itself to grant relief.
50. FREE CONSENT

Bharat Petroleum
corporation Ltd. v.
Great Eastern Shipping
e
Under certain circumstances, the offeree’s silence coupled
k
with his conduct, which takes form of a positive act, may
r an
Co. Ltd., (2008)
constitute an acceptance.
The law relating to undue influence is same in case if gift inter

vivos as in case of contract. The court must consider the
51. FREE CONSENT
o p
Subhash Chandra Das v.
Ganga Prasad Das, 1967
following two things:-
1. The relations between donor and donee are such that the
donee is in position to dominate the will of the donor,
52. FREE CONSENT

T Jangbahadur Raj, 1963
2. The donee has used that position to obtain unfair
advantage.
The burden
5U3S4R8U6M
Mst. Kharbuja Kaurtr-v.
4O0M to proof that the transaction was hit by undue
influence is upon person who enters into the transaction with
pardanashin lady.
The court defined fraud as a false statement made knowingly
53. FREE CONSENT Derry v. Peak, 1889 or without belief in its truth or recklessly whether it be true
or false. tr-5U3S4R8U6M4O0M
4A0E To make the agreement void under section 20 it must be a
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
common mistake of both parties about some vital fact.
ITC Ltd. v. George Mistake should not be mutual mistake. When the parties
54. FREE CONSENT
Joseph Fernandes, 1989 make mutual mistake misunderstanding each other, they are
at cross purpose. There is no real correspondence of offer and
acceptance and parties are not at consensus ad idem.
If there is fraud by one of the parties and there is no mistake
Phillips v. Brooks Ltd.
55. FREE CONSENT as regards identity of the party, then, the contract is voidable
1919
and not void
VOID & Central Inland Water
Supreme court held that public policy is capable of proper
56. VOIDABLE Transport Corpn v.
expansion and modification with changing times. New heads.
CONTRACT Borjo Nath. 1986

Of public policy can be evolved in light of Fundamental Rights
and Directive Principles of state policy.
Followinfg are the essentials of the wagering contract:- a)
Event must be uncertain;
VOID & b) Mutual chances of gain or loss for both parties;
Carlill v. Carbolic
57. VOIDABLE C) Neither party should have any interest except winning or
Smoke Ball co. 1893
CONTRACT losing;
d) Neither party should have any control over the happening
or non-happing of the event.
VOID & Supreme court has held that wagering agreements are void
Gherulal Parekh v.
58. VOIDABLE but they are not illegal. Therefore, Transactions collateral to
Mahadeo Das 1959
CONTRACT wagering agreements is enforceable.
VOID &
59. VOIDABLE
CONTRACT
Satyabrata Ghose v.
Mugneeram Bangur
1954
m
Supreme court held that in India ‘doctrine of supervening
o
impossibility’ is akin to ‘doctrine of frustration’ in English
law.
c
VOID &
60. VOIDABLE
CONTRACT
Satya Jain v. Anis
Ahmed Rushdie, 2013
.
Supreme court held that the principles of business efficacy
rs
can be invoked to achieve intended meaning of parties when
terms of the agreement/ contract are ambiguous or not clear.
VOID &
61. VOIDABLE
Hakum Singh v.
Garmmon (India) Ltd,
k e
The court held that if two courts are equally competent to
deal with a subject matter, then it is open to the parties to
agree that the dispute should be adjudicated by one of the
CONTRACT
VOID &
62. VOIDABLE
1971
r an
Gurmukh Singh v. Amar
courts only
Public policy is not static. It is variable with changing times
p
Singh, 1991 and the needs of the society.
CONTRACT
VOID &
63. VOIDABLE
CONTRACT
VOID &
64. VOIDABLE
To Madhu Chander v. Raj
Coomar, 1874
Niranjan Shankar v.
Section 27 is intended to prevent not merely total restraint
but also partial restraint.
Negative covenant operating during the period of contract of

employment
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Century Spinning Co.
4O0M when the employee is bound to serve the
employer exclusively are generally not regarded as restraint
CONTRACT Ltd. 1967 of trade and therefore, do not fall under section 27 of the
contract Act.
VOID &
K. R. Lakshman v. State Business of horse racing does not constitute either gambling
65. VOIDABLE 5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
of Tamil Nadu, 1996 or gamingtr-
but it is a mere game of skill.
CONTRACT 4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
What are necessaries? Necessaries mean such things which
are necessary to maintain a person according to his condition
QUASI in life. It is to be determined with reference to fortune and
66. Chappel v. Cooper
CONTRACT circumstances of the particular minor. What are necessaries
may also depends on the status of person and also his
requirements at the time of actual delivery
The court held that In order to render infant’s estate liable for
QUASI necessaries, two conditions must be satisfied:-
67. Nash v. Inman 1908
CONTRACT a) Supply must be for goods reasonably necessary for his
support in life; and

b) He must not already have sufficient supply of necessaries
at the time of delivery.
QUASI Mafatlal Industries v. Supreme court held that section 72 is based on equitable
68.
CONTRACT Union of India, 1997 considerations.
When the contract is void by reason of non-compliance of
QUASI Laliteshwar Prasad v. Article 299(1) of the constitution, the rights of the parties are
69.
CONTRACT Baleshwar Prasad 1968 determined in accordance with section 70 of the Indian
contract Act.
Law as well as justice should try to prevent unjust
QUASI
70. Moses v. Mcferlan, 1760 enrichment i.e. enrichment of one person at the cost of other.
CONTRACT
This is the basis of quasi contractual obligation.
Before invocation of section 70 the following conditions are
to be satisfied:-
o m
1. A person should lawfully do something for another person
or deliver something to him;
c
71.
QUASI
CONTRACT
State of W.B. v. B.K.
Mondal and Sons, 1962
rs .
2. In doing so he must not intend to act gratuitously;
3. The person to whom the thing is delivered must accept and
enjoy the benefit.
k e
The person made liable under this section always has an
option to reject the things. It is only when he voluntarily
accepts the liability arises
72.
QUASI
r an
Food Corporation of
India v. Majdoor Shakti
The principle of quantum meruit is often applied where for
some technical reason a contract is held to be invalid. Under
such circumstances an implied contract to pay reasonably for
p
CONTRACT
Mandali 2007 the work done is assumed. Provisions of section 70 is based
o
on the principle of quantum meruit.
Sri Shiba Prasad singh
73.
QUASI
CONTRACT
T v. Maharaja Nandi,
Sale Tax officer v.
The word ‘mistake’ in section 72 includes not only mistake of
fact but also the mistake of law. This section does not conflict
Kanhaiya Lal Saraf, 3S4Rwith
1959
tr-5U 8U6M4Osection
0M 21 of the contract Act
Ordinarily the damages for mental pain and suffering are not
Jarvis v. Swan Tours allowed but in certain special cases they may be recovered. It
74. DAMAGES
Ltd. 1973 was held that in proper case damages for mental distress can
be recovered.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4A0E It was held that proper measure of damages is the difference

tr-5D3F4A8G6B Jamal v. Mools Dawood
75. DAMAGES between the contract price and the market price on the date
sons & Co. 1916
of the breach of contract.
When two parties have made a contract which one of them
has broken the damages which the other party ought to
receive in respect of such breach of contract should be such
Hadley v. Baxendale
76. DAMAGES as may fairly and reasonably be considered either arising
1854
naturally from the usual course things or such as may
reasonably be supposed to have been in the contemplation of
the parties at the time they made the contract.
Union of India v. West Market price at the time of damages is the correct measure of
77. DAMAGES
Punjab Factories, 1966 damages to be awarded.

Brij Pal Singh v. State of
Gujarat, 1984 In work contract, where the party entrusting the work
78. DAMAGES MSK projects (I) (IV) commits breach of contract, contractor’s claim for damages
Ltd v. State of under the head of loss of profit is admissible
Rajasthan, 2011
Normally the damages for mental pain suffering are not
allowed. They are allowed in the following circumstances:-
Addis v. Gramophone
79. DAMAGES 1. Unjustified dishonor of cheque
Co Ltd, 1909
2. Breach of promise of Marriage.
3. Failure of the vendor of real estate to make title
Ghaziabad
Development Authority Mental agony cannot be a head of damages for beach of
80. DAMAGES
v. Union of India , AIR
2000
ordinary commercial contract.
c o m
Two principles on which the damages are generally
81. DAMAGES
Murlidhar
v.Harishchandra, 1962
rs .
calculated are; firstly-as far as possible who has suffered from
the breach be placed as far as money can do it in as good
situation as if the contract had been performed and secondly-
M. Lachai Shetty v.
k e
plaintiff is under the duty to take all reasonable care to
mitigate the losses.
82. DAMAGES
1980
r an
Coffee Board Bangalore,
Principle of mitigation of loss is a circumstances to be born in
mid in assessing damages.
If a single lump sum is made payable by way of compensation
83. DAMAGES
o p
Dunlop Pneumatic Tyre
Ltd. v. New Motor Co.
Ltd 1915
on the occurrence of one or more or all of several events,
some of which may occasion a serious and others trifling
charge, then it is presumed that the sum is in the nature of
84. DAMAGES T Maula Bux v. Union of

India, 1970
penalty.
Earnest money is a part of purchase prince but security
deposit
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
is not so. Therefore, the rule of forfeiture applies to
4O0M
earnest money and not to security deposit
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

SPECIFIC RELIEF ACT, 1963 - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO. Case Details
Supreme court held that under section 6 the court is only
I.T.C. Limited v. Adarsh Co-
required to determine following two things:-
1. operative Housing Society Ltd,
a) Whether the plaintiff was in possession of the property; and
2012
b) Whether he has been illegally dispossessed.
Supreme court held that the jurisdiction to order specific
performance of contract is based on existence of a valid and
2. Satish Kumar v. Karan Sngh 2016 enforceable contract. If a valid enforceable contract has not
been made, the court cannot order specific performance of
contract.
3.
2015
Jaswinder Kaur v. Gurmeet Singh,

contract is an equitable remedy.
o m
Zarina Siddiqui v A. Ramalingam, Supreme court held that remedy of specific performance of
Supreme court held that relief of part performance cannot be
c
4.
2017
plaintiff’s own conduct.
rs .
granted where the inability to perform arises because of
Excel Dealcomm (P) Ltd. v. Asset Supreme court held that court cannot grant the relief of
5. Reconstruction Co. (India) Ltd,
2015
e
possession in a suit for specific performance unless prayer for
delivery of possession is not sought specifically.
k
Supreme court held that rectification under section 26 is
6.
r
Veronica Thomas Rajkumar, 2013
an
Joseph John Peter Sandy v.
possible only by the parties to the instrument and no one else.
This section is applicable only when it is pleaded and proved
that through fraud or mutual mistake of the parties, the real
7.
o p
Kandala Port v. Hargovind Hasraj,
intention of the parties is not expressed.
Supreme court held that grant of declaratory decree is
discretionary in nature, court may in appropriate cases refuse
T
2013
to grant declaratory decree.
Supreme court observed that in a suit filed under section 38 of
Balakrishna Dattatraya Galande v.
the S.R.A. permanent
0M injunction can be granted only to a
8. Balakrishna Rambharose Gupta, tr-5U3S4R8U6M4O
person who is in actual possession of the property on the date
2019
of suit.
Holding that possessory title over property cannot be claimed
merely on the basis of ‘casual possession’, the Supreme court
9. Poona Ram v. Moti Ram, 2019
observed that tr-a 5U
causal act
3S4R8U of 0M
6M4O possession does not have the
effect of interrupting the possession of the rightful owner.
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
The Supreme court observed that grant of interim mandatory
injunction is not prohibited, and it can be granted in
Hammad Ahmad v. Abdul Majeed, ‘appropriate’ cases. An ad interim mandatory injunction, is to
10.
2019 be granted not at the asking but on strong circumstances so
that to protect the rights and interest of the parties so as not to
frustrate their rights regarding mandatory injunction.

LIMITATION ACT, 1963 – LANDMARK CASES
Bombay Dyeing Manufacturing Supreme court held that limitation bars the
1. PRELIMINARY
Co. V. State of Bombay 1958 remedy and does not extinguish the right.
Assam Urban Water Supply & Supreme court held that ‘prescribed period’
2. Sewerage Board v. Subash does not include period extendible by the
projects and MKTg Ltd. court in exercise of its discretion.
It was held by Supreme court that if it
becomes apparent that the suit is barred by
Narne Rama Murthy v. Ravula
3. limitation, then it is the duty of the court to
somasundarm, 2005
decide the question of limitation even if it is
B.B. & D Mfg. Co. v. ESI

not taken up in pleadings.
o m
The object of the statute of limitation is to
compel a person to exercise his rights of
c
4.
corporation, 1972
rs .
action within a reasonable time as also to
discourage and suppress stale, fake or
fraudulent claims.
5. Moti chand v. Munshi, 1970
k e
Principle on which the statute of Limitation is
based is interest republicae ut sit finis litium
i.e. the interest of the state requires that there
r an should be an end to litigation.

The Limitation Act, 1963 Does not provide for
limitation for filing criminal cases is because
6.
o p
Japani saho v. Chandrashekhar
the criminal offence is considered wrong
against the state and general rule of criminal
justice is that crime never dies. This principle
T
Mahanty, 2007
is reflected in maxim ‘nullum tempus aut
locus occurrit regi’ i.e. ‘lapse of time is no bar
4O0M to crown in proceedings against the
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
offenders.’
The Limitation Act is a consolidating and
amending statute relating to the limitation of
suits, appeals and applications, therefore, it
must be6M regarded
4O0M as an exhaustive code. They
A.S.K. Krishappa Chettiar v. tr-5U3S4R8U
7. cannot be extended by analogy or reference
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
4A0E K.S.V.V. Somiah, 1964
to the proceedings to which they do not
expressly apply. courts are not permitted to
travel beyond its provisions to add or to
supplement them
Limitation Act is not unconstitutional
because it applies to right of action in future.
It is a shield and not a weapon of offence.
Tilokchand Motichand v. H.P. State cannot put any hindrance by
8.
Munshi, 1970 prescribing period of limitation in the way of
an aggrieved person seeing to approach
Supreme court of India under Article 32 of the
constitution.

It was held by Supreme court that even if the
LIMITATION OF V.M. Salgaocar and Bros. v. defendant does not raise the plea of limitation
9. SUITS, APPEALS & Board of Trustees of port of and it appears to the court that the suit is ex
APPLICATION Mormugao, 2005 facie barred by limitation then the court must
dismiss it.
Supreme court observed that the suits,
Ganesan v. T.N. Hindu Religious appeals and applications referred to in the
10. and Charitable Endowments Limitation Act, 1963 are suits, appeals and
Board, 2019 applications which are to be filed in a court,
and not before a statutory authority.
Maniben Devraj shah v. Supreme court held that the expression
11. Municipal Corporation of ‘sufficient cause’ should be liberally
12.
Brihan Mumbai 2012
K. Subharayudu v. LAO, 2017

m
construed without any hard and fast rule.
o
Supreme court held that ‘sufficient cause’
c
must be given liberal construction so as to
13.
Sandhya Rani v. Sudha Rani
1978
rs .
advance substantial justice.
Expression ‘sufficient cause’ must be given
liberal construction so as to further the cause
14.
Darshan Singh v. Gurdev Singh,
k e
of substantial justice.
Section 6, 7 and 8 are to be read together.
Section 8 is in the nature of proviso to section
r an 1995
Rajender Singh v. Santa Singh,

6 and 7.
It is the duty of the court in the view of section
3 of the to apply the bar of limitation, where,
p
15.
1973 on the patent facts it is applicable, even
16.
To Angadi v. HiRANMAYYA, 1972
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O 0M
though it is not specifically pleaded.
Section 4 indicates that it has nothing to do
with computing the prescribed period nor it
deals with extension of time but only extends
the concession.
If the delay cannot be condoned under
Damodaran Pillal v. South section 5 of the Act it cannot also be condoned
17.
Indian Bank 2005 by invoking inherent powers of the court
under section 151 of code of civil procedure
It3Sis
tr-5U 4R8Uunreasonable
6M4O0M to call upon the party
4A0E explain the delay in its conduct during the
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
whole of the prescribed period. The party has
to show why he did not file an appeal on the
Ram Lal v. Rewa Coalfields Ltd.,
18. last day of the limitation prescribed and till
1962
they day actual application is filed.
Even if the sufficient cause is shown the party
is not entitled to the condonation of delay as
a matter of right
Section 5 gives a double discretion to the
Collector, Land Acquisition,
court. The court has to satisfy regarding the
19. Anantnag and Ors. v. Mst. Katiji
sufficiency of the cause and secondly, even if
& Ors. 1987
the sufficient cause is proved, the word ‘may’

in section 5 means that the court still has
discretion to condone the delay or not.
The expression ‘sufficient cause’ within the
meaning of section 5 should receive liberal
Ram Nath Sao v. Gobardhan
20. construction o as to advance substantial
Sao, 2002
justice when no negligence or inaction or
want of bona fide is imputable to party
Section 6, 7 and 8 have to be read together
Bailochan Karan v. Basant
21. and that section 6 is condrolled by section 8
Kumari Naik, 1999
which serves as an exception to section 6 & 7.
COMPUTATION Supreme court held that ordinarily in
M/s Saketh India Ltd. v. M/s/
22. OF PERIOD OF computing the time the rule is to exclude the
India Securities Ltd, 1999
23.
LIMITATION
India House v. Kishan N.
Lalwani, 2003 m
first day and include the last day.
o
Party need not file application praying to
c
exclude the time as given in section 12.
rs .
Supreme court held that following conditions
are to be satisfied for invoking section 14:-
a) The previous suit or application must be
24.
Madhavrao N. Patwardhan v.
Ram Krishna, 1958
k eprosecuted with good faith and due diligence;

b) The matter in issue in the previous suit or
application and the new suit is the same;
r an c) The court was unable to entertain the suit

or application because of defect of
jurisdiction.
25.
o p Supreme court held that the expression ‘other

Zafar Khan v. Board of Revenue, causes of like nature’ must be interpreted to
1985 convey meaning analogous to the expression
26.
T Roshanlal Kuthalia 8U6M
and
tr-5U3S4R
4O 0M
Ors. v.
R. B. Mohan Singh oberoi 1975
‘from the defect of jurisdiction’.
The expression ‘other causes of like nature’ in
section 14 of the Limitation Act is wide
enough to cover such causes where defects
are not merely jurisdictional but are more-or
–less neighbours to such deficiencies.
The expression ‘time requisite’ under section
12
tr-5U 3S4Rcannot
8U6M4O0Mbe understood as the time
4A0E State of U.P. v. Maharaja Narain, absolutely necessary for obtaining the copy of
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
27. the order. The words ‘time requisite’ For
1968
obtaining the copy of the decree means the
time beyond the party’s control occupied
obtaining the copy.
It is well settled by virtue of section 29(2) of
Limitation Act that the provisions of section
12 are applicable for the period of limitation
India House v. Kishan N.
28. prescribed by any special or local law. It is the
Lalwani 2003
statutory obligation of the court to extend the
benefit of section 12 where applicable
without any application being made.

Gulbarga University v. Provisions of section 14 of the Act would be
29.
Mallikarjun S. Kodagali 2008 applicable to arbitration proceedings.
Following conditions should be met before
application of section 14:-
1. Both the prior and subsequent proceedings
should be civil and by the same parties;
2. Prior proceedings have been prosecuted
with due diligence and good faith;
3. Failure of prior proceedings was due to
defect of jurisdiction or other causes of like
Deena (Dead) Through LRs v.
nature;
30. Bharat Singh (Dead) Through
4. Earlier proceedings and later proceedings
LRs, 2002
m
must relate to the same matter in issue; and
o
5. Both the proceedings are in court.
The words ‘other causes of like nature’ must
c
rs .
be construed ejusdem generis with words
‘defect of jurisdiction’, i.e. defect must be such
that it is impossible for the court to entertain
e
the suit or application and to decide on
merits.
k
The court observed that provisions of section
31.
r an
Pallav Seth v. Custodian and
others, 2001
17 embody fundamental principles of justice
and equity. Party should not be penalized for
failing to adopt legal proceedings when the
o p facts or materials necessary for him have

been willfully concealed.
The acknowledgement under section 18 must
32.
T Sampuran Singh v. Niranjan
Kaur 1999
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
be made before the expiration of the
prescribed period. One the prescribed period
has expired, it cannot be revived under
section 18.
The effect of acknowledgment is that the
State of kerala v. T.M. Chacko, fresh period of limitation has to be computed
33.
2009 from the time when acknowledgement as s
signed. 4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
To claim exemption under section 20 of the
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Act, the plaintiff must be in a position to allege
and prove not only that there was payment of
34. Sant Lal v. Kamla Prasad 1951 interest on a debt or part payment of the
principal, but that such payment had been
acknowledged in writing in the manner
contemplated by section 20.
Supreme court held that any person who has
perfectedtitle by way of adverse possession,
ACQUISITION OF
Ravinder Kaur Grewal v.Manjit can file a suit for restoration of possession in
35. OWNERSHIP BY
kaur, 2019 case of dispossession. The court held that plea
POSSESSION
of acquisition of title by adverse possession
can be taken by plaintiff under Article 65 of

the Limitation Act and there is no bar under
the Limitation Act, 1963 to sue on aforesaid
basis in case of infringement of any rights of a
plaintiff.
Supreme court reiterated that mere
continuous possession howsoever long it
may have been qua its true owner is not
enough to sustain the plea of adverse
Mallikarjunaiah v. Nanjaiah,
36. possession unless it is further proved that
2019
such possession was open, hostile, exclusive
and with the assertion of ownership right
over the property to the knowledge of its true
owner.
c o m
rs .
k e
r an
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

SALE OF GOODS ACT, 1930 – LANDMARK CASES
S. NO Case Details
State of M.P. v. Orient Paper Supreme court in held that standing timber is a movable
1.
Mills Ltd., 1977 property is tress are agreed to be severed under the contract
Al Jazeera steel products Co.
Supreme court has held that agreement to sell creates jus in
2. SOAG v. MID India power and
personam while sale creates jus in rem.
steel Ltd., 2012
A person cannot sell his goods to himself. Supreme court held
CIT v. Hindu Construction Ltd., that sale contemplates a seller and a purchaser. If a person
3.
1972 revalues his goods and shows a higher value in books of account
he cannot be considered as having sold the goods.
4.
H. Anraj v. Govt. of Tamil Nadu,
1986
o m
Supreme court held that lottery tickets are also ‘Goods’.
Supreme court held that transfer of goods may be made with
c
5.
M.S. Madhusoodhanan v. Kerala
Kanumudi (P) Ltd. 2004
rs .
immediate effect and the consideration may be agreed upon at a
later date. The court also observed that the agreement which
allows the party to fix the price at a later date is not invalid for
k e
uncertainty under section 29 f the contract Act.
The plaintiff wanted to buy car for touring purpose. The
defendant suggested that ‘Bugatti’ car would be suitable and
6. Baldry v. Marshall, 1925
r an therefore, plaintiff bought one. The car turned out to be unfit for
touring purpose. The plaintiff sought to reject the sale. The court
held that suitability of car for touring purpose was not a
o p
Grant v.Australian Knitting
‘warranty’ but instead it was a condition’.
The court held that buyer’s reliance on seller need not be express
every time. When the seller deals with particular goods the buyer
T
7.
Mills, 1936 has the confidence that tradesman has selected his stock with
skill and judgment.
Unascertained goods are not defined in the Act. Supreme court
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
held that unascertained goods falls in the following categories:-
Salar jung Sugar Mills Ltd. v.
8. 1. Goods to be manufactured or grown by the seller;
State of Mysore 1972
2. Generic goods;
3. Unidentified part of specific goods
Passing of property is one of
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
the results of sale of goods.
4O0M
McEntire v. Crossley Bros. Ltd. However, the time of passing of property depends on the
9. 4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B1895 intention of the parties. This question entirely depends on the
intention of the parties.
Supreme court held that if the requirements of section 20 are met
Agricultural Market Committee
then the title in goods passes to the purchaser. The passing of
10. v. Shalimar Chemical Works
title is not dependent on payment of price on time of delivery of
Ltd, 1997
the goods.
The court laid down following two principles:-
Bishopsgate Motor Finance
1. No one can give a better title than he himself has;
11. Corpn. Ltd. v. Transport Brakes
2. The person who takes in good faith for value without notice
Ltd., 1949
should get a good title.

Morgan Stanley Mutual Fund v. Till the allotment of shares take place, shares cannot b called
12.
Kartik Das, 1994 goods’ because they do not exist.
Definition of ‘goods’ under section 2(7) makes it clear that things
Badri Prasad v. state of Madhya fixed to the land may be subject matter of contract of sale of
13.
Pradesh 1970 goods provided that by the terms of contract they are agreed to
be severed from land.
State of Madras v. Gannon
‘Sale’ in legal sense is one arising out of contract leading to
14. Dunkerley & Co. (Madras) Ltd.,
passing of the ownership
1959
In case of sale by auction, the sale is complete when auctioneer
Consolidated Coffee Ltd. v.
15. announces its completion by the fall of hammer or in other
Coffee Board, Bangalore, 1980
customary manner.
16.
M. S. Madhusoodan v. Kerala
Kaumudi Pvt. Ltd., 2004
o m
An agreement which provides for future fixation of prices either
by the parties themselves or by the third party is capable of being
c
made certain and is not invalid as per section 29 of the contract
Act.
rs .
k e
r an
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

ARBITRATION - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO Case Details
Supreme court has held that it is required to seen whether the
parties have agreed to refer the dispute to the arbitrator. If there
1. Rukmanibai v. Collector, 1981
is such an arrangement, that will constitute arbitration
agreement. No particular form is required.
Supreme court held that arbitration agreement can be an
2. Giriraj Garg v. Coal India, 2019 independent agreement and it need not be in a form of clause in a
contract.
Supreme court held that when the parties to a contract containing
Zenith Drugs & Allied Agencies arbitration clause have settled their differences and compromised
3. Pvt. Ltd. vs. Nicholas Piramal
India Ltd., 2009
o m
the matter, arbitration clause in the prior agreement cannot be
invoked in the dispute subsequently arising between the parties
after such compromise.
c
4.
M.M. T.C. Ltd v. Sterlite
Industries Ltd 1996
rs .
Supreme court held that arbitration agreement cannot be held
invalid on the ground that the arbitration agreement specify even
number of arbitrators.
5.
Kss Kssiipl Consortium v. Gail
(India ) Ltd., 2015
e
Supreme court held that before exercising power under section
11(6) the court has to determine the arbitrable dispute between
k
the parties. This is only limited to the question of arbitrability
6.
United India Insurance Co. Ltd
an
v. Antique Arts Exports (P) Ltd.
2019
r
Supreme court held that appointment of arbitrator by court is a
judicial power and not merely an administrative function.
7.
Bharat Broadband Network
o p
Ltd. v. United Telecoms
Limited, 2019
Supreme court held that the appointment of arbitrator by a
person who himself is ineligible to be an arbitrator as per section
12(5) of the arbitration and conciliation Act 1996 is void ab initio,
8.
9.
T
Sai Babu vs. Cleariya Steels Pvt
Ltd. 2019
NHAI vs Subhash Bindlish,

Supreme court observed that the termination of Arbitration
proceeding by the Arbitrator under section 32(2) © of the
arbitration and
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
conciliation Act cannot be recalled.
4O0M
Supreme court observed that the mandate under section 34(3) of
the Arbitration and conciliation Act providing outer limit of 120
2019 days to file an application to set aside arbitral Award remains
unchanged even after 2015 amendment of the Act.
A foreign award given after the commencement
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M of the new act can
Thyssen stahlunion Gmbh v. be enforced only under the new Act. There is no vested right to get
10. tr-5D3F4A8G6B
4A0E
steel Authority of India, 1999 the award enforced Foreign Awards (Recognition and
Enforcement) Act, 1961.
Sheer stranger is not bound by the award of the arbitral tribunal
Union of India v. Dalmia
11. nor he can be allowed to participate in the proceedings because
Engineering Pvt. Ltd., 1990
arbitration is treated as a private proceedings
It is to be decided whether the existence of arbitration agreement
to refer the dispute to arbitration can be clearly ascertained from
12. K.K. Modi v. K.M. Modi, 1998
the facts and circumstances of the case. This depends on the
intention of the parties to be gathered from relevant documents.
Bihar state mineral
13. Following are the essentials of arbitration agreement:-
Development Corporatation v.

Encon Builders (I) Pvt. Ltd., 1. There must be present or future dispute or differences in
(2003) connection with some contemplated affairs,
2. There must be intention of parties to settle differences by such
private Tribunal.
3. The parties must agree in writing to be bound by decision of
such tribunal.
4. There must be consensus between the parties.
The language of section 8 is Premptory. It is obligatory for the
P. Anand Gajapathi Raju v.
14. court to refer the dispute to arbitration in terms of arbitration
P.V.G. Raju, 2000
agreement if the conditions are satisfied.
Sukanya Holding Pvt. Ltd. v. The court cannot add parties who are not parties to the agreement
15.
Jayesh H. Pandya, 2003 in the arbitration proceedings.
16.
MMTC Ltd. v. Sterile Industries
(India) Ltd. 1997
o m
Arbitration agreement need nor specific the number of arbitration
in order to be valid. Non specification of number of arbitrators
does not render the agreement void.
c
17.
SBP & CO. v. Patel Engineering
Ltd., 2005
rs .
The power exercised by the chief justice of High Court or chief
justice of India under section 11(6) is a judicial power and not an
administrative power
18.
Union of India v. Popular
Builders 2000
k e
The existence of an arbitrable dispute is a condition precedent for
exercise of power by the arbitrator.
r an
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

TORT - LANDMARK CASES
Supreme court held that ‘tort’ means ‘breach of duty
GENERAL Jayalakshmi salt works Pvt. V.
1. leading to damage’. The basic ingredients of tort are
PRINCIPLES state of Gujarat, 1994
injury and damage.
Law of Torts is based on English common Law. It is
Rajkot Municipal Corporation basically the product of judicial decisions. Supreme
2. v. Manjulben jayantilal court held that in absence of statutory law with
Nakum, 1997 respect to torts, common law principles evolved in
English may be applied in India.
The plaintiff was qualified voter but was wrongfully
3. Asbhy v. White
o m
denied voting in elections by the defendant (returning
officer). Although the candidate of the plaintiff won
but still the plaintiff was allowed to recover damages
c
.
because his legal right was violated.
rs
The petitioner who was M.L.A. was wrongfully
detained by the authorities and as a consequence he
Bhim Singh v. state of J & k,
e
4. could not attend Assembly session. The Supreme
1986
Court recognized his legal right and awarded
5.
an
Grant v. Australian Knitting
k
compensation to him.
The court held that mere fact that a man is injured
gives no claim in law, so long as the other party is
r
Mills 1936
exercising his legal right.
o p Defendant set up a rival school and as a result the

plaintiff had to reduce the fee because of competition.
The court did not allow any remedy to the plaintiff
T
Gloucester Grammar school
6. because the defendant had not violated any legal right
case
of the plaintiff. Defendant was within his right to open
4Oa0M
rival school. The injury suffered by the plaintiff was
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
not due to violation of any legal right.
A number of steamship companies drove the plaintiff
out of business by combining and offering reduced
Mogul steamship Co. v.
7. freight. The court held that the plaintiff had no cause
McGregor Gow and Co,. 1892
of action because4Odefendants
0M employed lawful means
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
to reduce freight.
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B Plaintiff was using the water stream steam for his mill.
This water came from an underground stream.
8. Chesmore v. Richards 1859 Defendants dug a well on their lands and the water
from the stream was pumped into that well. The court
held that defendants were not liable.
The court held that even if the harm has been caused
Mayor of Bradford
9. maliciously; no action will lie unless the plaintiff an
Corporation v. Pickles 1895
prove that he has suffered injuria.
Malice in law: It means a willful act done without legal
Smt. S.R. Venkatraman v. excuse of justification. A wrongful intention is
10.
Union of India 1979 presumed in case an unlawful act is done without just
excuse.

There was a motor race going on and two cars
collided. As a result of collision one of the car was
GENERAL Hall v. Brooklands Auto
11. thrown amongst the spectator. The spectator was
DEFENCES Racing Club, 1932
injured. It was held that the plaintiff impliedly took the
risk of the injury.
Two strangers took lift in a jeep. Suddenly one of the
bolts fixing the wheel of the jeep gave way and jeep
Padmavati v. Dugganaika, toppled. It was held that driver or master could not be
12.
1975 held liable because two strangers voluntarily got into
jeep and hence principle of volenti non fit injuria will
apply and secondly it was sheet accident.
Plaintiff was employed by the defendant in a stone
13.
Smith v. Charles Baker and
sons (stone quarry case)
o m
quarry. Large chunks of rocks were being conveyed
from one side to another by help of cranes. One of the
stone fell an injured the plaintiff working there. It was
c
1891
rs .
held by the court that there is a mere knowledge of
risk and there was no consent. There fore, maxim
volenti non fit injuria was not made applicable.
k e
The defendant left two horse van unattended. Horses
went berserk and started running on streets. The
plaintiff, who was police constable, saw eminent
14.
an
Haynes v. Harwood, 1935
r
danger to women and children on streets. He took the
risk and managed to stop the horses. In the process he
suffered injury. The court held that the defendant
o p could not be allowed to take the defence of volenti non

fit injuria.
Defendant created some artificial lakes on his land.
15.
T Nicholas v. Marshland, 1876
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
There was extraordinary rainfall (heaviest in human
memory) and as a result of it water overflowed and
4Owashed
0M away the nearby bridge of plaintiff. The
defendant was not held liable because the loss
occurred due to act of God
Defendant had put spring guns in his garden without
fixing any notice. The trespasser was injured from the
16. Bird v. Holbrook, 1828 automatic discharge.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M It was held that plaintiff was
entitled to recover compensation as the force used
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B was greater than the occasion demanded.
Defendant entered the plaintiff’s land to prevent the
spread of fire to the adjoining land. Since the
17. Cope v. Sharpe 1912
defendant’s act was considered to be reasonably
necessary, he was not held liable for trespass.
Sparks from the engine of a rail company set fire to the
Vaughan v. Taff Vale Rail Co., appellant’s woods on adjoining land. It was held that
18.
1860 since the respondent had taken care to prevent
emission of spark they were held not liable.
Defendants received a wooden case for further
19. Nitro Glycerine Case, 1872
transmission They were not informed of its contents.

The contents were found to be leaking and the
defendant took them for examination. While
examining the contents the nitro glycerine exploded.
The defendants were held not liable because it was
sheer case of accident.
Defendant Corporation permitted a picnic party.
Members of picnic party were carrying huge gallons of
tea through a passage where children were also
REMOTENESS OF
20. Glasgow Corpn v. Muir, 1943 playing. One of the member lost grip of gallons and
DAMAGE
few children were injured. It was held that the
defendant were not liable because the injury was not
foreseeable.
21. Bolton v. Stone, 1951
o m
The person on road was injured by a ball hit by a
player on a cricket ground. The court held that the
defendant was not negligent as the injury was not
c
foreseeable.
rs .
Due to heavy rains factory was flooded with water
which got mixed with oil substance and made the floor
22. Latimer v. A.E.C. Ltd., 1953
k e
slippery. Defendants took all possible care and spread
sawdust. Still oily patches remained and plaintiff
suffered injury. The court held that defendant was not
r an liable as he took all possible care to avoid the harm.

‘A’ threw a lighted squib into a crowd. It fell on ‘X’. ‘X’
in order to save him threw it further. It fell on ‘Y’. ‘Y’
23.
o p
Soott v. Shephard, also threw it further and as a result ‘B’ suffered injury.
Here, ‘A’ was held liable for his acts because his act
was the proximate cause of the damage
24.
T Greenland v. Chaplin 1850
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
It was held that a person is expected to anticipate and
guard against all reasonable consequences which are
expected
4O 0M to flow from his acts.
Test of directness was first upheld. In this case railway
company was negligent in keeping heap of grass
trimmings near the track. Spark from the engine set
Smith v. London & Western
25. fire to the material The fire was carried to the
Railway Co., 1870
plaintiff’s cottage
tr-5U3S4R 8U6M4O0M due to high wind. The railway
4A0E
company was held liable although they could not have
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
foreseen the accident.
Test of reasonable foresight was rejected. In this case
the defendants chartered a ship to carry a cargo which
consisted of Benzene and Petrol. Due to leakage in
those tins some of their contents were collected in the
Re Polemis and Furness,
26. hold of the ship. Owing to negligence of the defendant
Withy & Co. Ltd., 1921
servant a plank fell into the hold which sparked fire
and consequently the ship was destroyed. Defendants
were held liable for all direct consequences of their
servant’s negligence.

A large quantity of oil was negligently spilled on the
water from the Wagon Mound Ship. The oil was
Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd.
carried away by the wind to 600 ft away where a
27. v. Morts Dock and Engg. Co.
wharf was being repaired. A molten metal from the
Ltd 1961
wharf fell on the floating oil and damaged the ship. It
was held that test of reasonable foresight is better.
An employee of the bank received cash and cheques in
personal capacity from his friend on pretext of
VICARIOUS State Bank of India v. Shyama depositing in the bank, He misappropriated the funds.
28.
LIABILITY Devi, 1978 The court held that the bank cannot be made liable
because the employee misappropriated the funds in
the personal capacity.
29.
B. Govindarajulu M.L.A.
o m
A motor car was entrusted by the owner for repairs.
After the repairs the mechanic took the car for drive
for testing purpose. He met with an accident. The
c
Govindaraja Mudaliar, 1966
rs .
court held that owner was not liable because the
mechanic drove the car in the capacity of independent
contractor.
30.
State of Maharashtra v.
Kanchanmala Vijay Singh
k e
Supreme court held that if an unauthorized and
wrongful act of the servant is not so connected with
the authorized act as to the mode of doing that
r an
1995
Century Insurance Co. Ltd. v.

authorized act then the master is not liable.
A servant while transferring petrol from a lorry to
under ground tank lighted a cigarette and threw it on
31.
o p
Northern Ireland R.T.B. 1942
the floor. This result in fire and explosion. The act of
the Driver was held to be in the course of employment
and master was held liable.
32. T Beard v. London General

tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Omnibus Co., 1900
At the end of the journey the driver of the bus went to
take dinner and during his absence the conductor
drove
4O 0M the bus in order to turn it around and in that
process negligently caused the accident. In this case
the master was not held liable since the driving was
not the kind of act the conductor was authorized to do.
There was a specific instruction from the master that
bus tr-driver
5U3S4Rwas
8U6Mnot
4O0M supposed to indulge in the race
4A0ELimpus v. London General
with another bus. In defiance of the specific
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
33. instruction the driver engaged in a race and caused
Omnibus Co. 1862
accident. It was held that in spite of the prohibition
from the master the servant was still in the course of
employment and master was held liable.
STRICT &
T.C. Balakrishnan v. T.R. Explosives in an open ground even on the day of
34. ABSOLUTE
Subramanian, 1968 festival is a no-natural use of the land
LIABILITY
Supreme court evolved a new principle of absolute
M. C. Mehta v. Union of India,
35. liability. This rule is not subject to any exceptions as
1987
laid down in Ryland’s case.

If the act authorized by the statute is done in negligent
manner then the action lies. The servants of the
Smith v. London and South railway company negligently left trimmings of grass
36. NEGLIGENCE
Western Railway Co. 1870 and hedges near railway line. Sparks from the engine
set fire to the nearby materials. The railway company
was held liable because of Negligence on their part.
Negligence is a breach is a breach of duty caused by
omission to do something which a reasonable man
Jacab Mathew v. state of
37. guided by those considerations which ordinarily
Punjab, 2005
regulate the conduct of human affairs would do, or
doing something which a prudent man would not do.
Municipal Corporation of Supreme court held that where the accident is due to
38. Greater Bombay v. Laximan
Iyer 2003
o m
the negligence of both parties. There would be
contributory negligence and both will be blamed.
c
The driver of the overcrowded bus allowed
39.
Rural Transport Service v.
Bezlum Bibi 1980
rs .
passengers to travel on roof of the bus. While driving
he ignored this fact and drove negligently. As a result
the passenger sitting on the roof fell down and died.
k e
Driver and conductor were held responsible for the
negligence although there was contributory
negligence on the part of passengers as well
40. NUISANCE
r an
Dr. Ram Raj Singh v. Babulal
1982
Defendant started a brick grinding machine in
adjoining premises of plaintiff. Plaintiff was a medical
practitioner and the dust generated by the machine
o p caused inconvenience to him and his patients. The

court awarded special damages to him.
In order to constitute nuisance interference must be
41.
42.
T Sadleigh v. O’ Callageham
1940
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
unreasonable. Therefore, every interference is not
nuisance. In the court held that test of reasonableness
is0Maccording to ordinary usage of mankind living in
4O
society.
Radhey shyam v. Gur Prasad It was held thast running a flour mill in a residential
1978 area was a nuisance.
Mayor of Bradford corp. v. If an act is otherwise lawful, does not become nuisance
43.
Pickles 1895 merely
tr-5Ubecause
3S4R8U6Mit4O
is0Mdone with evil motive
4A0E Dixon v. Holden, 1869 A man’s reputation is considered to be a property and
44. DEFAMATION
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
in some cases more important than property.
The court held that if the published material tends to
S.N.M. Abdi v. Prafulla K. lower the reputation of person in the eyes of
45.
Mohanta, 2002 substantial group of persons then that is sufficient to
attract the liability.
Newspaper published a fictional article about a
person named Artemus Jones. The news item had cast
46. Hulton & co. v. Jones, 1910 aspersions on morals of fictitious person. A real
person of the same name brought an action for
defamation. The defendant was made liable.

It was held that a privileged occasion in an occasion
where the person who makes a communication has an
47. Adam v. Ward 1917 interest or duty to make such statement and the
person to whom it is made has a corresponding
interest to receive. The reciprocity is essential.
Malicious prosecution means a judicial proceeding
instituted by one against another from a wrongful or
improper motive and without a probable cause.
MALICIOUS Supreme court held that there are two essential
48. W.B.S.E.B. v. D.K. Ray, 2007
PROSECUTION elements for constituting malicious prosecution:-
1. There is no probable cause for instituting the
prosecution complained of;
49.
Nagendra Nath Ray v.
Basanta Das Bairagya 1929
o m
2. Such Proceeding ended in favour of plaint.
It was held that proceeding before police authorities
is no prosecution.
c
50. Hicks v. Paulker, 1878
.
The court held that there is reasonable and probable
rs
cause when the defendant has sufficient grounds for
thinking that the plaintiff was probably guilty of the
LIABILITY OF
PENINSULAR AND Oriental
e
crime imputed.
k
It was held that if the act done is in the exercise of the
Steam Navigation Company v. sovereign power of the state then the state cannot be
51.
STATE
r an
Secretary of state for India,
1861
Nobin Chandra Dey v.
sued but if the act was a non-sovereign function then
the state can be sued.
State was exempted from the liability when the
p
52.
Secretary of state for India, function was a sovereign one.
53.
To State of Rajasthan v.
Vidyawati, 1962
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Kasturi Lal v. state of
Supreme court observed that the constitution has
established a welfare state wherein the state is
required to carry out welfare activities. In such
scenario the state should not be immune to the
tortuous
4O 0M acts of its employees.
Supreme court held that the state will not be liable in
54.
U.P.1965 case of exercise of sovereign powers.
FALSE It was held that if a person is prevented from moving
55. IMPRISONMENT Bird vs. Jones 1845 in a particular direction but he was allowed to go back
& TRESPASS thentr-there
5U3S4Ris8Uno
6Mfalse
4O0Mimprisonment.
4A0EPerera vs. Vandiyar, 1935 The court held that going beyond the purpose for
56. tr-5D3F4A8G6B
which person has entered also amounts to trespass.

NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT, 1881 - LANDMARK CASES
Supreme court held that cognizance of an offence
punishable under section 138 of the Negotiable
instruments Act 1881 cannot be taken on the
Yogender Pratap Singh v. basis of a complaint filed before the expiry of the
1.
Savitri Pandey, 2014 period of 15 days stipulated in the notice required
to be served upon the drawer of the cheque in
terms of section 138© of Negotiable Instruments
Act 1881.
Supreme court has observed that a complaint
2.
Ripudaman Singh v.
Balkrishna, 2019
o m
under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments
Act is maintainable when there is dishonor of
c
cheques issued under and in pursuance of the
3.
Basalingappa v.
agreement to sell
rs .
Supreme court held that a complainant in a
cheque bounce case is bound to explain his
Muudibbasappa, 2019
k e
financial capacity, when the same is questioned
by the accused.
Supreme Court held that a ‘cheque bounce’
4.
an
SSicagen India v. complaint filed based on the second statutory
Mahindra Vadineni, 2019 notice issued after re-presentation of cheques, is
r maintainable.
5.
o pB. Sunitha v. state of

Telengana, 2018
Supreme court held that a free amount claim by a
lawyer based on percentage of subject matter in
litigation cannot be the basis of a complaint under
6.
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
Vani Agro Enterprises
state of Gujarat, 2010
v.
4O
section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
Supreme court refused to consolidate multiple
cheque bounce cases against the accused which
0M
emanated from a single notice and observed that
there is no provision of consolidation of cases in
the code of criminal procedure.
Supreme court held that in determining whether
0M
thetr-5U
presumption
3S4R8U6M4O under section 139 has been
4A0E ANSS Rajashekar v. rebutted, the test of proportionality must guide
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
7. Augustus Jeba Ananth, the determination. The standard of proof for
2019 rebuttal of the presumption under section 139 of
the Act is guided by a preponderance of
probabilities.
Supreme court held that mere denial of a debt or
liability cannot shift the burden of proof from the
accused in a case of dishounor of the cheque.
Kishan Rao v. Shankar
8. Supreme court made it clear that section 139 of
Gouda, 2018
the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, provides
for drawing the presumption in favour of holder
and a bare denial of the passing of the

consideration and existence of debt, apparently
would not serve the purpose of the accused.
G. Ramesh vs. Kanike Supreme court held that the expression
9. Harish Kumar Ujwal, ‘company’ used in section 141 includes a
2019 partnership firm or association of persons.
Supreme court held that, a ‘cheque bounce’
complaint against a company and its Director,
must contain a specific averment that the Director
AR Radha Krishna v.
10. was in charge of and responsible for the conduct
Dasari Deepthi, 2019
of the company’s business at the time when the
offence under section 138/141 of Negotiable
Instruments Act was committed.
11.
Dashrath Rupsingh
Rathod vs. state of
Maharashtra, 2014
c o m
Supreme court held that a complaint of dishonor
of cheque can be filed only to the court within
whose local jurisdiction the cheque is
GJ Raja v. Tejraj Surana, .

dishonoured by the bank on which it is drawn.
rs
Supreme court held that section 143A of the
Negotiable Instruments Act on payment of
12.
2019
k e
interim compensation to the complainant during
the pendency of the case has no retrospective
application.
r an Supreme court held that section 148 of the

Negotiable Instruments Act as amended, shall be
applicable in respect of the appeals against the
p
Surinder Singh Deswal @
order of conviction and sentence for the offence
13. Col. S.S. Deswal v.
o
under section 138 of the N.I.A. even in case where
Virender Gandhi, 2019
the criminal complaints for the offence under
14.
T Ashok Yeshwant tr-5U3SBadeve
v. Sunrendra Madhavrao
Nighojakar, 2001
section 138 of the N.I.A. were filed prior to 2018
Amendment Act i.e. prior to 01.09.2018.
4R8U6M A ‘post-dated cheque’ is not payable till date
4O 0M
which is shown thereon arrives and will become a
cheque on the said date and prior to that the same
remains a bill of exchange.
Offence under section 138 can only be made out if
Sundhir Kumar Bhalla v. thetr-cheques 5U3S4R8U6Mwere
4O0Missued in discharge of debt or
15.
4A0E
Jagdish, 2008 other liability but not when they were issued as a
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
security.
The court shall presume a negotiable instrument
M.S. Narayana Menon v. to be for consideration. The initial burden of proof
16.
state of Kerala, 2006 is on accused to rebut the presumptions under
section 118 and 139 by raising probable defence.
The standard of proof required to rebut the
Rangappa v. Srimohan,
17. presumption under section 139 is
2010
‘preponderance of probabilities’.
Indus Airways (p) Ltd. v.
If the cheque issued is for advance payment of
18. Magnum Aviation (p)
goods and for any reason the purchase order is
Ltd., 2014

not carried out, it cannot be said that the cheque
was drawn for existing debt or liability.
Section 138 is attracted if a post dated cheque
Goaplast (P) Ltd. v. Shri
issued by a person to settle his debt or other
19. Chico Vrsula D’ Souza,
liability is stopped from payment by the drawer
2003
even before the date of cheque
Dishonour of cheque on the ground that
‘signature do not match’ or that ‘image is not
Laxmi Dyechem v. state found’ which too implies that specimen
20.
of Gujarat, 2012 signatures do not match the signature on the
cheque can constitute a dishonor within the
meaning of section 138.
21.
Modi Cements Ltd. v.
Kuchil Kumar Nandi,
1998
c o m
Drawer is entitled to make deposits or make
arrangement for sufficiency of funds in his
account before presentation. Section 138 is
22.
C.C. Alavi HaJI V.
Palapetty Muhammad,
rs .
attracted only when the cheque is dishonoured.
When the notice is sent by registered post by
correctly addressing the drawer of cheque, the
2007
k e
mandatory requirement of issue of notice in
terms of section 138(b) stands
r an
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

PARTNERSHIP ACT - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO Case Details
Generally speaking ‘business’ refers to any activity
1. Smith v. Anderson, 1880
which if successful would result in profit.
It is not necessary that the business should be of a long
2. Minck v. Roshan Lal Shorey and permanent undertaking. There can be a single
business venture for which a partnership may exist.
Abdul v. Century Wood Industries Partnership Agreement need not be express. It may
3.
1954 arise from the conduct of the parties also.
No man is a partner unless he has the right to share in
4. Cox v. Hickman, 860 the profits of a business, but every person who received
5.
Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee
o m
the profit is not necessarily a partner.
Firm is not a legal person neither it has a separate legal
entity having an independent or distinct existence from
c
1979
rs .
its partners, it is only a compendious description of
individuals who compose the firm.
There was a partnership between two persons for
6.
Gherulal Parekh v. Mahadeo Das,
1959
k e
entering into certain wagering transactions for a
particular season only. It was held to be a valid
partnership
7.
an
CIT v. Dwarkadas Khetan & Co., 1961
r
The court held that a minor cannot be a full-fledged
partner in an existing firm.
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT, 1882 - LANDMARK CASES
If the owner of the tree intends to keep the tree
Shanti Bai v. state of alive, it is a tree; but if it is intended that the tree is
1. PRELIMINARY
Bombay, 1958 to be cut to be used for timber purposes it is called
standing timber (movable).
Municipal Corporation
Rights Under Lease or Tenancy is an immovable
2. Bombay v. Lala
property.
Pancham, 1965
Santosh Jaiswalv. State
3. Right of fishery is an immovable property.
of M.P. , 1996
4.
Mahadev v. state of
Bombay, 1959
o m
Right to take forest produce, e.g. tendue leaves etc.
and soil for making bricks is an immovable
property.
c
5.
6.
Jiwan Ali v. Basu Mal
Altaf begum v. Briji
rs .
Decree for sale of any immovable property on a
mortgage is movable property.
Right to get maintenance allowance is movable
e
Narayan, 1929 property.
Jugal Kishore saraf v.
7. Raw Cotton Co. Lrd,
an 1955
Sant Lal v. Kamla k
Where a decree provides for a future decree, this
future decree is not an actionable claim.
Each witness must sign only after the execution is
r
8.
Prasad, 1952 complete otherwise it will not be a valid attestation.
p
The principle of constructive notice is applicable
Ram Niwas v. Bano, when the plaintiff was in actual possession of the
9.
10.
11.
To 2000
Daya Devi v. Chapla

Devi, 1960
Savitri v. Dwarka,
tr-5U3S1939
property. The word ‘notice’ is of wider import than
‘knowledge’.
Arrears of rent is an actionable claim.

4R8U6M 0M
4O
Copyright is not an actionable claim.
TRANSFER OF Supreme court held that the words ‘in present or in
Judgalkishore v. Raw
12. PROPERTY BY future’ in section 5 of the T.P.A. qualify the word
Cotton Co. Ltd, 1955
ACT OF PARTIES ‘conveys’ and not the word ‘property’.
Transfer of any 4O non-existent
0M or future property
5U3S4R8U6M
Jugalkishore v. Raw operates only as a contract which may be performed
tr-
13.
tr-5D 3F 4A 8G 6B 4A0E Cotton Co. Ltd., 1955 in future and can be enforced as soon as the
property comes into existence.
V. N. Sarin v. Ajeet
14. Partition is not the TPA
Kumar 1966
Where the condition restricts the transferee
Muhammad Raza v. transferring the property to strangers, i.e. outside
15.
Abbas Bandi Bibi, 1932 the family of the transferor, the condition is merely
a partial restraint which is valid and enforceable.
Section 16 provides that in a transfer of property for
Girijesh Dutta v. Data
16. the benefit of a person or of a class of persons if
Din, 1934
prior interests fails under section 13 or 14, the

subsequent interest (which is created in the same
transaction) also fails.
If there are two successive creations of interests, the
later creation of interest would be subject to validity
of the former.
Covenants are written agreements or contracts with
17. Tulk v. Moxhay 1848
respect to the property.
R. Rajagopal Reddy v. P.
Benami Transaction Act, 1988 is not retrospective
18. chandrashekharan,
in nature.
1996
Supreme court held that whether a person is an
Jaya Dayal Poddar v. Bibi ostensible owner or not is to be decided by the facts
19.
m
Hazara, 1974 and circumstances of the case since it is a subjective
question.
20.
Jumma Mashid v.
.c o
Supreme court held that there is no conflict between
sections 6(a) & 43 and both may operate
simultaneously. Section 6(a) is a rule of substantive
rs
Kodhimaniandra 1962
law where as, section 43 is based on estoppels
which is rule of evidence.
21. Bwllamy v. Sabine 1857

e
English court held that doctrine of Lispendens is
k
common to both law and equity. Un absence of this
22.
r an
Musahur Sahu v.
doctrine suit or proceedings cannot be brought to a
successful termination.
If there are several creditors, transfer in favour of
one of them, does not amount to a fraudulent
o pHakimlal, 1950
Prabodh Kumar Das v.

transfer.
Section 53-A can be used as a ‘shield’, not as a
T
23. Dantamara Tea Co. Ltd.,
‘sword’ or weapon of attack’.
1940
Supreme court held that if the condition of re-
Pandit chunchum
tr-5U3Sjha v. 6M4O
4R8U 0M
purchase is not embodied in the document of
24.
sheikh Ibadat Ali, 1954 mortgage then the transaction cannot be said to be
mortgage.
Supreme court reiterated that a sale with a mere
condition of retransfer is not a mortgage. If the sale
and tr-
agreement 4O0M
5U3S4R8U6Mto repurchase are embodied in
Sopan v. Syed Nabi,
25. 4A0E separate documents then the transactions cannot
tr-5D3F4A8G6B 2019
be a mortgage by conditional sale irrespective of
whether the documents are the contemporaneously
executed.
A collateral benefit is an advantage which is in
addition to mortgage-money with interest. A
Kreglinger v. New collateral benefit to mortgagee is not necessarily a
26. Patagonia Meat & cold clog on redemption. It is ‘clog’ only when-
storage comp. Ltd., 1914 a) It is unfair and unconscionable; and
b) It is part of transaction of mortgage (not an
independent benefit).
Tanu Ram Bora v. Supreme court held that if the title of the property is
27.
Promod ch. Das (D) transferred by erroneous representation then the

Thtough LRs and others, principle of “feeding the grant by estoppels” under
2019 section 43 of the T.P.A. will apply if the transferor
acquires the title later.
The Supreme court observed that the landlord-
tenant relationship will not be terminated merely
Dr H K Sharma v. Shri
28. by an agreement to sell the property of the landlord
Ram Lal, 2019
unless there is a stipulation in the agreement itself
to that effect.
Anand Behra v. state of Right to catch fish from Chilka Lake over number of
29.
Orissa, 1956 years was held to be benefit arising out of land.
Whether the machinery embedded in the earth can
Duncans Industries Ltd. be treated as movable or immovable depends upon
30.
m
v. state of U.P., 2000 the intention of the parties which embedded the
machinery.
31.
Shanta Bai v. state of
Bombay, 1958
.c o
Standing timber is different from a timber tree.
Standing timber refers to tree in such a state that if
cut it could be used as timber, while timber tree
rs
refers to tree drawing sustenance from the soil.
Bequeathing of tenancy rights by tenant under the
32.
Kenneth soleomon v.
Dan Sigh Bawa 1977
e
will to his heirs does not amount to transfer within
k
the meaning of section 5 of the Act.
33.
r an
Mohar Singh v. Devi
Charan 1988
Partition does not amount to transfer but section
109 of T.P.A. Will be applicable in cases of partition
on the ground of justice, equity and good
conscience.
o p When the person having limited interest in the

property transfers a larger interest to the transferee
T
Ram Bhawan Singh v. on a representation that he has that larger interest
34.
Jagidh, 1990 and subsequently he acquires the larger interest
then that larger interest passes to the transferee at
tr-5U3S4R8U6M latter’s option.
4O0M
The transferee cannot acquire a valid title when he

Kartar Singh v. Harbans has actual or constructive knowledge of the defect
35.
Kaur , 1994 in title of the transferor. Section 43 imposes upon
transferee duty to take care.
The tr-test
5U3Sto 6M4O0M
determine
4R8U whether the restraint is
36. 4A 0E Rosher v. Rosher 1884 absolute or partial depends upon the effect and not
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
the form of words laying down the condition.
The rule against double possibilities was
recognized. Under this rule it is permissible to
37. Witby v. Mitchell 1890 confer life interest to an unborn person but it is not
possible to confer life interest to issues of unborn
person.
Private sale of the property by karta, pending suit
Jayaram Mudaliar v.
38. partition is hit by section 52 and does not bind the
Ayyaswami 1973
family.

c o m
rs .
k e
r an
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B

HINDU LAW - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO. Topics Case Details
Supreme court held that in absence of any rule of
Hindu Law, the courts have authority to decide cases
GENERAL
1. Gurunath v. Kamlabai 1951 on the principles of equity, justice and good
PRINCIPLES
conscience. However, such decision must not be
inconsistent with any doctrine or theory of Hindu law.
Supreme court held that any person who is a Hindu
Buddhist, Jain or Sikh by religion is a Hindu if:-
a) He practices, professes or follows ay of these
religions; and
m
b) He remains a Hindu even if he does not practice,
Chandrashekhar v.
2. profess or follow the tenets of any of these religions.
o
Kulandaivela, 1963
A person does not cease to be Hindu if he becomes
c
atheist, or dissents or deviates from the central
.
doctrines of Hinduism or lapses from orthodox
rs
practices of Hindu religion or adopts western way of
life.
k e
A non-Hindu will become Hindu by conversion in the
following circumstances:-
n
1. If the undergoes the formal ceremony of conversion
or re-conversion prescribed by the caste or
3.
p r a
Peerumal v. Poonsuswami, community to which he converts or reconverts;
1971 2. If he expresses a bona fide intention to become
Hindu accompanied by conduct unequivocally
4.
To Suranjmani stella Kujur
tr-5U 3S4Rv.
expressing that intention coupled with the acceptance
of him as a member of the community into the fold of
which he was ushered in.
In light of section 2(2) of the Hindu marriage Act,
8U6M scheduled
4O 0M Tribes could be brought under the purview
of the Act if a notification is issued to its effect. In other
DurgaCharan Hansdah 2001
cases they would be governed by their customs and
such customs have to be proved by clear evidence.
Hirachand Srinvas The object and purpose of the Act is to maintain the
5. Mangaonkar v. Sunanda , marital relationship
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
between the spouses and not to
4O0M
0E
2001 encourage snapping of such relationships.
3F4A8G6B4A
tr-5D
CONDITIONS
OF MARRIAGE, Supreme court held that in a bigamous marriage the
Yamunabai v. Anantrao,
6. VOID & ‘second wife’ has no status of wife because the second
1988
VOIDABLE marriage is null and void
MARRIAGES
Supreme court held that prosecution should establish
Priya Bala v. Suresh that second marriage was solemnized and mere
7.
Chandra, 1971 admission of the accused that he contracted second
marriage is not enough.
Supreme court held that there was no automatic
Sarla Mudgal v. Union of
8. dissolution of marriage by apostasy of a spouse to
India
another religion. The second marriage of a Hindu

Lily Thomas v. Union of Apostate to Islam during subsistence of first marriage
India, 2006 is violation of provisions of HMA.
Decision in Sarla Mudgal s case was reviewed in Lily
Thomas case. The court held that a marriage
solemnized according to one personal law cannot be
dissolved according to another personal law because
of change of religion of parties
Supreme court held that unless a marriage is
Bhaurao v. state of
9. celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies in
Maharashtra, 1965
due form, it cannot be said to have been solemnized.
Supreme court ordered compulsory registration of
Seema v. Ashwani Kumar, marriage irrespective of their religion. It directed the
10.
m
2006 Central and state Governments to make relevant rules
to this effect.
11.
Rathnamma v. Sujathamma,
2010
c o
The Supreme court observed that mere registration of
an agreement of marriage is not sufficient to prove
marriage.
.
rs
For proper solemnization of marriage it must be
Bhaurao Shankar Lokhande
celebrated or performed with proper ceremonies and
12. v. state of Maharashtra,
1965
e
due form’. Proper solemnization of second marriage is
k
essential to constitute bigamy.
13.
RESTITUTION
OF CONJUGAL
RIGHTS,
JUDICIAL
r an
Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan
kumar, 1984
Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of
section9. Conjugal right is inherent in the institution
of marriage. Section 9 only codifies the pre-existing
SEPARATION &
o
DIVORCE
p law. The provision of ‘reasonable excuse’ is the built in
safeguard against the misuse of section 9.
The term ‘cruelty’ was defined for the first time. The
14.
T Russel v. Russel 1897
court held that cruelty is a conduct of such character
as to have caused danger to life, limb or health, bodily
tr-5U3S4R8U6M or mental, or give rise to a reasonable apprehension
4O0M
of such conduct.
Supreme court held that cruelty is a conduct which
15. Dastane v. Dastane, 1975 causes a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or
injurious for one spouse to live with another.
Shobha Ranii v. Madhukar Supreme 4O0M that demand for dowry also
tr-5U3Scourt
4R8U6Mheld
16.
4A0E Reddi, 1988 constitutes cruelty.
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
The party seeking divorce on the ground of desertion
Savitri Pandey v. Prem
17. is required to show that he/she is not taking
Chandra Pandey, 2002
advantage of his/ her own wrong.
Supreme court held that the degree of mental disorder
Ram Narain Gupta SmT.
18. must be such that the spouse seeking relief cannot
Ramesh Gupta, 1988
reasonably be expected to live with other.
Supreme court has held that the period of 6 months
mentioned in section 13B(2) was not mandatory but
Amardeep Singh v. Harveen
19. directory. It will be open to the court to exercise its
Kaur, 2017
discretion in the facts and circumstances of each case
where there was no possibility of parties resuming

cohabitation after exhausting all efforts of mediation
and conciliation.
Legal meaning of impotency is a physical or mental
Digvijay Singh v. Pratap
20. condition which makes consummation of marriage a
Kumari, 1970
practical impossibility.
To brand a person as unfit for marriage and
procreation on account of mental disorder it needs to
R. Lakshmi Narayan v. be established that the ailment suffered by her is of
21.
Santhi, 2001 such a nature and extent that it is impossible for her
to lead a normal married life. The standard of proof is
strict.
Andhra Pradesh High court held that section 9 of
m
T. Sareetha v. T.V. Subbaih Hindu Marriage Act is unconstitutional as it violates
22.
1983 right to privacy and human dignity guaranteed by
23.
Saroj Rani v. Sudarshan
Kumar, 1984
Article 21.
.c o
Supreme court upheld the constitutionality of section
9 of HMA.
rs
Cruelty has to be judged taking into account entire
facts and circumstances of the case. There is no pre-
24.
Ravi kumar v. Julmidevi
2010
e
determined formula. In matrimonial relationships
k
cruelty means absence of mutual respect and
r an understanding between spouses which embitters

relationship. Silence in some situation may also
amount to cruelty.
When the court is confronted with the question of
o p
Shobha Rani v. M. Reddy,
cruelty it can examine two things:-
1. Nature of the conduct complained of;
2. Its impact on complaining spouse
25.
T 1988 In certain cases impact need not be considered

because the conduct itself is so bad. The concept of
tr-5U3S4R8U6M cruelty has to b view from the point of view of way of
4O0M
life, economic and social conditions of the parties.
Mental cruelty can be broadly defined as that conduct
which inflicts upon the other party such mental pain
and suffering as would make it impossible for other
26. V. Bhagat v. D. Bhagat 1994
partytr-to
5Ulive
3S4Rwith the0Mother. Mental cruelty must be of
8U6M4O
4A0E such nature that parties cannot reasonably be

tr-5D3F4A8G6B
expected to live together.
Mental cruelty is a state of mind and feeling with one
of the spouses due to the behaviour or behavioural
Praveen Mehta v. Indrajeet pattern by the other. Mental cruelty is difficult to be
27.
Mehta, 2002 established from direct evidence. It is a matter of
inference to be drawn from the facts and
circumstances of the case
Vijaykumar Ramchandra
Character assassination in or duing divorce
28. Bhate v. Neela Vijay Kumar
proceedings amounts to cruelty.
Bhate, 2003
Naveen Kohli v. Neelu Kohli Irretrievable breakdown of marriage amounts to
29.
2006 cruelty.

Mens rea is not a necessary element in cruelty. The
Suman Kapur v. Sudhir
30. concept of legal cruelty changes according to
Kapur, 2009
advancement of social concept and standards of living.
There can be no desertion without animus
Bipinchandra v. Prabhavati, deserdendi. It has to be proved that deserting spouse
31.
1957 persisted in the intention to desert throughout the
statutory period of two years.
Divorce on the ground of irretrievable breakdown of
Manish Goel v. Rohini Goel,
32. marriage could be granted by it under Article 142 of
2010
the constitution.
Petitioner does not have a vested right for getting the
Hirachand Srinivas relief of decree of divorce merely on showing that the
m
33. Mangaonkar v. Sunanda, ground in support of the relief sought exists. If he
2001 commits illegal or immoral acts he cannot secure
relief in matrimonial matters.
.c o
Supreme court held that the phrase passing any
decree’ under section 25 indicate that an order for
rs
permanent alimony can only be made when a decree
is passed granting any substantive relief under the Act
34. MAINTENANCE
Dhawan, 1993 withdrawn.
e
Chand Dhawan v. Jawaharlal and not where the main petition is dismissed or
k
r an Supreme court has made it clear that when the
marriage is subsisting section 18 of HAMA will apply
and if the marriage is not subsisting section 25 of HMA
will apply.
35.
o p
Ramesh Chandra Daga v.
Rameshwari Daga, 2005
Supreme court held that spouse of a null and void
union, entered into during pendency of an earlier
marriage, is entitled to maintenance on passing of a
36. ADOPTION
T Basavarajappa v.
tr-
Gurubasamma, 2005
decree of nullity.
Supreme court held that on adoption, adoptee gets
5U3S4R8U6M transplanted in adopting family with the same rights
4O0M
as that of natural born son. Adopted child becomes
coparcener in joint Hindu Family property after
severing all his ties with natural family.
Performance of Dutta Homam is not essential for
validity of4Radoption
tr-5U3S 8U6M4O0M according to section 11 (vi)
4A0E (proviso). Even when Datta Homam is performed, the

37. tr-5D3F4A8G6B Gurudas v. Rasarajan 2006
adoption should be taken to have been made when the
actual giving and taking had taking place and not
when the religious ceremony has been performed.
Supreme court held that word ‘after’ in section 6(a)
cannot be interpreted to mean ‘after the life of father.’
The word ‘after’ has the meaning ‘in absence of’. If the
38. GUARDIANSHIP Gita Hariharan v. RBI, 1999
father is absent or is wholly indifferent to the affairs
of the minor then mother will become the natural
guardian of the minor.
MOHINI v. Veerendra Supreme court has held that the controlling
39.
Kumar, 1977 consideration in deciding the custody of the child is

the welfare of the minor and not the rights of the
parents.
Supreme court held that father’s right to custody of
Sumedha Nagpal v. state of
40. children is neither an absolute nor indefeasible one.
Delhi, 2000
Welfare of the child is paramount importance.
In determining the question as to who should be given
Gaurav Nagpal v. Sumedha custody of a minor child, the paramount consideration
41.
Nagpal, 2009 is the ‘welfare of the child’ and not right of the parents
under a statute for the time being in force.
It is as much obligation of the father to maintain a
minor child as that of the mother. If both both of them
Padmaja Sharma v. Ratan
42. are working they are bound to contribute for
Lal Sharma, 2000
m
maintenance of their children in proportion of their
salary.
43.
JOINT FAMILY
PROPERTY &
Nopany Investments (P)
.c o
If the karta of the HUF was away in a remote place, (In
this case In a foreign country) and his return within a
Ltd. v. Santokh Singh (huf), reasonable time was unlikely, a junior member of HUF
rs
COPARCENARY
could act as the karta of the family.
The supreme court has held that the rule under
Arshnoor Singh v. Harpal
k e
Mitakshara law that whenever a male ancestor
inherits any property from, then his male legal heirs
44.
r an
kaur and others, 2019
upto three degrees below him would get an equal
right as coparceners in that property will apply in
cases of succession which opened before Hindu
Succession Act 1956.
o p
Govindbhai chhotabhai
Patel and Ors. v. Patel
The Supreme court has held that as per Mitakshara
Law of Succession, father’s self-acquired property
given to son by way of will/gift will retain the
45.
46.
T Ramanbhai Mathurbhai
2019
character of self acquired property and will not
become ancestral property, unless a contrary
tr-5U3S4R8U6M intention is expressed in the testament.
Radhamma and others v.

Muddu Krishna and others,
4O0M
Supreme court held that the undivided interest of a
Hindu in a joint property can be disposed of by will
according to section 30 of the Hindu Succession Act
2019
1956.
Dodamuniyappa through The Supreme
tr-5U3S4R8U 6M4O0M
court has ruled that property inherited
47. 4A 0EL.Rs. V. Muniswamy and from father by sons becomes joint family property in
tr-5D3F4A8G6B
others, 2019 the hands of sons.
The normal state of every Hindu Family is that it is a
Rukhmabai v.
48. joint family, presumably joint in food, worship and
Lakshminarayan, 1960
estate and it continues to be joint.
Even on death of sole surviving coparcener the Hindu
49. Sitabai v. Ram Chandra, joint family does not come to an end so long as it is
possible in law or nature to add a male member to it.
K.O. Reddy v.
There is no presumption that the joint family
50. Venkatanarayan Reddy,
possesses joint property.
1984

Commissioner of Income
Property in the hands of sole surviving coparcener
51. TAX v. Gomedalli
could be taxed as that of Hindu undivided family.
Lakshminarayan, 1935
Joint Hindu family can consist of a male Hindu and his
Krishna Prasad v. C.I.T.
52. wife. It may even consist of two female members but
Bangalore 1975
there must be at least two members to constitute it.
Makhan Singh v. Kulwant A property could not be presumed to be a joint Hindu
Singh, 2007 family property merely because of the existence of
53.
D.S. Lakshmaiah v. L. joint Hindu family. The one who asserts has to prove
Balasubramanyam, 2003 that the property is a joint Hindu Family property.
The property held by a sole surviving coparcener may
Smt. Dipo V. Wassan Singh constitute his separate property and on his death it
54.
m
1983 will devolve by succession on his heirs and any
custom giving preference to collaterals would be void
55. Maktul v. Manbhari 1958
.c o
Supreme court held that property inherited by a
person from his maternal grandfather is not ancestral
qua his descendants.
rs
Mitakshara father is competent to sell his self
acquired property to a stranger without concurrence
56.
Arunachalam v.
Murugantha, 1953
e
of his son. He can also make gift of such property to
k
one of his own sons to the detriment of another. In
r an such case it is not possible to hold that such property

bequeathed or gifted much necessarily rank as
ancestral property.
Younger member of joint Hindu property can deal
o p
Tribhovan Das v. Gujarat
with a joint family property as a manager in following
circumstances-
1. If the senior member or Karta is not available.
57.
T Revenue Tribunal, 1991 2. Where karta relinquishes his rights expressly or

impliedly.
tr-5U3S4R8U6M 3. In exceptional and extra ordinary circumstances
4O0M
affecting the whole family.
For alienation of Hindu joint family property on the
basis of legal necessity, such necessity is not the sole
58. Rani v. Shanta, 1971
test but the pressure upon the estate may be regarded
as serious
tr-5U3Sand
4R8Usufficient.
6M4O0M
4A0E When the alienation of joint family property by the

tr-5D3F4A8G6B
Balmukund v. Kamlavati karta was not for any legal necessity or benefit the
59.
1964 said alienation is voidable at the instance of other
coparcener.

MUSLIM LAW - LANDMARK CASES
S. NO. Case Details
Age of puberty: Privy council laid down that a girl becomes major on
Mst. Atika Begum v. happening of either of two events:-
1.
Mohd. Ibrahim 1916 i) Completion of 15th years; or
ii) Attainment of puberty at an early period.
Dower is a sum of money or other property promised by the husband to be
Abdul Kadir v. Salima paid or delivered to the wife in consideration of marriage and even where no
2.
1886 dower is expressly fixed, the law confers the right of dower upon the wife as
necessary effect of marriage. (justice Mahmood)
Supreme court of India declared the practice of Triple Talaq as
3.
Shayara Bano v. Union
of India 2017
o m
unconstitutional. It was held that this form of Talaq is manifestly arbitrary in
the sense that the marital tie can be broken capriciously and whimsically by
a Muslim man without any attempt at reconciliation so as to save it. This form
c
.
of Talaq must, therefore, be violative of the fundamental right contained
rs
under Article 14 of the constitution of India. The court held that triple talaq is
not fundamental to Islam.
e
Supreme court held that a divorced Muslim wife is entitled to maintenance
Bai Tahira v. Ali
4. even if she has already received the whole amount due under her personal
Hussain 1979
law.
an k
Section 125 is independent of any personal law and it is of secular nature. It
was held in that section 125 of Cr. P.C. applies to divorced Muslim woman
r
Mohd. Ahmad Khan v.
unless she remarries. Supreme court held that there is no conflict between
5. Shah Bano Begum,
1985
o psection 125 and Muslim personal law. The court observed that Muslim
personal law limits the liability of husband to maintain the divorced wife till
the period of iddat.
T
Danial Latifi and others
Constitutionality of The Muslim women (protection of Rights on Divorce Act),
1986 Act was challenged. Supreme court upheld that constitutional validity
of the and held the8Ufollowing
tr-5U3S4R 6M
4O0M
1) The liability of Muslim husband towards the divorced wife to maintain her
is not confined to iddat period. It extends to the whole life of divorced wife
6. unless she marries again.
v. Union of India 2001
2) The former husband must make a reasonable provision (which would
extend even beyond the period of3Siddat) for the future of divorced wife within
4O0M
tr-5U 4R8U6M
the period of iddat.
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B 3) The act is not in contravention of Articles 14, 15 and 21 of the constitution
of India.
The Supreme court held that a child born out of a marriage between a Muslim
Mohammed Salim v. man and his Hindu wife is entitled to claim a share in his father’s property.
7. Shamsudeen & Ors. The court held that the marriage of a Muslim man with an idolater or fire-
2019 worshiper is neither a valid (sahih) nor a void (batil) marriage, but is merely
an irregular (fasid) marriage.

Notes:
c o m
rs .
k e
r an
o p
T tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4O0M
4O0M
tr-5U3S4R8U6M
4A0E
tr-5D3F4A8G6B


Landmark Cases (1) 5348640

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Landmark Cases (1) 5348640

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Landmark Cases (1) 5348640

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

c o m

©Judiciary Gold Page 1 of 105

S. No. Contents Page No.

©Judiciary Gold Page 2 of 105

p r justice, equity and good conscience. Such

To Westarly Dkhar v. Sehekaya

©Judiciary Gold Page 3 of 105

k e of execution has been made is also a decree

o p Singh, 2003 result to be worked out for a later stage.

©Judiciary Gold Page 4 of 105

k e In judgment the whole process of reasoning

r an ‘suit decreed’ or ‘suit dismissed’.

©Judiciary Gold Page 5 of 105

Most Rev. P.M.A.

k e jurisdiction of a civil court to decide such

The supreme court observed that the

o p (Dead) Through LRs. V.

©Judiciary Gold Page 6 of 105

r an holder of the office should be under a legal

o p Union of India v. Ladlu Lal

©Judiciary Gold Page 7 of 105

k e Balance of convenience is prime

o p 1979 suit, and, the convenience of the particular

Jitendra Singh v. Bhanu

©Judiciary Gold Page 8 of 105

51. Daryao v. State of U.P., 1961 .

k e application and it is a part of rule of law.

r an following conditions are satisfied.

o p Iftikar Ahmed v. Syed

©Judiciary Gold Page 9 of 105

k e whether the parties had the opportunity of

©Judiciary Gold Page 10 of 105

k e accorded on the considerations of justice,

r an Law that if a foreign judgment is obtained

o p Swapna Mohanty v. state of

©Judiciary Gold Page 11 of 105

Embargo in order 2 Rule 2 will arise only of

73. ORDER2 RULE 2

k e the claim, which is omitted or relinquished

r an order 2Rule 2 will not apply

©Judiciary Gold Page 12 of 105

k e the amendment application

consider whether it is bona fide or mala fide

o p The merits of the amendment sought to be

©Judiciary Gold Page 13 of 105

Shaukat Hussain Mohd.

k e against some of the defendant(s) and

o p The Supreme court has observed that a

92. T Colonel Shrawan Kumar

©Judiciary Gold Page 14 of 105

Kailash v. Nankhu, 2005

k e court harmoniously constructed 0.8 R. 1,9

r an order 5 Rule 1 r/w order 8 Rule 1 and 10

o p SCG Contracts (India) (P)

T Ltd. v. K.S. Chamankar

©Judiciary Gold Page 15 of 105

Arjun Singh v. Mohinder

k e Ex parte proceedings do not mean that