Por Que Israel Deveria Declarar Um Cessar-Fogo Unilateral em Gaza - Relações Exteriores

12/05/2024, 11:08 Por que Israel deveria declarar um cessar-fogo unilateral em Gaza | Relações Exteriores
Por que Israel deveria declarar um cessar-fogo unilateral em

Gaza
Uma oportunidade de virar a mesa contra o Hamas e o Irão – e avançar na normalização com a
Arábia Saudita
Por Dennis Ross e David Makovsky 1º de maio de 2024
Soldados israelenses patrulhando a fronteira entre Gaza e Israel, abril de 2024

Amir Cohen/Reuters
Compartilhar Salvar
A té ao mês passado, a guerra entre o Irão e Israel era em grande parte travada nas sombras. Os iranianos decidiram tirá-lo das
sombras, atacando abertamente o território israelita directamente, a partir de solo iraniano, pela primeira vez na história da
República Islâmica. Alguns observadores argumentaram que o ataque de drones e mísseis do Irão a Israel, em 13 de Abril, foi um
gesto simbólico. No entanto, dada a quantidade de drones e mísseis disparados contra Israel e as suas cargas úteis, o Irão pretendia
claramente infligir danos graves.
As defesas de Israel eram quase perfeitas, mas não repeliu inteiramente o ataque do Irão por si só. Tal como o ataque do Irão não teve
precedentes, também o foi a intervenção militar directa dos Estados Unidos e de vários dos seus aliados, incluindo alguns Estados árabes.
O Comando Central dos EUA, com a participação do Reino Unido e da Jordânia, interceptou pelo menos um terço dos drones e mísseis
de cruzeiro que o Irão disparou contra Israel; A Arábia Saudita e os Emirados Árabes Unidos também partilharam informações de
inteligência que ajudaram Israel a defender-se. A sua disponibilidade para desempenhar este papel foi notável, dada a impopularidade da
guerra de Israel com o Hamas em Gaza entre os cidadãos árabes.
Cinco dias depois, quando Israel respondeu ao ataque do Irão, teve em conta os apelos de Washington à contenção, disparando três mísseis
contra uma instalação de radar que orienta a bateria de defesa antimísseis S-300 em Isfahan, o local da fábrica de conversão de urânio do
https://www.foreignaffairs.com/middle-east/why-israel-should-declare-unilateral-cease-fire-gaza?utm_medium=newsletters&utm_source=twofa&u… 1/5
Irão. Esta foi uma resposta muito limitada, concebida para evitar baixas e ao mesmo tempo mostrar que Israel pode penetrar nas defesas do
Irão e atacar qualquer alvo que pretenda atingir.
Mantenha-se informado.
Análise aprofundada entregue semanalmente.
Inscrever-se
Israel aparentemente reconheceu que a melhor maneira de lidar com a ameaça que o Irão e os seus representantes representam é trabalhar
com uma coligação. Isto também não tem precedentes. A ideia de que americanos, europeus e árabes se uniriam para ajudar a interceptar
drones e mísseis de cruzeiro lançados pelo Irão contra Israel teria, no passado recente, parecido uma fantasia – e, para Israel, indesejável. O
espírito de Israel em matéria de defesa sempre foi: “Defendemo-nos sozinhos”. Isto tem sido tanto uma fonte de orgulho como um
princípio – que ninguém além dos israelitas teria de pegar em armas em nome de Israel.
But now that Israel faces not only Iran but multiple Iranian proxy groups, the cost of taking on all these fronts by itself is simply becoming
too high. This development, as well as the willingness that Arab states showed in April to join Israel to confront the threat Iran and its
proxies pose, suggests that a window has opened for the creation of a regional coalition pursuing a common strategy to counter Iran and
its proxies.
To take advantage of this opening, however, Israel, the United States, and Arab countries—particularly Saudi Arabia—need to recognize
the unique nature of the moment and seize it. A U.S.-brokered breakthrough in a normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia
would do a great deal to cement this emerging coalition. If the Saudis, whose king is the custodian of Islam’s two holiest sites, made peace
with Israel, that would likely transform Israel’s relationship with other Sunni-majority states within and outside the Middle East following
suit. U.S. President Joe Biden’s administration, as well as Israeli and Saudi leaders, indicate that they would still like to see such a deal
happen soon. But the Biden administration believes that the fighting in Gaza must be paused before negotiations about normalization can
proceed.
A unilateral cease-fire of four to six weeks would offer Israel many strategic benefits.
There is some hope that negotiations in Egypt on a hostage deal between Israel and Hamas will finally be achieved and produce a cease-
fire of at least six weeks. But the Biden administration must not put all its eggs in that basket. Again and again, Hamas has raised hopes
that a deal is imminent only to dash them. Should no deal emerge in Egypt, the Biden administration should turn to the only realistic
alternative: encouraging Israel to announce a unilateral cease-fire in Gaza of four to six weeks.
Such an Israeli decision may be the only way to create the conditions for an Israeli-Saudi normalization deal to advance. Of course, a
unilateral cease-fire would be controversial in Israel, both because it de-links pausing the fighting in Gaza from the release of hostages and
because it may seem to concede something to Hamas for nothing in return. But a unilateral cease-fire of four to six weeks would, in fact,
offer Israel many strategic benefits with few material drawbacks. And in truth, if their negotiations with Hamas fail once again, Israeli
leaders will need to adopt a different approach if they hope to get hostages released while some are still alive.
The fact that Israel listened to the Biden administration when crafting its response to Iran’s attack shows that it is open to U.S. persuasion.
Indeed, a new reality may be taking shape in Israel, one that could change how it approaches defense, deterrence, and the region.
A PRECEDENT FOR RESTRAINT
When it comes to defense strategy, Israel has long been committed to doing its own fighting. All it asked of the United States was to help
ensure that it had the means to do so. The help that Israel received to defend itself against the Iranian attack, however, might have been
not only welcome but also necessary.
But such help also creates an obligation on Israel’s part. When others participate in Israel’s defense, they gain the right to ask Israel to take
their interests and concerns into account. After Iran’s attack, Biden made it clear to Israeli leaders that they did not need to retaliate
because their successful defense itself constituted a great success—and, by implication, an embarrassing failure for Iran. For Israel, not to
hit back at all would have contradicted the country’s basic concept of deterrence: if you attack us, you will pay, and no one can pressure us
not to respond to threats. But Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu could not easily dismiss the American position.
Israel’s concept of deterrence has always shaped its responses to direct threats—with one exception that is worth recalling today. During
the 1991 Gulf War, the night after U.S. forces attacked Iraq, Iraqi President Saddam Hussein hit Israel with Scud missiles. The Israeli
defense minister, Moshe Arens, and other senior military officials wanted to retaliate. But U.S. President George H. W. Bush’s
administration, particularly Secretary of State James Baker, persuaded Israeli Prime Minister Yitzhak Shamir not to do so. Baker reassured
Shamir that Israel could give the United States specific targets it wanted hit, and the United States would hit them. But he also stressed
that the world stood against Saddam, and that if Israel retaliated directly, it risked disrupting the coalition fighting Iraq. Saddam was
trying to transform the conflict into an Arab-Israeli war, and it was not in Israel’s interest to play into his hands.
In 1991, Israel’s prime minister accepted the counsel of the American president.
There is, of course, one big difference between 1991 and today: back then, the U.S. military was attacking Iraq, not simply trying to
intercept its missile launches. The United States is not about to attack Iran today. That said, in 1991, Israel was not already in the midst of
another war, as it is today in Gaza. And unlike today, Israel was not also juggling a tense northern front with Hezbollah that could easily
escalate into an all-out conflict.
In 1991, Israel’s prime minister accepted the counsel of the American president and secretary of state because he could see that it was in
Israel’s interest for the coalition against Saddam to remain intact. Shamir also believed that by responding favorably to the United States,
he could repair his relationship with Bush, which had become strained over disagreements about Israel’s settlements policy.
Bush appreciated Shamir’s decision, but the two leaders continued to clash over the United States’ provision of $10 billion in loan
guarantees, which Israel needed to manage a surge in immigrants from the Soviet Union. Bush wanted to condition those guarantees on
Israel’s freezing settlement building in the West Bank. Shamir would not agree, and the Bush administration did not provide the
guarantees until it reached an agreement with Shamir’s successor, Yitzhak Rabin, on reducing the value of the guarantees by the amount
the United States estimated that Israel was spending annually on settlements.
MAKE A VIRTUE OF NECESSITY
The nature of Israel’s response to the Iranian attack shows that Netanyahu, too, is willing to take American concerns into account—not
going as far as Shamir did to placate Washington but clearly limiting Israel’s response. Today, Netanyahu is also under pressure to repair
rifts in his relationship with America’s president, ones that have opened not over Israel’s fundamental war aims in Gaza—ensuring that
Hamas can never again threaten Israel—but over Israel’s approach to its military campaign and to humanitarian assistance entering Gaza.
As was the case in 1991, Israel’s restraint in its response to an outside attack will not, by itself, reset its relationship with the United States.
With Israel’s assault on Rafah looming, the ties between Biden and Netanyahu could become even more strained. But a U.S.-brokered
normalization deal between Israel and Saudi Arabia is the most important thing that could change the trajectory of the relationship. Biden
understands that because the Saudis require a credible political advance for the Palestinians in order to finalize a normalization deal,
Netanyahu will have to take on the part of his political base that most staunchly opposes Palestinian statehood. And the negotiations
cannot make serious progress unless the humanitarian crisis in Gaza is eased—something that cannot easily be done without a cease-fire.
No doubt such a move will be politically difficult for Netanyahu to undertake. He is likely to argue that a pause would take the military
pressure off Hamas. Having already greatly reduced its military presence in Gaza since November, however, Israel is not putting the kind
of military pressure on Hamas that it was when a hostage deal was brokered that month. No hostages have been released since, a reality
that suggests that Hamas’s leader in Gaza, Yahya Sinwar, does not feel any serious pressure to seek a reprieve. Israel’s threat to invade
Rafah may increase the pressure on Sinwar, but a Rafah operation cannot take place until Netanyahu fulfills his pledge to Biden that no
invasion will happen before Israel evacuates the 1.4 million Palestinians crammed into the area. Because evacuation involves not only
moving people but also ensuring they have a place to go that has adequate shelter, food, water, and medicine, an evacuation will itself take
four to six weeks, probably longer.
Netanyahu will have to choose between Biden and Ben-Gvir.
In light of these realities, Israel should make a virtue of necessity. If it cannot go into Rafah for some weeks, the cease-fire means that it is
giving up little but gaining a number of advantages. A four-to-six-week cease-fire would allow international organizations to ease
conditions in Gaza and address the world’s concerns about famine there. They could put better mechanisms in place to ensure that
sufficient humanitarian assistance not only enters Gaza but is also actually distributed to those most in need. A cease-fire would refocus
the world’s attention onto Hamas’s intransigence and the plight of the Israeli hostages. And it would help alter the skeptical narrative that
has taken hold about Israel internationally and reduce the pressure on it to end the war unconditionally.
To be sure, the far-right Israeli ministers Bezalel Smotrich and Itamar Ben-Gvir will oppose any unilateral cease-fire, no matter its
duration. But their war aims are not the same as Netanyahu’s or the Israeli public’s. They want to reoccupy Gaza, and they will
undoubtedly oppose any breakthrough with Saudi Arabia that requires concessions to Palestinians’ national aspirations. At some point or
another, Netanyahu will have to choose between Biden and Ben-Gvir.
Put simply, a unilateral Israeli cease-fire for four to six weeks would create a strategic opportunity—particularly if it creates an opening to
normalize relations with Saudi Arabia and transform the tacit regional alignment that emerged after Iran’s attack on Israel into a more
material reality. For the Biden administration, the role that Arab states played in helping defend Israel against Iran’s attack is a tangible
new development that needs quick follow-up. The U.S. political calendar, too, makes achieving progress on Israeli-Saudi normalization
urgent. Getting the Senate’s approval for the United States’ direct contributions to the deal—which include a U.S.-Saudi bilateral defense
treaty and a civil-nuclear partnership between the two countries—is certain to become more difficult as the U.S. presidential election
approaches.
The new behavior that the Iran-Israel crisis in April provoked in numerous states shows that long-standing realities in the Middle East
can change. Iran is now in a weak position, and Israel has a window of opportunity in an otherwise very difficult year. Rarely has Israel so
urgently needed to seize a potential strategic opportunity. But this is equally true for the United States. Biden has a strong interest in
showing that he was able to take the Israel-Hamas war and the chaos created by Iran’s proxies and forge a more stable and hopeful Middle
East. There is a moment to do that now. But there is no telling how long it will last.
DENNIS ROSS é conselheiro do Instituto Washington para Políticas do Oriente Próximo e professor da Universidade de Georgetown. Antigo enviado dos
EUA para o Médio Oriente, serviu em altos cargos de segurança nacional nas administrações Reagan, George HW Bush, Clinton e Obama.
DAVID MAKOVSKY é Ziegler Distinguished Fellow no Washington Institute e Diretor do Projeto Koret sobre Relações Árabe-Israelenses.
MAIS DE DENNIS ROSS
MAIS DE DAVID MAKOVSKY
Oriente Médio Israel Territórios Palestinos Irã Arábia Saudita Segurança Defesa e Militar Estratégia de Reconstrução Pós-Conflito e Conflito
Mais:
Guerra e Estratégia Militar Política Externa dos EUA Administração Biden Conflito Israel-Palestina Guerra Israel-Hamas Relações EUA-Israel
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