Instant Download Ebook of Aisne 1918 Battleground North West France David Blanchard Online Full Chapter PDF

Aisne 1918 Battleground North West
France David Blanchard

Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmeta.com/product/aisne-1918-battleground-north-west-france-david-blan
chard/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
Leading at a Higher Level Blanchard on Leadership and

Creating High Performing Organizations Kenneth H.
Blanchard
https://ebookmeta.com/product/leading-at-a-higher-level-
blanchard-on-leadership-and-creating-high-performing-
organizations-kenneth-h-blanchard/
Pool Care for Dummies Kristine Blanchard
https://ebookmeta.com/product/pool-care-for-dummies-kristine-
blanchard/
A Breath after Drowning 2nd Edition Alice Blanchard
https://ebookmeta.com/product/a-breath-after-drowning-2nd-
edition-alice-blanchard/
Tiger vs Churchill: North-West Europe, 1944-45 (Osprey

Duel 118) 1st Edition Neil Grant
https://ebookmeta.com/product/tiger-vs-churchill-north-west-
europe-1944-45-osprey-duel-118-1st-edition-neil-grant/
Violent Inheritance Sexuality Land and Energy in Making
the North American West 1st Edition E Cram
https://ebookmeta.com/product/violent-inheritance-sexuality-land-
and-energy-in-making-the-north-american-west-1st-edition-e-cram/
Architecture of the Islamic West North Africa and the

Iberian Peninsula 700 1800 Jonathan M. Bloom
https://ebookmeta.com/product/architecture-of-the-islamic-west-
north-africa-and-the-iberian-peninsula-700-1800-jonathan-m-bloom/
Handbook of the Marine Fauna of North West Europe 2nd

Edition P J Hayward J S Ryland
https://ebookmeta.com/product/handbook-of-the-marine-fauna-of-
north-west-europe-2nd-edition-p-j-hayward-j-s-ryland/
Transnational Indians in the North American West 1st

Edition Clarissa Confer Andrae Marak Laura Tuennerman
Sterling Evans
https://ebookmeta.com/product/transnational-indians-in-the-north-
american-west-1st-edition-clarissa-confer-andrae-marak-laura-
tuennerman-sterling-evans/
Effective Training Systems, Strategies, and Practices

6th Edition P. Nick Blanchard
https://ebookmeta.com/product/effective-training-systems-
strategies-and-practices-6th-edition-p-nick-blanchard/
00 Prelims_Layout 1 09/06/2015 07:27 Page 1
Battleground Europe
BATTLE OF THE AISNE 1918

Battleground series:
Stamford Bridge & Hastings by Peter Marren Hindenburg Line - Bourlon Wood by Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cave
Wars of the Roses - Wakefield/ Towton by Philip A. Haigh Cambrai - Airfields and Airmen by Mike O’Connor
Wars of the Roses - Barnet by David Clark Aubers Ridge by Edward Hancock
Wars of the Roses - Tewkesbury by Steven Goodchild La Bassée - Neuve Chapelle by Geoffrey Bridger
Wars of the Roses - The Battles of St Albans by Loos - Hohenzollern Redoubt by Andrew Rawson
Peter Burley, Michael Elliott & Harvey Wilson Loos - Hill 70 by Andrew Rawson
English Civil War - Naseby by Martin Marix Evans, Peter Burton Fromelles by Peter Pedersen
and Michael Westaway The Battle of the Lys 1918 by Phil Tomaselli
English Civil War - Marston Moor by David Clark Accrington Pals Trail by William Turner
War of the Spanish Succession - Blenheim 1704 by James Falkner Poets at War: Wilfred Owen by Helen McPhail and Philip Guest
War of the Spanish Succession - Ramillies 1706 by James Falkner Poets at War: Edmund Blunden by Helen McPhail and Philip Guest
Napoleonic - Hougoumont by Julian Paget and Derek Saunders Poets at War: Graves & Sassoon by Helen McPhail and Philip Guest
Napoleonic - Waterloo by Andrew Uffindell and Michael Corum Gallipoli by Nigel Steel
Zulu War - Isandlwana by Ian Knight and Ian Castle Gallipoli - Gully Ravine by Stephen Chambers
Zulu War - Rorkes Drift by Ian Knight and Ian Castle Gallipoli - Anzac Landing by Stephen Chambers
Boer War - The Relief of Ladysmith by Lewis Childs Gallipoli - Suvla – August Offensive by Stephen Chambers
Boer War - The Siege of Ladysmith by Lewis Childs Gallipoli - Landings at Helles by Huw & Jill Rodge
Boer War - Kimberley by Lewis Childs Walking the Italian Front by Francis Mackay
Italy - Asiago by Francis Mackay
Mons by Jack Horsfall and Nigel Cave Verdun: Fort Douamont by Christina Holstein
Néry by Patrick Tackle Walking Verdun by Christina Holstein
Le Cateau by Nigel Cave and Jack Shelden Zeebrugge & Ostend Raids 1918 by Stephen McGreal
Walking the Salient by Paul Reed
Ypres - Sanctuary Wood and Hooge by Nigel Cave
Ypres - Hill 60 by Nigel Cave Germans at Beaumont Hamel by Jack Sheldon
Ypres - Messines Ridge by Peter Oldham Germans at Thiepval by Jack Sheldon
Ypres - Polygon Wood by Nigel Cave
Ypres - Passchendaele by Nigel Cave
Ypres - Airfields and Airmen by Mike O’Connor SECOND WORLD WAR
Ypres - St Julien by Graham Keech Dunkirk by Patrick Wilson
Ypres - Boesinghe by Stephen McGreal Calais by Jon Cooksey
Walking the Somme by Paul Reed Boulogne by Jon Cooksey
Somme - Gommecourt by Nigel Cave Saint-Nazaire by James Dorrian
Somme - Serre by Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cave Normandy - Pegasus Bridge by Carl Shilleto
Somme - Beaumont Hamel by Nigel Cave Normandy - Merville Battery by Carl Shilleto
Somme - Thiepval by Michael Stedman Normandy - Utah Beach by Carl Shilleto
Somme - La Boisselle by Michael Stedman Normandy - Omaha Beach by Tim Kilvert-Jones
Somme - Fricourt by Michael Stedman Normandy - Gold Beach by Christopher Dunphie & Garry Johnson
Somme - Carnoy-Montauban by Graham Maddocks Normandy - Gold Beach Jig by Tim Saunders
Somme - Pozières by Graham Keech Normandy - Juno Beach by Tim Saunders
Somme - Courcelette by Paul Reed Normandy - Sword Beach by Tim Kilvert-Jones
Somme - Boom Ravine by Trevor Pidgeon Normandy - Operation Bluecoat by Ian Daglish
Somme - Mametz Wood by Michael Renshaw Normandy - Operation Goodwood by Ian Daglish
Somme - Delville Wood by Nigel Cave Normandy - Epsom by Tim Saunders
Somme - Advance to Victory (North) 1918 by Michael Stedman Normandy - Hill 112 by Tim Saunders
Somme - Flers by Trevor Pidgeon Normandy - Mont Pinçon by Eric Hunt
Somme - Bazentin Ridge by Edward Hancock Normandy - Cherbourg by Andrew Rawson
Somme - Combles by Paul Reed Normandy - Commandos & Rangers on D-Day by Tim Saunders
Somme - Beaucourt by Michael Renshaw Das Reich – Drive to Normandy by Philip Vickers
Somme - Redan Ridge by Michael Renshaw Oradour by Philip Beck
Somme - Hamel by Peter Pedersen Market Garden - Nijmegen by Tim Saunders
Somme - Villers-Bretonneux by Peter Pedersen Market Garden - Hell’s Highway by Tim Saunders
Somme - Airfields and Airmen by Mike O’Connor Market Garden - Arnhem, Oosterbeek by Frank Steer
Airfields and Airmen of the Channel Coast by Mike O’Connor Market Garden - Arnhem, The Bridge by Frank Steer
In the Footsteps of the Red Baron by Mike O’Connor Market Garden - The Island by Tim Saunders
Arras - Airfields and Airmen by Mike O’Connor Rhine Crossing – US 9th Army & 17th US Airborne by Andrew Rawson
Arras - The Battle for Vimy Ridge by Jack Sheldon & Nigel Cave British Rhine Crossing – Operation Varsity by Tim Saunders
Arras - Vimy Ridge by Nigel Cave British Rhine Crossing – Operation Plunder by Tim Saunders
Arras - Gavrelle by Trevor Tasker and Kyle Tallett Battle of the Bulge – St Vith by Michael Tolhurst
Arras - Oppy Wood by David Bilton Battle of the Bulge – Bastogne by Michael Tolhurst
Arras - Bullecourt by Graham Keech Channel Islands by George Forty
Arras - Monchy le Preux by Colin Fox Walcheren by Andrew Rawson
Walking Arras by Paul Reed Remagen Bridge by Andrew Rawson
Hindenburg Line by Peter Oldham Cassino by Ian Blackwell
Hindenburg Line - Epehy by Bill Mitchinson Anzio by Ian Blackwell
Hindenburg Line - Riqueval by Bill Mitchinson Dieppe by Tim Saunders
Hindenburg Line - Villers-Plouich by Bill Mitchinson Fort Eben Emael by Tim Saunders
Hindenburg Line - Cambrai Right Hook by Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cave Crete – The Airborne Invasion by Tim Saunders
Hindenburg Line - Cambrai Flesquières by Jack Horsfall & Nigel Cave Malta by Paul Williams
Hindenburg Line - Saint Quentin by Helen McPhail and Philip Guest
Battleground Europe
BATTLE OF THE AISNE 1918

The Phantom Sector
David Blanchard
First published in Great Britain in 2015 by

Pen & Sword Military
an imprint of
Pen & Sword Books Ltd
47 Church Street
Barnsley
South Yorkshire
S70 2AS
Copyright © David Blanchard 2015
ISBN 978 1 78337 605 6
The right of David Blanchard to be identified as Author of this Work
has been asserted by him in accordance with the Copyright, Designs
and Patents Act 1988.
A CIP catalogue record for this book is available
from the British Library.
All rights reserved. No part of this book may be reproduced or
transmitted in any form or by any means, electronic or mechanical
including photocopying, recording or by any information storage and
retrieval system, without permission from the Publisher in writing.
Printed and bound in England by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CRO 4YY.
Pen & Sword Books Ltd incorporates the Imprints of Pen & Sword
Aviation, Pen & Sword Maritime, Pen & Sword Military, Wharncliffe
Local History, Pen and Sword Select, Pen and Sword Military
Classics, Leo Cooper, Remember When, Seaforth Publishing and
Frontline Publishing.
For a complete list of Pen & Sword titles please contact
PEN & SWORD BOOKS LIMITED
47 Church Street, Barnsley, South Yorkshire, S70 2AS, England
E-mail: enquiries@pen-and-sword.co.uk
Website: www.pen-and-sword.co.uk
CONTENTS
Acknowledgements ..................................................7
List of Maps ............................................................9
Introduction ............................................................13
Historical Background ..........................................17
Chapter One The Allied Troops and Dispositions ..................19
Chapter Two The Defence of the Chemin des Dames and
Californie Plateau ................................................35
Chapter Three The Defence of the woods and
the Aisne River ....................................................99
Chapter Four The Defence of the Aisne Canal ......................135
Chapter Five Rearguard Actions: Afternoon of
27 May – 6 June ................................................157
Chapter Six General Advice for Tourers ..............................185
Car Tour 1 ............................................................189
Walking Tour 1 ....................................................213
Walking Tour 2 ....................................................227
Soissons Memorial to the Missing ......................241
Aisne 1918 British Cemeteries ............................247
German Cemeteries ............................................263
Order of Battle of British Forces ........................265
Order of Battle of German Infantry Units ..........269
Index ....................................................................271
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
It is nearly twenty years since I started researching the Aisne battle of

1918. I was inspired to do so by the brief inscription on the front page
of my great uncle’s war service Bible:
L/Cp T Williams 9th Bn N F 9th Platoon C-Coy, 27th May
1918, 45776 Thomas Williams taken prisoner at Pontevert,
released 13th November at Saaralben
I had no idea where Pontevert, or Pontavert, was and, intrigued, found
that it is near the Chemin des Dames, not far from Soissons. To cut a
long story short, starting from this rudimentary piece of information, I
went on to complete a research degree on the battle in 2005.
Along the way I discovered that my maternal grandfather, Private
Ned Burridge, who fought with the 8/DLI, was also taken prisoner on
27 May 1918. I would like to dedicate this book to the memory of both
these men who fought for the 50th Northumbrian Division until it was
decimated on the morning of 27 May 1918.
I have been fortunate to have the help and support of many people
through this long period of research. Charles Messenger, Steven
Broomfield, John Sheen and Nigel Cave read parts – and, in Nigel’s
case, all – of the manuscript and I’m extremely grateful for their
judicious comments, advice and support. The excellent maps in this
book reflect the cartographical skills of John Plumer, Ruth Coombs
and, in particular, Paul Hewson from Battlefield Design. Ian Durham,
who lives in Cormicy, has been an invaluable source of local
knowledge; I thank him for many conversations, which helped me open
up new avenues to explore. Yves Fohlen, a battlefield guide at the
Caverne du Dragon Museum and an expert on the battles of the Aisne,
was also generous with his time in answering my many questions about
the Chemin des Dames and Californie Plateau. I am also indebted to
everyone who contributed to the Aisne / Chemin des Dames thread on
the Great War Forum, which was a valuable sounding board. The
wealth of photographic material in this book is testament to the kind
generosity of relatives of those who took part in the battle. On a
personal level, my thanks go to my partner, Michiko, and our son,
Thomas, who patiently supported me in my endeavors; especially
during the numerous occasions when our family holidays have been
hijacked for ‘urgent research’. I am also grateful of the support
provided by the staff at The Liddle Collection at Leeds University, The
National Archives and the CWGC for helping to further my research.
7
I would also like to thank the following, who helped to ensure that this
publication saw the light of day: Adam Llewellyn, Alan Forster, Alan
Wallace, Andrew Carrick, Andrew Gill, Andrew Rawson, Andy
Jackson, Andy Pay, Angela Bird, Anne Caughey, Ann Galliard, Aris de
Bruijn, Avis Holden, Bill Danby, Brian Scanlon, Christopher Noble,
Chris Page, Chris White, Colin Murphy, Colin Poulter, Colin Young,
Dave Taylor, David Benjamin, David Marriott, David O’Mara, David
Wanstall, Denis Rigg, Elisabeth Thorn, Emma Bonney, Fae Jones, Fred
Ashmore, Fred Bromilow, George De Haas, Gil Alcaix, Gill Willett,
Graeme Foster, Graham Morley, Graham Stewart, Guy Smith, Helen
Charlesworth, Ian Durham, Ian Wiles, James Pitt, Jane Burrell, Jean
Armstrong, Jean Atkinson, Jerry Murland, Joan Paparo, John Beech,
John Burrell, John Butt, John Bryant, John Massey Stewart, John
Wishart, Jonathan Capewell, Keith Parsonson, Lawrence Brown,
Lewis Fiddicroft, Louisa Gingell, Mr L Weaterton, Margaret Atkinson,
Mark Connelly, Matthew Gilbert, Matthew Richardson, Maurice
Johnson, Michelle Young, Neil Storey, Nigel Brassington, Nigel
Henderson, Norman Hessler, Paul Cox, Paul Dixon, Paul Hewitt, Paul
Hutchinson, Paul Kendall, Paul Seymour, Peter Hart, Peter Hastie,
Peter Hurn, Pete Rhodes, Rainer Strasheim, Ralph Whitehead, Richard
Flory, Richard Van Emden, Rick Vincent, Robert Brunsdon, Robert
Dunlop, Robert Smith, Ron Hartley, Sebastian Laudan, Simon Barnard,
Stephen Beeby, Stephen Cooper, Steve
Heimerle, Stuart Wilson, Susan Tall,
Terry Reeves, Terry Robson, Tim
Whiteaway, William G Wood,Will
Murray, Valerie Snowball.
Lance Corporal
Tom Williams and
brother Sam.
Private George
Edward ‘Ned’
Burridge.
LIST OF MAPS
Aisne and Chemin des Dames, 27 May 1918 ....................................11

British Divisions, 27 May ..................................................................12
Sector occupied by IX Corps on the 27 May 1918 ............................18
German Offensives May-June 1918
(from German Official History) ....................................................30
The 50th Division sector on the eve of battle ....................................34
150 Brigade sector ..............................................................................40
French Map showing PC Terrasse (south of Craonnelle) where
Brigadier H C Rees was making for on
the morning of the attack................................................................50
Front line positions held by B and D Coy 8/DLI, with support from C
Coy 7/DLI morning, 27 May..........................................................54
Redoubt line held by C Coy 8/DLI ....................................................55
149 Brigade sector held by 6/NF, outpost line and
4/NF, battle zone ............................................................................70
Trench map of the battle zone, held by 4/NF ....................................75
50th Division sketch map....................................................................85
D Battery 250 Brigade RFA position ..................................................91
The 8th Division sector on the eve of battle ..........................................
A German map from 1916 of the Bois des Buttes, highlighting the
complexity of tunnels, trenches
and craters ....................................................................................103
25 Brigade sector, 2/Royal Berks and 2/Rifle Brigade
in the front line with 2/East Lancs in reserve ..............................120
Sketch map of 5th Battery positions prepared by
Mrs Massey based on reports she received from
eye-witnesses. The map was prepared for the French military
authorities in a bid to help find her son........................................133
The 21st Division sector on the eve of battle ..................................134
Trench map from May 1918, showing positions
occupied by the 62 Brigade ..........................................................136
Trench map of Cormicy and positions held by the Leicestershire

Brigade..........................................................................................140
Cauroy trench map ............................................................................152
21st Division sector from a French map ..........................................156
The battle of the Aisne 1918: Stages of retreat ................................157
Route taken by the German 50 Infantry Division, 27-28 May ........164
The retreat of the IX Corps from Vesle to Ardre ..............................167
The German Advance across the Aisne, 27 May
to 1 June........................................................................................174
Car Tour Map ....................................................................................188
Trench map of Gernicourt wood and Berry-au-Bac ........................205
Walk 1 Map Californie Plateau ........................................................212
French trench map c. 1916. Note the cemetery
to the east of Craonnelle ..............................................................216
French trench map c. 1916. Note the cemetery
to the east of Craonnelle ..............................................................224
Walk 2 Map Bois des Buttes ............................................................226
A trench map from May 1918 showing the Bois des Buttes and
surrounding area ..........................................................................231
Walk 2 Map Bois des Buttes point 10 ..............................................240
Sissonne Group of cemeteries CWGC..............................................247
Vendresse group of cemeteries, which includes Jonchery British
Cemetery ......................................................................................252
Chambrecy group of cemeteries, CWGC ........................................256
10
The British Sector on the Aisne, 27 May 1918.

British Divisions,
27 May.
INTRODUCTION
The Battle of the Aisne, 1918: ‘The Phantom Sector’
The 3rd Battle of the Aisne began on 27 May 1918. This German
offensive, the third of 1918, was an astonishing victory – indeed, the
greatest one day advance on the Western Front since the beginning of
trench warfare – which also started, ironically, on the banks of the
Aisne River in September 1914.
This successful operation allowed the German High Command and
General Erich Ludendorff, in particular, to plan for a push on Paris,
some forty miles distant. The
Allied armies had effectively now
been split in two. The Marne was
reached by 30 May, but to all
intents and purpose this is where
the offensive stalled.
The British IX Corps along
with the French Army had stood in
the way when the tremendous
German barrage had ripped the
front open along the heights of the
Chemin des Dames plateau and
across the Aisne River on the first
day. This was a novel setting; one
of the few times that part of a
British Army was under direct
Generalleutnant Erich Ludendorff.
control of the French. Eventually
five British divisions – the 8th,
21st, 50th in the front line and the 25th and 19th in reserve – came to
this haven of supposed tranquillity to rest and recuperate away from the
vicissitudes of war. All these divisions had played their role in the two
previous attacks on the Somme and the Lys and suffered very heavily
for it. The Aisne front was a refuge. As one British soldier put it:
In trenches shadowed by green trees and the Bois de
Beaumarais gay with flowers and singing birds, the war bore a
different aspect. Here surely was the hitherto phantom sector
all had one day hoped to find.
The British divisions found resting on the Aisne in early May 1918 had
13
German topographical postcard of the Chemin des Dames ridges.

been part of a plan hatched by the French General Foch, which was
termed “roulement”. Foch hoped that relatively fresh French divisions
could be transferred further north where it was felt that Ludendorff’s
next hammer blow would land. The British could now regroup on this
rather placid sector of the Western Front. In command was the
aristocratic gunner, Lieutenant General Sir Alexander Hamilton-
Gordon.
At the outbreak of the war Hamilton-Gordon was major general in
charge of Administration at Aldershot, a post he had been promoted to
in July 1914. In May 1916, he was appointed to the command of IX
Corps, succeeding Lieutenant Sir General
Julian Byng. This appointment to corps
commander seems to have been based solely
on the patronage of the Commander-in-Chief,
as he lacked the necessary experience of
combat to assume such a role; and it was seen
as such by contemporaries. Since February
1918 Hamilton-Gordon had been released by
the General Staff to work with the French to
explore the possibility of relief or intervention
by British troops on the French front. In late
April Hamilton-Gordon found himself charged
with commanding a reconstituted IX Corps
and despatched to the Chemin des Dames
sector.
The 8th, 21st, 25th and 50th divisions were
attached to the French Sixth Army,
commanded by the uncompromising General
Denis Duchêne. Later the 19th Division
moved further south into a reserve position Lieutenant Colonel Sir Alexander
near Châlons-sur-Marne (renamed Châlons- Hamilton-Gordon.
en-Champagne in 1998).
Many an infantryman who arrived on the Aisne in the warmth of an
early French summer, would have concurred with Lieutenant Victor
Purcell’s (5th Yorkshire) thoughts:
For the British, who came from the bleak north, with its mud
and water-logged trenches, this sector had been a haven of
delight. Whereas from Ypres to St Quentin they had almost
shared their parapet with the Germans, here was a No-Man’s
land, which gave their lungs air. In the north tons of high
explosive were cast from trench to trench by mortars as easily
Le Chemin des Dames, Decembre 1917, F Flameng.
as one would fling a stone, but here the mortars were out of
range. Anywhere north of the Somme it would have been
asking for trouble to have exposed a head or a hand for a
moment above the parapet, but in this sector the desultory
sniping from half a mile was amusement in the tranquil
monotony.
This battlefield guide and history will focus mainly on the events of the
attack that fell on the British sector of the front between the 27 May–6
June 1918. The French had held this area since 1914. French
monuments and cemeteries dominate the landscape. The British were
also here in 1914, and they too have left reminders of their relatively
brief presence. However, the actions fought here early in the war
mainly occurred in the west of the sector. The battlefield of May 1918
scales the heights of Chemin des Dames Ridge, along the Californie
Plateau and descends to the afforested valley of the Aisne River and
canal. The retreat of the British forces during the course of the first day
and in following days extends south almost to the Marne and takes in
part of the Champagne region.
16
HISTORICAL BACKGROUND
Once a good battlefield always a good battlefield.

Rose E B Coombs
Roughly five miles to the north of the Aisne is the Chemin des Dames
road. The ‘Ladies’ Way’ was built on the order of Louis XV in 1770 to
ease the carriage of his daughters, Adélide and Victoire, on their way
from the Royal Palace of Compiègne to the rural residence of their
former governess, the Comtesse de Narbonne Lara, in the Château de
la Bove near Bouconville. The Chemin des Dames bisects an area of
land referred to as le triangle mystique; the apex is centered on the
hilltop citadel of Laon, with Soissons and Reims forming the base.
Enclosed within this area, three ancient provinces of northern France
meet: Picardy, Île de France, and Champagne. These three regions form
a crossroads connecting Flanders – and thus much of northern Europe –
with the Paris basin, and therefore most of France. Old battlefields are
everywhere here. Stretching for no more than twenty-five miles east to
west, the Chemin des Dames is a microcosm of this area of France that
has often been referred to as the ‘Cockpit of Europe’.
Julius Caesar, in his history of the war against the Gauls, mentions
the capture of the fortress of Bibrax held by the Remi tribe, near present
day Berry-au-Bac. Napoleon fought his last successful battle at
Craonne on 7 March 1814, against a joint Prussian and Russian army
under the command of Field Marshal Blücher. The Marie-Louise
Monument at Le Ferme d’Hurtebise commemorates the Napoleonic
legacy of 1814 and the struggle of the French poilu in 1914. The British
Expeditionary Force fought here in September 1914 against the
retreating German army. French troops, commanded by General Robert
Nivelle, captured part of the Chemin des Dames Ridge from the
Germans at a tremendous cost in men in 1917. In October French
forces, this time under General Henri-Philippe Pétain, managed to push
the Germans back even further in an audacious set piece battle at
Malmaison, finally wresting the whole of the Chemin des Dames out
of the enemy’s hands.
By early 1918 the region had become almost a tranquil backwater.
The front line still ran across the Chemin des Dames, but actual
fighting was desultory; a system of ‘live and let live’ prevailed amongst
the French and German combatants. This period of calm was shattered
in May 1918, when the German Seventh Army attacked from the north.
Aubigny
British Units on the
Amifontaine
Chemin des Dames,
morning of 27 May
German7th Army
18
10th
10th 56th
Chermizy Bouconville 28th
Neuville Corbeny
4/E.York 5/ York 50th

8/D.L.I. 6/D.L.I. 52nd Juvincourt
4/N
Ailles Chevreux .F.
Chemin des Dames 2/W

.York
la Vallee Craonne 149t
h 2/Nor
151st th’n
Foulon 150th s Guignicourt
23rd 2/R. Berk
Craonnelle
Oulches 4/York 6/N.F La Ville aux Bois
.
ne
is
te
2/
24th 7th A
M
ie t
2R
Bat
idd
M er
ifle
tle
x.
Vassogne Zone R. Riv
Bd
. e
2/Devon 1/Worc. 25th Conde
French Sector 7/D.L.I
cs
2 Cos.
an
22nd
.L
7/D.L.I(P)
/E
s .2
Jumigny
Co
86th
2
Berry-au-Bac
Pontavert
50th Div. 5/N.F. Aguilcourt
12/1
Pargnan Gernicourt
3N
.F.
Chaudardes 2 Cos.
50th HQ
22/D.L.I(P)
2/
Œuilly
Lin
33rd
c.
Beaurieux 8th Div. 21st Div. German

Cuiry
7/
1st Army
L
Riv
eic
.
2 Cos.
er
Ais a nal 2/E. Lancs 8/
ne e C Concevreux Le
Maizy Aisn Bouffignereux
ic .
8th HQ
110th
9/
K.O
.Y.L
Roucy
.I.
1/Sher. For.. Cormicy

1/
Muscourt
9/
Ais
E.Y
K.O
ne
.Y.
ork
.
L.
Can
Guyencourt
I.
Meurival 64th al
74th 21
1/E
2 Cos. 15/D.L.I
.Yo
6/Leic. 1/Linc.
rk
7th
.
25 14/N.F.(P)
British front line/trenches 21st HQ
Ventelay Cauroy
Brigade Boundaries 9
Loivre
Line at 5am on the 28th 75th Bouvancourt Vaux
64th /K.O.Y.L
.I.
German front line m Varennes .
r ea .L.I
Romain St 15/D
Infantry company uil th
Bre th 7th Hermonville Villers
Batallion 75 110
Franqueux
nd
74th Courcy
Huit
62
Divisional Headquaters 45
Voisins
0 1 2 miles
25th HQ
Montigny
Pévy
01 Chapter 01_Layout 1 04/06/2015 19:37 Page 19
Chapter One
The AllieD TrOOPS AnD DiSPOSiTiOnS
The sector into which the five divisions of IX Corps were posted was
recognised as being one of the quietest of the whole of the Western
Front, and was known to the German forces in the region as the
sanatorium of the West. Since the French had seized the Chemin des
Dames in October 1917, there had been very little activity. The French
Sixth Army held a sector some fifty-five miles in length, from Noyon
in the west to a point three miles north of Reims in the east. The French
General Duchêne’s area of responsibility had almost doubled during
March and April 1918, due to the redeployment General Denis Auguste Duchêne,
of troops to the north as a result of the German GOC French Sixth Army.
offensives.
The main topographic feature of the French
front was the Chemin des Dames Ridge itself,
which runs from the town of Compiègne in the
north west to the precipitous buttress of the
Californie Plateau above the village of Craonne
in the east. The ridge has been compared to the
chalky plateau of the Hog’s Back of the North
Downs near Guildford. The plateau of the
Californie Plateau and the Chemin des Dames,

as seen from near Craonnelle.
Chemin des Dames is a range of heights, roughly 400 feet on average,

above the valley of the Aisne. The top of the plateau is gently rolling,
particularly in the west between Malmaison and Braye-en-Lannois, and
has a breadth of nearly three-quarters of a mile. From Californie
Plateau there are commanding views to the south, where the cathedral
of Reims can be observed in the distance.
The ridge appears to be a natural fortress, but in many respects this
is a mere illusion. Certainly as a defensive bastion it has much to
commend itself, a flat topped plateau with some severe slopes to the
north and the south. Indeed, Tim Carew in his book The Vanished Army
maintains that in September 1914 the German Army, reeling
northwards after the First Battle of the Marne, came to the Aisne region
and settled on the heights above the river valley and found themselves
occupying a defensive position as good as any that could be found
between the Urals and the Bay of Biscay. This position offered the
German gunners an ideal field of fire, as well as sited battery positions
and a number of old stone quarries that could be utilised as storerooms
and rest areas. But the heavily wooded slopes and the river valleys of
the Aisne (to the south) and the Ailette (to the north) provided cover for
attackers, allowing advanced units to creep forward almost totally
undetected.
The southern slopes of the Chemin des Dames, occupied by the
French Army in 1918, are far from uniform. The countryside consists
of gashes of limestone with sides so steep that in places the ascent is a
matter of climbing on hands and knees. Although this area had been
fought over for a number of months in 1917 as part of the Nivelle
Offensive, deciduous woodland still covered substantial acres of the
battlefield in 1918. However, the front lines running parallel with the
Chemin des Dames had been badly damaged by artillery fire and the
white chalk of the underlying rock strata exposed (the Germans called
Californie Plateau the ‘Winterberg’). The eastern sector of the French
front contrasted markedly with the steep gradients of the area extending
along the Chemin des Dames westwards to Soissons: east of Craonne
the land drops away abruptly and for twenty miles a low flat plain
extends to Reims.
The Aisne is relatively slow moving, occupying a wide fertile valley,
particularly in the west near Soissons. It extends to some 180 feet in
width, with many loops and meanders. Little is offered in the way of
cover along the riverbank other than high grass during the early
summer. Running parallel is the Canal Lateral, about sixty feet wide.
In some places only a few feet separate the canal and river; in others
the gap is up to half a mile. The river and canal are considerable
20
obstacles to north – south movement but there are numerous bridges in

the region, with fifty or more in the area from Berry-au-Bac to Soissons
alone. The main bulk of the French forces were to be found sandwiched
between the high ridge of the Chemin des Dames and the Aisne itself.
The staff of IX Corps reached the French front on 26 April 1918 and
decamped at Fère en Tardenois, fifteen miles south east of Soissons.
The first formation to arrive was the 50th Division on 27 and 28 April,
and gradually over the course of the next two weeks the other divisions
of the Corps arrived.
All of these divisions had played an active part in the German
offensives of March and April and had suffered heavy losses as a
consequence. Time was needed to refit and retrain, and the quiet sector
occupied by the Sixth Army seemed to afford them this opportunity.
But trained soldiers, NCOs and officers were in short supply by the
early summer of 1918. The commander of the 25th Division, Major
General Sir Edmund Guy Bainbridge, summed up the situation:
These reinforcements, largely composed of the nineteen-year-old
class, who had been training for the last nine months in England,
were most excellent material, but the absence of older men
suitable for promotion to NCOs rank was, in some units, a
serious disadvantage. A proportion under nineteen years of age
were wisely kept back for another two or three months
training. It is a thousand pities that they should
have been sent from England at all. Owing to
age and physique, some of these immature boys
were quite incapable of carrying the weight
and doing the work required of an infantry
soldier in the line: their presence in the ranks
rendered them a danger to their units. To use
them at the time was only a waste of those who
might, later on, with proper training and
physical development, have become valuable
reinforcements for the Army.
Unit cohesion had all but perished in IX
Corps by the time these formations had
reached the Chemin des Dames sector.
The experience of Second Lieutenant
Edwin Joicey was not untypical. In late
March 1918, he was notified of his
posting to France:
21
Second lieutenant
edwin Joicey, 15/Dli.
Arriving at Dover we saw two or three

Staff Officers calling out the names of
various Regiments and directing the
members of each where they had to go,
eventually they found several of us
standing as we had not been called. One
of the officers asked ‘What Regiment are
you?’ we replied ‘Northumberland
Fusiliers, sir’ to this the answer was ‘Oh!
You bloody Northumberland Fusiliers
you are all alike’. We were directed to the
boat and on arrival at Boulogne were
taken by motor transport and confined to
camp. We were there about two days
before entraining to join our regiments. I,
with one or two others, was instructed to
report to the 15th Durham Light Infantry.
Private Th Griffiths. Originally By May Joicey was in command of his own
in the West Yorks, he was platoon - he had three weeks to get to know his
transferred to the 4/Yorks, KiA
men before the German attack.
aged 18, on 27 May.
The Sector held by the British
The sector that was taken over by IX Corps had been very quiet for a
long time; the French and German troops stationed here had practised
a live and let live system. Many of the trenches had fallen into disrepair
but on paper seemed to offer many positive attributes with regard to
defence.
The sector comprised three distinct positions, corresponding to the
British system of a Forward Zone, Battle Zone and Rear Zone (Green
Line). There were plenty of gun emplacements and many positions
afforded good views over the enemy front and rear areas and the
Forward Zone had a number of strongpoints all along the front, very
well wired and with good deep dugouts. The Battle Zone lay a mile
behind the forward positions, consisting of defended localities (often
well-fortified hillocks, where battalion and brigade headquarters were
stationed) and clear fields of fire for interlocking machine guns. The
Rear Zone was located south of the Aisne. The defensive system was
very variable here; there were plenty of trenches but no organised
system of operation.
The position held by the 50th Division was 8,100 yards wide and No
Brigadier General ePA

riddell, GOC 149
Brigade.
Man’s Land in this sector was considerable, up to 2,000 yards or more.

The Divisional Headquarters were located in the village of Beaurieux,
south of a large wood, the Beaumarais and housed in the local chateau.
The area was divided into three sub-sectors, each held by a brigade plus
one machine gun company. Each brigade had one battalion in the line,
one in support, and one in reserve. Brigadier General Riddell of 149
Brigade provides an excellent account of the dispositions of the 50th
Division, as well as the general layout of the defensive arrangements in
this sector.
The sector was a most interesting one, bristling with tactical

problems. In the right (149th Bde) and centre (151st Bde) sub-
sectors, the ground formed a very gentle, uniform glacis slope
from the Bosch lines down to the river Aisne, with seven steep
sided, thickly wooded hillocks, which arose abruptly from the
surrounding plain to an average height of sixty feet. A clear view
of the right and centre sub-sectors could be obtained, as far as,
and including, the Bosch front line and close support trenches;
but the remainder of his trench system was lost to view in the
woods as it disappeared behind the ridge (parallel to our front
line) on which he had his front line system. From this ridge the
Bosch could see every movement in our front and support lines,
especially in the right sector, where movement along the trenches
by day drew the fire of his snipers…The left sub-sector (held by
the 150th Bde) had one outstanding feature: the famous
Californie Plateau, rising abruptly to a height of 350 feet above
the plain, with perhaps, half a dozen bricks to mark the site of the
once beautiful village of Craonne. This extraordinary plateau
stood out seared and naked, with its almost precipitous slopes
disappearing as they fell to the thick woodland which carpeted
the plain in every direction except south, east, and again west,
where ran the Chemin des Dames.
The positions held by the 8th Division were different from those of the
50th Division in that the sector formed a right-angled salient, which
projected out into the German positions. It was universally a much
flatter territory, comprising an Outpost Line some 1,000 to 1,500 yards
in depth as well as a Battle Zone 1,500 to 2,000 yards in depth. The
front line stretched some 7,500 yards. The right flank rested on the
Aisne at the village of Berry-au-Bac. This sub-sector was held by
troops of 25 Brigade, with the 2/Rifle Brigade and the 2/Royal
Berkshires as well as the 2/East Lancashires in the front line. The
regimental history of the East Lancashires provides the following
anecdote:
The line held by the battalion afforded a wide view over the back
areas of the enemy’s position; on one occasion a goods train was
seen to draw up at a siding where large fatigue parties proceeded
in broad daylight to unload it. The artillery was asked to deal
with the situation, but declined to do so, pleading that they had
been told not to ‘disturb the peace’!
The Miette stream, roughly twenty feet wide, was located to the north
24
and formed the boundary with 24

Brigade. This brigade occupied the
central area and had troops of the
2/Northamptons and the 2/Worcester
in line, with the 1/Sherwood
Foresters in brigade reserve south of
the Aisne. 23 Brigade was positioned
on the left flank of the sector, with
the 2/Middlesex and the 2/West
Yorks in the front line, with the
2/Devons in reserve near the hamlet
of La Ville-aux-Bois and the Bois des
Buttes. 8/Machine Gun Corps had
eight guns in each sub-sector and
eight guns in reserve. Another Captain Sidney Rogerson,
notable feature of this sector was the Headquarters Staff, 23rd
high wooded area south of the Aisne Brigade.
at Gernicourt. This was a position of
some tactical strength, situated as it was on a cliff-like bastion
protected by the river. A permanent garrison of 22 Durham Light
Infantry (a Pioneer battalion) held the defences in Gernicourt Wood,
along with troops from the 11/23rd French Territorial Battalion.
Stationed in the vicinity were also French artillery and machine gun
companies, all under the command of the 8th Division. Captain Sidney
Rogerson, a staff officer of 23 Brigade, vividly portrays the trench
system in his part of the line:
The ground was everywhere pitted with shell-holes, honeycombed
with dug-outs and littered with tangles of barbed wire. Here were
concrete ‘pill-boxes’ – super ‘pill-boxes’ – resembling square
forts and all bearing the marks of artillery fire; there, in a line,
the remains of seven or eight French tanks – a grim memento of
the first use of these. But whereas only a year ago it had been an
area of death and destruction, in May 1918 Nature had
reasserted herself and hidden the grosser evidences of battle
under a mantle of green. Only the actual front line trenches, dug
in the chalk, seared the landscape with white scars. The woods
had been blasted by the shell-fire of the previous year; but now
each shattered tree stump had covered its wounds with a wealth
of close foliage.
The 21st Division held a front line position from near Berry-au-Bac
running roughly south easterly for five miles and which ended near the
25
The Chemin des Dames and the Winterberg.
small village of Loivre, which was only three miles from Reims. The
forward area of this sector was a chalk plain intersected by the Aisne-
Marne canal. The front line ran east of the canal, at one point as much
as 1,000 yards beyond it. This forward area lay at the foot of a densely
wooded ridge, the Crête St. Auboeuf. The whole area was under view
from the enemy heights, Hill 108, Mount Spin and Fort Brimont. To
offset this disadvantage, camouflage netting had been set up by the
French, which screened all roads and tracks for many miles. The Battle
Zone lay to the west of the canal, which consisted of a chain of
redoubts, which ran in front of the Laon-Reims route national. This
area was considered to be the main line of resistance.
The trenches in this sector were very similar to those in other areas
of the IX Corps front. There was too many of them. It was a complex
system that resembled a rabbit warren, especially the communication
trenches. The second and third lines were very badly sited and with no
field of fire. These trenches were positioned on the top of ridges instead
of being positioned further down the slopes (on 27 May the Germans
did not bother about the ridges but went around them in every case by
the valleys). The main weakness on 21st Division’s front was the
Forward Zone across the canal. This had been sited at the limit of the
French advance in 1917. The area was very low lying, and Lieutenant
Colonel Harold Franklyn (GSO I 21st Division) commented, ‘I don’t
26
think ‘canal’ gives the right impression. Actually it was a swamp about
100 yards or more broad crossed by duck-boards tracks.’
Anglo French Co-operation
One of the most significant factors that contributed to the disaster on

27 May was the difference of opinion that existed between the British
and the French as to the best defensive strategy to adopt.
The Commander-in-Chief of the French Armies, General Pétain, had
laid down new principles for defensive arrangements at the end of
1917. Having observed the innovative Stosstruppen tactics in operation
on the Chemin des Dames in July 1917; and having also taken note of
German instructional pamphlets with regard to the construction of
defensive positions, Pétain realised the shortcomings of the allied
defence. There had to be a greater degree of flexibility; it was no longer
safe to pack the Forward Zone with troops. Front line positions should
be held lightly, with only enough soldiers stationed there to slow down
the assaulting waves of the enemy. The main line of resistance was to
be the Second Position (the British termed this the Battle Zone). This
was to be the killing ground and was designed to ensure that it could
not be reached by attacking troops until they had already been delayed
and to be so far back as to deny them artillery support. However,
support for this new ‘elastic defence’ was far from unanimous. General
Laure, a member of the Operations Bureau of General Pétain’s General
Staff, pointed out what he saw as folly:
At the front, as in the bosom of the Government, there was
stupefaction. Here was a General-in-Chief who deliberately
contemplated the eventual abandonment of the famous Buttes in
Champagne, conquered in 1915 at the cost of so much blood; of
the advanced lines of Verdun, like Hill 304, of the heights of the
Talon and the Poivre, on which were inscribed the victories of
1916; of the Chemin des Dames and the knolls of Morainvillers,
the capture of which had been the only positive results of the
attacks of 16th April 1917.
Another detractor was the commander of the Sixth Army, General
Denis Duchêne. He clung to the view that the defensive battle must be
fought on the Forward Zone, without yielding ground. Reluctantly,
Pétain gave way and approved the retention of the Chemin des Dames
as a position of resistance, with the proviso, ‘None of the divisions of
the 6th Army placed in reserve were to be brought north of the Aisne.’
27
Duchêne’s motives for holding on to the Chemin des Dames were

purely emotional; he argued that no ground in the sector, which
covered Paris, should be voluntarily given up. To do so would fly in the
face of public opinion; giving up the Chemin des Dames, which had
been so bitterly contested and won from the Germans the previous year,
would almost have been tantamount to surrendering Fortress Verdun. A
further concern may have been that the French were also reluctant to be
compared to the faltering BEF (British Expeditionary Force) in the
recent battles on the Somme and Lys:
The country would not have understood that from the experience
gathered from the British front alone, a position so rich in French
blood and thought to be impregnable had been given up. A
certain presumption, this writer thinks, may have asserted itself
in French minds: ‘The English had fallen away before the
enemy’s great assault, but the French would stand!’
The great weaknesses of the Chemin des Dames defence were that it
lacked depth and that the Aisne, standing five miles to the rear, was a
considerable obstacle. The British commander, Lieutenant General
Hamilton-Gordon, and his subordinates, free from the symbolic
necessity of having to hold on to the ridge, were quick to point out the
shortcomings of the defensive arrangements in this area. Using the
Aisne as the main line of defence, the ridge would become merely a
line of outposts. In other words, this area would have been almost ideal
for deploying a defence in depth.
Duchêne seems to have been loathed by most of his contemporaries
although, if not admired by the troops under his command, he was
respected and was given the nickname Tigre Militare:
The word was that the General was foul tempered, perpetually
angry and foulmouthed for no reason. Approaching him became
a form of torture for his officers, which they dared do only at the
last resort. His Chief of Staff, obliged to submit to his outbreaks
of anger, sulked for several days when the General went too far.
He was not a man who would listen to advice from subordinate
commanders. By contrast, Hamilton-Gordon comes across as being
weak and indecisive. His dour disposition does not seem to have helped
his cause, leading to him being ironically referred to as ‘Sunny Jim’ and
‘Merry and Bright’.
The differences of opinion between the British and the French with
regard to defence came to a head at a conference on 15 May at IX
Corps Headquarters. All his divisional commanders, in respect of the
28
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
absence, entrusting the legation to a chargé d’affaires; but this
positive order was practically revoked in the concluding sentence:
“Considering the season at which this instruction may have its effect,
and the possibility of a satisfactory change in the posture of our
relations with Great Britain, the time of your return to the United
States is left to your discretion and convenience.”
These instructions did not warrant Pinkney in demanding leave of
absence on any other ground than that of failure to appoint a
minister at Washington. They did not warrant him in returning to
America at all if he saw the possibility of such an appointment.
Pinkney was obliged to put a free construction on the President’s
language. Abandoning the ground that his departure was a
necessary result of the absence of a British minister at Washington,
he asked Lord Wellesley, in an official note, dated February 17, what
Mr. Foster was to do when he arrived there?[17] “I presume that for
the restoration of harmony between the two countries, the Orders in
Council will be relinquished without delay; that the blockade of 1806
will be annulled; that the case of the ‘Chesapeake’ will be arranged
in the manner heretofore intended; and in general that all such just
and reasonable acts will be done as are necessary to make us
friends.” So important a letter was probably never written by any
other American diplomatist without instructions from his Government,
—for it was in effect an ultimatum, preliminary to the rupture of
relations and ultimate war; yet even in this final list of American
demands made by the American minister in withdrawing from
London, impressment was not expressly mentioned.
Wellesley replied in a private letter[18] dated February 23, with
the formal avowal that “it would be neither candid toward you, nor
just toward this Government, to countenance any interpretation
which might favor a supposition that it was intended by this
Government to relinquish any of the principles which I have so often
endeavored to explain to you.” Nothing in Wellesley’s letter showed
a desire to irritate, and his refusals left less sting than was left by
Canning’s concessions; but the issue was fairly joined, and America
was at liberty to act upon it as she pleased.
In order to leave no doubt of his meaning, Pinkney instantly[19]
claimed his audience of leave for February 28, declining, in the mean
time, to attend the diplomatic levee which by postponement took
place only February 26. His conduct was noticed and understood, as
he meant it should be; and as his audience still remains the only
occasion when an American minister at London has broken relations
in a hostile manner, with resulting war, it has an interest peculiar to
itself. Several accounts were preserved of what passed at the
interview. Pinkney’s official report recorded the words used by him:
[20]—
“I stated to the Prince Regent the grounds upon which it had

become my duty to take my leave and to commit the business of the
legation to a chargé d’affaires; and I concluded by expressing my
regret that my humble efforts in the execution of the instructions of my
Government to set to rights the embarrassed and disjointed relations
of the two countries had wholly failed; and that I saw no reason to
expect that the great work of their reconciliation was likely to be
accomplished through any other agency.”
According to Pinkney, and according to the official report of Lord
Wellesley,[21] the Prince Regent replied in terms of the utmost amity
toward the United States. Another account of the interview gave the
impression that the Prince Regent had not shown himself so
gracious toward the departing minister as the official reports implied.
Francis James Jackson, who dogged Pinkney’s footsteps with the
personal malevolence he had almost a right to feel, and who
haunted the Court and Foreign Office in the hope of obtaining—what
he never received—some public mark of approval, wrote to Timothy
Pickering a long letter on Pinkney’s departure:[22]—
“It has occasioned much surprise here that exactly at the moment
of Pinkney’s demand being complied with he should nevertheless take
what he calls an inamicable leave.... It was not expected that he would
depart so far from his usual urbanity as to decline the invitation that
was sent him in common with the rest of the foreign ministers to
attend the Regent’s levee. It was not probable after this that the
audience of leave which he claimed should answer his expectation. It
was very short. Mr. Pinkney was told that the Regent was desirous of
cultivating a good understanding with the United States; that he had
given a proof of it in the appointment of a minister as soon as his
acceptance of the Regency enabled him to appoint one; that the
Orders in Council would have been repealed, but that his Royal
Highness never could or would surrender the maritime rights of his
country. Mr. Pinkney then made some profession of his personal
sentiments, to which he was answered: ‘Sir, I cannot look into men’s
minds; I can only judge of men’s motives by their conduct.’ And then
the audience ended.”
So closed Pinkney’s residence in London. He had passed there
nearly five years of such violent national hostility as no other
American minister ever faced during an equal length of time, or
defied at last with equal sternness; but his extraordinary abilities and
character made him greatly respected and admired while he stayed,
and silenced remonstrance when he left. For many years afterward,
his successors were mortified by comparisons between his table-
oratory and theirs. As a writer he was not less distinguished.
Canning’s impenetrable self-confidence met in him powers that did
not yield, even in self-confidence, to his own; and Lord Wellesley’s
oriental dignity was not a little ruffled by Pinkney’s handling. As
occasion required, he was patient under irritation that seemed
intolerable, as aggressive as Canning himself, or as stately and
urbane as Wellesley; and even when he lost his temper, he did so in
cold blood, because he saw no other way to break through the
obstacles put in his path. America never sent an abler representative
to the Court of London.
Pinkney sailed from England a few weeks afterward, leaving in
charge of the legation John Spear Smith, a son of Senator Samuel
Smith, who had been for a time attached to the Legation at St.
Petersburg; had thence travelled to Vienna and Paris, where he
received Pinkney’s summons to London,—the most difficult and
important diplomatic post in the world. Simultaneously, Lord
Wellesley hurried Foster to the United States. The new British
minister was personally acceptable. By birth a son of the actual
Duchess of Devonshire by her first husband, he had the advantage
of social and political backing, while he was already familiar with
America, where he had served as Secretary of Legation. Just
dismissed from Sweden by Bernadotte’s election and the declaration
of war against England which followed it, Foster would hardly have
sought or taken the mission to Washington had not Europe been
closed to English diplomacy. Even F. J. Jackson, who spoke kindly of
few people, gave a pleasant account of his successor.[23] “Foster is
a very gentlemanlike young man, quite equal to do nothing at his
post, which is now the best possible policy to follow;” but in the same
breath, “that most clumsy and ill-conditioned minister,” as Pinkney
described Jackson,[24] added that the police office was the proper
place to train officials for service at Washington. “One of the best
magistrates as minister, and a good sharp thief-taker for secretary,
would put us in all respects much upon a level with their
Yankeeships.” The phrase implied that Jackson felt his own career at
Washington to have been mortifying, and that he had not been on a
level with his opponents. Possibly the sense of mortification hurried
the decline which ended in his death, three years afterward, in the
midst of the war he did so much to cause.
Wellesley’s instructions to Foster were dated April 10,[25] and
marked another slight step toward concession. Once more he
discussed the Orders in Council, but on the ground taken by Pinkney
could come to no other conclusion than that the President was
mistaken in thinking the French Decrees repealed, and extravagant
in requiring the blockade of 1806 to be repealed in consequence; yet
as long as any hope remained of prevailing with the President to
correct his error, American ships, captured while acting in pursuance
of it, should not be condemned. Even under the challenge expressly
proclaimed by the non-importation, the British government anxiously
desired to avoid a positive rupture. As for the “Chesapeake” affair,
Foster was ordered to settle it to suit the American government,
guarding only against the admission of insulting expressions. He was
to remonstrate and protest against the seizure of the Floridas,[26] but
was not to commit his Government further. Finally, a secret
instruction[27] notified Foster that in case America should persist in
her non-importation, England would retaliate,—probably by
increasing her import duties, and excluding American commerce
from the East Indies.
These instructions conformed with the general attitude of English
society. Though sobered by the disasters that attended Tory
government, England had not yet passed beyond the stage when
annoyances created only the wish to ignore them. No one would
admit serious danger from America. In Parliament, Pinkney’s abrupt
and hostile departure was barely mentioned, and ministers denied it
importance. The “London Times,” of March 1, complained that no
one could be induced to feel an interest in the American question.
“There is certainly great apathy in the public mind generally upon the
questions now at issue between us and our quondam colonies,
which it is difficult to arouse, and perhaps useless to attempt.” Here
and there the old wish for a war with the United States was still felt;
[28] but the public asked only to hear no more on American subjects.
Even the “Times” refused, April 13, to continue discussion on matters
“upon which the feelings of the great bulk of the nation are peculiarly
blunt.” Wellesley’s course and Foster’s instructions reflected only the
lassitude and torpor of the day; but within eighteen months
Wellesley, in open Parliament, criticised what he charged as the
policy, not of himself, but of his colleagues, in language which
implied that the public apathy was assumed rather than real. “The
disposition of the American government was quite evident,” he said,
Nov. 30, 1812;[29] “and therefore common policy should have urged
ministers to prepare fully for the event; and they should have made
adequate exertion either to pacify, to intimidate, or to punish
America.” Knowing this, they sent out Foster, powerless either for
defence or attack, to waste his time at Washington, where for ten
years his predecessors had found the grave of their ambitions.
CHAPTER II.
The diplomatic insolvency inherited from Merry, Rose, Erskine,
and Jackson became more complete with every year that passed;
and even while Foster was on the ocean, a new incident occurred,
which if it did not prove a catastrophe to be inevitable, showed at
least how small was his chance of averting it.
On the renewal of trade between America and France, the British
navy renewed its blockade of New York. If nothing more had
happened, the recurrence of this vexation would alone have gone far
to destroy the hopes of diplomacy; but this was not all.
The “Melampus” reappeared, having for a companion the
“Guerriere,” commanded by Captain Dacres, and supposed to be
one of the best British frigates of her class. Early in May, when
Foster sailed from England, these cruisers, lying off Sandy Hook,
began to capture American vessels bound for France, and to
impress American sailors at will. No sooner did these complaints
reach Washington than Secretary Hamilton, May 6,[30] ordered
Commodore John Rodgers, whose flag-ship, the 44-gun frigate
“President,” was lying at Annapolis, to sail at once to protect
American commerce from unlawful interference by British and
French cruisers. Rodgers sailed from Annapolis May 10, and May 14
passed the capes. The scene of the “Chesapeake’s” unredressed
outrage lay some fifteen or twenty miles to the southward, and the
officers and crew of the “President” had reason to think themselves
expected to lose no fair opportunity of taking into their own hands the
redress which the British government denied. For the past year
Rodgers had carried orders “to vindicate the injured honor of our
navy and revive the drooping spirits of the nation; ... to maintain and
support at any risk and cost the honor” of his flag; and these orders
were founded chiefly on “the inhuman and dastardly attack on our
frigate ‘Chesapeake,’—an outrage which prostrated the flag of our
country, and has imposed on the American people cause of
ceaseless mourning.”[31]
Rodgers was bound for New York, but on the morning of May 16
was still about thirty miles from Cape Charles and eighteen miles
from the coast, when toward noon he saw a ship to the eastward
standing toward him under a press of canvas. As the vessel came
near, he could make her out from the shape of her upper sails to be
a man-of-war; he knew of no man-of-war except the “Guerriere” on
the coast; the new-comer appeared from the quarter where that
frigate would be looked for, and Rodgers reasoned that in all
probability she was the “Guerriere.” He decided to approach her, with
the object of ascertaining whether a man named Diggio, said to have
been impressed a few days before by Captain Dacres from an
American brig, was on board. The spirit of this inquiry was new.
Until quarter before two o’clock in the afternoon the ships stood
toward each other. The stranger showed no colors, but made
signals, until finding them unanswered, she changed her course and
stood to the southward. Rodgers then made sail in chase, his colors
and pennant flying. At half-past three, the stranger’s hull began to be
visible from the “President’s” deck, but as the wind failed the
American frigate gained less rapidly. In latitude 37° the sun, May 16,
sets at seven o’clock, and dusk comes quickly on. At quarter-past
seven the unknown ship again changed her course, and lay to,
presenting her broadside to the “President,” and showing colors,
which in the gathering twilight were not clearly seen. The ship had
the look of a frigate.
At quarter before eight, Rodgers ordered his acting commandant
to bring the “President” to windward of the supposed frigate within
speaking distance,—a manœuvre which naturally caused the
stranger uneasiness, so that she wore three times to prevent the
“President” from getting under her stern. At half-past eight, according
to the American account,—at quarter-past eight, according to the
British story,—the “President” rounded to, within pistol-shot. On both
ships every gun in the broadside was run out and trained on the
opposite vessel, and out of every port a dozen eyes were strained to
catch sight, through the dusk, of what passed in the stranger.
By the dim light Rodgers saw the supposed “Guerriere,” her
main-top-sail to the mast, waiting with apparent confidence the next
act of the audacious American frigate which had chased a British
man-of-war all day, and had at last run up close to windward,—a
manœuvre which British frigates were disposed to resent. To this
point the reports showed no great disagreement; but in regard to
what followed, one story was told by Rodgers and all his ship’s
company, while a wholly different story was told by the British captain
and his officers.
Rodgers reported that while rounding to, he hailed the unknown
vessel through his trumpet, calling out: “What ship is that?” The
question, “What ship is that?” was immediately echoed back.
Rodgers had time to tell his acting captain that the “President” was
forging too fast ahead, before he hailed again: “What ship is that, I
say?” Instantly a flash was seen from the dark where the stranger’s
hull lay, and a double report told that the ball had struck the
“President,” lodging in the mainmast. Taken by surprise, Rodgers
turned to his commandant of marines and asked, “What the devil
was that?” but before he gave an order his third lieutenant,
Alexander James Dallas, who was watching at the first port forward
of the gangway and saw the flash, leaped to one of the guns in his
division and discharged it. The “Chesapeake’s” disaster had done
away with the old-fashioned logger-heads and matches; the
“President’s” guns were fitted with locks, and were discharged in an
instant. Immediately afterward three guns were fired by the enemy,
and the report of muskets was heard. Then Rodgers gave the order
to fire, and the “President” opened with a whole broadside, followed
by another. In about five minutes the enemy seemed to be silenced,
and Rodgers gave the order to cease firing; but some three minutes
afterward the stranger opened again, and the “President” resumed
fire until she desisted. From the “President’s” deck enough could be
seen of the enemy’s behavior to prove that whoever she might be,
she was not the “Guerriere;” and Rodgers then made the remark that
either she had received some unfortunate shot at the outset, or she
was a vessel of force very inferior to what he had taken her for,—
although she was still supposed to be nothing less than a 36-gun
frigate. Disabled she certainly was, for she lay ungovernable, with
her bow directly under the “President’s” broadside.
Rodgers hailed once more, and understood the stranger to
answer that she was a British ship-of-war in great distress. At nine
o’clock at night the “President” began to repair damages, and beat
about within reach, on different tacks, with lights displayed, until
daybreak, when she ran down to the British vessel, and sent a boat
on board. Then at last Rodgers learned, certainly to his great
disappointment, that he had been fighting a single-decked vessel of
less than half his force. His mistake was not so surprising as it
seemed. The British cruiser might easily at a distance, or in the dark,
be taken for a frigate. Her great length; her poop, top-gallants,
forecastle; her deep bulwarks; the manner of stowing her
hammocks; and room on each side to mount three more guns than
she actually carried,—were decisive to any one who could not see
that she carried but one tier of guns.[32]
Captain Bingham of the “Little Belt,” a British corvette, rated at
twenty guns, gave a very different account of the affair. He had been
ordered from Bermuda to carry despatches to the “Guerriere;” had
run north toward New York without finding her; and on his return
southward, at eleven o’clock on the morning of May 16, had seen a
strange sail, to which he gave chase. At two o’clock in the afternoon,
concluding that she was an American frigate, he abandoned the
chase, and resumed his course. The rest of his story is to be told in
his own words:[33]—
“Hoisted the colors, and made all sail south, ... the stranger edging
away, but not making any more sail. At 3.30 he made sail in chase....
At 6.30, finding he gained so considerably on us as not to be able to
elude him during the night, being within gunshot, and clearly
discerning the stars in his broad pennant, I imagined the most prudent
method was to bring to, and hoist the colors, that no mistake might
arise, and that he might see what we were. The ship was therefore
brought to, her colors hoisted, her guns double-shotted, and every
preparation made in case of a surprise. By his manner of steering
down, he evidently wished to lay his ship in a position for raking,
which I frustrated by wearing three times. At about 8.15 he came
within hail. I hailed and asked what ship it was. He again repeated my
words and fired a broadside, which I instantly returned. The action
then became general, and continued so for three quarters of an hour,
when he ceased firing, and appeared to be on fire about the main
hatchway. He then filled, ... hailed, and asked what ship this was. He
fired no more guns, but stood from us, giving no reason for his most
extraordinary conduct.”
Bingham’s report was afterward supported by the evidence of his
two lieutenants, his boatswain, purser, and surgeon, at the official
inquiry made May 29, at Halifax.[34] Rodgers’s report was sustained
by the searching inquiry made by the American government to
ascertain the truth of Bingham’s assertions.[35] The American
investigation was naturally much more thorough in consequence of
Bingham’s charges, so that not only every officer, but also every
seaman of the “President’s” company gave evidence under oath. All
agreed in swearing to the facts as they have been related in the
American story.
About a month after the action, two sailors claiming to be
deserters from the “President” arrived at Halifax and made affidavits,
[36] which gave a third account quite different from the other two.
One of these men, an Englishman, swore that he had been stationed
in the second division, on the gun-deck of the “President;” that a gun
in that division went off, as he thought, by accident, four or five men
leaning on it; that he had turned to acquaint Lieutenant Belden, who
commanded that division, of the fact, but before he could do this,
though the lieutenant was only three guns from him, the whole
broadside of the “President” was discharged. This story was the
least probable of the three. The evidence of a deserter, under every
motive to ingratiate himself with his future officers, would be
suspicious, even if he were proved to have been in the “President’s”
crew, which was not the case; but it became valueless when the rolls
showed no Lieutenant Belden on board the “President,” but that the
second division on the gun-deck was commanded by Lieut. A. J.
Dallas,—and Lieutenant Dallas swore that he himself fired the first
gun from the “President,” without orders, in answer to the “Little
Belt’s” discharge. The evidence of every other officer and man at the
guns supported his assertion.
When the contradictory reports of Rodgers and Bingham were
published, a controversy arose between the newspapers which
sympathized with the different captains. Rodgers was vehemently
attacked by the English and Federalist press; Bingham was as hotly
scouted by the American newspapers friendly to Madison. The
dispute was never settled. Perhaps this was the only instance where
the honor of the services was so deeply involved on both sides as to
make the controversy important; for if Rodgers, all his officers, and
his whole crew behaved as Bingham alleged, and perjured
themselves afterward to conceal it, they were not the men they were
supposed to be; and if Bingham swore falsely, he went far to
establish the worst American charges against the character of the
British navy.
For this reason some little effort to form an opinion on the subject
deserves to be made, even at the risk of diffuseness. The elaborate
investigation by the United States government settled the weight of
testimony in favor of Rodgers. Other evidence raised doubts of the
accuracy of Bingham’s report.
This report was dated May 21, five days after the battle, in “lat.
36° 53´ N.; long. 71° 49´ W. Cape Charles bearing W. 48 miles,”—
which, according to the senior lieutenant’s evidence, May 29, was
about the spot of the action, from fifty to fifty-four miles east of Cape
Charles. Yet a glance at the map showed that these bearings
marked a point more than two hundred miles east of Cape Charles.
This carelessness could not be set to the account of a misprint.
The date proved only inaccuracy; other parts of Bingham’s report
showed a willingness to confuse the facts. He claimed to have
hoisted his colors at two o’clock in the afternoon, after making out
the American commodore’s pennant and resuming a southerly
course. Rodgers averred that the “Little Belt” obstinately refused to
show colors till darkness concealed them; and Bingham’s report
itself admitted that at 6.30 he decided to hoist his colors, “that no
mistake might arise.” During the five hours’ chase his colors were not
flying. His assertion, too, that at 6.30 the American frigate was within
gunshot, and that the “Little Belt” was brought to because she could
not escape, agreed ill with his next admission, that the “President”
consumed nearly two hours in getting within hailing distance.
The most evident error was at the close of the British story.
Bingham declared that the general action lasted three quarters of an
hour, and that then the enemy ceased firing; appeared to be on fire
about the main hatchway, and “stood from us,” firing no more guns.
The two lieutenants, boatswain, and purser of the “Little Belt” swore
that the action lasted “about an hour;” the surgeon said “about forty-
five minutes.” Every American officer declared under oath that the
entire action, including the cessation of firing for three minutes, did
not exceed a quarter of an hour, or eighteen minutes at most. On this
point the American story was certainly correct. Indeed, two years
later, after the “Constitution” had silenced the “Guerriere” in thirty-five
minutes, and the “United States” had, in a rough sea and at
comparatively long range, left the “Macedonian” a wreck in less than
two hours of action, no officer in the British service would have
sacrificed his reputation for veracity by suggesting that a British
corvette of eighteen guns could have lain nearly an hour within
pistol-shot, in calm weather, under the hot fire of an American “line-
of-battle ship in disguise.” The idea of forcing her to “stand from us”
would have seemed then mere gasconade. Some fifteen months
afterward, the British sloop-of-war “Alert,” of twenty guns, imitated
the “Little Belt” by attacking Commodore Porter’s 32-gun frigate
“Essex,” and in eight minutes struck her colors in a sinking condition.
If the “President” had been no heavier than the “Essex,” she should
still have silenced the “Little Belt” in a quarter of an hour.
The “Little Belt” escaped destruction, but she suffered severely.
Bingham reported: “I was obliged to desist from firing, as, the ship
falling off, no gun would bear, and had no after-sail to help her to; all
the rigging and sails cut to pieces; not a brace nor a bowline left.... I
have to lament the loss of thirty-two men killed and wounded, among
whom is the master. His Majesty’s ship is much damaged in masts,
rigging, and hull; ... many shot through between wind and water, and
many shots still remain inside, and upper works all shot away;
starboard pump also.” He did not know his good fortune. Two years
afterward he would have been well content to escape from the
“President” on any terms, even though the “Little Belt” had been
twice the size she was. The “President’s” loss consisted of one boy
wounded, and some slight damage to the rigging.
Bingham’s report was accepted by the British government and
navy with blind confidence, and caused no small part of the
miscalculation which ended in disasters to British pride. “No one act
of the little navy of the United States,” said the British historian five
years afterward, “had been at all calculated to gain the respect of the
British. First was seen the ‘Chesapeake’ allowing herself to be
beaten with impunity by a British ship only nominally superior to her.
Then the huge frigate ‘President’ attacks and fights for nearly three
quarters of an hour the British sloop ‘Little Belt.’”[37] So self-confident
was the British navy that Bingham was believed to have fought the
“President” with credit and success; while, on the American side,
Rodgers and his ship’s company believed that the British captain
deliberately delayed the meeting until dark, with the view of taking
advantage of the night to punish what he thought the insolence of
the chase.
Whatever opinion might be formed as to the conduct of the two
captains, the vehemence of feeling on each side was only to be
compared with the “Chesapeake” affair; but in this instance the
grievance belonged to the British navy, and Dacres and the
“Guerriere” felt the full passion and duty of revenge. The news met
Foster on his arrival at Norfolk, a few weeks afterward, and took
away his only hope of a cordial reception. His instructions intended
him to conciliate good-will by settling the “Chesapeake” outrage,
while they obliged him to take a tone of refusal or remonstrance on
every other subject; but he found, on arriving, that the Americans
cared nothing for reparation of the “Chesapeake” outrage, since
Commodore Rodgers had set off against it an outrage of his own,
and had killed four men for every one killed by Captain Humphries.
Instead of giving redress, Foster found himself obliged to claim it.
July 2 Foster was formally received by the President; and the
same day, as though he had no other hope but to take the offensive,
he began his official correspondence by a letter on the seizure of
West Florida, closing with a formal notice that if the United States
persevered in their course, his orders required him to present the
solemn protest of his Government “against an attempt so contrary to
every principle of public justice, faith, and national honor.”
The language was strong; but unfortunately for Foster’s
influence, the world at the moment showed so little regard for justice,
faith, or honor, that the United States had no reason to be singular in
Quixotism; and although in logic the tu quoque was an argument
hardly deserving notice, in politics it was only less decisive than
cannon. The policy of Foster’s remonstrance was doubtful in another
respect. In proportion as men exposed themselves to reprimands,
they resented the reprimand itself. Madison and Monroe had each
his sensitive point. Madison resented the suggestion that Napoleon’s
decrees were still in force, regarding the matter as involving his
veracity. Monroe equally resented the assertion that West Florida
belonged to Spain, for his character as a man of sense, if not of
truth, was involved in the assertion that he had himself bought West
Florida in his Louisiana purchase. Yet the mildness of his reply to
Foster’s severe protest proved his earnest wish to conciliate
England. In a note[38] of July 8 he justified the seizure of West
Florida by the arguments already used, and offered what he called a
“frank and candid explanation” to satisfy the British government. In
private he talked with more freedom, and—if Foster could be
believed—showed himself in a character more lively if not more
moral than any the American people would have recognized as his.
July 5 Foster wrote to Wellesley:[39]—
“It was with real pain, my Lord, that I was forced to listen to
arguments of the most profligate nature, such as that other nations
were not so scrupulous; that the United States showed sufficient
forbearance in not assisting the insurgents of South America and
looking to their own interests in the present situation of that country.”
Foster was obliged to ignore the meaning of this pointed retort;
while his inquiries how far the American government meant to carry
its seizures of Spanish territory drew from Monroe no answer but a
laugh. The Secretary of State seemed a transformed man. Not only
did he show no dread of interference from England in Florida, but he
took an equally indifferent air on every other matter except one. He
said not a word about impressments; he betrayed no wish to trouble
himself about the “Chesapeake” affair; he made no haste in
apologizing for the attack on the “Little Belt;” but the Orders in
Council—these, and nothing else—formed the issue on which a
change of policy was to depend.
Precisely on the Orders in Council Foster could offer no hope of
concession or compromise. So far from withdrawing the orders, he
was instructed to require that the United States should withdraw the
Non-intercourse Act, under threat of retaliation; and he carried out
his instructions to the letter. After protesting, July 2, against the
seizure of West Florida, he wrote, July 3, a long protest against the
non-importation.[40] His demand savored of Canning’s and Jackson’s
diplomacy; but his arguments in its support were better calculated for
effect, and his cry for justice claimed no little sympathy among men
who shared in the opinion of Europe that France was the true object
of attack, and that Napoleon’s overthrow, not the overthrow of
England, was the necessary condition of restoring public order.
Foster’s protest against including Fox’s blockade among the
admittedly illegal Orders in Council, brought the argument to a
delicate issue of law and fact.
“In point of date,” he said, “the blockade of May, 1806, preceded
the Berlin Decree; but it was a just and legal blockade, according to
the established law of nations, because it was intended to be
maintained, and was actually maintained, by an adequate force
appointed to guard the whole coast described in the notification, and
consequently to enforce the blockade.”
In effect this argument conceded Madison’s principle; for the
further difference between blockading a coast and blockading by
name the several ports on a coast, was hardly worth a war; and the
question whether an estuary, like the British Channel, the Baltic Sea,
or Chesapeake Bay, could be best blockaded by a cruising or by a
stationary squadron, or by both, called rather for naval than for legal
opinion. Foster repudiated the principle of paper-blockades; and
after showing that Fox’s blockade was defended only as far as it was
meant to be legal, he made the further concession of admitting that
since it had been merged in the Orders in Council, it existed only as
a part of the orders; so that if the orders were repealed, England
must either make Fox’s blockade effective, or abandon it. By this
expedient, the issue was narrowed to the Orders in Council
retaliatory on Bonaparte’s decrees, and intended to last only as long
as those decrees lasted. Foster appealed to Napoleon’s public and
official language to prove that those decrees were still in force, and
therefore that the United States government could not, without
making itself a party to Napoleon’s acts and principles, demand a
withdrawal of the British Orders. If the orders were not to be
withdrawn because they were illegal, they ought not to be withdrawn
on the false excuse that Napoleon had withdrawn his decrees.
Against such a demand England might reasonably protest:—
“Great Britain has a right to complain that ... not only has America
suffered her trade to be moulded into the means of annoyance to
Great Britain under the provisions of the French Decrees, but
construing those decrees as extinct, upon a deceitful declaration of
the French Cabinet, she has enforced her Non-importation Act against
England. Under these circumstances I am instructed by my
Government to urge to that of the United States the injustice of thus
enforcing that Act against his Majesty’s dominions; and I cannot but
hope that a spirit of justice will induce the United States government to
reconsider the line of conduct they have pursued, and at least to re-
establish their former state of strict neutrality.”
President Madison had put himself, little by little, in a position
where he had reason to fear the popular effect of such appeals; but
awkward as Madison’s position was, that of Monroe was many
degrees worse. He had accepted office in April as the representative
of Republicans who believed that Napoleon’s decrees were not
repealed, and the objects of his ambition seemed to depend on
reversing Madison’s course. In July he found himself in painful
straits. Obliged to maintain that Napoleon’s decrees were repealed,
he was reduced to sacrifice his own official agent in the effort. Foster
reported, as a matter of surprise to himself, remarks of Monroe still
more surprising to history.
“I have urged,” reported Foster, July 7,[41] “with every argument I
could think of, the injustice of the Non-importation Act which was
passed in the last session of Congress, while there were doubts
entertained even here as to the repeal of the Berlin and Milan
Decrees; but to my surprise I find it now maintained that there existed
no doubt on the subject at the time of passing the Act, and Mr. Russell
is censured by his Government for publicly averring that the ship ‘New
Orleans Packet’ was seized under their operation,—not that it is
denied, however, that she was seized under them by our construction.
Mr. Monroe, indeed, though he qualified his blame of Mr. Russell by
praising his zeal, yet allowed to me that much of their present
embarrassment was owing to his statement.”
“It would be fatiguing to your Lordship,” continued Foster, “were I
to describe the various shadows of argument to which the American
minister had recourse in order to prove his statement of the decrees
having been repealed in as far as America had a right to expect.”
These shadows of argument, however elaborately described,

could be reduced to the compass of a few lines; for they all resulted
in a doctrine which became thenceforward a dogma. Napoleon’s
decrees, so viewed, had two characters,—an international, and a
municipal. The international character alone could give the right of
international retaliation; and the Emperor, since November 1, had
ceased to enforce his edicts in this character. The municipal
character, whether enforced or not, in no way concerned England.
Such was, indeed, Napoleon’s object in substituting customs
regulations for the rules of his decrees in his own ports. After that
change, he applied the decrees themselves to every other part of
Europe, but made an apparent exception for American commerce
with France, which was forced to conform to his objects by municipal
licenses and prohibitory duties. Monroe took the ground that since
November 2 the decrees stood repealed, and the “New Orleans
Packet” had been seized under a “municipal operation” with which
England had nothing to do. The argument, though perhaps casuistic,
seemed to offer a sufficient excuse for England, in case she should
wish to abandon her own system as she saw danger approaching;
but it brought Monroe, who used it profusely, into daily mortification,
and caused the President, who invented and believed it, a world of
annoyance,—for Napoleon, as Monroe had personal reason to
remember, never failed to sacrifice his allies, and was certain to fail
in supporting a theory so infirm as this.
For the moment, Monroe made no written reply to Foster’s letter
of July 3; he was tormented by the crisis of his career, and Foster
ceased to be important from the moment he could do nothing toward
a repeal of the orders. With the usual misfortune of British
diplomatists, Foster became aggressive as he lost ground, and
pushed the secretary vigorously into Napoleon’s arms. July 14
Foster wrote again, in a threatening tone, that measures of
retaliation for the Act of March 2 were already before his
Government, and if America persisted in her injurious course of
conduct, the most unfriendly situation would result. While this threat
was all that England offered for Monroe’s friendship, news arrived on
the same day that Napoleon, May 4, had opened his ports to
American commerce. Not till then did Monroe give way, and turn his
back upon England and his old political friends. The course taken by
Foster left no apparent choice; and for that reason chiefly Monroe,
probably with many misgivings, abandoned the theory of foreign
affairs which had for five years led him into so many mortifications at
home and abroad.
July 23 Monroe sent his answer[42] to the British minister’s
argument. In substance this note, though long, contained nothing
new; but in effect it was an ultimatum which left England to choose
between concession and war. As an ultimatum, it was weakened by
the speciousness of its long argument to prove that the French
Decrees were repealed. The weakness of the ground required
double boldness of assertion, and Monroe accepted the whole task.
He showed further willingness to accept an issue on any point
England might select. Foster’s remonstrance in regard to the “Little
Belt” called from Monroe a tart reference to the affair of the
“Chesapeake,” and a refusal to order an inquiry, as a matter of right,
into the conduct of Commodore Rodgers. He showed equally little
disposition to press for a settlement of the “Chesapeake” affair.
Foster had been barely two weeks at Washington when he summed
up the result of his efforts in a few words,[43] which told the situation,
as Monroe then understood it, a year before war was declared:—
“On the whole, their view in this business [of the ‘Little Belt’] is to
settle this, with every other difference, in the most amicable manner,
provided his Majesty’s Orders in Council are revoked; otherwise, to
make use of it, together with all other topics of irritation, for the
purpose of fomenting a spirit of hatred toward England, and thereby
strengthening their party. Your Lordship cannot expect to hear of any
change till Congress meet.”

Instant Download Ebook of Aisne 1918 Battleground North West France David Blanchard Online Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Instant Download Ebook of Aisne 1918 Battleground North West France David Blanchard Online Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aisne 1918 Battleground North West

France David Blanchard

Leading at a Higher Level Blanchard on Leadership and

Pool Care for Dummies Kristine Blanchard

A Breath after Drowning 2nd Edition Alice Blanchard

Tiger vs Churchill: North-West Europe, 1944-45 (Osprey

Architecture of the Islamic West North Africa and the

Handbook of the Marine Fauna of North West Europe 2nd

Transnational Indians in the North American West 1st

Effective Training Systems, Strategies, and Practices

BATTLE OF THE AISNE 1918

BATTLE OF THE AISNE 1918

First published in Great Britain in 2015 by

It is nearly twenty years since I started researching the Aisne battle of

Aisne and Chemin des Dames, 27 May 1918 ....................................11

Trench map of Cormicy and positions held by the Leicestershire

The British Sector on the Aisne, 27 May 1918.

The Battle of the Aisne, 1918: ‘The Phantom Sector’

German topographical postcard of the Chemin des Dames ridges.

Le Chemin des Dames, Decembre 1917, F Flameng.

Once a good battlefield always a good battlefield.

4/E.York 5/ York 50th

Chemin des Dames 2/W

Beaurieux 8th Div. 21st Div. German

1/Sher. For.. Cormicy

Californie Plateau and the Chemin des Dames,

Chemin des Dames is a range of heights, roughly 400 feet on average,

obstacles to north – south movement but there are numerous bridges in

Arriving at Dover we saw two or three

The Sector held by the British

Brigadier General ePA

Man’s Land in this sector was considerable, up to 2,000 yards or more.

The sector was a most interesting one, bristling with tactical

and formed the boundary with 24

The Chemin des Dames and the Winterberg.

Anglo French Co-operation

One of the most significant factors that contributed to the disaster on

Duchêne’s motives for holding on to the Chemin des Dames were

“I stated to the Prince Regent the grounds upon which it had

These shadows of argument, however elaborately described,

You might also like