History 2000-2020

The History of United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations from

2000–2020
Course Author
Professor Paul D. Williams
Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University
Series Editor
Ramona Taheri
Peace Operations Training Institute® PELP

PARTNERSHIP FOR
E-LEARNING ON
Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time PEACE OPERATIONS
2000–2020
After their deployment in Bangassou, in the Mbomou

prefecture in the south-east of the Central African Republic,
150 members of the Central African Armed Forces work in
close collaboration with peacekeepers serving with the United
Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission
in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA). Joint patrols are
carried out daily in the city and its peripheries to reassure and
protect the population, working towards a lasting peace in the
region. 1 August 2018. UN Photo #775476 by Herve Serefio.
Course Author
Professor Paul D. Williams
Elliott School of International Affairs, the George Washington University
Series Editor
Ramona Taheri
Peace Operations Training Institute®

Study peace and humanitarian relief any place, any time
© 2020 Peace Operations Training Institute. All rights reserved.
Peace Operations Training Institute

1309 Jamestown Road, Suite 202
Williamsburg, VA 23185 USA
www.peaceopstraining.org
First edition: 2020 by Professor Paul D. Williams
The material contained herein does not necessarily reflect the views of the Peace Operations Training Institute (POTI),
the Course Author(s), or any United Nations organs or affiliated organizations. The Peace Operations Training Institute
is an international not-for-profit NGO registered as a 501(c)(3) with the Internal Revenue Service of the United States
of America. The Peace Operations Training Institute is a separate legal entity from the United Nations. Although every
effort has been made to verify the contents of this course, the Peace Operations Training Institute and the Course
Author(s) disclaim any and all responsibility for facts and opinions contained in the text, which have been assimilated
largely from open media and other independent sources. This course was written to be a pedagogical and teaching
document, consistent with existing UN policy and doctrine, but this course does not establish or promulgate doctrine.
Only officially vetted and approved UN documents may establish or promulgate UN policy or doctrine. Information with
diametrically opposing views is sometimes provided on given topics, in order to stimulate scholarly interest, and is in
keeping with the norms of pure and free academic pursuit.
Versions of this course offered in other languages may differ slightly from the primary English master copy. Translators
make every effort to retain the integrity of the material.
2000–2020
Table of Contents
Method of Study ix
Lesson 1 Overview: Trends and Key Themes 10
Introduction 11
Section 1.1 Course Overview 12
Section 1.2 Major Trends in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020 13
Section 1.3 Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020 26
Lesson 2 Peacekeeping Reborn 31
Introduction 32
Section 2.1 UN Peacekeeping Reborn 33
Section 2.2 UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone 34
Section 2.3 UN Peacekeeping in Kosovo 37
Section 2.4 UN Peacekeeping in East Timor 41
Section 2.5 UN Peacekeeping in the DRC 44
Section 2.6 UN Peacekeeping and the “Global War on Terrorism” 46
PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE
v
The History of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations from 2000–2020
Lesson 3 Peacekeeping in Western Africa 50
Introduction 51
Section 3.1 Ending UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone 52
Section 3.2 UN Peacekeeping in Cote d’Ivoire 53
Section 3.3 UN Peacekeeping in Liberia 57
Section 3.4 UN Peacekeeping in Western Sahara 61
Lesson 4 Peacekeeping in Eastern Africa 67
Introduction 68
Section 4.1 UN Peacekeeping between Eritrea and Ethiopia 69
Section 4.2 UN Peacekeeping in Burundi 71
Section 4.3 The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 73
Section 4.4 UN Peacekeeping in Chad and the Central African Republic 77
Section 4.5 UN Peacekeeping in Abyei 80
Section 4.6 UN Peacekeeping in South Sudan 82
Lesson 5 Peacekeeping in Europe, Asia, and the Caucasus 89
Introduction 90
Section 5.1 UN Peacekeeping in Southern Europe 91
Section 5.2 UN Peacekeeping in South and South-East Asia 96
Section 5.3 UN Peacekeeping in the Caucasus 101
Lesson 6 Peacekeeping in the Middle East 106
Introduction 107
Section 6.1 The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) 108
Section 6.2 The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 109
vi
Section 6.3 The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) 111
Section 6.4 The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 112
Section 6.5 The UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) 116
Lesson 7 UN Stabilization Operations 122
Introduction 123
Section 7.1 Stabilization and UN Peacekeeping 124
Section 7.2 MINUSTAH in Haiti 126
Section 7.3 MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo 129
Section 7.4 MINUSMA in Mali 131
Section 7.5 MINUSCA in the Central African Republic 135
Lesson 8 Partnership Peacekeeping 141
Introduction 142
Section 8.1 Partnership Peacekeeping in Theory and Practice 143
Section 8.2 Hybrid Peacekeeping in Darfur 145
Section 8.3 A Support Package for Somalia 149
Section 8.4 Sequential Peacekeeping: AU to UN Transitions 152
Lesson 9 Guidelines and Principles 157
Introduction 158
Section 9.1 The Panel on UN Peace Operations: The Brahimi Report

(2000) 159
Section 9.2 The UN Capstone Doctrine (2008) 161
Section 9.3 The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

(2015) 163
vii
Section 9.4 Improving the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers

(2017) 166
Section 9.5 Action for Peacekeeping (2018) 167
Lesson 10 Summary and Conclusions 173
Introduction 174
Section 10.1 Recap of the Course 175
Section 10.2 The Impacts of UN Peacekeeping on Armed Conflict 177
Section 10.3 Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020 180
Appendix A: List of Acronyms 186
Appendix B: Further Readings 191
About the Author: Professor Paul Williams 192
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination 193
viii
Method of Study
This self-paced course aims to give students flexibility in their approach to learning. The
following steps are meant to provide motivation and guidance about some possible strategies
and minimum expectations for completing this course successfully:
• Before you begin studying, first browse through the entire course. Notice the lesson and
section titles to get an overall idea of what will be involved as you proceed.
• The material is meant to be relevant and practical. Instead of memorizing individual details,
strive to understand concepts and overall perspectives in regard to the United Nations system.
• Set personal guidelines and benchmarks regarding how you want to schedule your time.
• Study the lesson content and the learning objectives. At the beginning of each lesson,
orient yourself to the main points. If possible, read the material twice to ensure maximum
understanding and retention, and let time elapse between readings.
• At the end of each lesson, take the End-of-Lesson Quiz. Clarify any missed questions by
rereading the appropriate sections, and focus on retaining the correct information.
• After you complete all of the lessons, prepare for the End-of-Course Examination by taking
time to review the main points of each lesson. Then, when ready, log into your online student
classroom and take the End-of-Course Examination in one sitting.
» Access your online classroom at

<www.peaceopstraining.org/users/user_login>
from virtually anywhere in the world.
• Your exam will be scored electronically. If you achieve a passing grade of 75 per cent or higher
on the exam, you will be awarded a Certificate of Completion. If you score below 75 per cent,
you will be given one opportunity to take a second version of the End-of-Course Examination.
• A note about language: This course uses English spelling according to the standards of the
Oxford English Dictionary (United Kingdom) and the United Nations Editorial Manual.
Key Features of Your Online Classroom »

• Access to all of your courses;
• A secure testing environment in which to complete your training;
• Access to additional training resources, including multimedia course

supplements; and
• The ability to download your Certificate of Completion for any completed

course.
ix
THE HISTORY OF UNITED NATIONS PEACEKEEPING OPERATIONS FROM 2000–2020
LESSON
Overview: Trends and Key
1 Themes
This lesson provides an

overview of the course
and highlights the major
trends and enduring themes
of peacekeeping in the
twenty‑first century.
UN Photo #814838 by Gema Cortes.
In this lesson » Lesson Objectives »
Section 1.1 Course Overview • Provide a brief overview of the course

structure.
Section 1.2 Major Trends in UN Peacekeeping,
2000–2020 • Provide an overview of the major patterns and

trends in UN peacekeeping operations between
Section 1.3 Enduring Themes in UN
2000 and 2020.
Peacekeeping, 2000–2020
• Summarize key enduring themes in the history
of UN peacekeeping between 2000 and 2020.
10
LESSON 1 | Overview: Trends and Key Themes
By agreement between Israel and Jordan, a UN-escorted convoy — carrying food, other necessities, and exchange personnel to the
Israeli humanitarian and cultural institutions on Mount Scopus — leaves Mandelbaum Square every two weeks. Manifests are filed with
United Nations and Jordanian authorities. Before departure, personnel of the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) examine the
contents of the convoy in the presence of both Jordanian and Israeli authorities. 1 May 1959. UN Photo #126537.
Introduction
This lesson starts by giving you an
overview of the rest of the course. It then
summarizes some of the major trends and
key enduring themes evident in the UN
peacekeeping operations between 2000
and mid-2020. For most of this period, the
number of UN missions and peacekeepers
grew steadily to reach record levels before
contracting somewhat after 2016.
11
Section 1.1 Course Overview

This course is organized into 10 lessons. Together, they will guide you through the major
developments in UN peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2020.
Lesson 1: Overview: Trends and Key Themes provides a concise overview of the number, size,
and composition of UN peacekeeping operations during this period, as well as the numbers of
uniformed personnel involved. It also describes the rising numbers of police, women, and fatalities in
these missions. It concludes by highlighting five enduring themes featured in the rest of the course,
namely, the relationship between means and ends in peacekeeping operations; the importance of
linking peacekeeping with effective political strategies for peacemaking; efforts to develop appropriate
guidelines and principles for UN missions; the need for effective partnerships; and the need to improve
the accountability and performance of UN peacekeepers.
Lesson 2: Peacekeeping Reborn summarizes how important new peacekeeping operations were
established in four war-torn territories in late 1999, namely, Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and
the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). These missions saw the start of a new era of growth for UN
peacekeeping both in terms of the number of missions and personnel. The lesson also discusses how
the “9/11” terrorist attacks on the United States intensified the so-called “Global War on Terrorism” that
influenced UN peacekeeping operations in various ways.
Lesson 3: Peacekeeping in Western Africa focuses on the cluster of operations that the UN conducted
in the Mano River region, namely, Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL), Liberia (UNMIL), and Cote d’Ivoire (MINUCI
and UNOCI), the last of which closed down in 2017. These operations responded to the civil wars in each
of these countries, as well as other critical issues, including the 2014 Ebola epidemic. The lesson also
summarizes developments in the UN mission in Morocco/Western Sahara, MINURSO, which remains
active at the time of writing.
Lesson 4: Peacekeeping in Eastern Africa focuses on operations in what became the region with the
most intensive deployments of UN peacekeepers. It discusses the main episodes and challenges that
faced UN missions in the DRC (MONUC), Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), Burundi (ONUB), Sudan (UNMIS
and UNISFA), Chad and the Central African Republic (CAR) (MINURCAT), and, since 2011, South Sudan
(UNMISS). Once again, these operations were mainly responses to the region’s civil wars and their
legacies or spillover effects. While most of these operations ended well before 2020, ongoing missions
remain in Sudan, South Sudan, and the DRC.
Lesson 5: Peacekeeping in Europe, Asia, and the Caucasus provides an overview of major
developments in UN peacekeeping operations in Southern Europe, South and South-East Asia, and
the Caucasus. It analyses the seven UN peacekeeping operations that deployed to Bosnia-Herzegovina
(UNMIBH), Croatia (UNMOP), the island of Cyprus (UNFICYP), Timor-Leste (UNMISET and UNMIT), and
in the contested regions of Kashmir (UNMOGIP) and Abkhazia in Georgia (UNOMIG).
Lesson 6: Peacekeeping in the Middle East discusses the six distinct UN peacekeeping operations in
this region. Specifically, it provides an overview of the longest-running UN peacekeeping mission, the
Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO); the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established
in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War; the UN observer mission along on the Iraq-Kuwait border
12
(UNIKOM); the UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL); and the organization’s Supervision Mission in
Syria (UNSMIS), which operated for a few months during 2012.
Lesson 7: UN Stabilization Operations begins by summarizing how the UN has approached the
concept of stabilization in its peace operations. It then provides an overview of the main episodes and
challenges that the four UN operations explicitly labelled as “stabilization” missions faced. The first
such operation was MINUSTAH, deployed in Haiti between 2004 and 2017. The next three stabilization
missions were all deployed in Africa, namely, the UN stabilization mission in the DRC (MONUSCO, 2010–
present), Mali (MINUSMA, 2013–present), and CAR (MINUSCA, 2014–present).
Lesson 8: Partnership Peacekeeping examines the different ways in which UN peacekeepers

partnered with peacekeepers from other organizations. These partnerships mainly occurred with actors
and organizations from Africa and Europe, but they resulted in a range of different models of cooperation
and spurred some of the key innovations in UN peacekeeping during the twenty-first century. The
lesson provides case studies of two particularly important partnership operations in Sudan and Somalia:
the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) and the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS),
respectively.
Lesson 9: Guidelines and Principles provides an overview of the different ways in which the UN
has tried to develop doctrine to guide how its peacekeepers operate in the field. Specifically, it briefly
summarizes the key themes and conclusions of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (the
“Brahimi Report”) (2000), the UN Capstone Doctrine (2008), the Report of the High-Level Independent
Panel on Peace Operations (2015), Lieutenant General (Retired) dos Santos Cruz’s Report on Improving
the Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers (2017), and the ongoing Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)
initiative (2018–present).
Lesson 10: Summary and Conclusions briefly recaps the content of Lessons 1–9, summarizes the
overall impact of UN peacekeeping operations during the twenty-first century, and revisits the five
enduring themes introduced in Lesson 1.
Section 1.2 Major Trends in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020

Between 2000 and 2020, the UN maintained between 13 and 18 active peacekeeping operations
each year (Figure 1-1). Overall, this period witnessed 35 UN-led peacekeeping operations (see Table
1-1). In addition to the UN-led missions, the same period saw 20 UN-authorized and 50 non-UN peace
operations that involved military contingents.1 Since the UN has never had a monopoly on authorizing or
conducting peace operations, it has often worked alongside and with a variety of other actors engaged
in peacekeeping. In the twenty-first century, many of those other actors came from Africa and Europe.
As a result, any comprehensive history of UN peacekeeping must take account of these other types of
peace operations. Lesson 8, therefore, examines the United Nations partnerships with these other actors
in more detail. For now, it suffices to say that the UN has provided technical, logistical, and financial
support to several non-UN peace operations, and its peacekeepers have engaged in sequenced, parallel,
and hybrid partnerships with regional organizations in a range of theatres around the world.
1) See: Paul D. Williams with Alex J. Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 3rd ed. (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021), Appendix.
13
Figure 1-1: Active UN Peace Operations, 2000–2020
Source: DPO, “United Nations Peacekeeping”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>.
Table 1-1: UN Peacekeeping Operations active 2000–June 20202

Deployed Size
(Estimated Maximum
of Uniformed Analysed in
Mission Location Years Active Peacekeepers) Lesson #
UNTSO Israel, Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria 1948–present 570 6
UNMOGIP India and Pakistan (Kashmir) 1949–present 50 5
UNFICYP Cyprus 1964–present 6,275 5
UNDOF Israel and Syria 1974–present 1,100 6
UNIFIL Lebanon 1978–present 12,700 6
MINURSO Western Sahara 1991–present 237 3
UNOMIG Georgia 1993–2009 1,529 5
UNIKOM Kuwait and Iraq 1993–2003 1,174 6
UNMOT Tajikistan 1994–2000 81 --
UNMIBH Bosnia-Herzegovina 1995–2002 2,047 5
UNMOP Croatia 1996–2002 28 5
MIPONUH Haiti 1997–2000 300 --
MINURCA The Central African Republic 1998–2000 1,350 --
UNMIK Kosovo 1999–present 4,720 2
UNTAET East Timor 1999–2002 10,790 2
MONUC The Democratic Republic of the Congo 1999–2010 22,016 2
2) UN Department of Peace Operations, “Where we Operate” and “Past Peace Operations”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en>.
14
UNAMSIL Sierra Leone 1999–2005 17,670 2
UNMEE Eritrea and Ethiopia 2000–2008 4,200 4
UNMISET Timor-Leste 2002–2005 5,500 5
MINUCI Côte d’Ivoire 2003–2004 76 3
UNMIL Liberia 2003–2018 16,115 3
MINUSTAH Haiti 2004–2017 10,101 7
ONUB Burundi 2004–2006 5,770 4
UNOCI Côte d’Ivoire 2004–2017 10,954 3
UNMIS Sudan 2005–2011 10,519 4
UNMIT Timor-Leste 2006–2012 1,608 5
MINURCAT Chad 2007–2010 5,525 4
UNAMID Sudan 2008–present 21,600 8
MONUSCO The Democratic Republic of the Congo 2010–present 22,016 7
UNMISS South Sudan 2011–present 7,900 4
UNISFA Sudan 2011–present 4,250 4
UNSMIS Syria 2012 300 6
MINUSMA Mali 2013–present 15,200 7
MINUSCA The Central African Republic 2014–present 12,900 7
MINUJUSTH Haiti 2017–2019 1,275 7
Although 35 UN peacekeeping operations were active between 2000 and 2020, only 19 of them
were established since 2000 (see Table 1-1). The busiest year in this period was 2004, when three new
peacekeeping operations were established in Haiti (MINUSTAH), Burundi (ONUB), and Cote d’Ivoire
(UNOCI) (Figure 1-2). The most recently established multidimensional operation involving peacekeeping
troops was MINUSCA in the Central African Republic in 2014 (MINUJUSTH, the successor mission
established in 2017 as part of the drawdown of MINUSTAH in Haiti, did not involve troop contingents).
In comparison, the UN closed down 22 peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2020, 18 of those
closing by 2012 (Figure 1-2).
In geographic terms, UN peacekeeping during the twenty-first century was notably concentrated in
sub-Saharan Africa. Of the 35 active UN peacekeeping operations between 2000 and 2020, 17 took place
in Africa. This trend among the new UN missions established since 2000 was even more pronounced,
with 13 of 18, or 72 per cent, deployed in Africa, including the five largest operations of this period:
UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone, UNMIL in Liberia, UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan, MONUSCO in the DRC, and
MINUSMA in Mali. The other five peacekeeping operations established after 2000 were deployed to
Timor-Leste (UNMISET and UNMIT), Haiti (MINUSTAH and MINUJUSTH), and Syria (UNSMIS).
In terms of the numbers of uniformed UN peacekeepers, the twenty-first century saw a generally
steady increase in troops and police, along with generally consistent numbers of observers and experts.
The number of uniformed UN peacekeepers reached record levels by 2010, before contracting somewhat
15
Figure 1-2: New and Closed UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2000–2020
since 2016 (Figure 1-3). The contraction was due to the closure of the missions in Liberia (UNMIL), Cote
d’Ivoire (UNOCI), and Haiti (MINUSTAH) and ongoing transitions and reduction of missions in Darfur
(UNAMID) and the DRC (MONUSCO). The lack of new operational theatres for UN peacekeepers since
the deployment of MINUSCA in 2014 contributed to the contraction as well.
Not surprisingly, given all the activity, the period from 2000 to 2020 was also the most expensive
in the history of UN peacekeeping since it began in 1948. In financial terms, the annual amount of
UN peacekeeping expenditure grew fairly steadily from just over $2 billion in 2000 to a peak of about
$8.3 billion in the 2015/2016 fiscal year, before decreasing gradually to about $6.5 billion by 2020. In
comparison with the roughly 50 years between 1948 and 1999, the two decades since 2000 account
for roughly three-quarters of total expenditure on UN peacekeeping. During these two decades, the UN
peacekeeping base reimbursement rate was increased in several increments from $988 per peacekeeper
per month in 2000 to $1,428 by 2018.3 The UN gives this monthly allowance per soldier/officer to
each contributing country government that provides contingents of troops and/or police. Importantly,
improved bureaucratic and procurement procedures enabled the UN to deploy its peacekeepers more
cost-effectively, with the UN reducing the deployment cost per peacekeeper by 22 per cent since 2006.4
As the number of UN peacekeepers grew between 2000 and 2020, so too did the number of
countries providing them. The number of UN troop/police-contributing countries (T/PCCs) stood at 82
in March 2000, but by late 2007, it approached 120. The precise number has remained around 120
since then, reaching a peak of 128 in September 2014 (Figure 1-4). These countries were a mix of
3) UN General Assembly, Review of the rates of reimbursement to the Governments of troop-contributing States, Report of the Secretary-General,
A/45/528. Available from: <https://undocs.org/a/45/582>; UN General Assembly, “Rates of reimbursement to troop- and police-contributing
countries”, resolution 72/285, 5 July 2018. Available from: <https://undocs.org/a/res/72/285>.
4) DPO and Information Management Unit, “Action for Peacekeeping: Key Achievements on Performance”, DPPA-DPO, 5 December 2019. Available from:
<https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/201912013_a4p_performence_achievements_one_pager_final_update003.pdf>.
16
Figure 1-3: Uniformed UN Peacekeepers, 2000–2020
old and new contributors, and they provided highly uneven numbers of peacekeepers. Nevertheless,
the general upward trend was a clear sign that more Member States were taking their responsibilities
seriously. As articulated in Articles 43 and 48 of the Charter of the United Nations, all Member States
should make available to the Security Council those assets that are necessary to maintain international
peace and security. The growing number of T/PCCs created both opportunities and challenges for the
UN. On the positive side, increasing the number of T/PCCs enabled the UN to draw from a larger
Figure 1-4: Number of UN Troop/Police-Contributing Countries
Source: Providing for Peacekeeping, “IPI Peacekeeping Database”. Available from:

<http://www.providingforpeacekeeping.org/contributions/>.
17
Figure 1-5: MINUSCA Neighbours and Neighbourhood
Source: Paul D. Williams and Thong Nguyen, “Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping

Operations, 1990–2017”, International Peace Institute, 11 April 2018. Available from:
<https://www.ipinst.org/2018/04/neighborhood-dynamics-in-un-peacekeeping-operations>.
pool of personnel and capabilities for its missions. It also increased the level of political support for
missions because more countries had a practical stake in them and gained first-hand knowledge of the
practical challenges involved. However, the larger numbers also created practical challenges, including
by ensuring that all T/PCCs understood and operated according to UN standards. This, in turn, placed a
considerable strain on the minimal training capacities of the UN, which often struggled to ensure that all
T/PCCs consistently met the UN pre-deployment training and equipment standards.
The weight of providing UN peacekeepers has always been shared in a very uneven manner between
the organization’s members, with a handful of T/PCCs providing most of the uniformed personnel of the
UN. In the twenty-first century, most of the largest T/PCCs were South Asian and African States, with
the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)/European States providing relatively few peacekeepers.
Let’s take as an example a relatively busy month for UN peacekeeping, August 2017. At that stage,
there were 91,256 uniformed peacekeepers deployed by 124 UN Member States. Bear in mind that in
order to sustain that number of personnel in the field, three times that many need to be available: While
one group is deployed in the field, another batch of forces needs to be preparing and training to rotate
into the mission, while the group that has just rotated out then needs time to rest and recover before
they might be required to deploy again. In August 2017, the division of labour was highly uneven. The
top-30 T/PCCs provided 80,059 (or 88 per cent) of the total number of uniformed UN peacekeepers,
while the top-10 T/PCCs provided 58 per cent.5 Perhaps incredibly, just five countries at the top of the
5) At that stage, the top-10 T/PCCs, in rank order, were Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, Rwanda, Nepal, Senegal, Egypt, Ghana, and Indonesia.
18
Figure 1-6: Percentage of UN-Uniformed Peacekeepers from the Neighbourhood (31 December annual)
Source: Paul D. Williams and Thong Nguyen, “Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017”, International
Peace Institute, 11 April 2018. Available from:
<https://www.ipinst.org/2018/04/neighborhood-dynamics-in-un-peacekeeping-operations>.
list — Ethiopia, Bangladesh, India, Pakistan, and Rwanda — provided 40 per cent of the world’s supply
of UN peacekeepers.
Another notable trend about who was providing UN peacekeepers concerned the rising level of
contributions from neighbouring States, i.e., those States that share a border with the host country.
Particularly since mid-2008, UN peacekeepers drawn from next-door neighbours and the wider
neighbourhood increased significantly.6 Figure 1-5 depicts how one study defined next-door neighbours
and “the regional neighbourhood” in the case of MINUSCA in the Central African Republic. Whereas in
the early 1990s, fewer than 3 per cent of all UN peacekeeping troops came from next-door neighbours,
since 2008, the percentage has grown steadily to reach about 20 per cent by 2017. For the wider
neighbourhood as a whole, the number of UN peacekeeping troops was rarely more than 10 per cent
until January 2008. By 2017, it had grown to nearly 34 per cent. Similar trends are evident for police
contributions. Figure 1-6 depicts the total percentages of uniformed UN peacekeepers drawn from
next‑door neighbours and the wider neighbourhood. By December 2017, seven UN missions had no
troops from neighbouring countries, but four had the neighbourhood providing over half their troops:
UNISFA (Abyei), MINUSMA (Mali), UNMIK (Kosovo), and MINUSCA (the CAR).
For the UN, the rise in neighbourhood contributors brought both opportunities and challenges. As
summarized by Williams and Nguyen:
“In generic terms, there are several potential opportunities

afforded by having neighbors as contributing countries.
They should have better local knowledge of the host State
6) Paul D. Williams and Thong Nguyen, Neighborhood Dynamics in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 1990–2017 (New York: International Peace Institute,
2018). Available from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2018/04/neighborhood-dynamics-in-un-peacekeeping-operations>.
19
Figure 1-7: P5 Uniformed UN Peacekeepers, 2000–2020
Source: DPO, “Troop and Police Contributors”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/troop-and-police-contributors>.
and its conflict dynamics, their geographic proximity should

facilitate rapid deployment, and, because they stand to be
impacted by spillover effects, they have a vested interest in
reaching a solution to the crisis and hence should be willing
to endure risky and lengthy missions. On the other hand,
neighborhood contributions might also bring challenges for
UN peacekeeping operations. Arguably the most important is
that their geographic proximity might render them primary or
secondary parties to the conflict, in which case they would be
likely to push partisan, vested interests both by omission and
commission that undermine the UN’s principle of impartiality.”7
Towards the other end of the contribution spectrum were those UN Member States that provided
relatively few peacekeepers, certainly compared to the top T/PCCs. The first notable group is the
permanent five members of the Security Council, also known as the P5. Under Article 24(1) of the
Charter, the Security Council has “primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security”. As veto-wielding permanent members of the Council, the P5 clearly hold privileged status. But
in terms of providing uniformed peacekeepers, their contributions do not stand out as remarkable. The
Council has not officially commented on whether Article 24(1) means that individual Council members
have an elevated responsibility to contribute UN peacekeepers beyond those of other Member States. In
the twenty-first century, P5 contributions showed considerable variation (see Figure 1-7):
• After deploying nearly 900 uniformed UN peacekeepers mainly in the Balkans from 2000–
2001, US contributions had dwindled to fewer than 100, mainly experts and police deployed
7) Williams and Nguyen, Neighborhood Dynamics, 2.
20
to MINUSTAH and UNMIL, by 2009. This number gradually reduced over the next decade, and
by 2020, there were only 30 American-uniformed UN peacekeepers, almost all of them staff
officers scattered across six different missions: five in Africa and UNTSO in the Middle East.
• In almost direct contrast, the trajectory of China’s contributions of uniformed peacekeepers

increased significantly during this period. Having deployed its first UN peacekeepers in 1989
in Namibia, China’s contributions increased only very slowly, and by 2000, it still deployed
fewer than 100 uniformed personnel. However, within eight years, China provided over 2,000
UN peacekeepers, mainly in missions in Africa, reaching a peak of just over 3,000 in 2015.
During this period, China not only grew its traditional contributions of medical personnel and
engineers but, from 2013, also deployed infantry battalions, first in Mali (MINUSMA) and then
from 2015, in South Sudan (UNMISS).
• France, too, increased its UN peacekeeping contingents since the early 2000s. It started in the
2000s with about 500 uniformed personnel deployed mainly in UNOCI and UNIFIL but with
smaller contributions in another eight operations. Following the 2006 war between Israel and
Hezbollah, France deployed over 1,600 troops to the revamped UNIFIL mission in Lebanon. In
2008, France deployed an additional battalion of troops to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central
African Republic to help deal with some of the spillover effects of the war in Darfur, Sudan. This
briefly brought France’s total to over 2,500 UN peacekeepers. The decade ended with most of
France’s roughly 700 uniformed peacekeepers deployed in UNIFIL.
• For the UK, it deployed roughly the same number of UN peacekeepers in 2020 as it had in 2000,
with overall numbers fluctuating between 270 to 700. The UK’s most enduring commitment
was the deployment of troops in Cyprus (UNFICYP), which saw a gradual reduction over these
two decades. The UK’s peak contribution came in 2017 after Prime Minister David Cameron had
pledged to provide more UN peacekeepers at the 2015 Leaders’ Summit on Peacekeeping. This
led to deployments of roughly 350 troops to UNMISS in South Sudan, mainly engineers and
medical personnel, as well as a small detachment of about 50 personnel to UNSOS in Somalia.
When the UK withdrew its contingent from UNMISS in early 2020, it handed over its level-II
hospital facility to Viet Nam. Shortly thereafter, the UK pledged a 250-strong reconnaissance
unit to MINUSMA in Mali, but its deployment has been delayed until probably late 2020 due to
the outbreak of COVID-19.
• For most of the 2000s, Russia maintained several hundred uniformed personnel in UN
peacekeeping operations, with its largest contingents deployed in UNMIS, UNMIK, and MONUC.
For most of the 2010s, however, Russia deployed very few troop contingents, preferring instead
to deploy small numbers of experts and police to a relatively wide range of missions. By 2020,
Russia deployed no troop contingents but maintained a small number of mainly experts, staff
officers, and police scattered across nearly a dozen missions.
Another group of States that provided relatively few UN peacekeepers for most of the twenty-first
century were those in Europe. Although they possessed many professional, capable, and well-trained
personnel, many European countries prioritized deployments in the US-led operations in Afghanistan
and Iraq rather than UN peacekeeping operations. Despite experiencing something of a return to UN
peacekeeping in Africa after the end of the Afghanistan campaign in 2014–2015, European countries
21
Figure 1-8: Police in UN Peacekeeping Operations, 2000–2020
were only contributing about eight per cent of UN peacekeepers globally by 2020.8 Researchers have
identified a number of reasons why European governments remained reluctant to provide many UN
peacekeepers: mistrust of UN command and control, particularly the rules regarding military utility
helicopters; the inadequacy of medical guarantees for casualty evacuation; the lack of professional
peacekeeping intelligence; the lack of clarity on operational tasks and end dates; the slowness of UN
processes for agreeing on deployments; the underuse of their assets and skills; the lack of proactive
and inclusive planning by the UN; the difficulty of meeting the UN targets for female peacekeepers; cost
considerations; and insufficient support for strategic communication to domestic audiences.9
In terms of the composition of UN peacekeeping operations, the period from 2000 to 2020 is notable
for significant increases in the number of police and women peacekeepers. First, there was a major rise
in the number of police deployed as UN peacekeepers, from around 4,500 at the start of 2000 to nearly
15,000 by 2011 (Figure 1-8). These numbers were also much higher than during the 1990s, which
saw only around 2,000 UN Police for most of the decade. UN Police were a mixture of individual police
officers (IPOs), a small number of specialized teams, and Formed Police Units (FPUs) of usually between
120 and 140 armed officers. First deployed as UN peacekeepers in 1960 in the Congo, IPOs perform a
variety of tasks, including mentoring and training national police officers, providing special expertise for
investigations, and assisting local law enforcement personnel combat transnational crime. FPUs were
first deployed in 1999 in Kosovo and East Timor to help field larger numbers of UN Police to carry out
public order management and protect UN personnel, facilities, and civilians. By 2016, more than 70
FPUs were deployed in UN peacekeeping missions. The first all-female FPU was deployed by India in
8) See: Joachim Koops and Giulia Tercovich (eds.), “A European Return to UN Peacekeeping?” International Peacekeeping, Vol. 23, No. 5, 2015, 597–
803.
9) Arthur Boutellis and Michael Beary, Sharing the Burden: Lessons from the European Return to Multidimensional Peacekeeping (Washington, DC:
International Peace Institute, 2020), 1. Available from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2020/01/lessons-from-the-european-return-to-multidimensional-
peacekeeping>.
22
2007 to UNMIL in Liberia. Men were present, but only in support roles, such as cooking, driving, and
vehicle maintenance. The first deployment of the newly established Standing Police Capacity occurred
in 2007 to MINURCAT. Like their military counterparts, UN Police also saw a steady contraction in their
numbers from 2016.
In the early 2000s, richer OECD (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development) States
deployed considerable numbers of UN Police. However, by the late 2000s, the vast majority of UN Police
came from poorer countries, mostly from Africa and Asia, as depicted in Table 1-2.
Table 1-2: Top-10 UN Police contributors in the twenty-first century10
December 2000 December 2005 December 2010 December 2015 December 2019
Country Total Country Total Country Total Country Total Country Total
USA 849 Jordan 739 Jordan 1902 Jordan 1564 Senegal 1079
Jordan 848 Bangladesh 478 Bangladesh 1862 Senegal 1392 Rwanda 1049
India 617 Nepal 431 India 1057 Bangladesh 1241 Egypt 825
Germany 455 Senegal 416 Pakistan 947 India 1080 Bangladesh 650
Ghana 389 Pakistan 394 Nepal 886 Nepal 1025 Nepal 580
Pakistan 377 India 381 Nigeria 877 Rwanda 964 Togo 480
Ukraine 231 Nigeria 374 Senegal 782 Pakistan 561 Jordan 433
UK 231 USA 359 Ghana 337 Egypt 528 Burkina 370
Faso
Portugal 217 Germany 252 Rwanda 298 Cameroon 402 Ghana 363
Nigeria 211 China 197 Malaysia 281 Benin 395 Indonesia 335
The other notable trend in the composition of UN peacekeeping forces was the increasing number of
women. In 1993, for example, women made up just 1 per cent of UN-uniformed peacekeepers.11 The UN
called for more women peacekeepers as part of implementing its women, peace and security agenda,
catalysed by the passing of Security Council resolution 1325 in October 2000. Officially, the Department
of Peacekeeping Operations made several arguments about why more women peacekeepers were
needed.12 These included improving operations and performance due to greater diversity and broadened
skill sets; increasing better access to local populations, especially women and children; building trust
and confidence with local communities; helping to prevent and reduce violence; and inspiring and
creating role models.13
Unfortunately, the UN has only made its comprehensive sex-disaggregated data for its uniformed
peacekeepers available since 2005, so numbers for the period from 2000 to 2004 are unclear. The
available data shows that the number of women peacekeepers grew slowly but steadily from around
1,000 in 2005 to over 5,000 by 2019 (Figure 1-9). As of June 2020, a total of nearly 4,000 women
were deployed as peacekeepers in all current UN peace operations.14 By that stage, most of the largest
contributors of female peacekeepers were from Africa, notably, Ethiopia, Rwanda, Ghana, Tanzania,
South Africa, and Senegal, and South Asia, specifically, Bangladesh and Nepal. It is notable that the
number of women peacekeepers continued to increase from 2016, while the overall number of UN
10) Source: Paul D. Williams with Alex J. Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping (Polity Press, 3rd edition, 2021), Chapter 18.
11) “Women in Peacekeeping”, UN Department of Peace Operations. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/women-peacekeeping>.
12) As part of the restructuring of the UN, the Department of Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) became the Department of Peace Operations (DPO) in
January 2019.
13) “Women in Peacekeeping”, UN Department of Peace Operations. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/women-peacekeeping>.
14) DPO, “Gender”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/gender>.
23
Figure 1-9: Female Uniformed UN Peacekeepers, 2005–2020 (June annual)
peacekeepers contracted. There was a major increase in female police officers deployed after 2008,
starting from almost zero to nearly 1,500 by 2011, but this figure has remained relatively stable since
then. The number of female troops increased steadily to over 3,000 by 2018, but this still represented
less than 5 per cent of the overall total.
One interesting innovation was the deployment of a small number of female engagement teams
(FET), such as the Zambian FET in MINUSCA. These were small teams of female troops intended to help
win the “hearts and minds” of the local population through their interaction with local women. To do so,
they conducted patrols; organized meetings and sensitization activities with local women; engaged in
medical outreach; trained women on sanitation, providing nutritional meals, and even gardening; and
identified Quick Impact Projects that might benefit the local community.
Although there had been general calls for more women and some ad hoc targets developed since
the late 2000s, it was not until 2018 that the UN established a Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy for
the decade ahead (2018–2028). It set targets for women troops, observers, police, and justice and
corrections personnel.15 It set the following targets for women peacekeepers by 2028: 15 per cent of UN
troops; 25 per cent of military observers and staff officers; 30 per cent of IPOs; 20 per cent of FPUs;
and 30 per cent of justice and corrections personnel. By 2019, women represented 4.7 per cent of UN
troops, 16.7 per cent of UN military observers and staff officers, 26.8 per cent of IPOs, 10.8 per cent of
FPUs, and 29 per cent of justice and corrections personnel.16 The main reason why these numbers were
not higher was the existence of various barriers to more women participating in UN peacekeeping. In
2018, the Canadian Elsie Initiative identified six main types of barriers:
15) Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018–2028 (New York: UN Department of Peace Operations, 2018). Available from: <https://peacekeeping.
un.org/en/uniformed-gender-parity-strategy-2018-2018-full-text>.
16) DPO, “Uniformed Women in Peace Operations”, 3 May 2020. Available from: <https://twitter.com/UNPeacekeeping/status/1257097608914325504?s=20>.
24
Figure 1-10: UN Peacekeeper Fatalities by Type, 2000–2020
Source: DPO, “Fatalities”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>.
1. Equal access to opportunities;
2. Deployment criteria;
3. The working environment;
4. Family constraints;
5. Equal treatment during deployment; and
6. Career-advancement opportunities.17
The last general trend discussed here concerns peacekeeper fatalities. As of April 2020, 3,925
UN peacekeepers had died while serving. Of this total, 2,277, or nearly 60 per cent, died since 1
January 2000.18 The UN records the cause of death for its peacekeepers as resulting from malicious
act, illness, accident, or another cause. The breakdown of UN peacekeeper fatalities by cause of death
are shown in Figure 1-10. Overall, 2010 proved the deadliest year, in large part because more than
100 UN peacekeepers were killed on 12 January when a massive earthquake hit Haiti. For most of
the 2000–2020 period, between 100–140 UN peacekeepers died each year, translating to roughly one
every three days. Of the missions established after 2000, the deadliest were UNAMID (278 fatalities),
MINUSMA (209), and UNAMSIL (192), while MONUC and MONUSCO combined suffered 347 deaths.
MINUSMA suffered the most fatalities from malicious acts, with over 130. Illness was another major
source of peacekeeper fatalities, particularly in MONUC/MONUSCO, UNAMSIL, UNMIL, and UNAMID,
which together suffered 542 such deaths.
17) Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations: Baseline Study (Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2018). Available from
<https://www.dcaf.ch/elsie-initiative-women-peace-operations-baseline-study>.
18) UN DPO, “Fatalities”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/fatalities>.
25
Section 1.3 Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020

Before analysing the history of UN peacekeeping operations deployed between 2000 and 2020,
this lesson concludes by briefly highlighting five of the most important enduring themes evident across
them. These concern the relationship between the means and ends in peacekeeping operations, the
importance of linking peacekeeping with effective political strategies for peacemaking, efforts to develop
appropriate guidelines and principles for UN missions, the need for effective partnerships, and the need
to improve the accountability and performance of UN peacekeepers.
The means and ends should be in sync
With just a few exceptions, the new UN peacekeeping operations established after 2000 had very
long mandates. In the late 2000s, often running to over a dozen pages, they earned the derogatory
nickname “Christmas-tree mandates” as a reference to how many different tasks were attached to
them. To take perhaps the most extreme example, in 2018, the UN Secretary-General told the Council
that UNMISS “cannot possibly implement 209 mandated tasks”.19 Common tasks included supporting
local police and military forces; ceasefire monitoring; maritime security; security monitoring, patrolling
and deterrence activities; protection of humanitarian and UN personnel and facilities, including free
movement of personnel and equipment; security sector reform (SSR); demilitarization and arms
management; humanitarian support; human rights; women, peace, and security; children in armed
conflict; the rule of law and judicial matters; political process; electoral assistance; support to State
institutions; international cooperation and coordination; support to sanctions regimes; public information;
civilian-military coordination; contingency planning; mission impact assessment; and (since 1999) the
protection of civilians, including refugees and internally displaced persons. In addition, some missions
have been tasked with degrading “spoilers”, illegal non-State armed groups, and even “terrorists”.20 To
implement such a wide range of tasks, peacekeeping missions require the appropriate capabilities in
terms of personnel, equipment and assets, financing, and support systems. However, gaps often opened
up between the capabilities provided to operations and the effects they were expected to generate in
the field. Gaps between the means and ends of UN peacekeeping operations are a regular feature of the
history of these missions in the twenty-first century.
Successful peacemaking is the best exit strategy
A second enduring theme derives from the fact that at the political and strategic level, peacekeeping
and peacemaking are distinct activities. It is a common misperception that it is the job of peacekeeping
operations to end wars. In fact, it is the belligerents in any armed conflict that must make peace. UN
peacekeepers can make that more likely by engaging in confidence-building measures, but they cannot
simply end wars. It is the job of peacemakers to help belligerents negotiate a political settlement. Ideally,
therefore, all UN peacekeeping operations would be directly linked to an effective political peacemaking
process aimed at resolving the armed conflict in question. Where no effective peacemaking strategy
exists, peacekeeping operations can do little more than limit the damage, even if all the individual
peacekeepers perform their mandated tasks admirably. Without peacemaking, there is no pathway
19) UN Security Council, “S/PV.8218, 2018. United Nations peacekeeping operations”, S/PV.8218 (2018), 28 March 2018, 3. Available from: <https://
undocs.org/S/PV.8218>.
20) “Spoilers” are parties of an armed conflict who try to stymie the peace process. For more information, read: Stephen Stedman, “Spoiler Problems in
Peace Processes”, International Security, Vol. 22, No. 2, 1997, 5–53.
26
Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (front left), Special

Representative of the Secretary-General and
head of the UN Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in the Central African
Republic (MINUSCA), greets Jean-Pierre
Lacroix (right), Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations, as he arrives on a
joint visit with Smaïl Chergui (second from
right), the African Union Commissioner for
Peace and Security. 10 April 2018. UN Photo
#756920 by Herve Serefio.
to a successful exit for peacekeeping operations. Of course, there is always the potential to end a
peacekeeping operation badly, perhaps by host governments ejecting the operation or major T/PCCs
withdrawing their personnel. Sadly, the history of twenty-first-century UN peacekeeping is littered with
missions that struggled because of the lack of an effective strategy to resolve the conflict in question.
Peacekeepers need appropriate guidance
To have any hope of implementing their complicated mandates, peacekeepers required some
guidance as to how best to go about it. As a social practice that has been invented and periodically
reinvented since the late 1940s, UN peacekeeping has been the subject of numerous efforts to develop
guidelines, principles, best practices, and doctrine. By the twenty-first century, the basic principles
had cohered around the three set out in the 2008 Capstone Doctrine.21 The first was the consent of
the main parties to the conflict, including the host country government. Despite not assuming the
universality of consent by all armed groups, this provided the freedom of action (political and physical)
to carry out mandated tasks. The second was impartiality, which enabled the implementation of
mandates without favour or prejudice to any party. Impartiality was considered crucial to retain the
consent and cooperation of the main conflict parties. Impartial UN peacekeepers should not condone
actions by parties that violate the mandate, but they should ensure that countering breaches should
be done transparently and the rationale for such action explained through transparent and effective
communication. The third was the non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the
mission’s mandate. Of course, given the frequently lengthy mandates, this was a very permissive
principle that permitted proactive use of force in some circumstances. Importantly, the UN was keen to
emphasize the differences between “robust peacekeeping” — where proactive force is permitted at the
tactical and operational levels — and “peace enforcement” — which does not require the consent of the
main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic level. The enduring theme for this
course is the persistent debates over the extent to which these basic principles remain appropriate for
all of the UN peacekeepers across all of its missions.
21) UN DPKO/DFS, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2008).
Available from: <https://www.un.org/ruleoflaw/blog/document/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-principles-and-guidelines-the-capstone-
doctrine/>.
27
Peacekeeping relies on partnerships
The UN has never possessed a monopoly on authorizing or conducting peace operations, although
the concept of “peacekeeping” is commonly associated with the United Nations. In practice, the UN
has regularly worked with a variety of actors who are also engaged in some form of peace operations.
In this sense, what the UN Secretary-General called “partnership peacekeeping” has a long history.22
But it is fair to say that during the twenty-first century, the frequency and nature of the peacekeeping
partnerships of the UN intensified, particularly with organizations in Africa and Europe. As we shall see
later in this course, the UN has developed various forms of partnerships with such actors, including
sequenced, parallel, support, and hybrid relationships in the field. But UN peacekeeping is founded on
partnerships in other senses too. At the political and strategic level, UN peacekeeping is the outcome
of partnerships between the Security Council, Secretariat, and Member States. At the operational and
tactical levels, UN peacekeeping is the outcome of partnerships between the relevant T/PCCs in the
field, who, in turn, are often supported by a range of private contractors. And at a fundamental level,
peacekeeping should be a partnership between the peacekeepers themselves and the “peacekept” — the
local populations on the receiving end of UN missions. As will become evident throughout this course, UN
peacekeeping stands a better chance of working effectively when these different partnerships function
smoothly.
Improving accountability and performance enables success
Finally, it is important to recall that there have been a variety of unintended negative consequences
when UN peacekeeping operations have deployed. Indeed, if one only read commentary about
contemporary UN peacekeeping in the popular press, one would probably find much more negative
coverage than positive. In particular, numerous media outlets have regularly reported on a variety
of scandalous behaviour by UN peacekeepers. This has included peacekeepers engaging in violence
against civilians, smuggling and trafficking of illicit goods, spreading infectious disease, and committing
sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA). Rather belatedly, the Security Council, Secretariat, and most
Member States have taken more serious steps to prevent such activities, including Security Council
resolutions, investigations, and making amends to some of the victims. They have done so not only
because such conduct is morally wrong and often criminal but also because improving the accountability
and performance of UN peacekeepers increases the likelihood that missions will be effective. A regular
theme of UN peacekeeping in the twenty-first century is, therefore, the struggle to hold peacekeepers
accountable for such misconduct and to improve their performance. Both of these objectives required
the UN to develop appropriate rules and standards, some of which were met with criticism from some
Member States. Part of the history you will learn in this course is, therefore, the story of developing
those standards and of peacekeepers trying to live up to them, sometimes under very challenging
circumstances.
22) UN Security Council, Partnering for Peace: Moving towards partnership peacekeeping, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2015/229, 1 April 2015.
Available from: <http://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/229>.
28
End-of-Lesson Quiz »
1. Between 2000 and 2020, how many 6. The base reimbursement rate for UN
United Nations peacekeeping operations peacekeeping troops was raised to
were active? _____ in 2018.
A. 25 A. $1,028 per peacekeeper per month
B. 30 B. $1,332 per peacekeeper per month
C. 35 C. $1,410 per peacekeeper per month
D. 40 D. $1,428 per peacekeeper per month
2. Since 2000, _____ percentage of newly 7. In what year did the United Nations
established United Nations peacekeeping deploy its first Formed Police Unit?
operations were deployed in Africa.
A. 1960
A. 52 B. 1996
B. 62 C. 1999
C. 72 D. 2001
D. 82
8. By 2028, the United Nations has set a
3. Between 2000 and 2020, what was the target for women peacekeeping troops
highest level of annual expenditure on of _____ per cent.
United Nations peacekeeping?
A. 5
A. $6.3 billion B. 10
B. $7.3 billion C. 15
C. $8.3 billion D. 20
D. $9.3 billion
9. Between 2000 and 2020, which year
4. From January to July 2009, which experienced the most United Nations
permanent member of the Security peacekeeper fatalities?
Council provided the most uniformed
A. 2010
peacekeepers?
B. 2013
A. China
C. 2016
B. France
D. 2019
C. United Kingdom
D. Russian Federation 10. A basic principle of United Nations
peacekeeping is to require the consent
5. Which Member State was the top of _____.
police‑contributing country in December
A. all conflict parties
2005, December 2010, and December
2015? B. no conflict parties
C. the host government only
A. Jordan
D. the main conflict parties
B. Senegal
C. Bangladesh
D. Rwanda
Answer Key provided on the next page.
29
Answer Key »
1. C
2. C
3. C
4. B
5. A
6. D
7. C
8. C
9. A
10. D
30
LESSON
2 Peacekeeping Reborn
Between 1999 and 2002, the

UN and other international
actors established 25 new
peace operations that were
mainly in sub‑Saharan Africa,
and many went well beyond
traditional peacekeeping
tasks.
UN Photo #110581 by Eskinder Debebe.
Section 2.1 UN Peacekeeping Reborn • Explain the renaissance of UN peacekeeping in

the early twenty-first century.
Section 2.2 UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone
• Analyse the new UN peacekeeping operations
Section 2.3 UN Peacekeeping in Kosovo
established in 1999 in Sierra Leone, Kosovo,
Section 2.4 UN Peacekeeping in East Timor East Timor, and the Democratic Republic of
Congo (DRC).
Section 2.5 UN Peacekeeping in the DRC
• Understand how the 11 September 2001

Section 2.6 UN Peacekeeping and the
terrorist attacks on the United States indirectly
“Global War on Terrorism”
affected UN peacekeeping.
31
LESSON 2 | Peacekeeping Reborn
A worker from the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) prepares repatriation kits, which are distributed to
returnees. The kits include plastic sheeting, a blanket, a jerrycan, and soap. 1 October 1999. UN/UNHCR Photo #31559 by M.
Kobayashi.
Introduction
This lesson analyses the new wave of multidimensional
peacekeeping operations that would shape the first
experiences of the UN at the start of the twenty-first
century. The UN established these operations in six hectic
months between June and November 1999 in four war‑torn
territories — Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and the
DRC. After analysing the UN missions in each of these
theatres, the lesson concludes by summarizing how the
“9/11” terrorist attacks and the subsequent US‑led “Global
War on Terrorism” indirectly influenced UN peacekeeping.
32
Section 2.1 UN Peacekeeping Reborn

In the mid-1990s, the Security Council proved reluctant to deploy large multidimensional
peacekeeping operations. This was largely because of the Western-led retreat from UN peacekeeping
following the difficult missions in Bosnia-Herzegovina, Somalia, Rwanda, and Angola. Instead, the UN
deployed only small confidence-building and assistance missions. The Council established a cluster of
small confidence-building missions in the Balkans in 1995–1996 (UNPREDEP, UNCRO, UNMIBH, UNMOP,
and UNTAES), and Haiti received three small support missions (UNSMIH, UNTMIH, and MIPONUH) in
1996 and 1997. In early 1997, a small verification mission was deployed for less than five months in
Guatemala (MINUGUA); another small observer mission was dispatched to Angola (MONUA) in 1997;
and a small security assistance mission was sent to Bangui, the capital of the Central African Republic,
in 1998.
Between 1999 and 2002, however, the UN and other international actors established 25 new peace
operations, mainly in sub-Saharan Africa. Lots of them went well beyond traditional peacekeeping tasks,
and a couple of them involved major attempts at State-building through transitional administrations.
Paul Williams, Associate Director of the M.A. Security Policy Studies programme at the Elliott School
for International Affairs, and Alex Bellamy, Director of the Asia Pacific Centre for the Responsibility
to Protect, have argued that there were five main reasons for this renaissance.1 First, a variety of
international institutions, including the United Nations Development Programme, the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank, and development ministries in several Western States
argued that security was a prerequisite for social development and human rights. Unless security was
established and local security services reformed, corruption and violence would steal humanitarian and
development aid and ruin projects. This led to an increasing convergence of traditional security and
development agendas whereby sections of the Western aid community supported peace operations as a
way to help facilitate humanitarian and development initiatives.
Second, some UN Member States showed an increased desire to stop the organized killing of civilians
in their neighbourhoods. Spurred in part by the failures to stop genocidal massacres in Rwanda and
Bosnia in the mid-1990s, in 1999, NATO intervened militarily in Kosovo while Australia led an intervention
force in East Timor. Although the Security Council authorized only the Australian-led INTERFET force,
both these interventions resulted in follow-on UN peace operations.
However, a third factor that encouraged new UN peacekeeping operations was the reluctance of
the Western States that conducted these military operations to place their own troops under the UN
command structure. They argued that operating unilaterally allowed them to overcome many of the
problems associated with UN missions related to interoperability and command and control. But this
meant that Western troops would not take on all the required peacekeeping tasks deemed important by
the Security Council. Hence, NATO forces in Kosovo, Australian troops in East Timor, and later UK, US,
and French soldiers in Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Cote d’Ivoire, respectively, only addressed part of the
list of challenges necessary for stabilizing these war-torn territories. It was UN peacekeepers that were
asked to pick up the slack.
The fourth factor enabling larger UN peace operations was the growth of relevant “train and equip”
programmes. While some Western States were reluctant to put their own troops in UN missions, they
1) Paul D. Williams with Alex J. Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021), Chapter 5.
33
were willing to ramp up their programmes to train and equip other countries to do so, including through
such initiatives as the US African Crisis Response Initiative (and later the Africa Contingency Operations
Training Assistance), Britain’s African Peacekeeping Training Support Programme, Norway’s Training
for Peace programme, and France’s Reinforcement of African Peacekeeping Capacities programme
(RECAMP). In the early 2000s, these initiatives were also given a boost by the new African Union’s
decision to build a new African peace and security architecture and commit to undertaking more peace
operations across the continent. As discussed in Section 2.6, some of them were further enlarged as an
indirect effect of the US-led “Global War on Terrorism”.
Finally, although not a direct cause of the new UN missions, 1998 and 1999 saw several major
reports that drew lessons from past peacekeeping mistakes and called for a renewed determination to
do better in the future. In 1998, the Organization of African Unity established the Integrated Panel of
Eminent Personalities to Investigate the 1994 Genocide and the Surrounding Events in Rwanda, which
reported on the failure to prevent and stop the 1994 Rwandan genocide.2 In November and December
1999, two independent inquiries were published on the failures of the UN system to stop genocidal
violence in Rwanda (1994) and Srebrenica (1995).3 These reports, in turn, catalysed what would
become known as the “Brahimi Report” on UN peace operations, convened in March and published in
August 2000 (see Lesson 9).4 Some more operational developments also increased the prospects of
more peace operations, with both NATO and the EU announcing plans to develop new crisis response
mechanisms involving rapid reaction forces of various sizes. In sum, on the cusp of the twenty-first
century, there were at least the seeds of optimism that UN peace operations could be conducted more
effectively than in the 1990s.
These five factors coalesced to bring about a rebirth of UN peacekeeping in the early 2000s. That
renaissance took place in the four war-torn territories of Sierra Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and the DRC.
Sections 2.2–2.5 provide brief overviews of UN peacekeeping in each of these theatres.
Section 2.2 UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone

The UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL) holds a special place in the history of peacekeeping. Not
only did it suffer the largest hostage crisis the UN faced, but it was also the first mission to be composed
of a significant number of “re-hatted” troops from another organization’s peace operation. It was the
first UN peacekeeping operation to receive an explicit mandate to protect civilians.5 Moreover, after a
very troubled start, it ended up playing a positive role in stabilizing the country.
The story of how UNAMSIL came to be established starts when civil war broke out in Sierra Leone.
After two decades of authoritarian rule and a collapsing economy, in March 1991, a group of some 300
Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels invaded the country from neighbouring Liberia, where they had
been receiving support from the notorious warlord Charles Taylor.
2) The report was released in July 2000. International Panel of Eminent Personalities, Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide (Addis Ababa: Organization of
African Unity, July 2000).
3) UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 53/55: The Fall of Srebrenica, Report of the
Secretary-General, A/54/549, 15 November 1999 and UN Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations
during the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, Report of the Secretary-General, S/1999/1257, 12 December 1999.
4) UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, UN Panel Report, A/55/305–S/2000/809, 21
August 2000.
5) Funmi Olonisakin, “UNAMSIL” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 629–641.
34
Figure 2-1: UNAMSIL Uniformed Personnel
Providing for Peacekeeping, “IPI Peacekeeping Database”. Available from:

The UN largely ignored the war until February 1995, when the Secretary-General appointed a
Special Envoy. As the violence escalated and it became obvious no UN peacekeepers were forthcoming,
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) deployed a large peace operation of over
10,000 troops to Sierra Leone known as ECOMOG 2, the ECOWAS Monitoring Group 2. It comprised
mainly troops from Nigeria but with contingents from Ghana and Guinea, some of whom had already
been in Sierra Leone as a support base for ECOMOG’s first operations to stabilize neighbouring Liberia,
which was suffering from its own civil war.
The catalyst for a larger UN role was the May 1997 coup d’état led by disaffected members of the
military, which deposed the elected President, Ahmed Kabbah. Although a negotiated deal was brokered
in Conakry, Guinea in October, the rebels reneged, and ECOMOG forcibly returned President Kabbah
to power in March 1998. At this stage, the Security Council added military liaison officers and security
advisory personnel to the Special Envoy’s staff. Then, in July 1998, the Security Council established
UNOMSIL, a small observer mission intended to support the new peace process and associated
disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of rebel fighters by ECOMOG. Initially, the UN
had planned to send a battalion of roughly 700 troops and 60 military observers, but the rebel leader,
Foday Sankoh, rejected this, and only about 40 observers were deployed.6 This little mission is where
the renaissance of large, multidimensional UN peacekeeping operations began.
Unarmed UNOMSIL teams were protected by ECOMOG forces while cataloguing atrocities and
human rights abuses against civilians. But the peace process broke down yet again, and UNOMSIL
was unable to stop the resumption of war. One problem was the sudden death of Nigeria’s President,
General Sunni Abacha, in June 1998. As the main political and financial force behind ECOMOG, this led
to a period of uncertainty. The rebels took advantage, and in January 1999, they overran most of Sierra
6) Adekeye Adebajo and David Keen, “Sierra Leone”, in United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004, ed. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides,
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 251.
35
Leone’s capital, Freetown, forcing UN personnel to evacuate and killing nearly 1,000 ECOMOG troops.7
Although ECOMOG recaptured Freetown about a month later, the large financial and human toll of the
mission prompted the newly elected President of Nigeria, Olusegun Obasanjo, to withdraw Nigerian
troops from ECOMOG.
As a result, President Kabbah came under considerable pressure to negotiate with the RUF rebels,
and after several months of talks, the Lomé Accord was signed on 7 July 1999. This established a
ceasefire, a power-sharing arrangement, and an expanded role for UNOMSIL, which was increased
to just over 200 military observers. President Obasanjo then duly withdrew Nigerian troops between
August and December 1999. This effectively meant the end of ECOMOG since they made up the vast
majority of the force. It was time for the UN to take the leading role, and on 22 October, the Security
Council replaced UNOMSIL with a much larger peacekeeping force, UNAMSIL. Initially authorized with a
strength of 6,000, UNAMSIL included two battalions of Nigerian ECOMOG forces and subsequently grew
to over 17,000 uniformed personnel by March 2001.
UNAMSIL’s mandate for most of its operations required its personnel to provide security at all DDR
sites; facilitate the free flow of people, goods, and humanitarian assistance along specific thoroughfares;
assist and coordinate the Sierra Leone law enforcement agencies in discharging their responsibilities;
and both guard weapons, ammunition, and other military equipment collected from combatants and
assist in their subsequent disposal or destruction.
UNAMSIL’s operations started badly. In the first half of 2000, the security situation deteriorated as
the RUF rebels reneged on the Lomé Accords. Instead, they regularly used violence against civilians and
to stop UN peacekeepers from deploying to the diamond-rich areas of Sierra Leone, where the rebels
made their money. Faced with a hostile environment, UNAMSIL was increased to 11,000 uniformed
personnel, but the force was slow to deploy, poorly organized and commanded, and lacked critically
important equipment and properly trained troops. As a result, when UN peacekeepers tried to disarm
RUF fighters forcibly in the diamond-rich Kono province in early May, the RUF responded by killing four
peacekeepers and taking about 500 others hostage.8 Emboldened by this success, the RUF once again
advanced on Freetown.
Unfortunately, the RUF was not UNAMSIL’s only problem. Internally, the mission was in turmoil. In
what became known as the “Jetley affair”, UNAMSIL’s Indian Force Commander, Major General Vijay
Jetley, accused Nigerian troops of engaging in illicit diamond mining and collaborating with the RUF.
Written in May 2000, Jetley’s internal memo raising these allegations was leaked in September, and
the resulting diplomatic controversy resulted in the withdrawal of India’s contingent and, in November,
Jetley’s replacement by a Kenyan Force Commander.9
From this rather bleak situation, UNAMSIL’s fortunes were turned around by a combination of several
factors.10 First, prompted by the crisis in Freetown, Britain, the former colonial power, unilaterally
deployed approximately 1,300 troops to evacuate British and Commonwealth citizens in May 2000. The
UK’s operation had President Kabbah’s blessing but no Security Council authorization. Nevertheless,
British forces subsequently broadened their operations to include supporting UNAMSIL and the Sierra
7) Olonisakin, “UNAMSIL”, 631.

8) Adebajo and Keen, “Sierra Leone”, 262.
9) Olonisakin, “UNAMSIL”, 636.
10) Olonisakin, “UNAMSIL”, 637–639.
36
Leone army and moved beyond Freetown and its immediate environs. Although a rebel faction known as
the West Side Boys took a British patrol hostage in August 2000, the following month, UK forces dealt
those rebels a major blow when they engaged in a rescue mission in which one British soldier and many
rebels were killed.
Second, by the end of May 2000, almost all the RUF’s UNAMSIL hostages were released after a deal
was brokered through Liberia’s warlord-turned-president Charles Taylor. Third, the Security Council not
only increased UNAMSIL’s strength to 13,000 (and later 17,000 in March 2001 at a total cost of nearly
$700 million a year), but it also gave Sierra Leone greater diplomatic attention, including a visit by 11
permanent representatives to the Security Council in October 2000. The fourth positive factor was the
much improved UNAMSIL response to subsequent hostage-taking by the RUF. Before he left the mission,
in July 2000, General Jetley orchestrated Operation Khukri. Involving troops from India, Ghana, and
Nigeria with logistical support from the UK, the operation freed more than 200 UNAMSIL personnel
who were trapped in the settlement of Kailahun and also inflicted major losses on the RUF. Finally,
although another ceasefire was brokered in November 2000, the process of disarming the RUF was once
again interrupted, this time because of their activities inside neighbouring Guinea. In response, greater
security cooperation between Guinea and Sierra Leone, including military operations, finally led to the
RUF’s disarmament.
In sum, after a difficult start, UNAMSIL worked with various partner forces to stabilize the situation
and disarm the rebels. It subsequently helped organize successful national elections in May 2002 and
would exit Sierra Leone in December 2005, leaving behind a country that was in a lot better shape than
when it arrived.
Section 2.3 UN Peacekeeping in Kosovo

In June 1999, the UN also began peacekeeping in Kosovo, where the Security Council established an
Interim Administration (UNMIK). Composed of approximately 4,000 police, 1,000 international civilian
personnel, and a handful of military observers, the mission’s mandate was to maintain peace and
security and provide transitional administration of Kosovo, establish and oversee the development of
provisional democratic self-governing institutions, and facilitate a political process to determine Kosovo’s
future status.11 Failure to achieve the last task meant that UNMIK remains in operation to this day.
UNMIK, deployed in the aftermath of NATO’s 78-day humanitarian military intervention over Serbia/
Kosovo, launched between March and June 1999. The Security Council did not authorize NATO’s air
war. Nevertheless, the Council subsequently authorized UN peacekeepers to work in partnership with
NATO, EU, and OSCE missions to develop an unprecedented form of transitional administration. In
supporting this administration, UNMIK peacekeepers faced several political and operational challenges
concerning the lack of agreement on Kosovo’s future political status, policing and rule-of-law issues, as
well as obstacles to economic reconstruction. Kosovo’s situation became even more complicated when
its authorities made a unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008.
The dissolution of Yugoslavia set the stage for UNMIK in the early 1990s. Ironically, this began
in Kosovo, which had important historical links to Serbia, but around 90 per cent of its population
11) Richard Caplan, “UNMIK” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 618.
37
Figure 2-2: UNMIK Uniformed Personnel

was Albanian.12 The significant autonomy acquired from Yugoslavia in 1974 was suffocated by Serbian
nationalist policies from the late 1980s, prompting a non-violent Albanian resistance movement to
create a de facto parallel State. When the wars in Bosnia and Croatia concluded with the 1995 Dayton
Peace Accords, Kosovo was left out. And when the central government collapsed in neighbouring Albania
in 1997, a flow of weapons arrived in Kosovo, which helped fuel an armed rebellion led by the Kosovo
Liberation Army (KLA). The Serbian response was brutal, and a policy of ethnic cleansing killed some
10,000 Kosovar Albanians in 1998 and 1999. It was this campaign that prompted NATO intervention.
Following NATO’s intervention, nearly one million displaced Kosovar Albanians returned home.13 At
the same time, Kosovar Albanians regularly attacked Serbs in Kosovo, and thousands fled to Serbia.
This encouraged a de facto ethnic partition within Kosovo, with the majority of Kosovo’s Serbs living in
the north-west. It also resulted in few Serbs being included in Kosovo’s governing institutions.
Unlike the situation in Bosnia, where the UN-led transitional administration had the agreement of
the main conflict parties, UNMIK was imposed after NATO’s military campaign. It also came as a bit of
a shock to the UN Secretariat, which had just one month’s notice that it would be leading the mission.14
As part of Kosovo’s transitional administration, UNMIK was given the lead on civil administration tasks
while its Special Representative was granted “all legislative and executive authority with respect to
Kosovo, including the administration of the judiciary”.15 Other organizations led in other areas: the
United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) on humanitarian assistance, the OSCE on
institution-building, the EU on economic reconstruction, while NATO (and later the EU) provided security
via the Kosovo Force (KFOR), which at its height had some 50,000 troops.
12) See: Tim Judah, Kosovo: War and Revenge (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2000).
13) Caplan, “UNMIK”, 619.
15) Cited in Williams with Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 221–222.
38
As set out in Security Council resolution 1244

(1999), the UN established “an interim administration
for Kosovo under which the people of Kosovo can
enjoy substantial autonomy from the Federal Republic
of Yugoslavia, and which will provide transitional
administration while establishing and overseeing the
development of provisional democratic self-governing
institutions to ensure conditions for a peaceful
and normal life for all inhabitants of Kosovo”. The
implementing actors were tasked with supporting
the distribution of humanitarian aid and the
reconstruction of infrastructure, protecting human
rights, maintaining law and order in association
with peacekeepers, performing civil administration,
Kosovar refugees fleeing their homeland. 1 March 1999.
developing democratic institutions, and assuring the
UN/UNHCR Photo #321389 by Roger LeMoyne.
return of refugees and displaced persons.
Resolution 1244 envisaged a phased transfer of authority: the gradual transfer of administration to
Kosovars and preparation for elections, the holding of elections, the establishment of a new government
and provisional administration, and, finally, the full transfer of the transitional administration to a new
permanent civil administration. International disagreements about the final status of Kosovo stalled
this. While Serbia and Russia wanted Kosovo to remain part of Serbia, Kosovo’s Albanian majority
wanted independence.
Over time, the lack of political agreement became more problematic, as it meant that external
actors were unsure whether they were building institutions of national or local government, and Kosovo’s
elected representatives were unable to assume authoritative positions. One example was the Kosovo
Protection Corps (KPC) — potentially the basis of a national army — which remained lightly armed and
poorly funded because it lacked a specific role in the State-building process. Organized crime gradually
infiltrated it.
Kosovo’s uncertain future also blighted economic reconstruction. As Richard Caplan, Professor of
International Relations and Official Fellow at Linacre College, noted, “Kosovo was embedded in a defunct
and largely dysfunctional socialist economy”, and hence the external powers had to build something
new and improved, not just return to the status quo ante.16 However, the subsequent neoliberal models
failed to transform an economy largely dependent on remittances and official aid, and unemployment
soon rose to over 50 per cent. This too fuelled organized crime by encouraging corruption and violence.
In these circumstances, policing was key to stabilizing the territory. Resolution 1244 tasked UNMIK
to maintain “civil law and order, including by establishing local police forces and meanwhile through
the deployment of international police personnel to serve in Kosovo; protecting and promoting human
rights; assuring the safe and unimpeded return of all refugees and displaced persons to their homes
in Kosovo”. UNMIK was a rare case for UN peacekeeping because of its executive powers. Executive
policing refers to “[t]he power and practice of law enforcement by international police within a particular
39
territory. This power derives from the assumption by the UN of sovereign authority over the area (either
all or part of a State) and its practice from the establishment of a transitional administration”.17
On this basis, UNMIK police had the power of arrest and detention and the authority to carry arms.
Their mission was designed to evolve in four phases: from executive policing to local capacity‑building,
then to a phase transitioning the conduct of policing powers from UNMIK to the Kosovo Police Service
(KPS), and, finally, to a situation where UNMIK monitored the KPS. It took a couple of years for KPS
officers to outnumber UNMIK, but by mid-2009, UNMIK reduced its police component to just 22 officers.18
Organized crime also posed problems. During the rebellion against Slobodan Milošević’s Serbian
nationalist government, illicit activity sustained the resistance, including the KLA. Some of Kosovo’s
major criminals were thus widely regarded as heroes and were subsequently democratically elected
to office, where they acted with impunity and ignored anti-corruption efforts. In return, so-called
“patriotic smuggling” was undertaken to support the Serb minority in northern Kosovo.19 A combination
of weak law enforcement institutions and poor economic conditions and high unemployment also fuelled
corruption. So too did the existence of a de facto “mafia state” — as one foreign intelligence officer put
it — wherein the most well-connected “fifteen families” controlled the major routes used by criminal
networks.20 In this situation, peacekeepers faced the difficult choice of working with Kosovo’s political
elites as partners in building new governance institutions or prosecuting some of them as criminals.21
Following years of unsuccessful negotiations, in 2007, many Western governments endorsed the
idea of Kosovo’s independence after then-Secretary-General’s Special Envoy for Kosovo, Martti Ahtisaari,
proposed a pathway to “conditional independence” via a phased transition to full independence based
on the achievement of key goals, notably, the protection of Kosovo’s multi-ethnic character. Serbia
continued to oppose this, while Russia and China insisted that any solution must have the consent of both
Serbia and Kosovo. On 17 February 2008, Kosovo’s President, Hashim Thaçi, declared independence,
while Serbia declared it an illegal act. As a result, UNMIK handed many of its powers to the new
government of Kosovo and the EU Rule of Law Mission (EULEX), which deployed in December 2008.
Today, UNMIK continues in a much-reduced form, while over 100 UN Member States support the idea
of an independent Kosovar State.
Over time, UNMIK’s presence helped reduce levels of ethnic violence and facilitated discussions
between Kosovar authorities and Serbia on potential new territorial arrangements that might encourage
political reconciliation. Kosovo’s economy is also better than when UNMIK arrived, although it is still a
poor territory compared to the rest of Europe. The fact that both Serbia and Kosovo wanted to join the
EU gave Brussels some leverage, but this did not translate into a political settlement. As Richard Caplan
concluded, “[w]ithout the support of Belgrade and the Kosovo Serbs, UNMIK’s efforts would always be
limited”.22
17) Executive Policing: Enforcing the Law in Peace Operations, ed. Renata Dwan (Oxford: Oxford University Press for SIPRI, 2002), 1.
19) Walter Kemp, Mark Shaw, and Arthur Boutellis, The Elephant in the Room: How Can Peace Operations Deal with Organized Crime? (New York:
International Peace Institute, 2013), 48. Available from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2013/06/the-elephant-in-the-room-how-can-peace-operations-
deal-with-organized-crime>.
20) Kemp et al., The Elephant, 49–50.
21) Williams with Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 391.
40
Section 2.4 UN Peacekeeping in East Timor
Figure 2-3: UNTAET Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2002

In June 1999, the same month that UNMIK was established in Kosovo, the UN established a
small peace operation to supervise a referendum on whether the people of East Timor would vote for
independence from Indonesia.23 When the subsequent vote for independence triggered mass violence,
an 11,000-strong intervention force led by Australia deployed to East Timor to stop it. Within a month,
INTERFET, as the intervention force was known, engaged both militias and the Indonesian army,
established a presence throughout East Timor, and started policing the border with Indonesia. After
successfully stabilizing the situation, INTERFET handed over to another UN transitional administration,
this time in East Timor, known by its acronym UNTAET. As in Kosovo, UNTAET deployed after a military
intervention. But unlike Kosovo, INTERFET had host State consent and Security Council authorization.
Also unlike Kosovo, the UN transitional administration lasted less than four years, from September 1999
to May 2002.
The referendum was the culmination of a 25-year armed struggle against the Indonesian occupation
of East Timor led by the Falintil guerrilla movement. It came about when B.J. Habibie replaced the
long-time ruler Suharto as the Indonesian President in 1998 and agreed to hold a referendum on
independence, supervised by a new UN Mission in East Timor (UNAMET). This was created in June 1999
to organize and administer the referendum known locally as the “popular consensus”. UNAMET registered
some 450,000 voters, over half of East Timor’s total population, and on 30 August 1999, 98 per cent of
them voted in the free and fair referendum, with 78.5 per cent opting for independence.24 In response,
pro-integration militias sponsored by the Indonesian army rampaged, killing over 1,000 people and
displacing over half of East Timor’s population. Security Council resolution 1264 (15 September) quickly
23) See: Michael Smith and Moreen Dee, Peacekeeping in East Timor (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2003).
24) Norrie Macqueen, “UNTAET” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 647.
41
authorized INTERFET to use all necessary measures to “restore peace and security…protect and support
UNAMET in carrying out its tasks and facilitate humanitarian assistance operations”.
It was widely suspected that most East Timorese would vote for independence. It was also thought
likely that pro-Indonesian forces would respond violently to such a result, so could anything have been
done sooner to prevent such bloodshed rather than manage its repercussions? Norrie Macqueen, head
of the Department of Politics at the University of Dundee, neatly summarized the central dilemma facing
the UN in the following manner:
“Clearly, a uniformed UN presence with operational capacity

would have gone a long way to deter and manage the militia
violence that was inflicted on the territory when the likely
outcome of the referendum became clear and later when it
was confirmed. However, in reality, this was never a possibility
open to the UN. Even if the Security Council had been willing
to authorize resources for such an operation at a time of
peacekeeping overstretch, host-State consent from Indonesia
would not have been given.”25
By the end of October 1999, the Security Council decided that INTERFET had created a sufficiently
secure environment in East Timor to establish a follow-on operation. Hence, UNTAET was established
to administer East Timor and provide security there. The mission was given an authorized strength of
9,150 troops, over 1,600 police, and 200 military observers. It took over security duties in February
2000 after INTERFET withdrew. UNTAET thus had to juggle some more traditional peacekeeping tasks
with its broader State-building and administration responsibilities.26
With regard to peacekeeping, UNTAET’s main initial challenge was dealing with the returning
displaced population and the low-level violence that went with it. The problem was most intense near the
border with Indonesian West Timor. Many of the people who fled the post-referendum violence crossed
the border, and large camps subsequently sprung up. When the situation calmed down, UNTAET not only
had to deal with about 167,000 refugees who returned from the camps but also some further violence
stoked by pro-Indonesian militias who had carried out the post-referendum violence.27 After several
months of violence left five UN personnel dead, the UN and Indonesian forces concluded an agreement
to act against the militias on each side of the border and manage the remaining 85,000–120,000 in the
West Timor camps.28 The other traditional peacekeeping challenge concerned the security sector. Here,
a significant step was taken in September 2000, when a new 3,000-strong East Timor Defence Force
was created, composed mostly of Falintil veterans. However, as discussed in Lesson 5, this would break
down several years later.
With regard to its broader State-building agenda, UNTAET created eight portfolios related to internal
administration, infrastructure, economic affairs, social affairs, finance, justice, police and emergency
services, and political affairs. East Timorese officials led the first four, and UN officials led the others.
25) Macqueen, “UNTAET”, 653.

27) UN DPO, “UNTAET: Background”. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/mission/past/etimor/UntaetB.htm>.
42
Like other transitional administrations, UNTAET

faced a series of dilemmas and challenges. Three
key dilemmas revolved around capacity-building, the
speed of the transition and accountability, and local
ownership. The first dilemma concerned how external
actors could effectively administer the war-torn
territory while simultaneously building local capacity
to govern. In December 1999, UNTAET established
a National Consultative Council, which was intended
to both advise the UN and learn from its personnel.
It had input into a range of issues, including the
justice system, currency matters, taxation, border
control, and budgetary affairs.29 It was replaced
by an expanded National Council in October 2000,
A member of Portuguese contingent of UNTAET on a
comprising 36 members from East Timorese civil
security patrol in the Becora district of Dili. 1 March 2000.
society with East Timorese holding five of the nine UN Photo #31573 by Eskinder Debebe.
cabinet portfolios.
A second dilemma revolved around the mission’s accountability and local ownership. Specifically,
how much influence should local officials wield in relation to UNTAET administrators? Critics argued that
the mission did not adequately consult the local population. For example, Jarat Chopra, who resigned his
post as head of UNTAET’s Office of District Administration in March 2000, wrote that the UN transitional
administration was so unaccountable to the local population that it resembled an authoritarian kingdom
of East Timor by dictating the pace of reform, the nature of the country’s constitution, and the creation
and implementation of laws.30 A practical example occurred in December 2000, when four of the five
East Timorese members of the cabinet threatened to resign over what they saw as UNTAET’s failure to
share decision-making authority and provide them with adequate resources. This threat and underlying
frustrations encouraged UNTAET to speed up the transition.31
With the end goal of an independent East Timor now in sight and local actors eager to assume
control, UNTAET focused its political energies on smoothing the way for elections. This included
engaging in a concerted programme of civic education about democracy.32 The elections duly took place
in August 2001, with 91 per cent of the population participating. The long-standing pro-independence
movement, Fretilin, won 55 of the 88 seats in the new constituent assembly, and the following month
saw the formation of a Council of Ministers. Its 24 members would form the basis of East Timor’s
post‑independence government and, in consultation with UNTAET, drew up a new national constitution
in February 2002. On 14 April 2002, Xanana Gusmão won a decisive victory in the presidential election.
Then on 20 May 2002, East Timor became the independent State of Timor-Leste, and UNTAET’s mandate
expired.
This chain of events highlights a third dilemma concerning the speed of the transition to
independence. In some ways, UNTAET faced the opposite problem of UNMIK in Kosovo. In East Timor,

30) Jarat Chopra, “The UN’s Kingdom of East Timor”, Survival, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2000, 27–40.
31) Richard Caplan, International Governance of War-Torn Territories (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 116.
32) Caplan, International Governance, 123.
43
the clear consensus over the territory’s final status created unrealistic expectations about how long
it would take to build a functioning State, and UNTAET was criticized for transferring authority to the
East Timorese too slowly. As Macqueen correctly noted, “[s]peed and effectiveness are not always
comfortable partners. To have properly developed local capacity would almost certainly have delayed
independence beyond May 2002 — and in so doing may well have provoked the resentment of those for
whom capacity was being built. The balance achieved by UNTAET was perhaps not perfect, but it was
far from disastrous”.33 Some commentators worried about a premature transition and that the new East
Timorese State lacked the capacity to resolve disputes and overcome crises.34 As we will see in Lesson
5, this was a prescient warning.
Section 2.5 UN Peacekeeping in the DRC

The final theatre of operations in the renaissance of UN peacekeeping came in the DRC, one month
after the establishment of UNAMSIL and UNTAET. In the DRC, the UN became embroiled in what became
known as “Africa’s world war”.35 UN peacekeepers are still there today. Since 1996, the series of wars in
the DRC had drawn in nearly a dozen African States. It was not until April 1999, however, that the
Security Council called for a ceasefire and withdrawal of all foreign forces and established an international
conference on peace, security, and stability in the Great Lakes region to bring this about. The Security
Council also signalled its willingness to become more involved should any peace agreement emerge.
Figure 2-4: MONUC Uniformed Personnel

In July, the DRC and five other States (Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, and Zimbabwe) signed
the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement, but initially, none of the rebel groups did. In August, the Security
Council duly authorized UN military liaison personnel to help develop modalities for implementing the

34) For example, Caplan, International Governance.
35) Gerard Prunier, Africa’s World War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009).
44
ceasefire. Then, in November, Security Council resolution 1279 established the UN mission in the DRC
(MONUC). It was given just 500 military observers to monitor the ceasefire and help foreign forces
to disengage. In February 2000, Security Council resolution 1291 increased MONUC to roughly 5,500
troops and tasked it to carry out the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration (DDR) of armed
groups, the “orderly withdrawal of foreign forces”, and, within its areas of deployment and capabilities,
the protection of civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.
MONUC would end up lasting nearly 12 years, after which it was reconfigured into a stabilization
force, MONUSCO, in July 2010. MONUC’s activities can be understood as unfolding in three broad
phases.36 From 1999 to 2002, MONUC focused on implementing the Lusaka Ceasefire Agreement; from
2003–2006, it concentrated on transitional governance arrangements, especially the preparation of
presidential and parliamentary elections and negotiation of the Global and Inclusive Agreement on
Transition, signed in Pretoria in December 2002; and from 2007–2010, it focused on post-electoral
stabilization. This section summarizes only the first phase, which is relevant to the rebirth of UN
peacekeeping in the early 2000s. Lesson 7 discusses MONUC’s more recent history.
Like UNAMSIL, MONUC got off to a very bad start. Its deployment was supposed to occur in phases
linked to progress on the ground. But there were two big problems. First, the signatories to the ceasefire
(as well as other non-signatory groups) kept fighting, and second, the DRC’s President, Laurent Kabila,
refused to allow the peacekeepers entry. MONUC’s deployment, therefore, only began in earnest after
Kabila was assassinated by one of his bodyguards in January 2001. Until that point, only 203 MONUC
peacekeepers had deployed.37
The next two years saw a variety of diplomatic efforts to negotiate peace, culminating in the
December 2002 Pretoria Agreement, which set out a transitional power-sharing arrangement for the
warring factions and a pathway to hold a constitutional referendum and national elections. Separate
agreements dealt with the withdrawal of Rwandan, Ugandan, and other foreign forces, which were to be
supervised by MONUC alongside its work on DDR.38
This certainly constituted progress, but it did not completely end the war in the east of the country
or stop regular massacres of civilians, some of which were carried out by the DRC’s armed forces.39
One particular massacre of civilians by the Rally for Congolese Democracy — Goma (RCD-Goma) units
in Kisangani in May 2002 occurred while MONUC peacekeepers were in the town. This, combined with
the rise in violence after Ugandan troops withdrew from the Ituri district, led to calls for more decisive
action by the mission.40
Overall, the first few years of UN operations in the DRC — as with Sierra Leone — highlighted that
peacekeepers would struggle when belligerents were not committed to the peace agreements they had
signed and when peacekeepers were not provided with sufficient capabilities to achieve their stated
objectives. On the latter issue, MONUC’s early years were a classic example of a huge gulf between
mandate and means. As Alan Doss, head of MONUC between 2007 and 2010, put it, “the Council did
36) These are set out in Alan Doss, “MONUC” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2015), 659ff.
37) See: UN DPO, “Monthly Summary of Troop Contribution to United Nations Operations as of 31/01/01”, 31 January 2001. Available from: <https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/jan01_3.pdf>.
38) Doss, “MONUC”, 660.
39) See: OHCHR, Report of the Mapping Exercise, Democratic Republic of the Congo, 1993–2003 (New York: UN OHCHR, 2010). Available from: <https://
www.ohchr.org/Documents/Countries/CD/DRC_MAPPING_REPORT_FINAL_EN.pdf>.
40) Doss, “MONUC”, 660.
45
not…make a strategic assessment of MONUC’s capacity to actually implement the growing list of the
tasks that it was mandating the mission to undertake”.41 This was largely because “the war in the Congo
was too gruesome and devastating for the West to ignore, but too difficult and too low a priority to
address seriously”.42 The US, in particular, played an important role by insisting that MONUC be limited
to around 5,000 troops and should avoid forcible disarmament of non-State actors.43 This signalled to
the local armed groups that the UN would likely remain a paper tiger.
Despite these problems, MONUC did help support the implementation of both the Lusaka and
Pretoria agreements, which improved the situation somewhat. The UN also encouraged and facilitated a
rapprochement of sorts between the DRC and its eastern neighbours, Rwanda, Uganda, and Burundi.44
On the other hand, MONUC remained relatively powerless to stop violence against civilians or reform
the country’s security forces, both of which would cause major challenges for the future of peacekeeping
in the DRC.
Section 2.6 UN Peacekeeping and the “Global War on Terrorism”

Al-Qaida’s terrorist attack on the United States on 11 September 2001 should also be mentioned
because it indirectly impacted the rebirth of UN peacekeeping in the twenty-first century. Politically, the
“Global War on Terrorism” produced a significant degree of agreement between the P5, each of whom
had its reasons to broadly support a rather vague and flexible “counter-terrorism” agenda. But its effects
on UN peacekeeping were mainly indirect because UN peacekeepers did not participate directly in this
US-led “war”, although terrorist attacks in Iraq, Afghanistan, and elsewhere deliberately targeted UN
political missions. Over a decade later, some of the extremist movements that splintered from Al-Qaida
central would end up targeting UN peacekeepers, primarily in UNSOA/UNSOS in Somalia, MINUSMA in
Mali, and UNDOF in Syria. But in the early 2000s, this was not the case.
Initially, the “Global War on Terrorism” had two main indirect effects: It influenced United States
policies towards UN peacekeeping, and it helped shape the composition of the major T/PCCs of the UN
after 2002.
For the United States, its war against Al-Qaida in Afghanistan in October 2001 quickly became
a priority of its national security strategy, as did the later misguided invasion of Iraq, which had not
participated in the 9/11 attacks, in 2003. Initially, as William Durch, Senior Associate at the Stimson
Center, and Tobias Berkman, Research Associate at the Stimson Center, pointed out, “[t]he new US
administration continued for a while to regard peacekeeping and ‘nation-building’ as obstacles to the
prosecution of the war on terrorism, rather than as building blocks in winning it”.45 But this changed
as the US increasingly viewed “failed States” — like Afghanistan — as potential safe havens for other
organizations to launch attacks on the US homeland or its interests abroad. In this context, the Bush
administration not only found its own troops engaged in extended State-building efforts in Afghanistan
and Iraq, but it was also much more willing to train and equip other countries to take the lead in peace
operations in parts of the world that were not first- or second-tier threats to US national security.46 This
41) Doss, “MONUC”, 660.
42) Philip Roessler and John Prendergast, “Democratic Republic of the Congo” in Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations, ed. William Durch (Washington,
DC: US Institute of Peace Press, 2006), 253.
43) Roessler and Prendergast, “Democratic Republic of the Congo”, 250–251.
44) Doss, “MONUC”, 665.
45) William Durch and Tobias Berkman, Who Should Keep the Peace? (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2006), 26.
46) From 2000–2007, George W. Bush was the 44th President of the United States. This is not in reference not his father, George H.W. Bush, who was
President from 1989–1993.
46
Opening of High-Level Conference of Heads of Counter-Terrorism Agencies of Member States. 28 June 2018. UN Photo #767518 by
Mark Garten.
led to several members of the Group of Eight (G8) ramping up their peacekeeping training programmes
(discussed in Section 2.1), the largest being the US Global Peace Operations Initiative launched in
2004.47
These training programmes were relevant to the second indirect effect of the “Global War on
Terrorism”, which was to shape the pool of T/PCCs that provided UN peacekeepers after the US-led
military interventions in Afghanistan (2001–present) and Iraq (2003–2011). These US-led campaigns
meant that between 2002 and 2015, very few NATO States provided large numbers of UN peacekeepers,
with the main exception of France after 2006. As a result, after 2001, most of the major UN T/PCCs
came from Asia and Africa, as noted in Lesson 1.
47) The Group of Eight (G8) “refers to the group of eight highly industrialized nations — France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, the United
States, Canada, and Russia — that hold an annual meeting to foster consensus on global issues like economic growth and crisis management, global
security, energy, and terrorism”. For more information, see: Zachary Laub, “The Group of Eight (G8) Industrialized Nations”, Council on Foreign
Relations, 3 March 2014. Available from: <https://www.cfr.org/backgrounder/group-eight-g8-industrialized-nations>.
47
1. Between 1999 and 2002, the United 6. In October 1999, the United Nations
Nations and other international actors Transitional Authority in East Timor
established how many peace operations? (UNTAET) had an authorized strength of:
A. 15 A. 9,150 troops
B. 20 B. 11,150 troops
C. 25 C. 13,150 troops
D. 30 D. 15,150 troops
2. In early May 2000, rebels in Sierra Leone 7. In August 1999, what percentage of
took hostage approximately _____ participants in East Timor’s “popular
UNAMSIL peacekeepers. consensus” voted for independence?
A. 50 A. 48.5
B. 250 B. 58.5
C. 500 C. 68.5
D. 750 D. 78.5
3. Which country provided the most 8. Between November 1999 and January
support to the Revolutionary United 2001, the United Nations Organization
Front (RUF) rebels in the Sierra Leone Mission in the DRC (MONUC) was only
Civil War? able to deploy _____ peacekeepers.
A. Libya A. 203
B. Liberia B. 303
C. Guinea C. 403
D. Cote d’Ivoire D. 503
4. In Kosovo’s transitional administration, 9. Which country played an important

the United Nations Mission in Kosovo role in insisting that the United Nations
(UNMIK) was given the leading role on Organization Mission in the DRC
which set of issues? (MONUC) should be limited to around
5,000 troops?
A. Security
B. Economic reconstruction A. France
C. Humanitarian assistance B. China
D. Civil administration C. Russia

D. United States
5. When did Kosovo’s president unilaterally
declare independence? 10. The US-led “Global War on Terrorism”
had the indirect effect of _____ Western
A. February 2006
peacekeeping training programmes.
B. February 2007
A. reducing
C. February 2008
B. increasing
D. February 2009
C. stopping
D. pausing
48
Answer Key »
1. C
2. C
3. B
4. D
5. C
6. A
7. D
8. A
9. D
10. B
49
LESSON
Peacekeeping in Western
3 Africa
This lesson focuses on the

missions that deployed to
Western Africa. These include
those in the three Mano River
States of Sierra Leone, Côte
d’Ivoire, and Liberia between
1999 and 2018.
UN Photo #666320 by Evan Schneider.
Section 3.1 Ending UN Peacekeeping in • Analyse UN peacekeeping operations in

Sierra Leone Western Africa.
Section 3.2 UN Peacekeeping in Cote • Summarize how UN peacekeeping ended in

d’Ivoire Sierra Leone.
Section 3.3 UN Peacekeeping in Liberia • Analyse the new UN peacekeeping operations

established in 2003 in Liberia and Côte
Section 3.4 UN Peacekeeping in Western
d’Ivoire.
Sahara
• Analyse the long-standing UN observation
mission in Western Sahara.
50
LESSON 3 | Peacekeeping in Western Africa
Peacekeepers from Burkina Faso serving with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
on patrol in Timbuktu, Mali. UN Photo #761104 by Harandane Dicko.
Introduction
As we saw in Lesson 1, Africa was the site of most
UN peacekeeping activity in the twenty-first century. This
lesson focuses on the missions that deployed to Western
Africa. These include those in the three Mano River States
of Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia between 1999
and 2018. This cluster of peacekeeping missions certainly
had their challenges, but compared to how the region
looked in the late 1990s, the situation was much improved
two decades later. The other mission analysed here is the
long-standing UN operation in the north-western territory
of Western Sahara, MINURSO, which has remained in place
since 1991. Lesson 7 discusses MINUSMA’s ongoing mission
in Mali since 2013 as one of the new UN stabilization
operations.
51
Section 3.1 Ending UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone

Lesson 2 analysed UN peacekeeping in Sierra Leone in some detail, but it is worth noting here how
and why UNAMSIL came to a relatively successful conclusion. In sum, the mission’s fortunes were
turned around by a series of interrelated developments during late 2000 and 2001 that effectively
ended the war. Adekeye Adebajo, Executive Director of the Centre for Conflict Resolution at the University
of Cape Town, and David Keen, Professor of Conflict Studies at the London School of Economics, neatly
summarized these developments: The first was the increasingly significant role of the Guinean armed
forces, sometimes in tandem with the local groups of Sierra Leonean hunters known as Kamajors, in
fighting the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) rebels.1 The second was the international efforts to
regulate Sierra Leone’s diamond trade, including the UN imposing sanctions on the country’s export.
The third important factor was international efforts to stop Liberian President Charles Taylor from giving
money and weapons to the RUF. UNAMSIL’s expanded size and its adoption of a clearer enforcement
mandate was the fourth factor. The fifth was the role UK forces played in effectively destroying the
rogue faction known as the West Side Boys as part of the operation to rescue British soldiers that had
been taken hostage by the group. And, finally, there were changes that took place within the RUF
leadership after the more moderate Isa Sesay replaced Foday Sankoh. By early 2002, the war was
officially brought to an end.
Figure 3-1: UNAMSIL Uniformed Personnel

Before its departure in December 2005, UNAMSIL disarmed and demobilized over 75,000
ex‑fighters, helped over 500,000 refugees and displaced persons to return home, facilitated national
elections, significantly improved the country’s police force — reform of the army had been led by the
at one-time nearly 600-strong International Military Assistance and Training Team — and helped repair
1) Adekeye Adebajo and David Keen, “Sierra Leone”, in United Nations Interventionism, 1991–2004, ed. Mats Berdal and Spyros Economides (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2007), 265–267.
52
infrastructure. A public opinion survey confirmed UNAMSIL’s positive impact, where nearly 100 per cent
of the 900 local respondents said the security situation had improved since UNAMSIL’s deployment, and
76 per cent said UNAMSIL had done a good or very good job.2
Finally, it is worth briefly noting what happened after the final UNAMSIL peacekeepers departed
Sierra Leone. In many respects, it is a textbook example of how the UN should continue its engagement
with a country after peacekeeping. In brief, UNAMSIL handed over to a small political and peacebuilding
mission known as the UN Integrated Office for Sierra Leone (UNIOSIL). With support from the new
UN Peacebuilding Commission, UNIOSIL’s job was to provide a different form of support to continue
peacebuilding and democracy consolidation efforts in post-war Sierra Leone. It had just under
100 international staff, including military liaison officers, police, and other civilians who provided
mentorship and training to the local security forces, as well as activities on a range of peacebuilding
and development-focused projects. In turn, in August 2008, UNIOSIL passed the baton to the UN
Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone (UNIPSIL). UNIPSIL’s roughly 70 staff supported the
implementation of peacebuilding projects, local governance reform initiatives, as well as those related
to human rights and the rule of law. When it departed in March 2014, UNIPSIL, in turn, passed on
responsibilities for engagement in Sierra Leone to the UN Country Team.
Section 3.2 UN Peacekeeping in Cote d’Ivoire

In Côte d’Ivoire, the UN deployed two operations (MINUCI and ONUCI) and maintained a continuous
peacekeeping presence between 2003 and 2017. MINUCI was a small observer mission, while UNOCI
was a multidimensional peacekeeping operation that peaked at over 11,000 uniformed personnel. Once
again, UNOCI involved “re-hatting” forces from an earlier ECOWAS mission (ECOMICI) and working
in parallel with a separate 4,000-strong French force known as Opération Licorne that was already
garrisoned in the country. UN peacekeepers were tasked with overseeing the implementation of the
Linas-Marcoussis Accords (January 2003), which sought a pathway to end Côte d’Ivoire’s civil war. This
took much longer than anticipated because the main conflict parties could not agree on when to hold
presidential elections. UNOCI entered into an unprecedented political territory for UN peacekeeping
when in late 2010, the Security Council played an important role in helping to eject the incumbent
President Laurent Gbagbo and install the winner of the election, his challenger Alassane Ouattara.
UN peacekeeping in Côte d’Ivoire aimed at ending the civil war there. In simplified terms, the civil
war stemmed from uncertainty about how to define citizenship and who had the right to vote. At its
heart was the controversial doctrine of Ivoirité, which held that certain groups could not claim to be
Ivoirian or enjoy citizenship rights. In 1994, then-President Henri Konan Bédié forced through a law
demanding candidates to prove that their parents were Ivoirian by origin. Bédié used this to disqualify
his principal challenger, Alassane Ouattara, on the grounds that his father was allegedly from Burkina
Faso. In 1999, General Robert Guéï launched a military coup against Bédié, pledging to move towards
a civilian and inclusive government. However, in the subsequent elections in 2000, Guéï suffered a
surprise defeat by Laurent Gbagbo and fled the country. Gbagbo then also used Ivoirité to discredit
Ouattara once again.
2) Jean Krasno, Public Opinion Survey of UNAMSIL’s Work in Sierra Leone (conducted January–February 2005) (New York: UN DPKO Best Practices Unit,
2005).
53
Figure 3-2: UNOCI Uniformed Personnel

In September 2002, the Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), led by disgruntled army officers
from marginalized groups in the country’s north, rebelled and quickly took charge there. It was joined
by other rebel groups to form the Forces Nouvelles led by Guillaume Soro. They demanded recognition
of their Ivoirian citizenship, an end to Ivoirité, and free and fair elections.
At Gbagbo’s request, in late 2002, ECOWAS and French troops who were garrisoned in Côte d’Ivoire
as part of a long-standing defence agreement established a peacekeeping force along a demilitarized
“zone of confidence” between the parties. The ECOWAS operation would eventually number some 3,000
troops. In May 2003, the Security Council established a small observer mission of fewer than 100
military observers (MINUCI) to help implement the deal reached in the January 2003 Linas-Marcoussis
Accords and confirmed in the Accra II agreement in March. After protracted French lobbying, in April
2004, the Security Council established a peacekeeping force (UNOCI), initially comprising some 5,000
uniformed personnel. This absorbed the ECOWAS peacekeepers and MINUCI personnel and operated
alongside French troops.
UNOCI would play a traditional interposition role between the conflicting parties. But it was also
mandated under Chapter VII to support the peace process, including by monitoring the ceasefire and
movements of armed groups; carrying out disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and
resettlement (DDRRR); protecting UN personnel, institutions, and civilians; supporting humanitarian
assistance; and strengthening law and order by supporting the police and judiciary. UNOCI troops tried
to reduce tensions by maintaining close contacts with both parties and working to preserve the integrity
of the zone of confidence. But it could not force the parties to respect the various peace deals, prevent
Gbagbo’s forces from attacking the Forces Nouvelles, or protect all civilians from periodic abuses. In
addition, its own movements were regularly obstructed.3
3) Alexandra Novosseloff, “UNOCI” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2015), 712.
54
UNOCI’s mandate to support the electoral process would see it deploy electoral advisers throughout
the country, although it would only complete its voter identification and registration work in November
2009.4 The DDRRR element of UNOCI’s work consistently took a backseat to its efforts to support
elections. Indeed, its DDRRR programme still did not start by 2011.5 The basic problem was that without
a resolution of the core issues relating to citizenship and voting rights, the Forces Nouvelles rebels were
unwilling to disarm.
In late 2004, tensions between France and

pro-Gbagbo forces escalated when a bombing
raid conducted by Ivoirian jets killed nine French
personnel. France retaliated by destroying
Gbagbo’s entire air force, seizing the key airport at
Yamoussoukro, and deploying heavy armour near
Gbagbo’s home. The political progress stagnated.
Although Gbagbo’s constitutional term ended in
October 2005, the planned elections were repeatedly
delayed. After much diplomatic wrangling, in 2007,
the Ouagadougou Agreement led to the formation
of a transitional government of national unity with
Guillaume Soro appointed as Prime Minister. The idea
was to hold national elections, resolve citizenship
disputes, and then withdraw UNOCI and French forces An officer of the disarmament, demobilization, and
reintegration programme (DDR) of UNOCI supervises
in phases.6 However, the elections were once again
the collection of weapons by UN peacekeepers and the
delayed. The reason, as Jean-Marie Guéhenno, former Republican Forces of Côte d’Ivoire. 1 February 2012. UN
Under-Secretary-General for Peace Operations, Photo #535676 by Basile Zoma.
observed, was “none of the key actors was willing to

let the election go ahead unless he was assured of
winning it”.7
In the end, the presidential elections were delayed a total of six times before the first round of
voting was held on 31 October 2010. Gbagbo won this round but without a sufficient majority to
avoid a run-off second vote, during which Bédié allied with Ouattara. Unsurprisingly, the results of the
presidential run‑off in November were disputed, thus reigniting the armed conflict between Gbagbo and
his challenger Ouattara. Gbagbo claimed an election victory, but so did Ouattara. In early December,
both men took an oath of office: Gbagbo before the Constitutional Council in Abidjan and Ouattara in
writing from the Golf Hotel, where UNOCI peacekeepers protected him.8 Gbagbo also demanded the
immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces, saying they were biased against him.
The stalemate was broken because ECOWAS, the African Union, the UN Secretary-General, and then
the Security Council (in resolution 1962) concluded that Ouattara had, in fact, won the elections. This
was crucial because it meant that Gbagbo was no longer viewed as the legitimate President, removed
4) Novosseloff, “UNOCI”, 713.

6) The agreement also saw the “zone of confidence” replaced by a UN-policed “green line”.
7) Jean-Marie Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press,
2015), 102.
55
any prospects of him participating in a power-sharing agreement, and legitimized economic sanctions
against his supporters.
But Gbagbo’s forces did not concede and now saw the peacekeepers as opponents. They subsequently
targeted UNOCI headquarters, patrols, and convoys, injuring several peacekeepers and killing one. In
response to the crisis, the Security Council used its inter-mission cooperation framework to redeploy
three infantry companies and an aviation unit from UNMIL to UNOCI temporarily and, in January 2011,
increased UNOCI’s authorized strength by 2,000 soldiers.9
As both sides turned to violence, fear grew of potential mass atrocities, and in Abidjan, Ouattara
remained confined to the Golf Hotel. In early January 2011, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
publicly called on Gbagbo to step down and indicated that any attempt to attack Ouattara or harass
UNOCI troops would be “unacceptable”. A stalemate ensued because Gbagbo would not concede defeat,
and Ouattara would not make fundamental concessions.
And so the war continued. In late February, the Forces Nouvelles seized two western towns,
Zouan‑Hounien and Bin-Houyé. In March, Gbagbo’s forces launched a major rocket attack on a
pro‑Ouattara part of Abidjan, leading UNOCI to state that “such an act, perpetrated against civilians,
could constitute a crime against humanity”.10 Meanwhile, Ouattara’s forces took several more western
towns and then, on 28 March, launched a general offensive. Both sides committed atrocities against
civilians along the way.
On 30 March, the Security Council unanimously passed resolution 1975. It recognized Ouattara
as President, condemned Gbagbo’s refusal to concede, and authorized UNOCI to “use all necessary
means” to protect civilians, including action to “prevent the use of heavy weapons against the civilian
population”. Ouattara’s forces reached Abidjan the following day. Most of Gbagbo’s army crumbled,
especially after UN and French helicopters attacked their camps and destroyed heavy weapons and
weapons stockpiles. Gbagbo’s forces made a last-ditch effort to attack the Golf Hotel and UN positions
on 9–10 April, but they were repelled.11 On 11 April, Gbagbo and members of his family were captured
after Ouattara’s troops, aided by French and UN forces, stormed his presidential residence. Gbagbo was
sent to the International Criminal Court on charges of crimes against humanity but was acquitted in
January 2019.
Critics of UNOCI’s actions, including former South African President, Thabo Mbeki, argued that the
UN had overstepped its authority by helping to oust Gbagbo.12 Then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
responded that UNOCI’s actions were “in line with its Security Council mandate” and taken “in self-
defence and to protect civilians”.13 There were also debates in the Security Council, with some members
expressing concern over how UNOCI’s mandate was interpreted.14 After staying on to help stabilize the
country after the 2010–2011 election crisis, UNOCI oversaw another presidential election in 2015, which
Ouattara won. The mission eventually left Côte d’Ivoire in June 2017. Interestingly, after UNOCI left,
9) Novosseloff, “UNOCI”, 714. The Security Council set up an inter-mission cooperation framework between UNMIL and UNOCI in resolution 1609 (24
June 2005).
10) “Ivory Coast Shelling in Abidjan a war crime – UN”, BBC News, 18 March 2011. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-12787015>.
12) Thabo Mbeki, “What the World Got Wrong in Côte d’Ivoire”, Foreign Policy, 29 April 2011. Available from: <https://foreignpolicy.com/2011/04/29/
what-the-world-got-wrong-in-cote-divoire/>.
13) Quoted in “Ivory Coast: UN Forces Fire on Pro-Gbagbo Camp”, BBC News, 4 April 2011. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-
africa-12960308>.
14) See: Alex J. Bellamy and Paul D. Williams, “The new politics of protection? Côte d’Ivoire, Libya and the responsibility to protect”, International Affairs,
Vol. 87, No. 4, 2011, 825–850.
56
Côte d’Ivoire was elected to the Security Council as a non-permanent member and, in 2018, deployed
several hundred of its own troops in the UN peace operation in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA).
Overall, UNOCI was generally effective at mitigating violence in Côte d’Ivoire and did so more
effectively when the Security Council increased its strength and resources.15 However, while the mission
tried to separate the conflict parties, it was not able to stop the war restarting in late 2010, when the
election crisis erupted. Ultimately, UNOCI and French forces helped consolidate Ouattara’s electoral and
subsequent military victory over Gbagbo. Arguably the most controversial issue during this period did
not concern UNOCI’s behaviour directly, but rather whether the Security Council was right to reject the
judgment of Côte d’Ivoire’s Constitutional Council concerning the outcome of the presidential election.
For UNOCI, arguably the main area of controversy was whether it could have done more to prevent and
punish massacres of civilians carried out by Ouattara’s forces.
Section 3.3 UN Peacekeeping in Liberia

The UN has deployed two peacekeeping operations to Liberia since the first of its two civil wars
started on Christmas Eve 1989. The first civil war took place between 1989 and 1997 and saw Charles
Taylor’s rebel National Patriotic Front of Liberia (NPFL) victorious despite the deployment of a large
ECOWAS Monitoring Group force (ECOMOG 1) designed to stop them. In this war, the UN deployed
a small monitoring mission (UNOMIL) composed of about 400 military and 100 international civilian
personnel to help monitor, verify, and report on violations of the 1993 Cotonou Agreement.16 UNOMIL
supported the larger ECOMOG force and ended up verifying the long-delayed but generally free and fair
national elections that brought Charles Taylor to the Liberian presidency in August 1997. At this point,
Taylor started filling the security forces with his loyalists, and UNOMIL prepared to depart.
During its DDR efforts in 1996–1997, UNOMIL helped disarm 20,332 fighters (of an estimated
total of 33,000), the UN Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Office demobilized 21,315 fighters,
and approximately 9,600 weapons and 1.2 million pieces of ammunition were surrendered.17 This
was significant, but as Kathleen Jennings, Researcher with St. Antony’s College at the University of
Oxford, noted, “it is hard to see the programme as anything other than inconsequential, at least from
a security standpoint”, given that armed conflict broke out again in 1998.18 This second civil war would
see the UN deploy a much larger peacekeeping operation, UNMIL, which at its peak composed of some
15,000 peacekeepers. This time, instead of facilitating Taylor’s ascent to the Liberian presidency, UN
peacekeepers facilitated the process of removing him. They stayed on to help stabilize the country after
Taylor was put on trial in Sierra Leone’s Special Court for crimes he had orchestrated in that country’s
civil war. However, renewed instability, reconstruction efforts, and then an Ebola epidemic saw UNMIL
remain in Liberia until 2018.
Charles Taylor won the 1997 election on a campaign pledge that if he were not elected president,
Liberia would return to civil war. As it turned out, within two years, two anti-Taylor rebel groups
emerged: the Mandingo-dominated Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy (LURD) and the
Krahn-dominated Movement for Democracy in Liberia (MODEL). Low-level fighting started in late 1999,
15) Lisa Hultman, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon, Peacekeeping in the Midst of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 143 and 148.
16) See: Kathleen Jennings, “UNOMIL” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
17) Jennings, “UNOMIL”, 458.
18) Jennings, “UNOMIL”, 458.
57
Figure 3-3: UNMIL Uniformed Personnel

and by 2003, the rebels were threatening Monrovia. In August 2003, ECOWAS mediation produced the
Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA), which involved Taylor’s resignation (and exile in Nigeria), the
creation of a National Transitional Government of Liberia, and plans for national elections in 2005.19
The ECOWAS Mission in Liberia (ECOMIL) initially supported the process, but this transitioned into a UN
peacekeeping force, UNMIL, from 1 October.
Security Council resolution 1509 mandated UNMIL to help implement the CPA, including by conducting
a disarmament, demobilization, repatriation, and reintegration (DDRR) programme, reforming the
security sector, and supporting national elections. The mission was also tasked to protect UN personnel
and civilians under imminent threat of physical violence and help extend State authority throughout
the country. UNMIL was ultimately given an authorized strength of just over 16,000 personnel. In
November 2005, it was also mandated to “apprehend and detain former President Charles Taylor in the
event of a return to Liberia and to transfer him or facilitate his transfer to Sierra Leone for prosecution
before the Special Court for Sierra Leone”.
Considered operationally effective by late March 2004, UNMIL’s early work prioritized the DDRR
programme. As Kathleen Jennings observed, the programme started badly and was suspended after
some ex-combatants rioted when they did not receive a cash payment immediately after handing
over their weapons. The rioting spread into Monrovia, killing nine people, and so the UN paused the
process in order to redesign it, “organize more cantonment camps, and await the deployment of
more peacekeepers”. Between its resumption in April 2004 and formal end in November 2004, UNMIL
disarmed about 102,000 fighters and demobilized about 92,000.20 The “reintegration and rehabilitation”
19) Jennings, “UNMIL”, 695.

20) Jennings, “UNMIL”, 696–697.
58
Peacekeepers of UNMIL’s Ghanaian battalion

participate in a medal parade in Buchanan,
Liberia, as Karin Landgren (standing left,
beneath gazebo), Special Representative of the
Secretary-General and head of UNMIL, watches.
16 November 2012. UN Photo #535017 by
Staton Winter.
dimensions ran until April 2009, but it is not clear that they made much difference to the ex-combatants
who completed them.21
After this, UNMIL focused primarily on supporting national elections, reforming the security sector,
and extending State authority across Liberia. On elections, UNMIL helped oversee and provide logistical
support and security for two national electoral processes in 2005 and 2011. Although turnout was
disappointingly below 40 per cent in the second round of voting in 2011, Ellen Johnson Sirleaf emerged
victorious on both occasions.22 Her administration enjoyed a relatively strong relationship with UNMIL,
certainly compared to the previous National Transitional Government of Liberia (NTGL), which was
factionalized and notoriously corrupt.23
On security sector reform, UNMIL took the lead on reforming Liberia’s police force. This was
predominantly a Monrovia-focused enterprise and did not start well, with the police performing poorly,
including in the run-up to the 2011 national elections when some officers had shot unarmed protesters.
Reform of the Liberian army was led by the United States, which contracted the job out to private firms,
notably, DynCorp and Pacific Architects and Engineers (PAE). This went reasonably well and eventually
enabled Liberia to deploy peacekeepers of its own to help other countries.
On helping extend State authority across Liberia, the main challenge was ensuring control of the
country’s big rubber plantations, some of which were illegally occupied until August 2009 by various
ex‑combatants from the war. The long process of repossession was put down due to the lack of desire to
force a major confrontation on the part of both the Liberian government and UNMIL.24
In terms of the mission’s composition, several aspects are worth briefly noting. First, UNMIL was
one of the early UN missions whose vanguard included “re-hatted” peacekeepers from a regional force
(ECOMIL), it was one of the first fully integrated UN missions, and it established a joint mission analysis
centre. UNMIL also employed a variety of Quick Impact Projects (QIPs) to build support for the peace
process and the mission among the local population. They included projects to repair schools, police
stations, courts, and border posts.

24) Jennings, “UNMIL”, 697–698.
59
In terms of special units, one notable inclusion was UNMIL’s quick reaction force (QRF). Composed
of an infantry battalion of about 450 Irish troops and a 230-strong Swedish mechanized company, the
QRF could deploy by land, air, or sea.25 On standby on 24-hours’ notice to respond to emergencies
in and around Monrovia, it was occasionally deployed to border areas where it engaged in “robust”
3- or 10-day patrols. Unlike the later Portuguese QRF in MINUSCA (see Lesson 7), it did not regularly
engage in offensive military operations.26 Its highlights included conducting a successful hostage rescue
operation against rebel forces in January 2004, quelling major riots in Monrovia in October 2004, and
transporting former President Taylor to face trial in the Special Court in Sierra Leone.27
UNMIL was also the first UN peacekeeping mission to receive an all-female FPU. India deployed the
first one in 2007, but Bangladesh soon followed suit, and the mission had all-female FPU until 2016. The
first Indian FPU comprised 105 female officers and 20 men who provided support services, including
cooking, driving, and maintaining the vehicles. The unit was tasked with helping to maintain law and
order and providing armed backup to the Liberian National Police.
In terms of major challenges beyond these mandated tasks, arguably the two biggest facing UNMIL
were issues concerning sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA) and the mission’s exit strategy. SEA was a
major problem for peacekeepers in Liberia, from both ECOWAS and the UN. After a poor start, UNMIL
improved its anti-SEA campaign under the leadership of Alan Doss (from mid-2005 until late 2007).28
Nevertheless, estimates of SEA remained high, particularly related to transactional sex. One study
concluded that UNMIL peacekeepers were “associated with a substantial and statistically significant
increase in the rate of entry [of Liberian women] into the transactional sex market”. Specifically, the
study estimated “that more than half of 18- to 30-year-old women in greater Monrovia have engaged
in transactional sex and that most of them (more than three-quarters, or about 58,000 women) have
done so with UN personnel, typically in exchange for money”.29
In terms of its exit strategy, UNMIL drew up benchmarks for its drawdown from 2006 based on
criteria related to security, governance and the rule of law, economic revitalization, and infrastructure
and basic services. As ever, security remained the priority.30 As the country stabilized, UNMIL’s personnel
were reduced steadily from 2008. After UNMIL was mandated to support the 2011 national elections
and these were held successfully, the mission continued its withdrawal. In late 2010 and 2011, the
mission was called on to provide some peacekeepers and helicopters to support the UNOCI mission in
neighbouring Côte d’Ivoire during the election crisis there. Interestingly, UNMIL’s numbers continued to
drop despite the outbreak of an Ebola epidemic in 2013, which saw the mission play various supportive
roles in international efforts to combat the disease.31 That epidemic also saw the deployment of missions
by the UN (UNMEER), African Union (ASEOWA) missions, and the United States (Operation United
Assistance).
25) The Irish troops in the QRF departed in mid-2007, passing their role to Pakistani soldiers.
27) Conor Lally, “Army’s UN mission in Liberia ends”, Irish Times, 1 June 2007. Available from: <https://www.irishtimes.com/news/army-s-un-mission-
in-liberia-ends-1.1208441>.
29) Bern Beber et al., “Peacekeeping, Compliance with International Norms, and Transactional Sex in Monrovia, Liberia”, International Organization, Vol.
71, No. 1, 2017, 3.
31) Michael Snyder, “What role for UN peacekeepers in tackling Ebola?” IPI Global Observatory, 8 September 2014. Available from: <https://
theglobalobservatory.org/2014/09/role-un-peacekeepers-unmil-tackling-ebola/>.
60
After the Ebola crisis, debate about the mission’s exit was partly about stability and preventing
organized violence, but there was also the question of the mission’s impact on the Liberian economy.32 In
general, UN peacekeeping missions are thought to encourage economic growth in host countries but of
a kind that is likely to recede when the mission departs.33 UNMIL not only increased demand for low‑skill
employment in the service sector but also its role in delivering stability “made the legal economy viable
again”.34 According to Samuel Thompson, Executive Director at Agency for Economic Development and
Empowerment, between 2003 and June 2018, UNMIL spent an estimated $551.8 million locally, or 7.4
per cent of its total related spending of $7.5 billion, mainly through mission subsistence allowances,
local procurement, and national staff salaries. In other words, UNMIL’s contribution to Liberia’s GDP
fluctuated between 11.2 per cent in 2004–2005 to 1.3 per cent in the fiscal year 2017–2018. This was
a problem for UNMIL’s transition because the services stimulated by the mission’s presence — including
stimulating an excess supply of high-end market housing, inflationary pressure on local wages, and a
loss of income taxes and leaking of duty-free goods into the local economy — risked collapsing when
it withdrew. This explained why some locals “did not want UNMIL to leave, despite a stable security
situation”.35
Overall, therefore, UNMIL was broadly successful in stabilizing the country, reducing major instances
of organized violence, facilitating elections, and helping to reform the security sector. The mission finally
withdrew from Liberia in March 2018.
Section 3.4 UN Peacekeeping in Western Sahara

The final peacekeeping operation analysed here is the long-standing but small UN observer mission
in Western Sahara, MINURSO. MINURSO has been deployed since 1991 to help implement the UN
Settlement Plan for Western Sahara to resolve the territorial dispute between Morocco and the Sahrawi
Arab Democratic Republic (SADR).36 The plan included a provision for a referendum on self‑determination
that could lead to independence. The fact that MINURSO remains active today demonstrates once
again the limits of peacekeeping operations when the conflict parties renege on their agreements.
Nevertheless, while the chances of MINURSO overseeing the planned referendum remain very small,
the mission has served a useful preventive function to stop the escalation of violence and reduce the
risk of renewed war between the parties.
In essence, MINURSO is one of the UN missions to manage the process of decolonization, somewhat
akin to UNMOGIP in Kashmir. In the case of Western Sahara, it stems from a dispute over who should
exercise authority over what the United Nations calls a non-self-governing territory after the end of
Spanish colonial occupation.
Armed conflict over Western Sahara started in late 1975 when the POLISARIO Front tried to eject
the Spanish colonists by engaging in small hit-and-run attacks.37 The legal basis for POLISARIO’s war
was the International Court of Justice (ICJ) ruling in October 1975 that there was no evidence “of
32) See, for example: Brooks Marmon, “Why the UN Can’t Leave Liberia Stability, Consistency, and the International Community”, Foreign Affairs online,
16 June 2016. Available from: <https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/liberia/2016-06-16/why-un-cant-leave-liberia>.
33) Bern Beber et al., “The Promise and Peril of Peacekeeping Economies”, International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 63, No. 2, 2019, 364–379.
34) Samuel Thompson, Assessing the Economic Impact of the Draw-Down of UNMIL on the Liberian Economy (Monrovia: Liberia Macroeconomic Policy
Analysis Center, 2018), 11. Available from: <www.limpac.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/11/Economic_Impact_of_Unmil_Final_Nov.pdf>.
35) Beber et al., “The Promise and Peril of Peacekeeping Economies”, 369.
36) The Plan was set out in UN documents S/21360 of 18 June 1990 and S/22464 of 19 April 1991.
37) Anna Theofilopoulou, “MINURSO” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
61
Figure 3-4: MINURSO Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2020

any legal tie of territorial sovereignty” between Western Sahara and Morocco, and consequently, the
decolonization of Western Sahara should proceed according to the principle of self-determination.38
Shortly after the ICJ ruling, the Madrid Accords ceded sovereignty of Western Sahara from Spain to
Morocco and Mauritania. Morocco then deployed some 350,000 civilians followed by troops into Western
Sahara in what was known as “the Green March”. Security Council resolution 380 (6 November 1975)
called upon Morocco to withdraw the Green March participants from the territory. Morocco ignored
this, and in January 1976, Moroccan and Mauritanian troops took over from the departing Spanish
administration, which was formally ended on 26 February 1976.39
POLISARIO announced the establishment of SADR in February 1976 and then fought both Moroccan
and Mauritanian troops. Mauritanian troops withdrew in 1978 after a military coup back home, and in
August 1979, Morocco took over the Mauritanian area of Western Sahara.40 In 1981, Moroccan forces
started building a great wall known as the berm. The berm would become increasingly fortified and
mined over time in order to create de facto Moroccan control over most of the territory.
In 1982, SADR made a significant diplomatic breakthrough when it was recognized as a Member
State of the Organization of African Unity (OAU). This prompted Morocco to leave the OAU two years
later, returning as a member of the African Union only in 2017. However, SADR was never recognized
as a member of the United Nations or the Arab Maghreb Union (founded in 1989), and its government
controlled only around 15 per cent of its claimed territory and generally operated in exile in Algeria.
It was not until August 1988, when Morocco and POLISARIO accepted, in principle, the idea of UN
engagement in the conflict that mediation efforts ramped up. In September, the UN Secretary-General
appointed a Special Representative for Western Sahara and asked him to submit a report on how to
38) Theofilopoulou, “MINURSO”, 326–327.
39) Theofilopoulou, “MINURSO”, 327.
40) Paul D. Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 128.
62
implement self-determination in this case. By 1991, the UN officially adopted its Settlement Plan for
Western Sahara. As Anna Theofilopoulou, a former United Nations Department for Political Affairs official
who covered Western Sahara from 1994 to 2006, summarized it, the Plan envisaged:
“the establishment of a ceasefire to be followed by a transition

period, during which the UN is to organize and conduct, in
cooperation with the OAU, a referendum to enable the people
of Western Sahara to choose freely, without administrative or
military constraints, between independence and integration
with Morocco. The ceasefire is to be followed by an exchange of
prisoners of war, a reduction of Moroccan forces in the territory
and confinement of combatants of both sides to specific
locations.… Following the proclamation of an amnesty, Saharan
political prisoners will be released. All laws and regulations that
might impede the holding of a free and fair referendum will be
suspended, as deemed necessary. Following the promulgation
of a general and complete amnesty for all refugees and others
outside the Territory who wish to return, they will be enabled
to do so by the UN, after the latter has established their right
to vote. A Special Representative will be appointed by the
Secretary-General in consultation with the current Chairman of
the OAU and with the consent of the parties to the conflict, who
will have sole and exclusive authority over all matters related to
the organization and holding of the referendum.”41
In 1991, the UN envisaged the Plan taking about 40 to 42 weeks to implement.
Although a peacekeeping force of around 2,000 troops was originally envisaged, this was never
deployed, and MINURSO instead comprised a few hundred military observers and small civilian and
police components.42 Since 2000, it has numbered around 200 military observers.
Initially, MINURSO’s key challenge was identifying the eligible voters in the planned referendum.
Of course, the conflict parties disagreed on the eligibility criteria: Whereas POLISARIO wanted those
residing in the territory to be granted referendum voter rights, Morocco wanted ethnicity to form the
eligibility basis. For three decades now, Morocco has refused to endorse a referendum with independence
as an option, while the UN and SADR will not endorse a plan that excludes independence. MINURSO,
therefore, spent its first five years trying to implement the identification process, but it made little
progress on this or any other elements of the Settlement Plan.
In 1997, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan concluded that the only way to break the stalemate
was to appoint a Personal Envoy: James A. Baker III, former US Secretary of State.43 Meanwhile,
MINURSO persisted with its voter identification, and in December 1999, it officially concluded that
out of 198,469 people identified, 86,387 were eligible to vote.44 Unfortunately, this did not lead to a

63
A member of MINURSO’s Military Liaison Office

chats with a group of local Western Saharans.
17 June 2010. UN Photo #440059 by Martine
Perret.
diplomatic breakthrough. MINURSO’s Identification Commission stopped its work in 2003 and handed
all peacemaking work over to the Secretary-General’s personal envoy. However, in 2004, Baker resigned
in frustration at the lack of progress. Danish diplomat Peter van Walsum (appointed July 2005), and
then-US diplomat Christopher Ross (in January 2009) succeeded Baker.
While the peacemakers came and went without success, MINURSO focused on supervising the
ceasefire, cooperating with the parties on demining, and helping with refugee issues.45 At times, there
were calls for MINURSO to engage in human rights monitoring in Western Sahara, but this was excluded
from relevant Security Council resolutions, largely due to French support for Morocco’s position.46
Violations of the ceasefire have been intermittent, and the lack of communications between the two
sides’ militaries did not help the situation. The most recent effort to persuade the parties to make
political progress came largely from John Bolton during his brief tenure as US National Security Adviser
in late 2018 and 2019. But this too dissipated after his removal.
As a result, by 2020, MINURSO remained trapped in a political stalemate not of its making.
Neither party would benefit from a renewed war, but they were not willing to break the stalemate.
In this sense, MINURSO serves the interests of both Morocco and SADR as a mechanism to prevent
renewed war by verifying allegations, allaying suspicions, remedying violations, and generally engaging
the parties to reduce tensions. MINURSO’s presence has almost certainly prevented incidents from
escalating and persuaded the parties that preventive attacks would be foolish. The mission also enables
Morocco and SADR to claim to outsiders that they are still working hard to resolve the conflict, despite
the overwhelming evidence to the contrary. Hence, while the chances of MINURSO conducting the
referendum are very small, it has served to prevent the escalation of armed conflict between the two
parties.

64
1. What was the first follow-on mission 5. In 2007, which country deployed the
that came after UNAMSIL peacekeepers first-ever United Nations all-female
left Sierra Leone in December 2005? Formed Police Unit in the UN Mission in
Liberia (UNMIL)?
A. UNIOSIL
B. UNMIL A. Bangladesh
C. UNOMIL B. India
D. UNIPSIL C. Nepal
D. Rwanda
2. In late 2010, the UN Mission in Liberia
(UNMIL) temporarily transferred _____ 6. In 2003, Liberian President Charles
to support the UN Mission in Côte Taylor was forced to resign and went
d’Ivoire (UNOCI). into exile in:
A. election monitors A. Sierra Leone
B. logistical equipment B. Nigeria
C. three infantry companies and an aviation C. Côte d’Ivoire
unit D. Switzerland
D. three infantry companies
7. Between 2003 and June 2018, the
3. In late 2004, tensions between France UN Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) was
and pro-Gbagbo forces escalated when a estimated to have spent $ _____ in the
bombing raid conducted by Ivoirian jets local Liberian economy?
killed nine French personnel. How did A. 551.8 million
French forces respond?
B. 751.8 million
A. They did not respond. C. 951.8 million
B. Bombing President Laurent Gbagbo’s home D. 1.151 billion
C. Arresting President Laurent Gbagbo
D. Destroying Gbagbo’s entire air force, 8. The territory of Western Sahara was
seizing the key airport at Yamoussoukro,
colonized by _____.
and deploying heavy armour near Gbagbo’s A. Spain

home B. Portugal
C. France
4. What happened to the former President
D. Belgium
of Côte d’Ivoire, Laurent Gbagbo, after
he was removed from power in April
9. In which year did the Sarahwi Arab
2011?
Democratic Republic become a member
A. He became a minister in a new transitional of the Organization of African Unity?
government. A. 1972
B. He went into exile. B. 1975
C. He remained in the country as the leader of C. 1982
the political opposition.
D. 1985
D. He was taken to the International Criminal
Court.
65
10. MINURSO serves the interests of

both Morocco and the Sarahwi Arab
Democratic Republic as a mechanism to
_____ by verifying allegations, allaying
suspicions, remedying violations, and
generally engaging the parties to reduce
tensions.
A. demine the territory
B. hold the referendum
C. stop the war
D. prevent renewed war
Answer Key »
1. A
2. C
3. D
4. D
5. B
6. B
7. A
8. A
9. C
10. D
66
LESSON
4 Peacekeeping in Eastern Africa
In the twenty-first
century, Eastern Africa
has been the most
intense region for UN
peacekeeping.
UN Photo #62133 by Martine Perret.
Section 4.1 UN Peacekeeping between • Summarize how UN peacekeepers tried to

Eritrea and Ethiopia support the peace processes designed to end
the war between Eritrea and Ethiopia and the
Section 4.2 UN Peacekeeping in Burundi
civil war in Burundi.
Section 4.3 The UN Mission in Sudan
• Analyse how UN peacekeepers helped
(UNMIS)
implement the 2005 Comprehensive Peace
Section 4.4 UN Peacekeeping in Chad and Agreement in Sudan.
the Central African Republic
• Analyse how UN peacekeepers supported the
Section 4.5 UN Peacekeeping in Abyei new State of South Sudan and responded
to the outbreak of the country’s civil war in
Section 4.6 UN Peacekeeping in South
December 2013.
Sudan
67
LESSON 4 | Peacekeeping in Eastern Africa
Peacekeepers from the Indian battalion of the United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE) serve food to local residents
after a competition organized by the battalion in Adigrat, Ethiopia. 8 February 2006. UN Photo #113702 by Rick Bajornas.
Introduction
In the twenty-first century, Eastern Africa has been the most intense
region for UN peacekeeping. Since 1999, the UN has deployed 10 new
peacekeeping operations in the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Burundi, Sudan,
Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, as well as the two
logistical support missions to help stabilize Somalia (UNSOA and UNSOS).
Lesson 2 analysed MONUC, while Lesson 7 on stabilization analyses
MONUSCO and MINUSCA. Lesson 8 on partnerships analyses the UNAMID
hybrid operation in Darfur as well as the UNSOA and UNSOS support
missions in Somalia. This lesson, therefore, provides an overview of the
UN peacekeeping operations between Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), in
Burundi (ONUB), Sudan (UNMIS), Chad and the Central African Republic
(MINURCAT), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Abyei, in the contested border
region between Sudan and South Sudan (UNISFA).
68
Section 4.1 UN Peacekeeping between Eritrea and Ethiopia

In July 2000, the UN deployed a small military observer force to help end the disastrous war
that erupted between Eritrea and Ethiopia in May 1998. UNMEE, as it was known, would monitor the
Temporary Security Zone (TSZ) between the two countries for nearly eight years before Eritrea expelled
the military observer force in 2008 for the force failing to implement the boundary commission ruling
over the contested international border.
The war started when Eritrean troops captured the Ethiopian-administered town of Badme. It
followed a falling out between the two leaders and former rebel comrades-in-arms Isaias Afwerki of
Eritrea and Meles Zenawi of Ethiopia. Despite mediation efforts by the United States, the OAU, and the
UN, the war raged for two years before the UN imposed an arms embargo, and the belligerents finally
decided on a ceasefire. Ethiopia gained the advantage militarily but at a huge cost: between 70,000 and
100,000 estimated dead with more than 1.2 million people displaced.1
After initially authorizing only 100 military observers (plus support staff), in September 2000,
Security Council resolution 1320 authorized up to 4,300 UN peacekeepers, many of whom were the
first-ever deployment of the Standby High Readiness Brigade. UNMEE’s mandate included monitoring
the ceasefire and the redeployment of both sides’ troops outside the TSZ as envisaged in the cessation
agreement. The plan was for UNMEE to help facilitate the delimitation and demarcation of the
Ethiopian‑Eritrean border, at which point the peacekeepers would leave. However, defining the TSZ
area took until June 2001 because of disputes between the belligerents on the TSZ location, and both
countries retained forces inside the TSZ. Eritrea also denied UNMEE freedom of movement outside of
the TSZ.2
Meanwhile, diplomacy persisted, and on 12 December 2000, the parties signed the Algiers
Agreement, agreeing to “terminate hostilities” and “refrain from the threat or use of force against the
other”; “release and repatriate” all prisoners of war; establish “a neutral Boundary Commission…to
delimit and demarcate” the disputed border; and establish “a neutral Claims Commission” to address
“the negative socio-economic impact of the crisis on the civilian population”.3
In April 2002, the Boundary Commission announced its decision on the delimitation of the border,
and the Security Council immediately expanded UNMEE’s mandate to include demining and other
assistance in support of the Boundary Commission’s demarcation activities. Initially, Ethiopia and
Eritrea both accepted this “April Decision”, but Ethiopia refused to allow UNMEE to implement it on the
ground. Ethiopia was particularly aggrieved that the Boundary Commission awarded control of Badme
to Eritrea. This supported Eritrea’s position that it went to war to defend its territory. The Boundary
Commission and the Security Council were unimpressed and passed several resolutions (1430, 1466,
1507, and 1531) that called for Ethiopia’s full cooperation on this issue. In November 2004, Ethiopia
finally accepted the Commission’s ruling in principle but would not demarcate the border accordingly in
practice.
1) Adekeye Adebjao, “Ethiopia/Eritrea” in The UN Security Council, ed. David Malone (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2004), 581.
2) Ian Martin, “Keeping the Peace: The UN Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea” in Unfinished Business: Ethiopia and Eritrea at War, ed. Dominique Jacquin-
Berdal and Martin Plaut (Trenton: Red Sea Press, 2004), 138–143.
3) UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Identical letters dated 12 December 2000 from the Permanent Representative of Algeria to the United
Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council, Letters to the Secretary-General and President of the Security
Council, A/55/686-S/2000/1183, 13 December 2000.
69
Figure 4-1: UNMEE Uniformed Personnel

Part of the problem was that the Boundary Commission did not physically demarcate the border, not
least because the area was heavily mined, and it faced significant obstruction from Ethiopia.4 Instead,
it only demarcated the boundary with reference to coordinates on a map. Ethiopia then adopted the
tautological argument that the Commission’s demarcation coordinates were “invalid because they are
not the product of a demarcation process recognized by international law”.5 One analysis accurately
summarized the situation by saying Eritrea clung “to the legitimacy of its position – backed by
international law”, while Ethiopia clung “to the leverage it has by virtue of the de facto situation on the
ground”.6
The lack of implementation increasingly frustrated Eritrea, which placed more restrictions upon
UNMEE, including by banning UN helicopter flights in its airspace, banning UNMEE from patrolling at
night, restricting its supply of diesel fuel, and hindering personnel movement. In late 2007, Eritrea
claimed that UNMEE was facilitating Ethiopia’s “occupation” of Eritrean territory.7 In February and March
2008, UNMEE decided the situation had become intolerable and relocated most contingents out of
Eritrea.
This led several members of the Security Council, including the United States, to advocate closing
down the mission. In April 2008, therefore, the Secretary-General outlined four options:
1. If Eritrea reconsidered its position, UNMEE could proceed with

its mission.
4) Paul D. Williams with Alex J. Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 3rd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2021), 146.
5) Cited in UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2008/40, 23 January 2008.
6) Security Council Report, “Update Report No. 5: Ethiopia-Eritrea”, 31 July 2008, 3. Available from: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/update-
report/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_4386219.php>.
7) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on Ethiopia and Eritrea, 5.
70
2. UNMEE could be terminated, leaving no UN peacekeepers in the

area.
3. A small observer mission could be deployed in the border area.
4. Liaison offices could be established in Asmara and Addis

Ababa to maintain UN readiness to assist the parties in the
implementation of the Boundary Commission’s decision should
they agree to proceed with the physical demarcation of the
border.8
Shortly afterwards, both States refused all of the options, promoting the Security Council to
terminate UNMEE, effective from 31 July 2008.
Section 4.2 UN Peacekeeping in Burundi

In May 2004, UN peacekeepers became part of the peace process to end Burundi’s long-running
civil war, which had killed several hundred thousand people between 1993 and 2005. Although the UN
had a small political office in Burundi since 1993, called UNOB, the organization deferred to African‑led
mediation efforts, spearheaded by Tanzania and then South Africa. UN peacekeepers arrived after both
South Africa and the African Union had deployed their own soldiers to help stabilize the situation.
Specifically, the roughly 5,700 uniformed peacekeepers who comprised the UN Operation in Burundi
(ONUB) were required to help implement the Arusha Peace and Reconciliation Agreement signed on 28
August 2000 by 18 different Burundian political parties. Earning the nickname “the little mission that
could”, ONUB successfully facilitated a series of elections and helped reform Burundi’s security sector
before being forced out of the country by President Pierre Nkurunziza’s new government at the end of
2006.9
The Arusha Agreement envisaged UN peacekeepers would monitor the ceasefire. However, continued
fighting meant that instead, South Africa deployed a unilateral Protection Support Detachment of
some 750 troops in October 2000 to protect Hutu leaders returning from exile to join the Transitional
Government. This was followed in April 2003 by an African Union peacekeeping mission (African Union
Mission in Burundi, or AMIB), which deployed nearly 3,000 troops from Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
South Africa, on the understanding that the UN would take over in 12 months. By September, it was
clear that the AU mission was struggling financially and required considerable support from the US and
UK. In December, South African Vice-President Jacob Zuma told the Security Council that conditions
were conducive to “re-hat” AMIB, and the UN Secretariat began working out the modalities for a new
UN peacekeeping operation.10 This would include “re-hatting” some 2,600 AMIB troops into ONUB as
well as absorbing UNOB staff.11
On 21 May 2004, Security Council resolution 1545 authorized ONUB to undertake ceasefire monitoring
and implementation, DDR, promotion and protection of human rights, security sector reform, monitor
8) Cited in Williams with Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 147.

9) Stephen Jackson, ONUB: Political and Strategic Lessons Learned (New York: UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations, 2006), 26. Available from:
<https://reliefweb.int/report/burundi/independent-external-study-onub-political-and-strategic-lessons-learned>.
10) Jackson, ONUB, 7.
11) Arthur Boutellis, “ONUB” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 733.
71
Figure 4-2: ONUB Uniformed Personnel

of arms flow across national borders (in cooperation with MONUC in the DRC), support of the electoral
process, creation of conditions for delivery of humanitarian assistance, and protection of civilians under
imminent threat of physical violence.
ONUB had to act quickly because the Arusha Agreement had set a deadline of 31 October 2004
for Burundi to complete its transition period and adopt a new constitution. The mission focused on
facilitating the relevant elections and making progress on DDR and security sector reform (SSR).
The war increased the number of fighters across the country. With an estimated 70,000 security
forces (army and police), the goal was to cut that number in half.12 AMIB started the DDR process,
which brought in fighters from the bush for cantonment.13 Fortunately, World Bank funds supported
the demobilization and reintegration of about 23,000 ex-combatants and the reinsertion payments for
some 28,000 civilian militias.14 As disputes arose in DDR and SSR issues, ONUB helped resolve them
through the Joint Ceasefire Commission chaired by the mission’s Force Commander. There were still
delays with SSR, however. The main reason, as Stephen Jackson, former head of Office for the Deputy
Special Representative of the Secretary-General for MONUC, noted, was that “[c]ontrol of the army was
long the bedrock of Tutsi dominance in the country and so reform of the army has very major political
implications”.15 It was not until December 2004 that Burundian legislators established a new Burundi
National Defence Force, National Police, and Intelligence Service. They comprised 50:50 ethnic quotas
as set out in the Arusha Agreement.
At times, ONUB had to deal with significant violence. Mostly, this stemmed from armed groups that
were not signatories to the Arusha Agreement. The main one was The National Forces of Liberation
12) Boutellis, “ONUB”, 735.

72
(FNL), an ethnically-Hutu rebel group whose roughly 3,000 fighters continued the war until a ceasefire
agreement in September 2006. Not only did the FNL sometimes attack civilians, but the Burundian
security forces also committed serious human rights abuses.16 The most notorious episode was the
Gatumba massacre of August 2004, where FNL fighters massacred more than 150 Banyamulenge
(Congolese Tutsi) refugees at the Gatumba camp. This considerably complicated the efforts of the UN to
try and bring the FNL into the peace process.17
As well as conducting DDR, ONUB had to register the armed groups as political parties ahead of the
holding of peaceful elections. This was because former rebel movements had to disarm in order to qualify
for formal recognition as political parties.18 After some delay, Burundi’s series of electoral processes
were conducted in a six-month period starting in February 2005. ONUB provided considerable support
for these elections, including by delivering election materials, raising public awareness, and providing
civic education. ONUB helicopters even airlifted ballot boxes to some remote hilltop polling stations.19
First came the constitutional referendum, then the communal, legislative, senatorial, presidential, and
“collinaires” (“hillside”) elections. Turnouts were very high, averaging around 90 per cent, and there
was relatively little violence.20 The transitional process was concluded in August 2005 after Nkurunziza
became Burundi’s first democratically elected leader since 1993.
Soon after Nkurunziza’s victory, his government requested that the UN withdraw its military
peacekeepers, and then terminate the mission completely.21 Diplomatic arguments took place mainly
behind the scenes, and it was eventually agreed that ONUB would withdraw by the end of 2006, and
a small Integrated Office in Burundi (BINUB) would replace it to transition the focus of the UN in the
country from peacekeeping to development.
Overall, ONUB has been credited with playing a significant role in “implementing a complex and
multi-faceted political agreement” and representing “a model of what can be accomplished by the United
Nations when mandate, resources, regional goodwill and the good faith of national actors align”.22 It
is also credited with providing useful mediation advice and technical support as well as good offices to
the African regional mediation efforts.23 Arguably the major source of criticism it received from local
Burundians related to allegations of sexual exploitation and abuse, which still occurred despite ONUB
being the first UN peacekeeping operation to establish a Conduct and Discipline Unit.24
Section 4.3 The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS)

The UN first started peacekeeping in Sudan to help end Africa’s longest-running civil war.
Specifically, the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) was mandated to help implement the Comprehensive
Peace Agreement (CPA) signed in January 2005 between the Sudanese government and the rebel
Sudan People’s Liberation Movement (SPLM). Although UNMIS ended in 2011, it turned out to be the
first of four UN peacekeeping operations deployed in Sudan and later South Sudan. The second was
the hybrid UNAMID operation deployed in Darfur in 2008, which was followed in mid-2011 by UNISFA

19) Jackson, ONUB, 18–19.
73
in the contested region of Abyei and UNMISS in the new State of South Sudan. By mid-2020, UNAMID,
UNISFA, and UNMISS were all still operating.
Mediated principally by the Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD), the CPA was the
name given to a linked set of six protocols signed between 2002 and 2004, altogether running to over
200 pages. Its signatories were the ruling National Congress Party and the SPLM; other opposition
political parties were notably absent. The CPA was intended to shape the future governance arrangements
for Sudan over a six-year timetable, including by holding national elections scheduled for July 2009
initially. But it also contained a provision for a referendum on southern independence, slated for January
2011. In a country as complex as Sudan, it was not surprising that the devil was in the CPA’s details,
which actually addressed seven distinct governance systems with different arrangements for the south,
Abyei, the States of Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile, Khartoum State, Darfur, the remaining
Northern States, and for the east of the country.25 While the CPA stated that the Sudanese should use
the interim period to “make unity attractive”, and although John Garang, the SPLM leader at the time
the CPA was signed, articulated a vision of a “New Sudan” as a united and democratically reformed
country, many of his followers in the SPLM remained strong supporters of southern independence. On
30 July 2005, however, Garang, who was the first Vice-President of Sudan and the President of Southern
Sudan, died in a helicopter crash, and almost immediately, any serious hope of maintaining a united
Sudan vanished.
Figure 4-3: UNMIS Uniformed Personnel

The CPA explicitly requested international support and a “UN Peace Support Mission”, principally to
help redeploy the opposing armies, create Joint Integrated Units (containing soldiers from both sides),
reform the security sector, and hold elections. To that end, in June 2004, the UN established its Advance
Mission in Sudan (UNAMIS). This was a small political mission to pave the way and develop modalities
25) While a simultaneous referendum was supposed to be held in Abyei, the areas of South Kordofan and the Blue Nile, where segments of the population
had strong ties to the south, were to hold “popular consultations” to determine how CPA provisions might be implemented.
74
for the subsequent peacekeeping operation, UNMIS.

Originally, the UN Secretariat conceived of UNMIS
as a Chapter VI observer mission.26 But that was
not what the Security Council authorized in March
2005. Instead, the UNMIS mandate dealt with the
outstanding disagreements between the government
of Sudan and the SPLM, internal divisions within the
government and SPLM, as well as helping to manage
other sources of armed conflict that could destabilize
the country.27
In the end, the proposed mandate for UNMIS

covered four broad areas:
1. Good offices and political support for the

peace process; Two men sit outside a shop in Tali, as UNMIS prepares
the people for the referendum of self-determination in
Southern Sudan. A poster of the upcoming referendum
2. Security aspects;
is seen in the background. 2 January 2011. UN Photo
#459859 by Tim McKulka.
3. Governance; and
4. Humanitarian assistance and development.
Specifically, Security Council resolution 1590 (24 March 2005) authorized UNMIS to support the
implementation of the CPA by, inter alia, monitoring the ceasefire and the redeployment of forces;
assisting the DDR programme, restructuring and training the police service, promoting the rule of law
and human rights, and conducting elections and referenda; facilitating the voluntary return of refugees
and internally displaced persons and humanitarian assistance; assisting the parties in the mine action
sector; promoting human rights; and protecting civilians from imminent threats of physical violence.28
The mandate would later expand to support the implementation of the Darfur Peace Agreement signed
in May 2006, the Ndjamena Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement, and the African Union Mission in Sudan
(AMIS).
At its peak, UNMIS was authorized over 10,500 uniformed personnel. But the mission’s actual
deployment was slow, taking until September 2006 to fully deploy its military component.29 This was
partly down to the usual force generation headaches, but in this case, the Sudanese government also
made life difficult by dragging its feet on the allocation of land for UNMIS team-sites, customs clearance
for UN goods, visa delays, and making specific demands of certain contributing countries.30 Indeed,
UNMIS no sooner reached its authorized strength when the Security Council expanded its mandate
to cover Darfur and authorized more peacekeepers. Getting involved in the war in Darfur not only
stretched UNMIS capabilities but also produced more tension with the Sudanese government, which
26) Victoria Holt and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly, Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping Operations (New York: United Nations OCHA,
2009), 332.
27) Holt and Taylor, Protecting Civilians, 318.
28) “Inter alia” means “among other things”.
30) Wibke Hansen, “UNMIS” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 744.
75
was exemplified by the expulsion of Jan Pronk, head of UNMIS, in October 2006 after he had criticized
the Sudanese army in his personal blog.31
As its operations progressed, UNMIS faced several key challenges. The one that attracted the most
attention was arguably related to its mandate to protect civilians. This was complicated by two main
factors: First, civilians faced numerous threats of physical violence across Sudan, and second, because
the mission’s personnel were not clear on how to interpret and implement such a mandate.32 On the
first point, civilians faced not only a range of threats, including deliberate attacks from the armed forces
of both parties to the CPA, but also intercommunal forms of violence, such as deadly cattle-raiding and
other forms of pastoralist conflicts, and the marauding attacks of the Lord’s Resistance Army, which
often operated in parts of Sudan. A couple of examples will suffice.
In early 2006, following multiple attacks on civilians by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), UNMIS
replied by stating that stopping such attacks was “beyond its capabilities, especially given its force size,
configuration, and other responsibilities”.33 This was not an unreasonable claim given that UNMIS had an
average of one armed soldier per 121 kilometre-squared or per 2,000 citizens.34 The mission also noted
that the CPA “expressly states that the parties to the Agreement would assume full responsibility for
dealing with foreign armed groups”.35
It also proved very difficult for UNMIS to prevent civilians from being killed when the CPA signatories
engaged in fighting, as occurred in November 2006, when at least 150 people were killed in the fighting
between the Sudanese army and the SPLA in Malakal in southern Sudan. Arguably the largest-scale
fighting occurred in May 2008, when government and allied irregular forces drove the SPLM out of
Abyei, causing the town’s entire population of some 30,000 people to flee for their lives as homes were
looted and burned. One of the decimated villages was “within 45 metres of the UNMIS compound”.36
In response, two UN inquiries concluded that the Zambian UNMIS contingent in Abyei did all that could
reasonably be expected with its limited numbers, including by evacuating over 100 civilians who fled to
their base.37
Violence in Darfur was also a major problem, but here, UNMIS played a lesser role once the UN-AU
hybrid operation (UNAMID) was deployed in 2008. UNMIS would play its main role there by supporting
the AU High-Level Panel on Darfur (established in 2008 to bring accountability, peace, and reconciliation
to the region) and other conflict parties through its good offices, as well as providing technical advice
and logistical support.38
UNMIS fared better on the more traditional aspects of its mandate. One of these was its work
on ceasefire monitoring, where UNMIS personnel joined the various commissions that brought the
Sudanese army and SPLA together and participated in joint monitoring teams with the parties.39 Even
here, however, UNMIS was frequently impeded by the conflict parties because they disagreed on what
constituted the “ceasefire zone” to be monitored by UN peacekeepers.40
31) Hansen, “UNMIS”, 745.

32) For a detailed analysis of how UNMIS interpreted and practised its civilian protection mandate, see: Holt and Taylor, Protecting Civilians, 315–336.
35) Cited in Conor Foley, UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Protection of Civilians (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2017), 302.
76
It was also reasonably successful regarding electoral support. UNMIS played a major supporting
role in completing the country’s population census in April 2008, and this helped pave the way for
the national elections. Although these were held in April 2010 instead of 2009, they were the first
multiparty elections in over two decades. Unsurprisingly, the incumbent regime won comfortably.41 After
the elections, UNMIS focused on facilitating credible referendums in southern Sudan and Abyei and
supported popular consultations in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile. The referendum on southern
independence was held in 2011 amidst relative peace. It was not surprising that the overwhelming
majority (about 99 per cent) voted for independence, but the fact that this clear result was accepted by
all sides constituted a major success for UNMIS. In contrast, the scheduled referendum in Abyei was not
held (even to this day), and there were a series of obstacles put in the way of implementing the popular
consultation processes in Southern Kordofan and the Blue Nile.
Tensions over the referendum in Abyei were particularly high, not only because of the rights of its
inhabitants but also because it is the site of significant amounts of oil and lies on the contested border
between Sudan and South Sudan. Whoever could establish de facto control of this area would thus
gain major leverage in the debates about the production and export of oil, the main source of revenue
for both CPA parties. Major fighting between the Sudanese army and SPLA occurred once more in
Abyei in May 2011. This time the Zambian contingent did not adequately respond.42 The result was the
establishment of a new UN peacekeeping operation known as the UN Interim Security Force in Abyei
(UNISFA), which Section 4.5 analyses below.
Overall, Wibke Hansen, head of the Analysis Division at the Center for International Peace Operations,
issued an accurate verdict: “With regard to the CPA, UNMIS successfully supported its implementation
where the parties had come to an agreement.”43 Where there was disagreement, UN peacekeepers could
do little to force the hand of the conflict parties. In the end, the UN offered to keep UNMIS going after
the referendum and subsequent creation of South Sudan, but the government in Khartoum ended the
mission. However, in the UN Secretary-General’s final report on UNMIS in May 2011, he suggested that
a new mission could “facilitate peace consolidation in the new State of South Sudan” and that protection
of civilians should be one of its “core activities”.44 This was to prove very prescient in the history of the
UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS), discussed in Section 4.6 below.
Section 4.4 UN Peacekeeping in Chad and the Central African

Republic
Between 2007 and 2010, UN peacekeepers were deployed to the eastern border region of Chad and
the northernmost part of the Central African Republic (CAR) that borders Sudan. They were deployed
in the UN mission in CAR and Chad (MINURCAT), primarily to deal with some of the spillover effects
of the ongoing war in Darfur, Sudan. These regions not only received major numbers of refugees and
displaced persons but also were caught up in the long-standing proxy wars whereby the regimes in
these countries fuelled rebel groups in neighbouring States.
41) Hansen, “UNMIS”, 745–746.

42) Hansen, “UNMIS”, 748. See, for example: David Smith, “UN admits peacekeepers failed in Sudan clashes”, The Guardian, 6 June 2011. Available
from: <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2011/jun/06/un-admits-sudan-peacekeepers-failure>.
44) Cited in Foley, UN Peacekeeping Operations, 305.
77
Figure 4-4: MINURCAT Uniformed Personnel

In the history of twenty-first-century UN peacekeeping, MINURCAT was notable for several reasons.
Not only was it the first UN peacekeeping mission focused almost solely on civilian protection, but it
was also the first to use UAV (unmanned aerial vehicles) surveillance to implement that mandate, and
it was the first time that the new United Nations Standing Police Capacity deployed to a field operation.
MINURCAT was also rare because it integrated security forces from the host State of Chad into its
operations. Finally, it was another UN peacekeeping operation that a host government ejected.
After the war in Darfur began in earnest in 2003, the eastern border region of Chad was deeply
entangled in its dynamics. MINURCAT was one of the peacekeeping missions the UN used to respond, in
addition to UNMIS (see Section 4.3) and UNAMID (see Lesson 8).
MINURCAT’s origins lie in the displacement crisis affecting the region, which, by 2007, saw an
estimated 242,600 refugees from Sudan, 46,200 from CAR, and 178,900 internally displaced locals.45 In
mid-2006, this situation prompted the Chadian government to ask the UN for support to deal with the
displacement camps. Chad then signed a memorandum of understanding with UNHCR for the deployment
of 235 Chadian gendarmes to 12 refugee camps in eastern Chad. On 31 August 2006, Security Council
resolution 1706 that established UNMIS had also called for “a multidimensional presence…to monitor
transborder activities of armed groups along the Sudanese borders with Chad and the Central African
Republic”.46
Initially, the Chadian government was adamant that it did not want foreign troops on its soil, but this
changed when French diplomacy persuaded the government to accept a peacekeeping presence that
could help with the humanitarian crisis.47 As a result, Security Council resolution 1778 (25 September
45) John Karlsrud, “MINURCAT I and II” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
46) Karlsrud, “MINURCAT I and II”, 791.
47) Karlsrud, “MINURCAT I and II”, 792 and 798.
78
2007) authorized MINURCAT as a largely civilian mission that would be protected by a European Union
military force. It deployed in early 2008 with a mandate to protect civilians in danger, including refugees
and displaced persons, and facilitate the delivery of humanitarian aid. The EU force was initially mandated
as a kind of “bridging operation” for one year “to establish a safe and secure environment” for the displaced
and MINURCAT personnel.48 MINURCAT would operate
primarily in eastern Chad, but about 300 troops
would also operate in north-eastern CAR because of
the refugee movements there too.49 In September
2008, the Security Council extended MINURCAT’s
mandate to include facilitating the regional peace
process, and in January 2009, MINURCAT was told to
engage in intercommunal dialogues in eastern Chad.
It was also granted its own military component to
take over from the EU force, which duly occurred in
March, when some 2,200 of the European forces “re-
hatted” into the UN mission.50 Although MINURCAT I
and II were authorized 4,300 and 5,200 uniformed
personnel, respectively, only about 3,000 actually
Engineers from MINURCAT erect a tent that serves as
deployed. MINURCAT also participated in inter-
a post for the Détachement Intégré de Sécurité, in Goz
mission cooperation with UNAMID (Darfur), UNMIS Amer, in the Goz Beïda region of Eastern Chad. This
(Sudan), MONUC (the DRC), and the United Nations provides security for internally displaced persons and
refugees in the area. 25 November 2008. UN Photo
Peacebuilding Support Office in the Central African
#354944 by Olivia Grey Pritchard.
Republic (BONUCA).51
MINURCAT was a rare UN peacekeeping operation because its civilian and police components
were protected by a linked EU force, but more extraordinary was the nearly 1,000-strong Chadian
gendarme unit that was integrated into its police component.52 Known as the DIS (Détachement Intégré
de Securité), they were trained, mentored, and equipped (with vehicles, uniforms, and side-arms) by
MINURCAT to build local capacity to deal with the crisis.53 As the UN Secretary-General had put it, the
DIS “would assume exclusive law enforcement responsibility in carefully defined jurisdictions, centred on
refugee camps and surrounding concentrations of internally displaced persons and associated towns”.54
The DIS was funded through a MINURCAT Trust Fund, with the EU contributing 10 million euros by the
end of 2007.55
MINURCAT had to cover a huge territory that had very little official government presence from either
the Chadian or CAR authorities. This is partly why the mission needed UAV as authorized in resolution
1706. Some of the “re-hatted” EU troops also had UAV, which MINURCAT used.56 Another related
challenge was banditry, some of it by heavily armed groups. MINURCAT’s European military component
48) See: Hylke Dijkstra, “The Military Operation of the EU in Chad and the Central African Republic”, International Peacekeeping, Vol. 17, No. 3, 2010,
395–407.
50) Dijkstra, “The Military Operation of the EU”, 403.
54) Cited in Karlsrud, “MINURCAT I and II”, 794–795.
55) Dijkstra, “The Military Operation of the EU”, 399.
79
was not configured to deal with this challenge.57 Yet, when the mission asked for FPUs to help deal with
bandits, the request was declined.58 It was usually the DIS that got involved in firefights and ambushes,
resulting in several fatalities, whereas the UN peacekeepers seldomly confronted bandits.59
Overall, MINURCAT helped improve a difficult situation. Ultimately, however, the mission was ejected
from Chad because the government concluded that it was unlikely to get much more funding, and the
DIS was capable of performing MINURCAT’s tasks.60 In March 2010, therefore, the Chadian government
informed the UN that it no longer needed MINURCAT to protect civilians in eastern Chad. MINURCAT was
subsequently withdrawn on 31 December.61
Section 4.5 UN Peacekeeping in Abyei

On 27 June 2011, the UN established its Interim Security Force in Abyei (UNISFA). This was designed
to help implement the unfinished parts of Sudan’s 2005 Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA) that
applied to Abyei. Specifically, the CPA set out a procedure for determining Abyei’s status, whereby the
region would have a six-year interim period with special administrative status and then would hold a
referendum in 2011 to decide whether it would remain part of Sudan or join the new State of South
Sudan. UNISFA was tasked to help demilitarize the area and build confidence between the conflict
parties so that they could finally hold that referendum. UNISFA remains active today because the
proposed referendum has still not taken place.
Figure 4-5: UNISFA Uniformed Personnel

57) Dijkstra, “The Military Operation of the EU”, 401–402.

80
Abyei was strategically significant not only because it straddled the contested border between
Sudan and South Sudan, but also because it was the site of significant oil production. Hence, the
governments in Sudan and South Sudan were both keen to have Abyei fall under their jurisdiction.
Moreover, determining the inhabitants of Abyei for the purposes of a referendum was also difficult
because the region was populated by two groups of cattle herders: the Ngok (a Dinka sub-group), who
permanently reside in Abyei, and the nomadic Arab Misseriya, “who consider seasonal access to pasture
and water a customary right”.62
Just prior to UNISFA’s arrival, in May 2011, major fighting occurred between the SPLA and the
government of Sudan. It left the Sudanese army and Misseriya militias in charge of Abyei town and
the north of the region. SPLA troops massed in the south, and over 100,000 civilians were forcibly
displaced.63 On 20 June, the “Agreement on Temporary Arrangements for the Administration and
Security of the Abyei Area” was signed. This provided the basis for UNISFA’s mandate by calling for the
demilitarization of Abyei, the creation of a joint administration and police service, the return of refugees,
and a UN force to monitor the ceasefire.64 As discussed in Section 4.3, UNISFA was needed because the
Khartoum government refused to extend UNMIS, which had previously deployed peacekeepers in Abyei,
and because the region was not part of South Sudan and hence did not fall under the UNMISS area of
operations (see Section 4.6).
Security Council resolution 1990 mandated UNISFA to monitor the ceasefire in and ensure the
demilitarization of Abyei, protect civilians, provide demining assistance, facilitate the delivery of
humanitarian aid, strengthen the capacity of the Abyei Police Service, provide security for oil infrastructure
in Abyei (when necessary and in cooperation with the Abyei police), and provide protection to a border
verification and monitoring mechanism. To achieve these goals, the mission was granted a maximum
authorized strength of about 5,300 military personnel.
Uniquely for a UN peacekeeping operation, almost all of the troops were supplied by one country:
Ethiopia. Ethiopia’s principal reason for doing so was to prevent the conflict in Abyei from escalating
and spilling over to undermine its own security.65 Its proximity to Abyei also enabled rapid deployment
of peacekeepers by road. As a result, UNISFA operations started on 8 August, and patrolling began
later that month. It was also useful that UNISFA took over some existing UNMIS facilities and Ethiopian
troops were willing to live in temporary tents that were below the normal standard for UN missions.66
In December 2011, Security Council resolution 2024 broadened UNISFA’s mandate to include force
protection and logistical support for the joint border verification and monitoring mission (JBVMM),
which was supposed to monitor 2,100 kilometres of the international border between Sudan and South
Sudan.67
UNISFA faced a number of challenges. One complicating factor was that in 2011, the Ngok had
established a civilian administration for Abyei with close ties to the new government of South Sudan.
62) Øystein H. Rolandsen, “Trade, peace-building and hybrid governance in the Sudan-South Sudan borderlands”, Conflict, Security & Development, Vol.
19, No. 1, 2019, 84.
63) Holger Osterreider et al., “UNISFA” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
64) Osterreider et al., “UNISFA”, 820.
65) Solomon Dersso, “Contributor Profile: Ethiopia”, Providing for Peacekeeping, 28 November 2017, 4. Available from: <http://providingforpeacekeeping.
org/profiles/>.
81
However, the United Nations did not formally recognize this, and UNISFA did not permit South Sudan
police to operate there.68
Another problem was landmines, which littered the area of operations and sometimes directly
affected the peacekeepers. In August 2011, for example, a mine killed four Ethiopian soldiers and
wounded seven others.69 UNISFA subsequently partnered with the UN Mine Action Service (UNMAS) to
work on demining and removing unexploded ordnance, in part for its own safety, but also to facilitate
refugee return. By December 2013, some 81,000 out of a total of 100,000 refugees returned.70
A third challenge for UNISFA was to enable commerce without sparking violence. One potential
flashpoint was the Amiet market, a major site for commercial activities for all parties. UNISFA
established a station in the market, conducted patrols, monitored the access roads, and tried to protect
people travelling from Abyei to Diffra. With local chiefs, UNISFA also established a security committee
to provide additional policing capacity. This included UNISFA providing training and vehicles but no
weapons or communications equipment; hence, such groups could not adequately defend themselves
from militia attacks.71 Nevertheless, violent incidents sometimes occurred. In July 2017, for example,
the market had to be temporarily closed until Ngok and Misseriya leaders reached an agreement.
Overall, however, UNISFA’s efforts to keep the peace worked relatively well, certainly compared
to the earlier UNMIS mission. Abyei was mostly demilitarized except for a 200-strong detachment of
Sudanese oil police that ostensibly protected the oil fields in Diffra. Major clashes were also reduced
dramatically. Nevertheless, UNISFA could not stop all violence between Dinka and Misseriya and other
armed groups. The most serious for UNISFA arguably occurred in May 2013, when Misseriya fighters
killed a Ngok Dinka paramount chief while he was touring the north of Abyei with UN peacekeepers.72
Ensuring stable peace was made more difficult because of the lack of an effective Abyei administration
and the failure to establish the envisaged joint institutions, including the Abyei Police Service. The
closest UNISFA got was in late 2017, when the mission planned where it might place police stations,
prison centres, and a hospital in the event that the police service was actually established.73
By early 2020, the political transitions in Sudan and the new government of national unity in South
Sudan held out some small room for optimism that Abyei might finally have its status clarified.
Section 4.6 UN Peacekeeping in South Sudan

The final peacekeeping operation discussed here is the UN Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS).
Initially deployed in July 2011, it comprised just under 8,000 uniformed personnel to help stabilize
the new State, create the conditions for development, and assist in the protection of civilians. UNMISS
operated according to this plan for 30 months, dealing with a range of low-intensity conflicts and a
humanitarian crisis, all in a State without basic infrastructure and suffering traumatic legacies of war.
In December 2013, however, a brutal civil war broke out as senior leaders of the ruling SPLM struggled
to achieve superiority and hence the presidency of the new State. Sadly, much of the violence targeted
civilians, often based on their ethnicity, and, by April 2018, resulted in an estimated 400,000 excess
68) Rolandsen, “Trade, peace-building and hybrid governance”, 90.

71) Rolandsen, “Trade, peace-building and hybrid governance”, 89–90.
73) UNISFA, “UNISFA undertakes preliminary action for police reform and restructuring in Abyei”, 19 February 2018. Available from: <https://unisfa.
unmissions.org/unisfa-undertakes-preliminary-action-police-reform-and-restructuring-abyei>.
82
Figure 4-6: UNMISS Uniformed Personnel

fatalities.74 From 2014, therefore, UNMISS dropped the State-building element of its mandate and
concentrated instead on civilian protection, mainly by sheltering approximately 200,000 civilians in its
emergency “protection of civilians sites”, six of which remain in operation today.
UNMISS was initially mandated to support the new authorities in South Sudan with two core
tasks: State-building and protection of civilians. However, resolution 1996 was long, running to eight
pages and listing at least 40 distinct tasks.75 The Security Council defined State-building as helping
with peace consolidation, economic development, conflict prevention and resolution, establishing the
rule of law, and providing security. The civilian protection element of the mandate tasked UNMISS with
deterring violence, within its capabilities and in its areas of deployment, where civilians were under
imminent threat of physical violence. Initially, most UNMISS uniformed personnel came from India and
Bangladesh — which together comprised over half of the mission — as well as Kenya and China. But
there were far too few personnel given the enormity of the tasks and territory involved, and they lacked
military aircraft and boats that would have helped overcome some of the logistical and environmental
constraints facing the mission.76
Initially, the State-building element of the mandate was made especially difficult because of four
main factors. First, the country was suffering from huge levels of underdevelopment and a distinct
lack of basic infrastructure. Second, the South Sudanese people were suffering many severe legacies
of decades of warfare, from trauma to landmines. Third, South Sudan inherited a set of war leaders
who were used to running an insurgency rather than governing a country. Recall that the CPA had
74) Francesco Checchi et al., Estimates of Crisis-Attributable Mortality in South Sudan, December 2013–April 2018 (London: School of Hygiene and
Tropical Medicine, 2018). Available from: <https://www.lshtm.ac.uk/south-sudan-full-report>.
75) By 2019, however, the Security Council resolution setting out the UNMISS mandate listed 207 tasks. Cited in Adam Day et al., Assessing the
Effectiveness of UNMISS (Oslo: NUPI/EPON, 2019), 18. Available from: <https://effectivepeaceops.net/publication/unmiss/>.
76) Diana Felix de Costa and Cedric de Coning, “UNMISS” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 835–836.
83
made the SPLM the sole voice of South Sudan. And,

fourth, organized violence continued in large parts of
the country.
It was the variety of the ongoing violence that

made the civilian protection element of the UNMISS
mandate especially difficult. Specifically, as discussed
in Section 4.5, fighting continued in parts of Abyei as
a residue of the old north-south war. There were also
groups within South Sudan that took up arms against
the SPLA. This was partly because the SPLA had long
been a patchwork of various militias cobbled together
in the “anti-Khartoum” cause, and these alliances
started to fray once that war was nominally over.
Then there was the violence perpetrated by the SPLA
United Nations Mine Action Service destroys explosive
against its own citizens, which often took the form remnants of war found close to UNMISS compound in
of extortion and collective punishment, especially if Juba. 20 March 2019. UN Photo #801564 by Nektarios
Markogiannis.
civilians were thought to be supporters of anti-SPLM
groups.
Like Sudan under UNMIS, South Sudan was also afflicted by significant levels of intercommunal
violence, primarily but not exclusively in the form of pastoralist conflicts and the traditional practice of
cattle raiding, which was now conducted with modern weapons. Just a month after UNMISS deployed,
for example, some 600 people were killed in cattle raiding conflicts in Jonglei State.77 And in December
2011, an estimated 6,000–8,000 Lou Nuer fighters attacked Pibor County, which prompted Murle youth
to retaliate by attacking Lou Nuer and Dinka Bor areas. The UN reported 888 people were killed,
hundreds more injured, and over 170,000 displaced over the next four months.78 Finally, there was also
violence perpetrated by the wandering Lord’s Resistance Army and other foreign armed groups that
moved across the country’s porous borders. So many civilians were under so many serious threats that
resolution 2057 (July 2012) made civilian protection the number one priority of UNMISS.
To try and protect against these threats, UNMISS deployed peacekeepers to all 10 state capitals in
South Sudan and planned to disperse further via “county support bases” proposed for locations that
were suffering from high levels of insecurity and isolation.79 But this planned force posture was derailed
when civil war broke out in South Sudan in December 2013.
The war was caused and driven by the country’s political leaders. As Paul Williams put it, the civil
war “was the deadly by-product of a power struggle waged by a small number of political and military
elites for control of the movement that would govern South Sudan”.80 But what started as a power
struggle between the SPLM’s political elites in the capital city, Juba, took an ethnic turn when those
leaders started to mobilize communities across the country on the basis of their ethnicity, and once
thousands of people were killed for no more than belonging to a different ethnic group at the wrong
77) “South Sudan attacks ‘leave 600 dead’”, BBC online, 23 August 2011. Available from: <https://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-14595368>.
78) Cited in Felix de Costa and de Coning, “UNMISS”, 834.
79) Felix de Costa and de Coning, “UNMISS”, 833–834.
80) Paul D. Williams, War and Conflict in Africa, 2nd edition (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2016), 155.
84
time and place. This intensified a deadly spiral of revenge and retaliation that was characterized by
many war crimes and crimes against humanity.81
Because the government of South Sudan was one of the main perpetrators of these crimes, UNMISS
was immediately put in a very difficult position: It required the government’s consent to remain in the
country, but its mandate tasked it with stopping attacks on civilians no matter who the perpetrator was.
It is fair to say that UNMISS has had a very troubled relationship with the host government ever since,
including instances of SPLA soldiers attacking peacekeepers.
UNMISS dealt with this dilemma by downplaying the State-building element of its mandate and
instead focusing its energies on civilian protection. This was crucial because many civilians fled towards
UN bases in late December 2013 and early 2014. In response, UNMISS leadership “opened the gates”
and created “protection of civilians sites” (POC sites). Sometimes comprising little more than a cleared
patch of land near a UN base with a berm or basic fence, UNMISS maintained up to eight different POC
sites.82 By the end of 2014, 102,000 civilians were sheltering in them. By mid-August 2015, the number
was over 200,000. As of April 2020, over 190,000 civilians were still sheltering in the six remaining POC
sites.
The POC sites were meant to provide a maximum of 72 hours of emergency protection to civilians
who were under immediate threat of physical violence by allowing them to stay on UN premises, which
are inviolable and subject to the exclusive control of the mission. UNMISS described this policy as “a
pragmatic reaction to the need to save lives, given that limited capabilities and restrictions of movement
exhausted the mission’s capacity to protect civilians outside UNMISS bases at such a scale. The POC sites
are thus a form of physical protection of last resort, tailored to the circumstances in South Sudan”.83 The
mission was clear from the outset that these were not meant to be ordinary IDP (internally displaced
persons) camps, which are supposed to meet a range of legal standards in order to function. Despite
several weaknesses, the UNMISS POC sites saved tens of thousands of lives. However, they tied up a
major portion of UNMISS capabilities dealing with what was, sadly, only a small percentage of South
Sudan’s displaced and vulnerable civilian population. Moreover, hostile forces sometimes attacked and
ravaged them despite the presence of UNMISS peacekeepers. Arguably two of the most infamous cases
occurred when UNMISS failed to stop major violence against civilians in the POC site in Malakal in
February 2016 and in Juba in July five months later.
Overall, the government generally retained the upper hand on the battlefield, but it was not able to
achieve a decisive military victory. It was, therefore, reluctantly cajoled into a series of ceasefires and
peace deals, most of which quickly fell apart, until one looked like it might hold in late 2018, in large
part because government forces had achieved dominance in most of the country. To help respond to
the war, in August 2016, Security Council resolution 2304 authorized a 4,000 strong regional protection
force to provide a secure environment in and around Juba (and in extremis in other parts of South
Sudan as necessary).84 This idea was first mooted by IGAD, but the force did not even start deploying
until August 2017, and then only partially.
81) For details, see: Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, Final Report of the African Union Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan (Addis Ababa:
Commission of Inquiry on South Sudan, 2015). Available from: <http://www.peaceau.org/uploads/auciss.final.report.pdf>.
82) The POC sites were located in Juba, Bentiu, Malakal, Bor, Melut, and Wau.
83) UN DPKO, Challenges, lessons learned and implications of the protection of civilians sites in South Sudan (Internal document, 17 June 2016), para. 3.
84) Paul D. Williams, “Key Questions for South Sudan’s New Protection Force”, IPI Global Observatory, 12 September 2016. Available from: <https://
theglobalobservatory.org/2016/09/south-sudan-regional-protection-force-kiir-unmiss/>.
85
The Rwandan battalion peacekeepers of the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS) construct ablutions at the Gudele 5
Police Post of the South Sudan National Police Service in Juba. The project was conducted in cooperation with the national police
service, UNMISS Sector South Headquarters, UNMISS Central Equatoria State Coordinator’s Office, and Rwandan Battalion I with
donations by the German Corporation for International Cooperation. UNMISS peacekeeper uniforms outside the police post. 6 October
2015. UN Photo #648378 by JC McIlwaine.
By 2019, UNMISS comprised some 17,000 troops, 2,000 police, and 2,000 civilians. Beyond civilian
protection in its POC sites, the mission’s protection of aid convoys enabled humanitarian assistance to
reach at least an additional 100,000 vulnerable people.85 Its monitoring function also enabled UNMISS
to document patterns and episodes of organized violence and abuses by the conflict parties publicly.
Yet, UNMISS, like all peacekeeping operations, could not control the national political processes that
ultimately determined whether or not there would be peace. Today, therefore, the mission continues
to confront a series of dilemmas. One revolves around maintaining the POC sites versus expanding its
outreach to protect civilians beyond the sites. Another revolves around how UNMISS can balance its
support for State-building when the government is a party to the conflict and a major threat to some
of the civilian population. There is not only a dilemma over how to support the return of refugees but
also how to ensure their safety when they return to locations where they comprise a minority ethnic
group. And, finally, there is a dilemma of expectations, namely, how the mission can ensure sustainable
progress on its mandated tasks with relatively few resources without raising unrealistic expectations.
None of these will be easy to resolve.
85) This paragraph draws from Day et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of UNMISS, 16–18.
86
1. Why did it take until June 2001 (10 6. The UN Mission in CAR and Chad
months) to define the Temporary (MINURCAT) was the first UN
Security Zone (TSZ) between Eritrea and peacekeeping operation to:
Ethiopia?
A. deploy in two countries
A. UNMEE was slow to deploy. B. use UAV for surveillance
B. Eritrea retained forces in the TSZ. C. be expelled by the host government
C. Ethiopia retained forces in the TSZ. D. have a civilian protection mandate
D. Eritrea and Ethiopia disagreed on the TSZ
location. 7. The UN Interim Security Force in
Abyei (UNISFA) received almost all its
2. In May 2004, the UN Operation in peacekeeping troops from _____.
Burundi (ONUB) incorporated _____ A. Kenya
peacekeepers from the African Union
B. Uganda
Mission in Burundi (AMIB).
C. Chad
A. 600
D. Ethiopia
B. 1,600
C. 2,600 8. The UN Interim Security Force in Abyei
D. 3,600 (UNISFA) failed to establish which local
security institution?
3. After some delay, Burundi’s series of A. Abyei National Guard
electoral processes were conducted in a
B. Abyei Intelligence Service
_____-month period starting in February
2005. C. Abyei Police Service
D. Abyei Corrections Service
A. Two
B. Four 9. The UN Mission in South Sudan
C. Six (UNMISS) established how many
D. Eight protection of civilians sites?
A. Two
4. The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) had
B. Four
an average of one armed soldier per how
many square kilometres? C. Six
D. Eight
A. 21
B. 121 10. In 2016, the Security Council authorized
C. 221 a _____ for the UN Mission in South
D. 321 Sudan (UNMISS).
A. Force Intervention Brigade (FIB)
5. In 2006, the Security Council extended
B. regional protection force
the mandate of the UN Mission in Sudan
(UNMIS) to cover which part of Sudan? C. quick reaction force
D. rapid reaction force
A. Darfur
B. Abyei
C. The Nuba Mountains
D. Blue Nile
87
Answer Key »
1. D
2. C
3. C
4. B
5. A
6. B
7. D
8. C
9. D
10. B
88
LESSON
Peacekeeping in Europe, Asia,
5 and the Caucasus
This lesson covers peace

operations in Southern
Europe, South-East Asia, and
the Caucasus.
Section 5.1 UN Peacekeeping in Southern • Summarize how UN peacekeepers tried

Europe to support peace processes in Southern
Europe, specifically in Bosnia-Herzegovina,
Section 5.2 UN Peacekeeping in South and
the Prevlaka peninsula in Croatia, and on the
South-East Asia
island of Cyprus.
Section 5.3 UN Peacekeeping in the
• Analyse how UN peacekeepers helped keep
Caucasus
the peace in South and South-East Asia,
specifically in the contested territories of
Kashmir and Timor‑Leste, respectively.
• Discuss how the UN tried to keep the peace

in Georgia over the disputed territory of
Abkhazia.
89
LESSON 5 | Peacekeeping in Europe, Asia, and the Caucasus
The Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 743 on 21 February 1992, establishing the United Nations Protection Force
(UNPROFOR) in Croatia and Bosnia-Herzegovina to create conditions for a negotiated settlement of the Yugoslav crisis. Two soldiers
from the Danish battalion outside of their quarters. 2 September 1992. UN Photo #122037 by John Isaac.
Introduction
Although Africa saw the majority of UN peacekeeping between 2000 and 2020,
the organization’s peacekeepers also deployed elsewhere. This lesson provides an
overview of UN peacekeepers deployed across several other regions, specifically
Southern Europe, South and South-East Asia, and the Caucasus. In Southern
Europe, UN peacekeepers were deployed to help consolidate the terms of the
1995 Dayton Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH), to help demilitarize
the Prevlaka peninsula in Croatia (UNMOP), and to maintain a decades-old
ceasefire on the island of Cyprus (UNFICYP). As discussed in Lesson 2, in South-
East Asia, UN peacekeepers were deployed in Timor‑Leste (UNMISET). However,
after peacekeepers left Timor‑Leste in 2005, they had to return the following year
after violence broke out (UNMIT). In South Asia, UN peacekeepers in UNMOGIP
remained deployed in one of the organization’s longest-running missions in the
contested region of Kashmir. Finally, in the Caucasus, UN peacekeepers were
deployed to help manage the dispute between Georgia and Abkhazia (UNOMIG).
90
Section 5.1 UN Peacekeeping in Southern Europe
Figure 5-1: UNMIBH Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2002

For the first three years of the twenty-first century, the UN had peacekeepers deployed in the
Southern Balkans: UNMIBH in Bosnia-Herzegovina and UNMOP in the Prevlaka peninsula in Croatia.
Neither were new operations. UNMBIH was established in 1995 to work alongside a NATO-led force as
part of the international effort to build stable peace in Bosnia, while UNMOP was established in 1996
to monitor the demilitarization of a territory disputed by Croatia and the Federal Republic of Yugoslavia
(now Montenegro). Both missions ended in December 2002. The UN also retained its long-standing
peacekeeping operation on the island of Cyprus (UNFICYP), which the final part of this section analyses.
UNMIBH was rare in the history of UN peacekeeping for being the first mission composed almost
entirely of a police force. UNMIBH comprised the international police force that had been agreed as part
of the 1995 Dayton Agreement — known as the International Police Task Force — as well as a small
civilian component. Its initial mandate was to assist and monitor Bosnia’s law enforcement agencies.
Between 1996 and 1998, the Security Council added additional tasks: investigating allegations of human
rights abuses by law enforcement officials, monitoring and restructuring of the police in the Brčko area,
ensuring police reform and providing material and financial support conditional upon the implementation
of democratic policing principles, and establishing the Judicial System Assessment Program.1 To carry
out these tasks, UNMIBH peaked at just over 2,000 police and military liaison personnel.
UNMIBH was terminated in December 2002 following a US veto. The United States vetoed the
extension of UNMIBH even though the operation enjoyed the consent of the Bosnian government, had
the support of the other permanent members of the Security Council, and involved only 45 Americans.
The veto was not targeted directly at UNMIBH per se but was part of a US policy to coerce States into
1) Thierry Tardy, “UNMIBH” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 512.
91
following its policy on the potential treatment of US troops by the newly established International
Criminal Court, including those deployed in UNMIBH.2 This was largely symbolic given that by 2002,
UNMIBH consisted mainly of a police training programme that was due to be handed over to the
European Union. The European Union Police Mission duly took over from UNMIBH on 1 January 2003
and remained in Bosnia until 2012.
Overall, UNMIBH struggled to implement its mandate, and this became more obvious in its final
few years in the early 2000s. On the positive side, by December 2002, UNMIBH certified 15,786 of the
23,751 registered police officers, and the increased numbers of multi-ethnic police helped encourage
more minority refugees to return home, with over double the numbers returning in 2001 and 2002 than
in 1999.3
But UNMIBH’s problems were considerable.4 Its goal of getting Bosnian police to follow internationally
recognized standards was always ambitious, but it was bordering on the impossible given that UNMIBH
had no executive powers or any UN Police doctrine on which to draw as a model. Nor could the police
force be separated from politics. The two separate political entities of Bosnia and Republika Srpska
effectively shattered the idea of a unified police service. Moreover, too many leaders in the respective
political parties were willing to use their influence to politicize the police, including by getting members
of the police to protect war criminals, refusing to investigate certain crimes, and even perpetrating
crimes themselves. In some areas, notably Republika Srpska, this led to locals targeting UN personnel
and property.
Overall, the UN Secretary-General’s verdict in 2002 was that the rule of law in Bosnia suffered
from “systemic weakness…and continued obstruction, interference and illegal activities of entrenched
political extremists and criminal organizations”.5
UNMOP was the second peacekeeping operation trying to end the wars of Yugoslav succession
that continued into the 2000s. It was also the smallest UN peacekeeping operation of the twenty-first
century, at its peak comprising 28 uniformed personnel. In early 1996, Security Council resolution 1038
mandated UNMOP as a follow-on operation to UNCRO and UNPROFOR to monitor the demilitarization
of the Prevlaka peninsula, a disputed territory between Croatia and Montenegro (part of the Federal
Republic of Yugoslavia until it achieved independence in 2006). The concern was that this territorial
dispute could spark a larger confrontation.
To carry out its mandate, UNMOP created a “blue zone” and a “yellow zone” for the conflict parties.
The “blue zone", including the Prevlaka peninsula, was not only supposed to be entirely demilitarized,
but also no police or civilians were permitted either. The larger “yellow zone” extended roughly five
kilometres past either side of the Croatian-Yugoslav border until it intersected with the Bosnian border
to the north. It was to be free of military units but permit a police presence.6
By the late 1990s, the UN estimated that both sides had police operating in the blue zone: Croatia
had about 30 officers, and Montenegro had about 10.7 After NATO’s military intervention in Serbia
3) Tardy, “UNMIBH”, 515.
4) This paragraph draws on Tardy, “UNMIBH”, 514–516.
5) Cited in Tardy, “UNMIBH”, 517.
6) Richard Gowan, “UNMOP” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 534.
7) Gowan, “UNMOP”, 535.
92
Figure 5-2 UNMOP Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2002

between March and June 1999, UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan made a diplomatic push to resolve the
issue later in the year. It resulted in the removal of Croat and Yugoslav armed forces from the yellow
zone, which meant that demilitarization had finally been completed.8
Diplomatic progress continued when Slobodan Milošević resigned as the Yugoslav President in
September 2000, and the two countries established an Interstate Diplomatic Commission to address
the dispute in December 2001. On 10 December 2002, they created an interim bilateral border regime.
Although this did not settle the dispute, it retained Croatian control of the peninsula until a final decision
was reached, guaranteed Yugoslavia rights of access to the Bay of Kotor, and included “mechanisms
for the continued demilitarization of the border area, mutual inspections, and the destruction of
fortifications”.9 In sum, it ensured that UNMOP was no longer required, and the mission withdrew later
that month. The fact that the territory has remained peaceful is a testament to UNMOP’s efforts and the
willingness of the parties to negotiate.
The other UN peacekeeping operation deployed in Southern Europe was on the island of Cyprus. The
UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) has remained active throughout the entire period of 2000
to 2020. Its job is to help build confidence among the conflict parties by monitoring the long-standing
ceasefire arrangements along the 180-kilometre Green Line that divides the island of Cyprus. UNFICYP
has been active for over five decades because all diplomatic efforts to settle the dispute have failed.
UNFICYP was established in April 1964 in response to fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots
that broke out in December 1963. Specifically, Security Council resolution 186 (1964) mandated
UNFICYP to “use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of the fighting and, as necessary, to contribute
to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”. The mission

93
Figure 5-3 UNFICYP Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2020

proved unable to complete the first part of this mandate when, in 1974, the Turkish military invaded
the island.
After the Turkish military intervention, UNFICYP had to accommodate the new military-imposed
partition on the ground. This de facto partition has remained broadly similar ever since, with UNFICYP
monitoring the ceasefire lines from Kato Pyrgos on the north-west coast to the east coast at Deryneia/
Famagusta. The UN buffer zone (the Green Line) covered about 3 per cent of the island and varied
between fewer than 20 metres in Nicosia to as much as seven kilometres near Athienou.10 In 1983, the
Turkish-Cypriot north issued a unilateral declaration of independence, which was recognized only by
Turkey.
UNFICYP’s Chapter VI authorization does not include the use of coercive force. Instead, the mission
acts as an interposition force, engaging in a range of activities, including “surveillance by patrols and
from observations posts, liaison with the opposing forces, and control of civilian activities in the buffer
zone”.11 Having initially involved over 6,000 troops, by 2000, the force was much smaller, and by
mid‑2020, it comprised just over 800 uniformed personnel, mainly from Argentina, Slovakia, and the
United Kingdom.
At the start of the twenty-first century, there were some signs that a political breakthrough might
be possible, specifically, the combination of Cyprus seeking EU membership, the economic crisis and the
political change in Turkey, and the arrival of a new leader for the Turkish Cypriots, Mehmet Ali Talat.12
In April 2003, a significant moment occurred with the opening of crossing-points throughout the
Green Line — the first time such movements were possible in nearly 30 years. The first day saw
10) Jan Asmussen, “UNFICYP” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 204.
11) Asmussen, “UNFICYP”, 208.
94
about 5,000 Greek Cypriots and 2,000 Turks cross the border. Since then, hundreds of thousands have
crossed, with many Turkish Cypriots working in the south of the island and crossing every day. Despite
some worries, the crossings did not generate any major outbreaks of violence.13 Along with the other
factors noted above, they also paved the way for a new diplomatic initiative spearheaded in early 2004
by then-Secretary-General Kofi Annan.
The so-called Annan Plan was submitted to

the parties in March 2004 following six weeks of
concerted negotiations and consultations. It was
based on simultaneous referendums to be held on
the two sides of the island. Annan hoped that the
inhabitants would vote for a united Cyprus in the April
referendums to accede to the EU on 1 May 2004.
Despite support from the Turkish Cypriots, the plan
was overwhelmingly rejected by Greek Cypriots, and
hence Cyprus joined the EU as a divided island.14
While disappointing for those seeking a settlement,
in October 2004, there was relatively good news
when the Security Council reduced UNFICYP’s military Private Eddie Skanshus (Danish Contingent) on sentry
duty at OP LOUTROS, Lefka, Cyprus. 1 May 1973. UN
component from 1,200 to 860 on the grounds that
Photo #86299 by Yutaka Nagata.
the situation had become “increasingly benign”.15
After this troop reduction, UNFICYP made greater use of technology to fulfil its monitoring duties at
a reduced financial cost. Specifically, it installed ground cameras in hotspot areas and used cameras to
replace six observation posts that were formerly staffed by humans 24/7. Since then, the mission has
expanded its camera system. It also enhanced its response capability by pursuing the idea of “mobility
with concentration”, meaning that rapid response units were on standby in case of major ceasefire
violations.16
Since the failure of the Annan Plan, talks between the respective leaders have been intermittent, but
none have produced a fundamental breakthrough. In July 2006, for example, the parties signed a set
of principles and decisions recognizing that the status quo was unacceptable and that a comprehensive
settlement was both desirable and possible. From 2008, talks also occurred between Greek Cypriot
leader Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, and then, from April 2010, his successor Derviş Eroĝluin.
But nothing fundamental changed. In February 2014, a Joint Declaration was signed. This included
the leaders expressing “their determination to resume structured negotiations in a results-oriented
manner. All unresolved core issues will be on the table and will be discussed interdependently. The
leaders will aim to reach a settlement as soon as possible and hold separate simultaneous referendums
thereafter”.17 In 2015, the UN started a new round of mediation, which also involved officials from
the three “guarantors” — Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom. There was no breakthrough,
however, and in 2017, the negotiations held at Crans-Montana in Switzerland collapsed. In late 2019,

15) UN Security Council, “Resolution 1568 (2004). The situation in Cyprus”, S/RES/1568 (2004), 22 October 2004.
16) Walter Dorn and Cono Giardullo, “Technology investments paying off in peace operations”, Security & Human Rights Monitor, 8 June 2020. Available
from: <https://www.shrmonitor.org/technology-investments-paying-off-in-peace-operations/>.
17) The text is available at <http://www.uncyprustalks.org/11-february-2014-joint-declaration-on-cyprus/>.
95
UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres tried again by engaging in informal meetings between the two
Cypriot leaders and diplomats from the three “guarantors” — so far, without success.
Overall, and at least since 1974, UNFICYP has had “a pacifying effect” on the conflict by containing
violence and acting as the eyes and ears of the Security Council.18 One outstanding question, however,
is whether this has produced the contradictory effect of making a new status quo on the island that is
relatively comfortable for the parties and hence contributed to a lack of urgency to settle the dispute.
Section 5.2 UN Peacekeeping in South and South-East Asia
Figure 5-4 UNMISET Uniformed Personnel

As we saw in Lesson 2, in 1999, the UN deployed a peacekeeping operation (UNTAET) and authorized
a multinational force (INTERFET) to help East Timor through its process towards independence.
The organization continued its engagement by establishing the UN Mission of Support in East Timor
(UNMISET) in May 2002 to help the newly independent State of Timor-Leste. UNMISET was subsequently
withdrawn exactly three years later. In retrospect, this was premature because widespread violence and
political turmoil followed, requiring yet another peace operation, the UN Mission in Timor‑Leste (UNMIT)
to deploy between 2006 and the end of 2012.19 As Norrie Macqueen noted, “UNMIT’s fundamental task
was to complete the work left unfinished by an untimely drawdown of UNMISET”.20
UNMISET was mandated to support Timor-Leste’s administrative structures, provide interim law
enforcement and security, build capacity in the local law enforcement agencies, and support the new
State’s external security. To do so, it was granted 5,000 uniformed personnel, about 2,500 fewer than
the earlier UN mission UNTAET, although the size of the police components was about the same. The

19) Norrie Macqueen, “UNMIT” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 683–693
20) Macqueen, “UNMIT”, 763.
96
main difference between the missions was that UNMISET was no longer a transitional administration
with executive authority over the territory.
This was a challenging agenda. Even though Timor-Leste had achieved independence, it lacked a
lot of the administrative capacity to support even its small population of roughly one million people.
The country had no tradition of self-government, was very poor with an economy based largely on
subsistence agriculture, had little functioning infrastructure, and its population was deeply traumatized.21
In this sense, the resources at UNMISET’s disposal were meagre.
Nevertheless, UNMISET made some progress. Its Civilian Support Group of about 100 administrative
specialists supported the government, but the group fluctuated between capacity-building and
capacity‑substitution, given the lack of local administrators. The mission also dealt with the remaining
border security issues effectively. After independence, some 28,000 Timorese were still in camps in
Indonesia, some of whom were part of anti-independence militias.22 Fortunately, the two countries
cooperated well on this issue, and the Indonesian army dealt effectively with the remaining militia on
its side of the border. Another issue was that the new international border still needed to be legally
demarcated. Here the two countries initially followed a “soft border” policy that permitted traditional
practices of informal movement. It worked well but did complicate UNMISET’s activities somewhat.23
Things went less well in relation to the justice system, where Timor-Leste lacked trained lawyers
to run the system. As a consequence, the international judges who had been appointed during the UN
administration were retained.24 UNMISET also spent too much effort on constructing public services in
the official language of Portuguese, but only a tiny minority of locals spoke the language and hence
limited its utility. The police force also struggled. Although the new Timorese police force did work with
UNMISET to investigate and prosecute offences connected with the 1999 violence, they were not able to
prevent some deadly riots in Dili and the second city Baucau in late 2002 and early 2003. Nevertheless,
by the end of 2003, the Timorese police were officially in charge of 12 of the 13 districts, and by April
2004, the local force had over 3,000 trained officers.25
By early 2005, the Security Council no longer wanted to deploy a military operation and therefore
replaced UNMISET with a new political mission, the UN Office in Timor-Leste (UNOTIL), which comprised
fewer than 100 personnel as advisers to the police and public services.26
In hindsight, this was a mistake because less than a year later, Timor-Leste descended into turmoil
once again. The spark was about 500–600 East Timorese soldiers — representing about 30 per cent of
the army — going on strike. They complained about their housing and that the promotions system was
ethnically biased. Most of them were “Loromonu” from the western region complaining about favouritism
towards the “Lorosau” from the east, who had formed most of the guerrilla army that led the resistance
against Indonesian occupation.27 When the soldiers refused to return to barracks, the government
sacked them, prompting them to march to Dili. The police were unable to maintain order — the army
said this was because many of them were sympathetic to the Loromonu dissenters — and violence
broke out, killing 37 people and displacing over 150,000.
21) Macqueen, “UNMISET”, 685 and 691–692.
22) Macqueen, “UNMISET”, 688.
97
Figure 5-5 UNMIT Uniformed Personnel

In response to an invitation by the Timor-Leste government, Australia, New Zealand, and Malaysia
deployed a multinational force of about 2,200 to stabilize the situation. Although the rebel leaders were
arrested, they subsequently escaped from prison and, in early 2008, attempted to assassinate President
José Ramos-Horta and Prime Minister Xanana Gusmão.28
It was in this context that UNMIT deployed with a mandate to support the government and enhance
its democratic governance and political dialogue. UNMIT would also support the national elections
scheduled for 2007, help the national police, and report on the human rights situation in the country.
UNMIT successfully facilitated the 2007 elections, which saw José Ramos-Horta become head of
State and Xanana Gusmão Prime Minister. There was some minor disorder in Dili and Baucau, but
UNMIT and the local police successfully handled it. This was in part because UNMIT continued where
UNMISET had left off in terms of training and advising the police. In addition, by 2008, most of the
country’s displaced people returned home, mainly through initiatives developed by the government and
UNMIT.29
UNMIT then focused on what would become its “exit visa” — the 2012 national presidential and
parliamentary elections.30 Held between March and July 2012, these too went well, and UNMIT duly
withdrew. Interestingly, before it left, UNMIT encouraged the government to make a compensation
settlement with the striking soldiers who sparked the 2006 crisis.31
As well as the new UN operations in Timor‑Leste, the organization’s second-oldest peacekeeping

mission remained active in South Asia between 2000 and 2020. This was the UN Military Observer
Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP), whose first peacekeepers were deployed in January 1949 to

98
Figure 5-6 UNMOGIP Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2020

supervise the ceasefire established after the 1947–1948 war between the two countries. UNMOGIP
would go on to monitor the Karachi Agreement, which included a ceasefire line in the disputed territory
of Kashmir. UNMOGIP has remained active ever since. Following a third war between India and Pakistan
in 1971, the two countries signed the Simla Agreement in 1972. This converted the ceasefire line that
had been in effect since 1 January 1949 into the Line of Control and called for “the establishment of
durable peace in the sub-continent”. The parties also “resolved to settle their differences by peaceful
means through bilateral negotiations or by any other peaceful means mutually agreed upon between
them”.32
Since then, UNMOGIP has observed the subsequent ceasefire agreement, provided early warning,
investigated alleged violations, and encouraged the parties to engage in confidence-building measures.
The mission has always been small, fluctuating between about 30 and 65 military observers who patrol
and observe the 770-kilometre Line of Control from nearly a dozen field stations on both sides of the
Line. As an indicator of its activities, in 2018, UNMOGIP carried out 2,139 unimpeded operational tasks,
including 1,492 area reconnaissance missions, 275 observation posts, and 152 field trips.33 UNMOGIP is
financed from the UN regular budget because it was established before the current financial system for
UN peacekeeping was created in the 1970s.
Even in periods without major war between India and Pakistan, the Line of Control experiences
significant violence. Between 2012–2018, for example, UNMOGIP investigated 1,273 complaints, an
average of about 180 per year.34 In recent years, most complaints come from Pakistan, with very
few coming from India, in large part because UNMOGIP has no operational freedom of movement
32) The government of India and the government of Pakistan, Agreement on Bilateral Relations between the Government of India and the Government of
Pakistan (Simla Agreement), 2 July 1972. Available from: <https://peacemaker.un.org/sites/peacemaker.un.org/files/IN%20PK_720702_Simla%20
Agreement.pdf>.
33) UN General Assembly, Proposed programme budget for 2020, A/74/6 (Sect.5)*, 10 April 2019, 50.
34) UN General Assembly, Proposed programme budget for 2020, 52.
99
in India‑administered Kashmir. This reflects the more general fact that although India has permitted
UNMOGIP to remain on its side of the Line of Control, it has not wanted the mission to play any
significant role. Pakistan, in contrast, views UNMOGIP as a means to ensure Kashmir is kept on the
agenda of the Security Council.35 India’s position dates back to the Simla Agreement (1972), which
it maintains rendered earlier Security Council resolutions redundant and placed the onus on bilateral
negotiations as the means to resolve the conflict. India’s position largely explains why there have been
no Security Council resolutions on Kashmir since 1971, no reports of the Secretary-General since 1993,
and why UNMOGIP has been hampered by one side disputing the terms of its mandate.36
Given this course’s focus on the twenty-first century, UNMOGIP’s first major concern during that
period was the rise in tension sparked by a terrorist attack on India’s parliament on 13 December 2001
that killed nine Indian citizens. In the following weeks, India deployed up to 700,000 troops to the Line
of Control while Pakistan mobilized over 300,000. Fortunately, no major fighting occurred.37
Another significant incident occurred in late 2009, when mass graves allegedly containing nearly
3,000 bodies were discovered in Kashmir. This suggested UNMOGIP had not been effective at reporting
on these atrocities and bringing them to the attention of the Security Council.38
The next major crisis erupted in early 2019. On 14 February, Jaish-e-Mohammed, a rebel group
associated with Al-Qaida, claimed a VBIED (vehicle-borne improvised explosive device) attack on a
military convoy that killed more than 40 Indian paramilitary personnel in Pulwama, Kashmir. India
retaliated on 26 February by launching airstrikes on what it claimed was a Jaish-e-Mohammed training
base in Balakot, Pakistan. Pakistan denied this, and in an air battle on the following day, it shot down
two Indian planes and captured a pilot (who was later released).39 In May, India’s Prime Minister
Narendra Modi, a Hindu nationalist, won his re-election in a landslide victory. Then, in late July, India
deployed an additional 45,000 troops into Kashmir, and in early August, Modi rescinded article 370 of
its constitution, which provided semi-autonomy to the territory, and article 35-A, which limited property
rights in the territory to inhabitants of the region. India also turned off or blocked much of the region’s
telecommunications infrastructure and restricted movement and public gatherings. In response,
Pakistan suspended trade with India and expelled its High Commissioner.40
Pakistan argued India’s constitutional changes violated Security Council resolutions calling for
Kashmir’s status to be resolved through a UN-sponsored plebiscite, whereas India saw its actions as an
internal matter.41 UNMOGIP continued its work throughout the year, conducting 161 observation post
operations, 1,317 area reconnaissance patrols, 158 investigations of alleged ceasefire violations, and 90
field trips, for an overall total of 1,726 field tasks.42 Indeed, UNMOGIP collects so much information that
it has been a challenge for such a small mission to synthesize and correctly interpret it all.43 Overall,
2015), 66.
36) Christy Shucksmith and Nigel White, “UNMOGIP” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 137–139.
37) Shucksmith and White, “UNMOGIP”, 138–139.
38) Shucksmith and White, “UNMOGIP”, 140.
39) “Jammu and Kashmir Consultations", What’s In Blue, 15 August 2019. Available from: <https://www.whatsinblue.org/2019/08/jammu-and-kashmir-
consultations.php>.
40) “Jammu and Kashmir Consultations”, What’s In Blue.
41) “Jammu and Kashmir Consultations”, What’s In Blue.
42) UN General Assembly, Proposed programme budget for 2021, A/75/6 (Sect.5), 7 April 2020, 55.
100
however, collecting information cannot resolve the fundamental dispute over Kashmir, so UNMOGIP will
probably continue to manage the political impasse as best it can.
Section 5.3 UN Peacekeeping in the Caucasus

The only UN peacekeeping operation in the Caucasus during the twenty-first century was its small
observer mission in Georgia (UNOMIG). Established in August 1993, UNOMIG would help manage the
various conflicts in the complicated triangular relationship between Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia.
Ultimately, however, it was unsuccessful. While the 1992–1993 war between Georgia and Abkhazia led
to UNOMIG’s creation, another war fought between Georgia and Russia in mid-2008 put an end to the
mission before it could complete its tasks.
UNOMIG’s initial mandate as set out in Security Council resolution 858 was to verify compliance
with the July 1993 ceasefire agreement between Georgia and Abkhazia, investigate violations, and
help the parties to resolve them. Later that year, UNOMIG was also authorized to engage with Russian
military contingents that were also deployed in the area (resolution 881). To carry out these tasks,
UNOMIG was only granted around 130 military observers.
However, things did not go according to plan, and war broke out once again. In early 1994, a
new ceasefire and separation of forces pact was signed, known as the Moscow Agreement. The deal
established a Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force in Abkhazia-Georgia (CISPKF),
composed of over 1,000 Russian soldiers who were already deployed in the area. In July 1994, Security
Council resolution 937 expanded UNOMIG’s mandate to encompass nine core security tasks:
1. Monitor and verify the Moscow

Agreement;
2. Observe the CISPKF;
3. Verify the removal of Georgian and

Abkhaz troops and their heavy military
equipment from particular security
zones;
4. Monitor the storage of the heavy

military equipment that had been
withdrawn;
5. Monitor the withdrawal of Georgian

troops from the Kodori Gorge in Louise Joergensen (Denmark, left), a Military Information
Abkhazia; Officer for United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
(UNOMIG), distributing UNICEF school kits for a primary
school in the city of Gali in the Abkhazia region of
6. Regularly patrol that gorge;
Georgia. 1 May 2004. UN Photo #49199 by Justyna
Melnikiewicz.
7. Investigate alleged violations of the
agreement and resolve such incidents;
101
Figure 5-7 UNOMIG Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2009

8. Report to the UN Secretary-General on the implementation of

the Moscow Agreement; and
9. Coordinate with the CISPKF to help create conditions for the

safe and orderly return of displaced persons.44
From 1998, a new wave of violence occurred, and in October 1999, Abkhazia made a declaration of
independence that signalled its growing dispute with Georgia. That same month, UNOMIG peacekeepers
were attacked and some taken hostage.45 Following two tense years, in October 2001, more fighting
occurred in the Kodori Gorge, and a UNOMIG helicopter monitoring the situation there was shot down,
killing nine personnel on board.46 On the diplomatic front, 2001 also saw the group of Friends of
the Secretary-General on Georgia persuade the conflict parties to engage with the so-called “Boden
document” — named after the German diplomat who developed it, Dietrich Boden.47 This potential
peace plan recognized the sovereignty of Abkhazia within the Georgian constitutional framework as a
compromise between Abkhazia’s demand for sovereignty and Georgia’s commitment to the principle
of territorial integrity. Unsurprisingly, the attempted compromise didn’t hold, despite Security Council
resolution 1427 (July 2002) calling on the parties to “ensure the necessary revitalization of the peace
process”.48
In 2003, the Security Council also added a police component to UNOMIG that deployed to the
troubled Gali region. The Gali region was the site of considerable UNOMIG activity. Bordering Georgia
44) As summarized in Bruno Coppieters, “UNOMIG” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al.
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 444.
45) Coppieters, “UNOMIG”, 448.
48) UN Security Council, "Resolution 1427 (2002)", S/RES/1427 (2002), 29 July 2002. Available from: <http://unscr.com/en/resolutions/1427>.
102
and with a majority of ethnic Georgians, it included a Security Zone and a Restricted Weapons Zone on
the Abkhazian side of the ceasefire line. UNOMIG did a lot of patrolling in the area, often four per day,
with nearly half its personnel located there. This was how UNOMIG gained an understanding of what
was happening in the region, helped facilitate various aid projects in the region, and liaised with the
CISPKF.49
The Rose Revolution of November 2003, which forced Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze to
resign, also stalled negotiations because it brought to power an administration supportive of closer ties
with the West and hence weaker ties with Russia. Although some diplomatic efforts were made during
the first half of 2005, they produced nothing concrete.50 2006 also started badly, with an increase in
robberies and kidnappings in the Gali region. But in May, Abkhazia released a peace plan that envisioned
“fundamentally new, neighbourly relations” between Abkhazia and Georgia as independent States, and
in June, Georgia countered with a peace plan offering Abkhazia “broad internal sovereignty” based on
the principles of federalism.51 In July, however, the Georgian military moved into the Kodori Gorge,
which breached the Moscow Agreement, and dialogue about a political settlement was suspended.
During 2007, the situation became increasingly tense, and in 2008, it exploded. Following Kosovo’s
unilateral declaration of independence in February 2008 and the support it attracted from many Western
States, Russia started to cooperate much more assertively with Abkhazia and South Ossetia. In August,
war broke out between Georgia and Russia in South Ossetia. Russia gained the upper-hand and duly
recognized Abkhazia and South Ossetia as independent States. Georgian troops were moved from their
positions in the Kodori Gorge to help their colleagues to the east, and the CISPKF was terminated. In its
place, a European Union Monitoring Mission deployed along the borders of Abkhazia and South Ossetia,
but only on the Georgian side of the borders. UNOMIG continued, but it was clear that the previous
agreement in the Security Council had now splintered, and there would be no chance of the permanent
five members agreeing on modalities for a revamped or new UN peacekeeping operation. UNOMIG,
therefore, withdrew in June 2009.52
Overall, UNOMIG was able to verify compliance with the Moscow Agreement and did increase the
channels of communications between the parties. It was also a useful source of independent information
as the security situation deteriorated in the Kodori Gorge and Gali regions. The mission also helped
facilitate the return of some displaced persons in the Gali region. However, this would last only as long
as the conflict parties cooperated with one another. Ultimately, as Bruno Coppieters, Professor of Political
Science at the Vrije Universiteit Brussel, concluded, “UNOMIG did not have the means necessary to halt
the unfolding spiral of conflict escalation affecting the triangular dispute between Russia, Georgia, and
Abkhazia”.53
49) “Georgia: The Gali Sector of UNOMIG”, UNOMIG Press Release, 2 November 2005. Available from: <https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/georgia-gali-
sector-unomig>.
50) Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace, 84–86.
51) Center on International Cooperation, Global Peace Operations Review (Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 98–99.
103
1. In 2002, the mandate renewal of the 6. In 2006, the political crisis that triggered
UN Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina the deployment of the UN Mission in
(UNMIBH) was vetoed by which country? Timor-Leste (UNMIT) was sparked by
_____.
A. Russia
B. China A. the President’s assassination
C. United States B. a tsunami
D. Serbia C. an army strike

D. Indonesian militia crossing the border
2. To carry out its mandate, the UN Mission
of Observers in Prevlaka (UNMOP) 7. The UN Military Observer Group in India
created an entirely demilitarized zone and Pakistan (UNMOGIP) is mandated
where no soldiers, police, or civilians to monitor which special area in the
were permitted. This was known as: disputed territory of Kashmir?
A. the blue zone A. The Temporary Security Zone
B. the yellow zone B. The Green Line
C. the green zone C. The Blue Line
D. the red zone D. The Line of Control
3. The 2004 Kofi Annan Plan to bring peace 8. In February 2019, which armed group
to the island of Cyprus was rejected by attacked an Indian military convoy in
_____. Pulwama, Kashmir, triggering a crisis for
the UN Military Observer Group in India
A. the European Union (EU)
and Pakistan (UNMOGIP)?
B. Turkey
A. The Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant —
C. Turkish Cypriots
Khorasan Province
D. Greek Cypriots
B. Jaish-e-Mohammed
4. The UN Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus C. Lashkar-e-Taiba

(UNFICYP) is mandated to monitor what D. The Taliban
special area that takes up approximately
3 per cent of the island’s territory? 9. In July 1994, Security Council resolution
A. Blue Line 937 gave the UN Observer Mission in
Georgia (UNOMIG) _____ core security
B. Restricted Weapons Zone
tasks.
C. Green Line
A. three
D. Temporary Security Zone
B. five
5. Which of the following tasks was NOT C. seven

in the mandate of the UN Mission of D. nine
Support East Timor (UNMISET)?
A. Support administrative structures in
Timor‑Leste
B. Support national elections in Timor‑Leste
C. Support interim law enforcement in
Timor‑Leste
D. Support the external security of
Timor‑Leste
104
10. What was the main factor that led to the

closing down of the UN Observer Mission
in Georgia (UNOMIG) in 2009?
A. The collapse of the 1994 Moscow
Agreement
B. A financial crisis at UN Headquarters
C. Georgia’s 2008 war with Russia over South
Ossetia
D. A settlement between the authorities in
Georgia and Abkhazia
Answer Key »
1. C
2. A
3. D
4. C
5. B
6. C
7. D
8. B
9. D
10. C
105
LESSON Peacekeeping in the Middle

6 East
Lesson 6 analyses the

developments of current
UN peace operations in the
Middle East.
UN Photo #745969 Pasqual Gorriz.
Section 6.1 The UN Truce Supervision • Summarize the experiences of UN observers

Organization (UNTSO) during the twenty-first century in the
organization’s Truce Supervision Operation
Section 6.2 The UN Disengagement
(UNTSO) and Disengagement Observer Force
Observer Force (UNDOF)
(UNDOF).
Section 6.3 The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation
• Analyse the activities of UN peacekeepers
Mission (UNIKOM)
along the Iraq-Kuwait border.
Section 6.4 The UN Interim Force in
• Discuss the ongoing operations of UN
Lebanon (UNIFIL)
peacekeepers in Lebanon.
Section 6.5 The UN Supervision Mission in
• Analyse how UN peacekeepers tried to help
Syria (UNSMIS)
facilitate the Kofi Annan peace plan in Syria.
106
LESSON 6 | Peacekeeping in the Middle East
A view of OP FOXTROT on the west side of the Suez Canal. Observing the east side are Commander Enrique Nunes (left) of Chile and
Major Alfredo Proud of Argentina. 17 April 1973. UN Photo #137861 by Yutaka Nagata.
Introduction
This lesson provides an analysis of the UN peacekeeping efforts in the
Middle East. This involved the deployment of peacekeepers in six distinct
operations. First, the lesson discusses the longest-running UN peacekeeping
mission, its Truce Supervision Operation (UNTSO), which originally deployed
in 1948. It then summarizes twenty-first-century developments in the United
Nations Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF), established in 1974
following the Yom Kippur War, when Egypt and Syria launched a coordinated
invasion of Israel. Third, it provides an overview of the UN observer mission
along the Iraq-Kuwait border (UNIKOM), deployed between 1991 and
2003. The fourth section analyses the ongoing operations of the United
Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), which originally deployed in
1978 but was significantly reconfigured after the 2006 war between Israel
and Hezbollah. Finally, it analyses the United Nations Supervision Mission in
Syria (UNSMIS), which operated for a few months in 2012.
107
Section 6.1 The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)

Established in 1948, the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) is the oldest UN peacekeeping
operation, yet it is still active today in locations across the Middle East, specifically Egypt, Israel, Jordan,
Lebanon, and the Syrian Arab Republic. UNTSO was initially mandated to support a Truce Commission
for Palestine but has subsequently helped maintain ceasefires in a series of Arab-Israeli wars in 1949,
1956, 1967, and 1973. Its observers have subsequently adapted to the region’s more recent wars
in 1978–2000, 2006, 2008–2009, 2012, 2014, as well as the ongoing war in Syria, which started in
2011. As an observer mission, UNTSO was unable to prevent hostilities in the region, but it has been
a valuable source of independent information and a training ground for generations of peacekeepers.
UNTSO is composed of military observers who provide reports and assessments about regional
developments and impacts across the mission’s area of operations. To connect the five countries in its
area of operations, UNTSO developed a regional liaison architecture: It deploys military observers to
the UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF, see Section 6.2) and the UN Interim Force in Lebanon
(UNIFIL, see Section 6.4) in support of the implementation of their respective mandates. UNTSO also
maintains liaison offices in Egypt, Lebanon, and Syria and carries out liaison functions with Jordan and
Israel from its headquarters. Although it peaked at over 570 observers, during the twenty-first century,
its size has fluctuated between 30 and a few hundred personnel. These arrangements are complicated.
As a former head of UN peacekeeping put it in 2015, “from a management standpoint closing UNTSO
certainly would make sense, maintaining the mission makes the political point that the conflict between
Israel and its Arab neighbours remains a single big issue”.1 Like UNMOGIP, UNTSO is financed from the
UN regular budget because it was established before the current financial system for UN peacekeeping
was created in the 1970s.
During the twenty-first century, UNTSO had to cope with the growing power of non-State actors, such
as Hezbollah and Hamas, as well as certain States designating these groups as “terrorist” organizations.
As of mid-2020, the mission has suffered 52 fatalities. The deadliest recent incident occurred on 25 July
2006, when four of its personnel in Lebanon were killed in an Israeli Air Force strike on Khiam during
the Israel-Hezbollah War.2
Over the last few years, UNTSO has seen increased military activity in the Sinai Peninsula, mainly
involving Egypt’s counter-terrorism operations there. In 2014, the mission also had to withdraw from
some observation positions in the Golan Heights because of spillover issues from the Syrian War.
Specifically, the closure of the established Al-Qunaytirah crossing between the Bravo side (Syria) and the
Alpha side (Israeli-occupied Golan) limited the ability of UNTSO observers to inspect military positions
and investigate alleged violations on the Bravo side. This situation persisted until 2018, when the Syrian
government regained control of most of the relevant areas, and UNTSO began redeploying some of its
observers.3 Finally, there have been increased tensions in the UNIFIL area of operations since the Israel
Defense Force discovered underground tunnels that crossed the Blue Line.4
2015), 65–66.
2) Andrew Theobald, “UNTSO” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 129.
3) UN General Assembly, Proposed programme budget for 2020, A/74/6 (Sect.5)*, 10 April 2019, 43.
108
Figure 6-1 UNTSO Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2020

For decades, UNTSO observers have acted “as the eyes and ears of the international community
in extremely tense circumstances”.5 Of course, the mission has not been able to fulfil its mandate in
the absence of cooperation between the conflict parties. Yet despite the major problems in the region,
it is important to recall that UNTSO has facilitated cooperation. As Andrew Theobald, Research and
Collections Officer with The Memory Project, concluded, “[a]ll of the parties, no matter how unbending
on major issues, cooperated on other levels, especially when assisted by UNTSO observers”.6
Section 6.2 The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF)

The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) is another long-standing peacekeeping operation
outside Africa established in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War, when Egypt and Syria launched a
coordinated invasion of Israel. The result was a dispute over the territory of the Golan Heights: Because
Syria had used it as an entry point for its invasion, Israel argued that it needed to occupy it as a matter
of self-defence. Security Council resolution 339 demanded that both parties return to their pre‑war
positions.
However, ceasefire violations were frequent, and a demilitarized zone was deemed necessary.
This involved demarcating lines to create both an “area of separation” that neither military was
allowed to occupy and an “area of limitation” that banned certain types of military assets. At its widest
point, in the mountainous north, the demilitarized zone is 10 kilometres wide, but in some areas, fewer
than 500 metres separate the two sides.
Then-Secretary-General Kurt Waldheim summarized UNDOF’s job as being to “maintain the

cease‑fire and see that it is scrupulously observed”. To that end, UNDOF was mandated to maintain the
5) Theobald, “UNTSO”, 130.

6) Theobald, “UNTSO”, 130–131.
109
Figure 6-2 UNDOF Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2020

ceasefire between Israel and Syria; supervise the disengagement of their forces; monitor compliance
with areas of separation and limitation created by the May 1974 Agreement on Disengagement; and
mark and remove minefields in the areas of operation.7
UNDOF’s roughly 1,000 personnel monitor the demilitarized zone from about 40 observation posts
as well as by patrolling. They also check the wider buffer zone to ensure both parties comply with
the agreement. As well as demining, UNDOF also has to engage with civilians who reside in several
settlements inside the demilitarized zone and hence need transport in and out of the zone.
During the twenty-first century, the mission experience was business-as-usual until the outbreak
of war in Syria in 2011. UNDOF’s problems started when Syrian troops moved into the demilitarized
zone to fight various rebels who sought to access it.8 In March 2013, a Syrian-based Palestinian rebel
group, the Yarmouk Martyrs Brigade, ambushed 21 Filipino peacekeepers travelling in a convoy and
threatened to hold them hostage until the Syrian government withdrew from the Golan. Fortunately,
the peacekeepers were released within a few days. However, in 2014, a Syrian jihadist group called
Jabhat al-Nusra kidnapped over 40 Fijian peacekeepers and besieged a base containing approximately
70 Filipino peacekeepers. The Filipino contingent chose to battle its way out over two days of intense
fighting with al-Nusra, while the Fijian hostages were released unharmed a month later.
Following these attacks, some troop-contributing countries withdrew, including the Philippines and
Austria. To fill the gap, Ireland deployed over 100 additional peacekeepers. Also, as noted above, the
UN promoted UNDOF to withdraw peacekeepers from the demilitarized and buffer zones on the Syrian
side, returning only four years later. In March 2019, the situation experienced yet more turbulence
7) As summarized in Peter Rudloff and Paul Diehl, “UNDOF” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et
al. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015), 239.
8) Rudloff and Diehl, “UNDOF”, 242.
110
when US President Donald Trump recognized Israel’s 1981 annexation of the Golan Heights, a move
that jeopardizes the entire basis of the 1974 agreement.9
Overall, like other observation missions, UNDOF was able to stabilize the area while the belligerents
cooperated but was unable to stop outbreaks of violence or control wider international political
developments that affected its area of operations.
Section 6.3 The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM)

The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) is another completed UN peacekeeping operation
that took place outside of Africa. This operation was established in April 1991 in the aftermath of the
first US-led invasion of Iraq and subsequently closed down in October 2003 in the aftermath of the
second US-led invasion of Iraq.
Figure 6-3 UNIKOM Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2003

Security Council resolution 687 tasked UNIKOM to monitor a demilitarized zone between Iraq and
Kuwait, as well as provide assistance to other missions operating in Iraq, notably, the UN Special
Commission (UNSCOM) and the UN Iraq–Kuwait Boundary Demarcation Commission, which operated
until mid-1993. More specifically, UNIKOM was to monitor the Khawr Abd Allah waterway and a
demilitarized zone, extending 10 kilometres into Iraq and 5 kilometres into Kuwait; deter violations of
the boundary by surveilling the demilitarized zone; and observe any potentially hostile action mounted
from either State against the other.10 In February 1993, the Security Council expanded UNIKOM’s
mandate to include the right to use force to prevent violations of the demilitarized zone and the new
Iraq-Kuwait border. To achieve these tasks, UNIKOM’s military strength peaked at nearly 1,200 troops in
9) Security Council resolution 497 (1981) demanded Israel rescind its annexation and declared Israel’s “decision to impose its laws, jurisdiction and
administration in the occupied Syrian Golan Heights is null and void and without international legal effect”.
10) Cited in Jan Bury, “UNIKOM” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 314–315.
111
1995. But it had considerable political support inasmuch as it was the first UN peacekeeping mission to
include troops from all five permanent members of the Security Council.11 The US-led invasion of Iraq in
March 2003 signalled the end of UNIKOM, and it was closed down in October after the Security Council
determined that Iraq no longer posed a threat against Kuwait.
UNIKOM’s most urgent activities came in the first few years after the first Gulf War, but tensions
flared again in 1998 after the air strikes conducted by the US and UK as part of Operation Desert Fox.
By the end of 2000, Iraq accused UNIKOM of turning a blind eye to violations of the demilitarized
zone and attacks from Kuwait’s side. In a letter to the UN Secretary-General, Iraq alleged 7,824
violations between 17 December 1998 and 31 December 2000 had gone unreported by UNIKOM.12 The
Secretary‑General did not agree with all of them, but UNIKOM clearly became politicized. In September
2001, Iraq expelled four UNIKOM peacekeepers, and in 2002, air violations increased. When the US-led
coalition invaded Iraq in March 2003, the UN Secretary-General suspended UNIKOM, and its personnel
were withdrawn.
Overall, therefore, UNIKOM only partially achieved its mandate. As Jan Bury, Assistant Professor
at Cardinal Stefan Wyszyński University, concluded, US and British forces “acted beyond the control of
UNIKOM and engaged alleged military targets in Iraq before diplomatic options had been exhausted”. As
a result, UNIKOM failed to report violations by Iraq’s adversaries, further enraging the Iraqi government
until it was overthrown in the invasion.13
Section 6.4 The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL)

UN peacekeepers have been deployed in southern Lebanon since 1978 and remain there today. The
twenty-first century started with a significant breakthrough for the long-standing UN Interim Force in
Lebanon (UNIFIL). UNIFIL was established in 1978 following Israel’s invasion of Lebanon. Its mandate
was to confirm the withdrawal of Israeli forces, restore international peace and security, and assist
the Lebanese government to restore effective authority in the area.14 In the year 2000, Israel finally
completed its withdrawal, and UNIFIL started to draw down.
However, UNIFIL did not complete the part of its mandate about restoring the Lebanese government’s
authority in the south of the country. The main issue here was the government’s relationship with
Hezbollah, a Shiite Muslim political party and resistance movement based in Lebanon that emerged in
1982. After years of considerable tension, in September 2004, Security Council resolution 1559 called
for the “disbanding and disarmament of all Lebanese and non-Lebanese militias”. But the resolution was
imprecise on what counted as a militia and how they should be disbanded.15 The following year witnessed
considerable political turbulence in Lebanon with a string of killings and assassinations — including of
former Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri — and the withdrawal of Syrian troops from the country. For UNIFIL,
however, the major test came in 2006.
In July 2006, open war broke out between Israel and Hezbollah. After a Hezbollah incursion into
Israel killed three soldiers and captured another two, Israel responded with a major bombing and
11) Bury, “UNIKOM”, 315.

14) See: Alexandra Novosseloff, “UNIFIL” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
15) Lise Howard, Power in Peacekeeping (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019), 98.
112
Figure 6-4 UNIFIL Uniformed Personnel, 2000–2020

a maritime and ground campaign that targeted Hezbollah compounds but also Lebanese towns and
infrastructure, including airports, harbours, roads, and bridges. Hezbollah then attacked numerous
Israeli positions and towns. The war lasted just over one month and killed an estimated 1,500 people.16
UNIFIL peacekeepers remained in their positions throughout, suffering 16 injured and five killed during
July and August.17 There was some discussion of withdrawing the mission, but it remained in place.18
On 11 August 2006, resolution 1701 expanded UNIFIL in several ways. It increased the mission’s
authorized strength from about 2,000 troops to 15,000 and expanded its original mandate, including by
adding the unusual element of a Maritime Task Force. The Maritime Task Force was partly to persuade
Israel to stop its own maritime blockade of Lebanon and partly to try and stop maritime shipments of
arms getting through to Hezbollah. UNIFIL’s new mandate included monitoring the ceasefire; helping
to ensure humanitarian access to civilian populations and the voluntary and safe return of displaced
persons; supporting the Lebanese armed forces to deploy throughout the south of the country and
establish a demilitarized area between the Blue Line and Litani River for all actors except the government
of Lebanon and UNIFIL; and helping Lebanese authorities secure the country’s borders.19
Fortunately, UNIFIL was able to deploy many of these additional troops quickly after the ceasefire.
Unlike UNIFIL I, which maintained a largely fixed posture in observation posts, UNIFIL II established
over 60 positions and checkpoints and carried out regular vehicle and foot patrols, about 10 per cent
of them with the Lebanese army.20 The mission also held regular “tripartite” meetings with senior
officials from the Lebanese and Israeli armed forces — but not Hezbollah — and set up a “hotline” for
16) Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace, 212.

17) Alexandra Novosseloff, “UNIFIL II” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
18) Guéhenno, The Fog of Peace, 216–217.
19) The “Blue Line” or “Line of Withdrawal” is a demarcation of the Israel-Lebanon border released by the United Nations in June 2000. It was used to
help determine when Israeli forces had withdrawn from Lebanon but does not constitute the legal border between Israel and Lebanon.
20) Novosseloff, “UNIFIL II”, 773.
113
dedicated communications. UNIFIL also carried out a range of assistance projects — including medical
and veterinarian aid and infrastructure repair — to endear itself with the local population, and regularly
engaged with them, especially via its several hundred civil affairs officers.21
UNIFIL II was notable in three other important respects: the diplomatic compromise that governed
its potential use of force, the way in which it was kept distinct from the political peacemaking process,
and the comparatively large number of European contributors and subsequent command and control
arrangements.
First, resolution 1701 was a diplomatic compromise. While Israel’s principal concern was to deploy
a force robust enough to secure its northern border, Lebanon was against UN peacekeepers wielding
Chapter VII enforcement powers, as was Hezbollah.22 Hence, while a purely monitoring mandate was
unacceptable, so was an enforcement operation that might try and forcibly disarm Hezbollah. In the
end, the mandate permitted UNIFIL “to take all necessary action” to fulfil its mandate but without
mentioning Chapter VII explicitly.
The most controversial issue remained what role UNIFIL should play in disarming militias in its
area of operations — this was UN code for the process of transforming Hezbollah into a political party.23
As the US ambassador to Lebanon at the time put it, “Just as stopping Israel’s violations of Lebanon’s
air space is beyond UNIFIL’s abilities, physically disarming Hezbollah was never going to make it into
a mandate”.24 Beyond UNIFIL’s capacity, the other key point was that Hezbollah grew less and less
dependent on arms hidden in southern Lebanon. Over time, it could quickly acquire weapons from
beyond UNIFIL’s area of operations, rendering the weapons-free zone south of the Litani River less
crucial.25
The situation became even more complicated when, in 2008, Hezbollah became part of the Lebanese
government. Although UNIFIL was not authorized to disarm Hezbollah forcibly or secure the Lebanese
border alone, it was supposed to assist the Lebanese army and ensure that southern Lebanon did not
become a staging post for attacks on Israel. This was ambitious, to say the least. As the then-head of
UN peacekeeping acknowledged, “[t]here was always a certain naivete in the expectation that a UN
military force could achieve in south Lebanon what decades of Israeli occupation could not”.26
Second, UNIFIL’s tasks were kept distinct from the political process of peacemaking in Lebanon.
This was reflected in the fact that the mission has no Special Representative of the Secretary-General
(SRSG), only a Force Commander.27 While diplomats are supposed to move forward the political peace
process in Lebanon, UNIFIL was to focus on defusing tensions — and landmines — around the Blue
Line and communicate with the conflict parties to ensure war did not break out again. As noted above,
UNIFIL established several mechanisms to do this.
Third, UNIFIL II was rare inasmuch as it received large numbers of European troops, the first
UN peacekeeping operation to do so in a decade. By December 2006, Europeans — notably France,
Italy, Spain, and Germany — provided 70 per cent of the force, although the number reduced to
21) Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 117–120.
24) Jeffrey Feltman, “Debating UN peacekeeping in Lebanon”, Brookings Institution, 15 June 2020. Available from: <https://www.brookings.edu/blog/
order-from-chaos/2020/06/15/debating-un-peacekeeping-in-lebanon/>.
25) Feltman, “Debating UN peacekeeping in Lebanon”.
114
Syrian soldiers on patrol in the city of Saida in

Lebanon. 25 March 1978. UN Photo #123365
by John Isaac.
about 30 per cent by 2014.28 This signalled the region’s strategic importance to Europe, but it was not
sufficient to guarantee European participation. Changes also had to be made to UNIFIL’s command and
control structures before the European contributors would integrate into the mission. Specifically, a
new structure for UN peacekeeping was established called a strategic military cell (SMC) based at UN
Headquarters. With a staff of about 30 officers, this became a conduit between the mission commander
and UN Headquarters to ensure the troop contributors had greater control over the mission’s operational
direction.29 The SMC was dissolved in 2010.
Throughout its operations, both Israel and Hezbollah have put significant pressure on UNIFIL. Israel
distrusted UNIFIL’s monitoring abilities and continued its own aviation activities — with planes and
drones — over the area. Hezbollah used its local supporters to monitor the peacekeepers and stop
them from searching villages that hid its arms caches.30 Peacekeepers were also regularly harassed by
locals, who sometimes threw stones and stole equipment. In June 2007, a particularly deadly incident
occurred when six Spanish peacekeepers were killed by a car bomb that targeted their patrol. Even with
over 10,000 soldiers, UNIFIL had to tread carefully since its forces could be over-powered by Israel or
Hezbollah. Over time, therefore, UNIFIL became more of an observer rather than an executor of any
coercive pressure on the conflict parties. However, its relatively large number of troops did saturate
some areas, depriving Hezbollah some of the freedom of movement it had enjoyed under the earlier
smaller force.
More recently, a few major developments occurred. One was the spillover effects of the war in Syria.
Not only did this see huge numbers of refugees flee to Lebanon, but fighters from various parties also
came into close proximity to UNIFIL’s eastern sector, and many Hezbollah troops travelled into Syria to
fight. Another was the discovery in late 2018 of underground tunnels dug by Hezbollah from Lebanon
into Israel, in clear violation of Security Council resolutions. The tunnels also suggested that UNIFIL had
failed to stop the area from becoming a potential staging ground for attacks on Israel. It once again
raised the issue of how UNIFIL could best influence Hezbollah.
Finally, UNIFIL II’s increased size meant it had a greater impact on the local economy in southern
Lebanon, with the mission becoming the largest formal-sector employer in the area.31 The level of
28) Novosseloff, “UNIFIL II”, 771–772.

29) Center on International Cooperation, Global Peace Operations Review, 86.
31) Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 82.
115
economic dependence on UNIFIL meant that the local population was reluctant to see the mission leave
or significantly downsize.32
Overall, it is fair to say that UNIFIL lowered the level of tension between the three sides, including
by enabling the Israeli withdrawal in 2000. However, its mandate was not focused on tackling the
root causes of the dispute. As the UN Secretary-General noted in 2006, UNIFIL cannot be “expected
to achieve by force what must be realized through negotiation and an internal Lebanese consensus”.
He added: “Nor can a reinforced UNIFIL be a substitute for a political process.”33 In fact, this is what
happened. The UN interim force in Lebanon thus spent the first two decades of the twenty-first century
without an obvious way out.
Section 6.5 The UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)

For about three months during 2012, the UN deployed peacekeepers to monitor an ostensible
ceasefire in Syria’s brutal civil war. Although it was officially active between April and August 2012, the
roughly 300 military observers and 100 civilian staff in the UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)
suspended most of their ground operations in mid-June. In that short time, they were bombed, shot at,
and had their movements regularly restricted. As a result, the mission had almost no impact on the
war’s wider dynamics. UNSMIS, therefore, stands as a salutary example of the dangers and limitations
of traditional UN peacekeeping if military observers are deployed to monitor a ceasefire when in reality,
the parties to the conflict do not feel bound to any cease fire but instead continue their combat
operations.
Figure 6-5 UNSMIS Uniformed Personnel

The short life cycle of UNSMIS was the result of two fundamental problems. The first was increasing
disagreements in the Security Council, especially among the permanent five members, over the roles
32) Howard, Power in Peacekeeping, 91, and 125 and Novosseloff, “UNIFIL II”, 773.
33) Cited in Novosseloff, “UNIFIL II”, 776.
116
UNSMIS should play. As Richard Gowan, UN Director at the International Crisis Group, and Tristan
Dreisbach, Senior Research Specialist with Innovations for Successful Societies at Princeton University,
concluded, “[t]he lack of diplomatic cohesion behind UNSMIS was arguably the most important factor in
ensuring its ultimate failure”.34 In brief, in the run-up to the establishment of UNSMIS, Russia and China
were concerned that the Security Council had authorized too much interference in Libya’s civil war in
2011 and did not want a repeat in Syria. While China was more concerned with the general principles
of peacekeeping, Russia was a long-standing supporter of President Bashar al-Assad’s regime and had
military bases in Syria. The second fundamental problem was events on the ground in Syria, specifically
the collapse of the ceasefire and peace process the peacekeepers were supposed to observe and help
facilitate.
Warning signs were apparent even before UNSMIS deployed. In December 2011, the Arab League
deployed a small monitoring mission after criticizing Assad’s response to the uprisings earlier that year.
These unarmed monitors had little impact, not least because they were escorted around by Syrian
military personnel. After appealing to the UN for assistance, the Arab League suspended its monitoring
mission in January 2012 before this option could be fully explored.35 On 22 January, the Arab League
called for President Assad to resign, and on 4 February, Morocco tabled a Security Council resolution
on behalf of the League, endorsing this position. China and Russia vetoed the resolution despite the
support of all other members of the Council.36
Later that month, UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon appointed Kofi Annan as his Special
Representative on Syria. Annan devised a six-point peace plan that envisaged a Syrian-led process
to stop the war with support from “an effective United Nations supervision mechanism”. Annan’s plan
involved:
1. An inclusive Syrian-led political process;
2. A UN-supervised cessation of armed violence;
3. Timely provision of humanitarian assistance;
4. Release of arbitrarily detained persons;
5. Freedom of movement for journalists; and
6. Respect for freedom of association and the right to demonstrate

peacefully.37
The Security Council endorsed the plan on 21 March 2012. According to the plan, “(a) cease troop
movements towards population centres, (b) cease all use of heavy weapons in such centres, and (c)
begin pullback of military concentrations in and around population centres, and to implement these in
their entirety”.38
34) Richard Gowan and Tristan Dreisbach, “UNSMIS” in The Oxford Handbook of UN Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
35) Gowan and Dreisbach, “UNSMIS”, 843.
37) Cited in Gowan and Dreisbach, “UNSMIS”, 844.
38) UN Security Council, Letter dated 25 May 2012 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Letter from the Secretary-
General, S/2012/363, 25 May 2012, 1.
117
On 1 April, the Syrian government committed to cease hostilities on 12 April and pull its troops back
from cities. On 14 April, the Security Council unanimously adopted resolution 2042, which authorized
30 unarmed military observers to deploy to Syria and requested the Secretary-General to propose how
best to configure a UN supervision mechanism.39 The first members of this advance team arrived in
Damascus two days later. The UN was able to deploy its initial personnel rapidly by drawing on personnel
already serving with the UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO, see section 6.1).40 On 21 April,
Security Council resolution 2043 established UNSMIS for a period of just 90 days. It comprised 300
unarmed military observers and a civilian component of about 120 staff. The mission’s mandate was to
monitor a cessation of armed violence and facilitate the implementation of Annan’s six-point peace plan.
UNSMIS headquarters was established in Damascus along with planned team sites in Aleppo, Daraa,
Deir ez-Zor, Hama, Homs, Idlib, and Rif Damascus. The mission was declared fully operational by the
end of May.
On the positive side, UNSMIS observers promoted localized confidence-building measures, such as
prisoner exchanges and a pilot project to restore critical public services in Homs.41 They also managed
to observe the release of a few hundred detainees. On 25 May, the first Secretary-General report on
UNSMIS noted that there had been some reduction in the intensity of fighting in areas where UNSMIS
deployed and hence the mission “appears to be having a calming effect” in some local areas.42 For
example, UNSMIS brokered some local level de‑escalation, including on 15 May, when the mission
organized a ceasefire between the Syrian army and opposition forces in neighbourhoods of Deir ez-Zor.43
However, things quickly deteriorated, including in opposition-dominated areas where frustrated

locals started threatening UNSMIS observers.44 UNSMIS also faced other challenges. First, in New York,
competing visions for the mission divided the Security Council. While Russia viewed UNSMIS as “a
minimal presence that left its allies in Damascus maximum room for maneuver”, the Western States
wanted UNSMIS “to place as many limits as possible on the Syrian government and potentially act as a
tripwire for further action if Damascus did not comply”.45
Second, in the field, the war escalated again in May, and UNSMIS personnel were targeted. On 9
May, for instance, Syrian soldiers guarding a convoy carrying the UNSMIS Force Commander General
Robert Mood were wounded in a bomb blast.46 On 15 May, an explosion damaged three UN vehicles
near Hama.47 On 20 May, there was an explosion in Douma near Damascus, very close to UN observers
being led by General Mood and then-Under-Secretary-General Hervé Ladsous (who was visiting Syria
with Jean-Marie Guéhenno, Annan’s deputy). Several other reports noted UNSMIS convoys being affected
by improvised explosive devices (IEDs), small arms fire, or stoning.48 The Secretary-General’s report in
39) Security Council Report, “UNSMIS (Syria): May 2012 Monthly Forecast”, 30 April 2012. Available from: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
monthly-forecast/2012-05/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_8075185.php>.
42) UN Security Council, Letter dated 25 May 2012 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 2.
47) UN Security Council, Letter dated 25 May 2012 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, 3–4.
48) Security Council Report, “UNSMIS (Syria): June 2012 Monthly Forecast”, 1 June 2012. Available from: <https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/
monthly-forecast/2012-06/lookup_c_glkwlemtisg_b_8102687.php>.
118
late May concluded that “[t]he situation poses serious security challenges to the implementation of the
mandate of UNSMIS, as well as risks for our observers”.49
Third, as a result of these problems, UNSMIS could not apply any significant pressure on the conflict
parties. A good example of the mission’s weakness was the massacre at El-Houleh, near Homs, on 25
May. After investigating the massacre, which included producing a widely disseminated video, UNSMIS
concluded that Assad’s forces perpetrated the atrocity with heavy weaponry, which killed over 100 people,
including 49 children. Such shelling violated Security Council resolutions 2042 and 2043, which called
to cease the use of heavy weapons and withdraw from population centres.50 Yet the only consequence
was a press statement issued by the Security Council, its weakest form of official communication. This
undoubtedly emboldened the Syrian government.
As a result of these problems, UNSMIS could not

effectively implement its mandate, and the conflict
parties increasingly ignored it. The mission could not
gain information or access to detention centres, nor
could it “systematically monitor and report” either
journalists’ freedom of movement or peaceful protests.
Under these circumstances, on 16 June, General
Mood suspended the mission’s field activities. Back
in New York, the UN Secretary-General summarized
four options for the mission’s future: maintain the
same size and posture, withdraw, expand its military
observation capacity or add an armed protection
element, or shift to civilian functions and redeploy in
Damascus, perhaps with no further field presence.51
While several Western States pushed for a 45- Major General Stefano Del Col, Force Commander
day mandate extension and a threat of sanctions and head of UNIFIL, reviews the guard of honour at
a ceremony held at UNIFIL headquarters to observe
against Syria if the government did not “visibly and
the International Day of United Nations Peacekeepers.
verifiably” fulfil its commitments under the Annan The ceremony had a limited attendance in order to
Plan, this resolution was vetoed by China and Russia prevent the spread of the COVID-19 virus. The day
offers a chance to pay tribute to the uniformed and
on 20 July. Later that day, Security Council resolution
civilian personnel’s invaluable contribution to the work
2059 gave UNSMIS 30 days to withdraw. Half of its of the organization and to honour more than 3,900
military observers were drawn down starting 25 July; peacekeepers who have lost their lives serving under the
UN flag since 1948, including 102 in 2019. 29 May 2020.
on 2 August, Kofi Annan announced he was resigning
UN Photo #842193 by Pasqual Gorriz.
due to lack of international support for his plan, and
UNSMIS officially ended operations on 19 August.
So ended the shortest UN peacekeeping mission of the twenty-first century. UNSMIS was a victim of
Security Council division, a host State that was never committed to cooperating with the mission, and
a war that raged on regardless. Under such conditions, UN observers could never have any significant
impact. Indeed, it was fortunate that many of them were not killed.
51) Gowan and Dreisbach, “UNSMIS”, 848 and 850.
119
1. In which of the following countries does 5. The two permanent members of the
the UN Truce Supervision Organization Security Council that acted beyond
(UNTSO) NOT have a presence? the control of the UN Iraq-Kuwait
Observation Mission (UNIKOM) to
A. Syria
engage alleged military targets in Iraq
B. Israel were _____.
C. Jordan
A. France and the United Kingdom
D. Iraq
B. Russia and China
2. In 2014, why did the UN Truce C. the United States and the United Kingdom
Supervision Organization (UNTSO) D. the United States and France
decide to withdraw from some
observation positions in the Golan 6. The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation
Heights? Mission (UNIKOM) was the first UN
peacekeeping operation to _____.
A. One of the troop-contributing countries
withdrew from the mission. A. include a Maritime Task Force
B. The mission ran out of money. B. include an Aviation Task Force
C. There were spillover issues from the war in C. demarcate an international border
Syria. D. include troops from all five permanent
D. The Security Council began to draw down members of the Security Council.
the mission.
7. In 2006, the UN Interim Force in
3. In 2014, troops from which contributing Lebanon II (UNIFIL II) was the
country in the UN Disengagement organization’s first peacekeeping
Observer Force (UNDOF) fought their operation to establish a _____ at UN
way out of their besieged base? Headquarters.
A. Joint Mission Analysis Centre
A. Fiji
B. Strategic Military Cell
B. The Philippines
C. All Source Information Fusion Unit
C. Ireland
D. Information and Strategic Analysis Cell
D. Austria
4. In 2014, which country deployed over 8. The UN Interim Force in Lebanon

100 additional peacekeepers to plug the (UNIFIL) was particularly notable for
gap when several troop‑contributing including a(n) _____.
countries withdrew from the UN A. Maritime Task Force
Disengagement Observer Force B. Aviation Task Force
(UNDOF)?
C. quick reaction force
A. France
D. tank battalion
B. Sweden
C. Austria
D. Ireland
120
9. Which permanent member of the

Security Council was a long-standing
supporter of President Bashar al-Assad’s
regime and had military bases in Syria?
A. China
B. France
C. Russia
D. United States
10. Whose peace plan was the UN

Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS)
mandated to help facilitate?
A. Ban Ki-moon’s
B. Kofi Annan’s
C. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization’s
D. The European Union’s
Answer Key »
1. D
2. C
3. A
4. D
5. C
6. D
7. B
8. A
9. C
10. B
121
LESSON
7 UN Stabilization Operations
The Security Council’s first

regular use of the term
“stabilization” came during
debates in 1994 about how
to deal with the aftermath of
Rwanda’s genocide.
UN Photo #361931 by Marco Dormino.
Section 7.1 Stabilization and UN • Explain how the concept of “stabilization” has
Peacekeeping been used in debates about UN peacekeeping
and some of the key operational and political
Section 7.2 MINUSTAH in Haiti
questions raised by such missions.
Section 7.3 MONUSCO in the Democratic
• Provide an overview of the four UN peace
Republic of Congo
operations with the word “stabilization” in
Section 7.4 MINUSMA in Mali their title. Specifically, MINUSTAH in Haiti
(2004–2017), MONUSCO in the Democratic
Section 7.5 MINUSCA in the Central African
Republic of Congo (2010–present), MINUSMA
Republic
in Mali (2013–present), and MINUSCA in the
Central African Republic (2014–present).
122
LESSON 7 | UN Stabilization Operations
UN peacekeepers visited a remote community in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), where Civilian Liaison Assistants work
to create a link between the UN Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO) and communities whose civilians MONUSCO seeks to
protect from violence. 12 July 2013. UN Photo #556775 by Myriam Asmani.
Introduction
This lesson examines how the UN has operationalized the
concept of “stabilization” in its peace operations. It does so by
briefly summarizing how the concept has been used in debates
about UN peacekeeping and some of the key operational and
political questions raised by such missions. The rest of the lesson
then provides an overview of the four UN peace operations with
the word “stabilization” in their title. Specifically, MINUSTAH in
Haiti (2004–2017), MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo
(2010–present), MINUSMA in Mali (2013–present), and MINUSCA
in the Central African Republic (2014–present).
123
Section 7.1 Stabilization and UN Peacekeeping

The Security Council’s first regular use of the term “stabilization” came during debates in 1994
about how to deal with the aftermath of Rwanda’s genocide.1 However, it really arrived on the Council’s
agenda during the 2000s when stabilization activities were discussed in numerous meetings about
peace operations, UN cooperation with regional organizations, and country-focused meetings on Haiti,
the DRC, Afghanistan, Somalia, Bosnia, and Kosovo. As Lise Howard, Professor in the Department of
Government at Georgetown University, and Alexandra Stark, Senior Researcher for the Political Reform
programme at New America, put it:
“[A]chieving stabilization arose as an approach to ending

civil wars after increasing recognition of the barriers to
democratization and nation-building in Afghanistan, Iraq, and
elsewhere. Stabilization sets the bar for success much lower
than the approaches of the immediate post-Cold War period.
[The central]…aim [is] to ensure that terrorist and other
organizations perceived as security threats cannot take root.”2
The frequency of use did not generate a consensus over the meaning of “stabilization”, and the UN
did not offer a general definition of the term. Indeed, governments, international organizations, Security
Council resolutions, and analysts have all used the term “stabilization” in vague and inconsistent ways.
As discussed below, all four UN peace operations with “stabilization” in their titles defined the concept
differently. This was useful for the Security Council because it meant its missions could remain flexible
to fit the distinct needs of unique local contexts.3 Bellamy and Williams define stabilization in the context
of peace operations as efforts to support “the transfer of territorial control from illegitimate non-State
armed groups to legitimate authorities, which need not always necessarily be central governments”.4
With reference to UN peace operations, the different approaches to stabilization share four similar
characteristics.5 First, stabilization is considered a strategic objective that encompasses a mixture
of civilian and military activities. Second, stabilization activities take place in contexts of ongoing
violence without a comprehensive ceasefire or peace agreement. Third, stabilization usually involves
recovering territory from “spoilers” — actors that use military force to disrupt peace processes. In other
words, it entails reclaiming “territory controlled by non-State armed actors that have been deemed
politically illegitimate by UN Member States, the host State government, and/or parties to a peace
agreement”.6 However, this is not always synonymous with the extension of State authority, and not all
non‑government actors should be considered spoilers. Fourth, stabilization aims to reach an endpoint
where foreign peacekeepers help build a sustainable local order that would enable them to leave.
Understood in these terms, stabilization operations have posed some vexing questions for the United
Nations. One issue was the extent to which new stabilization practices break with the basic peacekeeping
principles of the UN. The main issue here is whether stabilization missions have eroded the principle
1) Lise Howard and Alexandra Stark, “How Civil Wars End”, International Security, Vol. 42, No. 3, 2018, 166.
2) Howard and Stark, “How Civil Wars End”, 141–142.
5) Williams with Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 203–204.
6) Aditi Gorur, Defining the Boundaries of UN Stabilization Missions (Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center, 2016), 21. Available from: <https://
www.stimson.org/2016/defining-boundaries-un-stabilization-missions/>.
124
Stabilization »
Bellamy and Williams
define stabilization in the
context of peace operations
as efforts to support “the
transfer of territorial control
from illegitimate non-State
armed groups to legitimate
authorities, which need not
A large boulder with a message of peace at the Katale base of the UN Organization
always necessarily be central
Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO). 22
governments”. October 2015. UN Photo #677696 by Abel Kavanagh.
of impartiality by making UN peacekeepers parties to the armed conflict in which they are deployed.
The answer is unclear. In simplified terms, the argument is that UN peacekeepers in these operations
have effectively become “pro-State and anti-rebel”, especially when they have named certain “spoiler”
groups as targets. This led to an ongoing debate over whether the United Nations should revise its
basic peacekeeping principles in order to incorporate stabilization activities, or whether the organization
should stop conducting stabilization operations and stick with peacekeeping operations that abide by
the existing principles. By mid-2020, the UN has not redefined its basic principles of peacekeeping.
Assuming stabilization is a worthwhile endeavour for UN peacekeepers, a second question revolves

around how they can strike the right balance between military and civilian activities. It has long been
clear that military force alone cannot build stable peace. This required civilian-led activities such as
institution-building and the establishment of good governance, economic reconstruction, and national
reconciliation. In order to deliver the ultimate goal of legitimate governance over a territory, civilian
capabilities would hold the key.
A related question centred on what capabilities are required to conduct stabilization operations
effectively. Were they beyond what the UN force generation system could reasonably be expected to
deliver? And would stabilization operations inevitably create a large gap between means and ends — a
problem that caused no end of challenges for earlier peace operations? If so, was it better not to deploy
under-resourced missions in the first place?
A fourth question was whether stabilization operations provided what one analyst called “morally
and politically dubious support” for questionable regimes.7 Where host governments were deeply corrupt
and predatory towards some of their citizens, and where significant segments of the local population
considered them illegitimate, was it morally right for UN peacekeepers to support them?
Finally, a related debate revolved around the best way to deal with non-State actors that controlled
significant territory, especially if those actors were considered reasonably legitimate by the local
population. As Aditi Gorur, Senior Fellow and Director of the Protecting Civilians in Conflict Program at
the Stimson Center, has noted, “[i]f a peacekeeping operation supports the transfer of territorial control
7) Peter Rudolf, “UN Peace Operations and the Use of Military Force”, Survival, Vol. 59, No. 3, 2017, 174.
125
from one abusive entity to another, it cannot meaningfully claim to have supported stabilization”.8 But
how should UN peacekeepers engage with such abusive entities if they cannot be defeated militarily and
engaging them in political dialogue might enhance their legitimacy?
Section 7.2 MINUSTAH in Haiti
Figure 7-1 MINUSTAH Uniformed Personnel

The UN first used “stabilization” to describe one of its peace operations in 2004. The UN Stabilization
Mission in Haiti (MINUSTAH) deployed in the aftermath of the coerced exile of the country’s President,
Jean-Bertrand Aristide, on a US aircraft on 29 February 2004. This prompted the Security Council to
authorize a multinational interim force of some 3,000 troops from the US (1,800), France (530), Chile
(330), and Canada (150). They kept order in the capital, Port-au-Prince, before being replaced by
MINUSTAH in June. A transitional government run by an international technocrat, Gérard Latortue, was
installed to govern the country until elections were held in 2006. They saw Aristide’s former associate
René Préval elected to power.
Part of the reason why stabilization seemed appropriate in Haiti was that the UN did not face a
traditional inter-State or civil war but rather a series of interrelated and long-running problems related
to bad governance, corruption, and organized crime. This meant that the key task was not to facilitate
peace between warring factions but support the establishment of a functioning government and security
sector. Indeed, MINUSTAH was the fifth UN peacekeeping operation in Haiti since the mid-1990s, all of
which had focused in one way or another on trying to reform the Haitian National Police.
Established in April 2004, MINUSTAH initially comprised some 6,700 troops and more than 1,600
police but would peak after 2010 at approximately 13,000 uniformed personnel, including some 4,400
police. It was the first large mission of the UN with a majority of troops from Latin American contributors.
8) Gorur, Defining the Boundaries, 23.
126
Under Chapter VII, MINUSTAH was given a three‑pronged mandate. The first element was to create
a secure and stable environment, including by supporting the transitional government and national
police in re-establishing law and order and protecting civilians. The second part of the mandate involved
supporting a political process, including by assisting the organization of elections and the extension of
State authority. The third involved monitoring the human rights situation.9
MINUSTAH’s operations can be roughly divided

into four phases.10 The initial period from 2004 to
2006 saw the mission focus exclusively on stabilizing
the country after Aristide’s exile and providing
security for the 2006 elections. Initially, MINUSTAH
sought stabilization through three specific channels:
“the disarmament, demobilization, and reintegration
(DDR) of former members of the Haitian military
forces; the neutralization of urban gangs and
their incorporation into DDR programmes; and a
purging of the Haitian national police”.11 MINUSTAH
did not have an executive policing mandate to
arrest individuals based on its own investigations,
Bangladesh Air Force Peacekeepers serving with
so when the mission conducted major anti-gang MINUSTAH hold a ceremony to mark the termination of
operations during this period, it partnered with the their operations and the beginning of their withdrawal
from Haiti, ahead of MINUSTAH’s closing on 15 October
Haitian police to make arrests.12 Starting in one
2017. 22 September 2017. UN Photo #736522 by Logan
of Port-au-Prince’s largest slums, Cité Soleil, in Abassi.
December 2004 and July 2005, MINUSTAH police

and troops had limited success. Overall, this was a turbulent time for Haiti, with an estimated 8,000
people murdered and 35,000 women sexually assaulted between February 2004 and December
2005.13 UN peacekeepers contributed to such statistics through the use of force and sexual
exploitation and abuse (SEA) (see below). Overall, however, Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, Senior Lecturer
at the Coral Bell School of Asia Pacific Affairs at the Australian National University, concluded that
“[h]ad it not been for the UN’s presence, the transitional government would probably have been engulfed
in the 2004–2006 surge of violence”.14
In phase two, from 2006 to 2010, the priority was securing turbulent parts of Port-au-Prince by
coercing “armed gangs” and reforming the security sector. During 2006 and 2007, MINUSTAH conducted
another series of military and police operations against gangs using special weapons and tactics (SWAT)
and Formed Police Units as well as Brazilian troops. These measures resulted in the arrest of principal
gang leaders and approximately 800 of their followers.15 This time, the mission had a new Joint Mission
Analysis Centre (JMAC) that collected quite sophisticated information about the gangs. In 2008,
10) Nicolas Lemay-Hébert, “MINUSTAH” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford
11) Lemay-Hébert, “MINUSTAH”, 722.
12) David Beer, “Haiti” in Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace, ed. Michael Dziedzic (Lanham: Rowman & Littlefield, 2016),
125–135.
15) Michael Dziedzic and Robert Perito, Haiti: Confronting the Gangs of Port-au-Prince (US Institute of Peace Press Special Report 208, 2008). Available
from: <https://www.usip.org/publications/2008/09/haiti-confronting-gangs-port-au-prince>.
127
MINUSTAH also acquired a maritime unit that worked with the Haitian coastguard to patrol the country’s
maritime borders. While this forceful approach brought some short-term benefits, it could neither deter
illicit activities nor address the broader political economy in which such criminal activity flourished.
MINUSTAH did try some less combative approaches, including by establishing a community violence
reduction programme in 2007. This tried to create economic and social opportunities with a view to
diverting gang members from violence.16 Phase two saw a major scandal in 2007, when over 100 Sri
Lankan soldiers in MINUSTAH were repatriated after allegations of SEA, including SEA against minors.17
MINUSTAH’s third phase began after the January 2010 earthquake. The earthquake is estimated
to have injured between 200,000 and 300,000 people, killed between 65,000 and 316,000, and
destroyed most of the State apparatus.18 Once again, security was a top priority, along with recovery
and reconstruction programmes. Not long after the earthquake, however, MINUSTAH was embroiled in
a major scandal related to a cholera outbreak that began in Mirebalais, in the Artibonite region. It killed
more than 8,000 people and affected over 670,000. The outbreak’s origin was hypothesized to have
been caused by the peacekeepers in MINUSTAH.19 Many local people were furious and took to the streets
demanding that MINUSTAH leave the country and attacking mission personnel. It took another six years
of acrimonious arguments for the UN to acknowledge its responsibility in the outbreak. MINUSTAH’s
local popularity fell still further with continued SEA allegations during 2011, this time against Pakistani
and Uruguayan soldiers.20
MINUSTAH’s fourth and final phase involved its drawdown and transition, which officially began
in October 2012, when Security Council resolution 2070 cut its uniformed strength by about 4,000 to
6,270 troops and 2,601 police. During this time, MINUSTAH continued its efforts to reform the security
sector but without using much military force. After a few more years, MINUSTAH reduced its military
component, eventually to zero. By April 2017, MINUSTAH was transitioned into the new UN Mission for
Justice Support in Haiti (MINUJUSTH). MINUJUSTH’s job was to assist the government of Haiti in further
developing the Haitian National Police, strengthening Haiti’s rule of law institutions, including the justice
sector and prisons, and promoting and protecting human rights. It was composed of about 350 civilian
staff and nearly 1,300 police (seven Formed Police Units and nearly 300 individual officers). It left Haiti
in 2019.

17) “The United Nations today announced that it will repatriate more than 100 Sri Lankan peacekeepers serving with the UN Stabilization Mission in
Haiti (MINUSTAH) on disciplinary grounds.”, UN News, 2 November 2007. Available from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2007/11/238162-haiti-
over-100-sri-lankan-blue-helmets-repatriated-disciplinary-grounds-un>.To learn more about SEA and violence against children, please see our
Preventing Violence Against Women and Promoting Gender Equality in Peacekeeping and UN Military Specialised Training Materials on Child Protection
courses. Available free from: <https://www.peaceopstraining.org/courses/preventing-violence-against-women-english-2019/> and <https://www.
peaceopstraining.org/courses/child-protection-english-2020/>, respectively.
19) “Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon today named four top medical experts to an independent panel to investigate the cause of a cholera epidemic
in Haiti amid media reports that Nepalese peacekeepers from the United Nations mission there may have been the source.”, UN News, 6 January
2011. Available from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/01/363552-haiti-ban-appoints-four-top-medical-experts-probe-source-cholera-epidemic>.
For more information, see: “Haiti cholera outbreak ‘stopped in its tracks’”, UN News, 24 January 2020. Available from: <https://news.un.org/en/
story/2020/01/1056021>; Sher Bahadur Pun, “Understanding the Cholera Outbreak, Haiti”, Emerging Infectious Diseases, Vol. 17, No. 11 (2011).
Available from: <https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3310591/#>.
20) Lemay-Hébert, “MINUSTAH”, 725. For more information, see: “Uruguay to probe alleged sexual misconduct by its UN peacekeepers in Haiti”, UN
News, 9 September 2011. Available from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2011/09/386122-uruguay-probe-alleged-sexual-misconduct-its-un-
peacekeepers-haiti>; “Haiti: Three UN peacekeepers repatriated for sexual abuse”, UN News, 13 March 2012. Available from: <https://news.un.org/
en/story/2012/03/406312-haiti-three-un-peacekeepers-repatriated-sexual-abuse>.
128
Figure 7-2 MONUSCO Uniformed Personnel

Section 7.3 MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo

The word “stabilization” was not used to describe another UN peace operation until 2010. This time it
was in the DRC, where the existing UN mission MONUC (discussed in Lesson 2) was transitioned into the
new United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the DRC (MONUSCO). The change came about
after the DRC’s President, Joseph Kabila, criticized the mission and called for its withdrawal. MONUSCO
was the political compromise whereby the Security Council acknowledged that its peacekeeping in
the country had entered a “new phase”. MONUSCO’s focus henceforth would be on civilian protection,
stabilizing eastern DRC, and peace consolidation activities in the west of the country.21 It would become
one of the largest-ever UN peace operations, peaking at an authorized strength of 22,000 uniformed
personnel at the cost of about $1.3 billion per year.22
In the east of the country, the main problem was persistent low-intensity warfare, while in the
west, the main problem was a corrupt political system. In the east, MONUSCO faced well over 100
armed factions, many of whom behaved less like rebels with political agendas and more like mafia-style
criminal rackets. This was not surprising given the terrible legacy of colonialism, which had left the east
with little infrastructure and a dismal formal economy but lots of illicit trading in minerals and other
commodities.
UN peacekeepers in MONUC had, in fact, used stabilization well before the 2010 transition to
MONUSCO. It always generated confusion, and a popular phrase emerged within the mission: “If it
helps, it stabilizes.”23 In 2005, stabilization was used to describe the mission’s efforts to restore State
21) Alan Doss, “MONUSCO” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 803–817.
22) See: Alexandra Novosseloff et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of MONUC-MONUSCO (NUPI, EPON report, 3/2019, 2019). Available from: <https://
effectivepeaceops.net/publication/monusco/>.
23) Hugo de Vries, Going Around in Circles: The Challenges of Peacekeeping and Stabilization in the Democratic Republic of Congo (The Hague:
Clingendael Institute, 2015), 63. Available from: <https://www.clingendael.org/sites/default/files/pdfs/going_around_in_circles.pdf>.
129
authority over parts of the eastern province of Orientale. In 2008, after the government signed the
Goma Agreement with some 20 armed groups, MONUC created a small stabilization office to help
implement the deal and, in 2009, developed the I4S: the International Security and Stabilization
Support Strategy. Here, stabilization involved a wide range of military and civilian activities focused on
five areas: protection of civilians, support for the institutions of democratic governance, security sector
reform, defence of human rights and the rule of law, and restoration of State authority and economic
infrastructure.24
Between 2009 and 2012, MONUSCO took on a more proactive role supporting Congolese military
operations and filling vacuums left by the absence of State institutions in order to reduce conflict. For
many years, the Congolese military was a major perpetrator of abuses against civilians. But by this stage,
some units were becoming more effective. Drawing on Western counter-insurgency doctrine, MONUSCO
developed its own “clear–hold–build” sequence to restore the State’s authority. It did so by helping the
government to deploy police and public administrators to recovered areas and helping to revive the
rural economy by investing in public works such as road-building and agricultural investment.25 Only
with a revived economy was there hope that DDR programmes for ex-combatants would work.
After 2012, the I4S strategy was substantially revised to focus on helping the State and local society
to build mutual accountability and capacity to address the drivers of violent conflict. Instead of the
broadly top-down approach, MONUSCO adopted a new focus on localized drivers of conflicts over power,
land, and identity and on relations between local communities and the State.26 MONUSCO also tried to
encourage organized community dialogues that would enable its peacekeepers to devise stabilization
activities “based on local understandings of what was creating violence”.27 The mission also borrowed
the idea of “community violence reduction” programmes from MINUSTAH to provide manual labour
projects for unemployed youths, along with attempts at community policing activities. MONUSCO also
established “islands of stability”, where UN personnel deployed alongside Congolese officials to areas
recovered by joint military operations.
The most widely reported development during this period was MONUSCO’s battle against the M23
rebel group. In November 2012, the M23 rebels captured the eastern city of Goma, the hub for most
humanitarian activities in eastern DRC. In response, the Security Council authorized a Force Intervention
Brigade (FIB) to carry out “targeted offensive operations” against groups threatening civilians. The FIB
was composed of three infantry battalions; enabling units and force multipliers, including an artillery
battery; a special forces company; a signals unit; and support components. The troops came from
Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania. At this stage, MONUSCO also became the first UN peacekeeping
operation to have unarmed drones under mission command, although a contractor flew the drones. The
high-power cameras on-board meant that they were used mainly in rescue missions, route planning,
and subsequent UN enforcement action against rebel groups.28
During 2013, the FIB fought alongside the Congolese army against M23, effectively defeating the
rebels by the end of the year. Fighting was particularly intense during August 2013, when the M23
24) Doss, “MONUSCO”, 805–813.

25) Hugo de Vries, The Ebb and Flow of Stabilization in the Congo (Rift Valley Institute, PSRP Briefing Paper 8, 2016), 2. Available from: <http://riftvalley.
net/publication/ebb-and-flow-stabilization-congo>.
26) de Vries, The Ebb and Flow, 2.
27) de Vries, The Ebb and Flow, 2.
130
shelled Goma and the FIB-supported Congolese army operations with artillery, mortars, and attack
helicopters until the rebels withdrew. In November 2013, FIB artillery and attack helicopters were used
once again to inflict a decisive defeat on the rebels at the battle of Tchanzu. In late December 2013 and
early 2014, MONUSCO deployed the FIB’s Tanzanian battalion to support Congolese army operations
against another rebel group, the Allied Democratic Forces (ADF). But this did not have a similarly
decisive result, and the FIB would end up fighting the ADF rebels again during 2015 and 2016 during
Operation Sekula. These operations suggested that MONUSCO saw stabilization as requiring military
operations and the neutralization of armed groups to enable additional non-military activities.29
If MONUSCO’s role in the east of the country was to manage multiple armed groups, in the west, its
principal task was ensuring a relatively smooth and fair political process, including presidential elections,
which were held in 2011 and 2018. In the November 2011 presidential elections, Joseph Kabila won
again with about 50 per cent of the votes. But international observers considered the electoral process
too violent, opaque, and suffering from too many irregularities to be viewed as accurately reflecting
the will of the people. Under considerable international pressure, President Kabila did not run in the
December 2018 presidential elections, being constitutionally ineligible for a third term. This saw Felix
Tshisekedi win a more closely fought race. But once again, a number of international bodies concluded
that the electoral process was far from free and fair. Nevertheless, Tshisekedi remained President.
Overall, MONUSCO confronted three fundamental challenges in trying to stabilize the DRC. First,
the DRC government — based in Kinshasa — kept its representatives in the east purposefully weak
so as to be in a better position to manipulate them on behalf of private interests. The government
often used its security forces to pursue this agenda. Second, MONUSCO did not have the capabilities
to counter such dynamics and was limited to applying a relatively small set of technical interventions
to essentially political problems.30 Third, the mission was unable to stop various neighbouring States
fuelling instability in the DRC.31
As a result, Hugo de Vries’ verdict was that MONUSCO’s technical interventions were unable to
resolve political conflicts and hence could not stabilize eastern DRC; the central government was not
interested in peacebuilding in the east; and the Security Council and key donors proved unwilling to
sustain support for more complicated forms of local political engagement, focusing instead on broad
political processes, such as regional diplomacy, elections, and the FIB.32 Alan Doss, a former head of
MONUC, put it more diplomatically: “[T]he single most important lesson” from MONUSCO was that
“stabilization in the absence of effective security is just not possible. However, over time, security cannot
be sustained without the essential ingredients of stabilization: rule of law and economic progress.”33
Section 7.4 MINUSMA in Mali

The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) was the third
UN stabilization operation. Deployed in April 2013, it was mandated to stabilize key population centres
and support the re-establishment of State authority throughout Mali. It was one of six international
military operations sent to Mali since 2012: two French-led operations — Serval and Barkhane; three
29) Gorur, Defining the Boundaries, 9–10.

30) de Vries, Going Around in Circles, 4.
31) Novosseloff et al., Assessing the Effectiveness of MONUC-MONUSCO, 19.
32) de Vries, Going Around in Circles, 5 and de Vries, The Ebb and Flow, 4.
33) Doss, “MONUSCO”, 813.
131
multidimensional missions deployed by ECOWAS, the AU, and the UN; and a European Union training
mission to strengthen Mali’s security and defence forces. MINUSMA took over from the AU mission, the
African-led International Support Mission to Mali (AFISMA), which is discussed in Lesson 8.
The crisis that generated these missions was a rebellion led by Tuareg armed groups and an array of
transnational jihadis, including the National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad (MNLA), Ansar
al-Dine, the Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO), and al-Qaeda in the Islamic
Maghreb (AQIM). In their wake, the Malian security forces effectively collapsed, leaving the capital city,
Bamako, vulnerable. In March 2012, the president fled from an ostensible military coup orchestrated by
disgruntled officers complaining about their conditions.
In response, ECOWAS authorized a stabilization force but did not have the logistical resources to
deploy it. As a result, no international forces arrived until January 2013, when the Malian government
asked France to deploy Operation Serval, a force of about 4,000 troops. France conducted air strikes and
ground operations to stop the rebel advance, protect European nationals, and restore stability.34 After that,
ECOWAS forces (MICEMA) arrived with the help of external logistical and airlift assistance. The ECOWAS
operation quickly transitioned into an AU operation, AFISMA, numbering approximately 6,800 troops
and police.35 However, the AU was not able to sustain this operation because it suffered from capability
gaps in staffing, funding, equipment, military enablers and specialist units, intelligence‑gathering, and
training for desert warfare. With France seeking a relatively quick exit strategy for most of its troops,
Paris pushed for AFISMA to transition into a larger UN force, which happened in July 2013.
Under resolution 2100 (25 April 2013), the Security Council authorized MINUSMA to “[s]tabilize
key population centres and support the re-establishment of State authority throughout the country,
especially in the north of Mali, and deter threats and take active steps to prevent the return of armed
elements in those areas”. Stabilization was one component of a broad mandate, which also entailed
protecting civilians, supporting the country’s transitional political roadmap, promoting human rights,
supporting humanitarian assistance, preserving cultural and historic sites from attack, and supporting
national and international justice mechanisms.
Unlike most UN peace operations in Africa, MINUSMA attracted a significant number of European
personnel. The EU also established a training mission, which, by October 2018, claimed it had trained
almost 13,000 members of the Malian military. European States were particularly concerned about
Mali, given the potential of instability across the Sahel to produce more refugees in Europe. By late
2014, most European militaries had also left Afghanistan and hence had more capacity to devote to UN
peacekeeping. The Netherlands provided the key initial contribution, deploying 450 personnel (along
with more than 200 national support elements), including a special operations land task group. In
2015, following terrorist attacks in France, President Emmanuel Macron triggered Article 42.7 of the
Lisbon Treaty to persuade Germany to contribute to MINUSMA. In 2016, Germany deployed around
600 soldiers to Gao to take over from the Dutch.36 On the downside, in some respects, MINUSMA
became a de facto two-tier mission, as some European countries bunkered their personnel in “gated
34) Sergei Boeke and Bart Schuurman, “Operation ‘Serval’: A Strategic Analysis of the French Intervention in Mali, 2013–2014”, Journal of Strategic
Studies, 38:6 (2015), 801–825.
35) Walter Lotze, “MINUSMA” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford University Press,
2015), 854–864.
36) Arthur Boutellis and Michael Beary, Sharing the Burden: Lessons from the European Return to Multidimensional Peacekeeping (International
Peace Institute, January 2020), 3. Available from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2020/01/lessons-from-the-european-return-to-multidimensional-
peacekeeping>.
132
Figure 7-3 MINUSMA Uniformed Personnel

communities” or “camps within camps” — the practice of using separate ID cards for UN staff entering
camps within‑camps.37
MINUSMA deployed into an active war zone. The interim Ouagadougou Preliminary Agreement of
June 2013 was signed between two rebel groups (the MNLA and the Haut conseil pour l’unité de l’Azawad)
and the interim government in Bamako. But violence continued, and in May 2014, the government
lost the northern town of Kidal. At this point, Algeria led a mediation effort known as the inter-Malian
peace talks. There were so many rebel groups that they assembled into semi-united “platforms”.
Over time, they signed three increasingly comprehensive and inclusive agreements culminating in the
Algiers Accord in June 2015. With the reduction of French forces down to about 1,000 troops, MINUSMA
was left to take back the rebel-held territory in the north. The mission’s mandate was changed to
prioritize expanding its presence in the north, assisting the implementation of the peace agreement,
and strengthening Mali’s armed forces, among other activities.38
Not surprisingly, such an agenda required a sophisticated understanding of the operating

environment. MINUSMA, therefore, became something of an “intelligence laboratory” for UN
peacekeeping. The mission was given the most innovative and sophisticated intelligence mechanisms of
any UN peace operation. In addition to a regular JMAC, MINUSMA acquired the United Nations’ first-ever
450-person All Sources Information Fusion Unit (ASIFU), as well as two ISR (Intelligence, Surveillance,
and Reconnaissance) units provided by the Netherlands and Sweden, a Dutch helicopter detachment,
and a Dutch Special Operations Land Task Group, all of which gathered various types of intelligence.
Unfortunately, three major political and technical problems reduced their effectiveness. As Sebastiaan
Rietjens, Associate Professor at the Netherlands Defence Academy and Reserve Major in the Netherlands
army, and Dr. Walter Dorn, Professor of Defence Studies at the Canadian Forces College and the Royal
37) Boutellis and Beary, Sharing the Burden.

133
Military College of Canada, observed, most of these

innovative intelligence capabilities were based on
advanced NATO procedures, but African soldiers who
had greater cultural familiarity and knew more of
the locally spoken languages mostly populated the
main force. As a result, two tiers were created within
MINUSMA: NATO-countries with access to information
in the classified NATO databases and the rest. The
rest even included Sweden, which contributed many
personnel to the ASIFU. Second, several innovative
intelligence units produced comprehensive reports
focusing on longer-term conflict and political dynamics
in Mali, whereas MINUSMA’s military leadership
Sweden is one of the major troop contributors to
valued current and security-related intelligence far MINUSMA. A Swedish peacekeeper on Patrol in Timbuktu.
more. Third, intelligence contributions by military 11 October 2018. UN Photo #782271 by Harandane
Dicko.
and civilian actors were largely presenting without
context and lacked sufficient sharing, coordination,
and integration.39
As MINUSMA advanced in order to gain control of urban centres, it encountered considerable

resistance. Along with its intelligence-gathering mechanisms, MINUSMA also deployed attack helicopters,
including Apache helicopters from the Netherlands. They first engaged in combat on 20 January 2015, in
response to rebels firing close to peacekeepers and civilians while conducting an offensive on the town
of Tabankort, north of Gao. After firing warning shots, a helicopter destroyed a rebel rocket launcher.
Less than two months later, however, a technical malfunction resulted in one of the Apache helicopters
crashing, resulting in the loss of its two crew members.40 MINUSMA also faced significant threats from
IEDs and attacks on its convoys and bases. So serious was the threat of attack on the mission that
the United Nations deployed counter-artillery radar to warn of incoming rockets and mortar fire for the
first time.41 However, even with special US support and training in counter-improvised explosive device
techniques, MINUSMA suffered numerous casualties, especially peacekeepers from poorer countries.
MINUSMA also deployed the first-ever tethered balloon, known as an aerostat, in the history of UN
peacekeeping. A French company, Thales, was contracted to send it aloft above the UN base in Kidal.
It hovered over 300 metres in the air and was equipped with a high-resolution camera to consistently
observe the area and warn of incoming attacks. However, during a major attack on the Kidal camp on
12 February 2016, rebels used mortars, rockets, and ground forces and killed six Guinean peacekeepers
and wounded 30 more before soldiers from Mali and MINUSMA neutralized the attack. Shrapnel from
the explosions damaged the aerostat, which took months to repair. The aerostat was later destroyed in
a sandstorm, highlighting its relative vulnerability.42
39) Sebastiaan Rietjens and Walter Dorn, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence” in Perspectives on Military Intelligence from the First World War to
Mali, ed. Floribert Baudet et al. (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2017), 197–219.
40) Rietjens and Dorn, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence”, 208.
42) Rietjens and Dorn, “The Evolution of Peacekeeping Intelligence”, 209–210.
134
In June 2016, Security Council resolution 2295 mandated MINUSMA to “stabilize the key population
centres and other areas where civilians are at risk, notably in the north and centre of Mali, and, in
this regard, to enhance early warning, to anticipate, deter and counter threats, including asymmetric
threats, and to take robust and active steps to protect civilians”. It was also tasked for the first time to
“counter asymmetric attacks”, including against named armed groups — AQIM, Ansar al-Dine, MUJAO,
and al-Mourabitoun — that the UN labelled as terrorists and threats to international peace and security.
Overall, MINUSMA experienced several major challenges that limited its ability to implement its
mandate.43 First, it was deployed only to Mali, while several rebel and organized criminal groups were
transnational, operating across the Sahel’s international borders. Second, there was no consensus or
shared understanding of what activities constituted or led to stabilization. This was apparent across
the different French, AU, and UN operations, as well as across different contingents and components
within MINUSMA. Third, MINUSMA quickly started to suffer the highest rate of casualties of any UN-led
operation. The mission’s fourth problem was the weaknesses of Mali’s security forces. Not only were
they poorly equipped, but they were also often unprofessional, with many locals in the north of the
country viewing them as illegitimate. Between January 2016 and June 2017, for example, MINUSMA
documented 608 cases of human rights violations and abuses, 288 of which were attributable to State
actors, more than any single rebel group.44 Finally, MINUSMA could not effectively protect local civilians
and sometimes endangered them because their presence attracted attacks from various rebels.
Section 7.5 MINUSCA in the Central African Republic

The Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
was the fourth and final UN peace operation to include “stabilization” in its title. Like MINUSMA in Mali,
it was also one of several operations deployed in CAR, it contained a “re-hatted” set of personnel from
an earlier African Union force, and France was the principal diplomatic force behind its creation. Overall,
MINUSCA had to deal with a very large and underdeveloped country where the government was in
control of perhaps 40 per cent of its territory.45 Furthermore, movement was difficult and slow, and the
rainy season rendered roads impassable for six months of the year, making air travel the only way to
reach much of the country. When trying to protect civilians, a priority in its mandate, the mission had to
deal with both this tough environment and an array of militias and bandits. Simultaneously, MINUSCA
was working to improve the local security forces, which had a tendency to use violence regularly against
civilians, especially Muslims.
Since 1997, CAR hosted nearly a dozen international peace operations and peacebuilding initiatives
deployed by the UN and regional organizations, as well as long-standing French and more recent South
African bilateral military deployments.46 They were designed to quell a series of army mutinies, coups,
civil war, and mass atrocities. The round of instability that led to MINUSCA’s deployment began in 2012,
when a rebel alliance led by Michel Djotodia, known as the Séléka and composed predominantly of

44) Cited in Williams with Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 215.
45) The Primacy of Protection: Delivering on the MINUSCA Mandate in the Central African Republic (Washington, DC: CIVIC, 2017), 25. Available from:
<https://civiliansinconflict.org/wp-content/uploads/2017/09/CIVIC-MINUSCA-Report_WEB.pdf>.
46) Nathaniel Olin, “Pathologies of Peacekeeping and Peacebuilding in CAR” in Making Sense of the Central African Republic, ed. Tatiana Carayannis and
Louisa Lombard (London: Zed Books, 2015), 194–218.
135
Figure 7-4 MINUSCA Uniformed Personnel

Muslims, marched on the capital of Bangui.47 The resulting stalemate led to the signing of the Libreville
Agreement of January 2013.
However, the agreement quickly collapsed as embattled President François Bozizé refused to
implement its provisions. The rebels then marched on the capital again, overwhelming a force of South
African troops that had been deployed to support Bozizé and the roughly 700 peacekeepers who had
been stationed in Bangui since 2008 by the Economic Community of Central African States. The Séléka
overthrew Bozizé on 24 March, but Djotodia struggled to control the various parts of his loose alliance,
and widespread looting and atrocities were perpetrated, especially against the majority Christian
population. This stimulated the formation of self-defence militias known as the “Anti-balaka” (literally,
anti-machete in the local Sango language). They continued the cycle of vengeance by attacking civilians
from CAR’s Muslim minority. Some of the most brutal and well equipped of these attacks were composed
largely of Bozizé supporters and Pentecostal church movements, Bozizé’s power base.48 Banditry also
increased.
In December 2013, the African Union deployed a stabilization mission of about 5,800 troops and
police known as MISCA (African-led International Support Mission to the Central African Republic). By
this stage, more than 900,000 people (nearly 20 per cent of the country’s population) were forcibly
displaced, with over 100,000 sheltering at the Bangui-M’Poko International Airport. The AU peacekeepers
worked in parallel with a French force of 1,200 troops, Operation Sangaris, also authorized by the
Security Council. Some local Muslims accused the French of favouring the Christian anti‑Balaka groups
and undermining only the Séléka. In contrast, the contingent of AU troops from neighbouring Chad were
suspected of supporting the Séléka. They were expelled from MISCA after Chadian soldiers fired into a
47) This summary draws from Williams with Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 215–217.
48) Tatiana Carayannis and Mignonne Fowlis, “Lessons from African Union–United Nations cooperation in peace operations in the Central African Republic”,
African Security Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2017, 224.
136
crowd of Christians, killing 24 and injuring over 100. In June 2014, a battalion of about 700 European
Union troops was also deployed. But the AU force proved unable to sustain itself, and hence most of its
peacekeepers were “re-hatted” in September 2014 and integrated into MINUSCA.
Security Council resolution 2149 (2014)

authorized MINUSCA to focus on protecting civilians;
supporting the transition process to form a new
government; facilitating the delivery of humanitarian
assistance; promoting and protecting human rights;
supporting national and international justice and
the rule of law; and ensuring the disarmament,
demobilization, reintegration, and repatriation of
former combatants. To deal with the generally lawless
environment, MINUSCA was granted authority to
take “urgent temporary measures…to maintain
basic law and order and fight impunity”. This meant
UN peacekeepers were allowed to arrest and detain Security Council members hold an open videoconference
in connection with MINUSCA. 22 June 2020. UN Photo
individuals who were undermining the peace or the
#844007 by Loey Felipe.
political and reconciliation process.
In Bangui, MINUSCA often had to ensure public security and deal with mob and criminalized violence.
In 2015, the mission established a joint military and police task force that had a unified command
structure but was led by the police component. In its first few months, it arrested some high-value
targets, mainly non-State actors who targeted Muslim residents of Bangui and sometimes international
forces. After renewed violence later that year, the task force was placed back under military command.49
Unfortunately, during 2014, reports emerged of French forces and international peacekeepers
engaging in SEA of children. Leaks of further allegations of SEA by peacekeepers followed. The UN
Office of Internal Oversight Services initially took the lead on this investigation and made inquiries into
those suspected of leaking this information to the press. However, as political pressure increased to
respond to the scandal, in August 2015, the UN Secretary-General asked the head of MINUSCA, General
Babacar Gaye, to resign. It was the first time the head of a UN peacekeeping operation was removed
due to his failure to stop SEA within the mission.50
During 2015 and 2016, most of MINUSCA’s efforts went into securing the consultative processes
leading up to the presidential and legislative elections. In March 2016, Faustin Touadera was sworn
in as President, ending the country’s two-year political transition. After the elections, in July 2016,
Security Council resolution 2301 revised MINUSCA’s mandate to provide “support for the reconciliation
and stabilization political processes, the extension of State authority and the preservation of territorial
integrity”. By then, MINUSCA had an authorized strength of some 10,750 troops and just over
2,000 police, although not all of them were deployed. It used its forces to reduce the threat posed
by armed groups through a three-pronged strategy of supporting the political process and extending
State authority; implementing DDR, SSR, and community violence reduction projects; and combating

50) “Ban vows to act quickly after report finds UN failed to respond ‘meaningfully’ to Central African Republic abuse allegations”, UN News, 17 December
2015. Available from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2015/12/518392-ban-vows-act-quickly-after-report-finds-un-failed-respond-meaningfully-
central>.
137
The Central African Republic held run-off

presidential elections between two former Prime
Ministers, Anicet-Georges Dologuele and Faustin-
Archange Touadera. The country also held a
re-run of the 30 December 2015 legislative
elections. Parfait Onanga-Anyanga (centre),
Special Representative of the Secretary-General
and head of MINUSCA, with peacekeepers at
a polling station. 14 February 2016. UN Photo
#663862 by Nektarios Markogiannis.
impunity and promoting reconciliation.51 Between 2013 and 2016, the mission helped redeploy outside
of the capital 14 prefects, 71 sub-prefects, 176 mayors, and several hundred other civil servants,
mostly from the education sector, and fund the rehabilitation of 80 administrative buildings through
Quick Impact Projects (QIPs).52
In 2017, a Portuguese quick-reaction force (QRF) deployed to MINUSCA. Composed of about 160
soldiers, it could be deployed for up to 30 days anywhere in CAR. But because of heavy wear and tear
on vehicles, weapons, and other equipment, it then required 30 days of rest and recuperation.53 The
QRF often engaged in firefights and developed a good track record of working with other contingents
in MINUSCA, including Senegalese attack helicopters (for air-ground operations), Bangladeshi special
forces, and Nepalese and Rwandan troops.54
But using force was not enough. In April 2018, for example, MINUSCA partnered with local security
forces in Operation Sukula to try and dislodge predatory armed criminal groups operating in Bangui’s
PK5 district.55 However, much of the violence, especially outside the capital, was perpetrated by small,
localized, and incoherent militias or criminal groups, which military force alone couldn’t eliminate. Nor
could peacekeepers resolve the critical questions related to identity and citizenship that lay at the heart
of much of the country’s political violence. Subsequently, the mission tried to broker more local peace
deals to quieten particular hot spots.
By late 2018, MINUSCA was still facing a situation where multiple political processes were in play,
it was unclear how the use of military force could advance the mission’s overall political agenda, CAR’s
national security forces and State authorities were still very weak, and the fundamental issues of identity
and citizenship remained unresolved.56
51) UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic, Report of the Secretary-General, S/ 2016/ 565, 22 June 2016, para. 33–49.
52) UN Security Council, Special Report of the Secretary-General on the strategic review of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization
Mission in the Central African Republic, para. 21.
53) Boutellis and Beary, Sharing the Burden, 5.
54) Boutellis and Beary, Sharing the Burden, 6–7.
55) PK5 is the name of the Muslim-majority district in CAR. To learn more, visit: Boris Modeste Yakoubou, “Central African Republic: What is PK5?”, 6 June
2018. Available from: <https://www.kaiciid.org/news-events/news/central-african-republic-what-pk5>.
138
1. Which of the following is true about the 5. In 2009, the United Nations Organization
definition of “stabilization” in UN peace Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
operations? Republic of Congo (MONUSCO)
developed an International Security and
A. “Stabilization” was clearly defined during
Stabilization Support Strategy focused
debates in 1994 about how to deal with the
on how many areas of activity?
aftermath of the Rwandan genocide.
A. One
B. There is a clear consensus on the definition
B. Three
throughout scholarly literature.
C. Five
C. A vague definition of “stabilization” is useful
D. Seven
for the UN to retain the concept’s flexibility.
D. All four peace operations with “stabilization” 6. In 2013, the United Nations Organization
in their titles define the concept identically. Stabilization Mission in the Democratic
Republic of Congo (MONUSCO) deployed
2. Do the new UN stabilization operations a Force Intervention Brigade comprised
break the organization’s basic principles soldiers from:
of peacekeeping?
A. Malawi, South Africa, and Tanzania
A. No
B. India, Pakistan, and South Africa
B. Sometimes
C. Malawi, South Africa, and Uganda
C. Always
D. South Africa, Tanzania, and Uruguay
D. The answer is unclear.
7. The UN Multidimensional Integrated
3. The United Nations Stabilization Mission Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)
in Haiti (MINUSTAH) was the _____ UN was the first UN peacekeeping operation
peacekeeping operation to deploy to the to include _____.
country since the mid-1990s.
A. a special forces company
A. third
B. remotely piloted vehicles
B. fourth
C. attack helicopters
C. fifth
D. an All Sources Information Fusion Unit
D. sixth
8. In 2016, the UN Multidimensional
4. Why was a stabilization mission Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali
considered appropriate for MINUSTAH? (MINUSMA) was mandated for the first
A. Because the UN faced a series of time to:
interrelated and long-running problems A. use unmanned aerial vehicles
related to bad governance, corruption, and B. counter asymmetric attacks
organized crime C. protect civilians
B. Because the UN faced a traditional inter- D. arrest known terrorists
State war
C. Because the key task was to facilitate peace
between warring factions
D. Because the key task was not to establish a
functioning government and security sector
139
9. The UN Multidimensional Integrated

Stabilization Mission in the Central
African Republic (MINUSCA) was
granted authority to take “urgent
temporary measures” in order to:
A. maintain basic law and order and fight
impunity
B. hold national elections
C. assume temporary administration of the
Central African Republic
D. capture members of the Lord’s Resistance
Army
10. In 2015, the UN Multidimensional

Integrated Stabilization Mission in the
Central African Republic (MINUSCA)
created a _____ to maintain order in the
capital city, Bangui.
A. transitional administration
B. joint task force
C. quick reaction force
D. neighbourhood watch system
Answer Key »
1. C
2. D
3. C
4. A
5. C
6. A
7. D
8. B
9. A
10. B
140
LESSON
8 Partnership Peacekeeping
“Partnership peacekeeping”
has become more common
than the other types of
partnerships that UN
peacekeepers have engaged
in.
UN Photo #424402 by Olivier Chassot.
Section 8.1 Partnership Peacekeeping in • Summarize why “partnership peacekeeping”

Theory and Practice became increasingly common during the
twenty-first century compared to the
Section 8.2 Hybrid Peacekeeping in Darfur
other types of partnerships involving UN
Section 8.3 A Support Package for Somalia peacekeepers.
Section 8.4 Sequential Peacekeeping: AU to • Analyse the UN-AU hybrid operation in Darfur
UN Transitions (UNAMID).
• Examine the unprecedented United Nations

logistical support mission in Somalia (UNSOA/
UNSOS).
• Discuss the central issues involved in the

sequential partnership and “re-hatting” of AU
personnel into UN peacekeeping operations in
Mali and the Central African Republic.
141
LESSON 8 | Partnership Peacekeeping
African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM) combat engineers help grade and repair a road linking Afgooye, a town in the Lower
Shabelle region of Somalia, with Mogadishu, the country’s capital. Seven months after the liberation of the Afgooye Corridor from the
extremist group al-Shabaab following “Operation Free Shabelle”, a joint AMISOM and Somali National Army (SNA) operation, repair
began as part of an effort to bring economic revival to the region. 24 January 2013. UN Photo #541584 by Stuart Price.
Introduction
This lesson examines the array of partnerships that UN peacekeepers
have developed with other organizations and actors during the twenty-first
century. It does so by briefly summarizing why “partnership peacekeeping”
became more common than the other types of partnerships that UN
peacekeepers engaged in. It then focuses on three illustrative examples
of different types of partnership peacekeeping. Section 8.2 provides a
case study of UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan, the only hybrid peace operation
conducted by the UN and AU. Section 8.3 provides a case study of the
unprecedented form of logistical support from the UN to the African
Union in Somalia, specifically the UN Support Office for the AU Mission in
Somalia (UNSOA). Finally, Section 8.4 examines the issue of sequential
partnerships through short discussions of the “re-hatting” of AU personnel
into UN peacekeeping operations in Mali and the Central African Republic.
142
Section 8.1 Partnership Peacekeeping in Theory and Practice

In one sense, all UN peacekeeping operations are based on partnerships: between the Security
Council, General Assembly, Secretariat, contributing countries, host government, local conflict parties,
as well as a range of private contractors. In the field, there have been many different forms of partnership
between troop- and police-contributing countries in UN peacekeeping operations.1 Two recent examples
will suffice. One was Norway, Belgium, Denmark, Portugal, and Sweden partnering to deploy a C-130
aviation unit to MINUSMA in 2016.2 Another recent case involved the United Kingdom partnering with
Viet Nam in UNMISS in South Sudan. Here, the UK — with support from the US and Australia — worked
for two years to prepare a Vietnamese contingent to take over the running of its level-II hospital in
Bentiu.3
UN peacekeeping operations also sometimes engage in field partnerships with one another. This is
known as “inter-mission cooperation”. It includes activities such as sharing assets among the missions,
joint planning on issues of shared concern, cross-border liaison and information sharing, “hot pursuit”
operations by peacekeeping forces, joint air patrolling, and shared border responsibilities. The UN
peacekeeping operations in West Africa provide some good examples.4 UNMIL, for instance, played a
cross-border role, first by deploying some of its military personnel to Sierra Leone to provide security
for the Special Court for Sierra Leone and later deploying military personnel, helicopters, and resources
to UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, as well as cooperating with UNOCI on border security tasks (see Lesson 3).5
Here, however, our focus is on UN collaboration with other entities, which this lesson will call
“partnership peacekeeping”.6 This refers to “situations where collaboration occurs between two or
more multilateral institutions and/or various bilateral actors in the same mission theatre”.7 During the
twenty‑first century, it has become increasingly frequent, especially in Africa. It has also raised some
important new opportunities and challenges for the UN.
As Williams and Bellamy have noted, there were several reasons why partnership peacekeeping
increased in frequency.8 First, widespread recognition that no single organization or actor can cope alone
with the multiple challenges to international peace and security. Second, although the UN remained the
predominant actor in the field, it had neither a legal monopoly on conducting peace operations nor
a practical monopoly on wisdom and innovation. Partnerships emerged because of a convergence of
interests or goals between these other actors and the UN. Part of the reason why such partnerships were
attractive was the different comparative advantages and weaknesses of the multiple actors involved,
which made a division of labour sensible. A third factor was the vague terminology of Chapter VIII of
the Charter of the United Nations regarding regional arrangements. Some partnerships grew from the
1) For some of the different types of combined deployments, see: Donald Daniel et al., Deploying Combined Teams: Lessons Learned from Operational
Partnerships in UN Peacekeeping (New York: International Peace Institute, 2015). Available from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2015/08/sharing-the-un-
peacekeeping-burden-lessons-from-operational-partnerships>.
2) Arthur Boutellis and John Karlsrud, Plug and Play: Multinational Rotation Contributions for UN Peacekeeping Operations (Oslo: NUPI, 2017). Available
from: <https://www.nupi.no/en/Publications/CRIStin-Pub/Plug-and-Play-Multinational-Rotation-Contributions-for-UN-Peacekeeping-Operations2>.
3) Arthur Boutellis and Michael Beary, Sharing the Burden: Lessons from the European Return to Multidimensional Peacekeeping (New York: International
Peace Institute, 2020), 24.
4) UN Security Council, Report of the Secretary-General on inter-mission cooperation and possible cross-border operations between the UN Mission in
Sierra Leone, the UN Mission in Liberia and the UN Operation in Côte d’Ivoire, Report of the Secretary-General, S/2005/135, 2 March 2005. Available
from: <https://undocs.org/S/2005/135>.
5) Kathleen Jennings, “UNMIL” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 701.
6) To my knowledge, the phrase was coined by Norrie MacQueen, Peacekeeping and the International System (London: Routledge, 2006).
143
Members of the Indonesian Formed Police Unit

working with the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID) plant trees outside UNAMID
headquarters in El Fasher to mark World
Environment Day. 5 June 2012. UN Photo
#516063 by Albert González Farran.
need to define what a strategic relationship between the UN and a regional arrangement might look
like, particularly when it might require the use of force. Fourth, partnerships sometimes grew out of
competition between actors who each wanted to lead the response to a particular crisis. In such cases,
partnerships were a result of diplomatic compromise to calm that competition. Finally, partnerships
became particularly common in Africa because the continent hosted by far the most peace operations
between 2000 and 2020.
It is possible to identify five generic types of partnership peacekeeping.9 First, simple cooperation
is a minimal type of partnership where different actors collaborate in the same theatre but without
establishing an official or formal relationship. A second model is sequential deployment, whereby one
actor passes the peacekeeping baton to another. These could involve entirely separate contingents
of peacekeepers, but more commonly, they involve some sort of “re-hatting” procedure where
peacekeepers on the ground simply change organizational authority. Two examples of the latter occurred
when AU personnel “re-hatted” into new UN peace operations in Mali and the Central African Republic.
These two cases are analysed in Section 8.4. Parallel operations represent a third form of partnership
peacekeeping, whereby two types of actors deploy concurrently within the same conflict zone. Examples
include observer operations such as UNOMSIL and ECOMOG in Sierra Leone (1998–2000) and UNOMIG
and the CIS (Commonwealth of Independent States) operation in Abkhazia/Georgia (1993–2009).
Hybrid operations represent a fourth type of partnership peacekeeping, where two institutions join
together to establish working procedures within a single mission. To date, the UN-AU hybrid operation in
Darfur (UNAMID) remains the only example, discussed in Section 8.2. Finally, there have been various
forms of support missions, whereby one actor delivers support packages (perhaps technical, financial,
and/or logistical) to another actor conducting a peace operation. One example is the UN Support Office
for the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA), discussed in Section 8.3.
The next sections of this lesson focus on three key examples related to partnership peacekeeping.
The first is a case study of the only hybrid operation conducted by the UN and AU in Darfur, Sudan. This
is followed by a case study of the unprecedented United Nations operation to provide logistical support
to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM). The final section examines the issue of sequential
partnerships through a case study of AU to UN transitions in Mali and the Central African Republic.
144
Figure 8-1: Models of Partnership Peacekeeping
Source: Williams with Bellamy, Understanding Peacekeeping, 47.
Section 8.2 Hybrid Peacekeeping in Darfur

On 1 January 2008, the United Nations-African Union Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) took
over from the much smaller African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS), which had been deployed since June
2004. The first hybrid mission of its kind, UNAMID was the result of a political compromise between
the UN and the government of Sudan over how to manage the war in the western region of Darfur.
The complicated system of dual authority in the mission involved senior representatives from both the
UN and AU, but in practical terms, the UN peacekeeping assessments paid for and supported UNAMID
logistically, and its peacekeepers wore the distinctive UN blue helmets. Overall, UNAMID ended up
making a terrible situation a bit better, but the hybrid model generated a lot of controversies, generally
negative in the UN, but more positive in the AU. As the war died down, UNAMID’s peacekeeping role
was increasingly questioned, the mission downsized, and it was slated to end during 2020. However,
the people’s revolution that toppled Sudan’s long-time dictator, President Omar al-Bashir, in April 2019,
stalled that timetable.
AMIS and UNAMID were both deployed in response to a civil war that involved systematic atrocities
and that some countries determined amounted to genocide. Governing authorities in Sudan had
marginalized Darfur since it was incorporated into the modern State in 1916. British colonists ran
it until 1956. From 2000, several local insurgencies developed, protesting Darfur’s marginalization
and underdevelopment. These intensified as the rebels observed that negotiations towards Sudan’s
Comprehensive Peace Agreement, reached in 2005, did not represent Darfur. As a result, the war
escalated in early 2003, when the different rebel groups joined together in order to pose a greater
145
challenge to the rulers in Khartoum.10 In response, the government unleashed not only its army and
air force but also the local militia known as the Janjaweed, composed mainly of Arab groups from the
north of Darfur. They looted and committed many atrocities in an attempt to destroy the rebels’ support
base and steal land. The war was particularly intense from late 2003 to March 2004, with estimates
suggesting that between March 2003 and December 2008, there were 298,271 deaths.11
In April 2004, the UN Humanitarian Coordinator in Sudan, Mukesh Kapila, warned that Darfur was
facing violence akin to the 1994 Rwandan genocide. The heightened international concern prompted the
AU to deploy AMIS in June 2004. This started as a small observer mission of a few hundred personnel
but enlarged to nearly 7,000 by late 2006. A range of multilateral and bilateral donors, notably the EU,
NATO, the US, and Canada, provided the AMIS mission logistics and financial support. In August 2004,
the former Special Representative of the Secretary-General to Sudan, Jan Pronk, and the Sudanese
government agreed to a Plan of Action that would establish “safe areas” for displaced and resident
civilians in Darfur.12 But the Plan of Action was not implemented. In September 2004, the United
States government stated that a genocide was underway in Darfur. An array of civic groups argued
that AMIS was inadequate and called for a larger, more robust UN peacekeeping force or even forcible
military intervention. Naturally, Sudan refused any such peacekeeping force. After a panel of experts
had reported on the ongoing atrocities being committed in Darfur in March 2005, Security Council
resolution 1593 referred the situation in Darfur to the International Criminal Court. In 2006, various
international actors also debated creating a no-fly zone over Darfur or engaging in air strikes against
units threatening civilians.13 Neither occurred.
As international pressure on Sudan increased, in May 2006, the government eventually signed the
Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA) with one rebel faction led by Minni Minawi. However, the agreement
collapsed within a few days. Nevertheless, it provided the pretext of a political framework for a
potential UN peacekeeping operation. This resulted in Security Council resolution 1679 (16 May 2006)
recommending that a UN operation take over from AMIS.
On 31 August 2006, Security Council resolution 1706 authorized the UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS),
which had deployed in Sudan in 2005 and was mainly focused on the north-south civil war, to extend into
Darfur. This provided some temporary relief to AMIS, but it was not a sustainable solution. Moreover,
resolution 1706 contained an unusual formulation when it “invited” the government’s consent for this
deployment. As David Lanz, Co-head of the Mediation Program at swisspeace, summarized:
“To assuage Khartoum’s hostility and China’s concerns about

respect for host-State sovereignty, the drafters of the resolution
inserted a clause ‘inviting’ the Sudanese government’s consent
to the deployment of UN peacekeepers. Khartoum seized
on this and subsequently objected to the deployment of the
mission, arguing that international forces had a hidden agenda
10) David Lanz, “UNAMID” in The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations, ed. Joachim Koops et al. (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 2015), 779.
11) Olivier Degomme and Debarati Guha-Sapir, “Patterns of mortality rates in Darfur conflict”, The Lancet, Vol. 375, No. 9711, 2010, 294–300.
12) “Darfur: UN ‘Safe Areas’ Offer No Real Security”, Human Rights Watch, 31 August 2004. Available from: <https://www.hrw.org/news/2004/08/31/
darfur-un-safe-areas-offer-no-real-security>.
13) See, for example: “UK supports Darfur no-fly zone”, BBC News, 14 December 2006. Available from: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6178209.
stm>; Susan E. Rice, Anthony Lake, and Donald M. Payne, “We Saved Europeans. Why not Africans?” The Washington Post, 2 October 2006. Available
from: <https://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2006/10/01/AR2006100100871.html>.
146
of regime change. As a way out of the

impasse, Kofi Annan proposed a new
plan that would be more acceptable
to Khartoum: a hybrid mission jointly
authorized and operated by the UN and
the AU.”14
After considerable negotiations, in July 2007,

Security Council resolution 1769 established UNAMID
with a mandate to protect civilians, support the
implementation of the (now collapsed) Darfur Peace
Agreement, contribute to a secure environment for
the delivery of humanitarian aid, foster economic
reconstruction, monitor ceasefire agreements, and Chinese engineers working for UNAMID unload their
equipment kits. 17 July 2008. UN Photo #190255 by
support the political process. UNAMID was a large
Stuart Price.
mission, initially authorized with up to 19,555 military
personnel and 4,690 police, and cost at its peak (in
2010/2011) about $1.8 billion per year.
Khartoum subsequently used the wording of resolution 1769, which stated UNAMID should have
a “predominantly African character”, to reject various, mainly Western, peacekeepers. This was highly
unusual since host governments are not normally allowed to dictate the composition of UN peacekeeping
forces. As a result, most AMIS troops “re-hatted”, and many UNMIS civilian staff were also incorporated
into UNAMID.
Beyond the re-hatting, UNAMID’s deployment was slow, taking over two years to reach near its
authorized level. It also lacked some key enabling units. Notably, there were no tactical helicopters until
February 2010, when Ethiopia provided five, although without the requisite night-flight capabilities.15
Once on the ground, UNAMID peacekeepers focused on protecting civilians in IDP camps. These were
ultimately the responsibility of Sudanese police, but UN peacekeepers conducted regular patrols in
and around the camps and established 50 community policing centres to watch over 156 IDP camps.
The peacekeepers also implemented economic recovery and social welfare programmes on education,
health care, and environmental protection. The mission also tried to promote peace by leading the
Darfur‑Darfur Dialogue Consultation process. By this stage, the main international push for peace
focused on the talks in Doha. UNAMID tried to help by providing locals with information about the talks
and flying civil society representatives to Doha for consultations.16
In 2010, UNAMID developed its civilian protection strategy based on the idea of “protection by
presence”, i.e., engaging local communities through regular patrols. However, UNAMID could only access
about half of Darfur’s eight million inhabitants because of insecurity and the huge area of operations.17
The mission had some success. In January 2009, for example, it negotiated with the Sudanese Armed
14) Lanz, “UNAMID”, 782.

16) Lanz, “UNAMID”, 783 and 786.
147
Figure 8-2 UNAMID Uniformed Personnel

Forces and the rebel Justice and Equality Movement to keep some 1,500 civilians safe near its base as
the Sudanese army ejected the rebels from the town of Muhajeriya, in south Darfur.18
By this stage, critics of the mission were warning that UNAMID risked becoming a “mission without
end” if it got too embroiled in Sudanese domestic politics in an attempt to protect civilians and forge
both a local and national peace.19 Of course, Sudanese politics was the principal reason why these
civilians were under threat, but there were enormous limits on what UNAMID peacekeepers could do
about this. For one thing, although UNAMID was one of the largest-ever UN peace operations, it was
still a tiny amount of personnel for such an enormous territory — Darfur is about the size of Spain.
Moreover, travel was arduous, and the mission had only a small aviation component.
The most fundamental problem, however, was political. Although the government of Sudan had
granted legal permission for UNAMID to enter, it refused to offer its practical support and cooperation.
Indeed, it obstructed UNAMID whenever the opportunity arose. For example, the government withheld
hundreds of visas for UNAMID staff, prevented the importation of necessary equipment and spare
parts, imposed curfews, and stopped peacekeepers from conducting night patrols.20 The subsequent
limitations on UNAMID’s operations meant that as David Lanz put it, the mission “became trapped
between the obstructionism of the government and the maximalist demands from Darfuris and from
international activists”.21 In some cases, locals and rebels even attacked UNAMID personnel. In February
2012, Justice and Equality Movement rebels held 50 peacekeepers for several days, accusing them of
cooperating with the Sudanese intelligence service.22
18) Lanz, “UNAMID”, 784–785.

19) Alex de Waal, “Mission without End? Peacekeeping in the African Political Marketplace”, International Affairs, Vol. 85, No. 1, 2009, 99–113.
148
UNAMID continued doing what it could to improve the situation for Darfuris. Over time, the war
wound down, as Khartoum’s forces gradually pushed most armed opposition groups out of the country
or into the Jebel Mara mountains, as happened to the main remaining rebel faction.
UNAMID’s military activities were, therefore, gradually drawn down in favour of focusing on more
police and civilian activities. The plan was for the mission to end during 2020, but this was stalled by
the popular uprising in 2019 that toppled President Bashir in April. By mid-2020, the UN and Sudanese
authorities were debating how and when to end UNAMID and the form that its potential successor,
a smaller peacebuilding Chapter VI operation called the UN Integrated Transition Assistance Mission
(UNITAMS), should take.
Section 8.3 A Support Package for Somalia

In 2009, the UN established an unprecedented partnership with the African Union: deploying a
peace operation to provide logistical support to the AU Mission in Somalia (AMISOM).23 The UN Support
Office for the AMISOM (UNSOA) was the first field mission led by the Department of Field Support,
which had itself been created in 2007, and the first time the UN used its peacekeeping assessments to
create a new mission in order to support a non-UN regional peace operation.24 UNSOA also pioneered a
“light footprint” model that emphasized the use of contractors to deliver support to AMISOM, and later
elements of the Somali security forces, in an active war zone. In November 2015, UNSOA transitioned
into the UN Support Office for Somalia (UNSOS), which supported AMISOM, UNSOM, as well as elements
of the Somali army and police conducting joint operations with AMISOM.
UNSOA was created because the Security Council wanted to support AMISOM’s fight to protect
the Somali Transitional Federal Government and degrade its principal opponents, al-Shabaab, but
did not want to deploy UN peacekeepers. In December 2008, the UN Secretary-General suggested
that although a UN peacekeeping operation was not suitable for Somalia, and Member States were
unwilling to establish a multinational enforcement operation, the organization could provide a logistical
support package for AMISOM.25 On 16 January 2009, Security Council resolution 1863 requested that
the logistical support package for AMISOM provide “accommodation, rations, water, fuel, armoured
vehicles [for AMISOM’s police officers], helicopters, vehicle maintenance, communications, some
enhancement of key logistics facilities, medical treatment and evacuation services”. Importantly, UNSOA
was not authorized to provide ammunition to AMISOM’s troop-contributing countries. Along with the UN
providing logistical support, the other crucial part of the international support for AMISOM came from
the European Union, which paid the monthly allowances for AMISOM’s personnel.
Resolution 1863 also acknowledged the Security Council’s “intent to establish a United Nations
Peacekeeping Operation in Somalia as a follow-on force to AMISOM, subject to a further decision of the
Security Council by 1 June 2009”. Although no UN peacekeeping operation deployed, this meant two
things. First, UNSOA’s initial goal was, therefore, to raise AMISOM’s operational standards to enable its
23) See: Paul D. Williams, Fighting for Peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission (AMISOM), 2007–2017 (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2018).
24) Paul D. Williams, UN Support to Regional Peace Operations: Lessons from UNSOA (New York: International Peace Institute, February 2017). Available
from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2017/02/un-support-regional-peace-ops-unsoa>. The Department of Field Support was dissolved in 2019 as a part of
UN structural reforms.
25) UN Security Council, Letter dated 19 December 2008 from the Secretary-General to the President of the Security Council, Letter from the Secretary-
General, S/2008/804, 19 December 2008, Annex para. 8c. Cited in Williams, UN Support, 3.
149
Figure 8-3: The AMISOM Model of Partnership Peacekeeping
Source: Paul D. Williams, Lessons for “Partnership Peacekeeping” from the African Union Mission in Somalia (International Peace
Institute, October 2019). Available from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2019/10/lessons-partnership-peacekeeping-amisom>.
forces to be incorporated into a future UN peacekeeping operation. Second, because there was no set
transition timetable, UNSOA began without a clear exit strategy.26
UNSOA personnel first deployed to Mogadishu in June 2009 and, in August, set up its logistical
support base in Mombasa, Kenya, from where it shipped most of the heavy supplies and equipment to
Somalia. Because of the intense insecurity in Mogadishu, UNSOA personnel were only permitted to live
there for short periods. In May 2010, UNSOA had just 50 personnel; by 2014, the mission had about
700 civilian staff in Somalia, Kenya, and Ethiopia to support over 34,000 AMISOM and Somali security
personnel. In these circumstances, UNSOA used a range of commercial vendors willing to take risks to
deliver the required services.
Between 2009 and early 2012, AMISOM was only deployed in Mogadishu. However, in 2012,
AMISOM’s Ugandan and Burundian forces pushed out of Mogadishu, while Kenyan and Djiboutian forces
26) Williams, UN Support, 4.
150
Figure 8-4 UNSOS Uniformed Personnel

deployed in other areas across south-central Somalia. This meant UNSOA’s area of operations expanded
to over 400,000 square kilometres, and the AMISOM force increased from around 4,000 when UNSOA
arrived to 17,731 personnel.
UNSOA was actually a bit of a misnomer because the mission had to support five different entities
(not all of which were even in Somalia): They were AMISOM, UNSOM, elements of the Somali National
Army, the UN Monitoring Group on Somalia and Eritrea, and even the UN Special Envoy for the Great
Lakes Region. Overall, UNSOA costs between approximately $200 million to $600 million per year.
In 2013, UNSOA was mandated to expand its support services still further: first, to the new UN
Assistance Mission for Somalia (UNSOM), which replaced the smaller UN Political Office for Somalia
(UNPOS); and second, to provide non-lethal support to 10,900 personnel of the Somali National
Army engaged in joint operations with AMISOM (consisting of food, water, fuel, transport, tents, and
in‑theatre medical evacuation). A UN Trust Fund for AMISOM and the Somali National Army funded the
latter support rather than the assessed UN peacekeeping contributions (which paid for most of UNSOA’s
activities).27
In November 2015, UNSOA transitioned into UNSOS. This new mission continued to provide a similar
range of services to AMISOM and elements of the Somali security services engaged in joint operations
with AMISOM. One notable development was the adoption of unique trilateral memorandums of
understanding (MOUs) between the UN, the African Union, and respective troop-contributing countries.
Throughout its operations, UNSOA/UNSOS faced some major challenges. Perhaps the most
fundamental challenge was that UNSOA was a mission based on mechanisms and frameworks designed
for UN peacekeeping, but it was tasked to support a warfighting operation. To give just one example,
a senior UNSOA official recalled, “We were operating at roughly ten times the UN’s standard rate for
151
medical supplies…”.28 UNSOA tried to bridge the gap by procuring additional goods and services on an
exigency basis to meet the immediate operational requirements (i.e., procurement processes were
fast‑tracked on the grounds that if the services were not provided quickly, people would die). The UN
had used a similar approach following major crisis situations, including the mission start-up in Darfur in
2008 (see above) and the 2010 earthquake in Haiti (see Lesson 7).29
A second major set of challenges stemmed from the highly dangerous operating environment in
Somalia. UNSOA, therefore, initially developed a model of operations that tried to manage most tasks
remotely from Nairobi. The idea was to manage insecurity in Mogadishu, keep down financial costs,
and maintain a “light footprint” in terms of UN personnel by using more contractors than usual.30 The
extensive use of contractors meant that AMISOM’s support was ultimately the product of a four-way
partnership with UNSOA, private firms, and bilateral donors that supplied the ammunition and lethal
equipment.31
Overall, UNSOA significantly improved the logistical situation of AMISOM, UNSOM, and elements of
the Somali security forces engaged in joint operations with AMISOM. Although it suffered from some
major challenges, including its struggle to support some of AMISOM’s manoeuvre warfare rapidly, the
AU recognized UNSOA’s relative success when it called for the UN to establish similar mechanisms for
the African missions in Mali (2013) and the Central African Republic (2014).
Section 8.4 Sequential Peacekeeping: AU to UN Transitions

The UN first “re-hatted” peacekeepers from another organization’s mission into its own forces in
1999, when roughly two battalions of Nigerian ECOMOG troops re-hatted into UNAMSIL in Sierra Leone.
Since then, there have been nine more examples of other missions re-hatting to form part of a new UN
peacekeeping operation:32
• 1999: INTERFET to UNTAET in East Timor;
• 2003: ECOMIL to UNMIL in Liberia;
• 2004: ECOMICI to UNOCI in Côte d’Ivoire, the Multinational Interim Force to MINUSTAH in
Haiti, and AMIB to ONUB in Burundi;
• 2007: AMIS to UNAMID in Darfur, Sudan;
• 2009: EUFOR (European Union Force) Chad to MINURCAT in Chad and the Central African
Republic;
• 2013: AFISMA (International Support Mission to Mali) to MINUSMA in Mali; and
• 2014: MISCA (African-led International Support Mission in the Central African Republic) to
MINUSCA in the Central African Republic.
Re-hatting in these sequential partnerships was mainly a subset of UN force generation, i.e., a
way for the UN to get “boots on the ground” quickly. The largest cases in terms of the numbers of
peacekeepers involved were the re-hatting of AU personnel into MINUSMA in Mali (2013) and MINUSCA

32) UN Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS), Evaluation of Re-Hatting in MINUSMA and MINUSCA (UN, IED-18-002, New York, 12 February 2018),
8. Available from: <https://oios.un.org/es/file/7694/download?token=h53iuYH6>.
152
in the Central African Republic (2014). In these two missions, 12,163 uniformed personnel (roughly 50
per cent) of the initially authorized strength of 24,440 for both the missions combined were re-hatted
from 17 African contributing countries.33
On some rarer occasions, UN peace operations transitioned into non-UN missions. This happened
several times in the Balkans. For example, in 1995, NATO-led forces took over from UNPROFOR to
implement the Dayton Peace Accord in Bosnia, and in 2002, after the US vetoed the extension of
UNMIBH’s mandate, a European Union force took over the peacekeeping duties.
In Mali and the Central African Republic, the re-hatting AU forces into new UN missions was justified
on several grounds.34 First, the extent of human suffering required a quick and strengthened response,
which the Security Council had called for when establishing the respective missions. Second, AU forces
were already present in the field, but the AU was unable to sustain its missions financially. Third, the
earlier precedents (listed above) made this option more appealing. Fourth, there was a distinct lack of
better alternatives for the UN, given the operational imperatives. Finally, such transitions were part of
strengthening the overall strategic partnership between the AU and the UN.
In Mali, the Security Council established MINUSMA in April 2013, and it was given just nine weeks
to complete the re-hatting and assume authority from the African-led AFISMA on 1 July. In this case,
100 per cent of AFISMA personnel (6,587) from 11 African T/PCCs were re-hatted into MINUSMA on 1
July. This meant that all 13 of AFISMA’s operational units were integrated into MINUSMA. This happened
despite the fact that seven of them had not undergone any prior assessment by the UN. There was also
concern within the UN about deploying forces from countries whose national militaries were identified
in annual reports from the Secretary-General as recruiting children and committing sexual violence in
conflict (Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, and Guinea); these blacklisted forces were re-hatted anyway.35
In the Central African Republic, the Security Council established MINUSCA in April 2014. It had
five months to complete the re-hatting and assume authority from MISCA on 15 September. In this
case, 97 per cent of MISCA peacekeepers — 5,576 military and police personnel — from six African T/
PCCs were re-hatted into MINUSCA on 15 September. One contingent from MISCA was not allowed into
MINUSCA — a 189-strong company from Equatorial Guinea — as well as 17 peacekeepers from the
DRC.36 In this case, there were three main reasons why the UN took over from MISCA. First, the new
President Catherine Samba-Panza requested a UN force, thinking the UN would be able to generate
more capabilities on the ground than the AU. Second, the AU was not able to sustain the finances for
its operation. And third, key local and international actors thought the AU was not well placed to lead a
stabilization operation, not only because of its capacity constraints but also political divisions within the
region.37
On the positive side, these re-hatting processes provided a short-term solution to the UN force
generation problem. This had significant political and human security advantages, including by enabling
UN missions to start immediately, avoiding security vacuums, and hence likely contributing to civilian
protection and saving many lives.38
33) OIOS, Evaluation of Re-Hatting, 12.
34) OIOS, Evaluation of Re-Hatting, 12–14.
35) OIOS, Evaluation of Re-Hatting, 16–17.
37) Tatiana Carayannis and Mignonne Fowlis, “Lessons from African Union–United Nations cooperation in peace operations in the Central African Republic”,
African Security Review, Vol. 26, No. 2, 2017, 230.
153
Members of the United Nations Mission in the

Central African Republic and Chad (MINURCAT)
take over military authority of the mission from
the EUFOR forces during a transfer of authority
ceremony. 15 March 2009. UN Photo #359496
by Olivia Grey Pritchard.
On the negative side, the transitions revealed several problems. One problem was that the UN did
not fully comply with its own Human Rights Due Diligence Policy or its Policy on Human Rights Screening
of UN personnel, much of which would usually have been done during the pre-deployment phase. As
the OIOS noted, “[p]olitical and operational considerations were prioritized over compliance” with the
Human Rights Due Diligence Policy.39 Second, perhaps as a direct result, the re-hatted troops were
disproportionately involved in human rights violations, including sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA).
Specifically, re‑hatted personnel accounted for 80 per cent of all allegations of human rights violations,
SEA, and criminal activity in MINUSMA and MINUSCA.40 This imposed both reputational and operational
costs on the UN missions. A third problem was that some of the re-hatted contingents did not have
equipment, training, or accommodation that met UN standards. In the Central African Republic, for
example, MINUSCA inherited AU contingents that were using schools and other civilian premises as
military camps. Even by June 2016, over 2,500 troops in MINUSMA and 2,400 in MINUSCA were yet to
be provided with appropriate UN accommodation.41 Recall also that in this case, some troops had been
re-hatted twice: first from the earlier Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS) regional
peacekeeping mission to the AU’s stabilization force MISCA, and then again from MISCA into MINUSCA.
Finally, re-hatted troops from neighbouring countries sometimes deployed in border regions with their
own countries: three re-hatted contingents in MINUSCA and five in MINUSMA were from countries that
shared borders with the missions.42 This led some local populations to reject the claims of impartiality
from the United Nations, especially in MINUSCA.
In sum, the OIOS concluded that on the basis of the transitions in Mali and the Central African
Republic, “re-hatting should not be an automatic process. When the risks of re-hatting certain contingents
are too high, the UN should, in compliance with its own standards, be willing, ready and able to delay
or refuse such re-hatting”.43

154
1. In which region of the world has 5. The United Nations-African Union

“partnership peacekeeping” been Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID)
especially common during the was mandated to protect civilians, but
twenty‑first century? it could only access about _____ of
Darfur’s inhabitants.
A. Africa
B. Europe A. one-quarter
C. East Asia B. one-third
D. Middle East C. half

D. three-quarters
2. Which of the following activities is
NOT an example of “inter-mission 6. The planned withdrawal of the UN-AU
cooperation” in UN peacekeeping? Hybrid Operation in Darfur (UNAMID) in
2020 was postponed because:
A. Sharing assets
B. Sharing Special Representatives of the A. of the COVID-19 pandemic in 2020
Secretary-General B. Sudan’s president was ousted in a popular
C. Sharing information uprising
D. Sharing border responsibilities C. the war in Darfur reignited

D. the Security Council could not agree on its
3. Which of the following answers is an exit date
example of a parallel peacekeeping
partnership, where two types of actors 7. When Security Council resolution 1863
deploy missions concurrently within the (January 2009) authorized the UN to
same conflict zone? provide a logistical support package
A. AMIS and UNAMID in Sudan for AMISOM in Somalia, _____ were
excluded.
B. AMIB and ONUB in Burundi
A. armoured vehicles
C. UNOMSIL and ECOMOG in Sierra Leone
B. evacuation services
D. UNMIBH and the European Union Force in
Bosnia C. fuels
D. ammunitions
4. In what year did UNSOA transition
into the UN Support Office for Somalia 8. The UN Support Office for AMISOM
(UNSOS), which supported AMISOM, (UNSOA) and the UN Support Office
UNSOM, as well as elements of the for Somalia (UNSOS) were authorized
Somali army and police conducting joint to provide non-lethal support to which
operations with AMISOM? elements of the Somali National Army
(SNA)?
A. 2014
B. 2015 A. Those fighting against al-Shabaab
C. 2016 B. Those based in Mogadishu
D. 2017 C. Those undertaking joint operations with

AMISOM
D. Those co-located with AMISOM
155
9. Between 1999 and 2014, new UN

peacekeeping operations received “re-
hatted” peacekeepers deployed by other
organizations _____ times.
A. seven
B. eight
C. nine
D. 10
10. Which of the problems listed below

did NOT occur when African Union
peacekeepers “re-hatted” into UN
missions in Mali (2013) and the Central
African Republic (2014)?
A. Failure to screen all mission personnel
B. Inadequate equipment and accommodation
among some contingents
C. Local perceptions that some contingents
were not impartial
D. Failure to pay peacekeepers their monthly
allowances
Answer Key »
1. A
2. B
3. C
4. B
5. C
6. B
7. D
8. C
9. D
10. D
156
LESSON
9 Guidelines and Principles
This lesson provides an

overview of five major
attempts to reform UN
peacekeeping and develop
guidelines and principles
that were appropriate for the
twenty-first century.
UN Photo #800033 by Pasqual Gorriz.
Section 9.1 The Panel on UN Peace • Provide an overview of five key initiatives
Operations: The Brahimi Report that helped develop guidelines and principles
(2000) for UN peacekeeping fit for the twenty-first
century.
Section 9.2 The UN Capstone Doctrine
(2008) • Summarize the main themes and conclusions

of three high-level reports on UN peace
Section 9.3 The High-Level Independent
operations led by Lakhdar Brahimi (in 2000),
Panel on Peace Operations
José Ramos-Horta (in 2015), and Lieutenant
(2015)
General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos
Section 9.4 Improving the Security of United Cruz (in 2017).
Nations Peacekeepers (2017)
• Summarize the main themes and conclusions
Section 9.5 Action for Peacekeeping (2018) from the 2008 UN Capstone Doctrine and the
organization’s Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)
initiative launched in 2018.
157
LESSON 9 | Guidelines and Principles
The Zambian battalion was deployed in 2015 to the Vakaga prefecture (in the north-east part of the Central African Republic) to
ensure the protection of civilians. It regularly organizes civil-military activities with the aim of strengthening social cohesion. A
peacekeeper helps churn cassava during a visit with the local population. 10 October 2018. UN Photo #787443 by Herve Serefio.
Introduction
In late 1999, the UN released the results of two devastating independent inquiries
into the genocidal violence in Rwanda (1994) and the town of Srebrenica (1995).1 Each
report diagnosed the key peacekeeping failures, and both implicated the whole UN system
and its most powerful Member States. The inquiries also stimulated concerted efforts to
reform UN peacekeeping and develop guidelines and principles that were appropriate
for the twenty-first century. This lesson provides an overview of five major attempts to
do just that. Specifically, it briefly summarizes the key themes and conclusions of the
Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, commonly known as the “Brahimi Report”
(2000), the UN Capstone Doctrine on peacekeeping (2008), the Report of the High-Level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations (2015), Lieutenant General (Retired) dos Santos
Cruz’s Report on Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (2017), and the
ongoing Action for Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative (2018–present).
1) UN Security Council, Report of the Independent Inquiry into the Actions of the United Nations during the 1994 Genocide
in Rwanda, Letter from the Secretary-General, S/1999/1257, 12 December 1999. Available from: <https://www.un.org/en/
ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/1999/1257>; UN General Assembly, Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to General
Assembly Resolution 53/55: The Fall of Srebrenica, Report of the Secretary-General, A/54/549, 15 November 1999. Available
from: <https://undocs.org/A/54/549>.
158
Section 9.1 The Panel on UN Peace Operations: The Brahimi Report

(2000)
In March 2000, the UN Secretary-General established the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
to identify principal weaknesses of the UN and make practical recommendations for improving them.
The chairman was the former Algerian Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi, and the panel’s report was
officially launched at the UN Millennium Summit in September 2000. The panel’s overall conclusion was
that:
“Without renewed commitment on the part of Member States,

significant institutional change and increased financial support,
the United Nations will not be capable of executing the critical
peacekeeping and peace-building tasks that the Member States
assign to it in coming months and years. There are many tasks
which United Nations peacekeeping forces should not be asked
to undertake and many places they should not go. But when
the United Nations does send its forces to uphold the peace,
they must be prepared to confront the lingering forces of war
and violence, with the ability and determination to defeat
them.”2
The Brahimi Report began its diagnoses of UN peacekeeping by highlighting five sets of problems
related to the strategic direction of mission mandates, the decision-making mechanisms available to
the UN in both headquarters and its field missions, challenges related to the rapid deployment of
peacekeepers, shortcomings of operational planning and mission support, and deficiencies related to
information technology. On this basis, the panel made over 80 recommendations. For our purposes, the
main ones can be grouped into the following four broad clusters.
Mandates and clear vision
The first cluster concerned the vision and mandates that were supposed to guide UN peacekeepers
in the field. Of course, the panel acknowledged that peacekeeping operations were not the only
instrument available to the UN for managing conflicts. It also needed more effective strategies for
conflict prevention and peacebuilding. But when peacekeepers were required, the Brahimi Report
made four recommendations designed to ensure that missions would not be deployed with unrealistic
mandates or without the means to implement them properly. First, the Secretariat must give realistic
advice to the Security Council about the situation on the ground and the potential for a peace operation
to work effectively. As the panel put it, “[t]he Secretariat must tell the Security Council what it needs
to know, not what it wants to hear”.3 If there was little prospect that UN peacekeepers would make
a positive impact, the Secretariat should recommend against their deployment. Second, the Security
Council should ensure that mandates were clearly worded and realizable. Third, the Security Council
should not authorize an operation until it was confident that it had the means to accomplish its goals. All
too often, however, the Security Council expanded an operation’s mandate without ensuring the mission
2) UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations, Report of the Secretary-General,
A/55/305-S/2000/809, August 2000 [Brahimi Report], viii. Available from: <https://www.un.org/en/events/pastevents/brahimi_report.shtml>.
3) Brahimi Report, x.
159
was given the requisite resources. Consequently, Brahimi argued that Security Council resolutions
detailing a mission’s mandate and that the necessary resources should be left in draft form until the
Secretariat confirmed that Member States had committed the necessary resources in a timely fashion.
Finally, peacekeeping finance reform was needed to ensure that financial arrangements were in place
before a mission deployed.
Making peacekeeping forces more effective
A second set of reforms aimed to improve the

effectiveness of deployed peacekeepers. Specifically,
Brahimi’s panel called for three core reforms. First,
all UN peacekeepers must have relevant basic skills
and comply with “best practices” common to all UN
missions. Second, the UN should place renewed
emphasis on training for peacekeepers and senior
civilian personnel. And third, the military component
of a peace operation should be robust enough to do
three things: defend itself effectively, protect civilians
under its care, and “confront the lingering forces of
war and violence”. This would, of course, require
peacekeepers to be given the requisite resources.
The Security Council met to consider the report of its
As the panel put it, “[i]t means bigger forces, better Working Group on the Brahimi Report. It welcomed the
equipped and more costly but able to be a credible report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations
(the Brahimi Report) and unanimously adopted a
deterrent”. It would also require the Council to write
4
wide‑ranging resolution containing recommendations and

consistent and clear mandates about protecting decisions on peacekeeping operations proposed by its
civilians. And peacekeepers would need a clear view Working Group. 13 November 2000. UN Photo #31587 by
Eskinder Debebe.
of how to act impartially. Here, the panel made a
particularly important point:
“Impartiality for United Nations operations must therefore mean

adherence to the principles of the Charter: where one party to
a peace agreement clearly and incontrovertibly is violating its
terms, continued equal treatment of all parties by the United
Nations can in the best case result in ineffectiveness and in
the worst may amount to complicity with evil. No failure did
more damage to the standing and credibility of United Nations
peacekeeping in the 1990s than its reluctance to distinguish
victim from aggressor.”5
Improving decision-making at UN Headquarters
In 1999, both the independent inquiries on the failures in Rwanda and Srebrenica identified flaws
with the way that key strategic decisions were made at the UN. In order to improve the flow and
4) Brahimi Report, 9.
5) Brahimi Report, 9.
160
quality of information transmitted from the field to UN Headquarters, the panel called for more and
better consultation between the Security Council, which mandates operations, the TCCs that provide
the personnel, and the Secretariat, which supports the missions. It also advocated for the creation
of a standing committee to enhance these relationships. To help the Secretariat provide timely and
accurate advice to the decision makers at the UN, Brahimi called for the creation of an “Information
and Strategic Analysis Secretariat” capable of collating and disseminating this information, as well as
a “Best Practices Unit” to discover and disseminate “lessons learned”, collate the best new research on
peacekeeping, and conduct a systematic analysis of relevant issues. The panel also noted that creating
Integrated Mission Task Forces, comprising officials from the Secretariat and the UN humanitarian and
development agencies, would improve advance planning. Ultimately, the UN was more likely to make
better decisions if it had well-qualified senior leaders. Brahimi, therefore, also called for improvements
in selecting, assembling, and training these teams.
Improving rapid deployment
The final broad area of reforms concerned the rapid and effective deployment of UN peacekeepers.
This would increase the chances that the UN might have a significant impact because the first 6–12
weeks following a ceasefire or peace accord were often the most critical for “establishing both a stable
peace and the credibility of a new operation”.6 Here, Brahimi made four recommendations. First, the UN
should revamp its Standby Arrangements System (UNSAS), whereby Member States could nominate
specific forces they were prepared to assign to UN missions. Ideally, the panel concluded, a traditional
observer-type mission should be deployable within 30 days and larger, more complex missions within
90 days. Second, the UN should have the capacity to deploy the forward elements of a peace operation
within a few days of a mandate being handed down by the Security Council. To do this, Brahimi called
for the Secretary-General to be authorized to use up to $50 million from the Peacekeeping Reserve
Fund to secure key capabilities and services in advance of a mission being authorized by the Security
Council. Third, the panel thought that the Secretariat needed the capacity to make decisions and make
plans rapidly, and here its earlier recommendations about a strategic analysis centre and Integrated
Mission Task Forces would help. Finally, to meet the demand for rapid deployment, the UN needed its
own deployable logistics and communications capabilities.
Section 9.2 The UN Capstone Doctrine (2008)

In 2008, after much internal discussion, the UN published its “Capstone Doctrine”, United Nations
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines.7 This offered a broad definition of peacekeeping as
a “technique designed to preserve the peace, however fragile, where fighting has halted, and to assist in
implementing agreements put into place by peacekeepers”.8 This was contrasted to peace enforcement,
which involved the use of “coercive measures, including the use of military force” authorized by the
Security Council. As discussed in previous lessons, many of the UN peacekeeping operations were not
deployed in places “where fighting had halted” and ended up employing various “coercive measures”.
6) Brahimi Report, xi.

7) United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: UN DPKO/DFS, 2008) [UN Capstone]. Available from: <https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/capstone_eng_0.pdf>.
8) UN Capstone Doctrine, 18.
161
After summarizing the evolution of UN peacekeeping, the Capstone Doctrine set out the organization’s
basic principles for peacekeeping and how missions could be given the best chance to implement their
mandates successfully.
The organization’s three basic principles of peacekeeping concerned consent, impartiality, and the
use of force. The first principle was that “United Nations peacekeeping operations are deployed with the
consent of the main parties to the conflict”.9 The consent of the host country government was always
required, but the Capstone Doctrine left vague the criteria to determine which conflict parties should
count as “the main” parties. Nevertheless, this principle was intended to provide peacekeepers with the
freedom of action (political and physical) to carry out mandated tasks, although universality of consent
is not assumed.
The second principle was that UN peacekeepers should implement their mandates impartially, without
favour or prejudice to any party. This was considered crucial to retain the consent and cooperation of
the main conflict parties. UN peacekeepers should not condone actions by parties — including the host
country government — that violate the mandate. If peacekeepers were required to counter any breaches,
this should be done transparently and the rationale for such action explained through transparent and
effective communication.
The third basic principle was the non-use of force except in self-defence and defined the mandate.
Here, the Capstone Doctrine noted that proactive use of force is permitted in some circumstances.
It also reiterated the distinction between “robust peacekeeping” and “peace enforcement”. In robust
peacekeeping, proactive force is permitted at the tactical and operational levels. In peace enforcement
operations, on the other hand, the use of force by the UN does not require the consent of the main
parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic level.
The document then went on to describe some of the other factors that were important to the success
of UN peacekeeping. Here, legitimacy, credibility, and local ownership were particularly important. As
the Capstone Doctrine put it, “in order to succeed, United Nations peacekeeping operations must also
be perceived as legitimate and credible, particularly in the eyes of the local population”. The legitimacy
of UN peacekeepers derived from the authorization by the Security Council. In the field, however,
perceptions of a mission’s legitimacy could change depending on the conduct of its peacekeepers: “The
perceived legitimacy of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is directly related to the quality and
conduct of its military, police and civilian personnel.”10
As for credibility, the document noted how local conflict parties were likely to probe UN missions and
test for weaknesses. In such circumstances, the capstone document concluded that:
“The credibility of a United Nations peacekeeping operation is

a direct reflection of the international and local communities’
belief in the mission’s ability to achieve its mandate. Credibility
is a function of a mission’s capability, effectiveness and ability
to manage and meet expectations. Ideally, in order to be
credible, a United Nations peacekeeping operation must deploy

162
as rapidly as possible, be properly resourced, and strive to

maintain a confident, capable and unified posture.”11
With regard to local ownership, the Capstone Doctrine noted that it was “critical to the successful
implementation of a peace process”. As a result, when “planning and executing a United Nations
peacekeeping operation’s core activities, every effort should be made to promote national and local and
ownership and to foster trust and cooperation between national actors”.12
Finally, the Capstone Doctrine listed other success factors that stood out from the previous 15 years
of UN peacekeeping.13 The first was that success is more likely when there is a peace to keep, where
parties are genuinely committed to resolving the conflict through a political process. The signing of
a ceasefire or peace agreement is one (but not the only) important indicator of such a commitment.
Second, positive regional engagement, where neighbouring States are participants or supporters of
the peace process, increases the likelihood of success. The third factor was the full backing of a united
Security Council, or if any divisions emerged within the Council, they did not undermine the mission’s
legitimacy and authority in the eyes of the main parties and local population as a whole. Finally,
missions needed a clear and achievable mandate with resources to match, which should be revised if
circumstances warrant.
Section 9.3 The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

(2015)
In 2014, then-Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon
established a High-Level Independent Panel on Peace
Operations (HIPPO), chaired by Timor-Leste’s former
President José Ramos-Horta.14 The panel was asked
to examine how UN operations should be reconfigured
to contribute better to the prevention and resolution
of conflict.
The panel concluded that “decisive and far-

reaching change is required across four core areas
of the work of United Nations peace operations” to
deliver better results. First, the UN needed to devote
more resources to prioritizing conflict prevention and
A conference organized by the Permanent Mission of
mediation tools. To address the root causes of conflict,
the Republic of Korea to the UN, in cooperation with
the UN needed to invest more resources — including the International Peace Institute, was held at UN
in inclusive and equitable development — and work Headquarters on the topic “The Report of the High-Level
Independent Panel on Peace Operations: What’s next?”
with partners. Second, the UN must maintain its “core
Oh Joon (left), Permanent Representative of the Republic
obligation” to protect civilians. But it must do better of Korea to the UN, with Ameerah Haq, Vice-Chair of the
at aligning its civilian, military, and police capabilities UN High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations, at
the event. 15 July 2015. UN Photo #638302 by Cia Pak.
and expectations on this issue. Third, the UN must

13) UN Capstone Doctrine, 49–51.
14) UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Report of the High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations on Uniting our Strengths for Peace,
A/70/95-S/2015/446, 17 June 2015 [HIPPO Report]. Available from: <https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=S/2015/446>.
163
provide greater clarity on when and how its peacekeepers should use force, under what conditions,
and with what principles. This was especially important as more and more UN peacekeepers were
deployed in relatively hostile environments. Finally, in order to sustain peace, the UN must learn the
right lessons and embrace new approaches where they are needed to prevent a relapse into war. Here,
the UN and its partners “must maintain political engagement, promote inclusive social and economic
development, overcome systemic gaps and broaden community engagement, with women and youth
playing a prominent role”.15
In thinking about this complicated set of interrelated issues, the HIPPO Report identified four
“essential shifts” that the UN needed to undertake.16
The first was the need to ensure the “primacy of politics” in peace operations. By this, the panel
meant that political solutions to resolving the crisis in question “should always guide the design and
deployment of UN peace operations”. This was not an issue that could be avoided because the panel
rightly concluded that “military and technical engagements” cannot deliver lasting peace. The key
practical challenge was how the UN could design effective political solutions. The panel concluded that
for the organization to stand the best chance of success, it “must be committed to open and impartial
dialogue with all parties, States and non-State actors”. Together, this would enable the UN to deploy its
peace operations “as part of a viable process aimed at…bringing about lasting settlements and national
reconciliation”.17
The second shift is related to the different types of peace operations available in the United Nations
toolbox. Specifically, the panel urged the UN to use the “full spectrum of peace operations” more flexibly
in order to respond to changing needs on the ground. One dimension of this shift was to dispense with
“sharp distinctions between peacekeeping operations and special political missions”. Instead, the UN
should think of “a continuum of response and smooth transitions between different phases of missions”.
A second dimension involved greater clarity with regard to mission mandates. Specifically, “sequenced
and prioritized mandates” should be adopted in order to “allow missions to develop over time rather
than trying to do everything at once”.18
The third shift concerned the United Nations partnerships with other actors and organizations. Here,
the panel reiterated that the UN had long ago entered an era of “partnership peacekeeping”. Once
again, this shift had two dimensions. The first was internal: The UN system itself had to “pull together
in a more integrated manner in the service of conflict prevention and peace”. Recognizing that its
own peace operations are based on partnerships, the UN had to strengthen cooperation between its
decision-making institutions, the contributing countries, and the Secretariat. The second dimension
was external: The UN had to forge a “stronger global-regional peace and security partnership” with
other organizations and actors engaged in peacekeeping. Given the large number of UN peacekeepers
deployed in Africa, “the UN’s regional partnerships in Africa must be intensified and made more
predictable through mechanisms for collaboration and by optimizing the use of limited resources”.19
The fourth shift entailed the UN Secretariat becoming more “field-focused” and the organization’s
peace operations more “people-centred”. On the former, the UN needed to reconfigure its bureaucracy
15) HIPPO Report, 25.

17) HIPPO Report, 10 and 26–27.
18) HIPPO Report, 10 and 27–28.
19) HIPPO Report, 10, 14, and 28–29.
164
into a “more field-focused administrative framework”. It also needed to ensure that its resources were
managed in an accountable manner. On the latter, the UN needed to do a better job of engaging with
both host country governments and especially local communities, which “must increasingly be regarded
as core to mission success”.20
Along with these general recommendations, the HIPPO Report also weighed in on several specific
areas of debate about the best guidelines for UN peacekeeping. For reasons of space, this lesson will
mention just three: the use of force; the basic UN peacekeeping principles; and the women, peace, and
security (WPS) agenda.
On the use of force by UN peacekeepers, the panellists were divided. Nevertheless, the report
concluded that “much greater clarity” was needed “on when and how the United Nations and its
partners will use force, under what conditions and with what principles”.21 Overall, however, it continued
the tradition of deep scepticism about the ability of UN peacekeepers to use military force effectively.
Although it recognized the Council’s prerogative to authorize UN peacekeepers to undertake enforcement
tasks, the panel concluded that “[e]xtreme caution should guide the mandating of enforcement tasks to
degrade, neutralize or defeat a designated enemy. Such operations should be exceptional, time-limited
and undertaken with full awareness of the risks and responsibilities for the UN mission as a whole”.22
On the basic principles of peacekeeping in the UN, the panel noted the ongoing debate about
whether they should remain or required adjustment. The panel’s preference was to retain the basic
principles but ensure that they did not get used as an excuse to prevent peacekeepers from fulfilling
one of their main responsibilities, notably, civilian protection and proactive defence. As the panel wrote,
“[t]he Panel is convinced of the importance of the core principles of peacekeeping to guide successful
United Nations peacekeeping operations in observing ceasefires and implementing peace agreements.
At the same time, the Panel stresses its concern that the principles of peacekeeping should never be
used as an excuse for failure to protect civilians or defend the mission proactively”.23
Finally, on the WPS agenda, the panel noted how its full implementation by UN peace operations
continued to be hampered by several problems.24 Therefore, it advocated reform in four main areas:
1. Ensuring that the Secretariat and missions conduct gender-sensitive

analysis throughout the planning, implementation, review, evaluation,
and mission drawdown process;
2. Integrating gender expertise within all functional mission components

requiring gender knowledge and experience;
3. Ensuring missions gain full access to policy, substantive support, and

technical support from UN Women on how to implement the WPS
agenda; and
Ensuring that compacts between the Secretary-General and heads of
mission specify performance indicators relating to gender.25
20) HIPPO Report, 14, 15, 29–30, and 85.

24) HIPPO Report, 78–79.
25) HIPPO Report, 80–81.
165
Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto

dos Santos Cruz, Force Commander of the
United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
(MINUSTAH), addresses guests of an award
ceremony for the Chilean Contingent of
MINUSTAH, in recognition of the contingent’s
service. 16 July 2008. UN Photo #186368 by
Logan Abassi.
Section 9.4 Improving the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers

(2017)
In December 2017, Brazilian General and former UN Force Commander in Haiti and the Democratic
Republic of Congo, Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz, delivered a report on how to improve the safety
and security of UN peacekeepers. Specifically, he was tasked with proposing “practical, implementable
and effective recommendations to reduce peacekeeping personnel fatalities and injuries from acts of
violence”.26 Overall, the report is notable for striking a very different tone than most other panels
and reports on UN peacekeeping and issues concerning the use of force. It made a number of
recommendations that if implemented, would affect the operational guidelines and principles under
which UN peacekeepers operate.
The reported started its analysis by identifying the major problem; namely, the period 2013–
2017 saw more UN peacekeepers “killed by acts of violence…than during any other 5-year period in
history”. The report’s diagnosis was that peacekeepers were being endangered because the UN flag
no longer offers natural protection and because many peacekeeping contingents suffer from “Chapter
VI syndrome”, which prevented them from adapting to new challenges posed by some contemporary
armed conflicts. Consequently, the report put most blame for the peacekeeper fatalities during this
period on “deficiencies in training, equipment and performance”.27
At the heart of the report is the need for UN peacekeeping operations to become better at wielding
military power and using military force much more effectively. Its analysis is also based on the belief
that “hostile forces do not understand a language other than force”, and, therefore, UN peacekeepers
must “be strong and not fear to use force when necessary”.28 For dos Santos Cruz, if missions identified
a threat, they should move to where it is “in order to neutralise it”. Unlike some previous doctrinal
guidance that told peacekeepers to use minimal force, dos Santos Cruz called for peacekeepers to “use
overwhelming force and be proactive and preemptive” in order to win. This was necessary, in his view,
26) Lieutenant General (Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos Cruz et al., Improving Security of United Nations Peacekeepers (New York: United Nations,
2017) [Cruz Report], 2. Available from: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/improving-security-of-united-nations-peacekeepers-independent-report>.
27) Cruz Report, 31.
28) Cruz Report, Summary.
166
to “gain the respect of hostile actors”.29 The report also concluded that national caveats increased the
risk of peacekeeper casualties.
In response to these various problems, dos Santos Cruz called for UN peacekeepers to change their
mindsets; to improve their capacity in key areas; to deploy with threat-sensitive mission footprints,
using both massed and mobile forces; and to help develop enhanced accountability mechanisms. The
report also made recommendations on 18 issues in order to reduce fatalities and serious injuries to UN
peacekeepers, particularly from ambushes and attacks on their bases. These recommendations related
to:
1. The need for better organizational adaptation;
2. Peacekeepers adopting better operational behaviour and mindsets;
3. Improving command and control;
4. Mission-Specific Statement of Unit Requirements;
5. Establishing facts following serious security incidents;
6. Stopping impunity and improving accountability for attacks on

peacekeepers;
7. Better TCC pre-deployment operational readiness;
8. Better PCC pre-deployment operational readiness;
9. Better in-mission training and readiness;
10. Improving ambush and threat mitigation;
11. Improving IED threat mitigation;
12. Improving mitigation of attacks on camps/bases;
13. Improving intelligence for the security of peacekeeping personnel;
14. Improving field medical and health care systems;
15. Adopting more threat-sensitive mission footprints;
16. Increasing mutual accountability between the UN and contributing

countries;
17. Improving peacekeeping fatalities and injuries data; and
18. Improving contractor fatalities and injuries data.
Upon receiving the report, UN Headquarters acknowledged the importance of its recommendations
by establishing a Santos Cruz Action Plan.30 Implementing this action plan became part of the final
initiative discussed in this lesson: Action for Peacekeeping.
Section 9.5 Action for Peacekeeping (2018)31

In 2018, following several high-level summits on peacekeeping between 2014 and 2017, the
UN Secretary-General launched a new initiative to develop a set of mutually agreed principles and
29) Cruz Report, 10.

30) The initial action plan is available at: <https://peacekeeping.un.org/en/action-plan-to-implement-report-improving-security-of-peacekeepers>.
31) A three-minute introductory video on A4P is available at: <https://youtu.be/NIHWqrtmbrg>.
167
commitments to create UN peacekeeping operations

“fit for the future”. Specifically, the Action for
Peacekeeping (A4P) initiative was designed “to
refocus peacekeeping with more targeted mandates,
make our operations stronger and safer, mobilize
support for political solutions and better equipped
and trained forces”.32
On 16 August 2018, the UN Secretary-General

released the Declaration of Shared Commitments
and invited Member States and relevant international
organizations to endorse it.33 As of June 2020, it has
been endorsed by 153 UN Member States and four
supporting organizations: the EU, NATO, AU, and OIF
(Organisation internationale de la Francophonie). It
Retno Lestari Priansari Marsudi, Minister for Foreign
set out a roadmap for strengthening peacekeeping Affairs of the Republic of Indonesia, addresses the
based around 45 specific commitments from the Security Council meeting on Collective Action to Improve
United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. 28 March 2018.
Secretariat, Member States, host governments, as
UN Photo #755851 by Manuel Elias.
well as more generally applicable examples.34
» Committing to advance political solutions to conflict:
The commitments at the heart of A4P were organized around eight thematic areas. The first was
politics, specifically, a commitment to advance political solutions to conflict and boost the political impact
of peacekeeping operations. This entailed developing new national and regional political strategies.
» Implementing the WPS agenda:
The second thematic area was the implementation of the WPS agenda by ensuring full, equal,
and meaningful participation of women in all stages of the peace process and integrating a gender
perspective into all stages of analysis, planning implementation, and reporting. A related commitment
was to increase the number of women in peacekeeping operations, including in leadership positions.35
» Protecting civilians:
Protection was the third area, specifically, strengthening the protection peacekeepers provided to
civilians by supporting tailored, context-specific strategies. The A4P also added that improving strategic
communications and engagement with local populations was crucial to ensure that the missions and
their mandates were well understood by the people on the receiving end of them.
» Improving peacekeepers’ safety and security:
The fourth theme was improving the safety and security of UN peacekeepers. To this end, the A4P
committed to implementing the Action Plan to Improve the Security of Peacekeepers that emerged
from the dos Santos Cruz report discussed above. The key here was focusing on changing mindsets,
improving capacities — notably medical and technological innovations — ensuring a threat sensitive
32) United Nations, “Action for Peacekeeping”. Available from: <https://www.un.org/en/A4P/>.

33) The Declaration text is available at <https://peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/a4p-declaration-en.pdf>.
34) Listed at <https://www.un.org/en/A4P/>.
35) See: The Uniformed Gender Parity Strategy 2018–2028 (New York: UN Department of Peace Operations, 2018). Available from: <https://
peacekeeping.un.org/sites/default/files/uniformed-gender-parity-2018-2028.pdf>.
168
footprint for missions, and enhancing accountability in order to bring perpetrators of crimes against
peacekeepers to justice.
» Enhancing performance and accountability of peacekeeping

components:
Enhancing performance and accountability by all peacekeeping components was next. This would
entail the Secretariat developing an integrated performance framework that used clear standards for
all actors and ensure that performance data was used to inform planning, evaluation, deployment
decisions, and reporting. It also required the UN Secretariat to clearly communicate all operational
and technical requirements to the organization’s Member States and provide the field missions with
effective support. This, in turn, would likely require Member States to generate new types of specialized
capabilities, including language skills, new approaches to force generation, equipment serviceability
and sustainability, and new efforts to verify the operational readiness of troops and police. The
Comprehensive Performance Assessment System (CPAS) was developed in order to help track the
subsequent performance data and to strengthen accountability.
» Linking peacekeeping operations and peacebuilding operations:
The sixth theme was tying peacekeeping operations to peacebuilding efforts in order to leave
behind a self-sustaining peace in countries that hosted UN missions. This would entail engaging host
governments and local civil society groups, as well as coordinating with other actors, including the UN
Peacebuilding Commission and the World Bank.
» Pursuing effective partnerships:
The penultimate area was partnerships, specifically, ensuring that peacekeeping operations improved
their collaboration and planning with other international, regional, and local arrangements. Particular
emphasis was given to both the AU and EU, given their large role in contemporary peace operations.
On the AU specifically, the A4P reiterated the earlier recognition from the United Nations of the need for
predictable, sustainable, and flexible financing for AU-led peace operations authorized by the Security
Council.
» Improving conduct of UN peacekeepers:
Finally, the A4P stressed the need to improve the conduct of UN peacekeepers. This involved
stopping all forms of sexual exploitation and abuse and fully implementing both the UN Human Rights
Due Diligence Policy and its Environment Strategy to reduce the environmental impact of peacekeeping
operations.36
36) For the Human Rights Due Diligence Policy, see: United Nations, Human Rights Due Diligence Policy on United Nations Support to Non-United
Nations Security Forces (New York: United Nations, 2015). Available from: <http://hrbaportal.org/wp-content/files/Inter-Agency-HRDDP-Guidance-
Note-2015.pdf>. Environment Strategy was launched in 2016. “UN launches new strategy to minimize environmental footprint of its peace operations”,
UN News, 29 November 2016. Available from: <https://news.un.org/en/story/2016/11/546562-un-launches-new-strategy-minimize-environmental-
footprint-its-peace-operations>.
169
1. What failure did the Panel on United 5. What did the High-Level Independent
Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi Panel on Peace Operations (HIPPO)
Report) identify as doing the most mean by ensuring the “primacy of
damage to the standing and credibility of politics” in UN peacekeeping operations?
the UN?
A. A civilian should always be the head of a UN
A. The failure of the UN to sufficiently peacekeeping operation.
compensate its peacekeepers B. The UN should take sides in resolving the
B. The reluctance of the UN to distinguish crisis in question.
victim from aggressor C. The UN must develop political solutions to
C. The failure of the UN to sufficiently resource resolve the crisis in question.
its peacekeeping operations D. The UN should draft local peace agreements
D. The failure of the UN to write clear and before deploying its peacekeepers.
credible mandates for its peacekeeping
operations 6. The High-Level Independent Panel on
Peace Operations (HIPPO) argued that
2. How quickly did the Panel on United mandating peacekeepers to degrade,
Nations Peace Operations (the Brahimi neutralize, or defeat a designated enemy
Report) conclude traditional observer should be:
missions should be able to deploy to the A. Exceptional and time-limited
theatre of operations?
B. Avoided altogether
A. 7 days C. Done only with the most modern
B. 14 days capabilities
C. 30 days D. Done only against terrorist organizations
D. 90 days
7. According to the dos Santos Cruz report,
3. According to the 2008 Capstone the five-year period from _____ saw the
Doctrine — United Nations most United Nations peacekeepers killed
Peacekeeping Operations: Principles by acts of violence.
and Guidelines — which of the following
A. 1963–1967
concepts is not a basic principle of UN
peacekeeping? B. 1993–1997
C. 2003–2007
A. Consent
D. 2013–2017
B. Local ownership
C. Impartiality 8. What type of mission footprint did
D. Non-use of force the report by Lieutenant General
(Retired) Carlos Alberto dos Santos
4. The 2008 Capstone Doctrine — United Cruz recommend for UN peacekeeping
Nations Peacekeeping Operations: operations?
Principles and Guidelines — defined
A. A heavy footprint
_____ as “a function of a mission’s
capability, effectiveness and ability to B. A light footprint
manage and meet expectations”. C. A mobile footprint
A. credibility D. A threat-sensitive footprint
B. legitimacy
C. impartiality
D. efficiency
170
9. By June 2020, _____ UN Member States

endorsed the Action for Peacekeeping
Declaration of Shared Commitments.
A. 123
B. 133
C. 143
D. 153
10. The shared commitments set out in the

United Nations Action for Peacekeeping
(A4P) initiative are organized into how
many thematic areas?
A. 7
B. 8
C. 9
D. 10
Answer Key »
1. B
2. C
3. B
4. A
5. C
6. A
7. D
8. D
9. D
10. B
171
LESSON
10 Summary and Conclusions
This lesson summarizes

the course and revisits the
five enduring themes of
UN peacekeeping in the
twenty‑first century.
UN Photo #767876 by Harandane Dicko.
Section 10.1 Recap of the Course • Provide a brief recap of the course content for
Lessons 1–9.
Section 10.2 The Impacts of UN Peacekeeping
on Armed Conflict • Summarize the main impacts that UN

peacekeeping operations have on armed
Section 10.3 Enduring Themes in UN
conflicts.
Peacekeeping, 2000–2020
• Revisit the five enduring themes of
twenty‑first-century UN peacekeeping
identified in Lesson 1.
172
LESSON 10 | Summary and Conclusions
The United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO) commemorated the International Day
of Peacekeepers with a military parade and a wreath-laying ceremony in honour of fallen peacekeepers. The ceremony was attended
by military, police, and civilian staff members as well as local residents of Goma. Also at the ceremony was the Deputy Governor of
North Kivu province as well as senior military and police officers from the province. Feller Lutahishirwa, Deputy Governor of North Kivu
province, lays a wreath on behalf of the government and the people of the Democratic Republic of the Congo. 29 May 2018. UN Photo
#763802 by Michael Ali.
Introduction
This course has provided four main things: a general overview
of trends and patterns in UN peacekeeping during the twenty-first
century; short overviews of the more than 30 UN peacekeeping
operations that were active between 2000 and mid-2020; a
summary of the key themes involved in UN partnerships with
other peacekeeping organizations and actors; and a synopsis of
the main attempts to develop guidelines for UN peacekeepers fit
for the twenty-first century. This concluding lesson begins with a
brief recap of Lessons 1–9. It then summarizes some of the main
impacts that UN peacekeeping operations have had on armed
conflict, according to recent academic research. Finally, it concludes
by revisiting the five enduring themes in UN peacekeeping that
were introduced in Lesson 1.
173
Section 10.1 Recap of the Course

In Lesson 1, you learned about some of the general patterns and trends evident in UN peacekeeping
operations during the twenty-first century. We saw that between 2000 and mid-2020, the UN maintained
between 13 and 18 active peacekeeping operations each year and deployed a total of 35 peacekeeping
missions overall, 18 of which were established since 2000. The lesson also highlighted five of the most
important enduring themes evident across them. These concerned the relationship between means
and ends in peacekeeping operations; the importance of linking peacekeeping with effective political
strategies for peacemaking; efforts to develop appropriate guidelines and principles for UN missions;
the need for effective partnerships inside the UN system and with an array of external actors; and the
need to improve the accountability and performance of UN peacekeepers.
Lesson 2 explained the emergence of a new wave of multidimensional peacekeeping operations

that would shape the initial experiences of the UN in the twenty-first century. These missions were
established in six hectic months between June and November 1999 in four war-torn territories — Sierra
Leone, Kosovo, East Timor, and the DRC. After providing an overview of the UN missions in each of
these theatres, Lesson 2 concluded by summarizing how the “9/11” terrorist attacks and subsequent
US-led “Global War on Terrorism” indirectly influenced UN peacekeeping.
In Lesson 3, you learned about the cluster of UN peacekeeping operations that deployed in Western
Africa in the late 1990s and early 2000s. These were the missions in the three Mano River States
of Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, and Liberia, which operated between 1999 and 2018. This cluster of
peacekeeping operations certainly had their challenges, but compared to the situation facing these
West African States in the late 1990s and early 2000s, the situation nearly two decades later is much
improved. The lesson also analysed the long-standing UN operation in the north-western territory of
Western Sahara, MINURSO, which has remained in place since 1991. Despite nearly three decades of UN
peacekeeping, the planned referendum has not taken place, and the Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
finds itself in much the same position as it started: in control of very little of its declared territory and
recognized as a member of the African Union but not as a member of the United Nations.
In Lesson 4, you learned about the cluster of UN peacekeeping operations in Eastern Africa. This is
the region that saw the highest numbers of UN peacekeepers deployed during the twenty-first century.
Since 1999, the UN deployed 10 new peacekeeping operations here: in the DRC, Eritrea, Ethiopia,
Burundi, Sudan, Chad, the Central African Republic, and South Sudan, as well as the two logistical
support missions to help stabilize Somalia (UNSOA and UNSOS). This lesson provided an overview of
the UN peacekeeping operations between Eritrea and Ethiopia (UNMEE), in Burundi (ONUB), Sudan
(UNMIS), Chad and the Central African Republic (MINURCAT), South Sudan (UNMISS), and Abyei, in the
contested border region between Sudan and South Sudan (UNISFA). Overall, and unlike Western Africa,
UN peacekeepers were not able to facilitate transitions to more democratic States. Instead, many of the
armed conflicts continued, and missions had to work within the constraints imposed by authoritarian
host governments that gave legal consent to deploy UN peacekeepers but often obstructed their work.
Although the UN deployed most peacekeepers and peacekeeping operations to Africa during the
twenty-first century, about a dozen missions were deployed elsewhere. These were analysed in Lessons
5 and 6. In Lesson 5, you learned about the history of UN peacekeeping operations in Southern Europe,
South and South-East Asia, and the Caucasus. In Southern Europe, UN peacekeepers were deployed
174
to help consolidate the terms of the 1995 Dayton

Peace Accords in Bosnia-Herzegovina (UNMIBH),
to help demilitarize the Prevlaka peninsula in
Croatia (UNMOP), and to maintain a decades-old
ceasefire on the island of Cyprus (UNFICYP). As
discussed earlier in Lesson 2, in South-East Asia,
UN peacekeepers continued their efforts to support
the new State of Timor-Leste (UNMISET). However,
after UN peacekeepers left Timor-Leste in 2005,
they had to return the following year after renewed
violence broke out (UNMIT). In South Asia, UN
peacekeepers in UNMOGIP remained deployed in one
of the organization’s longest-running missions in the Elizabeth Spehar (at podium), Special Representative of
contested region of Kashmir. Finally, in the Caucasus, the Secretary-General and head of UNFICYP, and Olof
Skoog, Permanent Representative of Sweden to the
UN peacekeepers in UNOMIG were deployed to help
UN and President of the Security Council for the month
manage the complicated triangular dispute between of July 2018, speak to journalists following Security
Georgia, Abkhazia, and Russia, but they were forced Council consultations on Cyprus and the United Nations
Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). 17 July 2018.
to leave after war broke out between Russia and
Georgia in the nearby territory of South Ossetia.
In Lesson 6, you learned about the peacekeeping efforts of the UN in the Middle East. This involved
the deployment of peacekeepers in six distinct operations — some new, some long-standing. First,
the lesson discussed the longest-running UN peacekeeping mission, its Truce Supervision Operation
(UNTSO), which originally deployed in 1948 and provides military observers to several parts of the
region. The lesson then summarized twenty-first‑century developments in the UN Disengagement
Observer Force (UNDOF), established in 1974 following the Yom Kippur War, when Egypt and Syria
launched a coordinated invasion of Israel. Third, you learned about the now completed UN observer
mission along the Iraq-Kuwait border (UNIKOM), which had deployed between 1991 and 2003. The
fourth mission analysed was the ongoing UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL). Originally deployed in
1978, UNIFIL was significantly reconfigured after the 2006 war between Israel and Hezbollah. Today,
it continues to struggle with some aspects of its mandate and the spillover effects of the war in Syria.
Finally, you learned about one of the shortest ever UN peace operations: its Supervision Mission in Syria
(UNSMIS). UNSMIS operated for just a few months during 2012, had almost no impact on the war’s
dynamics, but did signal that the UN was divided and hence was unable to manage this disastrous war
effectively.
In Lesson 7, you learned about the relatively new use of the concept of “stabilization” to describe
four of the UN peace operations. The lesson began by explaining how the UN operationalized the concept
of “stabilization” in its peace operations and summarizing some of the key operational and political
questions raised by these missions. In the rest of the lesson, you learned about the four UN peace
operations with the word “stabilization” in their titles: specifically, MINUSTAH in Haiti (2004–2017),
MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo (2010–present), MINUSMA in Mali (2013–present),
and MINUSCA in the Central African Republic (2014–present). These operations all faced considerable
challenges related to civilian protection, State-building, and the use of force, and most of them suffered
175
notable scandals. Interestingly, MINUSCA was the last time the Security Council established a new
multidimensional UN peacekeeping operation.
Since the United Nations has never had a monopoly on authorizing or conducting peace operations, in
Lesson 8, you learned about the array of partnerships that UN peacekeepers have developed with other
organizations and actors during the twenty-first century. The lesson briefly explained why “partnership
peacekeeping” became more common than the other types of partnerships that UN peacekeepers have
engaged in. Three illustrative examples of different types of partnership peacekeeping were discussed.
The first was a case study of the only UN hybrid operation, namely, the UN-AU Hybrid Operation in
Darfur (UNAMID). This was the result of a political compromise with the host government of Sudan
and a prolonged transition from the earlier and much smaller AU Mission in Sudan (AMIS). The lesson
then provided a case study of the unprecedented United Nations logistical support mechanism to help
stabilize Somalia, specifically, the UN Support Office for the AU Mission in Somalia (UNSOA). Finally,
you learned about different examples of sequential partnerships, and the lesson discussed some of
the opportunities and challenges provided by the “re-hatting” of AU personnel into UN peacekeeping
operations in Mali and the Central African Republic.
Finally, in Lesson 9, you learned about efforts to develop and reform guidelines and principles that
were appropriate for UN peacekeeping in the twenty-first century. This lesson provided a brief synopsis of
key themes and conclusions from the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations — the “Brahimi Report”
(2000), the UN Capstone Doctrine on peacekeeping (2008), the Report of the High‑Level Independent
Panel on Peace Operations (2015), Lieutenant General (Retired) dos Santos Cruz’s Report on Improving
the Safety and Security of UN Peacekeepers (2017), and the ongoing Action for Peacekeeping (A4P)
initiative (2018–present).
Section 10.2 The Impacts of UN Peacekeeping on Armed Conflict

Lessons 2–8 provided short, individual histories of over 30 UN peacekeeping operations active
during the twenty-first century. This section provides a different perspective by offering an overview
of the main general impacts UN peacekeeping operations had on the conflict zones to which they
deployed. It does so by summarizing eight of the major findings of recent academic research into UN
peacekeeping. These findings help to situate the histories of the individual UN missions as part of a
broader international enterprise of managing armed conflicts. Although every UN peacekeeping mission
has its challenges — and often scandals — the majority of general assessments across multiple missions
is that their impact on armed conflicts is positive.
The first point to note is that UN peacekeepers were often asked to deploy to crises where other
international actors were reluctant to take the lead. In other words, UN peacekeepers were sent to
some of the world’s most intractable conflict zones.1
A second conclusion is that UN peacekeepers can help reduce the length of local armed conflicts,
even protracted civil wars.2 Moreover, larger UN troop deployments can shorten civil war duration to
1) See, for example: Virginia Page Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War (Princeton: Princeton University Press,
2008).
2) See, for example: Anke Hoeffler, “Can International Interventions Secure the Peace?” International Area Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2014, 75–94
and Andrea Ruggeri, Han Dorussen, and Theodora-Ismene Gizelis, “Winning the Peace Locally: UN Peacekeeping and Local Conflict”, International
Organization, Vol. 71, No. 1, 2017, 163–185.
176
a negotiated settlement.3 One recent statistical analysis found that a UN peacekeeping operation with
20,000 troops deployed would increase the likelihood of war cessation via negotiated resolution from
approximately 35 per cent to 98 per cent by the 58th month of conflict (the mean duration of wars in the
analysts’ database).4
Third, once a peace agreement is signed, UN peacekeeping operations significantly reduce the
likelihood of armed conflict and episodes of major violence reigniting afterwards. Virginia Page
Fortna, Professor of US Foreign and Security Policy at Columbia University, concluded that where UN
peacekeepers are deployed, the likelihood of war reigniting falls by 75–85 per cent compared to those
cases where no peacekeepers are deployed.5
A fourth finding was that UN peacekeeping operations could also reduce the geographic scope of
violence and the risk of armed conflicts spreading across international borders. They do this primarily
by reducing the tactical advantage of mobility for rebel groups, obstructing the movements of armed
actors, and changing the ability of governments to seek and confront rebel groups.6
A fifth and related finding was the impact of UN

peacekeepers on the intensity of local armed conflict.
Here, it was found that when UN troops are deployed
to situations of ongoing armed conflict, their presence
is associated with a reduction in violence. Specifically,
the more UN peacekeeping troops deployed, the
lower the number of battlefield deaths is.7 One recent
statistical analysis concluded that deployment of
20,000 UN peacekeeping troops reduces the level
of battlefield killing in the average government vs.
rebel group civil war by approximately 22 deaths per
month relative to the same conflict that receives no
peacekeeping troops. Given that each war has an
After their deployment in Bangassou in the Mbomou
average of 3.5 government-rebel dyads active at prefecture in the south-east of the Central African
any one time, and given that the average duration of Republic, 150 members of the Central African Armed
Forces work in close collaboration with the peacekeepers
each conflict dyad is approximately 58 months, the
serving with MINUSCA. Joint patrols are carried out daily
aggregate effect of deploying 20,000 UN troops is in the city and its peripheries to reassure and protect the
to save approximately 4,500 lives on the battlefield population, working towards a lasting peace in the region.
1 August 2018. UN Photo #775473 by Herve Serefio.
alone.8 A related finding was that relative to deploying
no UN peacekeeping troops to an active civil war,
a mission composed of 12,000 UN peacekeeping
3) Jacob Kathman and Michelle Benson, “Cut Short? United Nations Peacekeeping and Civil War Duration to Negotiated Settlement”, Journal of Conflict
Resolution, Vol. 63, No. 7, 2019, 1601–1629.
4) Lisa Hultman, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon, Peacekeeping in the Midst of War (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2019), 177.
5) Fortna, Does Peacekeeping Work?, 171.
6) Kyle Beardsley, “Peacekeeping and the Contagion of Armed Conflict”, Journal of Politics, Vol. 73, No. 4, 2011, 1051–1064 and Kyle Beardsley and
Kristian S. Gleditsch, “Peacekeeping as Conflict Containment”, International Studies Review, Vol. 17, No. 1, 2015, 67–89.
7) Lisa Hultman, Jacob Kathman, and Megan Shannon, “Beyond Keeping Peace: United Nations Effectiveness in the Midst of Fighting”, American Political
Science Review, Vol. 108, No. 4, 2014, 737–753.
8) Hultman et al., Peacekeeping in the Midst of War, 177. Their statistical analysis examines all UN peace operations (including special political missions)
deployed in situations of active civil wars between 1992 and 2014. However, it purposefully omits UNSMIS and does not include UNSOM and UNSOA/
UNSOS.
177
troops reduces battlefield deaths suffered each month by approximately 50 per cent.9 UN peacekeepers
can also reduce local violence by acting as negotiators and mediators in episodes of local communal
violence by organizing intergroup dialogues.10 Those same troops can further reinforce the likelihood of
a successful mediated settlement to the armed conflict in question.11
A sixth key finding is that UN peacekeepers can deter atrocities against civilians.12 This is particularly
important given that by the 2010s, over 90 per cent of UN peacekeepers were explicitly mandated to
protect civilians, and they did so in part by deploying to locations where non-combatants are at risk.13
UN peacekeepers were usually successful in this endeavour, and the extent of protection increased with
the number of troops and police deployed.14 A recent statistical analysis by Lisa Hultman, Associate
Professor of Peace and Conflict Research at Uppsala University, Jacob Kathman, Associate Professor in
the Political Science Department at SUNY Buffalo, and Megan Shannon, Associate Professor of Political
Science at the University of Colorado, Boulder, demonstrated that with no UN peacekeeping troops
deployed to an active civil war, the expected average number of civilians killed in a given month is
approximately 25. When the number of UN peacekeeping troops increases to 4,000, the expected
number of civilian deaths declines to just below 12, and with 10,000 troops, the expected civilian
death count is about 4 per month. This means that if we consider a hypothetical civil war over an
approximate 106-month duration (the mean duration of civil wars in their data), their analysis predicts
more than 2,650 civilians will be directly targeted and killed by the belligerent parties. Yet, if 14,000 UN
peacekeeping troops are deployed over the course of 106 months, their analysis predicts combatants
will murder under 200 civilians. In other words, approximately 2,450 civilian lives would be saved as a
result of deploying 14,000 UN peacekeeping troops.15
A seventh finding relates to the ability of UN peacekeeping operations to reduce sexual violence
in conflict zones. Some analysts have concluded that the presence of UN peacekeepers can reduce
sexual violence in armed conflicts by reducing its likelihood and limiting its prevalence.16 However, this
conclusion is contested, with another analysis concluding the ability of UN peacekeepers to reduce
sexual violence is generally weak.17
Finally, scholarly analysis has concluded that UN peacekeeping operations are a highly
cost‑effective means of promoting peace and security. Recall that the entire annual budget for UN
peacekeeping — which only once rose above $8 billion between 2000 and 2020 — is just a tiny fraction
of world military expenditure. In 2017, for example, UN peacekeeping cost less than 0.5 per cent of
9) Hultman et al., Peacekeeping in the Midst of War, 100.

10) Hannah Schmidt, “United Nations Peacekeeping Locally: Enabling Conflict Resolution, Reducing Communal Violence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution,
Vol. 64, No. 2–3, 2019, 344–372.
11) Kyle Beardsley, David E. Cunningham, and Peter B. White, “Mediation, Peacekeeping and the Severity of Civil War”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol.
63, No. 7, 2019, 1682–1709.
12) Erik Melander, “Selected to Go Where Murderers Lurk? The Preventive Effect of Peacekeeping on Mass Killings of Civilians”, Conflict Management and
Peace Science, Vol. 26, No. 4, 2009, 389–406.
13) Lisa Hultman, “UN Peace Operations and Protection of Civilians: Cheap Talk or Norm Implementation?” Journal of Peace Research, Vol.50, No. 1,
2013, 59–73.
14) Jacob Kathman and Reed Wood, “Stopping the Killing During the ‘Peace’: Peacekeeping and the Severity of Postconflict Civilian Victimization”, Foreign
Policy Analysis, Vol. 12, No. 2, 2016, 149–169; Hanne Fjelde, Lisa Hultman, and Desiree Nilsson, “Protection through Presence: UN Peacekeeping and
the Costs of Targeting Civilians”, International Organization, Vol. 73, No. 1, 2019, 103–131.
15) Hultman et al., Peacekeeping in the Midst of War, 123–125.
16) Shanna Kirschner and Adam Miller, “Does Peacekeeping Really Bring Peace? Peacekeepers and Combatant-Perpetrated Sexual Violence in Civil Wars”,
Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 63, No. 9, 2019, 2043–2070.
17) Karin Johansson and Lisa Hultman, “UN Peacekeeping and Protection from Sexual Violence”, Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 63, No. 7, 2019,
1656–1681.
178
the $1.739 trillion in global military expenditure.18 One recent statistical analysis concluded that if the
UN had invested $200 billion in peacekeeping operations with strong mandates between 2001 and
2013 — about $15.4 billion per year — major armed conflict worldwide would have been reduced by up
to two-thirds relative to a scenario without such missions, and 150,000 lives would have been saved
compared to a no‑peacekeeping operation scenario.19
Section 10.3 Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020

Lesson 1 raised five of the most important enduring themes evident across many UN peacekeeping
operations. This final part of the course briefly revisits each theme with an eye to how the UN might
improve its peacekeeping operations in the future.
Means and ends should be in sync
In order to implement their usually long list of mandated tasks, UN peacekeeping operations require the
appropriate capabilities in terms of personnel, equipment and assets, financing, and support systems.
They also need the political support of a unified Security Council. However, we have seen how gaps
often opened up between the capabilities provided to operations and the effects they were expected
to generate in the field. Today, the UN still faces the choice of how best to close these gaps. In generic
terms, it can be done in one of two ways: Either the UN can reduce the number and within the scope of
the mandated tasks given to its peacekeepers, or it can stick with these long, complicated mandates but
increase the resources given to peacekeepers. It is difficult to tell how the Security Council will approach
this issue because it has not established a new multidimensional peacekeeping operation since 2014.
Successful peacemaking is the best exit strategy
In order to leave successfully, UN peacekeeping operations must be directly integrated into an

effective peacemaking process aimed at resolving the armed conflict in question. Without a political
pathway to peace, peacekeeping operations can at best provide a kind of damage limitation, reducing
the duration, scope, and intensity of organized violence. This is what the HIPPO Report (2015) meant
by ensuring the “primacy of politics”. As we have seen, however, some of the UN peacekeeping missions
were not accompanied by viable political strategies of conflict resolution. In these instances, belligerents
refused to come to a political settlement, and peacekeeping had to continue indefinitely. This has been
particularly apparent in the long-standing UN missions involving territorial disputes, notably, UNTSO
in the Middle East, UNMOGIP in Kashmir, UNFICYP in Cyprus, and MINURSO in Western Sahara. But it
has also been a problem in more recent theatres where the Security Council has identified so-called
“spoilers” or “terrorist” organizations and supported government efforts to degrade those actors. In
places such as eastern DRC, Somalia, and Mali, the military defeat of these groups remains unlikely,
leaving the UN without a clear exit strategy for its peacekeepers. Deciding how to engage politically with
such non-State armed groups will remain a major issue for the foreseeable future.
18) “Military Expenditure Database”, Stockholm International Peace Research Institute. Available from: <https://www.sipri.org/databases/milex>.
19) Havard Hegre, Lisa Hultman, and Havard Nygard, “Evaluating the conflict- reducing effect of UN peacekeeping operations”, The Journal of Politics, Vol.
81, No. 1, 2019, 215–232.
179
Women representatives in the Kidal region,

Mali, meet with Jean-Pierre Lacroix (not
pictured), Under-Secretary-General for
Peacekeeping Operations, on the implications
of women on the peace process. 1 September
2018. UN Photo #773016 by Harandane Dicko.
Peacekeepers need appropriate guidance
UN peacekeepers are more likely to succeed in the field if they are given adequate guidance and
concomitant training beforehand. We have seen that although UN peacekeepers were given a very long
list of mandated tasks during the twenty-first century, the organization’s basic principles of peacekeeping
have remained constant. Specifically, UN peacekeepers should:20
» Obtain the consent of the main parties to the conflict, including

the host country government;
» Implement their mandates impartially, without favour or

prejudice to any party; and
» Not use military force except in self-defence and within the

scope of the mission’s mandate.
In practice, however, we also saw how there were significant debates over how these principles
should be interpreted and operationalized in some of the UN field missions. For instance, were the
principles broken if UN peacekeepers did not operate with the consent of some of the main parties
to the conflict, as in Mali, the DRC, and Somalia? Was the Security Council acting impartially in
mandating its peacekeepers to extend and consolidate State authority in an ongoing civil war? As a
result, debates continue over whether the UN peacekeeping principles should be revised in light of the
recent “stabilization” operations, whether the status quo is fine, and whether the UN should cease such
stabilization activities where they stretch the organization’s basic principles to breaking point.
Peacekeeping relies on partnerships
We have seen how UN peacekeeping is founded on partnerships: both within the UN system (between
the Security Council, General Assembly, Member States, and Secretariat) and with actors beyond the UN
system (such as regional organizations, coalitions of the willing, host governments, private contractors,
and, ultimately, local populations). UN partnerships with external actors became particularly important
in Africa. As a result, debate has intensified over how best the UN should support peace operations
20) DPKO, United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and Guidelines (New York: UN DPKO/DFS, 2008). Available from: <https://www.un.org/
ruleoflaw/blog/document/united-nations-peacekeeping-operations-principles-and-guidelines-the-capstone-doctrine/>.
180
authorized by the Security Council but led by African actors.21 Today, debates continue over the best
division of labour and hence the most effective types of partnerships between these different actors. As
discussed in Lesson 8, sequential partnerships where UN peacekeepers took over from earlier missions
were particularly common. But they raised challenges as well as providing opportunities. Debate also
continues over what form UN support should take in assisting the ad hoc coalitions fighting in Africa’s
Lake Chad Basin (the Multinational Joint Task Force) and across the Sahel (the G5 Sahel Joint Force).
Improving accountability and performance enables success
Figure 10-1 The UN Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse
Source: United Nations, “Trust Fund in Support of Victims of Sexual Exploitation and Abuse”. Available from:
<https://www.un.org/preventing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse/content/trust-fund>.
21) See, for example: UN General Assembly and UN Security Council, Report of the African Union-United Nations panel on modalities for support to
African Union peacekeeping operations, Letter from the Secretary-General, A/63/666–S/2008/813, 31 December 2008. Available from: <https://
undocs.org/A/63/666>; Crisis Group, A Tale of Two Councils: Strengthening AU-UN Cooperation (Washington, DC: Africa Report 279, June 2019).
Available from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/africa/279-tale-two-councils-strengthening-au-un-cooperation>; Crisis Group, The Price of Peace:
Securing UN Financing for AU Peace Operations (Washington, DC: Africa Report 286, January 2020). Available from: <https://www.crisisgroup.org/
africa/286-price-peace-securing-un-financing-au-peace-operations>.
181
A woman stands next to an anti-sexual

exploitation and abuse (SEA) poster during
a one-day workshop hosted by the National
Council on Child Welfare, in Khartoum,
Sudan, against SEA allegedly committed in
South Darfur by United Nations personnel. 18
January 2007. UN Photo #7714528 by Fred
Noy.
Finally, it is important to recall that the legitimacy and credibility of UN peacekeeping operations
are directly related to whether peacekeepers are held accountable and how well they perform their
assigned tasks. Despite a number of scandals involving UN peacekeepers engaged in violence against
locals, sexual exploitation and abuse (SEA), and the illicit trading of goods, accountability mechanisms
have improved since 2000. To take the example of SEA, adoption of the “zero-tolerance” policy, greater
transparency on SEA allegations against peacekeepers, the symbolic firing of the head of MINUSCA in
2015, and, especially, the passage of Security Council resolution 2272 (2016) are all steps in the right
direction.22 Being accountable also means making amends for violations and abuse. Fortunately, by mid-
2020, 21 UN Member States contributed roughly $2 million to a new trust fund in support of victims of
SEA (see Figure 10-1). However, when it comes to deterring perpetrators through punishment, there is
only so much the UN Secretariat can do on this issue because it is ultimately up to the organization’s
Member States to discipline their personnel when they are guilty of misconduct.
In relation to performance, the UN has also taken important steps in the right direction. First, it has
clarified the tasks that peacekeeping units should be able to perform in the field by developing about a
dozen UN military unit manuals.23 In turn, clarifying these tasks has enabled the UN to develop objective
criteria by which to assess peacekeeper performance, and the Inspector-General, Force Commanders,
and other senior leaders can now better assess the preparedness and performance of UN personnel in
field missions. Finally, the unanimous adoption of Security Council resolution 2436 (September 2018),
“aimed at enhancing the performance of peacekeeping personnel at all levels, both at Headquarters
and in the field”, was another important step forward.24 As this course has shown, it is important that
all UN Member States support the ongoing efforts to improve the performance of the organization’s
peacekeeping operations. The world really would be much worse off without them.
22) See: Jeni Whalan, Dealing with Disgrace: Addressing sexual exploitation and abuse in UN peacekeeping (New York: International Peace Institute,
2017). Available from: <https://www.ipinst.org/2017/08/addressing-sexual-exploitation-and-abuse-in-un-peacekeeping>.
23) These manuals cover infantry battalions, aviation, engineers, force headquarters support, logistics, maritime, military police, reconnaissance, riverine,
signals, special forces, and transport units.
24) See: Paul D. Williams, “The Security Council’s Peacekeeping Trilemma”, International Affairs, Vol. 96, No. 2, 2020, 479–499.
182
1. How many new peacekeeping operations 6. What are the three principles of
did the United Nations establish between peacekeeping?
2000 and mid-2020?
A. 8 7. A recent statistical analysis concluded
B. 18
that if between 2001 and 2013, the
United Nations had invested about
C. 28
$15.4 billion per year in peacekeeping
D. 38 operations with strong mandates, _____
lives would have been saved compared
2. Compared to the situation in Western to a no-peacekeeping operation
Africa, what did most UN peacekeeping scenario.
operations in Eastern Africa fail to do?
A. 150,000
A. Protect civilians
B. 175,000
B. Supervise elections
C. 200,000
C. Facilitate transitions to more democratic
D. 25,000
States
D. Disarm and demobilize former combatants 8. The last time the United Nations
Security Council established a new
3. A recent statistical analysis found that a multidimensional peacekeeping
United Nations peacekeeping operation operation was:
with 20,000 troops deployed would
A. 2014
increase the likelihood of ending a civil
war via negotiated settlement from B. 2015
approximately 35 per cent to _____ by C. 2016
the war’s 58th month. D. 2017
A. 68 per cent
9. By mid-2020, how many United Nations
B. 78 per cent
Member States contributed roughly $2
C. 88 per cent million to a new trust fund in support of
D. 98 per cent victims of sexual exploitation and abuse?
A. 11
4. By the 2010s, over _____ of United
Nations peacekeepers were explicitly B. 16
mandated to protect civilians. C. 21
A. 60 per cent D. 26
B. 70 per cent
10. In what documents has the United
C. 80 per cent Nations clarified the tasks that its
D. 90 per cent peacekeeping units should be able to
perform in the field?
5. A recent statistical analysis found that
A. Military Unit Manuals
relative to deploying no United Nations
peacekeeping troops to an active civil B. Secretary-General reports
war, a mission composed of 12,000 C. Concept of Operations
troops reduces battlefield deaths D. Security Council resolutions
suffered each month by approximately:
A. 10 per cent
B. 30 per cent
C. 50 per cent
D. 70 per cent
183
Answer Key »
1. B
2. C
3. D
4. D
5. C
6. Obtain the consent of the main parties to the

conflict, including the host country government;
implement their mandates impartially, without favour
or prejudice to any party; and not use military force
except in self-defence and scope of the mission’s
mandate.
7. A
8. A
9. C
10. A
184
Appendix A: List of Acronyms
Acronym Meaning
A4P Action for Peacekeeping (UN)
ADF Allied Democratic Forces (Uganda)
AFISMA African-led International Support Mission to Mali
AMIB African Union Mission in Burundi
AMIS African Union Mission in Sudan
AMISOM African Union Mission in Somalia
AQIM Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb
ASEOWA African Union Support to Ebola in West Africa
ASIFU All Sources Information Fusion Unit (MINUSMA)
AU African Union
BINUB United Nations Integrated Office in Burundi
BONUCA United Nations Support Office in the Central African Republic
CAR the Central African Republic
CIS Commonwealth of Independent States
CISPKF Commonwealth of Independent States Peacekeeping Force in

Abkhazia-Georgia
CPA Comprehensive Peace Agreement (Sudan)
CPAS Comprehensive Performance Assessment System
DDR disarmament, demobilization, reintegration
DDRRR disarmament, demobilization, reintegration, repatriation, and

resettlement
DIS Détachement Intégré de Securité (Chad)
DPA Darfur Peace Agreement
DPKO UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations
DPO UN Department of Peace Operations
DRC the Democratic Republic of Congo
ECCAS Economic Community of Central African States
ECOMICI ECOWAS Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
ECOMIL ECOWAS Mission in Liberia
185
ECOMOG Military Observer Group of the Economic Community of West African

States
ECOWAS Economic Community of West African States
EU European Union
EUFOR European Union Force
EULEX EU Rule of Law Mission (Kosovo)
FET female engagement team
FIB Force Intervention Brigade (MONUSCO)
FNL National Forces of Liberation
FPU Formed Police Unit
G8 Group of Eight
HIPPO High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations (2015)
I4S International Security and Stabilization Support Strategy
ICJ International Court of Justice
IDP internally displaced person
IED improvised explosive device
IGAD Inter-governmental Authority on Development
IMF International Monetary Fund
INTERFET International Force in East Timor
IPI International Peace Institute
IPOs individual police officers
ISR Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance
JBVMM joint border verification and monitoring mission
JMAC Joint Mission Analysis Cell
KFOR Kosovo Force
KLA Kosovo Liberation Army
KPC Kosovo Protection Corps
KPS Kosovo Police Service
LRA Lord’s Resistance Army
LURD Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
186
MICEMA ECOWAS Mission in Mali
MINUCI United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
MINUGUA United Nations Verification Mission in Guatemala
MINUJUSTH United Nations Mission for Justice Support in Haiti
MINURCA United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic
MINURCAT United Nations Mission in the Central African Republic and Chad
MINURSO United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara
MINUSCA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the

Central African Republic
MINUSMA United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in

Mali
MINUSTAH United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti
MIPONUH United Nations Civilian Police Mission in Haiti
MISCA African-led International Support Mission in the Central African

Republic
MNLA National Movement for the Liberation of the Azawad
MODEL Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MONUA United Nations Observer Mission in Angola
MONUC United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of

Congo
MONUSCO United Nations Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of

Congo
MOU memorandum of understanding
MPCI Patriotic Movement of Côte d’Ivoire
MUJAO Movement for Oneness and Jihad in West Africa
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NGTL National Transitional Government of Liberia
NPFL National Patriotic Front of Liberia
OAU Organization of African Unity
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OIF Organisation internationale de la Francophonie
OIOS United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services
187
ONUCI United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
ONUB United Nations Operation in Burundi
OSCE Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
P5 permanent members of the Security Council (Britain, China, France,

the Russian Federation, and the United States)
PAE Pacific Architects and Engineers
PCC police-contributing country
POC protection of civilians
POLISARIO Popular Front for the Liberation of Saguia el-Hamra and Río de Oro
QIP Quick Impact Project
QRF quick reaction force
RCD Rally for Congolese Democracy
RECAMP Reforcement des capacitiés africanes de maintien de la paix
RUF Revolutionary United Front of Sierra Leone
SADR Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic
SEA sexual exploitation and abuse
SMC strategic military cell
SNA Somali National Army
SPLM/A Sudan People’s Liberation Movement/Army
SRSG UN Special Representative of the Secretary-General
SSR security sector reform
SWAT special weapons and tactics
TCC troop-contributing country
TSZ Temporary Security Zone (Ethiopia–Eritrea)
UAV unmanned aerial vehicles
UK United Kingdom
UN United Nations
UNAMET United Nations Mission in East Timor
UNAMID AU/UN Hybrid Operation in Darfur (Sudan)
UNAMIR United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda
188
UNAMIS United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan
UNAMSIL United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone
UNCRO United Nations Confidence Restoration Operation in Croatia
UNDOF United Nations Disengagement Observer Force
UNFICYP United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus
UNHCR United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees
UNICEF United Nations Children’s Fund
UNIFIL United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
UNIKOM United Nations Iraq–Kuwait Military Observation Mission
UNIOSIL United Nations Integrated Office for Sierra Leone
UNIPSIL United Nations Integrated Peacebuilding Office in Sierra Leone
UNISFA United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei
UNITAMS United Nations Integrated Transition Assistance Mission in Sudan
UNMAS United Nations Mine Action Service
UNMEE United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea
UNMEER United Nations for Ebola Emergency Response
UNMIBH United Nations Mission in Bosnia-Herzegovina
UNMIK United Nations Mission in Kosovo
UNMIL United Nations Mission in Liberia
UNMIS United Nations Mission in Sudan
UNMISET United Nations Mission in Support of East Timor
UNMISS United Nations Mission in South Sudan
UNMIT United Nations Mission in Timor-Leste
UNMOGIP United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan
UNMOP United Nations Mission of Observers in Prevlaka
UNMOT United Nations Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
UNOCI United Nations Mission in Côte d’Ivoire
UNOMIG United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia
UNOMIL United Nations Observer Mission in Liberia
189
UNOMSIL United Nations Observer Mission in Sierra Leone
UNOTIL United Nations Office in Timor-Leste
UNPOS UN Political Office for Somalia
UNPREDEP United Nations Preventive Deployment Force
UNPROFOR United Nations Protection Force (Bosnia-Herzegovina and Croatia)
UNSAS United Nations Standby Arrangements System
UNSCOM United Nations Special Commission (Iraq)
UNSMIH United Nations Support in Haiti
UNSMIS United Nations Supervision Mission in Syria
UNSOA United Nations Support Office for AMISOM
UNSOM United Nations Assistance Mission for Somalia
UNSOS United Nations Support Office for Somalia
UNTAES United Nations Transitional Administration for Eastern Slavonia,

Baranja and Western Sirmium
UNTAET United Nations Transition Authority in East Timor
UNTMIH United Nations Transition Mission in Haiti
UNTSO United Nations Truce Supervision Organization
US United States
VBIED vehicle-borne improvised explosive device
WPS women, peace, and security
190
Appendix B: Further Readings
Dziedzic, Michael. Criminalized Power Structures: The Overlooked Enemies of Peace. Lanham:
Rowman & Littlefield, 2016.
Foley, Conor. UN Peacekeeping Operations and the Protection of Civilians. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 2017.
Fortna, Virginia Page. Does Peacekeeping Work? Shaping Belligerents’ Choices after Civil War.
Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008.
Ghittoni, Marta, Léa Lehouck, and Callum Watson. Elsie Initiative for Women in Peace Operations:
Baseline Study. Geneva: Geneva Centre for Security Sector Governance, 2018. Available from:
<https://www.dcaf.ch/elsie-initiative-women-peace-operations-baseline-study>.
Guéhenno, Jean-Marie. The Fog of Peace: A Memoir of International Peacekeeping in the 21st Century.
Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2015.
Holt, Victoria, and Glyn Taylor with Max Kelly. Protecting Civilians in the Context of UN Peacekeeping
Operations. New York: United Nations OCHA, 2009.
Howard, Lise. Power in Peacekeeping. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019.
Hultman, Lisa, Jacob D. Kathman, and Megan Shannon. Peacekeeping in the Midst of War. Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2019.
The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations. Edited by Joachim Koops, Norrie
MacQueen, Thierry Tardy, and Paul D. Williams. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2015.
Twenty-First-Century Peace Operations. Edited by William Durch. Washington, DC: US Institute of

Peace Press, 2006.
Williams, Paul D. with Alex J. Bellamy. Understanding Peacekeeping. 3rd edition. Cambridge: Polity
Press, 2021.
191
About the Author: Professor Paul Williams
Paul D. Williams, Ph.D., is currently a Professor at the Elliott

School of International Affairs, the George Washington
University, where he is also the Associate Director of the
Security Policy Studies M.A. programme. Professor Williams
received his Ph.D. in international politics from the University
of Wales, Aberystwyth (2001).
He worked previously at the universities of Warwick and Birmingham in the UK and has been a Visiting
Scholar at Georgetown University and the University of Queensland (2008) and a Visiting Professor at
Addis Ababa University, Ethiopia. In 2014–2015, he was a Fellow with the Woodrow Wilson Center for
International Scholars, and between 2012 and 2019, he served as a Non-Resident Senior Adviser at the
International Peace Institute in New York. Professor Williams is the author of several books related to
peace operations, including Understanding Peacekeeping (Polity Press, 3rd edition, 2021); Fighting for
Peace in Somalia: A history and analysis of the African Union Mission, 2007–2017 (Oxford University
Press, 2018); War and Conflict in Africa (Polity Press, 2nd edition, 2016); and is the Co-Editor and
Contributor to The Oxford Handbook of United Nations Peacekeeping Operations (Oxford University
Press, 2015).
192
Instructions for the End-of-Course Examination
Format and Material
The End-of-Course Examination is a multiple-choice exam that is accessed from the Online
Classroom. Most exams have 50 questions. Each question gives the student four choices (A, B, C, and
D), and only one is the correct answer. The exam covers material from all lessons of the course and may
also include information found in the annexes and appendices. Video content will not be tested.
» Access the exam from your Online Classroom

by visiting <www.peaceopstraining.org/users/
courses/> and clicking the title of this course.
Once you arrive at the course page, click the red
“Start Exam” button.
Time Limit
There is no time limit for the exam. This allows the student to read and study the questions
carefully and to consult the course text. Furthermore, if the student cannot complete the exam in one
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located at the bottom of the exam, next to the “Submit my answers” button. Clicking on the “Submit
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Passing Grade
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will be awarded to those who have passed the exam. A score of less than 75 per cent is a failing grade,
and students who have received a failing grade will be provided with a second, alternate version of the
exam, which may also be completed without a time limit. Students who pass the second exam will be
awarded a Certificate of Completion.
Continue your POTI training experience »

• Visit <www.peaceopstraining.org/courses/> for a list of all current courses.
• If a particular category of study interests you, such as Human Rights,

Logistics, or Military Studies, consider the POST Certificate programme
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History 2000-2020

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History 2000-2020

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The History of United Nations

Peacekeeping Operations from

Peace Operations Training Institute® PELP

After their deployment in Bangassou, in the Mbomou

Peace Operations Training Institute®

Peace Operations Training Institute

First edition: 2020 by Professor Paul D. Williams

Method of Study ix

Lesson 1 Overview: Trends and Key Themes 10

Section 1.1 Course Overview 12

Section 1.2 Major Trends in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020 13

Section 1.3 Enduring Themes in UN Peacekeeping, 2000–2020 26

Lesson 2 Peacekeeping Reborn 31

Section 2.1 UN Peacekeeping Reborn 33

Section 2.2 UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone 34

Section 2.3 UN Peacekeeping in Kosovo 37

Section 2.4 UN Peacekeeping in East Timor 41

Section 2.5 UN Peacekeeping in the DRC 44

Section 2.6 UN Peacekeeping and the “Global War on Terrorism” 46

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Lesson 3 Peacekeeping in Western Africa 50

Section 3.1 Ending UN Peacekeeping in Sierra Leone 52

Section 3.2 UN Peacekeeping in Cote d’Ivoire 53

Section 3.3 UN Peacekeeping in Liberia 57

Section 3.4 UN Peacekeeping in Western Sahara 61

Lesson 4 Peacekeeping in Eastern Africa 67

Section 4.1 UN Peacekeeping between Eritrea and Ethiopia 69

Section 4.2 UN Peacekeeping in Burundi 71

Section 4.3 The UN Mission in Sudan (UNMIS) 73

Section 4.5 UN Peacekeeping in Abyei 80

Section 4.6 UN Peacekeeping in South Sudan 82

Lesson 5 Peacekeeping in Europe, Asia, and the Caucasus 89

Section 5.1 UN Peacekeeping in Southern Europe 91

Section 5.2 UN Peacekeeping in South and South-East Asia 96

Section 5.3 UN Peacekeeping in the Caucasus 101

Lesson 6 Peacekeeping in the Middle East 106

Section 6.1 The UN Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) 108

Section 6.2 The UN Disengagement Observer Force (UNDOF) 109

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Section 6.3 The UN Iraq-Kuwait Observation Mission (UNIKOM) 111

Section 6.4 The UN Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL) 112

Section 6.5 The UN Supervision Mission in Syria (UNSMIS) 116

Lesson 7 UN Stabilization Operations 122

Section 7.1 Stabilization and UN Peacekeeping 124

Section 7.2 MINUSTAH in Haiti 126

Section 7.3 MONUSCO in the Democratic Republic of Congo 129

Section 7.4 MINUSMA in Mali 131

Section 7.5 MINUSCA in the Central African Republic 135

Lesson 8 Partnership Peacekeeping 141

Section 8.1 Partnership Peacekeeping in Theory and Practice 143

Section 8.2 Hybrid Peacekeeping in Darfur 145

Section 8.3 A Support Package for Somalia 149

Section 8.4 Sequential Peacekeeping: AU to UN Transitions 152

Lesson 9 Guidelines and Principles 157

Section 9.1 The Panel on UN Peace Operations: The Brahimi Report

Section 9.2 The UN Capstone Doctrine (2008) 161

Section 9.3 The High-Level Independent Panel on Peace Operations

PEACE OPERATIONS TRAINING INSTITUTE

Section 9.4 Improving the Security of United Nations Peacekeepers

Section 9.5 Action for Peacekeeping (2018) 167

Lesson 10 Summary and Conclusions 173

Section 10.1 Recap of the Course 175

Section 10.2 The Impacts of UN Peacekeeping on Armed Conflict 177