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A comparison process for mouse pairs
John R. Steel
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CONTENTS
P REFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix
C HAPTER 1. I NTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
1.1. Large cardinals and the consistency strength hierarchy . . . . . . . . . 1
1.2. Inner model theory . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
1.3. Mice and iteration strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
1.4. HOD in models of determinacy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
1.5. Least branch hod pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
1.6. Comparison and the mouse pair order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
1.7. Hod pair capturing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
1.8. Constructing mouse pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
1.9. The comparison argument . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
1.10. Plan of the book . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
C HAPTER 2. P RELIMINARIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.1. Extenders and ultrapowers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
2.2. Pure extender premice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
2.3. Projecta and cores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
2.4. Elementarity of maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
2.5. rΣk cofinality and near elementarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 40
2.6. Iteration trees on premice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 49
2.7. Iteration strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55
2.8. Comparison and genericity iterations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 62
2.9. Coarse structure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65
C HAPTER 3. BACKGROUND - INDUCED ITERATION STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . 71

3.1. Full background extender constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 72
3.2. Resurrection maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 78
3.3. A Shift Lemma for conversion stages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81
3.4. Conversion systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 85
3.5. Induced iteration strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 92
3.6. Internal consistency for iteration strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 93
3.7. Measurable projecta . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 95
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vi C ONTENTS
3.8. Projecta with measurable cofinality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99
C HAPTER 4. M ORE MICE AND ITERATION TREES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

4.1. Mice with projectum-free spaces . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 104
4.2. Other soundness patterns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 112
4.3. Elementarity for premouse embeddings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115
4.4. Plus trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 129
4.5. Copy maps, lifted trees, and levels of elementarity . . . . . . . . . . . . . 136
4.6. Iteration strategies and comparison . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 149
4.7. PFS constructions and their resurrection maps . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 154
4.8. Conversion systems and induced strategies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 158
4.9. Backgrounds for plus extenders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 170
4.10. Solidity in PFS constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 178
4.11. The Bicephalus Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 199
C HAPTER 5. S OME PROPERTIES OF INDUCED STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

5.1. Copying commutes with conversion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203
5.2. Positionality and strategy coherence . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 208
5.3. Pullback consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 211
5.4. Internal lift consistency . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 215
5.5. A reduction to λ -separated trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 219
C HAPTER 6. N ORMALIZING STACKS OF ITERATION TREES . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

6.1. Normalizing trees of length 2 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 222
6.2. Normalizing T ahFi . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 231
6.3. The extender tree V ext . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 245
6.4. Tree embeddings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 246
6.5. Normalizing T a U . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 251
6.6. The branches of W (T , U) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 266
6.7. Quasi-normalizing stacks of plus trees . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 278
6.8. Copying commutes with normalization . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 284
6.9. Normalizing longer stacks . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 290
C HAPTER 7. S TRATEGIES THAT CONDENSE AND NORMALIZE WELL . . . 293

7.1. The definitions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 294
7.2. Coarse Γ-Woodins and Γ-universality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 302
7.3. Strong unique iterability from UBH . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 307
7.4. Fine strategies that normalize well . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 317
7.5. Fine strategies that condense well . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 329
7.6. Pure extender pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 336
C HAPTER 8. C OMPARING ITERATION STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

8.1. Iterating into a backgrounded premouse . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 346
8.2. Extending tree embeddings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 351
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C ONTENTS vii
8.3. Resurrection embeddings as branch embeddings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

8.4. Iterating into a backgrounded strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 360
C HAPTER 9. F INE STRUCTURE FOR THE LEAST BRANCH HIERARCHY . . 391

9.1. Least branch premice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 392
9.2. Least branch hod pairs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 398
9.3. Mouse pairs and the Dodd-Jensen Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 400
9.4. Background constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 405
9.5. Comparison and the hod pair order . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 413
9.6. The existence of cores . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 418
C HAPTER 10. P HALANX ITERATION INTO A CONSTRUCTION . . . . . . . . . . 443
10.1. The Bicephalus Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 443
10.2. The Pseudo-premouse Lemma . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 451
10.3. Proof of Lemma 9.6.5 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 464
10.4. Some successful background constructions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 483
10.5. UBH holds in hod mice . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 486
C HAPTER 11. HOD IN THE DERIVED MODEL OF A HOD MOUSE . . . . . . . 499
11.1. Generic interpretability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 499
11.2. Mouse limits . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 501
11.3. HOD as a mouse limit . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 504
11.4. HOD mice satisfy V = K . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 513
11.5. Further results . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 518
R EFERENCES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 523
I NDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 529
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PREFACE
This book began life as a long research article titled Normalizing iteration trees
and comparing iteration strategies. I found the main ideas behind the comparison
process that motivates it in Spring 2015, and circulated a handwritten manuscript
shortly afterward. I circulated a preliminary form of the present book in April 2016,
and have revised and expanded it many times since then, as various significant
gaps and errors showed up. The last major revisions took place in 2020-2021.1
Beyond making the book correct, one of my goals has been to make it accessible.
I was encouraged here by the fact that the new definitions and results are actually
quite elementary. They rest on the theory of Fine structure and iteration trees
(FSIT), and can be seen as completing that theory in a certain way. The comparison
theorem for pure extender mice that is at the heart of FSIT is deficient, in that how
two mice compare depends on which iteration strategies are chosen to compare
them. Here we remedy that defect, by developing a method for comparing the
strategies. The result is a comparison theorem for mouse pairs parallel to the FSIT
comparison theorem for pure extender mice. We then use the comparison process
underlying that theorem to develop a fine structure theory for strategy mice parallel
to the fine structure theory for pure extender mice of FSIT.
There are points at which descriptive set theory under determinacy hypotheses
becomes relevant. At these points, it would help to have read the later sections of
[65]. However, I have included enough material that the reader familiar with FSIT
but shaky on determinacy should be able to follow the exposition. Our work here
is motivated by the problem of analyzing ordinal definability in models of Axiom
of Determinacy, but the prerequisite for following most of it is just inner model
theory at the level of FSIT.
1 Thisis a pre-publication copy only. The final, published version of the book can be purchased
through Cambridge University Press and other standard distribution channels. This prepublication copy
is made available for personal use only and must not be sold or re-distributed.
ix
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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION
In this book we shall develop a general comparison process for iteration strategies,
and show how the process can be used to analyze ordinal definability in models
of the Axiom of Determinacy. In this introduction, we look at the context and
motivation for the technical results to come.
We begin with a broad overview of inner model theory, the subject to which this
book belongs. Eventually we reach an outline of the ideas and results that are new
here. The journey is organized so that the technical background needed to follow
along increases as we proceed.
1.1. Large cardinals and the consistency strength hierarchy
Strong axioms of infinity, or as they are more often called, large cardinal hy-
potheses, play a central role in set theory. There are at least two reasons.
First, large cardinal hypotheses can be used to decide in a natural way many
questions which cannot be decided on the basis of ZFC (the commonly accepted
system of axioms for set theory, and hence all of mathematics). Many such
questions come from descriptive set theory, the theory of simply definable sets of
real numbers. For example, the hypothesis that there are infinitely many Woodin
cardinals yields a systematic and detailed theory of the projective sets of reals, those
that are definable in the language of second order arithmetic from real parameters.
ZFC by itself yields such a theory at only the simplest levels of second order
definability.
Second, large cardinal hypotheses provide a way of organizing and surveying
all possible natural extensions of ZFC. This is due to the following remarkable
phenomenon: for any natural extension T of ZFC which set theorists have studied,
there seems to be an extension S of ZFC axiomatized by large cardinal hypotheses
such that the consistency of T is provably (in ZFC) equivalent to that of S. The
consistency strengths of the large cardinal hypotheses are linearly ordered, and
usually easy to compare. Thus all natural extensions of ZFC seem to fall into
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2 1. I NTRODUCTION
a hierarchy linearly ordered by consistency strength, and calibrated by the large

cardinal hypotheses.2
These two aspects of large cardinal hypotheses are connected, in that the con-
sistency strength order on natural theories corresponds to the inclusion order on
the set of their “sufficiently absolute” consequences. For example, if S and T
are natural theories extending ZFC, and S has consistency strength less than or
equal to that of T , then the arithmetic consequences of S are included in those
of T . If in addition, S and T have consistency strength at least that of “there are
infinitely many Woodin cardinals”, then the consequences of S in the language of
second order arithmetic are included in those of T . This pattern persists at still
higher consistency strengths, with still more logically complicated consequences
about reals and sets of reals being brought into a uniform order. This beautiful and
suggestive phenomenon has a practical dimension as well: one way to develop the
absolute consequences of a strong theory T is to compute a consistency strength
lower bound S for T in terms of large cardinal hypotheses, and then work in the
theory S. For one of many examples, the Proper Forcing Axiom (PFA) yields a
canonical inner model with infinitely many Woodin cardinals that is correct for
statements in the language of second order arithmetic, and therefore PFA implies
all consequences of the existence of infinitely many Woodin cardinals that can be
stated in the language of second order arithmetic.
One can think of the consistency strength of a theory as the degree to which
it is committed to the existence of the higher infinite. Large cardinal hypotheses
make their commitments explicitly: they simply say outright that the infinities in
question exist. It is therefore usually easy to compare their consistency strengths.
Other natural theories often have their commitments to the existence of the infinite
well hidden. Nevertheless, set theorists have developed methods whereby these
commitments can be brought to the surface, and compared. These methods have
revealed the remarkable phenomenon described in the last paragraph, that natural
theories appear to be wellordered by the degrees to which they are committed to
the infinite, and that this degree of commitment corresponds exactly to the power
of the theory to decide questions about concrete objects, like natural numbers, real
numbers, or sets of real numbers.
We should emphasize that the paragraphs above describe a general pattern of
existing theorems. There are many examples of natural theories whose consistency
strengths have not yet been computed, and perhaps they, or some natural theory
yet to be found, will provide counterexamples to the pattern described above.
The pervasiveness of the pattern where we know how to compare consistency
strengths is evidence that this will not happen.3 The two methods whereby set
2 Let con(T ) be some natural formalization of the assertion that T is consistent. The consistency
strength order is given by: S ≤con T iff ZFC proves con(T ) → con(S).
3 The pattern extends to weak subtheories of ZFC as well. This book is concerned only with
theories having very strong commitments to infinity, and so we shall ignore subtheories of ZFC, but the
linearity of the consistency strengths below that of ZFC is evidence of linearity higher up.
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1.2. I NNER MODEL THEORY 3
theorists compare consistency strengths, forcing and inner model theory, seem to
lead inevitably to the pattern. In particular, the wellorder of natural consistency
strengths seems to correspond to the inclusion order on canonical minimal inner
models for large cardinal hypotheses. Forcing and inner model theory seem
sufficiently general to compare all natural consistency strengths, but at the moment,
this is just informed speculation. So one reasonable approach to understanding
the general pattern of consistency strengths is to develop our comparison methods
further. In particular, inner model theory is in great need of further development,
as there are quite important consistency strengths that it does not yet reach.
1.2. Inner model theory
The inner model program attempts to associate to each large cardinal hypothesis
H a canonical minimal universe of sets MH (an inner model) in which H is true.
The stronger H is, the larger MH will be; that is, G ≤con H if and only if MG ⊆ MH .
Some of our deepest understanding of large cardinal hypotheses comes from the
inner model program.
The inner models we have so far constructed have an internal structure which
admits a systematic, detailed analysis, a fine structure theory of the sort pioneered
by Ronald Jensen around 1970 ([16]). Thus being able to construct MH gives us
a very good idea as to what a universe satisfying H might look like. Inner model
theory thereby provides evidence of the consistency of the large cardinal hypotheses
to which it applies. (The author believes that this will some day include all the
large cardinal hypotheses currently studied.) Since forcing seems to reduce any
consistency question to the consistency question for some large cardinal hypothesis,
it is important to have evidence that the large cardinal hypotheses themselves are
consistent! No evidence is more convincing than an inner model theory for the
hypothesis in question.
The smallest of the canonical inner models is the universe L of constructible sets,
isolated by Kurt Gödel ([14]) in his 1937 proof that CH is consistent with ZFC. It
was not until the mid 1960’s that J. Silver and K. Kunen ([57],[23]) developed the
theory of a canonical inner model going properly beyond L, by constructing MH
for H = “there is a measurable cardinal”.4 Since then, progressively larger MH
for progressively stronger H have been constructed and studied in detail. (See for
example [7],[27], and [28].) At the moment, we have a good theory of canonical
inner models satisfying “there is a Woodin cardinal”, and even slightly stronger
hypotheses. (See [26],[30], and [61], for example.) One of the most important open
problems in set theory is to extend this theory significantly further, with perhaps
4 ZFC is of course too weak, consistency-wise, to prove that there is such a model. Silver and
Kunen worked in the theory ZFC+ “there is a measurable cardinal”. In the mid 1970s, Dodd and
Jensen developed general methods for constructing the canonical inner model with a measurable under
a wide assortment of hypotheses. See [7].
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4 1. I NTRODUCTION
the most well-known target being models satisfying “there is a supercompact

cardinal”.
Inner model theory is a crucial tool in calibrating consistency strengths: in order
to prove that H ≤con T , where H is a large cardinal hypothesis, one generally
constructs a canonical inner model of H inside an arbitrary model of T . Because
we do not have a full inner model theory very far past Woodin cardinals, we lack
the means to prove many well-known conjectures of the form H ≤con T , where H
is significantly stronger than “there is a Woodin cardinal”. Broadly speaking, there
are great defects in our understanding of the consistency strength hierarchy beyond
Woodin cardinals.
Inner model theory is also a crucial tool in developing the consequences for real
numbers of large cardinal hypotheses. Indeed, the basics of inner model theory
for Woodin cardinals were discovered in 1985-86 by D. A. Martin and the author,
at roughly the same time they discovered their proof of Projective Determinacy,
or PD. (Martin, Moschovakis, and others had shown in the 1960’s and 70’s that
PD decides in a natural way all the classical questions about projective sets left
undecided by ZFC alone.) This simultaneous discovery was not an accident, as
the fundamental new tool in both contexts was the same: iteration trees, and the
iteration strategies which produce them. Since then, progress in inner model theory
has given us a deeper understanding of pure descriptive set theory, and the means
to solve some old problems in that field.
The fundamental open problem of inner model theory is to extend the theory to
models satisfying stronger large cardinal hypotheses. “There is a supercompact
cardinal” is an old and still quite challenging target. One very well known test
question here is whether (ZFC+“there is a supercompact cardinal”) ≤con ZFC +
PFA. The answer is almost certainly yes, and the proof almost certainly involves
an inner model theory that is firing on all cylinders.5 That kind of inner model
theory we have now only at the level of many Woodin cardinals, but significant
parts of the theory do exist already at much higher levels.6
5 A parallel, and still older, question is whether (ZFC + “there is a supercompact cardinal”)
≤con ZFC+ “there is a strongly compact cardinal”.

6 J. Baumgartner showed in the early 1980s that ZFC + PFA ≤
con ZFC+“there is a supercompact
cardinal”. Supercompacts are far beyond Woodin cardinals, in the sense that there are many interesting
consistency strengths strictly between the two, and in the sense that constructing canonical inner
models for supercompacts presents significant new difficulties. Many set theoretic principles have
been shown consistent relative to the existence of (sometimes many) supercompact cardinals, so
inner-model-theoretic evidence of their consistency would be valuable.
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1.3. M ICE AND ITERATION STRATEGIES 5
1.3. Mice and iteration strategies
The canonical inner models we seek are often called mice. There are two
principal varieties, the pure extender mice and the strategy mice.7
A pure extender premouse is a model of the form Lα [~E] where ~E is a coherent
sequence of extenders. Here an extender is a system of ultrafilters coding an
elementary embedding, and coherence means roughly that the extenders appear in
order of strength, without leaving gaps. These notions were introduced by Mitchell
in the 1970s8 , and they have been a foundation for work in inner model theory
since then.
In this book, we shall assume that our premice have no long extenders on their
coherent sequences.9 Such premice can model superstrong, and even subcompact,
cardinals. They cannot model κ + -supercompactness. Long extenders lead to an
additional set of difficulties.
An iteration strategy is a winning strategy for player II in the iteration game. For
any premouse M, the iteration game on M is a two player game of length ω1 + 1.10
In this game, the players construct a tree of models such that each successive node
on the tree is obtained by an ultrapower of a model that already exists in the tree.
I is the player that describes how to construct this ultrapower. He chooses an
extender E from the sequence of the last model N constructed so far, then chooses
another model P in the tree and takes the ultrapower of P by E. If the ultrapower is
ill-founded then player I wins; otherwise the resulting ultrapower is the next node
on the tree. Player II moves at limit stages λ by choosing a branch of the tree that
has been visited cofinally often below λ , and is such that the direct limit of the
embeddings along the branch is well-founded. If he fails to do so, he loses. If II
manages to stay in the category of wellfounded models through all ω1 + 1 moves,
then he wins. A winning strategy for II in this game is called an iteration strategy
for M, and M is said to be iterable just in case there is an iteration strategy for it.
Iterable pure extender premice are called pure extender mice.
Pure extender mice are canonical objects; for example, any real number belong-
ing to such a mouse is ordinal definable. Let us say that a premouse M is pointwise
definable if every element of M is definable over M. For any axiomatizable theory
T , the minimal mouse satisfying T is pointwise definable. The canonicity of pure
extender mice is due to their iterability, which, via the fundamental Comparison
Lemma, implies that the pointwise definable pure extender mice are wellordered
by inclusion. This is the mouse order on pointwise definable pure extender mice.
7 Strategy mice are sometimes called hod mice, because of their role in analyzing the hereditarily
ordinal definable sets in models of the Axiom of Determinacy.
8 See [27] and [28].
9 An extender is short if all its component ultrafilters concentrate on the critical point. Otherwise, it
is long.
10 Iteration games of other lengths are also important, but this length is crucial, so we shall focus on
it.
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6 1. I NTRODUCTION
The consistency strength of T is determined by the minimal mouse M having a

generic extension satisfying T , and thus the consistency strength order on natural
T is mirrored in the mouse order. However, in the case of the mouse order, we
have proved that we have a wellorder; what we cannot yet do is tie natural T at
high consistency strengths to it. As we climb the mouse order, the mice become
correct (reflect what is true in the full universe of sets) at higher and higher levels
of logical complexity.
Iteration strategies for pointwise definable pure extender mice are also canon-
ical objects; for example, a pointwise definable mouse has exactly one iteration
strategy.11 The existence of iteration strategies is at the heart of the fundamental
problem of inner model theory, and for a pointwise definable M, to prove the
existence of an iteration strategy is to define it. In practice, it seems necessary
to give a definition in the simplest possible logical form. As we go higher in the
mouse order, the logical complexity of iteration strategies must increase, in a way
that keeps pace with the correctness of the mice they identify.
Our most powerful, all-purpose method for constructing iteration strategies is
the core model induction method. Because iteration strategies must act on trees
of length ω1 , they are not coded by sets of reals. Nevertheless, the fragment of
the iteration strategy for a countable mouse that acts on countable iteration trees
is coded by a set of reals. If this set happens to be absolutely definable (that is,
Universally Baire) then the strategy can be extended to act on uncountable iteration
trees in a unique way. There is no other way known to construct iteration strategies
acting on uncountable trees. Thus, having an absolutely definable iteration strategy
for countable trees is tantamount to having a full iteration strategy. The key
idea in the core model induction is to use the concepts of descriptive set theory,
under determinacy hypotheses, to identify a next relevant level of correctness and
definability for sets of reals, a target level at which the next iteration strategy should
be definable.
Absolute definability leads to determinacy. Thus at reasonably closed limit steps
in a core model induction, one has a model M of AD +V = L(P(R)) that contains
the restrictions to countable trees of the iteration strategies already constructed.
Understanding the structure of HODM is important for going further.
1.4. HOD in models of determinacy
HOD is the class of all hereditarily ordinal definable sets. It is a model of ZFC12 ,
but beyond that, ZFC does not decide its basic theory, and the same is true of ZFC
augmented by any of the known large cardinal hypotheses. The problem is that
the definitions one has allowed are not sufficiently absolute. In contrast, the theory
11 This follows from Theorem 4.11 of [65], and the fact that any iteration strategy for a pointwise
definable M has the Weak Dodd-Jensen property with respect to all enumerations of M.
12 See [31].
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1.4. HOD IN MODELS OF DETERMINACY 7
of HOD in determinacy models is well-determined, not subject to the vagaries of

forcing.13
The study of HOD in models of AD has a long history. The reader should
see [67] for a survey of this history. HOD was studied by purely descriptive set
theoretic methods in the late 70s and 80s, and partial results on basic questions
such as whether HOD |= GCH were obtained then. It was known then that inner
model theory, if only one could develop it in sufficient generality, would be relevant
to characterizing the reals in HOD. It was known that HODM is close to M in
various ways; for example, if M |= AD+ +V = L(P(R))14 , then M can be realized
as a symmetric forcing extension of HODM , so that the first order theory of M is
part of the first order theory of its HOD. 15
Just how relevant inner model theory is to the study of HOD in models of AD
became clear in 1994, when the author showed that if there are ω Woodin cardinals
with a measurable above them all, then HODL(R) up to θ L(R) is a pure extender
mouse.16 (See [60].) Shortly afterward, this result was improved by Hugh Woodin,
who reduced its hypothesis to ADL(R) , and identified the full HODL(R) as a model
of the form L[M, Σ], where M is a pure extender premouse, and Σ is a partial
iteration strategy for M. HODL(R) is thus a new type of mouse, sometimes called
a strategy mouse, sometimes called a hod mouse. See [77] for an account of this
work.
Since the mid-1990s, there has been a great deal of work devoted to extending
these results to models of determinacy beyond L(R). Woodin analyzed HOD in
models of AD+ below the minimal model of ADR fine structurally, and Sargsyan
extended the analysis further, first to determinacy models below ADR + “θ is
regular” (see [37] and [38]), and more recently, to models of still stronger forms of
determinacy. 17 Part of the motivation for this work is that it seems to be essential
in the core model induction: in general, the next iteration strategy seems to be a
strategy for a hod mouse, not for a pure extender mouse. This idea comes from
work of Woodin and Ketchersid around 2000. (See [21] and [47].)
13 We mean here determinacy models of the form M = L(Γ, R), where Γ is a proper initial segment
of the universally Baire sets. If there are arbitrarily large Woodin cardinals, then for any sentence ϕ,
whether ϕ is true in all such HODM is absolute under set forcing. This follows easily from Woodin’s
theorem on the generic absoluteness of (Σ21 )uB statements. See [64, Theorem 5.1].
14 AD+ is a technical strengthening of AD. It is not known whether AD ⇒ AD+ , but in every
model of AD constructed so far, AD+ also holds. In particular, the models of AD that are relevant in
the core model induction satisfy AD+ .
15 This is a theorem of Woodin from the early 1980s. Cf. [67].
16 In a determinacy context, θ denotes the least ordinal that is not the surjective image of the reals.
17 See [39]. Part of this work was done in collaboration with the author; see [68],[74], and [69]. The
determinacy principles dealt with here are all weaker than a Woodin limit of Woodin cardinals.
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8 1. I NTRODUCTION
1.5. Least branch hod pairs
The strategy mice used in the work just described have the form M = L[~E, Σ],
where ~E is a coherent sequence of extenders, and Σ is an iteration strategy for M.
The strategy information is fed into the model M slowly, in a way that is dictated
in part by the determinacy model whose HOD is being analyzed. One says that the
hierarchy of M is rigidly layered, or extender biased. The object (M, Σ) is called a
rigidly layered (extender biased) hod pair.
Perhaps the main motivation for the extender biased hierarchy is that it makes it
possible to prove a comparison theorem. There is no inner model theory without
such a theorem. Comparing strategy mice necessarily involves comparing iteration
strategies, and comparing iteration strategies is significantly more difficult than
comparing extender sequences. Rigid layering lets one avoid the difficulties
inherent in the general strategy comparison problem, while proving comparison for
a class of strategy mice adequate to analyze HOD in the minimal model of ADR +
“θ is regular”, and somewhat beyond. The key is that in this region, HOD does not
have cardinals that are strong past a Woodin cardinal.
Unfortunately, rigid layering does not seem to help in comparing strategy mice
that have cardinals that are strong past a Woodin. Moreover, it has serious costs.
The definition of “hod premouse” becomes very complicated, and indeed it is not
clear how to extend the definition of rigidly layered hod pairs much past that given
in [39]. The definition of “rigidly layered hod premouse” is not uniform, in that the
extent of extender bias depends on the determinacy model whose HOD is being
analyzed. Fine structure, and in particular condensation, become more awkward.
For example, it is not true in general that the pointwise definable hull of a level of
M is a level of M. (The problem is that the hull will not generally be sufficiently
extender biased.)
The more naive notion of hod premouse would abandon extender bias, and
simply add the least missing piece of strategy information at essentially every
stage. This was originally suggested by Woodin.18 The focus of this book is a
general comparison theorem for iteration strategies that makes it possible to use
this approach, at least in the realm of short extenders. The resulting premice are
called least branch premice (lpm’s), and the pairs (M, Σ) are called least branch
hod pairs (lbr hod pairs). Combining results of this book and [73], one has
T HEOREM 1.5.1 ([73]). Assume AD+ + “there is an (ω1 , ω1 ) iteration strategy
for a pure extender premouse with a long extender on its sequence”; then
(1) for any Γ ⊆ P(R) such that L(Γ, R) |= ADR + “there is no (ω1 , ω1 ) iteration
strategy for a pure extender premouse with a long extender on its sequence”,
HODL(Γ,R) is a least branch premouse, and
18 There are some fine-structural problems with the precise method for inserting strategy information
originally suggested by Woodin. The method for strategy insertion that is correct in detail is due to
Schlutzenberg and Trang. Cf. [56].
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1.6. C OMPARISON AND THE MOUSE PAIR ORDER 9
(2) there is a Γ ⊆ P(R) such that L(Γ, R) |= ADR + “there is no (ω1 , ω1 ) it-
eration strategy for a pure extender premouse with a long extender on its
sequence”, and HODL(Γ,R) |= “there is a subcompact cardinal”.
Of course, one would like to remove the mouse existence hypothesis of 1.5.1,
and prove its conclusion under AD+ alone. Finding a way to do this is one
manifestation of the long standing iterability problem we have discussed above.
Although we do not yet know how to do this, the theorem does make it highly likely
that in models of ADR that have not reached an iteration strategy for a pure extender
premouse with a long extender, HOD is a least branch premouse. It also makes it
very likely that there are such HOD’s with subcompact cardinals. Subcompactness
is one of the strongest large cardinal properties that can be represented with short
extenders.19
Although we shall not prove Theorem 1.5.1 here, we shall prove an approxi-
mation to it that makes the same points. That approximation is Theorem 11.3.13
below.
Least branch premice have a fine structure much closer to that of pure extender
models than that of rigidly layered hod premice. In this book we develop the
basics, including the solidity and universality of standard parameters, and a form of
condensation. In [76], the author and N. Trang have proved a sharper condensation
theorem, whose pure extender version was used heavily in the Schimmerling-
Zeman work ([44]) on in pure extender mice. It seems likely that the rest of the
Schimmerling-Zeman work extends as well.
Thus least branch hod pairs give us a good theory of HOD in the short extender
realm, provided there are enough such pairs.20 Below, we formulate a conjecture
that we call Hod Pair Capturing, or HPC, that makes precise the statement that
there are enough least branch hod pairs. HPC is the main open problem in the
theory to which this book contributes.
1.6. Comparison and the mouse pair order
Let us first say more about the nature of least branch hod pairs (M, Σ). There
are four requirements on Σ in the definition: strong hull condensation, quasi-
normalizing well, internal lift consistency, and pushforward consistency. We shall
describe these requirements informally, omitting some of the fine points, and give
the full definitions later.
Recall that an iteration tree on a premouse M is normal iff the extenders EαW
used in W have lengths increasing with α, and each EαW is applied to the longest
19 Until now, there was no very strong evidence that the HOD of a determinacy model could satisfy
that there are cardinals that are strong past a Woodin cardinal.
20 At least in the case that the background determinacy model satisfies AD +V = L(P(R)). Some
R
form of extender bias may be appropriate in other cases.
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10 1. I NTRODUCTION
possible initial segment of the earliest possible model in W. For technical reasons
we need to consider a slight weakening of the length-increasing requirement; we
call the resulting trees quasi-normal. Our iteration strategies will act on finite
stacks of quasi-normal trees, that is, sequences s = hT0 , ..., Tn i such that for all
k ≤ n − 1, Tk+1 is a quasi-normal tree on some initial segment of the last model in
Tk . We write M∞ (s) for the last model of Tn , if there is one.
D EFINITION 1.6.1. Let Σ be an iteration strategy for a premouse P.
(1) (Tail strategy) If s is a stack by Σ and Q M∞ (s), then Σs,Q is the strategy for
Q given by: Σs,Q (t) = Σ(s_ hQ,ti).21
(2) (Pullback strategy) If π : N → P is elementary, then Σπ is the strategy for N
given by: Σπ (s) = Σ(πs), where πs is the lift of s by π to a stack on P.
In (2), elementarity must be understood fine structurally; our convention is that
every premouse P has a degree of soundness attached to it, and elementarity means
elementarity at that quantifier level.
Perhaps the most important regularity property of iteration strategies is strong
hull condensation. To define it we need the notion of a tree embedding Φ : T → U,
where T and U are normal trees on the same M. The idea of course is that Φ should
preserve a certain amount of the iteration tree structure, but some care is needed in
spelling out exactly how much. Φ is determined by a map u : lh(T ) → lh(U) and
maps πα : MTα → MU u(α) having various properties. See §6.4.
D EFINITION 1.6.2. Let Σ be an iteration strategy for a premouse M; then Σ has

strong hull condensation iff whenever s is a stack of normal trees by Σ and N
M∞ (s), and U is a normal tree on N by Σs,N , and Φ : T → U is a tree embedding,
with associated maps πα : MTα → MU u(α) , then
(a) T is by Σs,N , and
(b) for all α < lh(T ), Σs_ hN,T α+1i = (Σs_ hN,U u(α)+1i )πα .
Strong hull condensation is a stronger version of the hull condensation property
isolated by Sargsyan in [37].
The second important property is quasi-normalizing well. Given an M-stack
hT , Ui with last model N such that T and U are normal, shuffling the extenders
of U into T in a minimal way produces a normal tree W = W (T , U). If U has
a last model R, we get nearly elementary map π : N → R. We call W (T , U)
the embedding normalization of hT , Ui. The idea is simple, but there are many
technical details.22 It proves useful to consider a slightly less minimal shuffling
V (T , U) that we call the quasi-normalization of hT , Ui. Even if T and U are
normal, V (T , U) may not be length-increasing, but it is nearly so. The reader
should see Chapter 6 for full definitions.
premice Q and R, Q R iff the hierarchy of Q is an initial segment of that of R.

21 For
22 Muchof the general theory of normalization was developed independently by Schlutzenberg. See
[54]. See also [19] and [58].
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1.6. C OMPARISON AND THE MOUSE PAIR ORDER 11
D EFINITION 1.6.3. Let Σ be an iteration strategy for a premouse M. We say

that Σ quasi-normalizes well iff whenever s is an M-stack by Σ, and hT , Ui is a
2-stack by Σs such that T and U are normal trees having last models, then
(a) V (T , U) is by Σs , and
(b) letting V = V (T , U) and π : MU V
∞ → M∞ be the map generated by quasi-
normalization, we have that Σs_ hT ,U i = (Σs_ V )π .
The final basic regularity property of iteration strategies for pure extender
premice is internal lift consistency. Suppose that s is a stack by Σ and P Q
M∞ (s). Stacks t on P can be lifted to stacks t + on Q in a natural way. We say that
Σ is internally lift consistent iff for all such s, P, and Q, Σs,P (t) = Σs,Q (t + ). See
§5.4.
For pairs (M, Σ) such that M is a strategy mouse, we require also that the
internal strategy predicate of M be consistent with Σ. More generally, letting Σ̇
be the predicate symbol used to record strategy information, we say that (M, Σ)
is pushforward consistent iff whenever s is a stack by Σ and N M∞ (s), then
Σ̇N ⊆ Σs,N .
If M is a pure extender premouse, and Σ is a strategy for M that has strong hull
condensation, quasi-normalizes well, and is internally lift consistent, then we call
(M, Σ) a pure extender pair. If M is a least branch premouse, and Σ is a strategy
for M that has strong hull condensation, quasi-normalizes well, is internally lift
consistent and pushforward consistent, then we call (M, Σ) a least branch hod pair.
A pair of one of the two types is a mouse pair.
If (M, Σ) is a mouse pair, and s is a stack by Σ with last model N, then we call
(N, Σs ) an iterate of (M, Σ). If the branch M-to-N of s does not drop, we call it a
non-dropping iterate. In that case, we have an iteration map is : M → N. Let us
write
(M, Σ) (R, Λ) iff M R and Σ = ΛM .
We have no hope of showing anything about mouse pairs (M, Σ) unless we
assume absolute definabilty for the iteration strategy. Here we assume Σ has scope
HC, i.e. that M is countable and Σ is defined on finite stacks of countable trees,
and we assume that we are in a model of AD+ .23 The following is the main new
result of the book.
T HEOREM 1.6.4. (Comparison Lemma) Assume AD+ , and let (P, Σ) and (Q, Ψ)
be strongly stable24 mouse pairs with scope HC of the same kind; then there are
iterates (R, Λ) of (P, Σ) and (S, Ω) of (Q, Ψ), obtained by normal trees T and U,
such that either
(1) (R, Λ) (S, Ω) and P-to-R does not drop, or
23 One could require that they be defined on countable stacks.
24 Strong stability is a mild fine structural requirement. One can avoid it by slightly complicating
the notion of iterate. See 4.4.5 and 4.6.12.
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12 1. I NTRODUCTION
(2) (S, Ω) (R, Λ) and Q-to-S does not drop.

Even for pure extender pairs, this theorem is new, because of the agreement
between tail strategies it requires. In fact, it is no easier to prove the theorem for
pure extender pairs than it is to prove it for least branch hod pairs. The proof in
both cases is the same, and it makes use of the properties of the iteration strategies
we have isolated in the definition of mouse pair.
Working in the category of mouse pairs enables us to state a general Dodd-Jensen
lemma. Let us say π : (P, Σ) → (Q, Ψ) is elementary iff π is elementary from P to
Q, and Σ = Ψπ . We shall show that an elementary submodel of a mouse pair is a
mouse pair, and that the iteration maps associated to non-dropping iterations of a
mouse pair are elementary.25
T HEOREM 1.6.5 (Dodd-Jensen lemma). Let (P, Σ) be a mouse pair, and (Q, Ψ)
be an iterate of (P, Σ) via the stack s. Suppose π : (P, Σ) → (Q, Ψ) is elementary;
then s does not drop, and for all ordinals η ∈ P, is (η) ≤ π(η).
The proof is just the usual Dodd-Jensen proof; the point is just that the language
of mouse pairs enables us to formulate the theorem in its proper generality. There
is no need to restrict to mice with unique iteration strategies, as is usually done.
Similarly, we can define the mouse order in its proper generality, without re-
stricting to mice with unique iteration strategies. If (P, Σ) and (Q, Ψ) are pairs of
the same type, then (P, Σ) ≤∗ (Q, Ψ) iff (P, Σ) can be elementarily embedded into
an iterate of (Q, Ψ). The Comparison and Dodd-Jensen theorems imply that ≤∗ is
a prewellorder on each type.
1.7. Hod pair capturing
Least branch hod pairs can be used to analyze HOD in models of AD+ , provided
that there are enough such pairs.
D EFINITION 1.7.1 (AD+ ). (a) Hod Pair Capturing (HPC) is the assertion:
for every Suslin-co-Suslin set A, there is a least branch hod pair (P, Σ) such
that A is definable from parameters over (HC, ∈, Σ).
(b) L[E] capturing (LEC) is the assertion: for every Suslin-co-Suslin set A, there
is a pure extender pair (P, Σ) such that A is definable from parameters over
(HC, ∈, Σ).
An equivalent (under AD+ ) formulation would be that the sets of reals coding
strategies of the type in question, under some natural map of the reals onto HC,
are Wadge cofinal in the Suslin-co-Suslin sets of reals. The restriction to Suslin-
co-Suslin sets A is necessary, for AD+ implies that if (P, Σ) is a pair of one of the
25 Neither is obvious. That iteration maps are elementary is a property of the iteration strategy
known as pullback consistency. It follows from strong hull condensation.
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1.8. C ONSTRUCTING MOUSE PAIRS 13
two types, then the codeset of Σ is Suslin and co-Suslin. This is the main result of
[73], where it is also shown that the Suslin representation constructed is of optimal
logical complexity.
Remark 1.7.2. HPC is a cousin of Sargsyan’s Generation of Full Pointclasses.
See [37] and [38], §6.1.
Assuming AD+ , LEC is equivalent to the well known Mouse Capturing: for
reals x and y, x is ordinal definable from y iff x is in a pure extender mouse over
y. This equivalence is shown in [63]. (See especially Theorem 16.6.) We show
in Theorem 10.4.3 below that under AD+ , LEC implies HPC. We do not know
whether HPC implies LEC.
Granted ADR and HPC, we have enough hod pairs to analyze HOD.
T HEOREM 1.7.3 ([73]). Assume ADR and HPC; then Vθ ∩ HOD is the universe
of a least branch premouse.
Some techniques developed in [59] and [73] are needed to prove the theorem, so
we shall not prove it here.
The natural conjecture is that LEC and HPC hold in all models of AD+ that have
not reached an iteration strategy for a premouse with a long extender. Because our
capturing mice have only short extenders on their sequences, LEC and HPC cannot
hold in larger models of AD+ .
D EFINITION 1.7.4. NLE (“No long extenders”) is the assertion: there is no
countable, ω1 + 1-iterable pure extender premouse M such that there is a long
extender on the M-sequence.
C ONJECTURE 1.7.5. Assume AD+ and NLE; then LEC.
C ONJECTURE 1.7.6. Assume AD+ and NLE; then HPC.
As we remarked above, 1.7.5 implies 1.7.6. Conjecture 1.7.5 is equivalent to
a slight strengthening of the usual Mouse Set Conjecture MSC. (The hypothesis
of MSC is that there is no iteration strategy for a pure extender premouse with a
superstrong, which is slightly stronger than NLE.) MSC has been a central target
for inner model theorists for a long time.
1.8. Constructing mouse pairs
The basic source for mouse pairs is a background construction. In the simplest
case, such a construction C builds pairs (Mν,k , Ων,k ) inductively, putting extenders
on the Mν,k -sequence that are restrictions of nice extenders in V . The iteration
strategy Ων,k is induced by an iteration strategy for V , and if we are constructing
strategy premice, the relevant information about Ων,k is inserted into Mν,k at the
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14 1. I NTRODUCTION
appropriate points. Mν,k+1 is the core of Mν,k . The construction breaks down if
the standard parameter of Mν,k behaves poorly, so that there is no core.
There is of course more to say here, and we shall do so later in the book. For
now, let us note that the background universe for such a construction should be a
model of ZFC that has lots of extenders, and yet knows how to iterate itself. In the
AD+ context, the following theorem of Woodin applies.26
T HEOREM 1.8.1 (Woodin). Assume AD+ , and let Γ be a good pointclass such
that all sets in Γ are Suslin and co-Suslin; then for any real x there is a coarse
Γ-Woodin pair (N, Σ) such that x ∈ N.
Here, roughly speaking, N is a countable transitive model of ZFC with a Woodin
cardinal and a term for a universal Γ set, and Σ is an iteration strategy for N that
moves this term correctly, and is such that Σ ∩ N is definable over N. See Definition
7.2.3.
The following is essentially Theorem 10.4.1 to follow. It too is one of the main
new results of the book.
T HEOREM 1.8.2. Assume AD+ , and let (N, Σ) be a coarse Γ-Woodin pair. Let
C be a least branch construction in N; then C does not break down. Moreover, each
C , ΩC ) is a least branch hod pair in N, and extends canonically
of its levels (Mν,k ν,k
to a least branch hod pair in V .
Background constructions of the sort described in this theorem have an important
role to play in our comparison process. Assume AD+ , and let (M, Ω) and (N, Σ)
be mouse pairs of the same type. We compare (M, Ω) with (N, Σ) by putting M
and N into a common Γ-Woodin universe N ∗ , where Σ and Ω are in Γ ∩ Γ̌. We
then iterate (M, Σ) and (N, Ω) into levels of a full background construction (of the
appropriate type) of N ∗ . Here are some definitions encapsulating the method.
D EFINITION 1.8.3. Let (M, Σ) and (N, Ω) be mouse pairs of the same type;
then
(a) (M, Σ) iterates past (N, Ω) iff there is a λ -separated iteration tree T by Σ on
M whose last pair is (N, Ω).
(b) (M, Σ) iterates to (N, Ω) iff there is a λ -separated T as in (a) such that the
branch M-to-N of T does not drop.
(c) (M, Σ) iterates strictly past (N, Ω) iff it iterates past (N, Ω), but not to (N, Ω).
λ -separation is a small strengthening of normality that is defined in 4.4.8. One
reason that it is important is that if T is λ -separated and U is a normal tree on
MT∞ , then W (T , U) = V (T , U). That is, embedding normalization coincides with
quasi-normalization in this case.
D EFINITION 1.8.4 (AD+ ). Let (P, Σ) be a mouse pair; then (*)(P, Σ) is the
∗
following assertion: Let (N, Ψ) be any coarse Γ-Woodin pair such that P ∈ HCN ,
26 See [22], and [66, Lemma 3.13].
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1.9. T HE COMPARISON ARGUMENT 15
and Σ ∈ Γ ∩ Γ̌. Let C be a background construction done in N ∗ of the appropriate

type, and let (R, Φ) be a level of C. Suppose that (P, Σ) iterates strictly past all
levels of C that are strictly earlier than (R, Φ); then (P, Σ) iterates past (R, Φ).
If (M, Ω) is a mouse pair, and N is an initial segment of M, then we write ΩN
for the iteration strategy for trees on N that is induced by Ω. We can unpack the
conclusion of 1.8.4 as follows: suppose the comparison of P with R has produced
a normal tree T on P with last model Q, with T by Σ, and S is an initial segment
of both Q and R; then ΣT ,S = ΦS . Thus the least disagreement between Q and R
is an extender disagreement. Moreover, if E on Q and F on R are the extenders
involved in it, then F = ∅.
We shall show (cf. Theorems 8.4.3 and 9.5.6 below)
T HEOREM 1.8.5. Assume AD+ ; then (*)(P, Σ) holds, for all strongly stable
mouse pairs (P, Σ).
This theorem lets us compare two (or more) mouse pairs of the same type
indirectly, by comparing them to the levels of an appropriate construction, done
in a Γ-Woodin model, where both strategies are in Γ ∩ Γ̌. One can show using the
Woodinness that C reaches non-dropping iterates of both pairs27 . This gives us a
stage (M, Ω) of C such that one of the pairs iterates to it, while the other iterates
past it.
1.9. The comparison argument
In what follows, we shall give fairly complete proofs of the theorems above.
The book is long, partly because we wanted to make it accessible, and partly
because we shall be forced to revise the basic definitions of [30] and [81] in various
ways, so there is a limit to what we can simply quote. In addition, the need
to compare strategies adds a layer of complexity to the proofs of the main fine
structural theorems about strategy mice. Nevertheless, the main new ideas behind
the strategy-comparison process itself are reasonably simple. We describe them
now.
The first step is to focus on proving (*)(P, Σ). That is, rather than directly
comparing two strategies, we iterate them both into a common background con-
struction and its strategy. In the comparison-of-mice context, this method goes
back to Kunen ([23]), and was further developed by Mitchell, Baldwin ([5]), and
the author.28 Woodin and Sargsyan had used the method for strategy comparison
in the hod mouse context. All these comparisons could be replaced by direct
comparisons of the two mice or strategies involved, but in the general case of
comparison of strategies, there are serious advantages to the indirect approach.
27 See 8.1.4.
28 In unpublished 1985 notes titled “Large cardinals and ∆13 wellorders”.
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16 1. I NTRODUCTION
There is no need to decide what to do if one encounters a strategy disagreement,

because one is proving that that never happens. The comparison process is just the
usual one of comparing least extender disagreements. Instead of the dual problems
of designing a process and proving it terminates, one has a given process, and
knows why it should terminate: no strategy disagreements show up. The problem
is just to show this. These advantages led the author to focus, since 2009, on trying
to prove (*)(P, Σ).
The main new idea that makes this possible is motivated by Sargsyan’s proof in
[37] that if Σ has branch condensation, then (*)(P, Σ) holds.29 Branch condensation
is too strong to hold once P has extenders overlapping Woodin cardinals; we
cannot conclude that Σ(T ) = b from having merely realized MTb into a Σ-iterate
of P. We need some kind of realization of the entire phalanx Φ(T ab) in order to
conclude that Σ(T ) = b. This leads to a weakening of branch condensation that
one might call “phalanx condensation”, in which one asks for a family of branch-
condensation-like realizations having some natural agreement with one another.
Phalanx condensation is still strong enough to imply (*)(P, Σ), and might well
be true in general for background-induced strategies. Unfortunately, Sargsyan’s
construction of strategies with branch condensation does not seem to yield phalanx
condensation in the more general case. For one thing, it involves comparison
arguments, and in the general case, this looks like a vicious circle. It was during
one of the author’s many attempts to break into this circle that he realized that
certain properties related to phalanx condensation, namely normalizing well and
strong hull condensation, could be obtained directly for background-induced
strategies, and that these properties suffice for (*)(P, Σ).
Let us explain this last part briefly. Suppose that we are in the context of
Theorem 1.8.5. We have a premouse P with iteration strategy Σ that normalizes
well and has strong hull condensation. We have N a premouse occuring in the
∗
fully backgrounded construction of N ∗ , where P ∈ HCN and N ∗ captures Σ. We
compare P with N by iterating away the least extender disagreement. It has
been known since 1985 that only P will move. We must prove that no strategy
disagreement shows up.
Suppose we have produced a λ -separated iteration tree T on P with last model
Q, that Q|α = N|α, and that U is a normal tree on R = Q|α = N|α of limit length
played by both ΣT ,R (the tail of Σ) and ΩR , where Ω is the N ∗ -induced strategy for
N. We wish to show that ΣT ,R (U) = ΩR (U). Because Σ is internally lift consistent,
we can reduce to the case that Q = R.
Let b = ΩR (U). We must see b = ΣT ,R (U), that is, that b = Σ(hT , Ui). Since
T is λ -separated, embedding normalization coincides with quasi-normalization.
29 Roughly, an iteration strategy Σ for M has branch condensation iff whenever T is an iteration tree
of limit length by Σ, b is a cofinal branch of T with associated iteration map ib : M → MTb ,π: M→N
is an iteration map by Σ, and there is a k : MT b → N such that π = k ◦ ib , then Σ(T ) = b. See [37] for
more detail.
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1.10. P LAN OF THE BOOK 17
Let us consider
Wc = W (T , U _ c) = V (T , U _ c)
for arbitrary cofinal branches c of U. We shall see:
(1) ΣT ,R (U) = c iff Wc is by Σ. The ⇒ direction follows at once from the fact
that Σ quasi-normalizes well, and the ⇐ direction is proved in §6.6.
(2) Letting i∗b : N ∗ → Nb∗ come from lifting iU ∗
b to N via the iteration-strategy
construction of [30], there is a tree embedding of Wb into i∗b (T ). This is the
key step in the proof. It is carried out in Chapter 8.
(3) i∗b (Σ) ⊆ Σ because Σ was captured by N ∗ , so i∗b (T ) is by Σ.
(4) Thus Wb is by Σ, because Σ has strong hull condensation.
(5) So by (1), ΣT ,R (U) = b.
Here is a diagram of the situation:
Wb
MbU M∞ i∗b (R) Nb∗
U i∗b i∗b
R Wb i∗b (T ) R N∗
F IGURE 1.9.1. Proof of (*)(P, Σ). Wb is a psuedo-hull of i∗b (T ).
1.10. Plan of the book
Chapters 2 and 3 collect and organize some standard definitions and results from
inner model theory. The book is aimed at people who have already encountered
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18 1. I NTRODUCTION
this material, via [30], [65], or [81] for example, but these chapters will serve as a
bridge to the rest of the book.
In §3.6 we explain why this standard theory is not completely adequate to the
problem of comparing iteration strategies. Roughly speaking, the problem is that
the induced iteration strategies for the levels of a background construction are not
connected sufficiently well to the iteration strategy for the background universe.
§3.7 and §3.8 analyze one of the two sources of this shortfall, and Chapter 4
removes both of them. This involves revising the notions of premouse and iteration
tree slightly, and re-proving the standard fine structural results in the new setting.
Chapter 5 shows that the new definitions lead to background-induced iteration
strategies that are better behaved in several ways. Chapters 6 and 7 push further in
this direction, leading ultimately to Theorem 7.6.2, which says that pure extender
background constructions, done in an appropriately iterable background universe,
produce pure extender pairs.
In Chapter 8 we prove the main comparison theorem for pure extender pairs,
Theorem 8.4.3. We shall adapt the proof of 8.4.3 to least branch hod pairs and
to phalanx comparisons in Chapters 9 and 10, but the main steps all show up in
this simpler situation, so we have begun with it. When we use the proof again in
Chapters 9 and 10, we shall condense long stretches by pointing to the proof of
8.4.3.
Chapters 9 and 10 use the strategy-comparison process to develop the theory
of least branch hod pairs. Chapter 11 uses this theory to analyze HOD in certain
models of ADR , and concludes with a discussion of further results that have been
proved by the methods we develop here.
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Chapter 2
PRELIMINARIES
Inner model theory deals with canonical objects, but inner model theorists have
presented them in various ways. The conventions we use here are, for the most
part, fairly common. For basic fine structural notions such as projecta, cores,
standard parameters, fine ultrapowers, and degrees of elementarity, we shall stay
close to Mitchell-Steel [30] and the paper [49] by Schindler and Zeman. We
shall use Jensen indexing for the sequences of extenders from which premice are
constructed; see for example Zeman’s book [81]. In Chapter 4 we shall modify the
notion of premouse slightly, by enlarging the standard parameters and associated
cores. Until we get to that point, our notion of premouse is just the standard one
determined by the conventions of [30], [49], and [81].30
Most of our terminology to do with iteration trees and iteration strategies traces
back to Martin-Steel [26] and Mitchell-Steel [30], and is by now pretty standard.
We do need to consider carefully iteration strategies defined on a wider class of
iteration trees than is common, and so there is some less familiar terminology
defined in sections 2.6 and 2.7.
2.1. Extenders and ultrapowers
Our notation for extenders is standard.

D EFINITION 2.1.1. Let M be transitive and rudimentarily closed; then E =
hEa | a ∈ [θ ]<ω i is a (κ, θ )-extender over M with spaces hµa | a ∈ [θ ]<ω i if and
only if
(1) Each Ea is an (M, κ)-complete ultrafilter over P([µa ]|a| ) ∩ M, with µa being
the least µ such that [µ]|a| ∈ Ea .
(2) (Compatibility) For a ⊆ b and X ∈ M, X ∈ Ea ⇐⇒ X ab ∈ Eb .
(3) (Uniformity) µ{κ} = κ.
(4) (Normality) If f ∈ M and f (u) < max(u) for Ea a.e. u, then there is a β <
max(a) such that for Ea∪{β } a.e. u, f a,a∪{β } (u) = u{β },a∪{β } .
30 The notion of premouse in [81], and its related fine structure, originate in Jensen’s manuscripts
[17] and [18].
19
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20 2. P RELIMINARIES
The unexplained notation here can be found in [49, §8]. We shall often identify
E with the binary relation (a, X) ∈ E iff X ∈ Ea . One can also identify it with
the other section-function of this binary relation, which is essentially the function
X 7→ iM
E (X) ∩ θ . We call θ the length of E, and write θ = lh(E). The space of E is
sp(E) = sup{µa | a ∈ [lh(E)]<ω }.
The domain of E is the family of sets it measures, that is, dom(E) = {Y | ∃(a, X) ∈
E(Y = X ∨ Y = [µa ]|a| − X)}. If M is a premouse of some kind, we also write
M|η = dom(E), where η is least such that ∀(a, X) ∈ E(X ∈ M|η). By acceptability,
η = sup({µa+,M | a ∈ [θ ]<ω }). We shall further abuse notation by writing η =
dom(E) when M is determined by context.
The critical point of a (κ, θ )-extender is κ, and we use either crit(E) or κE to
denote it. Given an extender E over M, we form the Σ0 ultrapower
<ω
Ult0 (M, E) = {[a, f ]M
E | a ∈ [lh(E)] and f ∈ M},
as in [49, 8.4]. Our M will always be rudimentarily closed and satisfy the Axiom
of Choice, so we have Los’ theorem for Σ0 formulae, and the canonical embedding
iM
E : M → Ult0 (M, E)
is cofinal and Σ0 elementary, and hence Σ1 elementary. By (1) and (3), κE =
crit(iM M
E ). By normality, a = [a, id]E , so lh(E) is included in the (always transi-
tivized) wellfounded part of Ult0 (M, E). More generally,
[a, f ]M M
E = iE ( f )(a).
If X ⊆ lh(E), then E X = {(a,Y ) ∈ E | a ⊆ X}. E X has the properties of an
extender, except possibly normality, so we can form Ult0 (M, E X), and there is a
natural factor embedding τ : Ult0 (M, E X) → Ult0 (M, E) given by
τ([a, f ]M M
EX ) = [a, f ]E .
In the case that X = ν > κE is an ordinal, E ν is an extender, and τ ν is the
identity. We say ν is a generator of E iff ν is the critical point of τ, that is,
ν 6= [a, f ]M
E whenever f ∈ M and a ⊆ ν. Let
ν(E) = sup({ν + 1 | ν is a generator of E }).
So ν(E) ≤ lh(E), and E is equivalent to E ν(E), in that the two produce the same
ultrapower.
We write
λ (E) = λE = iM
E (κE ).
Note that although E may be an extender over more than one M, sp(E), κE , lh(E),
dom(E), ν(E), and λ (E) depend only on E itself. If N is another transitive,
rudimentarily closed set, and P(µa ) ∩ N = P(µa ) ∩ M for all a ∈ [lh(E)]<ω , then E
is also an extender over N; moreover iM N
E agrees with iE on dom(E). However, iE
M
N
and iE may disagree beyond that. We say E is short iff ν(E) ≤ λ (E). It is easy to
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2.2. P URE EXTENDER PREMICE 21

+ M
see that E is short if lh(E) ≤ sup(iM
E “((κE ) )). If E is short, then all its interesting
measures concentrate on the critical point. When E is short, iM E is continuous at
κ +,M , and if M is a premouse, then dom(E) = M|κE+,M . In this book, we shall deal
almost exclusively with short extenders.
If we start with j : M → N with critical point κ, and an ordinal ν such that
κ < ν ≤ o(N), then for a ∈ [ν]<ω we let µa be the least µ such that a ⊆ j(µ), and
for X ⊆ [µa ]|a| in M, we put
(a, X) ∈ E j ⇐⇒ a ∈ j(X).
E j is an extender over M, called the (κ, ν)-extender derived from j. We have the
diagram
j
M N
i k
Ult0 (M, E j )
where i = iM
E j , and
k(i( f )(a)) = j( f )(a).

k ν is the identity. If E is an extender over M, then E is derived from iM
E.
+,M
The Jensen completion of a short extender E over some M is the (κE , iM E (κE ))
extender derived from iM ∗
E . E and its Jensen completion E are equivalent, in that
∗ ∗
ν(E) = ν(E ), and E = E lh(E).
2.2. Pure extender premice
Our main results apply to premice of various kinds, both strategy premice
and pure extender premice, with λ -indexing or ms-indexing for their extender
sequences.31,32 The comparison theorem for iteration strategies that is our first
main goal holds in all these contexts. But the proof of this theorem requires a
detailed fine structural analysis, and the particulars of the fine structure become
important at certain points. We shall first prove the comparison theorem in the case
of iteration strategies for what we shall call pfs premice. These are a variant on
pure extender premice with λ -indexing, the difference being that the soundness
31 Why “mouse”? Like “quark”, it is short and easily remembered. It has a fine tradition, going back
to a discoverer of the concept. The longer, colorless “extender model” does have its place, but “mouse”
is more flexible and distinctive.
32 People sometimes speak of “strategic” mice or extender models, but this seems wrong to us. A
strategic X (bomber, position, move, etc.) is an X that is incorporated in some strategy, not an X that
has a strategy incorporated in it. A mouse that incorporates a strategy is a strategy mouse, just as a pie
that incorporates apples is an apple pie.
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requirement has been relaxed. They are formally defined in Chapter 4. Until we get
to that chapter, we shall deal primarily with the standard λ -indexed pure extender
premice, as defined in [81].33
The reader should see [4, Def. 2.4] for further details on the following definition.
A potential Jensen premouse is an acceptable J-structure
~
M = hJαE , ∈, ~E, γ, Fi
with various properties. o(M) = OR ∩ M = ωα. The language L0 of M has ∈,
predicate symbols Ė and Ḟ, and a constant symbol γ̇. We call L0 the language of
(pure extender) premice.
If M is a potential Jensen premouse, then Ė M is a sequence of extenders, and
either Ḟ M is empty (i.e. M is passive), or Ḟ M codes a new extender being added to
our model by M. The main requirements are
(1) (λ -indexing) If F = Ḟ M is nonempty (i.e., M is active), then M |= crit(F)+
exists, and for µ = crit(F)+M , o(M) = iM M
F (µ) = lh(F). Ḟ is just the graph
M
of iF (M|µ).
(2) (Coherence) iM M M ah0i.
F (Ė ) o(M) + 1 = Ė /
(3) (Initial segment condition, J-ISC) If G is a whole proper initial segment of
F, then the Jensen completion of G must appear in Ė M . If there is a largest
whole proper initial segment, then γ̇ M is the index of its Jensen completion
in Ė M . Otherwise, γ̇ M = 0.
(4) If N is a proper initial segment of M, then N is a potential Jensen premouse.
Here an initial segment G = F η of F is whole iff η = λG .
Since potential Jensen premice are acceptable J-structures, the basic fine struc-
tural notions apply to them. We recall some of them in the next section. We then
define a Jensen premouse as a potential Jensen premouse all of whose proper initial
segments are sound.
Figure 2.2.1 illustrates a common situation, one that occurs at successor steps in
an iteration tree, for example.
There is a significant strengthening of the Jensen initial segment condition (3)
above. If M is an active premouse, then we set
ν(M) = max(ν(Ḟ M ), crit(Ḟ M )+,M ).
Ḟ M ν(M) is equivalent to Ḟ M , and so it is not in M. But
D EFINITION 2.2.1. Let M be an active premouse with last extender F; then M
satisfies the ms-ISC (or is ms-solid) iff for any η < ν(M), F η ∈ M.
Clearly the ms-ISC implies the weakening of J-ISC in which we only demand
that the whole proper initial segments of Ḟ M belong to M. But for iterable M, this
then implies the full J-ISC. (See [48].)
33 The essential equivalence of λ -indexing with ms-indexing has been carefully demonstrated by
Fuchs in [11] and [10].
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2.2. P URE EXTENDER PREMICE 23
Ult0 (M, E)
iM
E
M
Ult0 (N, E)
iNE
N
λ+
E λ
κ+
κ iE
F IGURE 2.2.1. E is on the coherent sequence of M, κ =

crit(E), and λ = λ (E). P(κ)M = P(κ)N = dom(E), so
Ult0 (M, E) and Ult0 (N, E) make sense. The ultrapowers agree
with M below lh(E), and with each other below lh(E) + 1.
T HEOREM 2.2.2 (ms-ISC). Let M be an active premouse with last extender F,

and suppose M is 1-sound and (1, ω, ω1 + 1)-iterable; then M is ms-solid.
This is essentially the initial segment condition of [30], but stated for Jensen
premice. [30] goes on to say that the trivial completion of F η is either on the
M-sequence, or an ultrapower away. This is correct unless F η is type Z. If F η
is type Z, then it is the extender of F ξ -then-U, where ξ is its largest generator,
and U is an ultrafilter on ξ , and we still get F η ∈ M. (See [48]. Theorem 2.7 of
[48] is essentially 2.2.2 above.)
If M is active, we let its initial segment ordinal be
ι(M) = sup({η + 1 | Ḟ M η ∈ M}).
So M is ms-solid iff ι(M) = ν(M). Theorem 2.2.2 becomes false when its sound-
ness hypothesis is removed, since if N = Ult0 (M, E) where ν(M) ≤ crit(E) < λF ,
then ι(N) = ι(M) = ν(M), but crit(E) is a generator of iM E (F).
The proof of Theorem 2.2.2 requires a comparison argument based on iterability,
and so in the context of this book, it is closer to the end of the development than to
the beginning. In the theory of [30], the strong form of ms-solidity is an axiom on
premice from the beginning, but comparison arguments are needed to show that
the premice one constructs satisfy it.34 One might similarly make ms-solidity an
axiom on Jensen premice from the beginning, and so have it available earlier in the
34 These are the results of [30, §9, §10] concerning bicephali and psuedo-premice.
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game, so to speak. This would simplify a few things, but it is not standard, and we
shall not do it here.35
We shall not use ms-premice, so henceforth we shall refer to potential Jensen
premice as potential premice, or later, when we need to distinguish them from
strategy premice, as potential pure extender premice.
2.3. Projecta and cores
Fine structure theory relies on a careful analysis of the condensation properties

of mice; that is, of the extent to which Skolem hulls of a mouse M collapse to
initial segments of M. Jensen’s theory of projecta, standard parameters, and cores
is the foundation for this analysis.
Sound premice and their reducts
Let M be an acceptable J-structure.36 We define the projecta ρi (M), standard

parameters pi (M), and reducts (“Σi mastercodes”) M i = M i,pi (M) by induction. At
the same time we define k-solidity and k-soundness for M. We start with A0 = 0, /
and
M 0 = (M, A0 ), ρ0 (M) = o(M), p0 (M) = 0.
/
M is automatically 0-sound and 0-solid. The successor step is
i
ρi+1 (M) = least α s.t. ∃A ⊆ α(A is boldface ΣM / M i ),
1 and A ∈
= ρ1 (M i )
and
pi+1 (M) = pi (M) ∪ ri+1 ,
where ri+1 is the lexicographically least descending sequence of ordinals from
which a new subset of ρ1 (M i ) can be Σ1 defined over M i . (ri+1 = 0/ is possible.)
We then set
M i+1 = (M||ρi+1 (M), Ai+1 ),
where
i
Ai+1 = ThM i
1 (M ||ρi+1 ∪ ri+1 )
= {hϕ, xi | ϕ(u, v) is Σ1 ∧ M i |= ϕ[x, ri+1 ]}.
We say that M is i + 1-solid iff ri+1 is solid and universal, and so is its image in
35 Our definition of pfs premice in Chapter 4 does include a small fragment of ms-solidity. See 4.1.1.
Dodd solidity is a useful and still stronger form of the initial segment condition that iterable premice
satisfy. See for example [48].
36 See [49].
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2.3. P ROJECTA AND CORES 25

i
the collapse of HullM 37 k
1 (ρi+1 (M) ∪ ri+1 ). In general, we don’t care about M for
k ≥ i + 1 if M is not i + 1-solid; fine structure has broken down. One of our main
tasks in any construction of premice will be to show that the premice we produce
are k-solid for all k. We say that M is i + 1-sound iff M is i-sound, i + 1-solid, and
i
and M i = HullM 1 (ρi+1 (M) ∪ ri+1 ). In general, we won’t care about M
i+2 unless M
is i + 1-sound.
Notice that o(M i ) = ρi (M), and ri+1 ⊆ [ρi+1 (M), ρi (M)). We may sometimes
identify Ai with a subset of ρi . We let
ri (M) = pi (M) ∩ [ρi , ρi−1 ),
[
pi (M) = p(M) ∪ [ρi , o(M)) = ri .
k≤i
This completes our inductive definition of the M i for i < ω. If M is i-solid and
i-sound for all i < ω, then we say that M is ω-sound. In this case, we let ρω (M)
be the eventual value of ρi (M) as i → ω. We define the reduct M ω by
M ω = (M||ρω (M), Ai )k≤i ,
where k is least such that ρk (M) = ρω (M).
D EFINITION 2.3.1. A Jensen premouse is a pair M = (M̂, k) such that k ≤ ω
and
(1) M̂ is a k-sound potential premouse, and
(2) every proper initial segment of M̂ is an ω-sound potential premouse.
We write k = k(M).
We shall drop the qualifier “Jensen” until we start considering another sort of
premouse in Chapter 4.
What we are calling a premouse is just a λ -indexed premouse in the usual
sense, paired with a degree of soundness that it has. We usually abuse notation by
identifying M with M̂.38
Abusing notation this way, if M is a premouse, then we set o(M) = ORD ∩ M,
so that o(M) = ωα for M = (JαA , ...). (The [49] convention differs slightly here.)
We write ô(M) for α itself. The index of M is
l(M) = hô(M), k(M)i.
If hν, li ≤lex l(M), then M|hν, li is the initial segment N of M with index l(N) =
hν, li. (So Ė N = Ė M ∩ N, and when ν < ô(M), Ḟ N = Ėων
M .) If ν ≤ ô(M), then we
write M|ν for M|hν, 0i. We write M||ν, or sometimes M|hν, −1i, for the structure
37 See Definitions 2.3.10 and 2.3.11.

38 The convention that each premouse has a distinguished degree of soundness is due to Itay Neeman.
It is quite useful for simplifying statements about premice, while retaining precision.
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that agrees with M|ν except possibly on the interpretation of Ḟ, and satisfies
/ By convention, k(M||ν) = 0.39
Ḟ M||ν = 0.
Remark 2.3.2. hM̂, ωi is a premouse iff for all k < ω, hM̂, ki is a premouse.
In contexts in which we care about k(M), the important case is k(M) < ω. If
k(M) = ω, one can usually just replace M with N = (rud(M̂ ∪ {M̂}), 0). / For
example, an ultrapower of M using M-definable functions is equivalent to an
ultrapower of N using functions belonging to N. Some of the general statements
about premice we make below may need small adjustments when k(M) = ω.
We occasionally want to raise or lower a soundness degree.
D EFINITION 2.3.3. Let M = (M̂, k) be a premouse;
(a) for i ≤ k, M ↓ i = (M̂, i),
(b) M − = (M̂, k−̇1),
(c) M + = (M̂, k + 1).
Of course, M + is a premouse iff M is sound.40

D EFINITION 2.3.4. If P and Q are Jensen premice, then
(i) P 0 Q iff there are µ and l such that P = Q|hµ, li.
(ii) P 0 Q iff P 0 Q and P 6= Q.
(iii) P Q iff there are µ and l ≥ 0 such that P = Q|hµ, li.
(iv) P Q iff P Q and P 6= Q.
The difference between the two initial segment notions lies in whether we
regard Q|hµ, −1i as an initial segment of Q. In other words, if Q|µ is active, then
Q||µ 0 Q, but Q||µ 6 Q. Both notions have a role. If P Q we say that P is an
initial segment of Q, and if P Q we say it is a proper initial segment. If P 0 Q
we say that P is a weak initial segment of Q, and if P 0 Q, it is a proper weak
initial segment.
Note that if P̂ = Q̂ but k(P) < k(Q), then P 0 Q.
If M = (M̂, k) is a premouse, then its extender sequence is Ė M = Ė M̂ together
with a last, or top, extender Ḟ M = Ḟ M̂ . We speak of ρi (M), M i , etc., instead of
ρi (M̂), M̂ i , etc. Our soundness hypothesis means that for n ≤ k, there is a natural
surjection of M n onto M.
D EFINITION 2.3.5. (a) If Q is an amenable J-structure, then h1Q is its canoni-
cal Σ1 Skolem function.41
39 Many authors, for example [81], reverse the meanings of M|ν and M||ν. We find it more logical
to let M||ν stand for cutting M twice, first to M|ν, and then again by throwing away the top extender.
40 If k(M) = ω, then M + = M − = M.
41 For ϕ(u, v) = ∃wθ (u, v, w) where θ is Σ , h (ϕ, a) = b iff there is c such that hb, ci is < least
0 Q Q
such that Q |= θ [a, b, c].
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n : M n onto
(b) If M is a premouse and 0 ≤ n ≤ k(M), then we define dM −→ M
0
dM = id,
n+1
dM n
(hϕ, xi) = dM (h1Mn (ϕ, hx, rn+1 (M)i))
(c) Let M be a premouse, n ≤ k(M), and R be a relation on M. Let Rn be the

relation on M n given by
Rn (x1 , ..., xk ) ⇔ R(d n (x1 ), ..., d n (xk )).
n
Then R is rΣn+1 iff Rn is ΣM
1 .
(d) A function is rΣM
n just in case its graph in rΣM
n .
The soundness requirement on premice is that when k ≤ k(M), then M =
ran(d k ).42 One can think of dM
k as giving us a system of names for the elements of
M, the names being parametrized by ordinals < ρk (M) and involving a fixed name
for pk (M).43 The predicate Ak of M k tells us the rΣk truths of M about the objects
named, which is somewhat more than just the Σk truths.
n
rΣM M
n+1 versus Σ1
It is possible to characterize the definability levels rΣM i+1 , without directly re-
ferring to the coding structures M i . This is what is done in [30]. That has the
advantage that we are primarily interested in premice, not codes for them. Also,
the definition of rΣi+1 in [30] makes sense even when M is not i-sound.44 On
the other hand, certain things stand out better when we use the M i . For example,
i Mi
ΣM0 has nice closure properties, and the prewellordering property for Σ1 is often
useful. A good compromise in many fine structural arguments is to focus on the
case i = 0, where M is its own coding structure, and rΣ1 = Σ1 . Usually, if this case
works out, then the case i > 0 will work out too.
Jensen introduced the reducts M i , and hence implicitly the definability levels
rΣi+1 in the sound case, in order to prove Σi+1 uniformization for M L. (See
[16].) But it has turned out that the rΣi stratification of definability is more useful
for inner model theory than the usual Σi stratification. One wants level 2 formulae
to be allowed a name for p1 , for example. In order to get a feel for what can be
said in an rΣn way, let us look more closely at rΣ2 .45
P ROPOSITION 2.3.6. Let M be a premouse and k(M) ≥ 1; then
42 Clearly
k “M k = d k “ρ (M) when k ≥ 1.
dM M k
43 M k
has a name for rk , and a name for a name for rk−1 , and so on. Putting them together, it has a
name for pk .
44 But the definition of rΣM in [30] would not be very natural unless one were trying to capture
i+1
i
ΣM
1 . Moreover, [30] only proves a few things about the unsound case.
45 Jensen’s Σ∗ theory provides a treatment of the higher levels of definability over premice that is
somewhat more general. See [78].
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1
(1) d 1 = h M 1 , for some h that is ΣM 1 1
1 in p1 . Thus d ∩ M is Σ0 .
M
1
(2) For R ⊆ M 1 , R is ΣM 1 iff R is rΣ2 ; more generally
1
(3) let S ⊆ M 1 × M, and let R(x, y) iff S(x, d 1 (y)); then R is ΣM
1 iff S is rΣ2 .
M M 1 M
(4) The predicates x = p1 , x 6= p1 , x ∈ M , and x < ρ1 are each rΣ2 .
(5) Every ΣM M M
2 (p1 ) relation is rΣ2 .
(6) The predicate R(x, α, q) ⇔ (α < ρ1M ∧ x = ThM M
1 (α ∪ {p1 , q})) is rΣ2 .
1
(7) dM is an rΣ2 function.
Moreover, these statements are all true uniformly in M.
P ROOF. For (1): d 1 (x) = y iff h1 (x, p1 ) = y iff hϕ, hx, yii ∈ A1 , where ϕ(u, v)
is a Σ1 formula expressing h1 ((u)0 , v) = (u)1 .
For (2): Let R ⊆ M 1 , and let S ⊆ M 1 be its coded version, i.e. S(x) iff R(d 1 (x)).
1 M1 1 1
We must see that R is ΣM 1 iff S is Σ1 . But S(x) iff ∃y ∈ M (d (x) = y ∧ R(y)),
1 1
and R(x) iff ∃y ∈ M (d (y) = x ∧ S(y)), so this is true.
For (3): This is a calculation like that in (2). We omit it.
1
For (4): Clearly x < ρ1 and x ∈ M 1 are ΣM 1 , so they are rΣ2 by (2). To see that
1
x = p1 is rΣ2 , we must see that d 1 (x) = p1 is ΣM 1 1
1 . But d (x) = p1 iff hϕ, xi ∈ A ,
1
where ϕ(u, v) expresses h (u, p1 ) = v.
(5) follows easily from (6). For (6): Let S(x, α, z) iff R(x, α, d 1 (z)). By (3), it
1 M 1
is enough to show that S is ΣM 1 . But it is easy to see that Th1 (α ∪ {d (z)}) can
M
be reduced to Th1 (α ∪ {z, p1 }) via a simple Σ0 function, and the latter can be
computed easily from A1 ∩ M||β whenever x, α, z ∈ M||β . So S(x, α, z) iff there is
a β < o(M 1 ) such that A1 ∩ β certifies S(x, α, z). We are done if we show that the
1
function β 7→ A1 ∩ M||β is ΣM 1
1 . (Note M is closed under this function!) That is
clear.
For (7), let S(x, y) iff d 1 (x) = y. By (3), it is enough to show the relation R(x, z)
1
iff S(x, d 1 (z)) is ΣM 1
1 . But R(x, z) iff hϕ, hx, zii ∈ A , where ϕ(u, v) is a Σ1 formula
1 1
expressing h ((u)0 , v) = h ((u)1 , v).
a
The predicates x < ρ1 and x = p1 are not (lightface) ΣM 2 in general. The predicate
R identifying ΣM M M
1 theories in (6) is Π2 , but not Σ2 in general. So rΣ2 goes strictly
beyond Σ2 .46
Part (6) of 2.3.6 yields a normal form for rΣ2 predicates: a predicate R(x) is
rΣM M
2 iff there is a Σ1 predicate P such that for all x,
R(x) ⇔ ∃α < ρ1M ∃q[P(x, ThM M
1 (α ∪ {q, p1 }))].
See [30], where this is essentially taken as the definition of rΣ2 .47
46 One can show that the predicate x = ρ M is not rΣM in general, because it is not always preserved
1 2
by Σ1 ultrapowers.
47 In [30] the formulae in Th (α ∪ {q}) are allowed to have Skolem terms in them. But one arrives
1
at the same class rΣ2 , as explained in the appendix to §2 of [30].
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n
One can analyze rΣM M
n for n > 2 is a similar way. For n ≤ k(M), the Σ1 relations
n−1 onto
on M n decode into the rΣM 2 relations on M n−1 , using d n,n−1 : M n −→ M n−1 .
n−2
Those decode into the rΣ3 relations on M , using d n−1,n−2 , and so on. Eventually
n n into the rΣM relations on M 0 = M. At
we have decoded the ΣM 1 relations on M n+1
each decoding, an analog of Proposition 2.3.6 applies. This leads to:
L EMMA 2.3.7. Let M be a premouse and 1 ≤ n ≤ k(M); then
n
(1) d n = h M n , for some function h that is rΣn in pn (M). Thus d n ∩ M n is ΣM 0 .
n
(2) For R ⊆ M n , R is ΣM 1 iff R is rΣ n+1 ; more generally
n
(3) let S ⊆ M n × M, and let R(x, y) iff S(x, d n (y)); then R is ΣM
1 iff S is rΣn+1 .
(4) M M n M
The predicates x = pn , x 6= pn , x ∈ M , and x < ρn are each rΣn+1 .
(5) Every ΣM M M
n+1 (pn ) relation is rΣn+1 .
(6) The predicate R(x, α, q) ⇔ (α < ρnM ∧ x = ThM M
n (α ∪ {pn , q})) is rΣn+1 .
(7) n M
dM is an rΣn+1 function.
Moreover, these statements are all true uniformly in M.
M
Part (6) yields a normal form for rΣM
n+1 if we interpret Thn as referring to the
rΣn theory in M. This is how rΣM 48
n+1 is defined in [30].
L EMMA 2.3.8. Let M be a premouse, and 0 ≤ n ≤ k(M); then

(1) Every Boolean combination of rΣn relations is rΣn+1 .
(2) The class of rΣMn+1 relations is closed under ∧, ∨, ∃x, and substitution of
partial rΣn+1 functions.
(3) Every rΣn+1 relation can be uniformized by a rΣn+1 function.
P ROOF. (1) and (2) are easy. For (3), let us first uniformize the rΣn+1 relation
R(y, x) iff d n (x) = y. (We omit M from the notation for readability.) Put
en (y) = x ⇔ (d n (x) = y ∧ ∀w <M x(d n (w) 6= d n (x))).
n
The first conjunct on the right is rΣn+1 . The second conjunct is ΣM 1 , because one
only needs An ∩ M||β where x ∈ M||β to determine its truth. Thus the second
conjunct is rΣn+1 , so en is a rΣn+1 function.
n
Now let R(x, y) be rΣn+1 , and S(u, v) iff R(d n (u), d n (v)), so that S is ΣM
1 . Let h
1
be a ΣM
1 function that uniformizes S. h is rΣn+1 by 2.3.7(2). Clearly
g = d n ◦ h ◦ en
uniformizes R, and is rΣn+1 . a
en
We can use the name-finding function to produce an rΣn+1 Skolem function.
If ϕ(u, v) is a Σ1 formula in the language of M n , let ϕ ∗ (u, v) be the natural Σ1
48 Lemma 2.3.7 holds trivially when n = 0, except possibly (6). If ô(M) is a limit ordinal, then (6)
holds.
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formula expressing “∃x∃y(d n (x) = u ∧ d n (y) = v ∧ ϕ(x, y))”. The rΣn+1 relations
are naturally indexed by the Σ1 formulae of the form ϕ ∗ . We set
∗ n 1 ∗ n
hn+1
M (ϕ , x) = d (hM n (ϕ , e (x))).
D EFINITION 2.3.9. Let M be a premouse and 0 ≤ n ≤ k(M); then
(1) hn+1 M
M is the canonical rΣn+1 Skolem function for M.
M
(2) For X ⊆ M, Hulln+1 (X) = {hn+1 (ϕ, s) | s ∈ X <ω ∧ ϕ ∈ Vω }.
(3) cHullM M
n+1 (X) is the transitive collapse of Hulln+1 (X).
It is clear that HullM
n+1 (X) is closed under (lightface) rΣn+1 functions, and
M M
in particular, pMn ∈ Hulln+1 (X), and Hulln+1 (X) is closed under the coding and
n n
decoding functions e and d . Also 49 50
HullM n n
n+1 (X) ∩ M ≺Σ1 M ,
and under a natural notion of rΣn formulae,
HullM
n+1 (X) ≺rΣn+1 M.
Solidity, universality, and cores
D EFINITION 2.3.10. Let M be a premouse, k ≤ k(M), α < ρk (M) and r ∈

[ρk (M)]<ω ; then
WMα,r = cHullM
k+1 (α ∪ r ∪ pk (M)).
If α ∈ pk+1 (M) and r = pk+1 (M)−(α +1), then we call WMα,r the standard solidity
witness for α. We say pk+1 (M) is solid iff all its standard solidity witnesses belong
to M.51
D EFINITION 2.3.11. Let M be a premouse and k ≤ k(M). We say that r is
ρ,r
k + 1-universal over M if for ρ = ρk+1 (M) and W = WM ,
(a) M|ρ +,M = W |ρ +,W , and
(b) for any A ⊆ ρ, A is boldface rΣM W
k+1 iff A is boldface rΣk+1 .
This strengthens the notion of universality employed in [30] a bit. The strength-
ening will be useful later. The proof in [30] that premice produced in a background
construction have universal parameters shows that the parameters are universal in
this stronger sense.
The soundness required to qualify as a premouse is that for all hα, ki ≤ l(M),
pk (M|hα, li) is solid and k-universal over M|hα, ki. In particular, M must be
k(M)-sound. It need not be k(M) + 1-sound.
49 We are diverging here from the terminology of [49]. Their hn+1 is essentially our denotation
M
n+1
function dM . They call it the canonical rΣM
n+1 Skolem function, but it is not actually a Skolem function.
Our hn+1
M is the Skolem function, so the divergent terminology seems justified.
50 The notation cHull for the transitive collapse of a Skolem hull is due to Schlutzenberg.
51 Here we assume k(M) < ω, as we often do without mention. Cf. Remark 2.3.2.
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D EFINITION 2.3.12. Let M be a premouse; then

(a) ρ − (M) = ρk(M) (M),
(b) ρ(M) = ρk(M)+1 (M),
(c) p(M) = pk(M)+1 (M), and
k(M)+1
(d) hM = hM .
We call ρ(M), p(M), and hM the projectum, parameter, and Skolem function of
M.
Let M be a premouse. We define
C(M) = Ck(M)+1 (M) = cHullM
k(M)+1 (ρ(M) ∪ p(M)),
considered as an L0 -structure. Let π : C(M) → M be the anticollapse, and t =

π −1 (p(M)). We say that M is k + 1-solid, or M has a core, iff pk+1 (M) is k + 1-
universal over M, and t is k + 1-solid over C(M). This implies that t is k + 1-
universal over C(M), that pk+1 (M) is k + 1-solid over M, and that t = pk+1 (C(M)).
If M is k(M) + 1-solid, then we call C(M) the core of M, and the associated π is
the anticore map. If M is k(M) + 1-solid, then setting
k(C(M)) = k(M) + 1,
C(M) is a premouse. We say
M is sound iff M = HullM
k(M)+1 (ρ(M) ∪ p(M)).
Equivalently, M is sound iff C(M) exists, and M = C(M)− .

We may occasionally say that M is k + 1-solid for some k > k(M). This just
means that M k+1 exists, that is, that the process of starting with M and iteratively
taking cores, setting Ck(M) (M) = M and Ci+1 (M) = C(Ci (M)), does not break
down by reaching some non-solid Ci (M) with i ≤ k. M k+1 is the reduct which
codes Ck+1 (M). We say that M is k +1 sound if M is k +1 solid, and M = Ck+1 (M).
(If we ignore the distinguished soundness degrees, that is.)
For the notion of generalized solidity witness, see [49]. Roughly speaking, a
generalized solidity witness for α ∈ p1 (M) is a transitive structure whose the-
ory includes ThM 1 (α ∪ p1 (M) − (α + 1)). If W is a generalized witness, then
ThM1 (α ∪ p1 (M) − (α + 1)) is an initial segment of ThW1 (α ∪ p1 (W ) − (α + 1)) in
the natural prewellordering of ΣM 1 , so we can recover the standard witness from
any generalized witness. Generalized witnesses are important because being a
generalized witness for an α ∈ pk (M) is an rΠk condition, hence preserved by rΣk
embeddings. Such embeddings may not preserve being a standard witness.52
52 [30] defines the solidity witnesses to be theories: instead of W α,r , the witness is ThM (α ∪ r).
M k+1
This doesn’t quite work in all contexts, because one needs that the wellfoundedness of the ∈ relation
coded into this theory is preserved under embeddings mapping M into wellfounded models. Without
knowing WMα,r ∈ M, this is not clear. The corrected definition is due to Jensen.
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Remark 2.3.13. We have defined cores here as they are defined in [49]. In [30]
they are defined in slightly different fashion. First, [30] works directly with the
Ck+1 (M), rather than with the reducts which code them. The translations indicated
above show that is not a real difference; see [30], page 40. Second, if k ≥ 1,
then [30] puts the standard solidity witnesses for pk (M) into the hull collapsing
to Ck+1 (M), and if k ≥ 2, it also puts ρk−1 (M) into this hull if ρk−1 (M) < o(M).
The definition from [49] used above does not do this directly. We are grateful
to Schindler and Zeman for pointing out that nevertheless these objects do get
into the cores as defined in [49], and therefore the two definitions of Ck+1 (M) are
equivalent. (For example, let k = 2 and let M be 1-sound, with α ∈ p1 (M). Let
r = p1 (M) \ (α + 1). Let π : C2 (M) → M be the anticore map, and π(β ) = α and
π(s) = r. The relation “W is a generalized solidity witness for α, r” is Π1 over
M. (It is important to add generalized here. Being a standard witness is only Π2 .)
Since π is Σ2 elementary, there is a generalized solidity witness for β , s over C2 (M)
in C2 (M). But any generalized witness generates the standard one ([49], 7.4), so
the standard solidity witness U for β , s is in C2 (M). Being the standard witness
is Π2 , so π(U) is the standard witness for α, r, and this witness is in ran(π), as
desired. A similar calculation shows that being equal to ρ1 can be expressed by a
Π3 formula, the Π3 clause being “for all α < ρ1 there is a generalized witness for
Th1 (α ∪ p1 )”. But π is rΣ3 elementary, so π(ρ1 (C2 (M))) = ρ1 (M).)
Remark 2.3.14. The pfs premice defined in Chapter 4 will differ from Jensen
premice in that all the ρi (M) for i ≤ k + 1 are added as points to the hull collapsing
to the counterpart of Ck+1 (M).
Extension of embeddings
The extension-of-embeddings lemmas relate reducts to the structures they code.

The downward extension of embeddings lemma tells us that if S is amenable
and π : S → N n is Σ0 , then there is a (unique) M such that S = M n . The upward
extension lemma tells us that if π : M n → S is Σ1 and preserves the wellfoundedness
of certain relations (the important one being ∈M as it is described in the predicate of
M n ), then there is a unique N such that S = N n . See 5.10 and 5.11 of [49]. In both
cases, there is a unique π̂ : M → N extending π, given by π̂(dM n (x)) = d n (π(x))
N
for all x ∈ M .n
Some care is needed in applying these lemmas. In the downward case, it is

possible that π : S → N is Σ0 , N is a premouse, and S is not. The problem is that
Ḟ S may not measure all sets in S.53 But if π is Σ1 elementary, then S is a premouse,
and this will pretty much always be the case in this book.
The importance of solidity shows up in our statement of the upward extension
53 Oneimportant context in which this happens is in the proof that iterable premice satisfy Jensen’s
principle. See [44]. Premouse-like structures with a partial top extender are called protomice, and
they are responsible for many of the difficulties overcome in [44].
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2.4. E LEMENTARITY OF MAPS 33
lemma. In order to conclude that N is a premouse and π̂ is rΣn+1 -elementary, we

need to use the solidity of pn (M). When we decode the name for pn that is part
of S, we do indeed get a parameter r = π̂(pn (M)) that generates all of N modulo
o(S), simply by construction. S = N n,r . So ρn (N) ≤ o(S), and o(S) ≤ ρn (N) can
be shown using the amenability of S. Thus pn (N) ≤ r in the parameter order.54
But it is the fact that being a generalized solidity witness is preserved that lets us
conclude that r is solid over N, and hence pn (N) = r. It is easy to see no t <lex r
can generate r modulo o(S), so if r 6= pn (N), then N is not n-sound, hence not a
premouse.
Schindler and Zeman prove a more abstract upward extension lemma in [49].
They first define M k,q for arbitrary q, and then set M k = M k,pk (M) . Their upward
extension lemma then just asserts the existence of a premouse N such that S =
N n,π(pn (M)) . The more abstract lemma is useful in practice, because it separates the
elementary facts to do with coding and decoding from the much less elementary,
premouse-specific question as to whether π preserves the standard parameter.
We shall discuss the extension of embeddings lemmas in more detail in Section
4.1.
2.4. Elementarity of maps
Given premice M and N, n = k(M) = k(N) < ω, and

π : Mn → N n
a Σ0 elementary embedding on their n-th reducts, then by decoding the reducts we
get a unique
π̂ : M → N
that is Σn elementary and is such that π ⊆ π̂. If π is Σ1 elementary, then π̂ is
Σn+1 elementary. The decoding is done iteratively, and yields that for k < n,
π̂ : M k → N k is Σn−k or Σn−k+1 , respectively. π̂ is called the n-completion of π.55
See lemmas 5.8 and 5.9 of [49]. These lemmas record additional elementarity
properties of π̂, namely rΣn+1 -elementarity if π is Σ1 , and weak rΣn+1 -elementarity
if π is only Σ0 . (See [49, 5.12].) Such maps are cardinal preserving , in that
M |= “γ is a cardinal” iff N |= “π(γ) is a cardinal”, except possibly the weakly rΣ0
maps. In this case, we shall always just add cardinal preservation as an additional
hypothesis. This leads us to:
D EFINITION 2.4.1. Let M and N be Jensen premice such that k(M) = k(N),
and π : M → N; then letting n = k(M),
54 Regarding parameters as finite descending sequences of ordinals, this is the lexicographic order,
so we often write p ≤lex q for it.

55 If k(M) = k(N) = ω, then a Σ elementary π : M ω → N ω determines a Σ elementary π̂ : M → N.
0 ω
As usual, our discussion is focused on the case n < ω.
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(a) π is weakly elementary iff π is the n-completion of π M n , and π M n : M n →

N n is Σ0 and cardinal preserving.
(b) π is elementary iff π is weakly elementary, and π M n : M n → N n is Σ1 .
(c) π is cofinal iff sup π“ρn (M) = ρn (N).
We should note that the reduct M n has a name for pn (M) built into its language56 ,
so a weakly elementary π : M → N must by definition preserve pk (M) for k ≤ k(M).
Weakly elementary maps are Σk elementary maps that preserve the pk for k ≤ k(M),
although this is not quite all there is to the concept.
Formally, Definition 2.4.1 only applies when M and N have the same distin-
guished soundness degree. However, it is easy to see that if π : M → N is weakly
elementary and i < k(M), then π : M ↓ i → N ↓ i is elementary (and more). One
could be pedantic and associate a degree to π itself, but we won’t do that. The one
caution is that π could be cofinal as a map from M to N, but not as a map from
M ↓ i to N ↓ i, where i < k(M). That is quite common, in fact.
The elementary maps correspond to those which are near n-embeddings in the
sense of [42]. The cofinal elementary maps correspond to the n-embeddings of
[30]. When n ≥ 1, the weakly elementary embeddings correspond to those that
(n)
are n-apt in the sense of [42], Σ0 in the sense of [81], or n-lifting in the sense of
[52]. There are many other levels of elementarity isolated in these references. The
elementarity notions that will come up in this book are defined in this and the next
section in the context of Jensen premice. We adapt them to pfs premice in §4.3.
There are essentially two: elementarity, and what we shall call near elementarity.57
Here are two basic sources of cofinal elementary maps.
L EMMA 2.4.2. Let M be a solid premouse, N = C(M)− , and let π : N → M be
the anticore map; then letting k = k(M) = k(N),
(a) π is cofinal and elementary,
(b) if ρk+1 (M) = ρk (M), then π = id, and
(c) if π 6= id, then ρk+1 (N) ≤ crit(π) < ρk (N).
P ROOF. We start with (a). By construction, π is the completion of π̂ = π N k ,
which is Σ1 elementary as a map from N k to M k . So π is elementary. Clearly
crit(π) ≥ ρk+1 (M) = ρk+1 (N). If ρk+1 (M) = ρk (M), then N k = M k and since
M and N are k-sound, π̂ is the identity, hence cofinal. If ρk+1 (M) < ρk (M) and
k M k ||α
sup(ran(π̂)) < α < ρk (M), then ThM1 (ρ(M) ∪ r) = Th1 (ρ(M) ∪ r), where
k
p(M) = pk (M)_ r and M k ||α = (M||α, A ∩ α). But M k ||α ∈ M k , so the new ΣM
1
56 Directly,
only a name for rn (M), but indirectly a name for pn (M).
57 Weshall not use the notion of weak n-embedding defined in [30]. In the end, that notion is not
very natural, and in a number of places it does not do the work that the authors of [30] thought that it did.
In particular, there are problems with how it was used in the Shift Lemma, the copying construction,
and the Weak Dodd-Jensen Lemma. These problems are discussed in [52], and a variety of ways to
repair the earlier proofs are given.
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subset of ρ(M) was not new after all. Thus again π is cofinal, and we have proved
(a).
We have already observed that (b) holds. For (c): if crit(π) ≥ ρk (N), then since
π is cofinal and elementary, N k = M k . But as we noted, this implies M = N and
π = id. a
The second basic source is fine structural ultrapowers. If M is a premouse with
n = k(M), and E is a short extender over M with κE < ρn (M) and P(κE )M ⊆
dom(E), then we set
Ult(M, E) = Ultn (M, E)
= decoding of Ult0 (M n , E)
iM n n
E = completion of canonical i : M → Ult(M , E).
By convention, k(Ult(M, E)) = k(M).

L EMMA 2.4.3. Let M be a premouse and E be a short extender over M such that
crit(E) < ρk(M) (M) and Ult(M, E) is wellfounded; then Ult(M, E) is a premouse,
and the canonical embedding iM
E : M → Ult(M, E) is cofinal and elementary.
P ROOF. We assume here that Ult(M, E) is wellfounded, but one could make
sense of these statements even if it is not. Let n = k(M). It is easy to see from Łos’s
Theorem that the canonical embedding i : M n → Ult0 (M n , E) is Σ1 and cofinal. If
n = 0 and M is active, with κ = crit(Ḟ M ), then also i“κ +,M is cofinal in i(κ +,M ).
This implies that i preserves rQ sentences, and hence Ult(M, E) is a premouse.58
Let S = Ult0 (M n , E) and N = Ult(M, E). We must see that S = N n . The abstract
part of the upward extension lemma tells us that S = N n,π(p) , where p = pn (M).(Cf.
[49, §4].) So we just need to see that π(p) = pn (N). But this follows from the
fact that M is n sound, as we saw above: ρn (N) ≤ o(S) because S = N n,π(p) , and
o(S) ≤ ρn (N) can be shown using the amenability of S. So pn (N) ≤lex π(p) in the
parameter order. But the solidity witnesses for p are moved by π to generalized
solidity witnesses for π(p), so π(p) is solid, and hence π(p) ≤lex pn (N).
Thus iME : M → Ult(M, E) is the n-completion of i, and hence it is cofinal and
elementary. a
The coding and decoding involved in the definition of Ult(M, E) can obscure its
properties. It is sometimes better to think of Ult(M, E) as an ordinary ultrapower
formed using rΣk(M) functions, as in [30]. More precisely, letting n = k(M) and
κ = crit(E),
Ult(M, E) = {[a, f ]M
E | a ∈ [λ ]
<ω
∧ dom( f ) = [κ]|a| ∧ f is boldface rΣn }.
Of course, the coding into M n is still present in the rΣn definition of f , but it
58 See [30, §2].
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can sometimes help to think of Ult(M, E) this way. We do indeed get the same
ultrapower. Each function g ∈ M n used in Ult0 (M n , E) corresponds to the function
g∗ (u) = d n (g(u))),
∗ M n
which is rΣn in the parameters g and pn (M). The decoding of [a, g]ME is [a, g ]E .
|a| ∗
Conversely, if f is a boldface rΣn function on [κ] , then f = g for some g ∈ M n .
.
D EFINITION 2.4.4. Let M be a premouse and n ≤ k(M), then
(1) skn = {hn, τ(u, v)i | τ(u, v) is Σ1 in the language of reducts}.
(2) For u, q ∈ M n and τ ∈ skn , fτ,q
M (u) = d n (hτ, hq, ui).
M
M parametrize the partial boldface rΣ functions with domain contained
The fτ,q n
in M n .59 One can think of τ as an rΣn definition of f from q. One only needs pa-
M = g∗ , where g(u) = hτ, hq, uii,
rameters q ∈ M n because M is n-sound. Clearly fτ,q
so our two versions of Ult(M, E) are isomorphic, and we have
M M
Ult(M, E) = {[a, fτ,q ]E | τ ∈ skn ∧ q ∈ M n ∧ dom( fτ,q
M
) = [κ]|a| }.
One has the usual Los theorem for rΣn formulae, so the ultrapower map is rΣn+1 -
elementary. Letting i = iM
E , we get
M M Ult(M,E)
[a, fτ,q ]E = i( f )(a) = fτ,i(q) .
Let us return to the general setting. Here are some basic facts regarding preser-
vation of parameters and projecta. In stating them, we adopt the convention that if
π : M → N, where M and N are premice, then π(o(M)) = o(N).
P ROPOSITION 2.4.5. Let M and N be Jensen premice with n = k(M) = k(N),
and π : M → N be weakly elementary; then
(1) π is Σn elementary,
(2) π(pk (M)) = pk (N) for all k ≤ n, and
(3) (a) sup π“ρk (M) ≤ ρk (N) for all k ≤ n,
(b) π(ρk (M)) = ρk (N) for k < n − 1, and
(c) ρn−1 (N) ≤ π(ρn−1 (M)).
(4) For any α < ρn (M) and r ∈ M, π(ThM N
n (α ∪ {r}) = Thn (π(α) ∪ {π(r)}).
P ROOF. (1) and (2) are part of the extension of embeddings lemmas. (3)(a) is
also implicit there, since π M k : M k → N k is a stage in completing π M n .
(3)(c) is true by convention if ρn−1 (M) = o(M). For k ≤ n, let
ϕk (u, v) = “∀x∃α < u(x = hk (α, v))”.
Here hk is the canonical rΣk Skolem function.60 ϕk is the natural rΠk+1 formula
59 Our M here is slightly different than that in [30], but not in any important way.
definition of fτ,q
60 One could also use the decoding function d k at this point.
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expressing the quoted one. M |= ϕk [ρk (M), pk (M)], so if k ≤ n − 1 then N |=

ϕk [π(ρk (M)), pk (N)], and therefore ρk (N) ≤ π(ρk (M)). This gives us (3)(c).
For (3)(b), note that “x = Thk (y)” can be expressed by a boolean combination
of Πk formulae. So “v ≤ ρk ” can be expressed by a Πk+2 formula, namely
ψk (v) = ∀α < v∃x(x = Thk (α ∪ pk ))”,
and “ρk = OR” can be expressed by a Πk+2 sentence, namely θk = “∀α∃x(x =
Thk (α ∪ pk ))”. If k < n − 1 then π preserves ϕk , ψk , and θ . This yields (3)(b).
(4) follows from the fact that “x = Thn (y)” can be expressed by a Boolean
combination of Πn formulae. Or we can just note that as a predicate on the reduct
M n , x = Thn (α ∪ pn (M)) is is Σ0 , so preserved by π, and take α large enough that
r = hnM (β , pn (M)) for some β < α. a
Note that we do not necessarily have that π(ρn−1 (M)) = ρn−1 (N), or ρn (N) ≤
π(ρn (M)), or that π is rΣn+1 -elementary on a set cofinal in ρn (M). These are the
additional requirements from [30] on weak n-embeddings. We do need to make
use of the first two of these requirements later, so we make a definition.
D EFINITION 2.4.6. Let π : M → N be weakly elementary, and k = k(M); then
(a) π respects projecta iff π(ρ j (M)) = ρ j (N) for all j < k,
(b) π is almost exact iff ρk (N) ≤ π(ρk (M)), and
(c) π is exact iff ρk (N) = π(ρk (M))
We use here the convention that π(o(M)) = o(N). Thus if k(M) = 0, then
π respects projecta and is exact, and if k(M) = 1, then π respects projecta. So
exactness only come into play when k(M) ≥ 1, and respecting projecta only comes
into play when k(M) ≥ 2. By Proposition 2.4.5, preservation of ρk(M)−1 is the
only issue in (a). However, so far as we can see, weakly elementary maps may not
preserve ρk(M)−1 .
Elementary maps respect projecta and are almost exact, by the calculations we
just did.61
P ROPOSITION 2.4.7. If π : M → N is elementary, then π respects projecta and
is almost exact.
P ROOF. Let n = k(M). We have ρn (N) ≤ π(ρn (M)) because “ρn ≤ v” is ex-
pressed by the Πn+1 formula ϕn (v, pn ) displayed above. We get that π(ρn−1 (M)) =
ρn−1 (N) from the fact that π preserves ϕn−1 , ψn−1 , and θn−1 . a
As we shall see in the next section, the ultrapower map π : M → Ult(M, E) may
be discontinuous at ρ − (M). In that case, it is a cofinal, elementary map that is not
exact.
In a similar vein,
61 In fact, elementary maps are weak n-embeddings in the sense of [30].
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P ROPOSITION 2.4.8. Let π : M → N be weakly elementary, n = k(M), and

suppose that if n ≥ 2, then either ρn−1 (N) = o(N) or ρn−1 (N) ∈ ran(π). Then π
respects projecta.
P ROOF. If ρn−1 (N) = o(N), then N |= θn−1 . But θn−1 is Πn+1 and π is Σn -
elementary, so M |= θn−1 , so ρn−1 (M) = o(M). Similarly, if ρn−1 (N) = π(µ), we
get that M |= (ϕn−1 ∧ ψn−1 )[µ], so µ = ρn−1 (M). a
The lifting maps that occur in the construction of background-induced iteration
strategies are weakly elementary and respect projecta, but may not be elementary
or almost exact. One can see why by considering the following simple examples.
E XAMPLE 2.4.9. Let M be a premouse and let E be an extender on the M-
sequence. Suppose that E λE = (E ∗ λE ) ∩ M, where E ∗ is an extender over V .
Let
σ : Ult(M, E) → iVE ∗ (M)
be the natural map, given by completing
k
σ ([a, f ]M V
E ) = [a, f ]E ∗ ,
where k = k(M), a ⊆ λE is finite, and f ∈ M k . Suppose k = 0, so M k = M. It is clear

that σ is Σ0 -elementary, but it may not be Σ1 -elementary. For example, let κ =
crit(E), and suppose o(M) = η + κ for some η; then o(Ult(M, E)) = iM E (η) + κ,
V V V M V
but o(iE ∗ (M)) = iE ∗ (η) + iE ∗ (κ). We have σ (iE (η)) = iE ∗ (η) and σ (κ) = κ.
Thus if ϕ(u, v) is the Σ1 formula “u + v exists”, then Ult(M, E) |= ¬ϕ[iM E (η), κ]
but iVE ∗ (M) |= ϕ[σ (iM
E (η)), σ (κ)].
One can construct similar failures of elementarity with k(M) > 0.

E XAMPLE 2.4.10. Let M, E, E ∗ , and σ be as in 2.4.9, but suppose now that
k(M) = 1, crit(E) < ρ1 (M), and ρ1 (M) has Σ1 cofinality crit(E) in M. By Lemma
2.5.6, iM
E is discontinuous at ρ1 (M), so
ρ1 (Ult(M, E)) = sup iE “ρ1 (M) < iE (ρ1 (M)).
On the other hand, σ (iE (ρ1 (M)) = iE ∗ (ρ1 (M)) = ρ1 (iE ∗ (M)). It follows that σ is
not almost exact.
It is easy to see that the lifting maps σ in these examples do respect projecta. That
is true in general of the lifting maps that occur in the construction of background-
induced iteration strategies.
Note that if π : M → N is weakly elementary, and k = k(M) = k(N), then π
moves generalized solidity witnesses for pk (M) to generalized solidity witnesses
for pk (N). For example, being a generalized witness for p1 (M) is a Π1 fact, so
preserved by Σ1 embeddings. If π is elementary, then it will move the standard
solidity witnesses for pk (M) to the standard solidity witnesses for pk (N).
The preservation results above were confined to ρk (M) and pk (M) for k ≤ k(M).
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We also need to consider what happens to ρk+1 (M) and pk+1 (M). Here is the main
fact concerning preservation by ultrapower maps.
D EFINITION 2.4.11. An extender E is close to M iff
(1) dom(E) = dom(F), for some F on the sequence of M, and
(2) for all finite a ⊆ λ (E),
(a) Ea is ΣM 1 in parameters, and
(b) for all α < κE+,M , Ea ∩ M|α ∈ M.
We say that E is very close to M iff E is close to M, and for all finite a ⊆ λ (E),
Ea ∈ M.
We have added item (1) to the standard definition of closeness from [30]. In
Lemma 4.5.3 we show that all extenders used in a normal iteration tree are close to
the models to which they are applied in this slightly stronger sense. We show also
that they are often very close.
L EMMA 2.4.12. Let M be a premouse and let E be an extender that is close to
M such that ρ(M) ≤ crit(E), and let N = Ult(M, E); then
k k
(a) for A ⊆ ρ(M), A is ΣM N
1 iff A is Σ1 ,
(b) ρ(M) = ρ(N), and
(c) if p(M) is solid, then iM
E (p(M)) = p(N), and p(N) is solid.
P ROOF. We assume k(M) = 0 for simplicity. Let ρ = ρ(M) and i = iM E . If

A ⊆ ρ(M) and A is ΣN1 in the parameter [a, f ]ME , then by Łos’s theorem, A is Σ M in
1
f and t, where t is such that Ea is ΣM
1 in t. This is because
ξ ∈ A iff M |= ∃g∃X ∈ Ea ∀u ∈ Xθ [ξ , f (u), g(u)],
where ∃vθ is the Σ1 formula defining A from [a, f ] in N. The other direction in (a)
is immediate.
This implies that ρ ≤ ρ(N). On the other hand, the amenability clause (2)(b) in
closeness implies that P(ρ)M = P(ρ)N . So if A ⊆ ρ is ΣN1 but not in M, then A is
ΣN1 but not in N. So ρ = ρ(N).
Toward (c), let p = p(M) and q = i(p). Let ϕ be a Σ1 formula such that
{α | M |= ϕ[α, p]} ∩ ρ ∈ / M. Then {α | N |= ϕ[α, q]} ∩ ρ ∈ / N, since the two sets
are the same below ρ, and P(ρ)M = P(ρ)N . It follows that p(N) ≤lex q. But if
α ∈ p, then there is a generalized solidity witness W for α such that W in M.
Being a generalized witness is Π1 , so i(W ) is a generalized witness for i(α) in q.
It is easy to see that the existence of these witnesses implies that q ≤lex p(N). So
q = p(N); moreover, p(N) has solidity witnesses. a
The solidity of p(M) was crucial in showing that it is preserved this way by
ultrapowers. This is perhaps the main reason one must prove that p(M) is solid in
order to get a reasonable theory going.
We shall resume our discussion of levels of elementarity at the end of the next
section, after we have introduced a stronger notion of respect for projecta.
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It may be replied that the history of Rome, on which I dwelt a
moment ago, shews that arrested progress, and even decadence,
may be but the prelude to a new period of vigorous growth. So that
even those races or nations which seem frozen into eternal
immobility may base upon experience their hopes of an awakening
spring.
I am not sure, however, that this is the true interpretation of the facts.
There is no spectacle indeed in all history more impressive than the
thick darkness settling down over Western Europe, blotting out all
but a faint and distorted vision of Graeco-Roman culture, and then,
as it slowly rises, unveiling the variety and rich promise of the
modern world. But I do not think we should make this unique
phenomenon support too weighty a load of theory. I should not infer
from it that when some wave of civilisation has apparently spent its
force, we have a right to regard its withdrawing sweep as but the
prelude to a new advance. I should rather conjecture that in this
particular case we should find, among other subtle causes of
decadence, some obscure disharmony between the Imperial system
and the temperament of the West, undetected even by those who
suffered from it. That system, though accepted with contentment and
even with pride, though in the days of its greatness it brought
civilisation, commerce, and security in its train, must surely have
lacked some elements which are needed to foster among Teutons,
Celts, and Iberians the qualities, whatever these may be, on which
sustained progress depends. It was perhaps too oriental for the
occident, and it certainly became more oriental as time went on. In
the East it was, comparatively speaking, successful. If there was no
progress, decadence was slow; and but for what Western Europe
did, and what it failed to do, during the long struggle with militant
Mahommedanism, there might still be an Empire in the East, largely
Asiatic in population, Christian in religion, Greek in culture, Roman
by political descent.
Had this been the course of events large portions of mankind would
doubtless have been much better governed than they are. It is not so
clear that they would have been more ‘progressive.’ Progress is with
the West: with communities of the European type. And if their energy
of development is some day to be exhausted, who can believe that
there remains any external source from which it can be renewed?
Where are the untried races competent to construct out of the ruined
fragments of our civilisation a new and better habitation for the spirit
of man? They do not exist: and if the world is again to be buried
under a barbaric flood, it will not be like that which fertilised, though it
first destroyed, the western provinces of Rome, but like that which in
Asia submerged for ever the last traces of Hellenic culture.
We are thus brought back to the question I put a few moments since.
What grounds are there for supposing that we can escape the fate to
which other races have had to submit? If for periods which,
measured on the historic scale, are of great duration, communities
which have advanced to a certain point appear able to advance no
further; if civilisations wear out, and races become effete, why should
we expect to progress indefinitely, why for us alone is the doom of
man to be reversed?
To these questions I have no very satisfactory answers to give, nor
do I believe that our knowledge of national or social psychology is
sufficient to make a satisfactory answer possible. Some purely
tentative observations on the point may, however, furnish a fitting
conclusion to an address which has been tentative throughout, and
aims rather at suggesting trains of thought, than at completing them.
I assume that the factors which combine to make each generation
what it is at the moment of its entrance into adult life are in the main
twofold. The one produces the raw material of society, the process of
manufacture is effected by the other. The first is physiological
inheritance, the second is the inheritance partly of external
conditions of life, partly of beliefs[2], traditions, sentiments, customs,
laws, and organisation—all that constitute the social surroundings in
which men grow up to maturity.
I hazard no conjecture as to the share borne respectively by these
two kinds of cause in producing their joint result. Nor are we likely to
obtain satisfactory evidence on the subject till, in the interests of
science, two communities of different blood and different traditions
consent to exchange their children at birth by a universal process of
reciprocal adoption. But even in the absence of so heroic an
experiment, it seems safe to say that the mobility which makes
possible either progress or decadence, resides rather in the causes
grouped under the second head than in the physiological material on
which education, in the widest sense of that ambiguous term, has
got to work. If, as I suppose, acquired qualities are not inherited, the
only causes which could fundamentally modify the physiological
character of any particular community are its intermixture with alien
races through slavery, conquest, or immigration; or else new
conditions which varied the relative proportion in which different
sections of the population contributed to its total numbers. If, for
example, the more successful members of the community had
smaller families than the less successful; or if medical administration
succeeded in extinguishing maladies to which persons of a particular
constitution were specially liable; or if one strain in a mixed race had
a larger birth rate than another—in these cases and in others like
them, there would doubtless be a change in the physiological factor
of national character. But such changes are not likely, I suppose, to
be considerable, except, perhaps, those due to the mixture of races;
—and that only in new countries whose economic opportunities
tempt immigrants widely differing in culture, and in capacity for
culture, from those whose citizenship they propose to share.
The flexible element in any society, that which is susceptible of
progress or decadence, must therefore be looked for rather in the
physical and psychical conditions affecting the life of its component
units, than in their inherited constitution. This last rather supplies a
limit to variations than an element which does itself vary: though
from this point of view its importance is capital. I at least find it quite
impossible to believe that any attempt to provide widely different
races with an identical environment, political, religious, educational,
what you will, can ever make them alike. They have been different
and unequal since history began; different and unequal they are
destined to remain through future periods of comparable duration.
But though the advance of each community is thus limited by its
inherited aptitudes, I do not suppose that those limits have ever been
reached by its unaided efforts. In the cases where a forward
movement has died away, the pause must in part be due to arrested
development in the variable, not to a fixed resistance in the
unchanging factor of national character. Either external conditions
are unfavourable; or the sentiments, customs and beliefs which
make society possible have hardened into shapes which make its
further self-development impossible; or through mere weariness of
spirit the community resigns itself to a contented, or perhaps a
discontented, stagnation; or it shatters itself in pursuit of impossible
ideals, or for other and obscurer reasons, flags in its endeavours,
and falls short of possible achievement.
Now I am quite unable to offer any such general analysis of the
causes by which these hindrances to progress are produced or
removed as would furnish a reply to my question. But it may be
worth noting that a social force has come into being, new in
magnitude if not in kind, which must favourably modify such
hindrances as come under all but the last of the divisions in which I
have roughly arranged them. This force is the modern alliance
between pure science and industry. That on this we must mainly rely
for the improvement of the material conditions under which societies
live is in my opinion obvious, although no one would conjecture it
from a historic survey of political controversy. Its direct moral effects
are less obvious; indeed there are many most excellent people who
would altogether deny their existence. To regard it as a force fitted to
rouse and sustain the energies of nations would seem to them
absurd: for this would be to rank it with those other forces which
have most deeply stirred the emotions of great communities, have
urged them to the greatest exertions, have released them most
effectually from the benumbing fetters of merely personal
preoccupations,—with religion, patriotism, and politics. Industrial
expansion under scientific inspiration, so far from deserving praise
like this, is in their view, at best, but a new source of material well-
being, at worst the prolific parent of physical ugliness in many forms,
machine made wares, smoky cities, polluted rivers, and desecrated
landscapes,—appropriately associated with materialism and greed.
I believe this view to be utterly misleading, confounding accident with
essence, transient accompaniments with inseparable characteristics.
Should we dream of thus judging the other great social forces of
which I have spoken? Are we to ignore what religion has done for the
world because it has been the fruitful excuse for the narrowest
bigotries and the most cruel persecutions? Are we to underrate the
worth of politics, because politics may mean no more than the
mindless clash of factions, or the barren exchange of one set of
tyrants or jobbers for another? Is patriotism to be despised because
its manifestations have been sometimes vulgar, sometimes selfish,
sometimes brutal, sometimes criminal? Estimates like these seem to
me worse than useless. All great social forces are not merely
capable of perversion, they are constantly perverted. Yet were they
eliminated from our social system, were each man, acting on the
advice, which Voltaire gave but never followed, to disinterest himself
of all that goes on beyond the limits of his own cabbage garden,
decadence I take it, would have already far advanced.
But if the proposition I am defending may be wrongly criticised, it is
still more likely to be wrongly praised. To some it will commend itself
as a eulogy on an industrial as distinguished from a military
civilisation: as a suggestion that in the peaceful pursuit of wealth
there is that which of itself may constitute a valuable social tonic.
This may be true, but it is not my contention. In talking of the alliance
between industry and science my emphasis is at least as much on
the word science as on the word industry. I am not concerned now
with the proportion of the population devoted to productive labour, or
the esteem in which they are held. It is on the effects which I believe
are following, and are going in yet larger measure to follow, from the
intimate relation between scientific discovery and industrial
efficiency, that I most desire to insist.
Do you then, it will be asked, so highly rate the utilitarian aspect of
research as to regard it as a source, not merely of material
convenience, but of spiritual elevation? Is it seriously to be ranked
with religion and patriotism as an important force for raising men’s
lives above what is small, personal, and self-centred? Does it not
rather pervert pure knowledge into a new contrivance for making
money, and give a fresh triumph to the ‘growing materialism of the
age’?
I do not myself believe that this age is either less spiritual or more
sordid than its predecessors. I believe, indeed, precisely the reverse.
But however this may be, is it not plain that if a society is to be
moved by the remote speculations of isolated thinkers it can only be
on condition that their isolation is not complete? Some point of
contact they must have with the world in which they live, and if their
influence is to be based on widespread sympathy, the contact must
be in a region where there can be, if not full mutual comprehension,
at least a large measure of practical agreement and willing co-
operation. Philosophy has never touched the mass of men except
through religion. And, though the parallel is not complete, it is safe to
say that science will never touch them unaided by its practical
applications. Its wonders may be catalogued for purposes of
education, they may be illustrated by arresting experiments, by
numbers and magnitudes which startle or fatigue the imagination;
but they will form no familiar portion of the intellectual furniture of
ordinary men unless they be connected, however remotely, with the
conduct of ordinary life. Critics have made merry over the naive self-
importance which represented man as the centre and final cause of
the universe, and conceived the stupendous mechanism of nature as
primarily designed to satisfy his wants and minister to his
entertainment. But there is another, and an opposite, danger into
which it is possible to fall. The material world, howsoever it may have
gained in sublimity, has, under the touch of science, lost (so to
speak) in domestic charm. Except where it affects the immediate
needs of organic life, it may seem so remote from the concerns of
men that in the majority it will rouse no curiosity, while of those who
are fascinated by its marvels, not a few will be chilled by its
impersonal and indifferent immensity.
For this latter mood only religion or religious philosophy can supply a
cure. But for the former, the appropriate remedy is the perpetual
stimulus which the influence of science on the business of mankind
offers to their sluggish curiosity. And even now I believe this
influence to be underrated. If in the last hundred years the whole
material setting of civilised life has altered, we owe it neither to
politicians nor to political institutions. We owe it to the combined
efforts of those who have advanced science and those who have
applied it. If our outlook upon the Universe has suffered
modifications in detail so great and so numerous that they amount
collectively to a revolution, it is to men of science we owe it, not to
theologians or philosophers. On these indeed new and weighty
responsibilities are being cast. They have to harmonise and to
coordinate, to prevent the new from being one-sided, to preserve the
valuable essence of what is old. But science is the great instrument
of social change, all the greater because its object is not change but
knowledge; and its silent appropriation of this dominant function,
amid the din of political and religious strife, is the most vital of all the
revolutions which have marked the development of modern
civilisation.
It may seem fanciful to find in a single recent aspect of this revolution
an influence which resembles religion or patriotism in its appeals to
the higher side of ordinary characters—especially since we are
accustomed to regard the appropriation by industry of scientific
discoveries merely as a means of multiplying the material
conveniences of life. But if it be remembered that this process brings
vast sections of every industrial community into admiring relation
with the highest intellectual achievement, and the most disinterested
search for truth; that those who live by ministering to the common
wants of average humanity lean for support on those who search
among the deepest mysteries of Nature; that their dependence is
rewarded by growing success; that success gives in its turn an
incentive to individual effort in no wise to be measured by personal
expectation of gain; that the energies thus aroused may affect the
whole character of the community, spreading the beneficent
contagion of hope and high endeavour through channels scarcely
known, to workers[3] in fields the most remote; if all this be borne in
mind it may perhaps seem not unworthy of the place I have assigned
to it.
But I do not offer this speculation, whatever be its worth, as an
answer to my original question. It is but an aid to optimism, not a
reply to pessimism. Such a reply can only be given by a sociology
which has arrived at scientific conclusions on the life-history of
different types of society, and has risen above the empirical and
merely interrogative point of view which, for want of a better, I have
adopted in this address. No such sociology exists at present, or
seems likely soon to be created. In its absence the conclusions at
which I provisionally arrive are that we cannot regard decadence and
arrested development as less normal in human communities than
progress; though the point at which the energy of advance is
exhausted (if, and when it is reached) varies in different races and
civilisations: that the internal causes by which progress is
encouraged, hindered, or reversed, lie to a great extent beyond the
field of ordinary political discussion, and are not easily expressed in
current political terminology: that the influence which a superior
civilisation, whether acting by example or imposed by force, may
have in advancing an inferior one, though often beneficent, is not
likely to be self supporting; its withdrawal will be followed by
decadence, unless the character of the civilisation be in harmony
both with the acquired temperament and the innate capacities of
those who have been induced to accept it: that as regards those
nations which still advance in virtue of their own inherent energies,
though time has brought perhaps new causes of disquiet, it has
brought also new grounds of hope; and that whatever be the perils in
front of us, there are, so far, no symptoms either of pause or of
regression in the onward movement which for more than a thousand
years has been characteristic of Western civilisation.
Notes:
[1] The ‘East’ is a term most loosely used. It does not here include
China and Japan and does include parts of Africa. The observations
which follow have no reference either to the Jews or to the
commercial aristocracies of Phœnician origin.
[2] Beliefs include knowledge.
[3] This remark arises out of a train of thought suggested by two
questions which are very pertinent to the subject of the Address.
(1) Is a due succession of men above the average in original
capacity necessary to maintain social progress? and
(2) If so, can we discover any law according to which such men are
produced?
I entertain no doubt myself that the answer to the first question
should be in the affirmative. Democracy is an excellent thing; but,
though quite consistent with progress, it is not progressive per se. Its
value is regulative not dynamic; and if it meant (as it never does)
substantial uniformity, instead of legal equality, we should become
fossilised at once. Movement may be controlled or checked by the
many; it is initiated and made effective by the few. If (for the sake of
illustration) we suppose mental capacity in all its many forms to be
mensurable and commensurable, and then imagine two societies
possessing the same average capacity—but an average made up in
one case of equal units, in the other of a majority slightly below the
average and a minority much above it, few could doubt that the
second, not the first, would show the greatest aptitude for
movement. It might go wrong, but it would go.
The second question—how is this originality (in its higher
manifestations called genius) effectively produced? is not so simple.
Excluding education in its narrowest sense—which few would regard
as having much to do with the matter—the only alternatives seem to
be the following:
Original capacity may be no more than one of the ordinary variations
incidental to heredity. A community may breed a minority thus
exceptionally gifted, as it breeds a minority of men over six feet six.
There may be an average decennial output of congenital geniuses
as there is an average decennial output of congenital idiots—though
the number is likely to be smaller.
But if this be the sole cause of the phenomenon, why does the same
race apparently produce many men of genius in one generation and
few in another? Why are years of abundance so often followed by
long periods of sterility?
The most obvious explanation of this would seem to be that in some
periods circumstances give many openings to genius, in some
periods few. The genius is constantly produced; but it is only
occasionally recognised.
In this there must be some truth. A mob orator in Turkey, a religious
reformer in seventeenth century Spain, a military leader in the
Sandwich islands, would hardly get their chance. Yet the theory of
opportunity can scarcely be reckoned a complete explanation. For it
leaves unaccounted for the variety of genius which has in some
countries marked epochs of vigorous national development. Athens
in the fifth and fourth centuries, Florence in the fifteenth and early
sixteenth centuries, Holland in the later sixteenth and seventeenth
centuries, are the typical examples. In such periods the opportunities
of statesmen, soldiers, orators, and diplomatists, may have been
specially frequent. But whence came the poets, the sculptors, the
painters, the philosophers and the men of letters? What peculiar
opportunities had they?
The only explanation, if we reject the idea of a mere coincidence,
seems to be, that quite apart from opportunity, the exceptional stir
and fervour of national life evokes or may evoke qualities which in
ordinary times lie dormant, unknown even to their possessors. The
potential Miltons are ‘mute’ and ‘inglorious’ not because they cannot
find a publisher, but because they have nothing they want to publish.
They lack the kind of inspiration which, on this view, flows from social
surroundings where great things, though of quite another kind, are
being done and thought.
If this theory be true (and it is not without its difficulties) one would
like to know whether these undoubted outbursts of originality in the
higher and rarer form of genius, are symptomatic of a general rise in
the number of persons exhibiting original capacity of a more ordinary
type. If so, then the conclusion would seem to be that some kind of
widespread exhilaration or excitement is required in order to enable
any community to extract the best results from the raw material
transmitted to it by natural inheritance.
Cambridge: Printed at the University Press.
Transcriber’s Note
The formatting of the notes was substantially altered for this edition.
On page 41, “Greek in culture Roman by political descent” was corrected to “Greek in
culture, Roman by political descent.”
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C HAPTER 3. BACKGROUND - INDUCED ITERATION STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . 71

3.8. Projecta with measurable cofinality . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 99

C HAPTER 4. M ORE MICE AND ITERATION TREES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 103

C HAPTER 5. S OME PROPERTIES OF INDUCED STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . 203

C HAPTER 6. N ORMALIZING STACKS OF ITERATION TREES . . . . . . . . . . . . 221

C HAPTER 7. S TRATEGIES THAT CONDENSE AND NORMALIZE WELL . . . 293

C HAPTER 8. C OMPARING ITERATION STRATEGIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 345

8.3. Resurrection embeddings as branch embeddings . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 357

C HAPTER 9. F INE STRUCTURE FOR THE LEAST BRANCH HIERARCHY . . 391

1.1. Large cardinals and the consistency strength hierarchy

a hierarchy linearly ordered by consistency strength, and calibrated by the large

1.2. I NNER MODEL THEORY 3

1.2. Inner model theory

the most well-known target being models satisfying “there is a supercompact

≤con ZFC+ “there is a strongly compact cardinal”.

1.3. M ICE AND ITERATION STRATEGIES 5

1.3. Mice and iteration strategies

The consistency strength of T is determined by the minimal mouse M having a

1.4. HOD in models of determinacy

1.4. HOD IN MODELS OF DETERMINACY 7

of HOD in determinacy models is well-determined, not subject to the vagaries of

1.5. Least branch hod pairs

1.6. C OMPARISON AND THE MOUSE PAIR ORDER 9

1.6. Comparison and the mouse pair order

D EFINITION 1.6.2. Let Σ be an iteration strategy for a premouse M; then Σ has

premice Q and R, Q R iff the hierarchy of Q is an initial segment of that of R.

1.6. C OMPARISON AND THE MOUSE PAIR ORDER 11

D EFINITION 1.6.3. Let Σ be an iteration strategy for a premouse M. We say

(2) (S, Ω) (R, Λ) and Q-to-S does not drop.

1.7. Hod pair capturing

known as pullback consistency. It follows from strong hull condensation.

1.8. C ONSTRUCTING MOUSE PAIRS 13

1.8. Constructing mouse pairs

1.9. T HE COMPARISON ARGUMENT 15

and Σ ∈ Γ ∩ Γ̌. Let C be a background construction done in N ∗ of the appropriate

1.9. The comparison argument

There is no need to decide what to do if one encounters a strategy disagreement,

1.10. P LAN OF THE BOOK 17

F IGURE 1.9.1. Proof of (*)(P, Σ). Wb is a psuedo-hull of i∗b (T ).

1.10. Plan of the book

2.1. Extenders and ultrapowers

Our notation for extenders is standard.

[17] and [18].

2.2. P URE EXTENDER PREMICE 21

k(i( f )(a)) = j( f )(a).

2.2. Pure extender premice

Fuchs in [11] and [10].

2.2. P URE EXTENDER PREMICE 23

F IGURE 2.2.1. E is on the coherent sequence of M, κ =

(a) π is weakly elementary iff π is the n-completion of π M n , and π M n : M n →