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OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 21/3/2019, SPi
A Treatise on
Northern Ireland
Volume 1: Colonialism
B R E N D A N O ’ LEARY
1
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3
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First Edition published in 2019
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To Lori Salem
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Contents: Volume 1
List of Figures xi
List of Maps xiii
List of Tables xv
List of Boxes xvii
Abbreviations and Glossary xix
Terminology xxix
Introduction 1
National and Ethnic Conflict and the Daily Recognition of Identities 9
History and Northern Ireland 17
Plan of the Volumes 21
Concepts and Methods 23
1.1. An Audit of Violence after 1966 27
The Spatial Distribution of Political Death 30
The Comparative Scale of the Conflict: “Troubles” or “War”? 37
The Combatants and their Victims 47
The Combatants: Republicans, Loyalists, and UK Security Forces 52
Forms of Killing 74
Trends in Deaths 1969–1990 versus 1991–2012 75
Victims and Responsibilities for Deaths 82
Injuries, Explosions, Shootings, Robberies, Intimidation, Incarcerations,
and Dirty War 90
Among Other Costs 97
Appendix 1.1.1: Different DataBases on Killings in Northern Ireland 103
1.2. Conceptual Conspectus: Colonialism 106
Definitions and Applications 108
Purposes and Types 118
Godly Matters 121
Internal Colonialism 123
The Dependent Kingdom Thesis: A False Alternative 125
Ruling Indirectly to Contain Nationalism 126
A Normal Ancien Régime? 127
The Union without Union 133
Marxism and Colonialism in Ireland 136
“Postcolonialists” and Colonialism 138
Bonn and Composite Colonialism in Ireland 139
On the Alternative 141
The Persistence and Vicissitudes of Settler Colonial Ideologies in Ulster 142
What was Wrong with Colonialism and how it was Remedied 144
1.3. Wild and Bitter Fruits and Royal Pains: Colonial Triangles
and Trilemmas, 1603–1800 146
Slow and Incomplete Penetration 149
Planting Ulster 156
The Rising of 1641 and the Catholic Confederacy 172
The Confederation of Kilkenny 178
Cromwell’s Moment and its Aftermath 181
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Acknowledgments 397
Notes 403
Bibliography 435
Index of Names 483
General Index 497
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VOLUME 1: COLONIALISM
THE SHACKLES OF THE STATE AND
HEREDITARY ANIMOSITIES
List of Figures xi
List of Maps xiii
List of Tables xv
List of Boxes xvii
Abbreviations and Glossary xix
Terminology xxix
Introduction 1
1.1. An Audit of Violence after 1966 27
1.2. Conceptual Conspectus: Colonialism 106
1.3. Wild and Bitter Fruits and Royal Pains: Colonial
Triangles and Trilemmas, 1603–1800 146
1.4. Overlooked by the Tall Kingdom before Dying of Political
Economy: Ireland under the Union, 1801–1857 217
1.5. Crying Aloud for Vengeance and the Power of a Colonial Caste:
Toward Union’s End, 1858–1914 263
1.6. “ ’Twas better to die ’neath an Irish sky, than at Suvla, or
Sud-El-Bar”: Revolution and Counter-Revolution, 1914–1922 311
1.7. Scratches across the Heart: Comparing Ireland’s Partition 370
Acknowledgments 397
Notes 403
Bibliography 435
Index of Names 483
General Index 497
VOLUME 2: CONTROL
THE SECOND PROTESTANT ASCENDANCY
AND THE IRISH STATE
Acknowledgments 197
Notes 203
Bibliography 219
Index of Names 239
General Index 246
Notes 365
Acknowledgments 391
Bibliography 397
Index of Names 429
General Index 439
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List of Figures
1.1.1. Places people were killed in the region, the Isles and the EU, 1969–2001 30
1.1.2. The distribution of killings in Belfast, 1966–2003 31
1.1.3. Two-way plot of killings (1969–2001) by parliamentary constituencies
as of 1997, and percentage of constituency voting for nationalist parties
in the Westminster elections of 2001 33
1.1.4. The first war: The triangle of ethno-national combat, 1969–1989 48
1.1.5. The second war: The killing of civilians, 1969–1989 49
1.1.6. The two wars, 1969–1989 50
1.1.7. The republican reading of the war, 1969–1989 51
1.1.8. The annual and cumulative death toll from political violence, 1969–1990 75
1.1.9. The annual and cumulative death toll from political violence, 1991–2012 77
1.1.10. The civilian annual death toll from political violence, 1966–2003 77
1.1.11(a). Escalation: Civilians killed, 1966–1976 78
1.1.11(b). Containment: Civilians killed, 1977–1986 78
1.1.11(c). Peace process: Civilians killed, 1987–2003 79
1.1.12. Armed agents responsible for deaths, 1969–1989 (IIP), 1969–2001
(Sutton), and 1966–2003 (Lost Lives) 85
1.1.13. Status of victims, 1969–1989 (IIP) and 1966–2003 (Lost Lives) 85
1.1.14. Estimates of the success of armed agents in killing their intended
targets, and their responsibilities for civilian deaths, 1969–1989 (IIP) 88
1.1.15. Data on related violence, with five-year trend lines, 1969–2011 91
1.1.16. Conflict-related injuries, 1990–2011 92
1.1.17(a). Loyalist and republican paramilitary-style attacks, shootings, 1991–2012 95
1.1.17(b). Loyalist and republican paramilitary-style attacks, assaults, 1991–2012
(assaults) 95
1.1.18. Northern Ireland prison population, 1967–2012 97
1.3.1. Two centuries of colonial land confiscation 186
1.4.1. Population growth and decline in the Isles, 1801–1921 220
1.4.1.A. Distribution of Americans who identify as “Irish,” by religion and
region, 1990–2000 260
1.5.1. The underrepresentation of Catholics in the secular professions
in Ireland, 1861–1911 273
1.5.2(a). Timeline of franchise reform in the four nations, 1793–1884 284
1.5.2(b). Timeline of franchise reform in Great Britain and Ireland, 1898–1969 284
1.5.3. Borough enfranchisement rates, four nations of the UK, 1868 288
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List of Maps
List of Tables
List of Boxes
CnP Clann na Poblachta, party formed by Sean McBride in the belief that FF
had ceased to be a proper republican party
cess originally any local tax, but in Ireland also the levying of soldiers and
provisions, or the billeting of soldiers
CLRNI Campaign for Labour Representation in Northern Ireland.
condominium political entity over which two or more states share sovereignty
confederation states unified by treaty for certain public functions, but that retain their
sovereignty, international identity, and usually rights of secession and
veto
consociation political system used to share governmental power proportionally
between divided peoples—in the executive, the legislature, and public
employment, including security forces; each community enjoys cultural
autonomy, and public expenditure may be allocated on a proportional
basis; in strong consociations the organized communities enjoy veto
rights over major legislation
Continuity IRA breakaway organization from the IRA
covenanters Scottish Presbyterians who wanted the Scottish system of church
government applied throughout Scotland, England, and Ireland; in 1643
a treaty with the English parliament appeared to give them what they
wanted (The Solemn League and Covenant)
CRC Community Relations Council
CRF Catholic Reaction Force—see INLA
CSJ Campaign for Social Justice, founded in 1960s; became part of NICRA
Cumann (Irish) Irish women’s republican organization
na mBan
Cumann na (Irish) pro-treaty party formed from Sinn Féin, which led governments
nGaedhael of the Irish Free State from 1922 until 1932; later dissolved into Fine
Gael; sometimes spelled Cumman na nGaedheal
DAAD Direct Action Against Drugs (IRA front)
Dáil Éireann (Irish) “trans. Assembly of Ireland,” the official name for the lower
house of the Irish parliament (Oireachtas)
devolution act of creating a subcentral government with executive and legislative
powers inside a state; the institutions are constituted by a delegated (and
revocable) act of the political center
DEA Department of External Affairs of the IFS, later the DFA of Ireland
DFA Department of Foreign Affairs (Ireland), today the Department of
Foreign Affairs and Trade
DFM Deputy First Minister
DL Democratic Left, a party formed in 1992 from a split in the Workers’
Party, now absorbed by the Irish Labour Party–some say it was a takeover
dominions originally the partly self-governing (white) settlement colonies of the
British Empire; evolved in the 1920s into sovereign states of the British
Commonwealth of Nations
DPPB District Policing Partnership Boards
DRs Dissident Republicans, expression and abbreviation used by the PSNI
and MI5 to refer to post-IRA republican organizations that remain
actively engaged in what they define as armed struggle
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PR proportional representation
PRONI Public Records Office Northern Ireland
PSF Provisional Sinn Féin
PSI Policy Studies Institute (London)
PSNI Police Service of Northern Ireland
PTA Prevention of Terrorism Act
PUP Progressive Unionist Party, political wing of the UVF
QUB Queen’s University Belfast
R&D research and development
Republican an advocate of a unified Ireland in a republic free of the British Crown;
an advocate of the thesis that there should be one Irish nation—
composed of its diverse multiple components—in which all share a
common citizenship
Republican see OIRA
Clubs
RHC Red Hand Commandos, name used by the UVF
RHD Red Hand Defenders, name used by the LVF and the UDA after 1998
RHI Renewable Heating Initiative
RIC Royal Irish Constabulary
RIR Royal Irish Regiment (regiment of the British Army created from the
merger of the UDR with the Royal Irish Rangers)
R-IRA Real IRA, breakaway from the IRA in 1997, which does not recognize
either Ireland’s or Northern Ireland’s legitimacy
RLP Republican Labour Party
RSF Republican Sinn Féin, breakaway from Sinn Féin in 1986, which does
not recognize either Ireland’s or Northern Ireland’s legitimacy
RTÉ Raidió Teilifís Éireann (Ireland’s public broadcaster, of both radio and
television)
RUC Royal Ulster Constabulary
SE Saor Éire, left-wing republican grouping of the 1930s, revived briefly in
1969–71
Saorstát Éireann (Irish) Irish Free State, name of dominion status for Ireland agreed in
the Anglo-Irish Treaty and named as such in the first Constitution of
Ireland established under that Treaty
SAA Saint Andrews Agreement, reached in Scotland in October 2006
between the Governments of Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great
Britain and Northern Ireland, and tacitly agreed by Northern Ireland’s
major political parties. Key elements included a change in the method of
electing the First and Deputy First Ministers, the full acceptance of the
Police Service of Northern Ireland by Sinn Féin, the restoration of the
Northern Ireland Assembly and a promise to abolish its Suspension Act
by the British government, and a commitment by the DUP to power-
sharing with republicans and nationalists in the Northern Ireland
Executive. The plan envisaged the devolution of policing and justice
powers within two years of the restoration of the executive
SACHR Standing Advisory Commission on Human Rights
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SDLP Social Democratic and Labour Party of Northern Ireland, party formed
in 1970 from the merger of civil-rights activists, labor activists, and
former members of the Nationalist Party and the National Democratic
Party
SF Sinn Féin (Irish; lit. “Ourselves”). Irish Republican political party,
though originally formed in 1905 by Arthur Griffith and others to
advocate a common monarchy presiding over independent British and
Irish parliaments (modeled on the dual monarchy of Austro-Hungary).
Radicalized as a republican (anti-monarchical) party in 1917, and after.
It split during the making of the 1921 Treaty and the Irish civil war; and
later after the formation of Fianna Fáil; it split again into Provisional
and Official Sinn Féin in 1969–70; later, Provisional Sinn Féin’s claim to
the title Sinn Féin was uncontested. The party is organized in Northern
Ireland and Ireland
sheriff royal official within a shire (or county)
SHA Stormont House Agreement (2014)
Stormont the site of the Northern Ireland Parliament in a suburb of Belfast from
1932 to 1972, of the Northern Ireland Assembly of 1973–4 and 1982–6,
and of the Northern Ireland Assembly since 1998
STV single transferable vote, a preferential and proportional candidate-based
voting system, in which more than one candidate is elected in a district,
and in which the winners normally have to achieve a quota
Tánaiste (Irish) literally successor to the chief, whence the title of Ireland’s
Deputy Prime Minister
Taoiseach (Irish) Chief, whence the title of the prime minister in Ireland’s
constitution of 1937
TCD Trinity College, Dublin University
TD Teachta Dála (Irish), deputy elected to Dáil Éireann, equivalent to
MP in the UK or Member of Congress in the USA
TRNC Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (so-called)
TUV Traditional Unionist Voice, a party formed by James Allister that
broke from the DUP after the DUP formed a government with
Sinn Féin 2007
UCC University College Cork
UCD University College Dublin
UCG University College Galway
UDF Ulster Defence Force
UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters
Ulster Clubs Loyalist organization formed in response to the AIA of 1985
UCDC Ulster Constitution Defence Committee (see also UPV)
UDA Ulster Defence Association, largest loyalist paramilitary organization
UDI unilateral declaration of independence
UDP Ulster Democratic Party, political party of the UDA
UDR Ulster Defence Regiment, formed in 1970, dissolved into the RIR in
1992
UFF Ulster Freedom Fighters, killing component of the UDA
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Terminology
¹ See, e.g., Conor Cruise O’Brien (1974); Bew et al. (1996: 21 ff.); David Fitzpatrick (1998). These
authors obtained Ph.Ds in history, but this matter is not disciplinary; it is simply mistaken usage.
Northern Ireland has never been a state according to any standard definition; see, e.g., the work of
Nicholas Mansergh (1936: 16, 108, 149), who emphasized that Northern Ireland was not sovereign, had
no constituent power, was a devolved rather than a federative entity, and was (when he wrote) wholly
subject to having its status altered by the Westminster parliament. The Stormont regime had attributes
fairly described as those of a “quasi-state,” but a quasi-state, no matter how quasi, is not a state. In this
respect I agree with Brendan Clifford (2011).
² See Stepan et al. (2011); see also Vol. 3, Ch. 5, pp. 202–04.
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xxx Terminology
³ Brittany had been “Little Britain,” in contrast with “Great Britain,” before the latter became the
name of the unified kingdoms of Scotland and England (Hay 1955–6: 55–66).
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Terminology xxxi
administration before 1920 or to the government and territory of the Irish Free
State, Éire, and the Republic of Ireland, the latter three of which have so far been
coextensive. Sometimes sovereign Ireland is used for clarity to describe the state.
Terminological exactitude imposes further norms. “The Isles” here refers to
Great Britain and Ireland, and their respective territorial waters and islands. “The
British Isles” is a tendentious expression.⁴ Ireland is an island behind an island,
but it is not part of the much smaller isles that surround Great Britain (or Britain).
The Romans knew better, and distinguished Hibernia from Britannia, but, alas,
love of Latin has melted like the snows of yesteryear. The expression the “British
archipelago” is avoided, because not all the archipelago is British, and the adjective
“archipelagic,” a term encouraged by a bright historian of ideas from New
Zealand, would occasion pain for readers.⁵ For the same reason I avoid “Atlantic
archipelago.” Try saying “archipelagic” with any variety of an Ulster accent;
“consociational” is much easier.
Capital-letter designations reference formal political membership of an organ-
ization; lower-case designations refer to political disposition or doctrine. Thus
“Nationalist” refers to the Nationalist party, whereas “nationalist” refers to an Irish
nationalist who may not have been a member of the Nationalist party. Most
unionists are British nationalists, but to avoid confusion and unnecessary debate
they are called unionists, and labeled Irish, Ulster, or British unionists, as required.
Irish unionists wanted all of Ireland to remain within the Union with Great
Britain; Ulster unionists focused on keeping Ulster within the Union, and settled
for Northern Ireland, which they renamed as Ulster without the consent of their
opponents; while British unionists once wanted to keep Ireland or Ulster in
Union, and now simply want to keep Northern Ireland in the Union—and
Scotland, Wales, and England. “Unionist” with a capital U refers to one of the
parties that bears this name, whereas a “unionist” refers to those who wish to
preserve the Union.
“Republicans” are Irish nationalists who advocate a secular, united, and inde-
pendent island of Ireland, free of the Crown and Government and Parliament of
Great Britain. Not all Irish republicans are pacifists; but only some have been
militarist, and none are monarchists. There are patriots of the state of Ireland who
have no wish to see Irish reunification who also describe themselves as repub-
licans, but others rarely describe them as such.
“Loyalists” are loyal to the British Crown. Typically, they are “ultras”—that is,
more loyal to the loyalist community than toward the relevant Majesty’s Govern-
ment. There were Irish and there are Ulster loyalists—they often call Northern
Ireland Ulster.
Catholic and Protestant are not synonyms for nationalist and unionist, though
there has been and there remains a very significant correlation between religion of
origin and political belief.
⁴ This is to follow Norman Davies (1999), whose excellent book has a few mistakes, not surprisingly
given its ambitious scope—e.g., it implies that the pro-treaty party was defeated in the Irish civil war
(p. 905).
⁵ See, e.g., J. G. A. Pocock (2005).
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xxxii Terminology
Terminology xxxiii
refer to insurgents. But, when “terrorist” or its cognates are used here, it is usually
because the views of the official authorities are being reported, or those of political
parties opposed to particular uses of violence. These terms, however, are also used
when it is plain that organizations, official or unofficial, have deliberately targeted
violence against civilian non-combatants. That reflects my belief that the term
terrorism should properly be confined to the tactic of those who deliberately kill
non-combatants—as loyalists frequently did, and as republicans, soldiers, and
police officers sometimes did in late-twentieth-century Northern Ireland. There is,
however, no consensus on this subject.⁹ The data reviewed in Volume 1,
Chapter 1, show that loyalist paramilitaries killed more civilians deliberately—as
a proportion of the total number of killings for which they were responsible after
1966—than either republicans or the UK’s security forces. On the preceding
definitions, they were therefore proportionally the most terroristic of the organ-
izations in the recent conflict. This logical conclusion is not, however, one that
loyalists or unionists are likely to embrace, and, upon absorbing these syllogisms,
some loyalists (and unionists) may be inclined to cease reading any further.
The use of the term “paramilitaries” instead of “terrorists” does not indicate,
and should not be construed to mean, any tacit support for any paramilitary
organization in the Isles, past or present; it is, simply, a more accurate and helpful
description than the available alternatives. The usage may be misunderstood by
specialists on Latin America, who describe paramilitaries as right wing and pro-
regime, and guerrillas as left wing and insurgent. Paramilitaries in Northern
Ireland were unauthorized and unlawful combatants; loyalists were pro-regime
and pro-state, and sometimes cooperated with government intelligence agencies
and the police, but their members were not invariably right wing; republicans
were anti-regime, and insurgent, and, though generally left wing, they were not
always so, and not all of their violent or forceful actions took the form of guerrilla
warfare. Experts in the ways of Northern Ireland may now think they know all of
what is to follow, but they are invited, along with others who claim no such
expertise, to read on.
The ship wherein Theseus and the youth of Athens returned had thirty oars,
and was preserved by the Athenians down even to the time of Demetrius
Phalereus, for they took away the old planks as they decayed, putting in new
and stronger timber in their place, inasmuch that this ship became a standing
example among the philosophers for the logical question of things that grow;
one side holding that the ship remained the same, and the other contending
that it was not the same.
Plutarch’s Life of Theseus, second century CE
Sedulo curavi, humanas actiones non ridere, non lugere, neque detestari, sed
intelligere
I have labored carefully, not to ridicule, or detest, but to understand.
Baruch Spinoza, A Political Treatise
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Introduction
Great Britain’s formation of Northern Ireland in 1920, out of the six counties of
Antrim, Down, Armagh, Londonderry, Fermanagh, and Tyrone, led to new
political antagonisms, and modified older divisions. The overt antagonism that
animated the new place was simple. British and Ulster unionists insisted that all of
Northern Ireland should remain exclusively part of the Union of Great Britain
and Northern Ireland under the sovereignty of the Crown and Westminster
parliament, whereas Irish nationalists, by contrast, insisted it should immediately,
or eventually, join an all-island Irish nation-state, unitary, federal, or confederal,
and preferably a republic. The political aims of nationalists and unionists seemed
mutually exclusive, “zero-sum”—that is, they could not cooperate because what
one would gain the other would exactly lose. Mutually exclusive and intensely felt
national aspirations helped generate the conflict that marked Northern Ireland off
in the late twentieth century as “a place apart”¹ within the peaceable polities of
democratic western Europe. Outsiders alleged that local minds were narrower
than Belfast’s backstreet terraces in 1969, their quarrels barely disturbed by the
small numbers who claimed not to belong to the two principal protagonists: the
Oxford English Dictionary used to record “bad-temper” and “illogicality” as
definitions of “Irish.”² Renewed violence in the Basque lands before and after
General Franco’s death, and in Yugoslavia a decade after the death of Marshal
Tito, forced the belated recognition that Northern Ireland was not unique, even in
western Europe, but part of the world’s large set of unresolved “national ques-
tions,” though it was not just that. Before 1998 no regime had emerged with
widespread support among both the British unionist and primarily Protestant,
¹ The phrase became a book (Dervla Murphy 1979). ² Eagleton (1999: 17).
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2 Volume 1: Colonialism
and the Irish nationalist and predominantly Catholic, communities, who composed
most of the region’s population.
The key animating antagonism between nationalists and unionists did not begin
in 1920, though it had acquired a new form. With qualifications to be supplied, two
distinct communities, originally three, differentiated by national identity, ethni-
city, and religion of origin, had already lived on “narrow ground” for over three
centuries, sometimes cheek by jowl.c The most recent phase of violent conflict
began in the summer of 1966, when two young Irish Catholic men, John Patrick
Scullion, a 28-year-old storeman, and Peter Ward, an 18-year-old bartender, who
had served in the British Army, were deliberately shot on the streets of Belfast.³
Scullion was shot on May 27 and died on June 11.⁴ In what became known as “the
Malvern Street murder,” Ward was shot and died instantly on June 26, and two of
three Catholic friends in his company were seriously wounded. The day after
Ward’s death, Matilda Gould, a Protestant widow aged 77, died of her injuries
sustained on May 7, when her home had been mistakenly fire-bombed instead of
an immediately adjacent Catholic-owned bar and off-license. John Scullion and
Peter Ward were the first to die as “representative targets” of loyalist paramilitar-
ies, while Matilda Gould was the first to die as loyalist “collateral damage.”d
Slogans had been daubed on the premises next to her home. They included:
“This house is owned by a Taig—Popehead—Remember 1690.”⁵ “Taig,” or “Teague,”
the plural is “Taigs,” or “Teagues,” is a derogatory name for Irish Catholics.⁶
Abbreviated slogans such as KAT, “Kill All Taigs,” or ATWD, “Any Taig Will
Do” (that is, for assassination), are still written on walls, and accompany loyalist
July 12 bonfires, which annually light the night skies to commemorate the victory
of the Dutch Protestant William, Prince of the House of Orange (William III), over
the British Catholic King James II of the House of Stuart at the Battle of the Boyne
in 1690. The first named was both nephew and son-in-law of the second, and the
great-grandson of James I. “Popehead” does not need to be glossed.
The unfortunate Scullion, Ward, and Gould were killed by members of the
loyalist Ulster Volunteer Force (UVF), in which Augustus (“Gusty”) Spence was
then a principal leader.⁷ He became a hero in the overwhelmingly Protestant
Shankill Road area of Belfast, though in the 1990s he would be a significant player
in a generally successful peace process. The UVF’s name recalled an army with the
same title, of doubtful legality, which had spearheaded the armed resistance of
Ulster’s Protestant population to the idea of “home rule” for Ireland in the second
decade of the twentieth century. Its founding members, later battle-hardened in
³ The year 1966 is the starting date for Lost Lives, the most exhaustive and reliable published
catalogue of those who died in the recent conflict (McKittrick et al. 2004); in contrast, an earlier book
erroneously attributed the first assassinations in the recent conflict to the IRA (Dillon and Lehane 1973: 25).
⁴ He was wrongly reported as having been stabbed (by the police), an account which still gets
reported as fact (e.g. J. Bowyer Bell 1993: 53). An autopsy conducted after the exhumation of his
remains confirmed that he had been shot (McKittrick et al. 2004: 25).
⁵ McKittrick et al. (2004: 28). An off-license is a liquor store.
⁶ Its provenance is widely attributed to the anti-Jacobite song ‘Lillibulero’, which once provided the
signature tune of the BBC World Service: it opens with “Ho, brother Teague, does hear the decree?”
⁷ Augustus Andrew Spence (1933–2011) was a former solider in the Ulster Rifles division of the
British Army who had served as a sergeant in the British military police in Germany and Cyprus; he
always denied he had murdered Ward.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/2/2019, SPi
Introduction 3
the First World War, had formed the toughest core of special police units used to
establish unionist control of Northern Ireland. The old UVF had feared that the
Westminster parliament would create an all-island parliament encompassing all
of Ulster. In 1966 the new UVF feared that Irish Catholics were still determined to
abolish Northern Ireland. Earlier that year street disturbances had ensued from
demonstrations in Belfast led by the Free Presbyterian minister, the Revd Dr Ian
Kyle Paisley.e He was protesting against the raising of flags to recognize the fiftieth
anniversary celebrations of the Irish Rising of 1916. These celebrations, confined
to Irish nationalists, recalled the insurrection of a faction of the Irish Volunteers
(Óglaigh na hÉireann) who had named themselves the Irish Republican Army
(IRA) on Easter Monday 1916. These Volunteers had been raised in response to
the formation of the UVF, to defend the establishment of home rule in arms—
and, for some, to establish Ireland’s independence.f
For many contemporary loyalists and unionists, however, the most recent
violent conflict did not begin in 1966, but rather in 1956, when the IRA launched
a campaign of guerrilla warfare, on the border of Northern Ireland, called
“Operation Harvest.” Its goal was the reunification of the island of Ireland into
one sovereign and independent republic. The military campaign failed, quickly,
and humiliatingly for the IRA, but dragged on before it was concluded in 1962.
Less than twenty people died in “the border war,” partly because the IRA had
initially avoided targeting the UVF’s successors in the special police units, and had
avoided armed conflict in Belfast, Northern Ireland’s largest and capital city.⁸ In
1966 loyalists had not forgotten this IRA insurrection. They sometimes heard
Irish Catholics singing Seán South from Garryowen in the 1960s and 1970s, a
tribute to an IRA volunteer from Limerick in the south of Ireland who had died in
an armed attack on Brookeborough police barracks in county Fermanagh on New
Year’s Eve 1956. Alongside him died Fergal O’Hanlon, memorialized in another
and very different song, The Patriot Game, written by Dominic Behan. Know-
ledgeable locals know that Seán South from Garryowen is sung to the same tune as
Roddy McCorley, a nineteenth-century ballad that commemorates the execution
of a young United Irishman. A Presbyterian from Duneane, McCorley’s family
had been evicted from their farm. He joined the United Irishmen in the mass
rebellion of 1798. In hiding after their defeat, he was betrayed, brought before a
court-martial in Ballymena, county Antrim, and hung near the Bridge of Toome,
across the River Bann that splits Ulster in two, on Good Friday 1799.g
It is easy to link collective memories over political Irish deaths, places, and dates.
Deaths: Seán South regarded himself as a descendant of the United Irishmen.
Fergal O’Hanlon considered himself the reincarnation of Redmond O’Hanlon, a
seventeenth-century south Armagh outlaw. Places: The River Bann divides North-
ern Ireland, geographically and electorally. To the west, nationalists now win a
majority of the seats and votes, in any form of election; to the east, unionists win
a majority of the seats and votes available, except in Belfast. Ballymena, east of the
Bann, had become the largest town in Ian Paisley’s constituency when he was elected
⁸ One explanation emphasizes that the IRA’s leaders feared triggering sectarian conflict in Belfast;
another emphasizes the disorganization of the Belfast IRA after the arrest of its commanding officer
(Robert W. White 2006: 58).
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/2/2019, SPi
4 Volume 1: Colonialism
⁹ Deutsch and Magowan (1973: 16). The explosion was certainly the work of loyalists, damaging a
monument to a Protestant republican; it was most likely the work of the UVF, which in these years also
attacked republican monuments to Daniel O’Connell and Wolfe Tone in Dublin and Bodenstown
respectively.
¹⁰ A lucid exegesis of the “Proclamation of the Provisional Government of the Irish Republic” may
be found in de Paor (1997).
¹¹ The Irish name (pronounced Shin Fain) means “Our Selves,” or “Our Selves Alone,” emphasizing
the goal of independence.
Introduction 5
constitution at that juncture (it was then embedded in the British North America
Act as an Act of the Westminster, not the Ottawa, parliament). Ireland’s status
was not that of a fully sovereign state, such as that enjoyed by the north American
republic that successfully revolted from Great Britain.
The Irish Free State would, however, soon weaken the role of the Crown (that is,
the symbols and form of UK legal authority and statehood) in its institutions, and
establish the marks of full sovereignty. Together with the Dominions of Canada,
South Africa, Australia, New Zealand, and Newfoundland, the Irish Free State
ensured the passage of the Statute of Westminster in 1931, which gave effect to the
agreements of Imperial Conferences of the Dominions of 1926 and 1930. In the
Statute, “the mother of parliaments” renounced its rights to legislate for the States
of the Commonwealth, including the Irish Free State. Predicting its passage,
the Irish Minister of External Relations, Patrick McGilligan, declared to Dáil
Éireann: “The States of the Commonwealth [now] control the Crown and the
prerogatives of the Crown absolutely.” His government had achieved its “one
purpose . . . [in entering the negotiations] that there must be uprooted from the
whole system of this State the British Government.”¹² The British government had
hoped to exclude the Irish Free State from the Statute of Westminster.
Later, in 1937, under the premiership of Éamon de Valera, who had resigned
from office rather than accept the treaty signed by those whom he had appointed
as negotiators in 1921, the Irish Free State abolished itself, and established the
Constitution of Ireland. It did so without British supervision or approval. Ratified
in a referendum, the new constitution substituted a president for the King and
Governor-General, and confined recognition of the Crown to the headship of the
Commonwealth. Ireland was now a republic in all but name—its head of state was a
president, and its new constitution, which declared its formal sovereignty and
independence, had been drafted solely by its officials and ratified by its parliament
and people. In 1939 Ireland, as it was now named in English by its constitution,
renegotiated the return of the treaty ports, and the withdrawal of all British military
forces from its soil. In the Second World War Ireland declared itself neutral, thereby
confirming its full independence in foreign policy. Later, a multi-party coalition
under Taoiseach (Irish for chief, and used for prime minister) John A Costello,
officially declared Ireland a republic in an act passed in December 1948, which took
effect the following April, which led to its departure from the British Commonwealth:
at that stage British governments insisted republics could not be members of the
Commonwealth, a position almost immediately reversed with India’s independence.i
The Irish Free State came into existence with an even more profound constraint
on its sovereignty. Under the terms of the treaty, it was obliged to permit another
new entity, Northern Ireland, to secede from it, if the Belfast parliament—
established by law in December 1920 and which first sat in June 1921—chose to
do so. Northern Ireland could thereby rejoin the United Kingdom, or remain
within it, depending upon the preferred constitutional framing of permitted
events. More bluntly put, the treaty obliged Ireland to accept the partition of the
island that the UK Parliament had unilaterally legislated in 1920 in the Govern-
ment of Ireland Act, without the consent of any Irish MPs—thereby acting as
6 Volume 1: Colonialism
Great Britain, not Great Britain and Ireland. In the unionist understanding, the
Irish Free State seceded from the Union. In the nationalist view, Great Britain
partitioned Ireland, and forced Sinn Féin’s negotiators to allow the newly created
Northern Ireland to secede from Ireland—the treaty violated Ireland’s territorial
integrity. The textual evidence supports both perspectives.
The Irish negotiators had sought to keep all of Ulster within Ireland. The British
government refused, however, as it put it, “to coerce Ulster,” by which it meant the
Protestant majority in four of the nine counties of the north-east of the historic
province, and the Protestant minority in two other counties appended to these
four to create “Northern” Ireland. Great Britain was wholly willing to coerce to
preserve its formation of Northern Ireland. But Ulster, however defined or
redefined, was not homogeneous, and the treaty made provision for a Boundary
Commission to adjust the border of Northern Ireland if the latter’s parliament
opted out of the Irish Free State. This Commission was later formed, but its report
was not only not implemented; it was never officially published.
The new UVF of 1966 restarted killing to keep Northern Ireland within the
Union—at least that was how it defended its activities. In extreme form, its
volunteers re-expressed the insecurity that had marked both Northern Ireland’s
founding elite and its unionist followers. The new entity had not looked certain to
survive its statutory birth in 1920. The streets of its new capital, Belfast, ran with
blood in 1920 and in 1922, after pogroms initiated against Catholics led to
extensive inter-communal killings.j The newly formed majority feared territorial
reduction through the Boundary Commission, and eventual absorption into a
reunited Ireland.
In the two years after the murders of 1966 further street disturbances accom-
panied demonstrations demanding full civil rights. These marches were mostly
composed of and led by Northern Irish Catholics, though they were leavened by
Protestant and secular radicals who believed it was past time for cultural Catholics
to be treated as equal citizens of the Union, and of Northern Ireland. The peaceful
civil-rights movement was met with Ulster loyalist and quasi-official state vio-
lence. Police and auxiliary police (“B Specials”) beat up civil-rights marchers;
some marches had been banned. The police and the B Specials were responsible
for seven of the first eight deaths in 1969, the year most believe the current conflict
began.¹³ These events encouraged a sustained new campaign of republican vio-
lence led by the IRA. It was matched by loyalist campaigns, which had preceded it,
if conflict initiation is dated to 1966, but not if it is marked as 1956. In place of
1966 unionists might insist on 1916, or 1867, or 1641. In place of either 1966 or
1956 republicans might insist on 1912, or 1798, or 1649, or 1609—some might
fixate on 1169. Each side has an arsenal of precisely dated arguments. But, in the
recent period, “the loyalist backlash,” unofficial in the UVF, or official but
unauthorized in the ranks of the police, including the B Specials, preceded the
formation of the Provisional IRA. The first killer combatants and bombers in the
recent conflict were members of the UVF.k
¹³ In July 1969, the RUC and RUC Reserve were responsible for the deaths of Francis McCloskey in
Dungiven, and Samuel Devenney in Derry; on August 14, 1969, they were responsible for the deaths of
Patrick Rooney, a child, in Belfast, and Samuel McLarnon, Michael Lynch, John Gallagher, and Hugh
McCabe, all adults. These persons were Catholics.
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 19/2/2019, SPi
Introduction 7
8 Volume 1: Colonialism
republicans and Ulster unionists, ratified by the British and Irish governments,
was published as “the Hillsborough Agreement.” In this text, two political
parties, Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionists, briskly explained that they
would in future jointly manage the administration of justice in the North—that
is, the courts—jointly oversee recently reformed policing institutions, and agree
joint mechanisms for the management and resolution of disputes over public
parades and flags. The Hillsborough Agreement of 2010 was made nearly
twenty-five years after another agreement signed at Hillsborough, the Anglo-
Irish Agreement of 1985. It marked—what was expected by many to be—the
final implementation of the 1998 Agreement. Together with the Stormont House
Agreement of 2014, and its successor, Fresh Start, it provides the formal end-
point for this book.m
Any judgment on the stability of the novel institutions of the 1998 Agreement,
as modified at St Andrews Golf Club in Scotland in 2006, and confirmed at
Hillsborough in 2010, must remain provisional. They operate within Northern
Ireland, and between Northern Ireland and its neighbors in Ireland and Great
Britain. Key confidence-building measures have been executed. The immediate
future may bring minor modifications, and mutually agreed refurbishments,
but a complete redesign is not likely. Northern Ireland for now largely conforms
to its remarkable Agreement. If this distinctive settlement breaks down, an
inbuilt stabilizer exists, one that concentrated the minds of the Democratic
Unionist Party in 2006–10, and other grave possibilities exist. If the local parties
fail to operate the new institutions, then, in one scenario, Northern Ireland would
become a de facto condominium of Great Britain and Ireland: Great Britain would
keep the livery and the costs of sovereignty, but the two governments would share
responsibility in the standing intergovernmental conference, and would endeavor
to re-create a local power-sharing executive whenever that seemed likely to
endure. Alternatively, the two governments could be more radical, and engineer
Northern Ireland’s internal regionalization, possibly recomposing it into subre-
gions, as foreseen in 2005 when Peter Hain was the UK’s Secretary of State for
Northern Ireland.n
In late 2017, however, the continuation of the 1998 Agreement with the
amendments made in St Andrews Golf Club, or a temporary reversion to direct
rule, seemed to exhaust immediate futures, though that judgment will be signifi-
cantly qualified in the final chapter of Volume 3. That was ten years after the
decision by Ian Paisley, then the leader of the Democratic Unionist Party, to share
the premiership and executive government with Sinn Féin, the party of militant
Irish nationalism, whose leaders claim political descent from the leaders of the
Easter Rising. This was the very same Free Presbyterian minister who just over
forty years earlier had wanted to ban the celebrations of the Easter Rising. His
volte-face lost him the leadership of his church but consolidated Northern Ire-
land’s cold peace, and warmed cross-community relations. Paisley’s decision
made sustained power-sharing viable; his act of statesmanship won him obituary
tributes that would have amazed his followers of 1966.o But shortly after Paisley’s
death, and the resignation of his successor Peter Robinson, a momentous and
unexpected event occurred. A referendum held in the UK produced a narrow
overall majority to leave the European Union, while the people of Northern
Ireland voted to remain. The ramifications of this event will close these volumes.
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[7] This is an instrument through which we can see things much
clearer and larger than we could with the naked eye.
LESSON VI.
DESCRIPTION OF THE EARTH’S SURFACE.—DIVISION OF IT INTO ZONES.—
TORRID, TEMPERATE AND ARCTIC ZONES.—THE FIVE GREAT
CONTINENTS.—RELATIVE DIMENSIONS OF AMERICA, EUROPE, ASIA,
AFRICA AND AUSTRALIA.
§ 32. Having learned the relation of our Earth to the Sun and the
Planets, it will be well to acquaint ourselves with the principal objects
on its surfaces.—What the Interior of our Earth consists of, we have
as yet no idea, because we have not yet been able to penetrate
deeper than a few hundred feet; and this is, in proportion to the
Earth’s Diameter, little more than nothing. But as regards her
surface, we know that it consists partly of land and partly of water.
Little more than one fourth of the Earth’s surface is covered with
land; all the rest is water.—The great lands are called Continents;
the great waters are called Oceans. Smaller portions of land
surrounded on all sides by water, are called Islands. Smaller bodies
of water surrounded by land are called Lakes.
§ 33. The land on our Earth is divided into Five Continents:
America, Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia.—These, however, are
not all of the same extent. Europe is the smallest of them. America
and Asia are the greatest.
The adjoining Plate No. XI, will give you an idea of the proportion of
land and water on our Earth, and of the relative extent of the Five
Continents.
Fig. I represents the surface of the Earth divided into land and
water. Were all land on our Earth put together in a circle, and the
water placed round it, then the land would only fill the inner circle, the
water occupying the surrounding ring, a space nearly four times as
large as the circle. Fig. II, III, IV, V and VI represent the comparative
surfaces of America, Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia. Fig. VII
represents the comparative surface of the Moon.
Upon close inspection of these figures you will perceive;
1. That the extent of America and Asia are nearly equal; but that
each of these Continents is several times larger than either Europe
or Australia.
2. That the next greatest portion of our Globe is Africa, which is
more than three times larger than Europe.
3. That Europe is the smallest Continent of our globe.
4. That the whole surface of the Moon would not be more than
enough to cover either America or Asia.
No. XI.
Fig. 1.
THE OCEAN
THE LAND
Fig. 2.
EUROPE
Fig. 3.
ASIA
Fig. 4.
AFRICA
Fig. 5.
AMERICA
Fig. 6.
AUSTRALIA
Fig 7.
THE MOON’S
SURFACE
Geographical Miles.
No. XII.
Fig. 1.
THE WHOLE TORRID ZONE
Comparative Extent
of the
TWO TEMPERATE
ZONES
Comparative
EXTENT
of the
TWO ARCTIC
ZONES
Fig. 2.
Comparative Extent
of one of the
WHOLE TORRID
ZONE
Fig. 3.
Comparative Extent
of one of the
TWO TEMPERATE
ZONES
Fig. 4.
ONE
of the
ARCTIC
ZONES
Fig. 5.
Comparative Extent
of the
WHOLE LAND
on our
GLOBE
No. XIII.
No. XIV.
Square contents
of the Two
TEMPERATE
ZONES.
Square contents
of the
WHOLE TORRID
ZONE.
Square contents
of the Two
ARCTIC ZONES.
No. XV.
Fig. 1.
Fig. 2.
Fig. 3.
Fig. 4.
Fig. 5.
Fig. 6.
You will observe from a close inspection of these figures, that the
whole extent of land on our globe is nearly equal to that of a
temperate zone; and that if it were possible to unite America,
Europe, Asia, Africa and Australia into one, their united extent would
not yet fill one of the temperate zones! You will also perceive that the
two temperate zones occupy together the greatest portion of the
Earth’s surface, and that the arctic zones occupy comparatively the
smallest.
§ 36. The Five principal parts of our globe, America, Europe, Asia,
Africa and Australia are not equally thickly settled. Europe and Asia
have, in proportion to their extent, the greatest population; America
and Australia the least.—The following Plate, No. XV, shows the
comparative population of these continents.
Fig. I represents the whole surface of land on our globe, inhabited
by nearly One Thousand Millions (One Billion) human beings. If
these were to live throughout as close together as in Europe, then
they would only occupy a surface of land as large in proportion, as
the inner circle marked a. But the two rings, b and c, occupy each as
much surface as the circle a; hence there is yet room for twice as
many human beings; before each quarter of the world is as thickly
settled as Europe.
Fig. II represents Asia and its population. If this quarter were
settled as thickly as Europe is, then its inhabitants would only fill the
inner circle marked b; the ring a, therefore, is still left for settlement.
Fig. III exhibits the population of Africa. If the inhabitants of this
continent lived as close together as those of Europe, they would only
fill the inner circle, marked c, and the surrounding ring might yet be
inhabited.
Fig. IV shows the comparative population of America. Its
inhabitants, crowded together as the inhabitants of Europe, would
only occupy the small circle e; the whole broad ring f, therefore, is
still left for settlement!!
Fig. V represents Australia. Its inhabitants, settled as in Europe,
would only fill the circle a.
Fig. VI represents the population of Europe filling the whole of that
Quarter.
The whole of these Six figures may represent to the pupil the
comparative extents of the five great continents of our globe; but the
inner circles of these figures, and the whole of the sixth figure, show
their comparative populations. From a close inspection of this plate
the pupil may learn:
1. That the population of Asia is yet greater than that of all the rest
of the world. (The circle b in figure II being yet larger than the inner
circles of all the other figures, and figure VI taken together.)
2. That the population of Europe is as yet larger than that of
America, Africa and Australia, taken together.
3. That the population of Africa is larger than the joint populations
of America and Australia.
4. That America if once settled as Europe is, will have more than
Six times her population.
[The teacher, if he think proper to ask the pupils some questions in
reference to the Appendix, will find no difficulty in adapting them to the
capacity of his pupils.]
TABLE I.
Showing the Diameter, Surface, and Cubic Contents of the Sun and
the Planets.
Diameter in Surface in Cubic Contents in
Names. Geographical Geographical Square Geographical Cubic
Miles. Miles. Miles.
Sun, 194,000 118,093,000,000 3,825,903,253,970,000
Mercury, 608 1,161,314 117,659,099
Venus, 1678 8,844,063 2,473,469,743
Earth, 1719 9,282,066 2,659,159,061
Mars, 1006 3,178,805 532,996,317
Vesta, 74 15,000 2,121,347
Juno, 309 282,690 2,355,750
Ceres, 352 389,182 22,832,034
Pallas, 465 650,266 52,886,472
Jupiter, 19566 1,202,280,406 23,533,143,597,631
Saturn, 17263 936,530,620 2,757,547,946,775
Herschel, 7564 173,696,911 1,359,227,438,858
Moon, 480 723,686 51,561,578
TABLE II.
Showing the exact Duration of the Revolutions of the different
Planets round the Sun.
Duration of the Moon’s
Planets. Years. Days. Hours. Min. Sec.
revolution round the Earth.
27 days, 7 hours, 43 minutes,
Mercury, — 87 23 15 44
and 12 seconds.
Venus, — 224 16 49 10
Earth, 1 — 6 9 8
Mars, 1 321 22 18 31
Vesta, 3 225 — — —
Juno, 4 131 10 30 —
Ceres, 4 220 13 4 —
Pallas, 4 221 15 35 —
Jupiter, 11 314 20 39 —
Saturn, 29 166 2 — —
Herschel, 83 266 9 — —
TABLE III.
Showing the Extent and Population of the five great Continents.
Names of the Continents. Extent in Sq. Miles. Population.
America, 14,868,000 40,000,000
Europe, 3,292,000 198,000,000
Asia, 15,000,000 500,000,000
Africa, 11,267,900 150,000,000
Australia, 3,823,200 1,500,000
The United States, 1,781,926 13,000,000
POPULAR
LESSONS IN ASTRONOMY,
ON A NEW PLAN;
IN WHICH
BY FRANCIS J. GRUND,
BOSTON:
CARTER, HENDEE, AND CO.
1833.
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK POPULAR
LESSONS IN ASTRONOMY, ON A NEW PLAN ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions will
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