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INTEREST GROUPS, ADVOCACY
AND DEMOCRACY SERIES
SERIES EDITOR: DARREN HALPIN
Achieving Democracy
Through Interest
Representation
Interest Groups in
Central and Eastern Europe
Patrycja Rozbicka · Paweł Kamiński

Meta Novak · Vaida Jankauskaitė
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series
Series Editor
Darren Halpin
Research School of Social Sciences
Australian National University
Canberra, Australia
The study of interest groups and their role in political life has under-
gone somewhat of a renaissance in recent years. Long standing scholarly
themes such as interest groups influence mobilization, formation, and
‘bias’, are being addressed using new and novel data sets and methods.
There are also new and exciting themes, such as the role of ICTs in
enabling collective action and the growth of global advocacy networks, are
being added. Contemporary debates about the role of commercial lobby-
ists and professionalized interest representation are also highly salient.
Together, they draw an ever larger and broader constituency to the study
of interest groups and advocacy. This series seeks to capture both new
generation studies addressing long standing themes in new ways and
innovate scholarship posing new and challenging questions that emerge
in a rapidly changing world. The series encourages contributions from
political science (but also abutting disciplines such as economics, law,
history, international relations and sociology) that speak to these themes.
It welcomes work undertaken at the level of sub-national, national and
supra-national political systems, and particularly encourages comparative
or longitudinal studies. The series is open to diverse methodologies and
theoretical approaches. The book series will sit alongside and complement
the Interest Groups & Advocacy journal.
More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14850
Patrycja Rozbicka · Paweł Kamiński ·
Meta Novak · Vaida Jankauskaitė
Achieving Democracy
Through Interest
Representation
Interest Groups in Central
and Eastern Europe
Patrycja Rozbicka Paweł Kamiński
School of Social Sciences Polish Academy of Sciences
and Humanities Institute of Political Studies
Aston University Warsaw, Poland
Birmingham, UK
Vaida Jankauskaitė
Meta Novak Faculty of Social Sciences, Arts
Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities
University of Ljubljana Kaunas University of Technology
Ljubljana, Slovenia Kaunas, Lithuania
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series

ISBN 978-3-030-55520-7 ISBN 978-3-030-55521-4 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55521-4
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG, part of Springer Nature 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
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of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
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names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
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tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover illustration: Martin Barraud/Getty Images
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Preface
This book assesses the quality of democracy through the study of orga-
nized interests in post-Communist Central and Eastern Europe (CEE)
from the collapse of the Communism in 1989 up to the 2018. It presents
an in-depth, an empirically grounded study comparing interest groups in
Central and Eastern Europe. Drawing on democratic theory and compar-
ative analysis, the book puts forward an evaluation of the effects of a
legal framework, political and social context, on the interest representa-
tion in the post-Communist era. The book is an important contribution
to debates on the performance of the young democracies in Central and
Eastern Europe, where scholars argue that there is a ‘democratic crisis’
and democratic fatigue while the interest group system is labelled as weak
and, in some cases, underdeveloped. This volume offers a much-needed
comprehensive look into formal interest representation in the CEE coun-
tries, contrasting it with the model of Western democracies. Although
great efforts have been made to deepen our understanding of interest
organization and lobbying tools, the current literature fails to provide
a comprehensive answer on influence of unsupportive environment on
population ecology. The case of CEE countries shows significant effects
v
vi PREFACE
of the political and social contexts on interest representation, stimulating

a debate about the quality of democratic institutions after the collapse of
communism.
Birmingham, UK Patrycja Rozbicka

Warsaw, Poland Paweł Kamiński
Ljubljana, Slovenia Meta Novak
Kaunas, Lithuania Vaida Jankauskaitė
Acknowledgments
We would like to thank following colleagues: Paulina Pośpieszna and

Aleksandra Galus from the Adam Mickiewicz University in Poznan,
Poland, for help in data collection; Patricia Correa Vila, Balázs Szent-
Iványi, Jörg Mathias and Luke John Davies, Aston University, Birm-
ingham, UK, Alenka Krašovec, Damjan Lajh and Matevž Malčič, Univer-
sity of Ljubljana, Slovenia, for constructive comments. We would also like
to thank our families for their support, and Dr. Kamiński would like to,
in particular, thank his wife Natalia and his son Jan.
We also would like to acknowledge that part of this research was
financed by the following: Research Foundation-Flanders, Grant No:
G032814N, Slovenian Research Agency, Grant No: N5-0023 and Grant
No: P5-0136; and the Research Council of Lithuania, Grant No:
MIP030/15.
vii
Contents
1 Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation:

Interest Groups in Central and Eastern Europe
in a Comparative Perspective 1
1.1 Interest Representation and Its Importance
for Democracy 4
1.1.1 From Pluralism and Corporatism
to Neo-Pluralism 5
1.1.2 Democratic Theory 7
1.2 Why Study Interest Groups in the Post-Communist
Countries? Our Exemplary Case Studies 12
1.3 Research, Methodology and the Book’s Structure 15
Bibliography 18
2 Interest Organizations in Central and Eastern Europe:

Evaluating Population Ecology 25
2.1 Explaining the Density and Diversity of Interest Group
Systems 28
2.1.1 The Lithuanian Interest Group System
and Punctuated Past 29
2.1.2 The Polish Interest Groups and Economic Shock
Therapy 30
2.1.3 The Slovenian Europeanized Interest Group
System 32
ix
x CONTENTS
2.2 Defining Interest Organizations in the Post-Communist

Context 34
2.3 Population Ecology: Density 39
2.4 Population Ecology: Diversity 40
2.5 Conclusions 48
Appendix 49
Bibliography 53
3 Organized Interest in the Policy-Making Process 59

3.1 A Framework of Interest Representation in the CEE
Counties 59
3.1.1 The Heritage of the Old System 60
3.1.2 The Europeanization Process 61
3.1.3 Characteristics of Interest Group Systems
in CEE Countries 63
3.2 Legal, Institutional and Political Determinants 66
3.2.1 The Executive 66
3.2.2 The Parliament 69
3.2.3 The Economic and Social Committees 73
3.2.4 Other Forms of Inclusion in Policy-Making 75
3.2.5 The Legal Basis for Interest Groups 80
3.2.6 Regulation of Lobbying 81
3.3 Comparisons Between Post-Communist Countries
and Western Democracies 83
3.4 Conclusions 85
Bibliography 87
4 The Drivers Behind Relations Between Interest

Organizations and Political Parties in the CEE
Countries 91
4.1 Discussing Interest Organizations and Parties’
Positions 91
4.2 The Post-Communist Transformation 92
4.3 Conceptualizing the Relationship Between Parties
and Groups 95
4.4 Who Contacts Whom and Why? 97
4.5 Access Points: Lobbing Government vs Lobbing Parties 99
4.6 Analysis 102
CONTENTS xi
4.7 What Explains Party—Group Interactions? 105

4.8 Conclusions 108
Bibliography 109
5 The Organizational Development of Nongovernmental

Organizations in Central and Eastern Europe 115
5.1 Post-Communist Transformation 116
5.2 Mushrooming of NGOs 118
5.3 Analysis 120
5.4 Case Studies 125
5.5 Discussion and Conclusions 132
Bibliography 133
6 The Significance of Trade Unions in the CEE

Countries: Beyond Corporatism and Pluralism? 137
6.1 Trade Unions and Political Parties: Western Europe vs
CEE Countries 137
6.2 Transition, Shock Therapy, Political Turmoil 140
6.3 Setting the Stage for Industrial Relations After 1989 143
6.3.1 Foundation of the First Post-Communist Trade
Unions in Poland, Slovenia and Lithuania 143
6.3.2 Economic Shock and Public Discontent 147
6.3.3 The Changing Political Paradigm
and Challenges to Trade Unions 148
6.4 Distrust Towards Trade Unions and Their
Diminishing Political Base 150
Bibliography 156
7 Seeking Access to Policy Stakeholders: Business

‘Lobbying’ vs Others 161
7.1 Venue Shopping in the CEE Political Systems 161
7.2 Strategies of Inside Lobbying 164
7.3 Explaining Access Goods 169
7.3.1 Data and Methodology 171
7.3.2 Results 172
Bibliography 177
xii CONTENTS
8 Interest Organizations in CEE Countries

and the European Policy Process 181
8.1 The Effects of EU Accession on Population
Ecology—Diversity, Structure and Numbers 183
8.2 EU Funding 186
8.3 Activity at the National vs European Level 189
8.3.1 Access to European Decision-Makers 190
8.3.2 Access to National Decision-Makers 193
8.4 Membership in European Umbrella Organizations 196
Bibliography 202
9 Conclusions: The Future of Lobbying in the CEE

Countries 209
9.1 Regime Change and the New Realities of Interest
Groups’ Systems in the CEE Countries 213
9.2 Continued Effects of the EU Accession? 214
9.3 Lobbying in the CEE Countries in the Next Decade? 215
9.3.1 Future Research 216
Bibliography 218
Index 221
About the Authors
Patrycja Rozbicka Associate Professor in Politics and International Rela-

tions at Aston University, Birmingham (Aston Centre for Europe). Her
main areas of interest and publications include: participation of interest
groups in the EU political system; coalitions and networks studies; and
regulation of the music industry.
Paweł Kamiński Adjunct at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish

Academy of Sciences His main areas of interest and publications include:
political parties and civil society in Central Eastern Europe; and the
relationships between political parties and interest groups.
Meta Novak Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences,

University of Ljubljana, and a researcher at the Centre for Political Science
Research at the same faculty. Her research interests include interest
groups, lobbying, civil society, political knowledge and opinion gaps.
Vaida Jankauskaitė, Ph.D. is a Researcher at the Faculty of Social

Sciences, Arts and Humanities, Kaunas University of Technology. Her
main research interests include interest groups, lobbying, party-interest
group relationship and political financing.
xiii
Abbreviations
CEE Central and Eastern Europe

CIGs Comparative Interest Groups Survey
CNVOS Centre for Information, Cooperation and Development of Non-
Governmental Organizations
DGs Directorate-General
DOPPS Društvo za opazovanje in proučevanje ptic Slovenije
EU European Union
KNSS Confederation of New Trade Unions of Slovenia
LDF Lithuanian Work Federation (LDF)
LDS Lithuanian Workers Union
LGM Lithuanian Green Movement
LPSS Lithuanian Trade Union Centre (LPSC), the Lithuanian Trade Union
Alliance
LSDP Lithuanian Social Democratic Party (LSDP)
MEPs Members of the European Parliament
MPs Members of Parliament
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPZZ All-Poland Alliance of Trade Unions
PHARE Poland and Hungary: Assistance for Restructuring their Economies
PiS Law and Justice Party
PO Civic Platform Party
SLD The Polish Democratic Left Alliance Party
xv
List of Figures
Fig. 2.1 Year of establishment 44

Fig. 3.1 Frequency of contacts with national institutions, mean
value (1—we did not seek access, 5—at least once a week)
(Source: CIG survey) 71
Fig. 3.2 Involvement in other activities of policy-making, mean
value (1—we did not do this, 5—at least once a week)
(Source: CIG survey) 79
Fig. 4.1 Seeking access to different governmental institutions 100
Fig. 4.2 Contacts with political parties 103
Fig. 4.3 Average marginal effects for contacting political parties 106
Fig. 5.1 The number of NGOs in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia
since 1989, controlling for demographics 119
Fig. 5.2 The year each organization was founded 121
Fig. 5.3 The composition of NGOs’ budgets 122
Fig. 5.4 The source of NGOs’ budget 123
Fig. 5.5 Membership size of NGOs in Lithuania, Poland
and Slovenia 125
Fig. 6.1 Trade union density by country (Data
OECD. Stat., accessed in November, 2019
[https://stats.oecd.org/Index.aspx?DataSetCode=TUD]) 152
Fig. 6.2 Trust in trade unions over the years by country (Source
Eurobarometer) 155
Fig. 7.1 Time allocated between direct and indirect strategies, mean
value 165
xvii
List of Tables
Table 2.1 An overview of organizations’ typology 37

Table 2.2 CIGs countries—Comparison of interest organizations
per country size and population 41
Table 2.3 Lithuanian, Polish and Slovenian national interest groups
dataset, by type 42
Table 2.4 Interest groups’ diversity by declared area of activity
(policy areas aggregated) 46
Table 2.5 Interest groups diversity by declared area of activity 50
Table 3.1 Trust in certain forms of interest groups (answer tend
not to trust) 65
Table 4.1 Impact of interest groups contacting political parties 104
Table 5.1 Types of organizations analyzed 120
Table 7.1 Strategies applied by interest groups, percentages 166
Table 7.2 Inside lobbying venues used by business and non-business
groups, mean values (scale 1–5) 168
Table 7.3 Inside lobbying venues for countries, mean values (scale
1–5) 169
Table 7.4 Linear regression analysis—factors of inside lobbying
in different venues 173
Table 8.1 Period of establishment of interest groups from CEE
countries 185
Table 8.2 Financing of interest groups from EU projects
and programmes 188
Table 8.3 Interest for EU policies 189
xix
xx LIST OF TABLES
Table 8.4 Frequency of contacts with EU institutions, mean value

(1—we did not seek access, 5—at least once a week) 192
Table 8.5 Frequency of contacts with national political institutions,
mean value (1—we did not seek access, 5—at least
once a week) 195
Table 8.6 Percentage of members to EU organizations 198
CHAPTER 1
Achieving Democracy Through Interest

Representation: Interest Groups in Central
and Eastern Europe
in a Comparative Perspective
The study of interest group politics—the organization, aggregation, artic-

ulation and intermediation of societal interests that seek to shape public
policies (Beyers et al. 2008: 1104)—is a relatively small field within polit-
ical science. When compared to studies of electoral systems, legislatives
and party politics, the research on interest groups (organized groups
which represent the interests of their members and supporters and are
politically active) remains under-published due to a much smaller schol-
ars’ community working on the topic. Nevertheless, during the last
20 years, interest in group politics has grown. This is evidenced by
numerous empirical studies, both qualitative and quantitative, within the
fields of European Union (EU) studies (see for example: the results of
the INTEREURO Project1 ), European politics, and American politics
(see, in particular, publications in the dedicated ‘Interest and Advo-
cacy’ Journal2 ). In recent years, interest groups scholars have moved
beyond the Olsonian collective action paradigm and there has been
growth in the importance of large-scale empirical research projects (e.g.
1 http://www.intereuro.eu/public/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

2 https://link.springer.com/journal/41309. Accessed 17 October 2017.
© The Author(s) 2021 1

P. Rozbicka et al., Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation,
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55521-4_1
2 P. ROZBICKA ET AL.
Advocacy and Public Policy Project3 ). In particular, the European schol-

arship on interest groups has become more empirical, systemic and
has drawn increasingly on sophisticated methodological techniques and
consistent theoretical approaches (Coen 2007). The majority of the schol-
arly research has analysed interest groups’ activities in one political system.
Studies have chiefly focused on the EU, the UK, Germany, Belgium,
the Netherlands, and France; with the later addition of Sweden (e.g.
Naurin and Boräng 2012), England (e.g. Mohan 2012), and Denmark
(e.g. Chiristiansen 2012).
This volume takes on board the vast accomplishments of the interest
groups literature, explored theories, methodological and normative issues
related to the study of political interests in the EU and elsewhere
and applies them to a new area, the post-Communist democracies of
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE). The intellectual principle here is
that understanding interest group systems remains crucial to under-
standing the functioning of advanced democracies, especially in areas
which have undergone a democratization process only within the last
30 years. The pluralist argument that without groups there would be
no democracy retains much plausibility and finds a resonance in social
capital research (Putnam 2000; Beyers et al. 2008). Due to the transfor-
mation of the European national state and the declining importance of
electoral and party politics in the Western democracies (Bartolini 2005;
Mair 2006), more and more attention has been paid to the prominent
position of interest groups within policy networks and policy negotiation.
The neo-Tocquevillian approach emphasizes the importance of internal
aspects of associational life for the proper functioning of democracy and
democratization (Kaufman 1999). From that perspective, interest organi-
zations are central democratic partners in the policy process enhancing its
open, transparent and participatory character. The emergence of interest
groups in the post-Communist countries should be treated as one of the
prerequisites of successful democratization.
In post-Communist CEE countries, contrary to Western democracies,
the emergence of modern civil society and the political system was not
the effect of a century-long process, but rather rapid and unexpected
regime change in the 1980s and 1990s. This regime change created
opportunities for interest communities in several countries to emerge
3 http://lobby.la.psu.edu/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

1 ACHIEVING DEMOCRACY THROUGH INTEREST REPRESENTATION … 3
in similar, but somewhat idiosyncratic environments as there had been

substantial variations in introducing democratic and economic reforms.
The regime change allows scholars to study interest groups’ popula-
tion in these countries—deriving from population ecology (i.e. Gray and
Lowery 2000)—almost as a living organisms’ life cycle. The population
ecology theory explains that density and diversity of interest groups in any
given system is more dependent on political and organizational environ-
ments than on micro-level decisions among groups themselves. It could
certainly be the case for CEE countries, where groups initially struggled
not only with a lack of supportive social infrastructure, but also a scarcity
of resources and chaotic political actors.
We explore in the book an essential question: which factors influence
interest groups in the CEE countries, their populations and organiza-
tional behaviour? Following Crawford and Lijphart (1995), we argue
that the collapse of Communism and transition to democracy introduced
a set of internal and external factors, which have characteristics that influ-
ence the formation and maintenance of groups’ populations. Fink-Hafner
(2011) contended that, in particular, an institutional choice in the tran-
sition to democracy (internal factor) was not only about the relations
between the democratic opposition and the old regime, but also formed
idiosyncratic opportunity structures which influenced the early processes
of interest group formation (in particular, the socio-economic partner-
ships). In the case of external factors, the key aspect was the process
of Europeanization (Berglund 2003; Maloney et al. 2018). The CEE
countries, due to external pressure, implemented reforms to meet various
economic and democratic criteria, including the Copenhagen Criteria to
join the EU, as well as the liberalization process along the lines of the
Washington Consensus, to have access to the World Bank and IMF credit
lines (Bohle and Greskovits 2007). The implementation of these was
viewed by observers as symptoms of emerging democracies and moves
towards the creation of a functional and representative civil society. While
the transition took place over 30 years ago, authors agree that changes
within interest groups’ population ecology and organizational behaviour
are slow and it takes major focus events to alter them (Gray and Lowery
2000). The type of events which alter these factors do not have to be of
an explosive nature but rather, similar to the changes themselves, they can
take place over an extended period.
The assessment of the quality of democracy through the study of

organized interests in the post-Communist CEE remains vastly unex-
plored. This is an apt time for an in-depth analysis and reflection on the
population of interest groups in the CEE region, especially in a compar-
ative perspective to their West European counter parts. The aim of this
volume is to lay down a sound basis and empirical data for such future
research. Taking its theoretical, conceptual and methodological basis from
existing Western democracies’ research, the volume avoids the risk of
heroic empiricism. Moreover, the research on CEE countries in a compar-
ative perspective is relatively fragmented and the integration and exchange
among various strands of the research in this book will contribute to a
more robust and consistent research agenda.
This introductory chapter outlines in detail interest representation
and its importance for democracy, underlining the place of this discus-
sion in a broader political science debate. In particular, we focus on an
evolution from the pluralist and corporatist perspective to neo-pluralism.
We consider different elements of the participatory, representative and
associative democracy. And, further support the argument by reference
to Tocqueville’s associanalism. We focus on our intellectual principle of
interest representation as a necessary element of democracy and elabo-
rate on a comparative yardstick of functional representation. We further
explain the focus on the post-Communist CEE countries. As the empir-
ical results presented in this volume are based on extensive qualitative
and quantitative research in the methodology section we introduce the
Comparative Interest Groups Survey Project (CIGs) and more in-depth
information on the data collection in the countries selected for the
analysis. In an overview of the volume’s structure, we conclude the
introduction with a brief discussion of the key arguments and result.
1.1 Interest Representation

and Its Importance for Democracy
Until the mid-twentieth century, research on interest groups participa-
tion in the decision-making process did not consider the question of the
impact on democracy (Jordan and Maloney 2007). The initial wave of
positive research on the topic was linked with the pluralist celebration of
groups as a means of face-to-face interaction to enhance social integra-
tion and direct democracy itself. Since then, however, the debate on the
democratic deficit and questions regarding the role citizens participation
should play in the political process has given way to a more norma-
tive body of literature on the role of ‘organized civil society’ (Saurugger
2008). Following Tocqueville’s approach, the new approach has consid-
ered interest groups as crucial actors in truly democratic systems. The
discussion below critically analyses the potential contribution that interest
groups make to improvement of the democratic character of political
system, potentially addressing the democratic deficit.
1.1.1 From Pluralism and Corporatism to Neo-Pluralism

No matter their differences with regard to group involvement in the polit-
ical system, in their perception of the balance of power between groups,
or whether or not such associations enhance or undermine governance
solutions, both pluralism and corporatism cast interest groups in a signifi-
cant role as a part of democratic life. To pluralists, interest groups are core
legitimate actors in the policy-making process. They consider politics to
be a competition between freely organized interest groups in society that
compete for access to a government that is unbiased and willing to listen
to different voices. In contrast to critical political economy approaches,
pluralists assume that no single interest, elite or class is able to dominate
society (Hosli et al. 2004: 46). Instead, policy-making is competitive and
fragmented. The state is a mere arena for the struggle between different
interest groups (Williamson 1989: 55), where the free interplay of interest
groups leads to a system of ‘checks and balances’, preventing the poten-
tial dominance of a particular societal group, or of a powerful state. Policy
is made within a ‘social equilibrium’ (Bentley 1908). Interest groups are
assumed to contribute to a more reasonable process of policy-making,
especially by providing information and analysis based on a multitude
of different perspectives (Watts 2007: 14–21). In the pluralist heaven,
effective interest representation is enabled by the mobilization and repre-
sentation of a plurality of social and economic interests that organize in
interest associations (Dahl 1961; Truman 1958). Far from posing any
form of threat, these groups’ existence serves to enhance democracy.
Indeed, they are the very substance of the democratic process (Watts
2007).
The corporatist perspective favours a strong role for interest groups
in policy-making, but only under the overarching leadership role of
the state (Hosli et al. 2004: 46–47; Molina and Rhodes 2002: 316).
The overall aim of corporatist initiatives is economic growth and a fair
share in its rewards. Due to increased demands, the state depends on

the assistance of societal actors in formulating and implementing poli-
cies (Lehmbruch 1979: 52). In particular, there is a demand on the
part of public actors for the expertise and compliance of private actors
(Wonka and Warntjen 2004: 17). Interest groups gain access to the formal
decision-making process, when they provide compliance with the agree-
ments reached and thereby add to the overall steering capacity of the state
(Rasmussen and Gross 2015; Bouwen 2004; Klüver 2013; Flöthe 2020).
Groups’ eagerness to engage derives from a consensus that is reached
on the formulation level, which realizes the interests of a larger number
of actors. The output of democracy is being enhanced (Schmalz-Bruns
2002; Heinelt et al. 2002: 17–18).
Pluralism and corporatism are widely discussed, however more and
more attention is being given in the literature to normative questions,
such as the general desirability of interest groups, the potential biases
in access, the attention different societal interests gain, and the societal
consequences generated by interest group activities. Interest groups are
often perceived as advocating for the interests of powerful business or
small sections of the public which are in conflict with the public good
or the preferences of the majority of citizens (Flöthe and Rasmussen
2018; Schattschneider 1948). More recently, questions have been raised
regarding the transparency, accountability and representative character
of interest groups. Given that interest groups lack an electoral mandate
or formal authorization from a clearly defined constituency (Halpin
2006), it remains a tricky question what their substantive representation
should look like (Pitkin 1967: 115). When acting in the interest of their
represented constituents, who are interest groups actually representing?
In response, neo-pluralism, while not entirely discarding its prede-
cessor, acknowledges that the mobilization of groups is not a one-
dimensional process and it often involves competition between the
groups themselves (Saurugger 2008). Interest groups interact with policy-
makers, but also organize themselves into stable or more ad hoc coalitions
(Gray and Lowery 2000). The influence production process is not unidi-
rectional—there are significant feedback mechanisms among and between
different stakeholders. As Saurugger (2008: 1277) underlines, neo-
pluralist research concludes that organized interests are only imperfectly
constrained by democratic politics. They still have ample opportunities
to influence politics in ways that may not fully reflect the democratic
conceptions of the pluralist ‘heavenly chorus’. Neo-pluralism takes into
account that not all policy issues might be equally represented and some
of them might indeed be mostly biased towards elites. From that perspec-
tive it abandons the pluralist equality of interest representation. Last,
but not least, the neo-pluralist perspective assumes that there are polit-
ical contexts and constraints in policy influence that groups face. Here,
the neo-pluralist research’s overarching narrative focuses on what specific
aspects of legal, social and political factors have a bearing on how and to
what extent interest groups participate in the democratic policy creation
process. Neo-pluralism thus encourages empirical research, which looks
beyond the groups themselves and asks scholars to study the context in
which groups are placed and act.
1.1.2 Democratic Theory

Could organized interests provide a core contribution to the reduction
of the democratic deficit? Schmalz-Bruns (2002: 59) concludes that the
direct inclusion and involvement of citizens, both individually and collec-
tively (through associations), is an obvious solution to the deficit of
democracy. He suggests there is a direct and mutually reinforcing link
between the virtues of direct participation on the one hand, and the
efficiency, effectiveness and sustainability of policies that emerge under
the structural shortcomings of representative institutions within a system
characterized by dispersion, poli-centricity and fragmentation on the
other (whether we look at it from the pluralist, corporatist or neo-pluralist
perspective). Three arguments support his assertion. The growing depen-
dency of policy success on the willing acceptance and active support
of those whom it affects. The inclusion of those directly affected not
only by a policy measure, but also by the problems which the policy is
intended to solve widens and improves the infrastructure of knowledge
upon which policy-decisions are based, helping to produce better results
(Lindblom 1965). The interchange of views between different ‘holders’
of rights and claimants to participation improves the sustainability of the
policy (because of complex negotiation and intermediation between those
factors that drive political action—interest, power, values and knowledge).
From a more ethical perspective, the experience of a plurality of views on
a subject matter is expected to heighten participants’ awareness of differ-
ences and thus their moral sensitivity towards each other. This could have
the effect of a willing identification not just to a particular project and
group, but also with wider and more encompassing concerns and the
activities in which they are embedded (Schmalz-Bruns 2002: 59).
From that perspective, interest groups are seen as a substitute for other
forms of democratic legitimization, ensuring that different types of inter-
ests are taken into account in policy-making (Greenwood 2007; Heritier
1999). In national contexts, it is a commonly held assumption that group
involvement in policy-making boosts legitimacy. The literature on public
consultations has even argued that, in some respects, interest groups can
serve as a surrogate for the public in the policy process (Lundberg and
Hysing 2016).
Although democratic legitimacy is a core concept in political science
research, it is certainly not the only relevant or possible criterion for
normative evaluation. According to Knill and Lehmkuhl (2002), private
governance contributions might compensate for the decreasing capacities
of national governments in defining and providing public goods in light
of the internationalization of markets and the emergence of transnational
information and communication networks (Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002:
85). The limited problem-solving capability of authoritative regulation
(and technological solutions) creates the need for a more cooperative,
consensual and inclusive policy style. This style should be aimed at
gaining the acceptance and input of business actors and ordinary citizens,
which are both concerned with policy objectives and their responsi-
bility to the collective good (Lenschow 1999: 42). The perception that
successful policy depends on economic and private actors ‘internalizing’
their responsibility has further consequences for the choice of policy
instruments, implying a more limited role for top-down regulatory instru-
ments and a more prominent role for market-oriented, self-regulatory as
well as informational and communicative instruments (Lenschow 1999:
42). Decision-makers and legislators may have their own views on issues
of broad community benefit, but on matters involving technical under-
standing and perhaps help in the implementation of policy they are
reliant on the advice and assistance of well-resourced groups (Watts 2007:
78–79).
A cornerstone of any democratic society is the capacity for its citi-
zens to have a political voice so that citizens ‘can express their views,
preferences, and interests towards political institutions and hold public
officials to account’ (Fraussen and Halpin 2016: 476). Although political
representation is achieved through voting for or joining and supporting
political parties, elections are irregular occurrences and scholars ques-

tion the participatory character of parties (e.g. Marsh 2006). The
well-documented debate regarding the transformation of party political
systems in Western democracies (expressed through electoral volatility and
the fragmentation of party landscapes) and dissatisfaction with the repre-
sentative system of government, has pushed scholars to explore the role
of interest groups as mechanisms of political expression enhancing the
quality and breadth of political participation (e.g. Fraussen and Halpin
2016 but also: Klüver 2015; van Biezen and Poguntke 2014). Here
in particular we focus on the principles of associative, deliberative and
participatory democracy.
Associative democracy incorporates the neo-Tocquevillian approach
emphasizing the importance of internal aspects of associational life
for the proper functioning of democracy and democratization, viewing
interest organizations as central democratic partners in the policy process
enhancing its open, transparent, and participatory character. From this
perspective voluntary associations become the basis of contemporary
conceptions of a third sector between the market and the state. Berger
and Neuhaus (1977) used the neo-Tocquevillian notion of non-profit and
civil society organizations as intermediate social institutions whose func-
tion is to mediate between citizens and government. These associations
provide information to policy-makers on members preferences, equalizing
representation, they promote citizens education (by acting as schools of
democracy) and offer alternative implementation, governance and admin-
istration functions. The associonalist further acknowledge that for their
system to work, the state has to monitor the functions and composition
of associations (Hirst 1994; Cohen and Rogers 1995a). However, they
disagree with regards to the ‘sponsoring’ of organizations. Cohen and
Rogers (1995b) favour the option where the state has a role in supporting
groups to emerge where they would do not so naturally. Hirst (1994)
and Carter (2002) challenge this artifactual approach and conclude that,
by default, the state’s sponsorship will build weaker organizations, depen-
dent on the state’s favouritism. Despite those doubts, the principles of
associative democracy see organized interest groups as actors in the demo-
cratic system responsible for the provision of information and expertise to
policy-makers, the representation of excluded and marginalized groups,
and democratic capacity building.
The discussion on alternatives to diminishing citizens’ participation

has been greatly enhanced by focusing on deliberative democracy. Delib-
erative democracy understands the democratic policy process differently
under different concepts: from the Rawlsian theory of public reason,
Dahl’s non-participatory pluralism, Arrow’s social choice, Riker’s rational
choice and the Habermasian theory of communicative action (or the
discursive account of decision-making; Zeleznik 2016). The analysts of
deliberative democracy indicate numerous attempts at improving the
quality of political participation; from the involvement of deliberation
in well-constituted forums which responds to the critique by encour-
aging participants to take a broader perspective on questions of common
interest (Gutmann and Thompson 2004: 10) to ‘macro deliberative’
theorist contributions to improve the quality of political participation.
In principle, however, deliberative democracy is about communication
and willingness of different sides to change their views (Dryzek 2000).
What is crucial to deliberative democracy is that through discussion and
deliberation citizens have the potential to move beyond their individual
preferences. Within an engaged, ‘deliberating’ society, Habermas (1996)
distinguishes between groups that engage in ‘clientele bargaining’ with
the state, such as business associations, trade unions and ‘supplier’ groups.
Supplier groups give voice to social problems, make broad demands,
articulate public interests or needs and attempt to influence the political
process from a normative point of view. The border between two groups
is however blurry, as even suppliers groups often represent the interests
of their constituencies, while ‘clientele bargaining’ can be extended to
debates on common goods.
According to Fung (2005: 671) deliberative democratic mechanisms
are a crucial component for the democratic policy process, but they are
not sufficient, and participation needs to be improved. A response to
that seems to be provided by participatory democratic theory, which
understands democratic notions in terms of direct empowerment vs repre-
sentation. Out of the three indicated approaches, participatory democracy
is the most concerned with a political system built on equality of voices. It
addresses the imperative for group empowerment and representation, but
also the need to focus on democratic procedures that facilitate inclusion
(Cunningham 2002). Among others, the Baker et al.’s (2009) characteris-
tics of participatory democracy include: widespread political participation
through different forms of association, which has to be diverse and repre-
sentative (including marginalized groups), committed to a democratic
ethos and open to deliberation. It is based on a qualified delegate model,

with an assumption of accountability. The delegate acts in the interest
of its broadly defined constituency, consults with them when necessary,
but also provides leadership, by inspiration and the transparency of infor-
mation. In practice that means within the assigned mandate and always
within the perceived interests of their membership. Baker et al. (2009)
primarily apply this qualified delegate model to the role of elected repre-
sentatives and political parties, but this approach also offers insights for
how interest groups might establish their representative legitimacy. In
practice, this approach means that leaders within interest organizations
should operate within the framework of the agreed values and mission of
their organizations, provide their members with opportunities to engage
in ongoing reflections and deliberation and ensure that their members
are adequately resourced and supported to avail of these opportunities.
Interest organizations serve here as spaces for deliberation, where inter-
ests can be articulated, developed and negotiated to later be passed and
negotiated within the local and national state institutions (Wainwright
2003: 188). Groups can be a mechanism by which citizens can hold
governments accountable for their actions and strengthen democratic
structures. This way, interest organizations are acknowledged as making a
contribution to participatory democracy.
In the above understanding, the three concepts (associative, deliber-
ative and participatory democracy) should be incorporated equally and
in mutually comprehensive terms within the institutions of represen-
tative democracy to fully grasp the importance of interest groups for
democracy. Interest groups can hold the democratic state accountable;
they can act as advocates for better democracy; can build democratic
capacity (enhancing citizens’ indirect participation); can create spaces for
discussion, debate and deliberation; facilitate representation of excluded
communities; and, can provide expertise to policy-makers. It is not
however without limitation or necessary control. The regulation of access
is one of the central arguments stressed by the theorists of associative
and participatory democracy (Saurugger 2008: 1277). Contrary to classic
pluralist assumptions, public intervention is necessary to guarantee the
equal representation of all groups. Secondly, resources (understood in a
very broad sense) are crucial for interest groups to intervene in the public,
political and private debates to the degree required by the three models.
Throughout this section, we have provided a broad overview of the
role interest groups can play in the enhancement of a democratic state.
Neo-pluralism and participatory democracy in particular have offered

frameworks to analyse the democratic legitimacy of interest groups partic-
ipation in the different Western political systems. While neo-pluralism
acted till now as a framework to structure empirical research on normative
premises within a number of those democracies, participatory democ-
racy approaches have led to a large number of normative studies on
how interest groups can and must participate in decision-making to
increase the democratic nature of a system in which they partake. While
analysts use an increasingly critical tone when studying the involvement of
interest groups and civil society organizations in various governance struc-
tures (e.g. Fraussen and Halpin 2018), a large-scale comparative research
design is still missing which would allow for a comparison of those in the
CEE countries.
1.2 Why Study Interest Groups

in the Post-Communist Countries?
Our Exemplary Case Studies
Against the above background, the emergence of interest groups poli-
tics can be perceived as one of the decisive factors in the democratic
transformation of post-Communist societies. CEE countries and their
accelerated transition to a market economy provide a ‘fast-forward’ study
of advanced post-Communist societies that enables us to anticipate the
social structures and issues shaping interest groups politics in the new
democracies.
Although all the CEE communist countries have undergone demo-
cratic transformations, the region is characterized by a high degree of
political diversity, with considerable cross-national variations in the exis-
tence and pace of the transformation process. The theoretical explanations
of differences in the trajectory of democratization in those countries
is linked to a number of factors. Socio-economic developments across
the region (Huntington 1991; Lipset et al. 1993) it is argued explain
a growth in the scale and complexity of government and an accompa-
nying diffusion of political power. The diffusion of power brought in its
wake a more open and participatory political style conductive to associa-
tional activity. This perspective brings a sharper focus on the relationship
between the economy and democracy, locating the socio-economic foun-
dations of associational activity in patterns of social stratification generated
by market relations. Following this perspective, we would expect to find

correlation between pluralism and the more rapid market transition found
in Poland and the Czech Republic. Stunted economic transformation
in the Balkan countries, by contrast, can be expected to constrain the
pluralists’ developments. In comparison, Szablowski and Derlien (1993)
suggested that variation between post-Communist countries comes from
the different patterns of elite interactions that accompanied regime
change. They argued that the transition process left economic elites rela-
tively undisturbed and the associational order was likely to be marked
by the persistence of old structures and modes of behaviour. Where
regime change was done through negotiations between Communists and
counter-elites, as in Poland and Hungary, interest groups politics can be
expected to assume a dual character, with familiar patterns of association
persisting alongside emergent pluralist forms. When the democratiza-
tion process was a result of the collapse of old regime and involved a
radical elite turnover, as in the Czech Republic and Slovakia, we might
expect a cleaner break with the past. When we add to the combination
ethno-linguistic conflict, as in the Balkans, associational activity on socio-
economic lines is likely to be darkened by more fundamentalist forms of
mobilization.
While the analysis in this book is attentive to these differences, a
comprehensive and systemic cross-national comparison of interest groups
activity across the region is beyond its scope. Rather than a more general
comparative study of the diverse characteristics of group activity in all
post-Communist societies, this volume focuses on interest groups in three
example CEE countries: Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia, in a compara-
tive perspective to their West European counterparts. The comparison of
Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia is a good sample for the CEE countries
as it includes one Višegrad country, one ex-Yugoslavian country and one
Baltic state, giving the reader a solid snapshot of the region. Between the
selected countries, we can find similarities as well as differences.
All three countries have non-federal/centralized systems, albeit to a
different degree (Poland, for example, due to its size shows signs of signif-
icant decentralization). Some differences are also observable (beyond the
obvious difference of the size of the country). In Poland, the transition to
a capitalist economy and new liberal-democratic order was done through
economic shock therapy, in contrast to, for example, a much smoother
process in Slovenia (Maloney et al. 2018). In terms of the vibrancy of the
interest groups system, both Lithuania and Poland are quite dissimilar
to their West European peers with extremely low numbers of associa-

tional engagement. In Poland the associational engagement in voluntary
organizations did not reach 25% within the last decade, nor in a broader
understanding, recording only 34% at its heyday in 2013 (Adamiak 2013).
And in Lithuania civil society is judged to be weak and poorly empow-
ered (see for example: Freedom House 2018; Sustainable Governance
Indicators 2016). While Slovenia is neo-corporatist, Poland incorporates
a mixture of neo-corporatist traditions—through, for example, the socio-
economic councils—but tries to maintain a pluralist approach, through
public consultations. In contrast, Lithuania does not show much evidence
of neo-corporatism as it is more common in other European countries. In
2008, Hrebenar et al. concluded that the Lithuanian system could evolve
eventually into a modified form of ‘corporatism without labour’ as labour
is very weak in Lithuania, however for now it remains, at least in general
terms, a pluralist model with minor elements of the corporatist set up
(Hrebenar et al. 2008: 62).
The previous research on the three selected countries leaves us with a
number of clues but is also quite inconclusive. The edited compendiums
on lobbying and/or interest representation in Europe usually include
single chapters on instances of lobbying in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia
(see for example: edited by Bitonti and Harris [2017] chapters on
Poland by Michałek, Spurga on Lithuania and Fink-Hafner on Slovenia).
However, Michałek himself concludes that studies on Polish lobbying,
and by proximity those within the CEE countries, are extremely lacking
and are rarely conducted in a comprehensive and comparative way
(Michałek 2017: 268). Fink-Hafner did pioneer work in the compara-
tive study of civil society and interest groups in countries of the Former
Yugoslavia such as an edited volume in 2015 and a special issue of the
Journal of Public Affairs edited with Thomas (Fink-Hafner and Thomas
2019). However, both publications limit their study only to the region of
ex-Yugoslavia. The second set of publications incorporates interest orga-
nizations into a larger discussion on civil society in the post-Communist
countries (see for example: Jacobsson and Korolczuk 2017). However,
the editors explicitly point to the fact that they look at political activism
outside of formal participation in policy processes, excluding insider
lobbying, which is the main focus of our work. The third set consists
of texts written in the national languages. While those are useful and
provide us with a solid base to work on, their common pitfall is a
lack of translation into English limiting their usefulness for compara-

tive study. There is also quite a variety between available publications
from the studied countries. In the case of Poland, two existing publica-
tions explicitly dealing with interest representation by Polish organizations
focus on: (1) the early evaluation of the effects of Poland’s accession to
the European Union in 2004 (Jasiecki 2011), which requires an update
(while published in 2011, as mentioned above, it explicitly dealt with
the immediate effects of the 2004 Polish accession to the EU), or (2)
prioritize the European context and concentrate on business organiza-
tions, rather than more broadly understood interest organizations (which
would include also NGOs, trade unions and professional associations;
Kurczewska 2016). In the case of Slovenia, the unparalleled sources of
information are texts by Fink-Hafner (Fink-Hafner 1998, 2011; Fink-
Hafner and Krasovec 2005). Worthy of notice is the fact that uniquely
the texts on Slovenia are also available in English. The majority of the
publications are, however, limited to journal articles and single country
case studies, leaving more elaborate and comparative analysis unattended.
The research on Lithuanian interest groups is fragmented, episodic and
mostly focused on case analyses. Meanwhile, the interest group system is
still not a popular research object per se and publications existing to date
are exclusively in the Lithuanian language.
1.3 Research, Methodology

and the Book’s Structure
The empirical base of the book is data collected within the Compara-
tive Interest Groups Survey Project (CIGs; https://www.cigsurvey.eu/),
expanded further by a comprehensive analysis of the existing literature and
qualitative interviews. While a lot of the analysis is rooted in secondary
sources, the core of the book is based on mapping and surveying exer-
cises conducted in Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia from 2016 to 2017 as
part of the CIGs. Up till the present date, the CIGs Project covered one
other post-Communist country (Montenegro), two post-authoritarian
ones (Spain, Italy) and three established democracies (Sweden, Belgium
and the Netherlands), with study in the Czech Republic ongoing.
Similar attempts, but to a much smaller degree, were attempted within

the INTEREURO Project4 (locating, among many others, Polish and
Slovenian interest groups active in the European level consultations
between 2008 and 2010) and EUROLOB II5 (investigating, among
others, Polish business associations’ activities in policy-making between
2010 and 2016). Poland was one of the main case studies in the
EUROLOB II but focus there was explicitly only on business groups thus
studying only one type of group within the whole population. Slovenia
was one of the comparative case studies in the INTEREURO, but there
the focus was only on groups’ engagement within EU policy-making,
leaving all the national activities unexplored. Our results are informed
by these attempts but go far beyond their initial exploration.
The CIGs project followed a joined uniform definition of interest
group. We defined them as: organized groups which have some sort of
constituency either in the form of supporters or members and which
represent the interests of their members and supporters or the interests
of others who cannot represent themselves, such as children, animals, and
the environment. These groups are either politically active or their polit-
ical activity is dormant (they have an interest in being active and a capacity
to act, but most of the time their activity is not political; when they
encounter a new political issue of interest, they may become politically
active). This definition of interest groups includes trade unions, societies
and religious groups. We excluded law firms, consultancy firms, and all
types of private companies. We only took into consideration national level
groups and excluded those from the regional and local levels.
The first step in our approach has been an extensive mapping exer-
cise of all national level interest organizations (for details see Chapter 2).
Priory to mapping, we had asked the question of whether the system
of interest groups is capable of ensuring the representation of a variety
of public and private interests. Addressing this conundrum required data
that maps the essential traits of the population of organized interests—
its density and diversity in a given country. Thus, we focused on the
previously unexplored system-level approach that delivered important
insights into the nature of the Lithuanian, Polish and Slovenian interest
4 http://www.intereuro.eu/public/.
5 http://www.mzes.uni-mannheim.de/d7/en/projects/eurolob-ii-europeanization-of-
interest-intermediation.
group systems, as well as providing a framework for subsequent work

conceptualizing advocacy activities or lobbying dynamics in specific policy
domains.
In the second step, we surveyed a sample of groups focusing on a
number of issues related to interest group activity. The translated versions
of the same questionnaire have been circulated to all surveyed groups
(Beyers et al. 2016; preceded by official invite letter and followed by email
with the link leading to the online survey). The invitation was sent to 905
organizations in Lithuania, 1369 in Poland and 1203 in Slovenia. The
response rate differed per country, with 41% in Lithuania, 28% in Poland
and 36% in Slovenia.
In the survey, we asked various sets of questions. Those sets informed
further qualitative research and evidenced comparative trends we iden-
tified in the existing research on West European interest organizations.
A major focus in the survey was on the participation of interest groups
in the policy-making process. We explore those in Chapter 3, where we
further ask about the provisions within political systems in the CEE coun-
tries that stimulate interest groups’ engagement in them. We pay attention
here to both attitudes seen at the micro-level of individual participation
in interest groups, but also macro-level patterns of political competition,
where structural political factors affect organized interest groups. The
survey also looked into groups’ interactions with specific stakeholders.
Chapter 4 analyses factors informing the relations between interest
organizations and political parties in Lithuania, Poland, and Slovenia.
The fundamental question there is whether these young democracies,
using Western democracies as established benchmarks, have been able
to develop complex linkages involving parties and interest organizations.
Chapter 5 explores the organizational development of nongovernmental
organizations and their organizational capacity to interact with various
stakeholders. Chapter 6 focuses on trade unions’ activities. We point
there to the fact that unions in the studied CEE countries did not build
stable and long-term relationships with political parties as are observed
in the Western democracies. We further explored groups’ strategies and
lobbying activities. Chapter 7 analyses the differences in strategies for
inside lobbying (i.e. direct interactions with policy-makers or participation
in policy consultations) between business and non-business organizations
in studied countries in a comparative perspective. The results indicate
that lobbying is concentrated on the government and national ministries,
interestingly omitting the interactions with directly elected representa-

tives. Chapter 8 looks into different forms of engagement in the European
policy process, both at the European and national levels, analysing the
existing institutional framework for consultations in the European policy
process.
We summarize the results of research conducted for this book in
Chapter 9. We revisit there the three themes that flow throughout the
book, the effects of legal, social and political contexts on interest orga-
nizations’ population and activities in the CEE countries. Coming back
to our theoretical framework, we view those effects through a prism of
internal and external factors that explain the trajectories of regime and
system change.
The book is an important contribution to debates on the performance
of new democracies in Central and Eastern Europe, where scholars argue
that there is a ‘democratic crisis’ and democratic fatigue. By focusing
on associational vibrancy, we look into the possibility of CEE organiza-
tions bridging the ‘democratic deficit’ by bringing citizens closer to their
policy-makers. This volume offers a much-needed comprehensive look
into formal interest representation in the CEE countries, contrasting the
model of Western democracies. Although great efforts have been made
to deepen our understanding of interest organizations and lobbying tools,
the current literature fails to provide a comprehensive answer on the influ-
ence of and importance of a supportive environment within a population
ecology. The book picks up on the tension between a ‘liberal’ and ‘plural-
ist’ idea of democracy in which interest groups can thrive and, in contrast,
also a more ‘plebiscitarian’ and ‘populist’ idea of democracy, which sees
interest groups as enemies of the people. The book is addressed to both
scholars of comparative politics, interest groups and civil society organi-
zations, experts working for interest groups, as well as those who wish to
explore the realities of post-Communist democracy in more detail.
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CHAPTER 2
Interest Organizations in Central and Eastern

Europe: Evaluating Population Ecology
A cornerstone of any democratic society is the capacity for its citizens to

have a political voice, so that citizens ‘can express their views, preferences,
and interests towards political institutions and hold public officials to
account’ (Fraussen and Halpin 2016: 476). Although political represen-
tation is achieved through voting for or joining and supporting political
parties, elections are irregular occurrences (every 4 years in Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia) and scholars question the participatory character
of parties (e.g. Marsh 2006). The well-documented debate regarding
the transformation of party political systems in Western Democracies
(expressed through, for example, electoral volatility and the fragmenta-
tion of party landscapes) and dissatisfaction with the representative system
of government, has pushed scholars to explore the role of interest groups
as mechanisms of political expression (e.g. Fraussen and Halpin 2016; but
also: Klüver 2015; van Biezen and Poguntke 2014).
Against this background, a crucial inquiry is the potential of the
interest group system to address these democratic challenges and whether
it can ensure the representation of a variety of public and private inter-
ests. The composition of the group system—its density and diversity—is
an important way to judge such questions. The study of the essen-
tial traits of populations of organized interests has grown steadily since
1995 (Gray and Lowery 2000; Berkhout et al. 2015). Inspired by core
theories of population biology and organization ecology, the research
© The Author(s) 2021 25

P. Rozbicka et al., Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation,
Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-55521-4_2
within this area has been applied to a wide range of political systems.
The largest concentration of studies focused on analysis of the United
States (see for example: Nownes 2015; Walker and McCarthy 2010;
Brulle et al. 2007; Nownes 2004), Western European countries (e.g.
Van Waarden 1992, in the Netherlands; Naurin and Boräng 2012, in
Sweden; Mohan 2012, in England; Klüver 2015, in Germany; Fisker
2013, and Christiansen 2012, in Denmark) and in the EU (see for
example: Berkhout 2015; Berkhout and Lowery 2010; Coen and Katsaitis
2013). The notable publications on the composition of organized interest
‘systems’ in the post-Communist democracies include: Slovenia (Fink-
Hafner 1998, 2011; Maloney et al. 2018), Lithuania (Hrebenar et al.
2008), Czech Republic (Císař and Vráblíková 2010, 2012; Císař 2013),
and the Western Balkan countries (Cekik 2017). While these countries
have established democratic elections, modern judicial systems and insti-
tutions of representative government, most of the literature agrees that
successful democratization requires the construction of a civil society
provided with functional channels of interest representation (see espe-
cially: Hrebenar et al. 2008). Studies of interest organizations in the
post-Communist countries are still a rarity and they are primarily based
on normative assessment and lack an empirical base (Dobbins and Riedel
2018).
The lack of study of groups’ populations from Central and Eastern
Europe is surprising as it would provide a unique opportunity to observe
a new environment—created by the extended focus events: the collapse
of Communism and transition to democracy. Distinctively, those realities
introduced a set of internal and external factors, which have characteris-
tics that influence the formation and maintenance of groups’ populations
(Crawford and Lijphart 1995). Fink-Hafner (2011) contended that, in
particular, an institutional choice in the transition to democracy (internal
factor) was not only about relations between the democratic opposition
and the old regime, but it also formed idiosyncratic opportunity struc-
tures which influenced the early processes of interest group formation
(in particular, the socio-economic partnerships). In the case of external
factors, the key aspect was the process of Europeanization (Berlung
2003; Maloney et al. 2018). Due to external pressure countries from
Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) implemented reforms to meet various
economic and democratic criteria, including the Copenhagen Criteria to
join the European Union (EU), as well as the liberalization process along
the lines of the Washington Consensus, to have access to the World Bank
2 INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE … 27
and IMF credit lines (Bohle and Greskovits 2007). The implementa-
tion of these was viewed by outside observers as symptoms of emerging
democracies and moves towards the creation of a functional and represen-
tative civil society. Yet, studies dealing with population ecology in those
countries are still a rarity, despite the fact that they present a unique case
that could explain drivers behind a population’s growth and downfall due
to internal and external factors. To strengthen the argument here, while
we are talking about events that took place over 30 years ago, authors
agree that changes within population ecology are slow and it takes major
focus events to alter them (Gray and Lowery 2000). The events altering
the population do not have to be of an explosive nature, rather, similar to
the change itself, they can take place over an extended time period.
The challenge is how we can build on these research foundations in
such a way as to say something more concrete about the size (density) and
composition (diversity) of the aggregate systems. First, we report on the
construction and content of the interest groups’ datasets for Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia that capture the density and diversity of the group
systems. This will enable a better sense of their scale and composition.
We use this data to answer some fundamental questions such as how
big are the systems and what are the balances between different types
of interests. These questions relate to major topics within interest groups
research, namely representation and bias. Without system-level data, these
topics cannot be fully explored. The second objective is to offer a basis for
further research on the interest groups populations in our three studied
countries. Our aims, while we engage in a pioneering systemic study, are
to report a small number of facts about a large number of groups.
The chapter starts from a look at Lithuania, Poland and Slovenia
through a prism of their historical legacies and changes triggered by the
liberalization of their economies. We explore here, after Crawford and
Liphart (1995), factors that influenced the development of and changes
within population ecology establishing a firm ground from which to move
to the analysis of the current populations. We continue with informa-
tion on data collection and an evaluation of available sources from which
we obtained the material to reconstruct interest groups’ populations.
Related work in other countries participating in the Comparative Interest
Groups Survey Project (CIGs)1 that our three cases were part of, mostly
1 http://www.cigsurvey.eu.
utilized lobby data or information available on stakeholders participating

in national consultations, or relies on data from formal associational regis-
ters. As no equivalent, ready-made dataset concerning advocacy activity
existed for all three cases, we utilized a number of resources and contrast
them with sources available in other countries to provide a reliability
check. As will become evident, we argue that different sources have to
be cross-checked and require an intervention. We outline the modifi-
cations, coding decisions and conceptual distinctions required to make
those sources work for the larger research community within the CIGs
Project. After clarifying how we used sources to provide an estimate of
the interest populations for the three countries, we provide an analysis of
the size, composition and diversity of their interest group systems. More
specifically, we consider the balance between different organizational types
(including resource levels) and the age dimension of the interest group
system. We also look into the size of the population from a comparative
perspective and areas of the groups’ activity. In the conclusion, we high-
light our main findings and suggest some promising avenues for future
research.
2.1 Explaining the Density

and Diversity of Interest Group Systems
After Crawford and Liphart (1995), we argue in the Introduction to this
book, that to fully understand the current ‘realities’ of post-Communist
countries, the legacy of the countries’ past (transformation to democracy)
and essentials of liberalization (transformation to a capitalist economy
and accession to the EU) have to be taken into consideration. In no
country could upheavals equivalent to those that occurred to the formerly
Communist states of Europe fail to leave a lasting impact on different
aspects of its society and this is certainly true in the cases of Lithuania,
Poland and Slovenia and the emergence and modification of their interest
groups populations. Their experiences however have not been universal
and we must analyse each in turn to understand how the dynamics played
out and draw common threads from them, turning first to the case of
Lithuania.
2 INTEREST ORGANIZATIONS IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE … 29
2.1.1 The Lithuanian Interest Group System and Punctuated Past

In Lithuania, civil society and the associational organizations that form its
structure have evolved in several stages. The modern system of Lithua-
nian interest groups essentially consists of three types of organizations:
the restored organizations that were operating in the interwar period,
organizations that were founded in the Soviet era and de-nationalized
at the dawn of independence and modern interest groups, formed during
liberal democracy. The origins of the system of Lithuanian interest groups
lie in interwar Lithuania (1918–1940), when the first civil society orga-
nizations were founded. At that time various student fraternities, creative
societies and unions appeared and operated. At the same time, some of
the largest and most important civil organizations, such as the Lithuanian
Riflemen Union, the Lithuanian Catholic Federation ‘Ateitis’ and others,
were founded. After the Second World War, the Soviet regime essentially
exterminated civil society, completely taking control of the space between
society and the individual (Auers 2015: 121).
Nonetheless, as Krupavičius (1999) observes, it is not that there were
no interest groups in Lithuania during this period: various professional
associations, creative societies and trade unions functioned as pseudo or
even semi-interest groups during the communist period. However, these
organizations, although similar to interest groups in their structure, did
not have autonomy and were largely controlled by the state apparatus.
On the other hand, during transition from the Communist regime to
liberal authoritarianism some semi-interest organizations gradually gained
wider autonomy and new organizations. Those groups in particular had
a better link with the new social movements that highlighted issues in
European civil society at that time: various environmental organizations,
human rights and equal opportunities groups.
After the restoration of Lithuanian independence, significant progress
was made during the first decade in creating representative government
institutions, a multi-party system as well as civil rights and freedoms
aiming at the consolidation of a pluralistic political culture (Hrebenar
et al. 2008: 52). However, the process was rather monopolized by the
emergence of newly formed political parties, leaving interest groups on
the periphery of the political process. During the early years of indepen-
dence, Lithuanian interest groups were at the stage of interest formation
and in search of an identity (Krupavičius 1999), while the relationship
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den Flecken und brachte sich Tabak mit, aber Saiten nicht. Es
schnitt Peter manchmal ins Herz, wenn die Verstummte mit ihren
schrägliegenden Augen ihn von ihrem alten Ruheplatz so traurig
anschaute. Wenn er zufällig allein in der Stube war, trat er wohl
einmal an sie heran und zupfte an der gebliebenen Baßsaite. Dann
brummte die alte Freundin, zornig und wehmütig zugleich.
Es wäre dem armen Jungen zu wünschen gewesen, daß er nach
seiner elenden Jugendzeit in mütterliche Hände gekommen wäre.
Wo diese sehnsüchtige Kinderseele nur ein wenig Verständnis, ein
ganz klein wenig Liebe gefunden hätte, da hätte sie sich dankbar
aufgeschlossen, wie das Marienblümchen in der ersten spärlichen
Märzsonne. In den rechten Händen wäre Peter weich wie Wachs
gewesen. Aber von mütterlicher Art, die dem armen Jungen das
zuerst mit so inbrünstiger Liebe als Heim umfaßte Schulhaus zu
einer wirklichen Heimat hätte machen können, hatte die
Schulmeisterin auch gar nichts. Seit ihre erwachsenen Kinder das
Haus verlassen hatten, lebte sie nur noch für ihren Mann. An dem
sah sie wie an einem Halbgott hinauf und diente ihm wie eine treue
Magd. Zu Peter hatte sie kein anderes Verhältnis, als daß sie für
seines Leibes Nahrung und Notdurft leidlich sorgte.
Peter las viel. Als Wenckes Bücher ihm nichts mehr zu sagen
hatten, wußte er sich solche hier und da bei den Lehrern der
Nachbarschaft zu leihen. Er las, was ihm gerade unter die Finger
kam, und bei seinem guten Gedächtnis behielt er auch manches von
dem Gelesenen. Aber, da er zu unreif war, um eine Auswahl zu
treffen und die Einzelheiten einzuordnen und geistig zu verbinden,
so hatte er selbst keine rechte, tiefe Freude daran. Deshalb suchte
er andern Freude damit zu machen. Aber damit hatte er auch kein
rechtes Glück. Die Leute schätzten seine Belehrungen nicht, zumal
er von Schulmeister Wencke die Kunst gelernt hatte, die einfachsten
Dinge mit vielen Worten breitzutreten. Als er merkte, daß die
Menschen seine Weisheit verachteten, bedauerte er sie aufrichtig
und fing an, sich als einen jener »Unverstandenen« zu fühlen, die
mitleidig auf das Leben und die Menschen herabblicken und wunder
meinen, was die Welt in ihnen verkennt.
Es war schlimm, daß es ihm an Menschen fehlte, an denen er
hinaufsehen mußte, von denen er sich Maßstäbe zu richtiger
Selbsteinschätzung hätte holen können. Für die wirkliche
Lebenstüchtigkeit mancher Bauersleute seines Dorfes hatte der
kleine Büchermensch natürlich kein Auge. So kam der grüne Junge
nach und nach in einen Hochmut hinein, der ihn um so
unangenehmer machte, als er zu seinem eigentlichen Wesen gar
nicht paßte.
Wenn kein Mensch Peter in diesen Jahren recht leiden konnte, so
hatte er dennoch e i n e n wahren und treuen Freund. Das war des
Schulmeisters Phylax, der aus einer angesehenen
Schäferhundefamilie stammte. Wenn er mit diesem an den
Sonntagnachmittagen in der Heide, fernab von den Blicken der
Menschen, herumtollte, hatte er den Gelehrten und Schulmeister
ganz ausgezogen und war nichts als der gute, große Junge, der mit
lachenden Augen über die Heide sprang. Aber wenn er mit ihm
durch das Dorf nach dem Schulhause zurückkehrte, war er wieder
der Herr Schulmeister, und auch Phylax mußte dieser Würde seines
Freundes durch gesittetes Benehmen Rechnung tragen.
Vielleicht war dieser zweite Käfig, das Schulmeisterhaus in
Wehlingen, noch gefährlicher für Peter als der erste, die
stiefmütterliche Kate. Denn jetzt stand er in den Jahren, wo es sich
entscheiden mußte, ob er ein aufrechter, tüchtiger Mensch werden
oder als eine aus Mangel an Wärme, Licht und Luft verkrüppelte und
verkümmerte Existenz am Boden dahinvegetieren sollte. Das
letztere erschien nachgerade als das Wahrscheinlichere.
Da, am Anfang des dritten Jahres bei Schulmeister Wencke, trat
ein Neues in sein Leben hinein.
Als Peter am Sonnabend nach Ostern, einen Tag früher, als er
erwartet wurde, abends nach Wehlingen zurückkehrte, fand er das
Schulhaus bereits verschlossen. Er machte sich bescheiden durch
leises Bewegen des Drückers und durch Hüsteln bemerkbar, und
wartete geduldig, bis der Alte heranschlarren und, über Störung der
Nachtruhe brummend, öffnen würde. Der wohlbekannte
Schlarrschritt ließ sich aber nicht hören, sondern der Riegel wurde
plötzlich schnell zurückgeschoben, und es kam Peter vor, als ob
drinnen schnelle Füße husch husch husch über die Diele
davoneilten. Darüber wunderte er sich, und als er ins Haus trat, sah
er sich auf dem Vorplatz nach allen Seiten um, entdeckte aber nichts
Besonderes. So stieg er leise seine knarrende Treppe hinauf, legte
sich schlafen, und schlief, von der langen Wanderung und der
Frühjahrsluft ermüdet, tief in den Sonntag hinein.
Endlich erwachte er mit einem starken Hungergefühl. Denn er war
ja wieder einmal ohne ordentliches Abendbrot zu Bett gegangen. Er
kleidete sich schnell an und ging hinunter, um zu sehen, ob die
Schulmeisterin trotz des verschlafenen Morgenkaffees noch etwas
für ihn hätte. Noch auf der Treppe, sah er durch die halboffene
Küchentür mit Verwunderung, daß drinnen etwas Buntes, Schnelles
hantierte. Ehe ihm klar wurde, was das war, ging die Tür ganz auf,
und vor ihm stand ein — Mädchen. »Guten Morgen,« sagte sie
munter, »den Kaffee habe ich dir warm gestellt und bringe ihn gleich,
geh man in die Stube!«
Peter tat, wie ihm geheißen. Das erste in der Wohnstube, worauf
sein Blick fiel, war ein Glas gelber Osterblumen, das auf dem Tisch
stand. Und auf dem Nähtischchen neben einer Handarbeit entdeckte
er eins mit Weidenkätzchen. Der Frühling, an dessen ersten zarten
Kindern er sich gestern auf der Wanderung erfreut hatte, war auf
einmal, ganz gegen seine Gewohnheit, auch ins Schulmeisterhaus
gekommen und sogar in die dunkle Nordstube.
Die Tür ging auf. Da kam ein heller Sonnenstrahl hereingehuscht,
dann erschien eine blanke Zinnkanne, in deren geputztem Metall
sich auch ein wenig Frühlingssonne gefangen hatte, und die
bewegte sich gerade auf Peter zu. Er rückte scheu mit dem Stuhle
und sah von der Seite in ein Paar nahe Augen, die waren ganz voll
Frühling und Sonne. »Bist du bange vor mir?« fragten ein Paar
lachende Lippen, die zu diesen Augen gehörten. »Nehee,« sagte
Peter errötend und rückte mutig wieder auf seinen Platz. Das
Mädchen stand jetzt ihm gegenüber, die Hand auf der Kaffeekanne,
aus der sie ihm eben eingeschenkt hatte, und sah ihm unbefangen
und ruhig beobachtend ins Gesicht. Peter beugte sich vor
Verlegenheit zu seiner Tasse und tat schlürfend einen tiefen Zug.
»Du wunderst dich wohl, daß ich auf einmal hier bin?« fragte das
Mädchen.
Peter wischte sich mit dem Handrücken über den Mund, wagte es,
sie anzublicken und sagte: »Ja, das ist mir sehr auffällig. Was willst
du denn hier?«
»Mein Großvater schrieb mir, ich sollte kommen und Großmutter
helfen; es würde ihr mit der Arbeit zu viel.«
»Ach soo. Denn bist du dem Schulmeister Albers in Audorf seine
Tochter ...,« sagte Peter. Er hatte sich jetzt von seinem Staunen
erholt und fühlte sich der Situation gewachsen. »Wie heißt du
denn?«
»Marie. Ich bin die älteste.«
»Wie alt bist du denn?«
»Siebzehn.«
»So alt schon? Du siehst viel jünger aus. Ich bin auch siebzehn.«
»Mehr noch nicht? Du siehst viel älter aus.«
»Soo? Meinst du? Das freut mich.«
Sie lachte plötzlich laut auf.
»Was lachst du?« fragte Peter errötend.
»Och Mensch, du bist so furchtbar komisch.«
»Was? Ich?«
»Ja, wenn du einen um was fragst, machst du gerade so'n Gesicht
wie mein Großvater.«
»Soo?«
»Ja, so'n rechtes Schulmeistergesicht. Aber nun laß den Kaffee
nicht ganz kalt werden, und vergiß das Essen nicht.«
Peter gehorchte. Er trank ein paar Schluck und aß einige Mundvoll
dazu.
»Meine Großeltern sind zur Kirche. Großvater war böse, daß ich
dich dazu nicht früh genug geweckt hatte,« sagte sie, indem sie sich
an den Osterblumen zu schaffen machte.
»Och, das schadet nicht viel,« sagte Peter, »ich bin die Festtage
über oft genug hingewesen. Sag' mal, bleibst du lange hier?«
»Dieses Jahr gewiß. Zu Hause bin ich über.«
»Wie viel seid ihr denn bei euch?«
»Sieben. Fünf Mädchen und zwei Jungens.«
»Sieben? Ja, das ist zu viel.«
»Zu v i e l?«
»Ja, zu viel. Als ich noch zu Hause war, waren wir fünf. Das war
schon reichlich. Nun sind da auch schon wieder zwei zugekommen,
und wir sind auch sieben. Das ist zu viel.«
»Bei uns war's nicht zu viel. Wie wir immer vergnügt gewesen
sind, das kannst du dir gar nicht denken. Hier hatte ich die ersten
Tage ordentlich Heimweh. Ist man gut, daß du gekommen bist. So
ist's doch wenigstens noch einer mehr.«
Peter wurde ein wenig rot und sah zum Fenster hinaus. Dann
trank er seine Tasse aus und stand auf, um nach oben zu gehen.
Aber sie sagte: »Bleib' noch'n Augenblick sitzen. Ich will schnell
hinauf und deine Stube zurechtmachen.« Und schon war sie hinaus.
Er hörte das schnelle Knarr-knarr-knarr der Treppe, dann, wie sie
oben das Fenster aufstieß und eilig hin und her ging, wie sie sein
Bett klopfte. Dazu sang sie trällernd eine muntere Weise.
Was sollte bloß hieraus werden? Das ganze Haus war ja wie
verwandelt. Als ob alles auf den Kopf gestellt wäre!
Bald war sie wieder unten. »So!« sagte sie lustig, »nun mach' daß
du 'rauf kommst! Ich will jetzt hier zu Mittag decken, daß alles fertig
ist, wenn die Großeltern aus der Kirche kommen.«
Peter stieg hinauf. Als er in seine Dachstube kam, sah er sich
unwillkürlich nach den Spuren ihrer Tätigkeit um. Es kam ihm vor, als
ob sein Bett weicher aufgelockert wäre als sonst. Ein Buch, das
aufgeschlagen auf dem Tisch gelegen hatte — er hatte gestern
abend noch eben die Nase hineingesteckt — war, schwapp,
zugeklappt und in die Reihe der andern gestellt. Der Anzug, den er
gestern beim Zubettgehen über den Stuhl geworfen hatte, hing fein
säuberlich an seinem Haken. Was sollte das geben, was sollte das
geben? —
Es wurde ihm auf seiner Dachstube bald langweilig. Ein Buch vor
die Augen zu nehmen, fühlte er keine Lust. Draußen lachte die
Aprilsonne. Da beschloß er, einmal durch den Garten zu spazieren.
Kaum war er bei dem dicken Apfelbaum, da hörte er schnelle
Tritte hinter sich. Und richtig, da war sie, an die er gerad' eben
dachte. »Halt!« rief sie lustig, »bin mit allem fertig, die Kartoffeln
stehen auf dem Feuer, darf ich ein büschen mit?«
»Och jaa,« sagte Peter, »wenn du Zeit hast ...«
»Sag' mal,« fragte sie, indem sie nebeneinander den Steig
hinuntergingen, »kommt dir das hier in Wehlingen nicht manchmal
sehr langweilig vor?«
»Langweilig? Och nee.«
»Hast du denn Freunde?«
»Freunde? Weißt du, Marie, unter den Menschen sind wenige, die
einen verstehn. Meine Freunde sind die Bücher.«
Sie lachte hell auf. »Was? Die alten toten Dinger sind deine
Freunde? Hast du denn Lust, zu lesen?«
»Wer etwas werden will, der muß viel lesen und lernen,« sagte er
ernsthaft.
»Was liest du denn?«
»Och, alles Mögliche. Geistliches und Weltliches, Poesie und ...
das andere, was so gewöhnlich geschrieben ist und sich nicht reimt
..., Naturgeschichte und Weltgeschichte und ...«
»Mensch, verstehst du das denn alles?«
»Och ja, das geht. Man muß eben seinen Verstand gebrauchen
und scharf denken.«
»Junge, Junge, denn mußt du ja schrecklich klug werden.«
Peter lächelte überlegen und machte dann ein Gesicht, als ob er
eben daran wäre, die letzten Fragen alles Seins denkend zu
bewältigen.
»Mensch, du siehst schon ordentlich gelehrt aus, mit deinen
Falten vorm Kopf.«
Er sah zur Seite und blickte in ihr lachendes Gesicht. Die grauen
Augen, die Grübchen in den Wangen, der rote Mund, die weißen
Zähne, alles lachte. Da mußte er auch lachen.
»Eigentlich müßtest du erst'n Bart kriegen, und dann die Falten,«
meinte sie.
»Etwas kommt hier auch schon,« sagte Peter stolz und zupfte an
seiner Oberlippe.
»Wirklich?« fragte sie lachend und kam ganz nahe, um sich von
dem Vorhandensein der paar winzigen blonden Härchen zu
überzeugen. Er fühlte ihren Hauch auf seinem Gesicht, es wurde
ihm ganz wunderlich zumute.
»Wirklich, 'ne Idee is da schon, muß aber noch tüchtig wachsen.«
Sie waren an ein Stückchen frisch gegrabenen Landes
gekommen. »Das habe ich gestern gemacht,« sagte sie, mit dem
Fuß eine auf den Weg gefallene Erdscholle zertretend, »ach ja, is
noch 'n schöne Arbeit, den ganzen Garten umzugraben ... Ob mir
wohl einer dabei hilft?«
Sie sah Peter schelmisch an.
»Meinst du mich?« fragte er.
»Wen denn sonst?«
»Ich habe diese Jahre viel hier im Garten gearbeitet,« erklärte
Peter, »aber ich hatte mir eigentlich vorgenommen, mich diesen
Frühling und Sommer ganz den Büchern zu widmen. Weil ich doch
im Herbst aufs Seminar komme, weißt du.«
»Ach du, mit deinen alten Büchern immer! Du tust grad' so, als ob
das ganze Leben so zwischen den Pappdeckeln säße.«
»Marie, darüber mußt du nicht reden. Das verstehst du nicht,«
verwies er ernstlich. »Übrigens das mit dem Graben ... ich will nicht
sagen ... so 'ne Viertelstunde nach dem Mittagessen mal ... oder
auch mal 'ne halbe ... das ginge am Ende doch ... Die alten Lateiner
hatten ein Wort, das die Gelehrten folgendermaßen übersetzen: eine
gesunde Seele in einem gesunden Körper. Für die Seele sind die
Bücher, und für den Körper, ja, da ist so ein Stündchen Arbeit mal
ganz gut ... Ja, ich will dir wohl mit helfen ...«
»Peter, du sollst mal sehen, das wird aber gemütlich. Zu zweien
arbeitet sich's viel besser als allein. Großvater und Großmutter
schlafen dann; da können wir uns immer schön was erzählen. Ich
muß dir so viel erzählen, von meinen kleinen Brüdern zu Hause, und
von meinen Schwestern, und was wir da abends immer spielen. Und
du, na du kannst mir mal was aus deinen Büchern erzählen. Aber
nicht so'n langweiligen Kram, wo'n bei gähnen muß. Daß ich doch
etwas von deiner Gelehrsamkeit abkriege und nicht so dumm bleibe
... Hör'! Was ist das?«
Aus dem Dorf tönte plötzlich etwas herüber, wovon man zunächst
nicht wissen konnte, ob es ein Schmerzensgebrüll oder eine Art von
Gesang sein sollte. Wenn man genauer hinhörte, war die Melodie
des Chorals: »Wie schön leucht' uns der Morgenstern«
herauszuhören. Es klang trotz der Entfernung grauenerregend. Und
das Mädchen starrte ihren Begleiter entsetzt an, als sie fragte: »Was
ist das?«
Peter sagte gleichmütig: »Och, da wohnt so'n alter Kerl, der vor'n
Stücker zwanzig Jahren verrückt geworden ist. So grölt er jeden
Sonntagvormittag.«
»Ist das nicht der Gesang: ›Wie schön leucht' uns der
Morgenstern, voll Gnad' und Wahrheit von dem Herrn?‹«
»Ja, der soll's ja wohl sein. Mit dem, was daran fehlt.«
»Woher weiß denn der arme Mensch, daß Sonntag ist?«
»Och, das mag er wohl daran sehen, daß die andern Leute ihr
gutes Zeug anziehen und nach der Kirche gehen.«
»... Wie schön, daß der arme Mensch doch auch seinen Sonntag
hat! ... Hör', jetzt kann man's auch verstehen. Er hat nach dem
ersten Vers gleich den letzten angefangen. Hör': Amen — Amen —
komm du schöne — Freudenkrone — bleib nicht lange, — deiner
wart' ich mit Verlangen ... Nun ist er still ... Wenn sie ihm doch bald
geschenkt würde!«
Peter warf schnell einen erstaunten Blick auf das Mädchen, das
still nach der Richtung schaute, wo eben der Gesang verstummte.
Dann senkte er ein wenig den Kopf und errötete. Er schämte sich.
Auf der Höhe, über die der Kirchweg führte, wurden die ersten
zurückkehrenden Kirchbesucher sichtbar. Da gingen die beiden
langsam und schweigend durch den Garten zum Hause zurück.
Vor der Haustür wurde Peter stürmisch von seinem alten Freunde
Phylax begrüßt, der eben von einem Frühjahrsbummel durch das
Dorf zurückkam. Er tätschelte ihm zweimal mit der Hand über den
Kopf und kümmerte sich dann nicht weiter um ihn. Da leckte Phylax
sich verlegen ums Maul, und in seinem ehrlichen Hundegesicht war
ein ähnlicher Ausdruck, wie etwa in dem eines Menschen, der sich
nach langer Trennung einem alten Freunde an die Brust geworfen
hat und nun plötzlich merkt, daß bei jenem die Freundschaft
merklich abgekühlt ist, vielleicht weil sich inzwischen für ihn etwas
Besseres gefunden hat. Phylax sah das Mädchen mit einem Blick
an, als ob er sie in Verdacht hätte, ihm die Freundschaft Peters
gestohlen zu haben.
Als die Schulmeistersleute zurückkamen, setzte die jetzt
vierköpfige Familie sich sofort an den Mittagstisch.
»Peter,« begann der Schulmeister, »durch deine Langschläferei
hast du dich um eine ganz wunderschöne Predigt gebracht. Der
Pastor hat anerkennenswert gut über das heutige Evangelium
gepredigt: Wie der Herr unter die Jünger tritt bei verschlossenen
Türen und sagt: Friede sei mit euch. Dieser schöne Gruß klang da
immer wieder durch, und ging einem recht zu Herzen. Ich habe mich
sehr erbaut ... Aber Marie, was hast du bloß mit dem Essen
angefangen? Der Suppe fehlt das Salz, und das Fleisch hast du
nicht mürbe gekriegt. Hast du denn gar nicht an meine Zähne und
meinen schwachen Magen gedacht?«
Die Getadelte wollte die Zähigkeit des Fleisches mit dem Alter der
Kuh entschuldigen, wurde aber zur Ruhe verwiesen. Da konnte
Peter sich nicht mehr halten. Ihm hatte es die beiden Jahre noch nie
so gut geschmeckt wie eben jetzt, und er sagte, ohne aufzublicken:
»Ich finde im Gegenteil, es schmeckt alles s e h r gut,« und hieb
tapfer mit den Zähnen auf eine Sehne ein. Die Schulmeisterin hatte
ihre Gabel hingelegt und sah Peter starr von der Seite an. Der
Schulmeister aber sagte, hämisch lächelnd: »Soo? Du hast wohl mal
wieder gehörig hungern müssen, bei deinem nassen Vater und der
zärtlichen Stiefmutter?« Peter wurde glutrot und beugte sich tief über
den Tisch. Er schämte sich vor der neuen Hausgenossin. Als man
aufstand, ging er schnell aus der Stube, ohne jemand anzusehen.
Auf seiner Dachkammer angelangt, schlug er mit der Faust
dröhnend auf den altersschwachen Tisch. Seine Scham war dem
Zorne gewichen. Zum ersten Male, solange er in Wehlingen war, war
er auf den Schulmeister wirklich zornig. Da läuft der Kerl, dachte er,
in die Kirche und erbaut sich an dem Friedensgruß des
Auferstandenen, und dann kommt er wieder und verdirbt seinen
Mitmenschen den schönen Sonntag; dem armen Ding da unten
durch ungerechtes Mäkeln am Essen und ihm, Peter, durch den
hämischen Spott über seine häuslichen Verhältnisse, an denen er
doch unschuldig war und unter denen er ohnehin genug litt. Aber so
war der Mann eigentlich ja schon immer gewesen. Peter wunderte
sich, daß er jetzt erst anfing, ihn zu durchschauen.
An diesem Vormittag war's ihm gewesen, als sei ein neuer Geist in
das Schulhaus eingezogen. Er mußte bitter lachen, wie er jetzt
daran dachte. Nein, der alte mürrische, unzufriedene, kleinliche
Geist hatte nach wie vor die Herrschaft. Aber etwas anders war's
doch geworden ...
Wart', morgen mittag, wenn die beiden alten Ekel auf dem Ohr
liegen, dann grabe ich im Garten ... Nicht allein, wie diese beiden
langweiligen Jahre, sondern in Gesellschaft. Sie freut sich mächtig
darauf. Wie lachten ihre Augen, als ich ihr versprach, daß ich ihr
helfen wollte! Och ja, es kann ganz interessant werden. Solche
Mädchen haben was Komisches an sich ... Ich soll ihr aus den
Büchern erzählen ... Was nehme ich da wohl? Ich muß etwas
Leichtes aussuchen. Das Schwere versteht so'n Mädchen ja doch
nicht ... Daß ein Gelehrter gesagt hat, die Menschen stammten von
den Affen ab, und es auch Menschen gibt, von denen man das
beinahe glauben könnte ... Daß der alte Kaiser Barbarossa unten im
Kyffhäuser sitzt, und der lange weiße Bart ist ihm durch den
steinernen Tisch gewachsen, und daß Deutschland vielleicht noch
mal einen Kaiser wieder kriegte; einige meinten, der König von
Preußen müßte es werden, aber er, Peter, hätte mal gelesen, die
Preußen wären gar keine echten Deutschen, sondern halbe Russen,
und er hätte mal einen Preußen gesehen und von diesem einen sehr
schlechten Eindruck gewonnen ... Daß die Franzosen einmal eine
große Revolution gemacht und dabei ihren König geköpft und den
lieben Gott abgesetzt hätten. So wäre es aber doch nicht gegangen,
und da hätten sie ihn wieder eingesetzt, das heißt nicht den
richtigen, sondern nur ein »höchstes Wesen« ... Daß die Menschen
einen Stoff entdeckt hätten, den sie Elektrizität nennten, und manche
meinten, damit würde man noch mal Wagen ziehen können. Aber
das glaube er nicht, denn es sei schon wunderbar genug, daß der
Dampf das könne ... Daß Schiller und Goethe die größten deutschen
Dichter wären, aber sie wären beide tot, und nun gäbe es gar keine
Dichter mehr, die ordentlich reimen könnten ... und so noch vieles
mehr. Aber dies war für morgen wohl erst einmal genug.
Peter war seines geistigen Besitzes noch niemals so von Herzen
froh gewesen als diesen Sonntagnachmittag, da er die Aussicht
hatte, ihn am nächsten Tage auf so angenehme Weise zu verwerten.
Und dann wollte sie ihm ja auch erzählen. Ach ja, von ihren
Brüdern und Schwestern! Davon versprach er sich nicht viel. Aber
was sollte man sonst groß von ihr verlangen? Sie war ja nur ein
Mädchen. Die lasen und lernten ja gar nichts mehr, wenn sie aus der
Schule waren. Aber sie war doch wohl etwas anderes als die
meisten ... Sie hatte ja selbst gesagt, daß sie nicht so dumm bleiben
wollte. Na, was er, Peter, dazu tun konnte, das wollte er gewiß tun.
Am nächsten Morgen trug Peter einige der für den Nachmittag

vorgesehenen Unterrichtsgegenstände in der Schule vor. Er hatte
sich zwar die Form, in der er's ihr bringen wollte, gestern nachmittag
schon einigermaßen überlegt. Aber es konnte nicht schaden, wenn
er auch den Vortrag einmal praktisch durchübte.
Beim Mittagessen sagte der Schulmeister: »Kinder, es hilft nun
nichts, ihr müßt gleich beide tüchtig ans Graben. Daß wir die
Frühjahrssaat in die Erde kriegen!«
Peter verbarg die Freude seines Herzens unter einer
gleichgültigen Maske. Aber eine Sekunde lang zuckte es doch über
sein Gesicht. Marie hatte ihn heimlich auf den Fuß getreten.
»Denn kommt,« sagte der Schulmeister, »daß ich euch anweise.«
Sie holten schnell ihre Spaten aus der Scheune und folgten dem
Alten. Der führte sie an die Ostgrenze des Gartens und sagte: »So,
Peter, hier gräbst d u. Und d u, Marie, fährst dort im Westen fort, wo
du angefangen hast. Jeder für sich! Daß ihr mir nicht die kostbare
Zeit mit Schnacken vertrödelt!«
»Och Großvater, dürfen wir nicht zusammen arbeiten? Wir wollen
auch tüchtig fleißig sein,« sagte Marie.
»Nein, Kind,« sagte der Alte bestimmt, »das hält euch nur auf.
Und das schickt sich auch nicht für so'n großen Jungen und so'n
großes Mädchen.«
»Das schickt sich nicht?« fragte Peter und sah den Schulmeister
fast herausfordernd an.
»Nein. Ihr seid beide keine Kinder mehr. Steh nicht, Marie, und
gaff'! Mach, daß du an deine Arbeit kommst!«
Sie nahm ihre Schaufel und entfernte sich, zögernd und
widerwillig. Der Schulmeister ging langsam durch den Garten ins
Haus zurück.
Peter hatte die Zähne aufeinandergebissen und sah ihm voll Wut
nach. Nicht mal eine kleine Unterhaltung gönnte ihm der bei der
Arbeit? War er, Peter, denn sein Sklave? Man sollte dem ekligen Kerl
die Schaufel vor die Füße werfen und keinen Stich mehr für ihn tun.
Er sah nach dem entgegengesetzten Ende des Gartens hinüber.
Marie hatte auch noch nicht angefangen zu graben. Sie blickte zu
ihm herüber. Den Ausdruck ihres Gesichts konnte er bei der
Entfernung nicht erkennen. Aber er sah, daß sie ärgerlich mit dem
Fuße aufstampfte.
Ach was! dachte Peter, der Alte schläft. Geh einfach hin und grabe
mit ihr! Aber ... »das schickt sich nicht.«
Was schickt sich nicht?
Daß er sie, die Belehrung verlangte, belehrte? Daß er ihren engen
Gesichtskreis erweiterte? Warum sollte sich das nicht schicken?
Er nahm seine Schaufel und tat ein paar Schritte. Aber es stand
wie eine unsichtbare Mauer zwischen ihm und ihr: »Es schickt sich
nicht.«
Dem Befehl des Schulmeisters hätte er heute mit gutem Gewissen
getrotzt. Aber über dieses dumme Wort kam er nicht hinweg.
Und dem Mädchen drüben ging es ebenso. Auch sie dachte
daran, dem Großvater zu trotzen und zu Peter hinüber zu gehen.
Aber ... »es schickt sich nicht.« Warum nicht? »Ihr seid keine Kinder
mehr.« Nachdenklich sah sie vor sich hin, eine feine Röte legte sich
auf ihr Gesicht; dann nahm sie die Schaufel und fing langsam an,
das Erdreich herumzuwerfen.
Peter stieß plötzlich seinen Spaten in die Erde und ging mit
kurzen, trotzigen Schritten ins Haus. Als er die knarrende Treppe
hinanstieg, gab er sich keine Mühe, leise zu gehen. Der Alte sollte
es hören und sich darüber ärgern, daß er nicht für ihn graben wollte.
Voll Grimm riß er ein Buch aus der Reihe und fing an zu lesen.
Aber bald irrten seine Blicke über die Zeilen hinweg. Er war mit
seinen Gedanken im Garten. Da fiel ihm plötzlich ein, wenn er sich
tüchtig ans Graben machte, müßten sie ja doch bald
zusammentreffen. Und nach einer Weile stieg er trotzig die Treppe
wieder hinab und kehrte in den Garten zurück. Und fing an zu
graben, wobei er sich immer wieder beteuerte, der alte Schulmeister
wäre es nicht wert, daß man den kleinen Finger für ihn rührte.
Als er sich endlich zwang, nicht mehr an ihn zu denken, fingen all
die schönen Sachen, die er bei ihr hatte anbringen wollen, an, ihn
sehr zu drücken. Aber je mehr er in Schweiß geriet, desto leichter
und klarer wurde ihm der Kopf. Er grub nicht nur das halbe
Stündchen, das er gestern allenfalls den Büchern entziehen zu
dürfen gemeint hatte, sondern den ganzen Nachmittag. Wenn er
einmal innehielt, schielte er unter dem Baumgezweige und über dem
Beerengesträuch weg nach der Westseite des Gartens. Und es traf
sich fast immer, daß Maries Arbeitspausen mit den seinigen
zusammenfielen. Dann schaute sie zu ihm herüber. So waren sie,
obgleich der ganze Garten und das »Es schickt sich nicht« des
Schulmeisters zwischen ihnen lag, doch Arbeitsgenossen, wenn sie
sich auch nichts aus den Büchern und aus dem Leben erzählen
konnten. Dem brummigen Alter gegenüber, das im Hause bei
geschlossenen Fensterläden durch ein Mittagsschläfchen im Bett
verbunden war, fühlte die Jugend im Garten, über dem der
wunderliche April bald lachte, bald weinte, sich durch die gleiche
Arbeit verbunden.
So wiederholte es sich in den nächsten Tagen. Peter wurde seinen
Büchern fast untreu. Auch wenn er auf seiner Stube saß, widmete er
sich ihnen nicht mit dem gleichen Eifer wie sonst. Sie schienen ihm
so viele völlig gleichgültige Dinge zu enthalten. Er nahm sich aber
fest vor, nach der Frühjahrsbestellung wollte er alles, was er jetzt
versäumte, nachholen.
Der April vergaß in diesem Jahre früher als gewöhnlich seine
wunderlichen Launen und brachte die schönsten Sonnentage. Die
kleinen Vögel kamen zurück, jagten sich durch Busch und Baum in
frohem Liebesspiel, suchten Halme und Federn zum Nestbau und
sangen den beiden fleißigen jungen Menschenkindern zu ihrer
Arbeit. Wenn die herzfrohe Grasmücke im Fliederbusch es so recht
jubelnd machte, standen diese, von der Arbeit ausruhend, sahen
nach dem Vöglein und sahen dann einander froh an. Denn so nahe
hatten sie sich schon zusammengearbeitet, daß sie das konnten.
Zuweilen, auf dem Wege von und zu der Arbeit, und auch wohl
einmal zwischendurch, sprachen sie auch miteinander. Aber die
Harmlosigkeit jenes ersten Sonntagmorgens war nicht mehr. Das
Gespräch wollte gar nicht so recht in Gang kommen. Peter, der
sonst immer so weise und weitläufig hatte reden können und vorher
immer ganz genau wußte, was er sagen wollte, war in den paar
kurzen günstigen Augenblicken jedesmal wie auf den Mund
geschlagen. Aber er tröstete sich. Er meinte, das würde sich schon
wieder machen, wenn sie nur erst zusammen auf einem Stück
arbeiteten. Die Stunde kam ja mit jedem Spatenstich näher.
Am Abend vor diesem langersehnten Tage saß Peter auf seiner
Dachstube und überlegte sich noch einmal, was er ihr denn morgen
eigentlich erzählen wollte. Da hielt er es für gut, zwischen den
Dingen, die er vor zehn Tagen sich vorgenommen hatte, zu sichten.
Die Affengeschichte und die Politik schied er aus. Dafür schob er ein
Gedicht von Schiller ein, das er auswendig gelernt hatte, weil es ihm
so sehr gefiel:
In einem Tal bei armen
Hirten
Erschien mit jedem
jungen Jahr,
Sobald die ersten
Lerchen schwirrten,
Ein Mädchen schön und
wunderbar.
Die ersehnte, mit vielen tausend Spatenstichen und manchem
Schweißtropfen verdiente Stunde war gekommen! Aber o weh! Die
Aermsten! Schulmeister Wencke fühlte sich diesen Tag so frisch und
fand die Frühlingsluft so köstlich, daß er auf das gewohnte
Mittagsschläfchen verzichtete und nahe der Arbeitsstätte von Peter
und Marie Bohnen legte. So gruben denn die beiden ihre letzten
Reihen stumm und verdrossen und waren so ärgerlich, daß sie auch
einander nicht einmal einen freundlichen Blick gönnten.
Was hatte Peter sich nicht alles von dieser gemeinsamen Arbeit
versprochen! Und wie war das alles zu Wasser geworden! Aber
schön war's doch gewesen. Jetzt, wo die Arbeit vollendet war, fehlte
ihm etwas. Er suchte Ersatz in seinen Büchern. Aber die wollten ihn
gar nicht recht fesseln. Immer wieder irrte sein Blick durch das kleine
Fenster der Dachkammer in das Grün des Apfelbaumzweiges und
darüber hinaus ins Blaue.
Die Bohnen, die Schulmeister Wencks zitterige Hand unter Peters

stillen Verwünschungen in die Erde gesteckt hatte, hielten es dort
unten im Dunkeln nicht lange aus. Es dauerte nur wenige Tage, so
schickten sie grüne Blättchen ans Licht empor. Und bald angelten
grüne Ränkchen nach einem Halt, um noch höher aufzusteigen ins
goldene Licht.
»Marie,« sagte da eines Mittags der Schulmeister, »die
Bohnenstangen müssen eingesteckt werden. Peter kann dir dabei
helfen. Ich will mich lieber hinlegen, habe so Rheumatismus in der
rechten Schulter. Wißt ihr, wie das gemacht wird?«
»Ja,« sagten Peter und Marie wie aus einem Munde.
Peter wollte just vor Freude Marie auf den Fuß treten. Da fiel's ihm
plötzlich ein: »Das schickt sich nicht für so'n großen Jungen, und ihr
seid keine Kinder mehr.« Und er zog den schon ausgestreckten Fuß
zurück.
Marie mußte nach dem Essen zunächst das Geschirr aufwaschen.
Denn auch Mutter Wencke fühlte sich nicht ganz wohl. Peter aber
sprang auf den Hausboden, wo nicht weit von seiner Dachkammer
die Bohnenstangen überwintert hatten, stieß die von staubigem
Spinnegewebe umsponnene Luke auf und warf die Schächte hinaus.
Dann sprang er, immer zwei Absätze überschlagend, die Treppe
hinunter und schleppte sie, jedesmal ein gutes halbes Dutzend auf
die Schulter legend, zum Bohnenfelde. Als er sie alle an Ort und
Stelle hatte, setzte er sich erhitzt auf den Stangenhaufen, trocknete
den Schweiß und sah erwartungsvoll nach dem Hause ...
Horch, da quiekt die alte Gartentür. Und da leuchtet ihr Schleierhut
zwischen dem lichten Maiengrün. Aber! Was ist das? Da soll doch
der ...! Zehn Schritte hinter ihr der alte Kerl. Ist der mit seinem
Rheumatismus nicht längst im Bette?! Peter biß ingrimmig die Zähne
aufeinander und wünschte dem Schulmeister den Rheumatismus in
beide Beine.
»Ich bin doch bange, daß ihr mir die Sache nicht recht macht,«
quäkte der Schulmeister, als er bei den Bohnen angekommen war.
»Die Wurzeln müssen geschont werden, und die Stangen müssen
fest in die Erde, daß der Wind mir nachher den ganzen Kram nicht
umreißt, und auskommen müssen wir auch mit dem Haufen auf
beiden Feldern; denn neue sind so schnell nicht zu kriegen.« Dann
nahm er eine Stange, um sie in die Erde zu stoßen. »Au!« schrie er
plötzlich mit schmerzlich verzogenem Gesicht, ließ die Stange los
und griff sich nach der rechten Schulter. »Nein, Kinder, es ist doch
zu toll. Ihr müßt's allein tun. Macht's so, wie ich gesagt habe, schont
mir die Wurzeln, nicht zu dicht an die Pflanzen mit den Stangen,
aber tief in die Erde und gut durch Querstangen verbunden, und
seht, daß ihr auskommt!« Damit ging er, die wehe Schulter
schmerzlich haltend. Peter sah ihm nicht ohne Schadenfreude nach,
und als er in Mariens Schleierhut blickte, entdeckte er da auch nicht
gerade Mitgefühl. »Wollen hoffen, daß er sehr schön schläft,« sagte
er lachend, »das ist für so alte Leute das beste.« Da nickte sie und
lachte auch.
Und nun machten sie sich an die Arbeit. Peter riß den Haufen der
Stangen auseinander, und mit Sorgfalt suchten sie jedesmal zwei
Stangen aus, die nach Länge und Stärke zueinander paßten. Dann
nahm er die eine und sie die andere, und sie stellten sich, das
Bohnenbeet zwischen sich, einander gegenüber, und jedes stieß
seine Stange mit der jungen Kraft seiner siebzehn Jahre in den
lockeren Erdboden, erst mit der Muskelkraft der Arme, dann das
ganze Körpergewicht einen Augenblick mit einem Ruck daran
hängend. Bald fanden sie heraus, daß sich auf Kommando besser
arbeiten ließ, und sie kamen überein, bei jeder Stange abwechselnd
das Rucken und Nachstoßen zu kommandieren. »Eins, zwei, drei,
R u c k, eins, zwei, drei, R u c k!« kommandierte Peter mit seiner
rauhen, unreinen Stimme, die im Wechseln begriffen war. »Eins,
zwei, d r e i, eins, zwei, d r e i!« kommandierte mit heller, reiner
Stimme Marie. Zwischendurch rüttelte Peter einmal prüfend an
seiner Stange und an Marie ihrer: sie saßen beide gleich fest in der
Erde.
An seine Wissenschaft, die er so lange für Marie mit sich
herumgetragen hatte, dachte Peter mit keinem Gedanken. Er hatte
völlig genug an den Bohnenstangen, an dem Schleierhut mit dem
rosig überschatteten, lieblichen Gesicht darin, an der jungen Gestalt,
die sich kraftvoll und zierlich zugleich vor seinen verwunderten
Augen bewegte. Wenn er in dieser Stunde einen Wunsch hätte
äußern dürfen, wie der Mann im Märchen, so wäre es sicher der
gewesen, bis an sein Ende bei der warmen Maiensonne im grünen
Garten unter Grasmückengesang mit Marie Bohnenstangen
einstecken zu dürfen.
Aber solcher Wunsch wurde ihm von keiner gütigen Fee gewährt,
und bald staken die Schächte alle in der Erde. Es blieb nur noch
übrig, die Verbindungsstangen über die Kreuzungsstellen zu legen
und festzubinden. In stillschweigender Uebereinkunft machten sie
das so, daß jeder eine um die andere Kreuzungsstelle verband, so
daß sie, immer wieder voreinander vorübergehend, die ganze
Stangenreihe entlang beieinander blieben. Peter band richtige
Knoten, Marie Schleifen, aber fest saßen die Schleifen wie die
Knoten.
Nun stand das Stangengerüst, aufrecht, gleichmäßig und fest.
Noch einmal prüften sie das Ganze mit derbem Ruck. Das Gebäude
gab nicht nach. »Das haben wir gut gemacht,« sagte er stolz und
froh, »ja, ja, wir beide zusammen, das gibt was.«
Ein Fink kam angeflogen, setzte sich auf die höchste der Stangen
und schmetterte seinen Vers herunter.
»Kuck da, Marie,« rief Peter, »der freut sich auch über unser
Werk.«
Marie sagte verwundert: »Mensch, heute sollte man gar nicht
denken, daß du ein Schulmeister bist.«
»Ein Schulmeister?« fragte Peter lustig, »das bin ich heute auch
nicht. Heute nachmittag bin ich mal ein Mensch. Meinst du denn,
daß unsereiner immer ein weises, feierliches Gesicht machen
muß?«
»Och nee,« lachte sie, »das habe i c h noch niemals gemeint. Aber
nun sind wir fertig. Nun kannst du wieder an deine Bücher gehen.«
»An meine Bücher? Och Menschenkind, schnack' doch nicht so'n
dummes Zeug! Die Bücher? Die sind ganz gut für den Winter. Aber
an solchem Maitag wie heute? Am liebsten möchte ich in einem fort
jubeln und singen.«
»Denn sing doch!« sagte sie. »Ich hab' dich noch niemals singen
hören.«
»Och nein, zum Singen ist's doch viel zu schön ... Fliegen möchte
ich, so hoch wie die Schwalben, und noch viel höher; so hoch wie
die Sonne da steht, und noch tausendmal so hoch.«
»Menschenkind! Was hast du bloß? Du bist ja ganz aus dem
Häuschen.«
»Oh, Marie ... es ist heute so wunderschönes Wetter. Das dringt
einem ins Herz und ins Geblüt. Wer heute nicht anders ist als sonst,
weißt du, was der verdient?«
»Na?«
»Ordentlich welche hinten vor!« sagte Peter übermütig, hielt die
rechte Hand schlagbereit und sah sich um, als ob er jemand suchte,
an dem er diese Strafe vollziehen könnte.
Marie lachte hell auf. »Nun bist du ja auf einmal doch wieder
Schulmeister,« sagte sie und sah ihm lustig in die Augen.
»Kuck mal den kleinen Vogel da zwischen den Kartoffeln,«
flüsterte Peter eifrig, indem er mit dem Finger hinzeigte.
»Das ist ja ein Wippsteert,« sagte sie froh. »Ei kuck doch mal, wie
zierlich er da hüpft und wippt ... Die kleinen Vögel kommen mir
immer vor wie lebendige Blumen ...«
»Ei ja,« sagte Peter verwundert, »das hast du dir fein ausgedacht
...«
»Wie hat der liebe Gott das doch alles so schön gemacht in der
Welt!«
»Ja,« sagte Peter nachdenklich und froh.
Das Vöglein erhob sich plötzlich und flog mit lautem Angstgeschrei
dem Hause zu. Die beiden sahen ihm nach. Da kam von dort eine
Krähe geflogen, die lautlos über die Baumkronen dahinstrich und
von zwei kleinen Vögeln unter schrillen Klagetönen verfolgt wurde.
»Die armen Wippsteerte!« sagte Marie traurig, »da hat ihnen die
scheußliche Krähe ein Kind geraubt.«
»Und eben saß das kleine Tier hier so seelenvergnügt vor uns und
wippte mit dem Schwanz,« sagte Peter ernst. »Ja, so geht es oft ...
auch im Menschenleben ...«
Sie schwiegen beide. Marie bückte sich und legte eine in der Luft
schwankende Bohnenranke an die nächste Stange. Peter folgte
ihrem Beispiel, und so boten sie allen Pflanzen, die sich schon nach
einem Halt sehnten, hilfreiche Hand. Zu einem zarten Ränkchen,
das sich widerspenstig zeigte, sagte Peter, und die alte Fröhlichkeit
war wieder in seiner Stimme: »So halte dich doch, du eigensinniges

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Achieving Democracy Through Interest

Representation: Interest Groups in

Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation:

The Causes and Consequences of Interest Theory:

Competing Interest Groups and Lobbying in the

Politics of Representation: Historically Disadvantaged

Ethical Data Science: Prediction in the Public Interest

Pan-Slavism and Slavophilia in Contemporary Central and

Illiberal Trends and Anti-EU Politics in East Central

The Influence of Business Cultures in Europe: An

Patrycja Rozbicka · Paweł Kamiński

More information about this series at

Interest Groups, Advocacy and Democracy Series

Cover illustration: Martin Barraud/Getty Images

of the political and social contexts on interest representation, stimulating

Birmingham, UK Patrycja Rozbicka

We would like to thank following colleagues: Paulina Pośpieszna and

1 Achieving Democracy Through Interest Representation:

2 Interest Organizations in Central and Eastern Europe:

2.2 Defining Interest Organizations in the Post-Communist

3 Organized Interest in the Policy-Making Process 59

4 The Drivers Behind Relations Between Interest

4.7 What Explains Party—Group Interactions? 105

5 The Organizational Development of Nongovernmental

6 The Significance of Trade Unions in the CEE

7 Seeking Access to Policy Stakeholders: Business

8 Interest Organizations in CEE Countries

9 Conclusions: The Future of Lobbying in the CEE

Patrycja Rozbicka Associate Professor in Politics and International Rela-

Paweł Kamiński Adjunct at the Institute of Political Studies, Polish

Meta Novak Assistant Professor at the Faculty of Social Sciences,

Vaida Jankauskaitė, Ph.D. is a Researcher at the Faculty of Social

CEE Central and Eastern Europe

Fig. 2.1 Year of establishment 44

Table 2.1 An overview of organizations’ typology 37

Table 8.4 Frequency of contacts with EU institutions, mean value

Achieving Democracy Through Interest

The study of interest group politics—the organization, aggregation, artic-

1 http://www.intereuro.eu/public/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

© The Author(s) 2021 1

Advocacy and Public Policy Project3 ). In particular, the European schol-

3 http://lobby.la.psu.edu/. Accessed 17 October 2019.

in similar, but somewhat idiosyncratic environments as there had been

The assessment of the quality of democracy through the study of

1.1 Interest Representation

1.1.1 From Pluralism and Corporatism to Neo-Pluralism

share in its rewards. Due to increased demands, the state depends on

1.1.2 Democratic Theory

political parties, elections are irregular occurrences and scholars ques-

The discussion on alternatives to diminishing citizens’ participation

ethos and open to deliberation. It is based on a qualified delegate model,

Neo-pluralism and participatory democracy in particular have offered

1.2 Why Study Interest Groups

by market relations. Following this perspective, we would expect to find

to their West European peers with extremely low numbers of associa-

lack of translation into English limiting their usefulness for compara-

1.3 Research, Methodology

Similar attempts, but to a much smaller degree, were attempted within

group systems, as well as providing a framework for subsequent work

interestingly omitting the interactions with directly elected representa-

Bartolini, S. (2005). Restructuring Europe: Centre Formation, System Building,

Cunningham, F. (2002). Theories of Democracy: A Critical Introduction. London:

Greenwood, J. (2007). Organized Civil Society and Democratic Legitimacy in