(Download PDF) A Miracle Creed The Principle of Optimality in Leibnizs Physics and Philosophy Jeffrey K Mcdonough Full Chapter PDF

A Miracle Creed: The Principle of
Optimality in Leibniz's Physics and

Philosophy Jeffrey K. Mcdonough
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/a-miracle-creed-the-principle-of-optimality-in-leibnizs-
physics-and-philosophy-jeffrey-k-mcdonough/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
The Toyota Way Jeffrey K. Liker
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-toyota-way-jeffrey-k-liker/
A Mother's Creed Lilo Quie
https://ebookmass.com/product/a-mothers-creed-lilo-quie/
Physics of nuclear reactors K. Umasankari
https://ebookmass.com/product/physics-of-nuclear-reactors-k-
umasankari/
The Toyota Way 2nd Edition Jeffrey K. Liker
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-toyota-way-2nd-edition-jeffrey-
k-liker/
Engineering Physics Hitendra K Malik
https://ebookmass.com/product/engineering-physics-hitendra-k-
malik/
The Principle of Moments Esmie Jikiemi-Pearson
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-principle-of-moments-esmie-
jikiemi-pearson/
The Principle of Political Hope Loren Goldman
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-principle-of-political-hope-
loren-goldman/
Leibniz on the Problem of Evil Paul Rateau
https://ebookmass.com/product/leibniz-on-the-problem-of-evil-
paul-rateau/
Principle of Macroeconomics: A Streamlined Approach 4th

Edition Frank
https://ebookmass.com/product/principle-of-macroeconomics-a-
streamlined-approach-4th-edition-frank/
A MIR ACLE CREED
A MIR ACLE CREED
The Principle of Optimality in Leibniz’s Physics and

Philosophy
Jeffrey K. McDonough
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2022
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: McDonough, Jeffrey K., author.
Title: A miracle creed : the principle of optimality in Leibniz’s physics and philosophy /
Jeffrey K. McDonough.
Description: New York, NY, United States of America : Oxford University Press, 2022. |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2021036136 (print) | LCCN 2021036137 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197629079 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197629086 |
ISBN 9780197629109 | ISBN 9780197629093 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Freiherr von, 1646–1716. |
Teleology. | Physics—Philosophy.
Classification: LCC B2598 .M33 2022 (print) | LCC B2598 (ebook) |
DDC 193—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021036136
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2021036137
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197629079.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Integrated Books International, United States of America
CONTENTS
Acknowledgments vii
Abbreviations xi
Introduction 1
1. Optics and Immanent Lawful Teleology 8
1.1. A Unitary Principle for Optics (1682) 11
1.2. Immanent Lawful Teleology 19
1.3. An Old Myth about Teleology? 28
1.3.1. First Objection: Thin Teleology Isn’t
Genuine Teleology 29
1.3.2. Second Objection: Immanent Lawful
Teleology Isn’t (Even) Thin Teleology 35
1.4. Two Realms Revisited 49
1.5. Conclusion 58
2. Rigid Beams and the Foundations of Physics 60
2.1. New Proofs Concerning the Resistance of Solids
(1684) 63
v
Contents
2.2. A Model for Leibnizian Forces 73

2.3. A Model for Leibnizian Bodies 80
2.4. Are Monads Spatial Per Se? 90
2.5. Conclusion 98
3. Vis viva and the Origins of Leibniz’s Natural
Philosophy 100
3.1. A Brief Demonstration of a Notable Error (1686) 102
3.2. Contingency 107
3.3. Providence 117
3.4. Entelechies 125
3.5. Conclusion 131
4. Hanging Chains and Monadic Agency 133
4.1. A String Bending under its Own Weight (1691) 134
4.2. An Unlikely Model of the Will 138
4.3. Non-optimal Agency and Bayle’s Dog 146
4.4. Optimal Form and a Role for Reason 158
4.5. Conclusion 167
5. Falling Bodies and the Rise of Variational Mechanics 169
5.1. The Problem of the Brachistochrone (1696) 170
5.2. The Triumph of Variational Principles 177
5.3. Derivative Principles? 187
5.3.1. An Incomplete Mechanics? 188
5.3.2. An Unexplanatory Mechanics? 193
5.3.3. An Upside-Down Mechanics? 200
5.4. Conclusion 204
Epilogue 207
Bibliography 215
Index 231
vi
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
This book is the product of many years of labor and more debts of
all kinds than I can now possibly recall. I recognize all too well that it
would not have been possible without the help and support of many
friends, teachers, colleagues, and, above all, my family.
As a student I was fortunate to have enjoyed the support of
faculty and staff at three different philosophy departments. I was
drawn into philosophy by my teachers at Santa Clara University
many years ago. They gave me my first taste for the history of phi-
losophy, and they remain in my memory as ideals, both as teachers
and philosophers. Among the outstanding members of that de-
partment, I owe a special thanks to Philip Kain, William Parent,
and Elizabeth Radcliffe. The Philosophy Department at Syracuse
University generously took me on as a graduate student and allowed
me to continue my studies. There I was tremendously lucky to be
a part of a department that cared in equal measure about doing
and teaching philosophy. Among my many excellent teachers
there, I owe special thanks to Jonathan Bennett, John Hawthorne,
and Brent Mundy as well as to my dear friends David Bzdak, John
vii
Acknowledgments
Draeger, and Erik Schmidt. I owe David a special debt of gratitude

for carefully reading the entire manuscript and preparing the index.
The University of California at Irvine provided me with the oppor-
tunity to complete my graduate studies. With the twin departments
of Philosophy and Logic and Philosophy of Science, it could not
have been a more ideal setting for my philosophical interests. I felt
like a kid in a candy store. From the Philosophy Department, I owe
a special debt of gratitude to Bonnie Kent, Nicholas Jolley, and Alan
Nelson. From the Department of Logic and Philosophy of Science,
I owe the same to Jeff Barrett, Penelope Maddy, David Malament,
and Kyle Stanford.
Many colleagues and students have since supported and improved
my philosophical work. I am grateful to all my colleagues—and the
wonderful staff that supports us—in the Philosophy Department at
Harvard. I owe a singular debt of gratitude to my fellow early mod-
ernist, and friend, Alison Simmons. Outside of Harvard, my efforts
over the last decade and a half have been supported by adoptive
communities during two research sabbaticals. I am grateful for the
welcome and support my family and I received from the Leibniz
Forschungsstelle in Münster, Germany, and from the Center for
the Philosophy of Religion at the University of Notre Dame. From
the Leibniz Forschungsstelle, I wish to express special thanks to
Professor Dr. Thomas Leinkauf, Professor Dr. Stephan Meier-
Oesser, Gerhard Biller, Stefan Jenschke, Dr. Herma Kliege-Biller,
Dr. Stefan Lorenz, Dr. Lucia Oliveri, and the late Professor Dr.
Heinrich Schepers. From the Center for the Philosophy of Religion,
I wish to express special thanks to Karl Ameriks, Robert Audi,
Katherine Brading, Therese Cory, Michael Rea, Blake Roeber, Chris
Shields, Jeff Speaks, Nicholas Teh, Ted Warfield, and especially, Sam
Newlands. Sam has generously thanked me for my feedback on a
draft of his Reconceiving Spinoza by inviting everyone to send me
viii
Acknowledgments
their unsolicited book manuscripts for comment. I hereby announce

my intention to return the favor by forwarding those manuscripts to
Sam. Authors should expect extensive comments very soon.
The early modern philosophical community is deservedly well
known for being a particularly welcoming and encouraging group
of scholars, and I have benefited from that community in count-
less ways. At the risk of going on too long, and yet leaving many
out, I would like to give a special thanks to Maria Rosa Antognazza,
Richard Arthur, Sebastian Bender, Martha Bolton, Gregory
Brown, Clara Carus, John Carriero, Michael Della Rocca, Thomas
Feeney, Ursula Goldenbaum, Daniel Garber, Aaron Garrett, Ruth
Hagengruber, Glenn Hartz, Julia Jorati, Olli Koistinen, Eberhard
Knobloch, Mogens Laerke, Marcy Lascano, Martin Lin, Paul
Lodge, Brandon Look, Yitzhak Melamed, Christia Mercer, Ohad
Nachtomy, Steven Nadler, Larry Nolan, Robert Pasnau, Arnauld
Pelletier, Dominik Perler, Gonzalo Rodriguez-Pereyra, Marleen
Rozemond, Donald Rutherford, Lisa Shapiro, Eric Schliesser, Tad
Schmaltz, Justin Smith, Marius Stan, Tom Vinci, John Wipple,
Catherine Wilson, Kenneth Winkler, and the late (much missed)
Paul Hoffman. I owe an extra special thanks to Samuel Levey for
many conversations and suggestions, and, as it happens, for his sur-
prising mastery of Russian diplomacy.
Finally, I would like to thank the two anonymous referees for
Oxford University Press who reviewed the entire manuscript. I
hope they will accept my apologies for not being able to respond
to all of their insightful comments. They have generously not only
improved this book but have given me much to think about for the
future.
Four chapters of the book began their lives as self-standing
articles. The first chapter descends from “Leibniz on Natural
Teleology and the Laws of Optics,” published in Philosophy and
ix
Acknowledgments
Phenomenological Research (78:3) 2009: 505–544 and “Leibniz’s

Two Realms Revisited,” published in Noûs (42:4) 2008: 673–696.
The second chapter originated from “Leibniz and the Foundations
of Physics: The Later Years,” published in The Philosophical Review
(125:1) 2016: 1–34. The third chapter derives from “Leibniz’s
Optics and Contingency in Nature,” published in Perspectives
on Science (18:4) 2010: 432–455, and the fourth chapter from
“Leibniz on Monadic Teleology and Optimal Form,” published in
Studia Leibnitiana Sonderhaft, Leibniz and Experience, ed. Arnauld
Pelletier 2016: 93–118. I am grateful to the editors of those
journals for permission to revisit here the ideas first tried out in
those publications. The image for the book’s cover is taken from
an anonymous sixteenth-century treatise on comets now held at
the Universitätsbibliothek Kassel. More images from The Book of
Comets may be found from the Public Domain Review at: https://
publicdomainreview.org/collection/the-comet-book.
Finally, to close, I’d like to dedicate this book to my wife, Anne,
and our two children, Madeline and Maxwell, who are such a gift
to me every day that sometimes I think maybe, just maybe, Leibniz
was right.
x
ABBREVIATIONS
A Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1923–). Sämtliche Schriften und

Briefe. Deutsche Akademie der Wissenschaften zu Berlin
(eds.) (Berlin: Akademie-Verlag). Reference is to series,
volume, and page.
AG Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1989). Philosophical
Essays. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber (eds. and trans.)
(Indianapolis: Hackett, 1989).
AT Descartes, René (1996). Oeuvres de Descartes, Charles Adam
and Paul Tannery (eds.). 11 vols. (Paris: J. Vrin). Reference
is to volume and page.
CSM Descartes, René (1984–85). The Philosophical Writings of
Descartes, vols. 1 and 2. J. Cottingham, R. Stoothoff, and D.
Murdoch (eds. and trans.) (Cambridge University Press).
DC Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, “Definitiones cogitationesque
metaphysicae,” LOC 236–257. Reference is to Akademie
edition page number followed by translated page number.
xi
A b b r e v i at i o n s
DM Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Discourse on Metaphysics, G

IV 427–463/AG 35–68; reference is to section number.
FW Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1988). G. W. Leibniz:
Philosophical Texts, Richard Franks and Roger
Woolhouse (eds. and trans.) (New York: Oxford
University Press).
G Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1875– 90). Die
Philosophische Schriften von Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, C.
I. Gerhardt (ed.) 7 vols. (Berlin: Weidmann). Reference
is to volume and page.
Gerland Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1906). Leibnizens
Nachgelassene Schriften Physikalischen, Mechanischen und
Technischen Inhalts, Ernst Gerland (ed.) (Leipzig: B. G.
Teubner, 1906). Reference is to section number.
GM Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1849– 63). Leibnizens
mathematische Schriften C. I. Gerhardt (ed.) 7 vols.
(Berlin: Weidmann). Reference is to volume and page.
L Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1969). Philosophical Papers
and Letters, Leroy. E. Loemker (ed. and trans.) 2nd edn.
(Dordrecht: Reidel).
Langley Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1949). New Essays Concerning
Human Understanding together with An Appendix of Some
of His Shorter Pieces, Alfred G. Langely (ed.) (La Salle,
Illinois: The Open Court Publishing Company).
LOC Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2001). The Labyrinth of the
Continuum: Writings on the Continuum Problem, Richard
T.W. Arthur (ed. and trans.) (New Haven, Connecticut:
Yale University Press).
xii
LDB Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2007). The Leibniz-Des Bosses

Correspondence, Brandon C. Look and Donald Rutherford
(ed. and trans.) (New Haven, Connecticut: Yale University
Press, 2007).
LDV Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2013). The Leibniz-De Volder
Correspondence Paul Lodge, ed. and trans. (New Haven,
Connecticut: Yale University Press, 2013).
LH Eduard Bodemann, Die Leibniz- Handschriften der
Königlichen öffentlichen Bibliothek zu Hannover (Hannover,
1889; reprint Hildesheim: Georg Olms, 1966). Reference
is to folio number and page.
Mon Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, “Monadology,” G 6:607–623/
AG 213–225. Reference is to section number.
NE Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Nouveaux essais sur
l’entendement, A6.6; English translation in Gottfried
Wilhelm Leibniz, New Essays on Human Understanding,
P. Remnant and J. Bennett (ed. and trans.) (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press). Reference is to book,
chapter, section.
NI Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, “On Nature Itself,” G 4:504–
516/AG 155–167. Reference is to section number.
PNG Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, “Principles of Nature and
Grace,” G 6:598–606/AG 206–213. Reference is to section
number.
SD Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, “A Specimen of Dynamics,”
GM 6: 235–254/AG 117–137. Reference is to part and
paragraph.
xiii
T Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté

de Dieu, la liberté de l’homme et l’origine du mal, G 6. English
translation in Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, Theodicy, E. M.
Huggard (trans.) (La Salle: Open Court, 1985). Reference is
to section number
TA Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Tentamen Anagogicum, G 7:270–
279/L 477–485.
UO Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm “On the Ultimate Origination of
Things,” G 7:302–308/L 486–491.
WF Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2006). Leibniz’s “New System”
and Associated Texts, Roger Woolhouse and Richard Franks
(ed. and trans.) (New York: Oxford University Press).
xiv
Introduction
In 1950, Albert Einstein published an essay on general relativity

in Scientific American magazine. Reflecting on recent discoveries,
and looking back over his distinguished career, Einstein began by
waxing philosophical:
Time and again the passion for understanding has led to the illu-
sion that man is able to comprehend the objective world ration-
ally, by pure thought, without any empirical foundations—in
short, by metaphysics. I believe that every true theorist is a kind
of tamed metaphysicist. . . . The metaphysicist believes that
the logically simple is also the real. The tamed metaphysicist
believes that not all that is logically simple is embodied in ex-
perienced reality, but that the totality of all sensory experience
can be “comprehended” on the basis of a conceptual system built
on premises of great simplicity. The skeptic will say that this is a
“miracle creed.” Admittedly so, but it is a miracle creed which has
been borne out to an amazing extent by the development of sci-
ence. (Einstein 1950, 342)
Illustrating his thought, Einstein offered ancient atomism as an ex-

ample of a specific miracle creed. It was introduced, Einstein claims,
A Miracle Creed. Jeffrey K. McDonough, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197629079.003.0001
Introduction
precisely to “comprehend” a wide variety of experiential phenomena

on the basis of simple principles, and he speculates that had later
physicists paid it due heed, the modern identification of heat with
kinetic energy would have been greatly facilitated. Einstein drew
two lessons. First, miracle creeds occupy an intriguing epistemolog-
ical position. Being “produced by a creative act,” they are neither
derivable from, nor wholly independent of, experience. Second,
miracle creeds can be remarkably productive. Once a miracle creed
has been acquired, Einstein counsels, “one does well to hold fast to
it until it leads to an untenable conclusion.”
Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz’s philosophy contains a number
of “miracle creeds” in Einstein’s sense. Most famously, Leibniz
articulates and defends the Principle of Sufficient Reason, ac-
cording to which “we can find no true or existent fact, no assertion,
without there being a sufficient reason why it is thus and not other-
wise” (G 6:612/L 646). But other, often closely related, principles
abound in his philosophy. For example, Leibniz insists that this is
the best of all possible worlds and that all change is continuous. He
maintains that God maximizes perfection, that indiscernibles must
be identical, and that identicals must be indiscernible. Such princi-
ples may be counted as “miracle creeds” in Einstein’s sense both in
virtue of their epistemological standing and in virtue of their sur-
prising fecundity. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, for example,
has proven itself to be a rich and fruitful principle both in philos-
ophy and the foundations of physics. It has spurred thinking about
grounding, free will, and necessitarianism. It has served as a cru-
cial premise in arguments concerning the fundamental structure
of space and time. The Principle of Sufficient Reason, however, is
clearly not a purely empirical principle. One can’t just look out the
window and see that nothing happens without a sufficient reason
“why it is thus and not otherwise.” But nor is it wholly unanswerable
2
Introduction
to experience. Just as Leibniz grants that the appearance of evil

in the world gives us a defeasible reason to doubt that this is the
best of all possible worlds, I think he would have granted that the
appearance of irreducibly probabilistic phenomena in quantum
mechanics gives us a defeasible reason to doubt the Principle of
Sufficient Reason itself.
This book is a study of one of Leibniz’s most intriguing, most
successful, and yet most neglected miracle creeds—what I will call
his Principle of Optimality. Spanning his seemingly disparate work in
philosophy and physics (broadly understood), Leibniz’s Principle
of Optimality is related to his conviction that this is the best of all
possible worlds, and more generally to the Principle of Sufficient
Reason. It gained specific content and structure, however, through
Leibniz’s efforts to apply it to a series of particular problems in
optics, mechanics, and statics between the years 1682 and 1697.
Through those efforts, Leibniz’s scientific studies lent substantial
support to his highly speculative metaphysics. His work on the be-
havior of light lent support to his defense of final causes in the nat-
ural world. His work on the strength of bending beams lent support
to his monadic metaphysics. His work on hanging chains provided
a concrete model for his understanding of the will. This was, re-
markably, physics in the service of metaphysics. And just as remark-
ably, Leibniz’s metaphysics repaid the favor. For via his Principle of
Optimality, Leibniz’s metaphysics dramatically advanced the cause
of physics itself. It first encouraged Leibniz, then his followers, and
then followers of his followers, to think in new ways about the struc-
ture of the physical world. With time, the approach encouraged
by Leibniz’s Principle of Optimality grew to represent a powerful,
mathematically rigorous way of thinking about nature that remains
embedded—if not always appreciated—in our most advanced
theories about the deepest structure of the world.
3
Introduction
The book is divided into five chapters. The first chapter begins
with a discussion of Leibniz’s seminal Unitary Principle of Optics,
Catoptrics, and Dioptrics, published in 1682 in the Acta Eruditorum.
In that piece, Leibniz shows how the central laws of geometrical op-
tics—the laws of reflection and refraction—can be derived from an
optimality principle according to which light takes the easiest path
between its starting and ending points. Leibniz’s “easiest path prin-
ciple” allows him to steer a middle course between rival accounts as-
sociated with Pierre Fermat and René Descartes. It also allows him
to show how his infinitesimal calculus can be put to work to make
genuine physical problems more tractable. Having sketched the his-
torical and technical context of Leibniz’s discoveries in optics, the
chapter goes on to explore the implications of Leibniz’s discoveries
for his views on teleology. Leibniz’s easiest path principle allows
him to defend the existence of a “thin” version of teleology in the
natural world—a version that escapes many traditional and con-
temporary objections to natural teleology. When paired with his
metaphysical commitments, it further allows him to see the causal
structure of the world as being overdetermined by efficient and final
causation. Finally, because it does not rely on unfashionable scho-
lastic forms or anti-naturalistic assumptions, Leibniz’s immanent
lawful teleology presents a formidable challenge even to contempo-
rary philosophers, many of whom are understandably reluctant to
allow genuine teleological explanations at the level of fundamental
physics.
The second chapter turns to Leibniz’s ingenious treatment of
the breaking strength of rigid bodies. The science of elasticity in ge-
neral, and of the strength of rigid bodies in particular, was initiated
by Galileo Galilei as one of his two new sciences. Spurred by both
empirical and theoretical dissatisfaction with Galileo’s results,
Leibniz offered a novel approach to the central problem that Galileo
4
Introduction
had considered. In 1684, in another seminal paper published in the

Acta Eruditorum, Leibniz offered a model of the behavior of rigid
bodies that crucially takes it for granted that rigid beams must sat-
isfy his principle of optimality. In doing so, he successfully arrived
at an improved formula for calculating the strength of a cubic beam.
Beyond its scientific results, however, Leibniz’s approach to the
problem of determining the breaking strength of rigid beams had
profound implications for the structure and nature of matter itself.
Having offered an account of Leibniz’s analysis of rigid bodies, the
chapter draws out the implications of Leibniz’s account for his views
on the nature of forces and material bodies. It argues that Leibniz’s
work on the breaking strength of rigid beams provides crucial in-
sight into how he understands the relationship between derivative
and primitive forces as well as the relationship between extended
bodies and unextended monads. The chapter concludes by con-
sidering the implications of Leibniz’s thinking about forces and
bodies for his understanding of the relationship between monads
and space.
The third chapter takes up Leibniz’s famous defense of the con-
servation of vis viva as announced in his A Brief Demonstration of
a Notable Error of Descartes and Others Concerning a Natural Law,
According to which God is Said Always to Conserve the Same Quantity
of Motion; a Law which They also Misuse in Mechanics, published in
the Acta Eruditorum in 1686. Leibniz’s thinking about the conserva-
tion of vis viva is often linked to his mature understanding of the laws
of nature, an understanding according to which the laws of nature
are held to illustrate and support his mature views on contingency,
providence, and immaterial natures. This chapter argues that each of
these features of Leibniz’s mature understanding of the laws of na-
ture is, however, better understood—both historically and concep-
tually—as arising not out of Leibniz’s work in dynamics, but rather
5
Introduction
out of his optimality approach to the laws of optics. What would

become his signature approach to the laws of optics emerges imme-
diately before his mature understanding of the laws of nature takes
shape and helps to make otherwise puzzling features of his mature
views more intelligible. The upshot of the chapter is that Leibniz’s
mature natural philosophy should be understood as being initially
driven not by his discoveries in dynamics, but rather by his studies
in optics and his embrace of the Principle of Optimality.
The fourth chapter looks to Leibniz’s work on catenaries—
freely hanging cords suspended at both ends—for insight into his
understanding of monadic agency. Leibniz was introduced to the
problem of determining the shape of catenaries by James Bernoulli
in the early 1690s. He immediately recognized that catenaries are
instances of optimal form and knew that all instances of optimal
form must satisfy two specific properties, namely, that any subsec-
tion of an optimal form must itself be an optimal form, and that
some subsections of a non-optimal form may nonetheless be op-
timal forms themselves. With this background in place, the second
and third sections draw on the first specific property of optimal
forms to argue that catenaries provide an especially elegant model
for Leibniz’s understanding of monadic agency, a model that helps
to resolve otherwise outstanding problems in Leibniz’s thinking
about how immaterial mind-like substances may unfold in a goal-
directed manner. In particular, the “catenary model” shows how
Leibniz could maintain that the subjective optimization of each
created monad might simultaneously serve as a necessary condition
for, and a necessary consequence of, an objective optimization of
the world as a whole. The fourth section draws on the second spe-
cific property of optimal forms to argue that the “catenary model”
also shows how rational monads might benefit from the use of
reason without violating Leibniz’s commitment to the optimization
6
Introduction
of a monad’s appetites under the constraints imposed by its point

of view. As a whole, the chapter thus aims to show how specific
features of optimal form may be invoked to provide Leibniz’s views
on monadic agency a coherence and elegance that they would oth-
erwise lack.
The fifth chapter turns to Leibniz’s efforts with respect to the
famous problem of the brachistochrone—that is, the problem of
determining the shape of the path of quickest descent between two
points in a vertical plane. With his own solution in hand, Leibniz
oversaw the dissemination of an international challenge to find the
correct form of the brachistochrone. Among the solutions he re-
ceived, one—Johann Bernoulli’s—explicitly tied the problem of
the brachistochrone back to Leibniz’s early discoveries in optics,
thus, in effect, highlighting the chain of influence from Leibniz’s
earliest discoveries to what was then the cutting edge of mechanics.
Another solution—James Bernoulli’s—set the stage for all subse-
quent work in what is now known as the calculus of variations, thus,
in effect, linking Leibniz’s efforts to the future development of a
powerful approach to fundamental physics that is still with us today.
With the historical stage set, the bulk of the chapter argues that the
rational mechanics of the eighteenth century and beyond—devel-
oped by the likes of Leonhard Euler, Joseph-Louis Lagrange, and
William Rowan Hamilton—served to vindicate Leibniz’s original
optimality approach to problems in optics, mechanics, and statics.
The chapter thus aims to show that Leibniz’s Principle of Optimality
has proven itself to be a miracle creed not only in virtue of its odd
epistemological standing—in its being fully grounded neither in
reason nor experience—but also in having “been borne out to an
amazing extent by the development of science.”
7
Chapter 1
Optics and Immanent

Lawful Teleology
Teleology is the belief that some things happen, or are for the sake
of, other things. That, for example, eyes are for seeing, and eating is
for nourishing. It is widely thought that teleology was largely aban-
doned in the early modern period with the rise of modern science.
That’s not true. Most early moderns continued to believe that some
things happen, or are for the sake of, other things. More specifi-
cally, they continued to accept two kinds of teleology in particular.
First, they took it for granted that rational agents act for the sake
of ends. They believed that God created the world for a purpose.
They believed that people go to work to make money and go to fairs
to have fun. Second, early moderns generally took it for granted
that other things may have functions imposed on them by rational
agents. They believed that God made wings for the sake of flying
and that watchmakers make clocks with the function of telling time.
In spite of some much-discussed remarks by the likes of Francis
Bacon, René Descartes, and Baruch Spinoza, rational and func-
tional teleology continued to thrive in the early modern period, and
indeed beyond.1
1. I discuss the legacy of teleology in the early modern period more fully in McDonough
(2011) and (2020).
A Miracle Creed. Jeffrey K. McDonough, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197629079.003.0002
O p t i c s a n d I m m a n e n t La w f u l T e l e o l o g y
While strictly false, the legend that teleology was abandoned in

the early modern period nonetheless has an echo of truth. Although
early moderns continued to endorse rational and functional tele-
ology, a certain understanding of teleology—an understanding due
primarily to Aristotle—did indeed prove difficult to reconcile with
new mechanical conceptions of the natural world. In his Physics and
elsewhere, Aristotle had defended an immanent teleology built into
the very natures, or “substantial forms,” of natural beings.2 According
to Aristotle, it belongs to the very nature of an acorn that it does
(and should) strive to become a mighty oak. The end of becoming
a mighty oak, Aristotle thought, is crucial to explaining the acorn’s
current behavior and its full potential. Mechanists typically found
such talk of “substantial forms” and “intrinsic ends” to be both ob-
scure and unnecessary. Such terms seemed obscure to them insofar
as they trafficked in ideas that lacked the clarity of geometrical struc-
ture and part-whole relations. They seemed unnecessary insofar as
mechanists believed that the phenomena they purport to explain
could be better explained in, well, mechanical terms—above all, in
terms of geometrical structure, constituent parts, and motion.
By his own reports, Leibniz embraced mechanism at an
early age while strolling through the woods in the Rosenthal (G
3:606/L 655). Too ambitious to be merely a follower, however,
Leibniz was soon seeking to reform mechanism itself. He argued
that Descartes’s laws of motion are false and that his conception
of matter is impoverished. Leibniz would go on to offer a new
measure of force, and new conceptions of celestial motion and
space. Most centrally to our present concerns, however, Leibniz
argued in eclectic fashion that Plato, Aristotle, and their followers
had been right to insist that the world enjoys a kind of immanent
2. For a helpful overview of Aristotle’s views on teleology, see Leunissen (2020).
9
A M i r ac l e C r e e d
teleological order—that some things are for the sake of other

things not just because some rational being thinks them so, but by
their very nature. Having conceded to the mechanists that partic-
ular natural phenomena should not be explained in terms of par-
ticular substantial forms, Leibniz nonetheless sought to defend
an alternative conception of immanent teleology. His key insight
was to see that the laws of nature—so championed by mechan-
ical philosophers—might themselves have a teleological struc-
ture, and, in particular, that the laws of optics might show how
the behavior of rays of light can be explained not only in terms of
lawful regularities linking present states to future states but also in
terms of lawful regularities relating means to ends. This simple but
profound idea would spur Leibniz’s most important discoveries in
the domain of optics and—as we’ll see in subsequent chapters—
would eventually ramify through his philosophical thought and
historical legacy.
The present chapter is divided into four main sections. The first
section introduces Leibniz’s most seminal paper in geometrical op-
tics, A Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics and Dioptrics, published
in the June 1682 edition of the Acta eruditorum. At the heart of
that paper is a principle of optimality that Leibniz introduces in
trying to steer a middle course between the discoveries made by
Descartes and Pierre Fermat in the domain of optics. The second
section fleshes out Leibniz’s understanding of his optimality prin-
ciple as a teleological principle and attempts to head off some po-
tential confusions. The third section argues that while Leibniz’s
teleology is significantly thinner than the teleology embraced by
Aristotelian predecessors, it should nonetheless be counted as tel-
eological by contemporary standards. Finally, the fourth section
takes up the question of how immanent lawful teleology fits into
Leibniz’s broader metaphysical system, and in particular, it takes up
10
the question of how teleological and efficient laws of nature may be

reconciled.
A UNITARY PRINCIPLE FOR OPTICS (1682)

1.1.
Descartes’s publication, in 1637, of the two central laws of geo-

metrical optics marked a milestone in the history of the field (see,
especially AT 6:81–105/CSM 1:152–164). The law of reflection—
known since at least Euclid’s time—states that the angle at which a
ray of light strikes a reflective surface equals the angle at which it is
reflected; or, more succinctly, that the angle of incidence is equal
to the angle of reflection. The law of refraction—first published
by Descartes—states that the ratio between the sine of the angle
at which a ray of light strikes a refractive surface and the sine of
the angle at which it is refracted is a constant determined by the
mediums involved. Put more intuitively, it tells us that the amount
that a ray of light bends during refraction is determined by the na-
ture of the mediums through which it travels.
In keeping with the spirit of his mechanistic program, Descartes
attempts to show how both the law of reflection and the law of re-
fraction may be derived in an essentially uniform manner by con-
sidering broadly mechanical models under idealized conditions.
Toward that end, he first argues that optical phenomena may be
modeled on the behavior of moving bodies, insisting that “the ac-
tion or tendency to move (which, I have said, should be taken for
light) must in this respect obey the same laws as motion itself ” (AT
6:88/CSM 1:155). Descartes then proposes to derive the law of
reflection by considering the behavior of tennis balls being hit by
rackets and rebounding off of hard surfaces, and the law of refrac-
tion by considering the behavior of tennis balls being hit through
11
thin sheets of cloth (AT 6:93–108; for more detailed discussion, see
McDonough (2004, 72–77)).
Descartes’s mechanical derivations of the laws of optics re-
ceived a mixed response in his own day. On the one hand, his
general approach of explaining optical phenomena in broadly me-
chanical terms was widely emulated. Inspired largely by Descartes’s
work, Newton began his famous experiments with prisms around
1665, and his early theory of colors, published less than ten years
later, owed much to the impetus of Descartes’s pioneering pro-
ject (Westfall 1986, 157; Newton 1959 1: 92–102). Likewise,
Christiaan Huygens’s rival wave theory of light, presented to the
Académie des Sciences in 1678, grew out of his early acquaintance
with Descartes’s derivations and took shape against the background
of the general Cartesian framework that he had absorbed in his
youth (Sabra 1967, 198–230).
On the other hand, in spite of their ingenuity, Descartes’s partic-
ular derivations of the laws of optics met with widespread dissatis-
faction. In a letter to an unknown correspondent, Fermat relates that
Descartes’s account of the laws of optics struck him immediately as
“a veritable paralogism” (Fermat 1888–1912, 2: 485). In a similarly
critical statement, Leibniz later complained that “the way in which
Descartes has tried to explain the law of refraction by efficient causes
or by the composition of directions in imitation of the reflection
of balls is extremely forced and not intelligible enough” (TA 274/
L 480). Indeed, so strong was the dissatisfaction with Descartes’s
proofs that many took their implausibility as evidence that Descartes
had stolen his results from Willebrord Snell and merely tailored his
derivations to match the conclusions he had already pirated.
In his Unitary Principle of Optics, Catoptrics and Dioptrics (Unicum
Opticae, Catoptricae et Dioptricae Principium, henceforth abbreviated
Unitary Principle), published in the 1682 edition of the Acta Eruditorum,
12
Leibniz attempted to offer new foundations for Descartes’s laws of

optics while building on the work of Pierre Fermat and addressing
perceived difficulties with Descartes’s results. At the heart of Leibniz’s
approach is his attempt to derive the laws of reflection and refraction
from his “first principle of optics,” namely that “Light radiating from a
point reaches an illuminated point by the easiest path.”
In his derivation of the law of reflection, Leibniz argues, in refer-
ence to Figure 1.1, that “in simple optics, the ray directed from the
radiating point C to the illuminated point E arrives by the shortest
direct path, in the same medium, that is, by the straight line CE”:
The accompanying proof of the law of reflection is elegant and
geometric. Leibniz reasons that, under the given conditions, “the
I
C O D
O
A H F E L R B
O
K G
V
K
Figure 1.1.
13
whole path CE +ED becomes the least of all . . . if E is taken to be

such that as a result the angles CEA and DEB are equal, as is ev-
ident from geometry” (Leibniz 1682). In a related piece, Leibniz
goes on to hint at a still more tantalizing set of metaphysical or
“architechtonic” considerations. In his Metaphysical Definitions and
Reflections, he suggests that since nature always chooses the “optimal
means . . . there ought to be a reason only for a long or short journey,”
drawing, in effect, the conclusion that a ray of light reflected from C
to D must pass through the point E on the grounds that (i) there
would have to be a unique reason for its passing through any point,
and (ii) there could be no unique reason for its passing through any
point other than E (A.VI.iv.1405).
Leibniz’s derivation of the law of refraction in his Unitary
Principle is necessarily more involved than his derivation of the law
of reflection. Whereas the paths of reflected rays of light typically
coincide with shortest reflected paths between two points, this ev-
idently cannot be the case with refracted rays (since refracted rays
typically follow bent, rather than straight, paths). Leibniz’s solution
to this difficulty is to suppose that a refracted ray must always follow
the “easiest” path—rather than the shortest path—from one point
to another, where the “ease” of a path is a measurable quantity that
can be computed by multiplying the distance of the path by its re-
sistance. With this strategy in mind, Leibniz argues, in essence, that
the actual refracted path from C to T will be CET provided that
the quantity determined by the length of CE times the resistance
of the medium IE plus the length of ET times the resistance of the
medium EK is less than the quantity similarly determined from the
sum of any other two paths CF and FT. That is to say, the actual
refracted path will be the easiest path.
In casting his proof in terms of “ease,” rather than speed, Leibniz
hoped to steer a middle course through a dispute between Descartes
14
and his defenders on one side and Fermat on the other side. The nub
of the dispute concerned the question of whether light travels faster
in denser materials, such as water, or faster in rarer materials, such
as air. Fermat took the more intuitive view that light travels faster in
rarer materials, and was thus able to argue that a ray of light might,
for example, follow a quickest path by traveling a greater distance
through air and a shorter distance through water. Fermat could in-
sist that by traveling a greater distance through air (IE) and a shorter
distance through water (EK), a ray of light could traverse a quickest
path by following CET. Cartesians objected. On theoretical grounds,
they argued that rays of light must travel faster in denser materials.
Descartes, for example, suggests that air acts like a soft body ab-
sorbing the motion of a ray of light, while water acts more like a
hard body that preserves (even while redirecting) a ray’s motion
(AT 6:103/CSM 1:163). Cartesians consequently maintained that
a ray of light following CET would not follow a quickest path, since
the ray would travel more slowly along the longer stretch through
IE (air) and more quickly along the shorter stretch EK (water). On
the Cartesian account, Fermat’s principle is simply false. In arguing
that rays of light travel along easiest paths, Leibniz hoped to side with
the letter of the Cartesian position that light travels faster in denser
materials, while nonetheless preserving the spirit of Fermat’s view by
identifying the paths of rays of light with minimal paths.
Another difficulty, however, remained. The sticking point is
most apparent in cases of reflection involving concave mirrors. In re-
flecting off of a concave mirror, a ray of light may travel along a path
that is in fact longer, slower, and “harder” than other merely possible
paths that would involve the ray’s reflecting off one of the mirror’s
“upturned” sides. In his 1682 paper, Leibniz agreed with Fermat that
in such cases a ray of light should be viewed as being optimized with
respect to a tangent drawn at the point of reflection, and even in later
15
writings Leibniz would continue to insist that “Order demands that

curved lines and surfaces be treated as composed of straight lines
and planes, [so that] . . . a ray is determined by the plane on which it
falls, which is considered as forming the curved surface at that point”
(GP VII 274/L 479). Fermat’s Cartesian detractors, however, un-
derstandably demurred. They saw Fermat’s appeal to tangent planes
as an ad hoc response to a family of clear counterexamples to the
proposal that rays of light always follow quickest paths. For all its in-
novation, Leibniz’s Unitary Principle offers essentially no new reply
to this old Cartesian objection.
The difficulty must have nagged at Leibniz. For in a later work—
his Tentamen Anagogicum of circa 1696—Leibniz took up the objec-
tion anew and in doing so brought to fruition the full sophistication
of his mature work in optics. His derivations of the laws of optics in
the Tentamen may be thought of as progressing in three distinguish-
able steps. In the first step, Leibniz considers, with respect to Figure
1.2, “a curve AB, concave or convex, and an axis ST to which the
ordinates of the curve are referred:”
G
H
P
B
F
A B
A B
C
A B
Figure 1.2.
16
Stating the problem in terms of finding the point C which

is unique with respect to its ordinate (i.e., y-axis) value, Leibniz
characterizes C as the only point on AB that does not have a cor-
responding point of the same ordinate value a finite distance away,
that is, as the only point on AB whose “twin” with respect to ST
would have to be “infinitely close.” As Leibniz shows, it is possible
to find C by taking the derivative of an equation describing the line
AB and setting it equal to zero. With good justification, Leibniz
maintains that this now standard operation for determining local
maxima and minima greatly simplifies the calculations involved in
his derivations of the laws of reflection and refraction.
In the second step, Leibniz shows how the law of reflection may
be derived from the principle that “a ray is directed in the most de-
termined or unique path, even in relation to curves” (GP VII 274/L
479). In reference once again to Figure 1.2, Leibniz considers a ray
of light traveling between the fixed points F and G being reflected
off a mirror ACB, which might be planar, concave, or convex. Tacitly
assuming that the medium through which the light travels is every-
where the same, Leibniz reduces the problem of finding the path
unique with respect to “ease” to the problem of finding the point C
such that the path FCG is unique with respect to its length. Using
the technique set out in the first step, and elementary trigonometry,
Leibniz is able to show that for such a path the angle of incidence
FCA must be equal to the angle of reflection GCB. Because his der-
ivation is fully applicable to standard cases involving concave and
convex mirrors, Leibniz could see his derivation of the law of reflec-
tion in the Tentamen as a response to the family of counterexamples
involving concave and convex mirrors to which he had no novel
reply in his Unitary Principle.
In the third step, Leibniz uses essentially the same strategy in
order to derive the law of refraction. In reference to Figure 1.3,
17
Leibniz considers a refracting surface ACB which, again, might be

planar, concave, or convex, and lets F and G represent illuminating
and absorption points for a ray of light (so that the refracted ray of
light is represented by FCG):
H
P
A B
B
C
A B
A B
Figure 1.3.
Once again Leibniz reduces the problem of finding the path

unique with respect to ease to the problem of finding the point
C such that the path FCG is unique with respect to its length.
Employing the same technique as earlier and using elementary
trigonometry, Leibniz is able to show in this case that (i) the
ratio of the sine of incidence to the sine of refraction is inversely
proportional to the ratio of the incident velocity to the refrac-
tive velocity, and (ii) the ratio between the sine of the angle at
which a ray of light strikes a refractive surface and the sine of the
angle at which the ray is refracted is a constant determined by the
mediums involved. Here again, since Leibniz’s proof is fully ap-
plicable to standard cases involving concave and convex surfaces,
18
he could see his derivation of the law of refraction as a response

to the difficulty he had left without a novel answer in his Unitary
Principle.
Through his technical studies in optics, Leibniz was thus
able to offer a sophisticated defense of the “optimality” ap-
proach pioneered by Fermat in his own optical writings. Leibniz’s
derivations showed that an optimality approach to the laws of op-
tics could be reconciled with the mechanist assumption that light
travels faster in denser materials and that such an approach could be
adapted in an intuitive way to cases of reflection and refraction off
of concave and convex surfaces. Furthermore, and not incidentally,
he showed how an optimality approach could be paired with his
own infinitesimal calculus to yield clear, rigorous, readily derivable
results. In doing so, he was able to effectively shift the focus of dis-
cussion from technical concerns to more philosophical issues sur-
rounding the legitimacy of optimality explanations in the natural
sciences. Among those issues, none was more striking or pressing
than concerns about the place of teleological explanations in the
natural sciences and their relationship to mechanical explanations.
Let us therefore turn to precisely those issues, considering first
Leibniz’s understanding of immanent lawful teleology, then pos-
sible objections to it, and finally its relationship to efficient causal
processes and explanations.
1.2. IMMANENT LAWFUL TELEOLOGY
Leibniz’s easiest path principle represents an important contribu-

tion to the development of early modern optics. As we will see in
later chapters, other “optimality principles” with a similar struc-
ture would profoundly influence the development of early modern
19
statics and mechanics. Throughout his career, Leibniz sought to lev-

erage the success of optimality principles in general, and his easiest
path principle in particular, into a defense of teleology and teleolog-
ical explanations:
In fact (as I have shown by a quite remarkable example of a prin-

ciple in optics, which the famous Molyneux greatly approved of
in his Dioptrics), final causes can sometimes also be introduced
to great effect in particular problems in physics—not only so
that we can better admire the most beautiful works of the su-
preme Creator, but also sometimes in order to find out things
which by consideration only of efficient causes would be less ob-
vious, or only hypothetical. (SD 24)
For I believe that God considered principles of wisdom and
reasons of order when he established the laws which are observed
in nature. And I think that this makes it clear (as I once pointed
out when discussing the laws of optics, and which the famous
Molyneux later accepted in his Dioptrics) that consideration of
final causes is useful not only to virtue and piety—in ethics and
natural theology—but also for discovering and detecting hidden
truths in physics itself. (NI 4)
What is more, our thinking sometimes furnishes us with
considerations revealing the value of final causes, not merely in
increasing our admiration for the supreme Author, but also in
making discoveries among his works. Someday I shall show this
in a special case in which I shall propose as a general principle of
optics. (TA 273/L 479)
As these passages suggest, optimality principles enter into Leibniz’s

defense of teleology in two different ways. First, he maintains that
optimality principles—like other elegant laws of nature—can be
20
related to God’s intentions to create the best of all possible worlds.

In this way, he sees his work in optics as being related to his defense
of divine teleology—a topic to which we will return in subsequent
chapters, and especially in Chapter 4. Second, Leibniz maintains
that optimality principles show that teleological explanations
have an important role to play even in the thick of doing natural
philosophy.
In order to better understand Leibniz’s second thought, it may
be helpful to begin by sharpening the contrast between efficient
laws of nature and Leibniz’s optimality principles. Early modern
science famously gave rise to powerful laws of nature, including
Galileo’s law of falling bodies, the Huygens-Wren laws of collision,
and Newton’s laws of motion. We might characterize those laws
as being efficient laws of nature insofar as they link prior events or
states to later events or states.3 So, for example, the Huygens-Wren
laws of collision allow us to relate the speeds and directions of a pair
of bodies before a collision to their speeds and directions after they
collide. In doing so, it was, and indeed is, generally accepted that
such laws contribute to explanations of the events or states they so
relate. Appealing to the Huygens-Wren laws of collision, it seems we
can explain the speeds and directions of a pair of bodies after they
collide by citing their speeds and directions before they collide.
Leibniz’s optimality principles appear to differ from efficient
laws insofar as they link prior events to subsequent events by ap-
pealing to consequences of those subsequent events. To see this
more clearly, consider two alternative explanations for a ray of light’s
passing through a particular point of reflection B as depicted in the
following diagram (Figure 1.4):
3. I set aside for now complications that arise from the “reversibility” of many laws of nature,
including the Hugyens-Wren laws and Newton’s laws. This issue is taken up in Chapter 5,
section 5.4.3.
21
A C
D B E
Figure 1.4.
An efficient explanation of the sort offered by Descartes could be

expected to explain the ray of light’s passing through the point B by
appealing to its initial speed and direction at point A and using the
laws of motion to derive its position at each next instant. In this way,
an efficient explanation would, in effect, trace the progress of the
light infinitesimal piece by infinitesimal piece from point A through
point B, and onto point C. Leibniz’s novel explanation, in contrast,
begins with the assumption that the ray starts at point A and ends
at point C. He then uses his optimality principle to deduce that the
ray passes through point B. In this example, “reaching its endpoint
by the easiest path” serves as an explanans of the process by which
the ray passes through point B. That is to say, whereas in the efficient
explanation, the light’s passing through point B is part of the expla-
nation of why the ray arrives at point C, in Leibniz’s novel explana-
tion the light’s arrival at point C is part of the explanation of why it
passes through point B.
With the contrast between efficient laws and optimality princi-
ples sharpened, we can see more clearly why Leibniz might think
that his optimality explanations are teleological. First—almost too
obvious to mention—is the fact that explanations in terms of opti-
mality principles may make essential appeal to outcomes or “goals”
of the relevant processes or events. For example, in the optics case,
the process by which the ray of light comes to pass through some
22
point B is explained in part by its arrival at a later point C by an eas-

iest path. In this way, optimality explanations are similar to other
commonly accepted teleological explanations such as that the bear
is swatting at the beehive in order to get honey, which purports
to explain the bear’s earlier behavior of swatting at the beehive in
terms of the result or goal of its swatting at the beehive, namely,
its getting honey. It should be acknowledged that the two cases do
differ in that rays of light always reach their endpoints by easiest
paths, while bears do not always succeed in obtaining their ends.
That is, I think, an interesting difference, but not a difference that in
any way undermines Leibniz’s characterization of his principles as
being teleological. For it is hard to see why it should be essential to
teleological explanations that they sometimes fail. Certainly, when
theists appeal to divine ends, for example, there is no assumption
that God’s teleology must be fallible, and if it so happened that bears
always succeeded in getting their honey, it seems that their behavior
would be no less teleological on account of their success.
A second reason for thinking that Leibniz’s optimality prin-
ciples are teleological is to be found in the fact that they are
counterfactually stable. Consider once again the behavior of a
ray of light. In different environments, rays of light will behave
in different ways. When they encounter mirrors, they will reflect.
When they encounter different media, they will refract. Et cetera.
In any environment, however, they will always adapt their beha-
vior in order to bring about the outcome conditions specified by
Leibniz’s optimality principle. We therefore seem to be justified
in thinking that it is not the case that the ray of light described
earlier just happens to arrive at its endpoint by an easiest path. For
if the ray of light had started at a different origin, passed through a
different medium, or been reflected off of a differently configured
mirror, it would have behaved very differently but still in such a
23
way as to take the easiest path between its starting and ending
points. In being counterfactually stable, Leibniz’s explanations
in terms of optimality principles again closely resemble more fa-
miliar examples of teleological explanations. Part of what makes
the explanation of the bear’s behavior smack so strongly of tele-
ology is the fact that under different circumstances—the honey
placed differently, an obstacle erected—the bear would behave
differently—moving to a different location, climbing over the
obstacle—but still in such a way as to obtain the honey. Indeed,
counterfactual stability seems crucial for distinguishing the bear’s
ends from merely accidental outcomes. Even if in the process of
getting the honey the bear gets stung by a bee, we see its getting
honey as a goal but not its getting stung. Why? I submit that we
think that the difference lies in the fact that the bear would modify
its behavior in order to get the honey but that it would not modify
its behavior in order to get stung. Thus, in keeping with the de-
mand of counterfactual stability, we maintain that the bear is swat-
ting at the beehive in order to get the honey but not in order to get
stung, even if its swatting at the beehive regularly results both in
the bear’s getting honey and in its getting stung.4
A third reason for thinking that Leibniz’s optimality principles
are teleological will play a more prominent role in later chapters but
should nonetheless be noted here. Often, we can think of efficient
causal explanations as proceeding from part to whole. The Cartesian
4. This consideration highlights an important difference between the kinds of explanations

Leibniz is defending, and “explanations” that would try to take advantage of the temporal
“reversibility” of the laws of nature in order to deduce prior states of a process from later
states of that process. Although one could deduce the velocity and position of a billiard ball
at t1 from its velocity and position at t2, we would not normally take this to constitute a tele-
ological explanation at least in part because we do not think that the billiard ball would have
adjusted its behavior in order to arrive at that position with that velocity at t2. Again (see the
previous footnote), these sorts of considerations will be taken up in more detail in Chapter 5.
24
explanation of the ray’s trajectory proceeds piecemeal. Intuitively,

it begins with the first tiny element and adds tiny element to tiny
element until the whole path is mapped out. Explanations in terms
of optimality principles, in contrast, often appear to move from
whole to part. Intuitively, we begin with the path as a whole. We
take for granted that the ray starts at point A and ends at point C.
We then explain the parts. We explain, for example, why the path
from A to C includes the segment AB. The path must include AB be-
cause the whole path AC must be optimal. This feature of Leibniz’s
optimality explanations is reminiscent of more familiar teleological
explanations that attempt to explain the presence or operation of a
part in terms of that part’s contribution to a greater whole, as, for ex-
ample, when it is suggested that animals have eyes in order to see. In
such familiar teleological explanations, the presence of eyes in ani-
mals seems to be explained by the fact that their presence allows the
organism of which they are a part to do something or to have some
capacity, in this case, to see. The point is that Leibniz’s optimality
principles seem to license explanations that move from whole to
part—rather than part to whole—in a way that is typical of teleo-
logical explanations more generally.
Insofar as they appeal to “goals,” are counterfactually stable, and
move from wholes to parts, Leibniz has good reasons for seeing his
optimality principles as being teleological and it is clear that his
contemporaries recognized them as such. Nonetheless, the sort
of immanent teleology that they directly support is significantly
“thinner” than the kind of immanent teleology associated with
Leibniz’s predecessors, in particular with Aristotle and his followers.
To see the contrast more clearly, and thereby further clarify Leibniz’s
understanding of immanent teleology, let’s consider three features
which distinguish Aristotle’s teleology from the immanent lawful
teleology implied by Leibniz’s optimality principles.
25
First, it was one of the hallmarks of Aristotle’s position on tel-

eology that final causes are rooted in substantial forms that are
themselves intrinsically directed toward ends. As we will see in sub-
sequent chapters, such a picture is not entirely foreign to Leibniz’s
metaphysics. Nonetheless, the teleology that arises specifically in
connection with optimality principles is grounded immediately
only in the structure of those principles. The teleology of Leibniz’s
optimality principles is thus consistent with, but does not presup-
pose, a metaphysics of substantial forms. And, indeed, the variety of
teleology suggested by Leibniz’s optimality principles would appear
to be consistent with a wide variety of views concerning the ulti-
mate foundations of the laws of nature, including views that Leibniz
ultimately means to reject. The teleology of Leibniz’s optimality
principles is thus thinner than Aristotle’s teleology in being con-
sistent with, but not presupposing, immanent, teleological natures.
Second, Aristotle—like Plato before him—suggests that gen-
uine teleology must not only reliably bring about given end states,
but that the relevant end states in question must be brought about
for the sake of some good (for discussion, see especially Cooper
(1987)). For Aristotle, it is not enough for genuine teleology that
a tree consistently acts in such a way as to develop leaves. Rather,
the tree must develop leaves for the sake of protecting its fruit, and
thus for the sake of contributing to its own flourishing. In short, for
Aristotle, genuine teleology requires not just that one thing act for
the sake of something else, it must also act for the sake of something
else that is, or appears to be, good for it.5 No such constraint, how-
ever, is directly implied by the teleology of optimality principles.
To be sure, Leibniz’s optimism obscures this point to some extent.
5. In Chapter 4, I’ll argue that Leibniz consistently accepts a similar constraint with respect to
agential teleology.
26
For Leibniz famously believes that a benevolent, omnipotent god

has designed the world, and that, consequently, literally everything
is for the sake of some good, and in particular, for the sake of this
being the best of all possible worlds. Nonetheless, we needn’t sup-
pose—and Leibniz does not suggest—that rays of light take op-
timal paths for the sake of their own actual or perceived good. Their
teleology only requires that they reliably act in such a way as to con-
sistently bring about particular consequent states. Considerations
of goodness enter only at one step removed, when the contribution
of rays of light to the overall perfection of the universe is brought
into the picture. In this respect, Leibniz’s position is something of
an intermediary between Aristotle’s—where considerations of the
good must play an immediate role—and standard contemporary ac-
counts, which typically shy away from attributions of goodness al-
together. We’ll return to this point in the next section in connection
with contemporary conceptions of teleology.
Third, in defending the need for final causes in the second book
of his Physics, Aristotle implies that some natural phenomena cannot
be explained without appealing to final causes. Efficient causes, for
example, might explain the growth of an acorn or the spouting of a
leaf. But they cannot explain why the acorn stops growing once it
becomes a mighty oak, or why a tree’s leaves so regularly protect its
fruit. Leibniz rejects this aspect of Aristotle’s account of final cau-
sation, shrewdly insisting that justifying teleological explanations
by appealing to the incompleteness of nonteleological explanations
threatens to leave the defender of teleology liable to refutation as
science progresses and additional efficient causes are discovered
(TA 272/L 478; DC 1403/253, G III 607/L 655). As we’ll see
in more detail in the last section of this chapter, Leibniz does not
think that we should defend the existence of final causes by seeking
to establish the incompleteness of efficient causes, for he does not
27
think that efficient and final causation are mutually incompatible.

By Leibniz’s lights, the existence of nonteleological explanations in
no way rules out the possibility of teleological explanations (prop-
erly understood), or vice versa. Rather than supposing—with
Aristotle’s suggestion in book two of the Physics—that teleolog-
ical explanations must be justified by the absence of efficient causal
explanations, Leibniz maintains that the postulation of teleological
laws may—if needed—be justified by pragmatic considerations,
insisting that “the way of final causes is easier, but is nevertheless
frequently of use in discovering important and useful truths, truths
which one would take a long time to find by the other, more phys-
ical route” (DM 22). In not presupposing the incompleteness of
nonteleological explanations, the teleology suggested by Leibniz’s
optimality principles is once again importantly “thinner” than the
teleology generally associated with Aristotle and his followers. It is
thus with good reasons that Leibniz saw his optimality principles as
providing the basis for a kind an immanent, lawful teleology that is
nonetheless significantly weaker, and distinct from, the kind of tele-
ology defended by Aristotle and his followers.
1.3. AN OLD MYTH ABOUT TELEOLOGY ?
As we will see in more detail in Chapter 5, the application of opti-

mality principles to the natural world has proven to be successful in
ways that even Leibniz couldn’t have imagined. Optimality princi-
ples are now used widely in the natural sciences and have become
an essential aspect of contemporary scientific work. Their wide-
spread application in the sciences, however, has led some contem-
porary philosophers to question anew their teleological credentials.
Could some of the most wide-ranging and seemingly foundational
28
principles of modern science really be teleological? Critics who

have cast a suspicious eye on optimality principles have generally
followed one of two broad strategies in calling into question their
teleological bona fides. The first strategy would deny that Leibniz’s
thin conception of teleology represents genuine teleology. The
thought here is that Leibniz’s optimality principles might be teleo-
logical in an anemic sense, but that genuine teleology requires some-
thing more. The second strategy would grant that genuine teleology
can indeed be thin but deny that Leibniz’s optimality principles are
teleological even in a thin sense. The thought here is that—on close
inspection—Leibniz’s optimality principles fail to clear even the
low bar of modern, pared-down, non-Aristotelian conceptions of
teleology. Let’s look more closely at each of these strategies.
1.3.1.
First Objection: Thin Teleology Isn’t Genuine
Teleology
Why might one think that Leibniz’s conception of teleology is too
thin to capture genuine teleology? One suggestion is that Leibniz’s
understanding of teleology fails to capture genuine teleology pre-
cisely because it fails to incorporate either considerations of good-
ness or intentionality (or both).
Let’s focus first on the issue of goodness.6 Many cases of tele-
ology involve some actual or perceived good. When I go to the café
to get a coffee, I think that getting a coffee would be good, and my
thinking that getting a coffee would be good seems integral to a
teleological explanation of my behavior. Other cases are less clear,
but plausible enough. One might think that when the bear goes
after some honey, in some sense the bear sees the honey as good,
and that the bear’s seeing the honey as good will be important to
6. On this point, see especially the challenging work of Bedau (1992a) and (1992b).
29
any teleological explanation of its behavior. So much, I think, can

be allowed on all sides. The harder question is whether or not all
teleological explanations must involve a reference to goodness.
For if all teleological explanations must involve some reference to
some good, and explanations in terms of optimality principles do
not involve some reference to some good, then we will have com-
pelling grounds for concluding that Leibniz’s conception of im-
manent lawful teleology is too thin, and thus for denying that his
explanations in terms of optimality principles are teleological.
So, let’s ask: Is a reference to some good essential to all teleo-
logical explanations? Prima facie, the suggestion seems open to a
range of powerful counterexamples. Take, for example, the beha-
vior of heat-seeking missiles. The behavior of heat-seeking missiles
certainly seems to be teleological. It seems that we can explain the
behavior of such a missile in terms of an outcome or goal of its beha-
vior. The missile swerved left because the heat source swerved left.
The behavior of such missiles is counterfactually stable. If the heat
source had swerved right, the missile would have swerved right. We
may even be able to think of subintervals of the behavior of a heat-
seeking missile as being explained by larger intervals of its beha-
vior. The missile passed through such and such coordinates in order
to reach the heat source by the most direct path. Finally—just to
round out our parallels—it is worth noting that we feel no temp-
tation to suppose that heat-seeking missiles must have substantial
forms; nor is there any temptation to think that a teleological ex-
planation of their behavior presupposes any gaps in their efficient
causal history. The behavior of heat-seeking missiles thus appears
to satisfy Leibniz’s thin sense of teleology and, indeed, seems to be
teleological.
Nonetheless, the behavior of heat-seeking missiles does not ap-
pear to involve a reference to any good that is inimical to Leibniz’s
30
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Old Buddha first called on all present to draw near to the
Throne; then, speaking with great vehemence, she declared that it
was impossible for her to brook these latest indignities put upon her
by the foreigners. Her Imperial dignity could not suffer it. Until
yesterday, until, in fact, she had read the dispatch addressed to the
Tsungli Yamên by the Diplomatic Body, it had been her intention to
suppress the Boxers; but in the face of their insolent proposal that
she should hand over the reins of government to the Emperor, who
had already proved himself quite unfitted to rule, she had been
brought to the conclusion that no peaceful solution of the situation
was possible. The insolence of the French Consul at Tientsin Tu
Shih-lan (Du Chaylard), in demanding the surrender of the Taku
Forts was bad enough, but not so grievous an affront as the
Ministers’ preposterous proposal to interfere with her personal
prerogatives as Sovereign. Her decision was now taken, her mind
resolved; not even Jung Lu, to whom she had always looked for wise
counsel, could turn her from this purpose. Then, addressing more
directly the Chinese present, she bade them all to remember that the
rule of her Manchu House had conferred many and great benefits
upon the nation for the past two hundred and fifty years, and that the
Throne had always held the balance fairly in the benevolent
consideration for all its subjects, north and south alike. The Dynasty
had scrupulously followed the teachings of the Sages in
administering the government; taxation had been lighter than under
any previous rulers. Had not the people been relieved, in time of
their distress, by grants from the Privy Purse? In her own reign, had
not rebellions been suppressed in such a manner as to earn the
lasting gratitude of the southern provinces? It was therefore now
their duty to rally to the support of the Throne, and to assist it in
putting an end, once and for all, to foreign aggression. It had lasted
too long. If only the nation were of one mind, it could not be difficult
to convince these barbarians that they had mistaken the leniency of
the past for weakness. That leniency had been great; in accordance
with the principle which prescribes the showing of kindness to
strangers from afar, the Imperial House had ever shown them the
greatest consideration. The Emperor K’ang Hsi had even allowed
them liberty to propagate their religion, an act of mistaken
benevolence which had been an increasing cause of regret to his
successors. In matters of vital principle, she said, these foreigners
ignore the sacred doctrines of the Sages; in matters of detail, they
insult the customs and cherished beliefs of the Chinese people. They
have trusted in the strength of their arms, but to-day China can rely
upon millions of her brave and patriotic volunteers. Are not even
striplings taking up arms for the defence of their country? She had
always been of the opinion that the allied armies had been permitted
to escape too easily in the tenth year of Hsien Feng (1860), and that
only a united effort was then necessary to have given China the
victory. To-day, at last, the opportunity for revenge had come.
Turning to the Emperor, she asked for his opinion. His Majesty,
after a long pause, and with evident hesitation, urged her to follow
Jung Lu’s advice, to refrain from attacking the Legations, and to
have the foreign Ministers escorted in safety to the coast. But, he
added, it must be for her to decide. He could not dare to assume any
responsibility in the matter.
The junior Chinese Member of the Council, Chao Shu-ch’iao then
spoke. He begged the Old Buddha to issue her orders for the
immediate extermination of every foreigner in the interior, so as to
avoid the danger of spies reporting on the nature and extent of the
patriotic movement. Her Majesty commanded the Grand Council to
consider this suggestion and to memorialise in due course for an
Edict.
After him, however, each in his turn, the Manchu Li-shan, and the
Chinese Hsü Ching-ch’eng and Yüan Ch’ang implored the Empress
not to declare war against the whole world. China, they said, could
not possibly escape defeat, and, even if the Empire should not be
partitioned, there must arise great danger of rebellion and anarchy
from within. Yüan Ch’ang even went so far as to say that he had
served as a Minister of the Tsungli Yamên for two years and that he
had found foreigners to be generally reasonable and just in their
dealings. He did not believe in the authenticity of the despatch
demanding the Empress’s abdication, which Prince Tuan professed
to have received from the Diplomatic Body; in his opinion, it was
impossible that the Ministers should have dared to suggest any such
interference with China’s internal affairs.
At this Prince Tuan arose and angrily asked the Empress whether
she proposed to listen to the words of a Chinese traitor? Her Majesty
rebuked him for his loud and violent manner of speaking, but ordered
Yüan Ch’ang to leave the Audience Hall. No one else dared to say
anything.
She then ordered the promulgation of the Decree, for immediate
communication to all parts of the Empire; at the same time
announcing her intention of sacrificing at the ancestral shrines before
the commencement of hostilities. Prince Chuang and Duke Lan were
appointed joint Commanders-in-Chief of the Boxers, but Tzŭ Hsi
gave them clearly to understand that if the foreign Ministers would
agree to take their departure from Peking this afternoon Jung Lu was
to do his best to protect them as far as Tientsin. Finally, the Empress
ordered the Grand Council to report themselves at mid-day for
further orders. All were then permitted to retire with the exception of
Prince Tuan and Duke Lan; these remained in special audience for
some time longer. Hsü T’ung was present at the general audience,
having made good his escape from the Legation quarter, and was
congratulated by Her Majesty on his safety.
They say that Duke Lan told the Empress of a vision in which, the
night before, he had seen Yü Huang, the Jade Emperor. To him, and
to his company of Boxers while drilling, the god had appeared, and
had expressed his satisfaction with them and their patriotic
movement. The Old Buddha observed that the Jade Emperor had
appeared in the same manner at the beginning of the reign of the
Empress Wu of the T’ang Dynasty (the most famous woman ruler in
Chinese history); the omen, she thought, showed clearly that the
gods are on the side of China and against the barbarians.
When, at the hour of the Sheep (1 p.m.) Kang Yi returned to the
Palace, he found Prince Ch’ing in the anteroom of the Grand
Council, greatly excited. It seems that En Hai,[77] a Manchu
sergeant, had just come to his residence and reported that he had
shot and killed two foreigners whom he had met, riding in sedan
chairs that morning, just opposite the Tsungpu Street. As orders had
been issued by Prince Tuan and Ch’i Hsiu to the troops that all
foreigners were to be shot wherever met, and as one of these two
was the German Minister, he hoped that Prince Ch’ing would
recommend him for special promotion. Prince Tuan had already
heard the news and was greatly pleased. Prince Ch’ing and Kang Yi
discussed the matter and decided to inform the Empress Dowager at
once. Kang Yi did not think that the death of one foreign devil, more
or less, could matter much, especially now that it had been decided
to wipe out the Legations entirely, but Prince Ch’ing thought
differently and reiterated his opinion that the killing of an accredited
Envoy is a serious matter. Until now, only missionaries and their
converts had been put to death, but the murder of a Minister could
not fail to arouse fierce indignation, even as it did in the case of the
British negotiator[78] who was captured by our troops in the 10th year
of Hsien-Feng (1860).
The Grand Council then entered the presence. Prince Li, as the
senior member of the Council, told the Old Buddha the news, but
added that the foreigners had brought it on themselves because they
had first fired on the people. Upon hearing this Her Majesty ordered
Jung Lu to be summoned in haste, but Kang Yi, being extremely
busy with his work of providing supplies for the Boxers, did not await
his arrival.
Now, even as I write, they tell me that bullets are whizzing and
whistling overhead; but I am too deaf to hear them. En Ch’u says
that already the Kansuh braves have begun the attack upon the
Legations and that Jung Lu’s endeavours to have the foreigners
escorted to a place of safety have completely failed.
Liu Shun has just come in and asked for leave to go home for a
week. People are leaving the city in all directions and in great
numbers.
24th Day of the 5th Moon: the Hour of the Dog, 7-9 p.m. (June
20th, 1900).—En Ming has just come in to inform me that a foreign
devil[79] has been captured by Tung Fu-hsiang’s troops. They were
taking him, wounded, to Prince Chuang’s Palace, prodding at him
with their bayonets; and he was babbling in his foreign tongue. He
will be decapitated, and his captors will receive good rewards (Prince
Ch’ing has just been given command of the gendarmerie). “The rut in
which the cart was overturned is just ahead.” Let this be a warning to
those puny barbarian ruffians, the soldiery encamped at the very
gates of the Palace. (This alludes to the proximity of the Legations to
the Palace enclosure.) Jung Lu was all ready to escort the foreigners
to Tientsin; he had with him over 2,000 Manchu troops. Doubtless he
means well, but the Old Buddha now says that she will not prevent
the Kansuh braves from destroying the Legations. If the foreigners
choose to leave with Jung Lu, let them do so, and they will not be
attacked; but if they insist upon remaining, then their punishment be
upon their own heads, and “let them not say they were not
forewarned.”
Duke Lan sent over to invite me to breakfast with him to-morrow;
he is sore pressed with business cares just now; nevertheless, he
and his brothers always treat their old teacher with politeness and
respect. Though bellicose by nature, he is singularly gentle and
refined. Chi Pin[80] sent over to ask whether we would like to move
to his house in the north of the city, because the noise of the firing is
very great in our quarter, but I am so deaf that I hear not a sound of it
all.[81]
Chi Pin is writing to his father-in-law, Yü Hsien, about the audience
in the Palace.
Duke Lan writes to tell me that this evening ⸺ informed Prince
Tuan and Chi Hsiu that, by the orders of that rascally Chinaman,
Yüan Ch’ang, the corpse of the foreign devil had been coffined. ⸺
wanted Prince Tuan to have the corpse decapitated and the head
exhibited over the Tung An Gate. Yüan Ch’ang defends his action,
saying that he knew the German Minister personally at the Tsung Li
Yamên, and he cannot bear the idea of leaving his body uncoffined.
Mencius says, “It is common to all men to feel pity. No one can see a
child fall into a well without a shudder of commiseration and horror.”
But these Chinese traitors of ours are compassionate to the enemies
of our glorious Kingdom, and the foes of our ancient race. It is
passing strange!
25th Day of the 5th Moon: the Hour of the Monkey, 3-5 p.m. (June
21st).—My chair-bearers have fled from the city, so to-day I had to
use my cart to go to Duke Lan’s residence. Prince Tuan and the
Grand Secretary, Kang Yi, were there; also Chung Li, lately
Commandant of the gendarmerie, and the “Beileh” Tsai Lien. Prince
Tuan had seen the Old Buddha this morning; their Majesties have
moved from the Palace by the lake into the Forbidden City. As the
Empress Dowager was crossing the road which runs between the
Gate of the Hsi Yüan (Western Park) and the Hsi Hua Gate of the
Forbidden City she saw that a number of Boxers had lined up on
each side of the street as a Guard of Honour for the “Sacred
Chariot.” She presented them with 2,000 taels, congratulating their
commander, Prince Chuang, on their stalwart appearance. Said the
Old Buddha to Prince Tuan, “The foreigners are like fish in the stew-
pan. For forty years have I lain on brushwood and eaten bitterness
because of them, nursing my revenge like Prince Kou Chien of the
Yüeh State (5th Century b.c.). Never have I treated the foreigners
otherwise than generously; have I not invited their womenfolk to visit
the Lake Palace? But now, if only the country will stand together,
their defeat is certain.”
I think Prince Tuan hopes that the Old Buddha will now have the
Ta-A-Ko proclaimed Emperor; but unfortunately the Nanking Viceroy,
Liu K’un-yi, has much influence over her in this matter. When he was
in Peking this spring, in the second moon, he solemnly warned her
against the Boxers and ventured even to remonstrate at the Ta-A-Ko
being made Heir Apparent. Were it not for Liu K’un Yi, he would have
been Emperor long since; therefore Prince Tuan has a very bitter
hatred against him. Liu told the Old Buddha at his second audience
that if H.M. Kuang Hsü were deposed, the people of his province
would assuredly rise in rebellion. What concern is it of theirs who
reigns in the Capital? His present Majesty’s reign has brought many
misfortunes to the nation; it is high time that it came to an end. Why
does not Prince Tuan enter the Palace and proclaim his son
Emperor? Tung Fu-hsiang’s Kansuh braves and the Prince’s own
Manchu soldiery would surely rally round him. But if Jung Lu
opposed them the Old Buddha would side with him. His wife[82] is for
ever in the Palace.
26th Day of the 5th Moon (June 22nd).—I went this morning to
Prince Li’s palace in the western quarter of the city. I had to go in my
small cart, because my chair-bearers have either run away to their
homes in the country or had joined the Boxers. My two sons, En
Ch’u and En Ming, have been making arrangements to quarter one
hundred Boxers in our outer courtyard, and it seems that we shall
have to supply them with food. Although it cannot be denied that
everyone should join in this noble work of exterminating the
barbarians, I grudge, nevertheless, spending money in these hard
times even for the Boxers, for rice is now become as dear as pearls,
and firewood more precious than cassia buds. It may be that, in my
old age, I am becoming like that Hsiao Lung, brother to the founder
of the Liang Dynasty, who was so miserly that he stored up his
money in heaps. On every heap of a million cash he would place a
yellow label, while a purple label marked each hoard of ten millions.
It is recorded of him, that his relatives abused him for this habit; as
for me, my sons would like to get at my money, but they cannot.
I find Prince Li much depressed in his mind; his treasure vaults
contain vast wealth; as senior member of the Grand Council,
moreover, he feels a weight of responsibility that is too much for him.
His abilities are certainly small, and I have never yet understood why
the Old Buddha appointed him to succeed Prince Kung as senior
Councillor. He tells me of a stormy meeting at the Grand Council this
morning; it seems that Her Majesty is greatly annoyed with Liu K’un-
yi for sending in a telegram strongly denouncing the Boxers. He has
also telegraphed privately to Jung Lu, imploring him to check their
rebellion, but no one knows what answer Jung Lu has made.
In his telegram to the Empress Dowager, which came forward by
express couriers from Pao-ting-fu, the Viceroy declares that he
would be more than ready to march north with all his troops if it were
to repel a foreign invasion, but he firmly declines to lend his forces
for the purpose of massacring a few helpless foreigners.
Commenting on this, the Empress Dowager quoted the words of the
Classic Historical Commentary (Tso Chüan): “The upper and lower
jaws mutually assist each other; if the lips shrivel, then must the
teeth catch cold.” Thereby she meant to imply that even such, in its
close interdependence, is the relation between the northern and
southern parts of our Empire, and no one should know this better
than Liu K’un-yi, after his experiences at the time of the Taiping
Rebellion.
The Old Buddha has directed Prince Chuang, as head of the city
gendarmerie, to issue a proclamation offering Tls. 50 for every head
of a male barbarian brought in, Tls. 40 for that of a woman, and Tls.
30 for that of a child.
While I was still talking with Prince Li, Jung Lu came over in his
sedan chair to visit his kinsman. He looks very tired, and walks with
a limp. He was loud in denouncing the Boxers, who, he says, are
quite incapable of doing any good. They had even now dared to
shout abuse at him while passing the “Houmen,” calling him a
Chinese traitor. I could not help thinking that Jung Lu deserved the
name, but I did not say so. He is a strong man, the strongest of all
the Manchus, and I greatly fear that his influence may yet be able to
wreck all our hopes.
Returning to my house, I heard that the Princes Tuan and Chuang
were sending troops to surround the French Cathedral, which is
defended by a few foreign soldiers only, and which should, therefore,
be easily captured. Prince Li’s palace is within a stone’s throw of the
cathedral, and to enter the Forbidden City he has to pass just south
of it, through the “Hsi-Hua” gate. Although greatly disturbed by the
impending hostilities in his neighbourhood, he fears to move to a
quieter locality, lest, in his absence, his treasure vaults should be
plundered. No doubt the cathedral will fall in a few days.
My courtyard is now full of Boxers and Kansuh soldiery; I can no
longer call my house my own. How I loathe these cursed foreigners
for causing all this disturbance!
The same Day: at the Hour of the Dog (7-9 p.m.).—I learn that
Jung Lu has just sent off a courier with a telegram, which Yüan Shih-
k’ai is to send on to the Viceroys of Canton, Nanking and Wucha’ng.
Prince Li has sent me a copy, which I am to keep secret; it reads as
follows:—
“With all respect I have received your telegrams. Where

one weak people dares to oppose ten or more powerful
nations, the inevitable result can only be complete ruin. It has
always been maintained as a fixed principle with civilised
nations, that, in the event of war between any two Powers,
their respective Envoys should be treated with respect. Can it
now be that this our great inheritance, founded by our remote
ancestors at so great a cost of toil and danger, is to be
endangered, and suddenly brought to ruin, by these false
workers of magic? Shall the fate of the Dynasty be staked on
a single throw? It requires no peculiar sagacity to see that
these Boxers’ hopes of success are nothing but the shadow
of a dream. It is true and undeniable, that, from their
Majesties on the Throne down to the very lowest of our
people, all have suffered from the constant aggression of
foreigners and their unceasing insults. For this reason these
patriotic train-bands have been organised, claiming a divine
mission of retaliation; but the present crisis is all-serious, and
although I have used every effort to explain its dangers, I
have laboured in vain. I am sick and suffering from lameness,
but since I obtained leave of absence I have already
submitted seven separate memorials denouncing these
Boxers. Seeing that they produced no result, I have now left
my sick bed, in order, if possible, to explain the situation
clearly to their Majesties; and this also has been in vain.
“All the Princes and Ministers of State who surround the
Throne now cry out against me with one voice, as your
Excellencies can readily believe. I dare not quote in this place
the words of Her Majesty, but I may say that the whole of the
Imperial family have joined the Boxers, and at least two-thirds
of our troops, both Manchu and Chinese, are with them. They
swarm in the streets of our capital like a plague of locusts,
and it will be extremely difficult to disperse them.
“Even the divine wisdom of Her Majesty is not sufficient to
stand against the will of the majority. If Heaven is not on our
side, how can I oppose its will? For several days past I have
been pondering night and day on some way out of our
difficulties, some forlorn hope of escape. Therefore yesterday
morning (June 20th) I arranged for a meeting with the foreign
Ministers at the Tsung Li Yamên, with a view to providing a
safe conduct for the entire foreign community, with my own
troops, to Tientsin. This course appeared to me to hold out
some reasonable chances of success, but Prince Tuan’s
soldiery slew the German Minister, and since then the
situation continues to develop from hour to hour with such
extraordinary rapidity that words fail me to describe it. On my
side, in the discussions of the Grand Council and the
Chamberlains of the Presence, are Prince Ch’ing and Wang
Wen-shao, but the former, following his usual practice, has
applied for leave, and Her Majesty will have nothing to do with
him; so that these two are of no real assistance to me. I have
no fear of death, but I grieve at the thought of the guilt which
will be recorded against me in history; Heaven knows that I
am overwhelmed with grief and shame. I have received great
favours at the hands of the Throne, and can only now pray to
the spirits of the Dynastic ancestors to protect our Empire.
The situation here is well-nigh lost, but it remains for your
Excellencies to take all possible steps for the protection of
your respective provinces. Let each do his utmost, and let
proper secrecy be maintained.” Signed “Jung Lu, with tears in
his eyes.”
It is reported from the Grand Council that Chang Chih-tung has

telegraphed to Her Majesty, assuring her of his devotion and loyalty,
and asking whether he should come north with his troops to help in
the work of destroying the barbarians. Chang is a time-server, and
loves not the Emperor;[83] we have not forgotten how he approved
the Decree appointing an Heir Apparent, and how he would have
been a party to His Majesty’s removal from the Throne, justifying
himself on quibbling grounds of legality and precedents as to the
lawful succession. He trims his sails according to the wind of the
moment, and has no courage of fixed principles, like Liu K’un-yi. I
despise the latter’s views in opposing the Boxers, but no one can
help admiring his upright character.
(At this point the diarist proceeds to give a full account of the rise
and spread of the Boxer movement, describing in detail their magic
rites, their incantations, and their ceremonies of initiation. The facts
have nearly all been published before, so that most of this portion of
the Diary is here omitted. It is chiefly interesting as showing to what
heights of superstition even the most educated of the Manchus,
including the Empress Dowager, could go. We give one example
only of the farrago of gibberish which, believed in high quarters,
nearly brought about the end of the Dynasty.)
The Boxers also possess a secret Talisman, consisting of a small
piece of yellow paper, which they carry on their persons when going
into battle. On it is drawn, in vermilion paint, a figure which is neither
that of man nor devil, demon nor saint. It has a head, but no feet; its
face is sharp-pointed, with eyes and eyebrows, and four halos. From
the monster’s heart to its lower extremities runs a mystic inscription,
which reads: “I am Buddha of the cold cloud; before me lies the
black deity of fire; behind is Laotzu himself.” On the creature’s body
are also borne the characters for Buddha, Tiger, and Dragon. On the
top left-hand corner are the words “invoke first the Guardian of
Heaven,” and on the right-hand corner, “invoke next the black gods
of pestilence.” The Empress Dowager has learned this incantation by
heart, and repeats it seventy times daily, and every time that she
repeats it the chief eunuch (Li Lien-ying) shouts: “There goes one
more foreign devil.” The Boxers determine the fate of their victims by
a curious test, which consists of burning a ball of paper, and seeing
whether the ashes ascend or remain upon the ground. They may
believe that it is the spirits who decide, but, as a matter of fact, these
balls of paper are sometimes made of thinner material, which
naturally leave a lighter ash that is easily caught up in the air;
whereas, when they use thick paper, the ashes seldom rise. Some of
the balls are also more tightly rolled than others, and it is quite
evident that the ashes of the loose ones have a much better chance
of blowing away than those which are tightly rolled. Similarly, when
they set fire to any place, they profess to be guided by their gods,
and they say that fire leaps forth at the point of their swords in any
quarter which the spirits desire to have destroyed. As a matter of
fact, however, there is deception practised in this also, for when they
wish to burn any place for purposes of plunder they have it sprinkled
in advance with kerosene oil, and if no oil is available, they even pile
up brushwood around it, upon which they drop a lighted match
secreted upon their persons.
27th Day of the 5th Moon (June 23rd).—The foreign barbarian of
whom I have written[84] was executed this morning at the hour of the
Hare (6 a.m.) and his head is now exhibited in a cage, hanging from
the main beam of the “Tung-An” gate. It had to be put in a cage, as
there was no queue to hang it by. The face has a most horrible
expression, but it is a fine thing, all the same, to see a foreigner’s
head hung up at our palace gates. It brings back to memory the
heads that I saw outside the Board of Punishments in the tenth year
of Hsien-Feng (1860), but there were black devils among those.
Jung Lu tried to save the barbarian’s life, and even intended to
rescue him by force, but the Princes Tuan and Chuang had
determined upon his death, and they had him executed before Jung
Lu knew it, so that, when his men arrived upon the scene, the
foreigner’s head had already parted company from his body. The
Princes had him kneeling before them yesterday for several hours on
a chain, and all the time he kept on imploring them to spare his life;
his groans were most painful to hear. The Old Buddha has been
informed of his death, and she gave orders that Tls. 500 be
distributed to the soldiers who had captured him, i.e. a reward ten
times greater than that which was promised in the proclamations.
The Ta-A-Ko, Son of Prince Tuan, the Boxer Leader.
Appointed Heir-Apparent in January, 1900. Appointment rescinded November,

1901.
The Boxers who occupy my courtyard tried to take away my cigars

from me, but subsequently relented and allowed me to keep them
because of my extreme old age. Nothing of foreign origin, not even
matches, may be used nowadays, and these Boxer chiefs, Chang
Te-ch’eng and Han Yi-li, both of whom are common and uneducated
men, are treated with the greatest respect even by Princes of the
blood: a curious state of affairs indeed!
Duke Tsai Lan came to see me this afternoon. He tells me an
extraordinary story how that the Heir Apparent called the Emperor a
“Devil’s pupil” this morning, and, when rebuked for it, actually boxed
His Majesty’s ears. The Emperor then reported the facts in a
memorial to Her Majesty, who flew into a towering rage, and gave
orders to the eunuch Ts’ui to administer twenty sharp strokes of the
whip on the Heir Apparent’s person. Prince Tuan is much enraged at
this, but he is horribly afraid of Her Majesty, and, when she speaks to
him, “he is on tenter-hooks, as if thorns pricked him, and the sweat
runs down his face.”
T’ung Fu-hsiang told the Empress Dowager yesterday that the
Legations have come to the end of their tether. From a rockery on
some high ground in the Forbidden City gardens, the Old Buddha
could see the flames bursting from the Legation quarter, and was
more than once assured that final destruction had come upon the
foreigners at last. But later in the afternoon, Hsü Ching-ch’eng was
received in audience, when he presented a memorial which he and
Yüan Chang had drawn up, denouncing the Boxers; he told Her
Majesty that it was not the Legations, but the Han Lin Academy, that
was in flames, the Kansuh soldiery having set fire to it in the hope
that the conflagration might spread and thus enable them to force a
way into the Legation. Her Majesty was greatly disappointed and
displeased, severely blaming Tung Fu-hsiang, and she sent for Jung
Lu and talked with him in private for a long while.
Good news has come in to-day of victorious fighting at Tientsin; Yü
Lu reports that many foreigners were slain in their attack on the Taku
forts, and several of their warships sunk. Practically the whole of the
foreign community of Tientsin had been annihilated, he says.
Many hundreds of Chinese Christians were put to death to-day
just outside Prince Chuang’s palace. The judges who convicted them
were Prince Chuang, Yi Ku, Fen Che, and Kuei Ch’un. There was no
mercy shown, and a large number of innocent people perished with
the guilty. The Empress is essentially a kind-hearted woman, and
she was greatly shocked to hear of this wholesale massacre. She
was heard to say that if the Catholics would only recant and reform,
a way of escape might very well be provided for them.
29th Day of the 5th Moon (June 25th).—To-day about sixty of the
Boxers, led by the Princes Tuan and Chuang, and the “Beilehs” Tsai
Lien and Tsai Ying, marched to the Palace at 6 o’clock in the
morning to search there for converts. Coming to the gate of the
Palace of Peaceful Longevity, where their Majesties were still abed,
they noisily clamoured for the Emperor to come out, denouncing him
as a friend of foreigners. Prince Tuan was their spokesman. I heard
of the incident from Wen Lien, Comptroller of the Household, who
was on duty this morning; he was amazed at the foolhardy effrontery
of Prince Tuan, and thought that he had probably been drinking. On
hearing the noise outside and the shouts of the Boxers clamouring to
kill all “Devil’s pupils,” the Old Buddha, who was taking her early tea,
came out swiftly and stood at the head of the steps, while the
Princes and the Boxer leaders swarmed in the court-yard below her.
She asked Prince Tuan whether he had come to look upon himself
as the Emperor; if not, how dared he behave in this reckless and
insolent manner? She would have him know that she, and she alone,
had power to create or depose the Sovereign, and she would have
him remember that the power which had made his son Heir Apparent
could also wipe him out in a moment. If he and his fellow Princes
thought that because the State was at a crisis of confusion they
could follow their own inclinations in matters of this kind, they would
find themselves very seriously mistaken. She bade them depart, and
refrain from ever again entering the palace precincts, except when
summoned to her presence on duty. But they would first prostrate
themselves and ask His Majesty’s pardon for their insolent
behaviour. As a slight punishment for their offences, she further
commanded that the Princes be mulcted of a year’s allowances. As
to the Boxer chiefs, who had dared to create this uproar in her
hearing, they should be decapitated upon the spot, and Jung Lu’s
guards, who were on duty at the outer gates, were ordered to carry
this sentence into immediate effect. Her Majesty is so greatly
incensed against the Boxers at this moment that everyone thinks
that Jung Lu will now be able to put a stop to the attacks on the
Legations. The Emperor was much alarmed at this incident, and
when it was over humbly thanked Her Majesty for so benevolently
protecting him.
Later; 9 p.m.—The Old Buddha has suddenly determined, in her
rage against Prince Tuan and his followers, to put a stop to the
fighting in Peking, and she now agrees that Jung Lu shall proceed to
the Legations to discuss terms of peace. At 6 p.m. to-day all firing
stopped, and Jung Lu, at the head of his troops, proceeded to the
bridge which lies on the north of the Legation quarter. The foreigners
came out from their hiding-places and commenced to parley; they
were shown a board, and on it the words written: “Orders have now
been received from the Empress Dowager to afford due protection to
the Legations.” Jung Lu hoped to be able to induce the foreign
Ministers to confer with him for the purpose of restoring order. For
three hours not a shot has been fired; but En Ming has just come in
to tell me that the situation has again changed, and that the Old
Buddha has heard such good accounts of the defeat of the foreign
relief force on its way to Peking that she is once more determined to
give the Boxers their head and “to eat the flesh and sleep on the
skins” of the foreign devils.
4th Day of the 6th Moon: at the Hour of the Dog, 7 p.m. (June 30,
1900).—Kang Yi called to-day, and remained with me for the evening
meal. He tells me that Tung Fu-hsiang called in person this morning
on Jung Lu at his residence, and asked him for the loan of the heavy
artillery which is under his orders. Jung Lu is said to have ample
armaments in stock in the city, the property of the Wu Wei-chün
(Military Defence Corps) sufficient to knock every foreign building to
pieces in a few hours.
Tung was kept waiting at Jung Lu’s door for over an hour; when
finally admitted, he began to bluster, whereupon Jung Lu feigned
sleep. “He gave no consent, but leant on his seat and
slumbered.”[85] Tung then expostulated with Jung Lu for his
rudeness, but the Commander-in-chief only smiled, and brought the
interview to an end by remarking that Tung’s only way to get the
guns would be to persuade the Old Buddha to give him Jung Lu’s
head with them. “Apply for an audience at once,” he said. “She
believes you to be a brave man and will certainly comply with any
request you may make.”
Tung Fu-hsiang left in a towering rage, and made straight for the
Forbidden City, although the hour for audiences was long since past.
At the gate of the Hall of Imperial Supremacy (Huang Chi-tien) he
made a loud disturbance, bidding the eunuchs inform Her Majesty
that the Kansuh Commander-in-chief was without, desiring audience.
It so happened that the Old Buddha was engaged in painting a
design of bamboos on silk, and she was highly displeased at being
thus disturbed. Tung was ushered in, however, and fell on his knees.
“Well,” said Her Majesty, “I suppose that you have come to report the
complete destruction of the Legations? This will be the tenth time
since the end of last Moon.” “I have come,” replied Tung Fu-hsiang,
“to ask Your Majesty’s permission to impeach the Grand Secretary
Jung Lu as a traitor and the friend of barbarians. He has the guns
which my army needs; with their aid not a stone would be left
standing in the whole of the Legation quarter. But he has sworn
never to lend these guns, even though Your Majesty should
command it.” Angrily the Old Buddha replied, “Be silent. You were
nothing but a brigand to begin with, and if I allowed you to enter my
army it was only to give you an opportunity of atoning for your former
misdeeds. Even now you are behaving like a brigand, forgetting the
majesty of the Imperial Presence. Of a truth, your tail is becoming
too heavy to wag. Leave the Palace forthwith, and do not let me find
you here again unless summoned to audience.”
Reproduction of Picture painted on Silk, by Her Majesty Tzŭ Hsi.
Kang Yi declares that we shall never take the Legations so long as

Jung Lu continues to exercise his present great influence at Court. Li
Shan, who is also a great favourite of the Empress Dowager, is now
on the side of those who would make peace with the foreigners, and
has been impeached for it by Na T’ung.
The following proclamation is now placarded all over the city, in
accordance with the Empress Dowager’s orders issued to Prince
Chuang. They say that she means to pay the rewards from her own
privy purse:
“Rewards.
“Now that all foreign churches and chapels have been
razed to the ground, and that no place of refuge or
concealment is left for the foreigners, they must unavoidably
scatter, flying in every direction. Be it therefore known and
announced to all men, scholars and volunteers, that any
person found guilty of harbouring foreigners will incur the
penalty of decapitation. For every male foreigner taken alive a
reward of 50 taels will be given; for every female 40 taels, and
for every child 30 taels; but it is to be clearly understood that
they shall be taken alive, and that they shall be genuine
foreigners. Once this fact has been duly authenticated, the
reward will be paid without delay. A special proclamation,
requiring reverent obedience.”
Much larger rewards than these were paid in the tenth year of
Hsieng-Feng (1860) for the heads of barbarians, but of course in
those days they were comparatively rare, whereas now, alas, they
have become as common as bees!
This morning an important trial took place outside the gate of
Prince Chuang’s palace; Yi Ku, Fen Che, and Kuei Ch’un presided.
Over nine hundred people were summarily executed by the Boxers,
in some cases before any proofs whatsoever had been substantiated
in regard to their alleged connection with foreigners. Helpless babes
even were amongst the slain. Fen Che is nothing more than a
butcher and the Old Buddha remonstrated with Prince Chuang for
not keeping the Boxers in better order.
8th Day of the 6th Moon, 11 a.m. (July 4th).—Yü Hsien’s son-in-
law, Chi Shou-ch’eng, came and talked with me for a long while. The
bombardment of the city was going on all the time he was here, and
to the south of my house, close to the Imperial City Wall, the troops
of Li Ping-heng were mounting cannon on an elevated platform.
They are all still very wroth with Jung Lu, who refuses to lend his
guns, and his troops are so faithful to him that it is impossible to
bribe them to disobey him. Jung Lu’s courage is really extraordinary;
he said of himself lately, that “in the days of the wicked Ruler
(meaning Prince Tuan) he bided his time on the shores of the bleak
North Sea, awaiting the purification of the Empire.”[86] I am told that
Prince Tuan has taken possession of one of the Imperial Seals, so
as to be able to proclaim his son Emperor at the first favourable
opportunity; but if the Old Buddha finds this out, as most probably
she will, there is trouble ahead for Prince Tuan.
Chi Shou-ch’eng tells me that Yü Hsien has sent in a memorial to
the Empress Dowager with reference to the missionaries in Shansi.
Ten days ago she had sent him a secret Decree, saying, “Slay all
foreigners wheresoever you find them; even though they be
prepared to leave your province, yet must they be slain.” It seems
that the Old Buddha ordered that this Decree should be sent to every
high provincial official in the Empire, but it is now reported that Tuan
Fang, the acting governor of Shensi, and Yü Chang, governor of
Honan, together with the high officials in Mongolia, received the
Edict in a very different form, for the word “slay” had been changed
to “protect.” It is feared that some treacherous minister is responsible
for this, but no one dares inform Her Majesty. To Yü Hsien’s latest
memorial, she has made the following reply, which has been sent by
the fastest express riders to T’ai-Yüan fu:—“I command that all
foreigners—men, women, and children, old and young—be
summarily executed. Let not one escape, so that my Empire may be
purged of this noisome source of corruption, and that peace may be
restored to my loyal subjects.” Chi Shou-ch’eng tells me that Yü
Hsien’s bitterness against foreigners is inspired by his wife, of whom
he is greatly afraid. He himself has earned golden opinions in T’ai-
Yüan during his short administration, and has a high reputation for
even-handed justice. He says also that this last Decree gave
pleasure to Prince Chuang; Jung Lu tried to stop it, asking the Old
Buddha what glory could China expect to gain by the slaughter of
women and children. “We should become the laughing-stock of the
world,” he said, “and the Old Buddha’s widespread fame and
reputation for benevolence would be grievously injured.” “Yes,”
replied the Empress Dowager, “but these foreigners of yours wish to
see me deposed, and I am only paying off old scores. Ever since the
days of Tao-Kuang this uproarious guest within our borders has been
maltreating his hosts, and it is time that all should know who is the
real master of the house.”
Yesterday afternoon the Empress Dowager crossed over to the
Lake Palace for a water picnic, attended by several ladies of the
Court. The continuous bombardment of the French cathedral
eventually made her head ache, so she despatched a chamberlain

(Download PDF) A Miracle Creed The Principle of Optimality in Leibnizs Physics and Philosophy Jeffrey K Mcdonough Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Download PDF) A Miracle Creed The Principle of Optimality in Leibnizs Physics and Philosophy Jeffrey K Mcdonough Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

A Miracle Creed: The Principle of

Optimality in Leibniz's Physics and

The Toyota Way Jeffrey K. Liker

A Mother's Creed Lilo Quie

Physics of nuclear reactors K. Umasankari

The Toyota Way 2nd Edition Jeffrey K. Liker

The Principle of Moments Esmie Jikiemi-Pearson

The Principle of Political Hope Loren Goldman

Leibniz on the Problem of Evil Paul Rateau

Principle of Macroeconomics: A Streamlined Approach 4th

The Principle of Optimality in Leibniz’s Physics and

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2022

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

2.2. A Model for Leibnizian Forces  73

Draeger, and Erik Schmidt. I owe David a special debt of gratitude

their unsolicited book manuscripts for comment. I hereby announce

Phenomenological Research (78:3) 2009: 505–​544 and “Leibniz’s

A Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1923–​). Sämtliche Schriften und

DM Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Discourse on Metaphysics, G

LDB Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2007). The Leibniz-​Des Bosses

T Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm, Essais de Théodicée sur la bonté

In 1950, Albert Einstein published an essay on general relativity

Illustrating his thought, Einstein offered ancient atomism as an ex-

precisely to “comprehend” a wide variety of experiential phenomena

to experience. Just as Leibniz grants that the appearance of evil

had considered. In 1684, in another seminal paper published in the

out of his optimality approach to the laws of optics. What would

of a monad’s appetites under the constraints imposed by its point

Optics and Immanent

While strictly false, the legend that teleology was abandoned in

2. For a helpful overview of Aristotle’s views on teleology, see Leunissen (2020).

teleological order—​that some things are for the sake of other

the question of how teleological and efficient laws of nature may be

A UNITARY PRINCIPLE FOR OPTICS (1682)

Descartes’s publication, in 1637, of the two central laws of geo-

Leibniz attempted to offer new foundations for Descartes’s laws of

whole path CE +​ED becomes the least of all . . . if E is taken to be

writings Leibniz would continue to insist that “Order demands that

Stating the problem in terms of finding the point C which

Leibniz considers a refracting surface ACB which, again, might be

Once again Leibniz reduces the problem of finding the path

he could see his derivation of the law of refraction as a response

1.2. IMMANENT LAWFUL TELEOLOGY

Leibniz’s easiest path principle represents an important contribu-

statics and mechanics. Throughout his career, Leibniz sought to lev-

In fact (as I have shown by a quite remarkable example of a prin-

As these passages suggest, optimality principles enter into Leibniz’s

related to God’s intentions to create the best of all possible worlds.

An efficient explanation of the sort offered by Descartes could be

point B is explained in part by its arrival at a later point C by an eas-

4. This consideration highlights an important difference between the kinds of explanations

explanation of the ray’s trajectory proceeds piecemeal. Intuitively,

First, it was one of the hallmarks of Aristotle’s position on tel-

For Leibniz famously believes that a benevolent, omnipotent god

think that efficient and final causation are mutually incompatible.

1.3. AN OLD MYTH ABOUT TELEOLOGY ?

As we will see in more detail in Chapter 5, the application of opti-

principles of modern science really be teleological? Critics who

any teleological explanation of its behavior. So much, I think, can

“With all respect I have received your telegrams. Where

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

2.2. A Model for Leibnizian Forces 73

Phenomenological Research (78:3) 2009: 505–544 and “Leibniz’s

A Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (1923–). Sämtliche Schriften und

LDB Leibniz, Gottfried Wilhelm (2007). The Leibniz-Des Bosses

2. For a helpful overview of Aristotle’s views on teleology, see Leunissen (2020).

teleological order—that some things are for the sake of other

whole path CE +ED becomes the least of all . . . if E is taken to be

1.2. IMMANENT LAWFUL TELEOLOGY

4. This consideration highlights an important difference between the kinds of explanations

1.3. AN OLD MYTH ABOUT TELEOLOGY ?