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Advanced Theory of Mind
Advanced Theory
of Mind
SCOT T A. MILLER
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2022
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

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You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Miller, Scott A., 1944–author.
Title: Advanced theory of mind /Scott A. Miller.
Description: New York : Oxford University Press, [2022] |
Includes bibliographical references and index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2022000302 (print) | LCCN 2022000303 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780197573174 (hardback) | ISBN 9780197573198 (epub) | ISBN 9780197573204
Subjects: LCSH: Cognitive psychology. | Social perception. |
Human behavior. | Developmental psychology.
Classification: LCC BF201 .M55 2022 (print) | LCC BF201 (ebook) |
DDC 153—dc23/eng/20220125
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022000302
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2022000303
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197573174.001.0001
1 3 5 7 9 8 6 4 2
Printed by Marquis, Canada
To Sylvia, Brielle, Tavia, and Ronan
Contents
Preface xi
1. Introduction 1
irst-Order Theory of Mind
F 2
Advanced Theory of Mind 6
What Do We Want to Know? 9
Organization of the Book 12
2. Understanding of Cognitive States 18
Second-Order False Belief 18
evelopmental Findings
D 19
More About Assessment 21
Pointing Ahead 23
Higher-Order Recursion 23
Strange Stories 27
Nonliteral Utterances 31
Lying 32
Irony and Sarcasm 34
Opacity 36
Diversity 39
Culture 42
Developmental Origins 44
Language and Executive Function 45
Social Experience 48
3. Understanding of Affective States 53
Emotion Understanding 53
Early Forms 54
est of Emotion Comprehension (TEC)
T 56
Hidden Emotions 59
Mixed Emotions 61
Belief 63
Reading the Mind in the Eyes Test 66
Faux Pas 69
Socially Ambiguous Stories 71
Other Measures 73
viii Contents
Gender 73
Culture 76
Developmental Origins 79
Language and Executive Function 79
S ocial Experience 81
Genetics 84
Comparisons Among Developments 85
4. Other Approaches 91
Mental Actions 91
ccurrence of Actions
O 92
Organization of Actions 96
Target for Judgment 99
amiliarity of Target: General
F 101
Familiarity of Target: Specific 108
Self as Target 113
Extraordinary Minds 118
Mind and Brain 123
5. Variations of First-Order Paradigms 127
Complications 127
alse Belief
F 128
Perspective Taking 138
Simplifications 141
erspective Taking
P 141
False Belief 143
Neuroimaging 152
Methods 152
Issues 154
Findings 155
6. Consequences: Cognitive Development 160
First-Order Findings 161
Contrasts Between First-Order and Advanced Theory of Mind 163
Academic Ability 164
Reading 164
Writing 169
Science and Epistemology 170
Teaching 174
Language Use 178
7. Consequences: Social Development 185
Peer Relations 186
S ocial Standing 186
Friendship 189
Contents ix
rosocial Behavior
P 191
Moral Reasoning and Moral Emotions 193
Reasoning 193
Emotions 199
Cooperation 201
Persuasion 203
Aggression 206
ullying
B 206
Aggression in General 208
Machiavellianism 210
Coda 211
8. Aging 213
ognitive Abilities and Aging
C 214
Theory of Mind and Aging 216
ethodological Issues
M 216
Age and Task Comparisons 218
Determinants: Aspects of the Task 225
Determinants: Aspects of the Person 229
Consequences 234
Alzheimer’s Disease 237
Neuroimaging 239
9. Clinical Conditions 243
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD) 244
I nitial Studies 245
Determinants of Performance 247
Consequences 254
Evaluation 255
Deafness 257
Specific Language Impairment (SLI) 261
Depression 263
Schizophrenia 267
Neuroimaging 270
utism Spectrum Disorder
A 270
Schizophrenia 273
10. Conclusions 275
hat Develops and When Does It Develop?
W 275
Individual Differences 277
Group Differences 278
Sources of Development 280
Relations Among Developments 282
Theories 285
x Contents
Future Directions 287

ore Study of Different Cultures
M 287
More Longitudinal Study 288
More Study of the Individual Dimension 290
Study of a Wider Range of Individual Differences 292
References 295
Author Index 359
Subject Index 381
Preface
As the title indicates, this book deals with advanced theory of mind, that is,
forms of mentalistic understanding that emerge beyond the first 5 or 6 years
of life. It is one of three book-length treatments of this topic.
The first was an earlier book of mine entitled Theory of Mind: Development
Beyond the Preschool Years (Miller, 2012). The present book is not simply a
new edition of this earlier work. To be sure, it does what new editions al-
ways do: namely, update the coverage in light of more recent research—in
the present case, several hundred studies from the last 9 or 10 years. But it
also differs from the earlier book in its organization and emphases. In partic-
ular, several topics that received a few pages in the first book receive chapter-
length treatments in the present one. The result, I believe, is a book that
complements rather than duplicates its predecessor.
The other entry under the book-length heading is a book entitled Theory
of Mind in Middle Childhood and Adolescence, edited by Devine and Lecce.
This is a fine book, with well-chosen topics for its 11 chapters and leading
researchers to write about each topic. As is often the case with edited books,
however, some topics fall between the cracks; the present book provides a
fuller coverage of a number of issues. My book also provides a lifespan treat-
ment rather than up to adolescence only, and it provides a more up-to-date
treatment. My recommendation is that anyone interested in advanced theory
of mind draw from both sources.
I am grateful to many people for various kinds of help during the writing of
this book. The book benefitted greatly from the excellent reviewers solicited
by Oxford University Press: Daniel Bernstein, Michelle de Haan, Kristin
H. Lagattuta, Louis Moses, and Claudie Peloquin. I am also grateful to Dea
Garic for her comments on the neuroimaging material and to Bill Fabricius
for his sharing of a prepublication version of his research. As with my earlier
books, I received much needed help from the Interlibrary Loan Division of
the University of Florida Library, which tracked down so many sources that
I needed. Finally, I am grateful for the excellent help and support provided
by the editorial team at Oxford University: Abby Gross, Katie Pratt, Jennifer
Rod, and Hannah Cherry.
1
Introduction
Books or articles about theory of mind often begin with an example that
helps to convey what is meant by the term (e.g., Derksen, Hunsche, Giroux,
Connolly, & Bernstein, 2018; Miller, 2012; Wellman, 2014). This book will be
no exception.
The example I use is drawn from one of the Peanuts Sunday comic strips
in which Lucy is holding the football and Charlie Brown is about to run up to
kick it. The question is, what does each of the characters believe that the other
is thinking?
Lucy believes several things. She believes that Charlie thinks that she will
hold the ball in place and that he will finally be able to make his long-desired
kick. She believes this despite the fact that she knows that such a belief on
Charlie’s part is false, because she intends, as always, to pull the ball away at
the last minute. She believes as well that Charlie will act on what he believes
is true and not on what in fact is true—that is why he will end up kicking at
empty air. Finally, she believes that false beliefs such as Charlie’s do not al-
ways simply happen; rather, they can be deliberately implanted by another.
She, in fact, has just done so.
As Figure 1.1 shows, Charlie Brown’s thoughts may take a complicated
form. He has, of course, been fooled before, and so a natural first thought
is that Lucy intends to trick him again. If he stopped here (she thinks that
I think she will hold the football, but I really think that she will pull it away),
he would be fine. But being Charlie Brown, he overcomplicates things, and
the final entry in his chain of reasoning has the ball in place. And so he is
fooled again.
The beliefs of the two protagonists are not the only mental states in play
here. Lucy also takes into account Charlie’s desire to kick the football, be-
cause without the desire no attempted kick would be made. In general, nei-
ther beliefs nor desires alone are sufficient to impel behavior; they must work
together. Had the strip carried the story a bit further, Charlie’s emotion in
response to the outcome would have become apparent. In the typical case,
Advanced Theory of Mind. Scott A. Miller, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197573174.003.0001
2 Advanced Theory of Mind
Figure 1.1. Theory of mind in Peanuts.

PEANUTS © 1962 Peanuts Worldwide LLC. Dist. By ANDREWS MCMEEL SYNDICATION.
Reprinted with permission. All rights reserved.
successful fulfillment of a desire results in happiness, whereas sadness is the

result of an unsuccessful attempt. Lucy knows this, and thus she is manipu-
lating Charlie’s emotion as well as his belief.
First-Order Theory of Mind
The Peanuts example shows both Charlie and Lucy exercising their theory-
of-mind abilities (although Lucy more successfully than Charlie). Theory of
mind has to do with what people understand about the mental world. As
the example shows, theory of mind encompasses mental states of a variety of
sorts (e.g., beliefs, desires, emotions). It also encompasses both the self and
others as targets for judgment.
The mental states that figure most prominently in the football scenario are
beliefs, and it is beliefs that have been the most often studied mental state
in the research literature. The first theory-of-mind study had to do with
beliefs—specifically, with the realization that beliefs can sometimes be false
Introduction 3
(Wimmer & Perner, 1983). The child participants in the study heard a story
about a little boy named Maxi and his mother. When the story opens, the
mother has just returned from the store with some chocolate, which Maxi
helps her put away in the blue cupboard. Maxi then goes out to play, his
mother breaks off some of the chocolate for a cake she is making, and she
puts the rest back in the green cupboard. Maxi returns, and the question
asked of the child is where Maxi will look for the chocolate.
As the Peanuts example suggested, answering this question cor-
rectly requires several realizations. The child must realize that beliefs are
mental representations rather than direct reflections of reality and that as
representations they may sometimes be false. The child must also realize
that people’s actions follow from what they believe and not directly from the
world itself. Maxi, therefore, should look where his experience has led him to
believe that the chocolate is: in the blue cupboard.
It turned out that most 3-or 4-year-olds were incapable of such reasoning.
The dominant answer was that Maxi would search where the chocolate actu-
ally was—thus a response in terms of reality, and the child’s own knowledge,
and not in terms of Maxi’s belief. There have been hundreds of false belief
studies since, spanning diverse samples and diverse methods of testing, and
they confirm the results of this initial investigation: Children younger than
4 seldom succeed on standard measures of false belief (Wellman, Cross, &
Watson, 2001). Note that such children are not simply random in their re-
sponse; rather they are systematically wrong.
A further finding is that young children find it just as difficult to recapture
their own initial false belief as they do to judge the false belief of someone
else. In another often-used testing procedure, children first see a familiar
container such as a crayon box and are asked what it contains. After the child
gives the expected response of “crayons,” the box is opened to reveal that the
actual contents are candles. The box is then closed up, and the child is asked
what he or she thought was in the box before it was opened. Despite the fact
that they have just said “crayons,” most 3-year-olds and many 4-year-olds re-
spond “candles.” Whether the target is self or other, young children have dif-
ficulty in realizing that a belief need not match reality.
Young children’s difficulties in linking experience and belief are not lim-
ited to cases of false belief. In some instances experience is sufficient to instill
a true belief (thus knowledge), in some instances it is too insufficient to instill
any belief (thus ignorance), and in some instances it is compatible with two
or more beliefs (thus ambiguity). Children as young as 3 sometimes succeed
in making such judgments in the maximally simple case—for example, if X

sees the contents of a box and Y does not, who knows what is in the box (Pratt
& Bryant, 1990)? But they do not always do so (Varouxaki, Freeman, Peters,
& Lewis, 1999). And they struggle in cases that are not maximally simple.
Judging ambiguity, for example, is typically more difficult than judging ei-
ther a true or a false belief (Carpendale & Chandler, 1996). In addition, per-
ception is not the only source of beliefs, and mastery of communication and
inference as sources typically extends into the grade-school years (Miller,
Hardin, & Montgomery, 2003).
Judging someone’s belief is not the only situation in which it is necessary
to recognize the distinction between a mental state and reality. As its name
suggests, an appearance/reality task tests the ability to distinguish between
an object’s perceptual appearance and its underlying reality. Suppose, for ex-
ample, that we show young children a picture of a white butterfly, after which
we place a red filter over the picture. Two questions follow: “When you look
at the butterfly, does it look red or does it look white?” “For real, is the but-
terfly really and truly red or really and truly white?” Most 3-year-olds and
many 4-year-olds answer “red” to both questions, thus failing to realize that
a momentary representation may not match an object’s enduring nature
(Flavell, Green, & Flavell, 1986).
The ability to separate self and other also applies to situations other than
false belief. Another often studied development during the preschool years
is labeled Level 2 perspective taking. Suppose that experimenter and child
sit on opposite sides of a table, and a picture is placed flat on the table be-
tween them. Again, two questions follow: “Do you see the picture right side
up or upside down?” “Do I see the picture right side up or upside down?”
Prior to age 4 most children judge that the experimenter sees the picture
just as they do (Flavell, 1992). Note that by this age children realize that that
one person may see something that another does not see (Level 1 perspec-
tive taking); what they do not yet realize is that two people may see the same
thing differently.
The discussion to this point has concerned epistemic mental states, that
is, states (such as belief and perception) that are intended to reflect reality
accurately. Other mental states can also pose problems for young children.
It is true that in some ways both desires and emotions are easier to under-
stand than are beliefs; indeed, even infants have some ability to recognize
and respond appropriately to what other people feel or what other people
want (Carpendale & Lewis, 2015). Furthermore, even toddlers may realize
Introduction 5
that different people may have different desires, even though they do not yet
realize that different people may have different beliefs (Repacholi & Gopnik,
1997). Still, such knowledge has to develop, for the developmentally earliest
response is to assume a desire identical to one’s one. Similarly, only some
forms of emotion understanding are evident during the preschool years.
Cases in which there is a mismatch between emotion and available cues
(e.g., facial expression) are especially challenging. Thus a full understanding
of mixed emotions or display rules is typically years away (Flavell, Miller, &
Miller, 2002).
The preceding is only a sampling of the challenges that face young chil-
dren in the domain of theory of mind. If the research picture ended at this
point, the general conclusion would mirror one of the conclusions from the
Piagetian studies that dominated the field of cognitive development prior to
the emergence of theory of mind. The conclusion would be that preschool
thought is riddled with gaps and confusions and basic misunderstandings
about how the world works. It is not until the grade-school years that chil-
dren begin to develop adult-like forms of thought.
Fortunately, the theory-of-mind research picture does not end at this
point. The first 5 years of life are not only a time during which many basic
understandings are initially lacking; they are also the time during which
most of these early problems are overcome. By age 5 typically developing
children have mastered false belief, appearance/reality, Level 2 perspective
taking, and numerous other forms of early theory of mind. Furthermore—
and as touched on earlier—even toddlers show some understanding, espe-
cially for states other than beliefs, and even infants are in various ways tuned
in to and responsive to the social world (Carpendale & Lewis, 2015).
The interest that the field has shown in theory of mind no doubt has many
sources, but these early theory-of-mind successes may be one of the initial
bases for interest. The Piagetian model dominant at the time told us mainly
what preschoolers do not yet know. Research on theory of mind provided a
valuable corrective by demonstrating the many important things that they
do know.
A further conclusion—and a further reason for interest—is that these
forms of knowledge make a difference in children’s lives. Theory of mind has
been shown to relate to a wide range of developmentally important outcomes
in both the cognitive and social realms: the more advanced the child’s
theory-of-mind abilities, the more advanced the child’s social and cognitive
functioning (Astington, 2003; Derksen et al., 2018). Theory of mind is thus
of interest for two reasons: as an important form of cognitive development in

itself, and as a contributor to a wide range of other developments.
Advanced Theory of Mind
The preceding is a brief summary of a huge research literature. Fuller sources

are plentiful (e.g., Astington & Hughes, 2013; Carpendale & Lewis, 2021;
Wellman, 2014), and I will also add to the description just given at various
points throughout the book. The present treatment was kept brief because
first-order theory of mind is not the main topic of this book. Such a summary
was included, however, because it is a necessary prelude to what is the main
topic: advanced theory of mind. The obvious question posed by such a label
is: advanced with respect to what? The answer is advanced with respect to the
first-order developments that emerge during the first 4 or 5 years of life.
Descriptively, then, advanced theory of mind is easy to characterize.
Advanced theory of mind consists of developments that go beyond
achievements such as false belief and appearance/reality—that go beyond
what 4-or 5-year-olds are capable of. The forms of understanding are more
complex than those at the first-order level, the tasks to measure under-
standing are more difficult, and the ages of mastery are later—in some cases
considerably later. First-order theory of mind tells us what the typical 5-year-
old is capable of. Advanced theory of mind tells us what the typical adult is
capable of.
The preceding is a quick and convenient way to identify the target of
study. But it clearly does not capture all that we want to know about ad-
vanced theory of mind. The empirical characterization must be joined by a
theoretical characterization—by a specification of exactly what changes with
development and exactly how advanced theory of mind is different from
first-order theory of mind. What, in short, is advanced theory of mind?
Possible answers to this question will be a continuing theme throughout
the book, with the fullest consideration coming in the concluding chapter.
For now, I settle for a start to the discussion through a brief consideration of
one of the most often studied of the advanced theory-of-mind tasks. As we
will see, it is a task that is prefigured by Charlie Brown’s string of “knows that
knows that knows that.”
Shortly after Wimmer and Perner (1983) initiated the study of first-order
false belief, the same investigators published the first example of an advanced
Introduction 7
theory- of-
mind measure: the second- order false belief task (Perner &
Wimmer, 1985). Table 1.1 shows one of the scenarios that were used. It was
one of six versions of the task that Perner and Wimmer created, versions that
differed in some ways procedurally but that produced essentially the same
results.
Chapter 2 will discuss what these results were, along with a review of
results from the second-order task more generally. But I can give one basic
result here: As expected, second-order false belief is indeed more difficult
than first-order false belief.
Various differences between the first- order and second- order tasks
might contribute to the difference in difficulty. Here I suggest four. (See also
Miller, 2009.)
A first difference is that there are now two mental states to which the
child must attend and not just one. In the first-order case the child must
Table 1.1 One of the Perner and Wimmer (1985) Scenarios Used to Assess
Children’s Understanding of Second-Order False Belief
This is a story about John and Mary who live in this village. This morning John and
Mary are together in the park. In the park there is also an ice-cream man in his van.
Mary would like to buy an ice cream, but she has left her money at home. So she is very
sad. “Don’t be sad,” says the ice-cream man, “you can fetch your money and buy some
ice cream later. I’ll be here in the park all afternoon.” “Oh good,” says Mary, “I’ll be back
in the afternoon to buy some ice cream. I’ll make sure I won’t forget my money then.”
So Mary goes home. . . . She lives in this house. She goes inside the house. Now John is
on his own in the park. To his surprise he sees the ice-cream man leaving the park in
his van. “Where are you going?” asks John. The ice-cream man says “I’m going to drive
my van to the church. There is no one in the park to buy ice cream; so perhaps I can sell
some outside the church.”
The ice-cream man drives over to the church. On his way he passes Mary’s house. Mary
is looking out of the window and spots the van. “Where are you going?” she asks. “I’m
going to the church. I’ll be able to sell more ice cream there,” answers the man. “It’s a
good thing I saw you,” says Mary. Now John doesn’t know that Mary talked to the ice-
cream man. He doesn’t know that!
Now John has to go home. After lunch he is doing his homework. He can’t do one of the
tasks. So he goes over to Mary’s house to ask for help. Mary’s mother answers the door.
“Is Mary in?” asks John. “Oh,” says Mary’s mother. “She’s just left. She said she was going
to get an ice cream.”
Test question: So John runs to look for Mary. Where does he think she has gone?
Justification question: Why does he think she has gone to the ____?
Note: From “ ‘John Thinks That Mary Thinks That . . .’ Attribution of Second-Order Beliefs by 5-to
10-Year-Old Children,” by J. Perner and H. Wimmer, 1985, Journal of Experimental Child Psychology,
39, p. 441. Copyright 1985 by Elsevier. Reprinted with permission.
understand what Maxi believes. In the second-order case the child must un-
derstand what both John and Mary believe.
A second difference concerns the target for John’s belief. In the first-order
case the belief concerns some aspect of the world—where the chocolate is
located, what is inside the crayon box. In the second-order case the belief
concerns another belief—where Mary believes the ice cream truck is. The
child must therefore realize that beliefs can take other beliefs and not simply
empirical facts as their target, and also that such beliefs, like beliefs in ge-
neral, may sometimes be false.
A third difference concerns the number of propositions involved. In the
first-order case there is just one: Maxi believes that . . . In the second-order
case there are two: John believes that Mary believes that . . . Furthermore, the
propositions are not merely conjoined; rather, they take a recursive form that
is potentially endless (A believes that B believes that C believes . . .). Even if
lengthy chains are beyond the child (or any of us), some capacity for recur-
sive reasoning is necessary to solve the second-order problem.
A final difference is that the second-order task places more response
demands on the child than does the first-order task. Because there is more
that must be conveyed, the typical second-order scenario is longer than the
typical first-order scenario, it contains more informational units, it requires
more linguistic understanding, it puts more demands on working memory,
and it concludes with a more complexly worded test question. We will see in
Chapter 2 that later researchers have attempted to simplify the Perner and
Wimmer approach in various ways. Nevertheless, in any version the second-
order task remains more complex than the first-order one.
How general are these differences between first-order and advanced
theory of mind? As we will see, the answer is not perfectly. Some of the char-
acteristics just described do not apply to every task under the “advanced”
heading, and thus to every comparison between first-order and advanced.
Conversely, other tasks at the advanced level sometimes incorporate com-
plexities not found in the second-order false belief task, and thus provide
further possible bases for differences between early and later developments.
Based simply on this sort of task analysis, it is difficult to identify any feature
that is both necessary and sufficient to define advanced theory of mind.
Of course, decisions about the nature of advanced theory of mind are not
based solely on task analysis. It is an empirical question whether potentially
important characteristics are in fact important. It is also an empirical ques-
tion how best to characterize advanced theory of mind: whether in terms
Introduction 9
of a single overarching form of knowledge that makes possible a variety of

specific developments; or in terms of a number of discreet, largely separate
forms of understanding; or (as a middle ground) in terms of a mixture of
general knowledge and specific competencies. Again, this question will be a
recurring one throughout the book.
What Do We Want to Know?
The purpose of the present section is to preview the major questions to which
this book is directed. The most general of these questions is the one just
noted: how to characterize advanced theory of mind. But a number of other
questions are also of interest, both as steps toward an answer to the how-to-
characterize question and as important issues in their own right.
As always, an accurate descriptive picture is the starting point. Before we
can explain what develops, we need to know what it is that we are attempting
to explain. And explanation aside, a description of the phenomena of interest
is a basic part of any science. One thing we want to know, therefore, is what
sorts of competencies make up advanced theory of mind and when in devel-
opment children master the various forms.
Of course, any pattern of mean or modal performance will not apply
in every case; unless floor or ceiling effects occur, all attempts to measure
constructs of interest yield differences, not uniformity. A further thing
we want to know, therefore, is what these differences are and where they
come from.
The answer to the “what” question is in most instances straightforward. In
the great majority of cases, the individual differences studied are differences
in rate of development—some children master theory-of mind milestones
more quickly than do others. As we will see at various points, differences in
rate of mastery are important, for such differences show both concurrent and
prospective relations to numerous other aspects of children’s development.
But differences in speed of mastery are not the only possible way in which
people may differ, especially when we move to older ages and more complex
developments. Other kinds of individual differences in addition to rate will
be considered at various points throughout the book.
Whatever the differences at issue, various forms of evidence speak to the
question of where differences in development come from. One approach
is to compare groups that may differ in the factors that are assumed to be
important. The group comparisons that appear in the theory-of-mind liter-

ature are the same ones found for a myriad of other topics in developmental
psychology: age, gender, race, ethnicity, socioeconomic status, culture. In it-
self, such a “social address” approach (Bronfenbrenner, 1979) is just a starting
point; we still need to identify the causal agents for any group differences
that are found. Still, group differences can offer helpful clues with respect
to what may be important. In addition, differences (or similarities) across
groups provide a valuable broadening of the descriptive picture of devel-
opment. This last point applies especially to culture. The study of theory of
mind began as a Western literature and is still largely a Western literature,
something that is true at both the first-order and advanced levels. Still, more
of the world’s cultures regularly enter in to the database, and this work will
receive special attention in the chapters that follow.
When we move from a group to an individual level—and thus from
markers to direct study of causal factors—the possible determinants of in-
dividual differences divide into three general categories. The first category
consists of relevant experiences that may nurture theory-of-mind develop-
ment. Not surprisingly, attempts to identify such experiences have concen-
trated largely (although not exclusively) on the family, with a large literature
devoted to the effects of parents (Miller, 2016) and a moderately large litera-
ture devoted to the effects of siblings (Devine & Hughes, 2018).
A second category consists of the other component of the familiar nature-
nurture divide: the biological contributors to development. As is generally
the case in the study of individual differences, the relevant evidence takes the
form of similarities in development across different degrees of genetic rela-
tion (parents and children, siblings, half siblings, etc.): the greater the simi-
larity, the greater the genetic contribution. As we will see, such studies make
clear that not all individual differences are environmental in origin (Hughes
et al., 2005).
The third category of contributor is orthogonal to the nature-nurture
issue. It consists of the building blocks for theory-of-mind development, that
is, the prerequisite skills that must be in place for theory-of-mind compe-
tencies either to emerge or to be expressed. Two such building blocks have
been shown to be clearly important at the first-order level. One is language
(Milligan, Astington, & Dack, 2007). The other is executive function, a term
that refers to general problem-solving resources such as working memory,
rule switching, and inhibition (Devine & Hughes, 2014). Both language and
executive function are also topics in the literature on advanced theory of
Introduction 11
mind. In addition, a focus on advanced theory of mind adds another poten-

tial building block: namely, first-order developments. At least some advanced
developments may be possible only once their lower-level components are
in place.
The kinds of individual-differences research sketched in the last few
paragraphs make up a large part of the theory-of-mind literature. The focus
on individual differences is understandable, given both the theoretical and
the pragmatic importance of such differences. In addition, some variability
in the outcome measure is a necessary step in the search for causality—
without variability there would be no way to determine whether would-be
predictors are in fact predictive. It is important to remember, however, that
differences are only one of the two things we want to explain under the “how
do we explain development?” heading. The other target for explanation is
commonalities in development. Especially early in development, theory of
mind is very much a normative topic—virtually every typically developing
child masters the same basic developments and does so on at least roughly
the same timetable and in roughly the same order. As with differences, both
experience and biology undoubtedly contribute to such commonalities. But
both the nature and the balance of the two forces may not be identical when
our focus shifts from differences to commonalities. Nor, as we will see, may
the emphases and the contributions of different theories.
The discussion to this point has assumed a concentration on a single
theory-of-mind development, for example, second-order false belief. As
noted earlier, another thing we want to know is how different developments
fit together. This question is central to the broader question of how to char-
acterize advanced theory of mind. If advanced theory of mind depends on
a similar underlying structure across its different manifestations, then we
would expect substantial relations among various developments. Conversely,
if advanced theory of mind consists of a collection of largely independent
achievements, then we would expect minimal relations at best. This issue,
too, is a long-standing one in the first-order literature, and the usual conclu-
sion is an in-between one: some but far from perfect relations in the emer-
gence of developments such as false belief and appearance/reality (Hughes &
Devine, 2015).
The first-order literature reveals another finding as well. For
some developments the relation is not one of concurrence but of se-
quence: Particular achievements emerge in a constant order from simplest to
most complex (Wellman & Liu, 2004). The development of advanced theory
of mind is both more extended and more varied than is first-order develop-
ment; thus possible sequences are clearly a question of interest.
The relations among theory-of-mind developments are not the only re-
lations of interest. As in the first-order literature, advanced theory of mind
is of interest not simply in itself but also as a possible contributor to other
developments. And as in the first-order literature, an important challenge,
which will be addressed at various points, is how to move beyond correlations
in such research to establish causality.
The questions identified to this point all assume a focus on overt behavior—
it is behavior, after all, that indicates what is or is not understood. Especially
in recent years, however, a research literature has emerged directed to what
lies beneath the behavior, that is, the neurological underpinnings for theory-
of-mind reasoning. In addition to constituting an important scientific en-
deavor in its own right, such research provides further evidence with respect
to many of the questions just summarized—in particular, the question of re-
lations among different forms of theory of mind.
I conclude this overview with a return to the starting-point question of
how best to characterize advanced theory of mind. I have been stressing
that this question is an empirical one. But it is also a theoretical question.
Theory of mind has been a theoretical enterprise from the start; three ge-
neral theories emerged within a few years of the first theory-of-mind study,
and a fourth soon joined them. For now I settle for a brief tabular summary
of these theories, with further points to be added as we go (see Table 1.2).
But I will note now that each of the theories was devised primarily to explain
lower-order developments and has been most fully elaborated with respect
to such developments. How well each speaks to advanced theory of mind is
clearly an important question.
Table 1.3 provides a summary of the issues just discussed.
Organization of the Book
There are various ways to organize the research literature on advanced theory
of mind. Studies might be grouped in terms of the mental state being judged,
or in terms of the person making the judgment, or in terms of the person
being judged, or in terms of the causes or the consequences of relatively good
or relatively poor understanding.
Table 1.2 Theories of Theory of Mind
Theory Description Sources
Theory theory Theory-of-mind understanding takes the form Perner (1991);

of a series of informal theories about the mental Wellman
world. Although such theories do not have all the (2014)
properties of formal scientific theories, they do
have several theory-like features. For instance, they
have a specific domain to which they are directed,
and they identify specific entities within that
domain—in this case, the mental world and various
mental entities. These entities are not observable;
rather, they are themselves theoretical postulates.
Thus to think about the mental world, the child
must make a basic, ontological distinction between
physical objects (external, perceptible, tangible)
and mental representations (internal, invisible).
Furthermore, theories not only identify entities;
they also specify cause-and-effect relations among
the entities. Because they identify such cause-and-
effect relations, theories can be used for predictive
and explanatory purposes—in the present case, to
make sense of people’s behavior. And because they
are modifiable by experience, theories change as
experience provides evidence that an existing theory
is not satisfactory. Developmental change, then, is
theory change.
Simulation Two postulates underlie simulation theory. One Goldman &
theory is that people have privileged access to their own Jordan (2013);
mental contents—thus their own immediate Harris (1992,
thoughts, feelings, percepts, and so forth. The second 2009)
is that our ability to make sense of others depends
on our ability to place ourselves, via an imaginative
simulation process, in their position—that is, to
imagine how we would feel, think, or whatever
if we were in the same situation. This argument
assumes a capacity for imaginative pretense, and
such a capacity is in fact evident from very early in
human development. These abilities do improve
with development, however, and such improvements
are one basis for developmental changes in theory
of mind. In addition, the difficulty of carrying out
simulations varies across different mental states and
as a function of how many “default settings” must be
adjusted. It is for this reason that development takes
time and that some developments (e.g., reasoning
about beliefs) are slower to emerge than others (e.g.,
reasoning about desires).
Continued
Table 1.2 Continued
Theory Description Sources
Modularity Although every theory admits a role for biology, Baron-Cohen

theory modularity theory is by far the most biologically (1995); Leslie
oriented of any of the positions. In this view, theory- (1994)
of mind reasoning is made possible by an innately
specified portion of the brain dedicated solely to
the task of theory of mind and thus “encapsulated,”
that is, separate from other brain regions and
cognitive functions. The theory-of-mind module
is seen as having been selected for in evolution, just
as other modules that underlie essential human
characteristics (e.g., aspects of perception and
language) were selected for. Developmental change
in this perspective results primarily from biological
maturation that brings more advanced modules
online. Development is not wholly maturational.
Certain environmental “triggers” may be necessary
for particular changes to occur. Environmental
factors can also contribute to individual differences
in the speed of development or in how theory-
of-mind skills are deployed. Underlying such
differences, however, is a common theory-of-mind
architecture that is largely biological in origin.
Sociocultural The central claim of the sociocultural approach is Carpendale
theory that the development of theory of mind is always & Lewis
embedded within and made possible by the social- (2004, 2021);
cultural environment that surrounds the child. Fernyhough
Furthermore—and in contrast to other theoretical (2008); Nelson
positions—the focus is not on developments et al. (2003)
within the individual child; rather, child and
social world are viewed as inseparable from the
start. Development occurs as the child gradually
internalizes the forms of knowledge and modes of
adaptation provided by the surrounding culture.
Language plays an important role in this process,
for language is a major way in which parents and
others socialize children and a culture’s accumulated
knowledge is passed from one generation to the
next. A further emphasis is on the relationships that
the child forms with others—the idea that learning
about the minds of others occurs best in the context
of long-term, affectively charged social relationships.
Introduction 15
Table 1.3 Questions of Interest in the Study of Advanced Theory of Mind
What are the major developmental achievements?

When in development do these achievements emerge?
What kinds of individual differences characterize development?
How do we explain both the differences and the commonalities in development?
What are the relations among different forms of advanced theory of mind?
How does advanced theory of mind relate to other aspects of development?
What are the neurological bases for theory-of-mind performance?
How, if at all, does advanced theory of mind vary across different groups (e.g.,
ethnicities, cultures, clinical syndromes)?
How satisfactorily do theoretical positions initially devised to explain lower-level
developments account for advanced theory of mind?
At various points this book will adopt all of these organizational

approaches. The initial approach, however, will be in terms of the mental
state at issue. Chapters 2 and 3 will follow a commonly evoked distinction
between two categories of mental state (e.g., Casseta, Pexman, & Goghari,
2018; Mahy, 2018). Chapter 2 will focus on cognitive or epistemic mental
states, that is, mental states, in particular beliefs and perceptions, that are
meant to reflect reality accurately. Beliefs have been the most often studied
mental state in the advanced theory-of-mind literature, just as beliefs are the
most often studied mental state at the first-order level. But beliefs do not ex-
haust the topics that have been examined. Affective mental states have also
received considerable attention, and Chapter 3 will discuss this work.
Useful though the cognitive-affective division is, it must be supplemented
in various ways. Some judgments require both cognitive and affective
knowledge—for example, attributions of emotion that depend on first infer-
ring the target’s relevant belief. Even when cognitive and affective are not
intertwined, many studies include both sorts of measure and thus provide
evidence on the important question of the relations among different aspects
of theory of mind. The last (“Comparisons”) section of Chapter 3 will discuss
research that examines both cognitive and affective understanding.
As its title (“Other Approaches”) suggests, Chapter 4 will address several
lines of research that do not follow a mental state organization. The first two
sections of the chapter address topics that arguably have not received the at-
tention they deserve in research to date. The first section is directed to beliefs
about mental actions—thus not mental states (the most common target for
research) but the activities (e.g., inferring, attending, remembering) that

both result from and lead to particular states. The second section of the
chapter addresses the target for mental state reasoning, with a special focus
on the self as target. It also discusses recent work on beliefs about “extraor-
dinary minds.” The chapter concludes with some intriguing work directed to
beliefs about the underlying bases for mental state reasoning: what children
believe about the mind and about how the mind relates to the brain.
Some of the most revealing work on theory of mind beyond the preschool
years has examined what happens when the standard first-order paradigms
are altered in some way. The alterations may occur at the independent vari-
able end in the way that the task is presented, or at the dependent variable end
in the way that understanding is measured, or in both the task presentation
and the required response. Response measures that reduce demands on the
subject (e.g., eye gaze, brain activity) have been of special interest. Chapter 5
discusses the two main findings to emerge from such research: the claim (still
controversial) that even infants possess some knowledge of false belief, and
the situations under which even adults may show less than perfect first-order
performance. Clearly, a challenge for any theory is to account for both the
unexpected precocity and the unexpected difficulty.
As I noted, the consequences of theory-of-mind understanding have
long been an important topic in the study of first-order developments.
Consequences have also been a focus of much of the work on advanced
theory of mind, and Chapters 6 and 7 will review this work. Chapter 6 will
discuss relations with cognitive outcomes, and Chapter 7 will add a comple-
mentary discussion of social outcomes. Although the general conclusion will
mirror that at the first-order level (positive relations with a number of cogni-
tive and social measures), the focus on older participants and more advanced
developments provides a valuable broadening of the first-order literature—
that is, not simply effects early in childhood but effects into adulthood as well.
The next two chapters are organized in terms of the subject groups in ques-
tion. Chapter 8 addresses possible changes in theory-of-mind reasoning as
people age. Such studies join a large and long-standing literature directed to
cognitive changes with aging, much of which has presented a negative pic-
ture of old age. I will note now a point that I will make later as well, and that is
that cognitive decline is not inevitable in old age—many older adults remain
cognitively active and cognitively proficient. Not all do, however, and both
the timing and the nature of any declines, including declines in theory of
mind, are of clear interest both pragmatically and theoretically.
Introduction 17
Chapter 9 is also directed to research of both pragmatic and theoret-

ical importance: namely, what is known about theory of mind in clinical
conditions. By far the most often studied clinical condition is autism, or what
is more commonly labeled in contemporary writing as autism spectrum dis-
order (ASD). ASD therefore receives the fullest treatment. But two dozen
or so other syndromes have also been objects of study, and the chapter will
also discuss some of the most informative of these further examples. In ad-
dition to the obvious pragmatic implications of such work, two theoretical
questions will be of interest: What does such research tell us about the syn-
drome? And what does such research tell us about theory of mind?
Finally, Chapter 10, “Conclusions,” has two goals. The first is to summa-
rize the conclusions from research to date. The second is to identify needed
directions for future study.
2
Understanding of Cognitive States
This chapter and the next address children’s understanding of mental states—
cognitive states in the present chapter, affective states in the next. Beliefs have
been the most often studied cognitive state, and second-order false belief has
been the most often studied form of belief. The discussion begins, therefore,
with second-order false belief.
Second-Order False Belief
Chapter 1 offered a brief introduction to second-order false belief through

its presentation of the Perner and Wimmer (1985) assessment procedure
(Table 1.1). The Perner and Wimmer approach or slight variants thereof is
one of the two most common methods of assessing second-order false belief.
The other often-used approach was developed a few years later by Sullivan,
Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg (1994). Table 2.1 shows one of the scenarios
used by these researchers.
A comparison of the two tables suggests the goal underlying the Sullivan
et al. (1994) study. In various ways their scenarios were designed to be less
complex and more child-friendly than those of Perner and Wimmer. Thus
the stories are shorter than those in Perner and Wimmer, they contain less
information, they put less demand on memory, and they provide helpful
prompts and reminders at various points during the story. They also include
deception, an element that has been shown to be helpful at the first-order
level. Other researchers have pushed the simplification process even fur-
ther (Coull, Leekam, & Bennett, 2006; Hayashi, 2007). In the Hayashi study,
only a handful of words separate the second-order task from a standard first-
order task.
Advanced Theory of Mind. Scott A. Miller, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780197573174.003.0002
Understanding of Cognitive States 19
Table 2.1 One of the Sullivan, Zaitchik, and Tager-Flusberg (1994) Scenarios
Used to Assess Children’s Understanding of Second-Order False Belief
Tonight it’s Peter’s birthday and Mom is surprising him with a puppy. She has hidden
the puppy in the basement. Peter says, “Mom, I really hope you get me a puppy for my
birthday.” Remember, Mom wants to surprise Peter with a puppy. So, instead of telling
Peter she got him a puppy, Mom says, “Sorry Peter, I did not get you a puppy for your
birthday. I got you a really great toy instead.”
Probe Question 1. “Did Mom really get Peter a toy for his birthday?”
Probe Question 2. “Did Mom tell Peter she got him a toy for his birthday?”
Probe Question 3. “Why did Mom tell Peter that she got him a toy for his birthday?”
Now, Peter says to Mom, “I’m going outside to play.” On his way outside, Peter goes
down to the basement to fetch his roller skates. In the basement, Peter finds the
birthday puppy! Peter says to himself, “Wow, Mom didn’t get me a toy, she really got me
a puppy for my birthday.” Mom does not see Peter go down to the basement and find
the birthday puppy.
Nonlinguistic control question. “Does Peter know that his Mom got him a puppy for his
birthday?”
Linguistic control question. “Does Mom know that Peter saw the birthday puppy in the
basement?”
Now, the telephone rings, ding-a-ling! Peter’s grandmother calls to find out what time
the birthday party is. Grandma asks Mom on the phone, “Does Peter know what you
really got him for his birthday?”
Second-order ignorance question. “What does Mom say to Grandma?”
Memory-aid: Now remember, Mom does not know that Peter saw what she got him for
his birthday.
Then, Grandma says to Mom, “What does Peter think you got him for his birthday?”
Second-order false belief question. What does Mom say to Grandma?
Justification question. Why does Mom say that?
Note: From “Preschoolers Can Attribute Second-Order Beliefs,” by K. Sullivan, D. Zaitchik, and
H. Tager-Flusberg, 1994, Developmental Psychology, 30, p. 402. Copyright 1994 by the American
Psychological Association. Reprinted with permission.
Developmental Findings
As we will see, these differences make a difference. I begin, however, with

a finding that holds across all methods of assessment. However it is meas-
ured, second-order false belief is more difficult than first-order false be-
lief. Mastery of second-order false belief typically emerges between 5 and
7 years of age, and thus at least 1 to 2 years later than mastery of first-order
false belief. Although most of the evidence for this conclusion comes from
between-group comparisons, within-child data lead to the same conclusion
(Hayashi, 2007; Lecce & Hughes, 2010; Osterhaus, Koerber, & Sodian, 2016;
Parker, McDonald, & Miller, 2007). Indeed, the within-child data suggest an
invariant sequence between the two developments, which is what would be
expected if understanding first-order false belief is a necessary step in mas-
tering second-order false belief. In all of the relevant studies, more than 90%
of children show the expected sequence, and the few exceptions are probably
best attributed to measurement error.
The preceding does not mean that method of assessment has no effect
on children’s performance. In fact, it has a clear effect. Studies adopting the
Sullivan et al. approach typically report success approximately a year earlier
than do those using the Perner and Wimmer approach—thus success at 5 or
6 (and occasionally even 4 ) rather than 6 or 7.
Why does this difference occur? I draw the following from a fuller discus-
sion in Miller (2009).
The most obvious basis is the difference in complexity between the two
paradigms. The Sullivan et al. approach was intended to reduce the linguistic
and information-processing demands of the task, thus revealing any bud-
ding competence that might have been masked by these features, and it
clearly succeeds in doing so. As noted, other researchers have added still fur-
ther simplifications. In general, the less complex the procedure, the better
the performance, a conclusion that emerges from both between-study and
within-study examinations of the issue. Sullivan et al. (1994), in fact, showed
that a simplified version of the Perner and Wimmer procedure resulted in
better performance than that in the original study, although not as good as
the performance elicited by their new procedure.
The evidence is less clear with respect to a second possible contributor to
the difference in difficulty: the presence of deception in the Sullivan et al.
scenarios. Deception is (at least sometimes) helpful at the first-order level
(Wellman et al., 2001). At the first-order level, however, it is the character
whose belief is being judged who is the target of the deception; it is not sur-
prising, then, that children may be more likely to attribute a false belief when
they see this character deceived. As Table 2.1 shows, in the second-order case
it is not the target for belief ascription (the mother in the example) who is
deceived; rather it is this person who attempts to deceive the other protago-
nist in the story. The deception-belief connection is thus less straightforward
than in the first-order case.
A study of mine provides the only comparison of the two possible forms
of deception in a second-order scenario (Miller, 2013b). More basically, it
also provides the only within-study attempt to determine whether decep-
tion of any form is in fact helpful. The kindergarten participants responded
to three kinds of trials: one in which character A (e.g., the mother in the
Sullivan et al. scenario) attempted to deceive character B (e.g., the boy in
the scenario), one in which character B attempted to deceive character A,
and one in which no deception occurred. Only the A deceives B condition
led to better performance than in the no-deception condition, a finding that
suggests that Sullivan et al.’s (1994) inclusion of deception of the A-B form
was in fact helpful. The proposed explanation for this effect focused on the
salience with which the mother’s belief is conveyed to the child. The child
hears the mother state the belief that she intends to implant; it is perhaps not
surprising that moments later the child judges correctly that this is the belief
that she believes her son holds.
A comparison of Tables 1.1 and 2.1 reveals one further difference between
the two approaches. The Sullivan et al. approach includes an “ignorance
question” (“What does Mom say to Grandma?”) prior to the false belief ques-
tion. Two findings follow from the inclusion of this question. First, the igno-
rance question turns out to be easier than the false belief question (Hogrefe,
Wimmer, & Perner, 1986). Second, the ignorance question also turns out to
be helpful; children are more likely to recognize a target’s false belief if they
have first judged that the target is ignorant. Here, then, is another contributor
to the difference in results between the two approaches.
More About Assessment
The importance of method of assessment has been a theme throughout this

discussion. I add two further points here.
The first is that the discussion to this point has not addressed a basic ques-
tion: What are the criteria for determining that a child has mastered second-
order false belief? Clearly, at least one criterion must be consistently correct
judgments on the standard assessment tasks. In many studies this is the only
measure used. Many studies, however, add a second criterion: explanations
that provide an adequate justification for the judgments (e.g., “he doesn’t
know that she talked to the ice-cream man”; “he doesn’t know that she
knows”). In this respect, the second-order literature shows an interesting
divergence from the bulk of the first-order literature, in which explanations

have never been a basic part of the assessment of false belief. It is true that
explanations occur occasionally in first-order assessments (e.g., Clements &
Perner, 1994). It is true also that explanations have been used productively in
modified versions of the first-order task (e.g., Bartsch & Wellman, 1989). The
typical assessment, however, is judgment-only.
As we would expect, the requirement of an explanation affects the de-
scriptive picture: Mastery of second-order false belief comes later when ade-
quate explanations are part of the criteria for success. Not necessarily much
later, however, for in most studies the majority of children are able to pro-
vide explanations—indeed, in some studies 100% of the children. And there
is no issue with respect to second-order false belief for which conclusions
have been shown to vary as a function of the criterion for understanding that
is used.
The second point about assessment concerns how we choose among
methods when several different approaches are available. The answer
depends on the goals of the research. A common and important goal in re-
search on cognitive development is to identify the earliest point in develop-
ment at which children show some knowledge of the concept in question.
Identifying first emergence was a basic goal in the Piagetian literature, and it
has also been a basic goal in the study of first-order theory of mind. If iden-
tifying first emergence is the goal, then the method of choice is clearly some
version of the Sullivan et al. approach.
Why, then, should any other approach ever be used? There are several
reasons. First, use of a single method is subject to the threat to validity la-
beled mono-operation bias (Shadish, Cook, & Campbell, 2002), the danger
being that results may not hold generally but rather may be specific to the one
method that has been used. Use of multiple methods guards against this pos-
sibility. In addition, comparison of results from multiple methods can pro-
vide helpful clues as to the bases for performance, which, as we have seen,
is in fact the case for second-order false belief. Finally, the use of a single
method cannot tell us the range of situations in which children can apply
their knowledge, nor can it tell us what the typical level of performance is and
how close typical is to optimal. In this regard, it seems a safe assumption—to
return to the Sullivan et al. approach—that most real-life situations do not
provide three helpful reminders of the critical information before a judg-
ment must be made, along with an explicit statement of the belief that the
child must judge correctly.
Pointing Ahead
The present treatment does not exhaust the issues surrounding second-
order false belief. Most obviously, it has not addressed the basic question
of where such knowledge comes from, as well as why there are individual
differences in how quickly children acquire the knowledge. In this and
the next chapter, I defer the discussion of these questions until late in the
chapter, once all the developments to be discussed have been presented. In
part, this decision reflects the fact that the literature is often too limited to
permit a task-by-task analysis. In addition, the forms of relevant evidence
and (as we will see) the general conclusions are the same across different
developments, and it will therefore be most informative to consider the var-
ious outcomes together.
Also of interest are relations between second-order false belief and other
developments. As Chapter 1 indicated, an important question concerns
the fit between various advanced theory-of-mind developments—do they
emerge in synchrony, for example, or perhaps in sequence, or perhaps in no
consistent pattern at all across different children? This question cannot be
addressed until other developments under the advanced heading have been
introduced, and it therefore will be the subject of the last section of Chapter 3.
Just as in the first-order literature, relations with developments out-
side the domain of theory of mind are also of interest. Indeed, Perner and
Wimmer (1985) made this point in the first report of second-order false be-
lief. Chapters 6 and 7 will discuss the relations that have been examined.
Higher-Order Recursion
As its label indicates, second-order false belief involves two levels of recur-
sion: A thinks that B thinks . . . The recursive chain need not stop at this point.
It is also possible that A thinks that B thinks that C thinks . . . (third-order re-
cursion) or that A thinks that B thinks that C thinks that D thinks . . . (fourth-
order recursion). Note also that the same protagonist may appear more than
once in such chains—for example, A thinks that B thinks that A thinks . . . The
Peanuts example in Chapter 1 is of this sort.
The first examination of higher levels of recursive thinking predated the
theory-of-mind era by more than a decade (Miller, Kessel, & Flavell, 1970).
Miller and colleagues devised a thought-bubbles procedure in which bubbles
above the characters’ heads indicated what they were thinking. Bubbles
within bubbles then served to convey various levels of recursive thought.
Figure 2.1 shows two examples. In the first the boy is thinking that he is
thinking of himself. In the second the boy is thinking that the girl is thinking
of the father thinking of the mother.
Both the Miller et al. (1970) study and subsequent adaptations of the
thought-bubbles approach (Mueller & Overton, 2010; van den Bos, de Rooij,
Sumter, & Westenberg, 2016) lead to two main conclusions. Both are ex-
pectable. The first is that the difficulty of the task increases as the levels of
recursion increase. The second is that performance improves with age, a con-
clusion that comes not only from cross-sectional but also from longitudinal
comparisons (van den Bos et al., 2016). The more recent studies (Mueller &
Overton, 2010; van den Bos et al., 2016) make clear that improvements con-
tinue well into adolescence.
ONE-LOOP RECURSION (Item no.14) TWO-LOOP RECURSION (Item no.15)
Figure 2.1. The thought-bubbles approach to the study of recursive thinking.

From “People Thinking about People Thinking about People. . . .A Study of
Social Cognitive Development,” by P. H. Miller, F. Kessel, and J. H. Flavell,
1970, Child Development, 41, p. 616. Copyright 1970 by John Wiley and Sons.
Reprinted with permission.
Although the thought-bubble approach has proved informative, it does

not tell us all we want to know from a theory-of-mind perspective. Theory of
mind addresses not just the knowledge that A is thinking about B’s thinking;
it also, and critically, addresses the knowledge of what A is thinking about
B’s thinking. Thus, to return to Table 2.1, it is not sufficient to realize that
Mother has a belief about Peter’s thinking; the child must be able to infer
what this belief is. But in the thought-bubble approach there is no content to
the beliefs, which means that there is also no context from which a belief can
be inferred.
Table 2.2 shows a theory- of-
mind approach to recursive thinking
(Osterhaus et al., 2016). As can be seen, it adopts the vignettes approach used
at the first-order and second-order levels, as well as the requirement that the
participant use the information in the stories to attribute a false belief. But
the challenge of doing so is clearly greater than that at the first-or second-
order level. (I will add, with respect to the table, that the inconsistency in
verb choice—“thinks,” “knows,” “believes”—is not a strength of this partic-
ular example.)
A dozen or so studies have taken the vignettes approach to the study of
higher levels of recursion. Most have sampled adults only, but a subset does
include children or adolescents, including the study from which the example
in Table 2.2 was drawn (Liddle & Nettle, 2006; Osterhaus et al., 2016; Valle,
Massaro, Castelli, & Marchetti, 2015). The two most general conclusions to
emerge from such research are the same as those from the thought-bubbles
approach. In samples that provide an age comparison, adults outperform
adolescents, and adolescents outperform children. And whatever the sample,
performance declines as the number of levels increases. Most studies with
adult samples have concluded that fourth-or fifth-level recursion represents
the adult limit (Kinderman, Dunbar, & Bentall, 1998; Oesch & Dunbar, 2017;
Stiller & Dunbar, 2007).
The summary in the preceding paragraph refers to “most studies.” A report
from O’Grady and colleagues (O’Grady, Kliesch, Smith, & Scott-Phillips,
2015) makes a stronger claim, namely, that adults can handle up to seven
levels of recursion. To convey an idea of what this claim entails, the following
is one of the response options (subjects had to choose between two options)
at the seventh level of recursion: “Megan doesn’t want Lauren to know that
she, Megan, knows that Stephen knows that Elaine knows that Bernard feels
she doesn’t know him well enough to date, so that Lauren doesn’t ask Stephen
out” (O’Grady et al., 2015, p. 320).
Table 2.2 Example of Higher-Order Recursion Problems
David and Nick are Ben has a big problem on his

best friends. mind: Tomorrow is his mom’s birthday
They really enjoy but he doesn’t know what to buy.
playing football
together.
David and Nick both want to play on the Ben remembers that his sister, Anna, had
school football team. already asked their mom what she would
like for her birthday.
Anna is out riding her bike.
Nick thinks that Ben decides to look around Anna’s room
he is not as good at to see if he could find what present she
football as David is. got for their mom.
Nick thinks that the Ben goes into the room and finds a big
football manager bunch of beautiful flowers with a little
is more likely to card that says: ‘Happy birthday, Mom!’
choose David for
the football team.
But the football Ben thinks to
manager thinks himself: “Mom must
that both David want flowers for her For m
om
and Nick are good birthday.”

football players. Just as Ben is leaving
He wants them both the room, Anna is
to play in the school coming up the stairs.
football team. But she does not
see Ben.
Ben doesn’t want
Anna to know
that he has been
snooping around
her room, so he asks
her: “Anna, Did you
get mom a birthday
present?”
But the manager knows that Nick doesn’t Anna thinks for a minute—she does
think he will get on the team. not want Ben to copy her idea and to get
mom the same present. So she says: “Yes,
Ben, I got mom some perfume.”
What does the manager believe? What does Anna believe?
◽ The manager ◽ The manager ◽ Anna thinks ◽ Anna thinks
thinks that Nick knows that Nick that Ben believes that Ben
knows he wants doesn’t know that she knows knows that she
him to be on the that he wants that mom wants knows that
football team. him to be on the perfume for her mom wants
football team. birthday. flowers for her
birthday.
Note: From “Scaling of Advanced Theory- of-

Mind Tasks,” by C. Osterhaus, S. Koerber, and
B. Sodian, 2016, Child Development, 87, p. 1975. Copyright 2016 by the Society for Research in Child
Development. Reprinted with permission.
Imposing though the quoted sentence seems, it obviously does not appear
in isolation; rather it comes after the subject has watched a film, as often as
he or she wishes, in which Megan and Lauren and the others talk and act in
various ways that convey what each of them knows or feels and what Megan
ultimately wants or does not want. According to the authors, the theory-of-
mind processing in such cases is implicit—something that both evolution
and much social experience have prepared us to do automatically and largely
effortlessly. This is a claim that we will return to, for the idea that much
theory-of-mind usage is automatic and implicit has become a major theme
in current theorizing. We will also return to higher-level recursive thinking
in Chapters 6 and 7 in a discussion of the consequences of advanced forms of
theory of mind.
Strange Stories
The measure to be discussed now is one of the three most often used meas-
ures in the study of advanced theory of mind, the others being the second-
order false belief task and the Reading the Mind in the Eyes test, a measure to
be considered in Chapter 3.
I begin the discussion of Strange Stories with a brief history of the de-
velopment of the measure. It is worth doing so, because it is the same his-
tory that underlies a high proportion of the measures of advanced theory
of mind.
I noted in Chapter 1 that theory of mind has long been a central topic in the
study of autism, or autism spectrum disorder (ASD). The first study of ASD
and theory of mind came only 2 years after the Wimmer and Perner (1983)
study, and it showed that many children with ASD apparently never master
first-order false belief, a finding supportive of the theory that the well-known
social deficits of ASD reflect an absence of theory-of-mind abilities (Baron-
Cohen, Leslie, & Frith, 1985). Still, some children did master the task, albeit
on a very delayed schedule. What, then, about second-order false belief? In
the first examination of the issue, no child with ASD showed any success on
the second-order task, even though all were well past the usual age of mastery
(Baron-Cohen, 1989). Again, however, the deficit turned out not to be uni-
versal, for in later studies some children, although again well past the usual
age, did succeed (e.g., Bowler, 1992). It remained unclear, therefore, whether
any aspects of theory of mind are forever absent in individuals with ASD,
even those high on the autism spectrum, or whether such developments are
simply delayed rather than absent.
The Strange Stories measure, created by Francesca Happe (1994), was in-
tended to address this question. It was the first of many measures designed
originally for the study of ASD; other examples include the Reading the
Mind in the Eyes test (Baron-Cohen, Jolliffe, Mortimore, & Robinson, 1997),
the Faux Pas test (Baron-Cohen, O’Riordan, Stone, Jones, & Plaisted, 1999),
the Awkward Moments test (Heavey, Phillips, Baron-Cohen, & Rutter, 2000),
Stories from Everyday Life (Kaland et al., 2002), the Reading the Mind in
the Voice test (Golan, Baron-Cohen, Hill, & Rutherford, 2007), the Reading
the Mind in Films test (Golan, Baron-Cohen, & Golan, 2008), and the Moral
Dilemmas Film test (Barnes, Lombardo, Wheelwright, & Baron-Cohen,
2009). In this and the next chapter, I discuss the application of these measures
to typically developing children; Chapter 9 will discuss the work on ASD.
Table 2.3 shows a sampling of items from the Strange Stories measure.
As can be seen, the focus of the measure is on nonliteral utterances, that is,
utterances whose actual meaning is different from what a literal reading of
the utterance would indicate. In addition to the examples in the table, the
other speech forms included are misunderstanding, appearance/reality, for-
getting, sarcasm, persuasion, and double bluff.
The Strange Stories measure is broader in scope than the second-order
false belief task, requiring a range of varied judgments and not simply a di-
chotomous choice between two alternatives. It also embeds its problems and
related questions within more naturalistic, everyday settings, without the
reminders and prompts that characterize the false belief task. Both of these
features were expected to increase the difficulty of the task, thus providing a
further test of whether some forms of advanced theory of mind are absent
in ASD.
Of course, difficulty was not the only criterion in constructing the
measure; it was also necessary to ensure that correct responses did in fact de-
pend on theory of mind. Understanding nonliteral utterances meets this cri-
terion, because such understanding requires going beyond the surface form
to take into account the speaker’s underlying intention in producing the ut-
terance. To make sense of what has been said, the participant must realize
that the speaker intends to implant a particular mental state in the listener—
thus A intends that B thinks or feels or whatever. Two mental states, and the
relation between them, must be understood.
Table 2.3 Examples of Scenarios from the Strange Stories Measure
Story Type: Pretend

Katie and Emma are playing in the house. Emma picks up a banana from the fruit
bowl and holds it up to her ear. She says to Katie, “Look! This banana is a telephone!”
Is it true, what Emma says?
Why does Emma say this?
Story Type: Joke
Today, James is going to Claire’s house for the first time. He is going over for tea, and
he is looking forward to seeing Claire’s dog, which she talks about all the time. James
likes dogs very much. When James arrives at Claire’s house Claire runs to open the
door, and her dog jumps up to greet James. Claire’s dog is huge, it’s almost as big as
James! When James sees Claire’s huge dog he says, “Claire you haven’t got a dog at all.
You’ve got an elephant!”
Is it true what James says?
Why does James say that?
Story Type: Lie
One day, while she is playing in the house, Anna accidentally knocks over and breaks
her mother’s favorite crystal vase. Oh dear, when mother finds out she will be very
cross! So when Anna’s mother comes home and sees the broken vase and asks Anna
what happened, Anna says, “The dog knocked it over, it wasn’t my fault!”
Was it true what Anna told her mother?
Why did Anna say that?
Story Type: White Lie
Helen waited all year for Christmas, because she knew at Christmas she could ask
her parents for a rabbit. Helen wanted a rabbit more than anything in the world. At
last Christmas Day arrived, and Helen ran to unwrap the big box her parents had
given her. She felt sure it would contain a little rabbit in a cage. But when she opened
it, with all the family standing around, she found her present was just a boring old set
of encyclopedias, which Helen did not want at all! Still, when Helen’s parents asked
her how she liked her Christmas present, she said, “It’s lovely, thank you. It’s just what
I wanted.”
Is it true, what Helen said?
Why did she say that to her parents?
Story Type: Figure of Speech
Emma has a cough. All through lunch she coughs and coughs and coughs. Father
says, “Poor Emma, you must have a frog in your throat!”
Is it true, what Father says to Emma?
Why does he say that?
Story Type: Irony
Ann’s mother has spent a long time cooking Ann’s favorite meal: fish and chips. But
when she brings it to Ann, she is watching TV, and she doesn’t even look up, or say
thank you. Ann’s mother is cross and says, “Well that’s very nice, isn’t it? That’s what
I call politeness!”
Is it true, what Ann’s mother says?
Why does Ann’s mother say this?
Note: From “An Advanced Test of Theory of Mind: Understanding of Story Characters’ Thoughts and
Feelings by Able Autistic, Mentally Handicapped and Normal Children and Adults,” by F. Happe,
1994, Journal of Autism and Developmental Disorders, 24, pp. 147–151. Copyright 1994 by Plenum
Publishing Corporation. With kind permission from Springer Science & Business Media.
In scoring the measure, responses to the Why question are critical. To re-
ceive credit, the participant must identify the mental state in question and
also the speaker’s reason for creating that particular state. In the case of a lie,
for example, the speaker’s intent is to implant a false belief that absolves her
of responsibility for some misdeed. In contrast, in the case of a white lie, the
intent is also to implant a false belief but in this case with the goal of sparing
the feelings of those to whom the utterance is directed. In the case of most
of the other forms of utterance, the intent is not to deceive the listener but
to convey a particular message via the nonliteral utterance. With irony, for
example, the intent is to convey the speaker’s attitude with respect to the situ-
ation in question, an attitude that can be either positive or (as in the example
in the table) negative.
As intended, the Strange Stories measure is in fact more difficult than the
second-order false belief task. The original Happe (1994) study was the first
to demonstrate this point, and it did so for both a sample of children with
ASD and a control sample of typically developing children. With occasional
exceptions (e.g., Bosco, Gabbatore, & Tirassa, 2014), subsequent studies led
to the same conclusion. Children as young as 5 or 6 (in the handful of studies
that go that young) show little success on Strange Stories; success begins to
emerge by middle childhood; and performance continues to improve, al-
though typically without reaching ceiling, through adolescence. Indeed,
some adults are less than perfect in their response to the Strange Stories
measure (Murray et al., 2017).
A further point is worth noting here, a point that applies to most of the
tasks that soon joined second-order false belief as measures of advanced
theory of mind. Because they are more difficult, these additional measures
can reveal individual differences not captured by the false belief task, that is,
differences among children who perform perfectly on false belief. In addi-
tion, the false belief task is essentially dichotomous (success or failure), and
the only way to obtain a range of scores is to administer a number of trials.
Most of the more recent measures are designed to yield a range of scores. On
the Strange Stories measure, for example, the range of possible scores (as-
suming standard administration and scoring) is from 0 to 24. For this reason,
too, such measures can reveal individual differences not captured by pass/fail
measures such as false belief.
One kind of difference that Strange Stories reveals is a gender differ-
ence: Girls sometimes outperform boys (e.g., Devine & Hughes, 2013).
The “sometimes” qualifier is important, because many studies report no
difference between the sexes. But when differences do appear, they almost
always favor females. Such, as we will see in Chapter 3, is also the case for sev-
eral other measures of advanced theory of mind. Although various proposals
have been offered, there is as yet no agreed-upon explanation for why such
differences occur. Chapter 3 will discuss the various possibilities that have
been proposed.
Nonliteral Utterances
The Strange Stories measure is made up of nonliteral utterances. Because so

many forms are included, however, the measure provides limited informa-
tion about any specific form of utterance—what children know about lying,
for example, or about jokes, or about irony. It also provides limited infor-
mation about how the utterances compare—whether some are more diffi-
cult than others, and whether children are consistent in their understanding
across different forms. With a few exceptions (e.g., Hao & Liu, 2016; O’Hare,
Bremner, Nash, Happe, & Pettigrew, 2009), studies with Strange Stories have
reported only overall point totals, with no separate consideration of utter-
ance type. The fact that many studies use a shortened version of the measure
makes a breakdown by type even less likely.
The present section considers research whose focus is on specific
utterances rather than cumulative understanding across multiple forms of
utterance. It concentrates on three forms: lying, irony, and sarcasm. These
have been the most often studied forms of nonliteral utterance (apart, per-
haps, from pretense), and they also provide some clear contrasts with regard
to the intention and the effects of the utterance.
In addition to the concentration on specific forms of utterance, the work to
be considered now differs in two ways from that discussed under the Strange
Stories heading. First, the Strange Stories measure is directed to children’s
comprehension of utterances; it provides no direct evidence with respect to
a second question of interest, children’s ability to produce such utterances
themselves. Both comprehension and production are a focus in the work to
be considered now. This point is especially true of lying, for which the ability
to produce lies of various forms is a central question.
The second difference concerns what might be regarded as the ultimate
goal of the research. With Strange Stories the goal is to characterize advanced
theory of mind through the identification of forms of understanding not
present in early childhood—specifically, the ability to understand nonliteral

utterances of various types. Such understanding is necessarily part of what is
examined in the work to be considered now. A further question, however, is
where this understanding itself comes from—in particular, whether other,
in a sense more basic, forms of theory-of-mind understanding underlie the
capacity to interpret nonliteral utterances. The most often studied potential
contributor is the development with which this chapter began: second-order
false belief.
Lying
The relevance of theory of mind for lying was succinctly stated by Talwar,
Gordon, and Lee (2007, p. 804): “Lying, in essence, is theory of mind in ac-
tion.” The purpose of a lie is to instill a false belief. It is difficult to see how
children can lie if they do not yet understand that beliefs can be false.
Yet very young children can lie. Charles Darwin (1877) was the first to
report this phenomenon in writing about his 30-month-old son Doddy.
Subsequent research has confirmed Darwin’s belief that children as young as
2 or 3 can tell lies, a conclusion that has emerged in both naturalistic (Newton,
Reddy, & Bull, 2000) and experimental (Evans & Lee, 2013) examinations of
the issue. Understanding of false belief (at least as typically assessed) does not
seem to be a necessary basis for telling a lie.
Nevertheless, understanding of false belief is clearly a helpful basis. Both
the frequency and the sophistication of lies increase across the early child-
hood years, and both show a clear relation to understanding of false belief
(Ding, Teo, & Tay, 2021; Talwar & Lee, 2008). Children who understand false
belief are more likely to lie than are children who do not, and they are also
more likely to lie successfully than are children who do not.
How might advanced theory of mind contribute? As noted, second-
order false belief is the most often evoked possible contributor, and its
mastery has been argued to make possible at least three post-preschool
developments in children’s understanding and production of lies (see also
Lee & Imuta, 2021).
One is the ability to distinguish lies from other nonliteral utterances.
Two features mark this distinction: the speaker’s belief about the listener’s
knowledge and the speaker’s intention in producing the utterance. With
lies the speaker believes that the listener does not know the truth, whereas
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neighbourhood of the divide do they become higher and give the
country a more mountainous character.” The hill-land also sends
spurs into the low-lying plains, which appear as outliers.
Geological Sketch Map of Borneo. After Posewitz
The great plains extend from the hill-land to the sea. Towards the
hills there is dry flat land which gradually passes into swamps.
Several travellers describe swamps and marshes at the foot of the
hills and even in the mountain land. “On the other hand,” as
Posewitz points out, “outlines of the dry flat land stretch far into the
swampy lowlands, and isolated high-lying districts are then formed in
the middle of marshy low-lying plains.”
THE GEOLOGY OF THE “MOUNTAIN LAND”
PALÆOZOIC
Very little is accurately known about the geology of the “mountain

land” of Borneo. The mountain chains and their spurs are composed
of crystalline schists, the so-called “old slate formations,” which may
be of Devonian age, and the igneous rocks; among the latter are
granites, diorites, gabbros, and serpentines. The two latter appear to
belong rather to the spurs.
Verbeek distinguishes in Sumatra between an “old slate formation”
and a “younger slate formation” which he includes in the Lower
Carboniferous Culm Measures. He is of opinion that perhaps part of
the schists of the older group are of Archæan age, but that the
greater part are Silurian or Devonian, or a mixture of both.
In Borneo there are hornblende schists, mica schists, and
quartzites, which are likely to be Archæan, as there is no evidence
for including these rocks as Devonian. A part of the quartzite schist
and phyllites are perhaps Archæan, while another part may belong
to the Devonian.
In Sumatra it is not always possible to separate the Culm
Measures sharply from the slates of the “old slate formation.” On the
other hand, the unconformity between the limestone facies of the
Lower Carboniferous and the “old slates” is clearly visible. Indeed,
part of the “old slates” in Borneo perhaps belongs to the Culm
Measures in such districts as British North Borneo and Sarawak.
The old crystalline rocks are very generally gold-bearing.
Deposits of the Carboniferous Formation usually form a broad
zone flanking on their northern aspect the older Palæozoic rocks that
constitute the backbone of the island. The Carboniferous rocks
consist mainly of sandstones and limestones, which must not be
confused with those of the Eocene Formation.
The older sandstone is coarse grained, and not very ferruginous: it
rises to 4,000 feet; while the Tertiary sandstone, as far as is at
present known, only constitutes a “hill-land” of very moderate
altitude.
The older limestones are characterised by their hardness and
bluish colour; usually they do not contain fossils, except in isolated
localities; and the rocks are traversed by numerous calcite veins and
by ore-bearing quartz veins. In Sarawak the veins mostly contain
antimony; in Sabah iron pyrites and copper pyrites. Like the Tertiary
coral reefs, the older bands of limestone are full of caves, which, by-
the-by, contain edible swifts’ nests; but while the Tertiary rocks only
attain a height of 200 to 300 feet, the Carboniferous limestones
reach as much as 1,200 feet. In places greenish or reddish slates
are intercalated in the limestone, or the latter alternates with
sandstone.
Although the Carboniferous Formation is clearly marked off from
the Tertiary beds above it, this is not the case, as has been already
noted, with its lower boundary. In many cases beds of the Culm type
cannot at present be distinguished from the “old slate formation.”
There is much doubt as to the horizon to which in any given case a
quartz schist or slate belongs, and the same is the case with the old
sandstone. In Western Sarawak, which, with the “Chinese Districts”
of West Borneo, forms an immense mountain island, the sandstone
is certainly Devonian, and it may be of interest to note that these
beds contain quicksilver.
MESOZOIC
No Secondary Formations have been described from Sarawak,

though Jurassic and Cretaceous rocks occur in Dutch Borneo.
THE GEOLOGY OF THE “HILL-LAND”

CAINOZOIC
The Tertiary “hill-land” forms a belt round the mountain land, which
in some places reaches to the sea, but in others is separated from it
by wide alluvial plains. It has been mentioned that the hill-land not
only surrounds the mountain land, but also penetrates within it,
connecting the separate chains; and it also surrounds isolated
mountain chains.
From a geotectonic standpoint, the Tertiary hill-land only averages
200 to 300 feet. Towards the border of the mountains the hills
become higher where they are of Eocene Age; towards the plains
their height diminishes, and they form low ranges of Miocene or
Pliocene Age.
Verbeek systematised as well as added to the labours of Horner,
Schwaner, and C. de Groot, and established a threefold division of
the older Tertiary beds for the south of Borneo.
1. Sandstone Stage.—The lowermost beds are predominantly
sandstones, and contain the “Indian coal” seams. The sandstones
are usually of a white or yellow colour, and always contain flakes of a
silvery-white mica; the cement is argilaceous. They are probably
derived from mica schists. Alternating with them are bands of shale,
carbonaceous shale, and coal. The sandstone beds are much
pierced and faulted by younger eruptive rocks.
2. Marl Stage.—Among yellowish-white sandstones are the
following beds: bluish-grey “Letten” and shales without fossils;
bluish-grey “Letten” with crustacean remains; grey Marl, with marl-
clay nodules, often of the large size and very full of fossils. The
percentage of lime in these beds increases from below upwards.
3. Limestone Stage.—This stage consists of a hard whitish or
bluish limestone rich in fossils, and contains numerous nummulites.
All the above strata are pierced in numerous places by basalts and
hornblende-augite-andesites, the intrusion of which has disturbed
their bedding. The andesites are always accompanied by
widespread deposits of tuffs and volcanic agglomerates.
Verbeek[3] has recently recast his original allocation of these beds,
and now he regards the “Sandstone Stage” as Eocene; the “Marl
Stage” as Oligocene (Nari group of India); and the “Limestone
Stage” to the later Miocene.
Above the andesites are later Tertiary shales and sandstones,
which were previously regarded as of Miocene Age, but Verbeek
now assigns them to the Pliocene. A lower band of shales and an
upper series of sandstones can be distinguished; beds of a true
brown coal are often present.
The Tertiary geology of Sarawak has chiefly been elucidated by A.
H. Everett, but a great deal more remains to be done. In the district
of the Sarawak River a hilly formation, comprising sandstones and
limestones, extends from the coast to the mountains at the
boundary. Exact details as to its composition are as yet wanting; we
only know that the coal-bearing sandstone of the Eocene occurs,
and that there are Tertiary coral reefs. The limestone beds, which
appear to occur sporadically in Sarawak, are penetrated by
numerous caves; they dip at a high angle and contain many fossils.
Intrusions of andesite have been found in the district of the Upper
Sarawak River. These recent eruptive rocks have often disturbed the
bedding of the coal-bearing strata. They are described as basalts
and felspar-porphyrites, occurring in hills, or as dykes in the
lowlands.
In the Bay of Brunei the Tertiary coal-bearing sandstone hills
extend down to the coast. Coal is now worked at a mine close to
Brooketown, whence it is exported.
The Limbang River, in its lower and middle course, traverses a
hilly country, the elevations rising from 500 to 1,500 feet in height,
and consisting of hard sandstone, which contains coal in places, as
in the Madalam tributary. Limestone rocks are also found in the
middle course of the Limbang. In part they are Tertiary coral reefs, in
part older rocks.
On the island of Labuan the Tertiary beds are greatly developed
and contain coal. The Rev. J. E. Tenison-Woods (Nature, April 23,
1885) has stated that “the Labuan coals are probably of Oolite age,
and not connected with any marine formation, but apparently of
Eolian origin.” I am not aware that this view has received any support
or confirmation.
Concretions of clay-ironstone are often present in the shales.
THE GEOLOGY OF THE PLAINS
QUATERNARY
Fringing the Tertiary beds almost continuously round Borneo, and

often extending into broad bands, are the earlier Quaternary beds,
which are to be regarded as shore deposits. These deposits
constitute the great coastal plains of Borneo, and were laid down
during the last partial submergence of the island. In part they form
flat districts, in part gently undulating plains.
In general the composition is everywhere the same. The highest
bed consists of a partly sandy clay, which towards the bottom
becomes more sandy, the sand grains at the same time increasing in
size. The conglomerates consist mainly of quartz pebbles, but also
of pebbles of different igneous rocks, such as gabbro, diorite,
granite, etc.; they also contain pebbles of the Tertiary strata, such as
sandstones, coral limestone, etc. Between these pebbles there is
more or less of a clayey earth, containing gold, diamonds, platinum,
magnetic iron ore, and chromite. The pebbly bed is often united by a
very hard siliceous cement.
Towards the sea these deposits merge into marshy lowlands.
While flowing through the later alluvium the rivers have low banks,
but in the earlier Quaternary beds they flow between high,
perpendicular, clay walls, in a narrow gully. The bedding is
horizontal, or, at the border of the hill-land, only slightly inclined.
THE GEOLOGY OF THE MARSHES
ALLUVIUM
The river deposits show their greatest development in south
Borneo, where they form extended marshy plains. They are next
best exemplified in west Borneo; while they are least developed in
the east and north. They are composed of a dark brown, black, or
bluish clay, which is often rich in humus in its upper layers; in the
lower layers it is of a harder consistency. It is often mixed with, or
traversed by, seams of sand; the latter, as a rule, occurring on a
lower level. The boundary with the older Quaternary cannot be
sharply drawn.
The bog formation and the marsh-land of the lower river courses
of north Borneo are of less account than in the south and west owing
to the great development of the sea sand, which hinders the
formation of morasses. They occur only in the river deltas, some of
which are of considerable extent. The great delta of the Rejang is a
morass, and the swamps can only be travelled over by boats. On the
Baram the alluvium extends for about a hundred miles from the
coast.
The sea-sand formation extends from Sarawak as a long, broad
strip of sand dunes, right along the coast, excepting the river
mouths.
(b) a sketch of the ethnography of sarawak.

We have not at present sufficient precise information to be able to
speak with certainty concerning the characters and affinities of all the
races and peoples that inhabit Borneo. One of our objects in visiting
Sarawak was the hope that by measuring a large number of people,
and by recording their physical features, we might help towards a
solution of the ethnic problems; we also hoped that further light might
be thrown on the matter by a comparative study of their customs,
beliefs, as well as of their arts and crafts. Our stay was of too short a
duration, and the ground we covered was not sufficiently extensive
for us to do much in this regard, and our physical results have yet to
be fully worked out. Fortunately Hose has made a prolonged and
careful study of Bornean ethnography, and when his voluminous
manuscripts are published we shall be in a much better position to
pronounce on the subject. In the meantime one must remain content
with Ling Roth’s great compilation, The Natives of Sarawak and
British North Borneo.
In the following sketch of the ethnography of Sarawak I have
purposely dealt with the subject on broad lines only, since if we
understand the main features first we shall be the better able to
formulate the real problems, and this is a necessary first step
towards their elucidation. As most of the peoples that inhabit Borneo
have representatives in Sarawak, this sketch may be taken to apply
provisionally to the island as a whole.
Scattered over a considerable part of the jungle of Sarawak live
the nomad Punans. They are a slender people, of moderate height,
and paler in colour than most tribes. They were the lightest coloured
of the indigenous people that we met with in Sarawak; many have a
distinct greenish tinge. Those that we measured were slightly broad-
headed, with an average cephalic index of 81. The Ukit may be allied
to the Punan, but none of them have been measured as yet. Their
mode of life is very similar.
The wild Punans are grouped in small communities, and inhabit
the dense jungle at the head waters of the principal rivers of Borneo.
They do not cultivate the soil, but live on whatever they can find in
the jungle. There is so much that is edible in the jungle that there is
no fear of starvation, especially as these people live on a very mixed
diet.
PLATE XXVII
PUNANS
A LELAK MAN, WITH TYPICAL TATTOOING ON SHOULDERS AND UPPER

ARMS
Their few wants are supplied by barter from friendly settled

peoples, and in return for iron implements, calico, beads, tobacco,
etc., they offer jungle produce, mainly gutta, indiarubber, camphor,
dammar, and ratans. They do not live in permanent houses, but
erect miserable shanties in which they sleep.
They are very mild savages, they are not head-hunters, do not
keep slaves, are generous to one another, are moderately truthful,
and probably never do an injury by purposely making a false
statement. On first acquaintance they appear melancholy, and
certainly shy and timid-looking, but when they have gained
confidence they show themselves in their true colours as a cheerful,
bright people, who are very fond of their children and kind to the
women.
It is probable that eight hundred or a thousand years ago the
greater portion of Sarawak, perhaps the whole of it, was occupied by
a weak, agricultural people, who are now represented by the Land
Dayak, Sĕbop, Malang, Kanauit, Mĕlanau, Narom, Kadayan,
Kajaman, Lelak, Long Kiput, Batu Blah, Long Pata, Barawan,
Kalabit, Dusun, and Murut. For this group Hose and I propose the
term Kalamantan.
From the measurements we have made of some of these tribes
there is no doubt that they were not all originally of one stock. Some
are distinctly narrow-headed, others are inclined to be broad-
headed. As Hose and myself propose dealing at some length
elsewhere with the problem of the ethnology of Sarawak, I will not
here anticipate our discussion further than to state that I believe it
can be demonstrated that among this primitive population, as indeed
in most, if not in all, of the larger islands of the Malay Archipelago,
there are two stocks, one of which is distinctly narrow-headed, and
to which we may restrict the name of Indonesian; the other being
broad-headed, and to which the term Proto-Malay may conveniently
be applied.
Hose states that the Muruts, according to their own traditions,
migrated from the Philippines. They are essentially of Indonesian
stock, as are also, I believe, the Land Dayaks. Probably it will be
ultimately shown that this dual element existed in very early times in
the country, but it has been blurred by intermarriage and by contact
with immigrant peoples, some of whom belonged to one or other or
even a mixture of these two stocks.
I do not intend to refer to even the main tribes of this group of
peoples; but I must allude to the Land Dayaks in order to emphasise
their distinctness from the Iban or Sea Dayaks.
My acquaintance with the Land Dayaks is of the slightest, and I
have had no opportunity of measuring any of them. Hose has given
a Land Dayak woman’s skull to the Cambridge Museum; its cranial
index is 71·3. Apparently they belong to a native stock that has been
crossed with Indo-Javan races; but they are not related in any way to
the Iban. They occupy the western end of the Raj as far as the
Upper Sadong River; they also extend into Dutch Borneo.
Brooke Low, who knew them well, gives a very favourable account
of these people, and this opinion has been confirmed by other
travellers. They are described as amiable, honest, grateful, moral,
and hospitable. Crimes of violence, other than head-hunting, are
unknown. It is uncertain whether the custom of head-hunting was
indigenous to them, or adopted from the Iban; probably it was an
older custom than the arrival of the Iban, but which had gradually
increased until it was stopped by Rajah Brooke. The Land Dayaks,
alone in Sarawak, permanently kept the heads in a separate house,
which also served as the bachelors’ quarters.
The following account of the dealings of the Malays with the Land
Dayaks, which I have taken from The Sarawak Gazette (Vol. xxiv.,
1894, p. 98), proves that the latter are rather easily imposed upon.
The Sarawak Malay can as a rule get on very fairly well with the
Land Dayak—better, perhaps, than he can with the Sea Dayaks up
coast; he can “pèjal,” that is, he can force his wares upon those who
really have no use for them, or who are not particularly in want of the
goods hawked by the Malay pedlar. Whilst the Land Dayak is turning
over his mind as to whether he will purchase or not, the seller sits
patiently by smoking and singing the praises of his wares. A Land
Dayak usually takes a considerable time in forming his mind in
making a purchase, but time is of no particular object to either party,
and the bargain is completed. The pedlar having obtained the
customary cent. per cent. packs up his baggage and departs to the
next house or village as the case may be.
But the present Malay system of trading with the Land Dayaks is
rotten to the core. Land Dayak bintings, or villages, are perpetually
being visited, and the commonest articles of trade thrust upon them
at exorbitant rates, which they could purchase ever so much cheaper
at any of the numerous Chinese shops scattered through the river,
and which are easily accessible in a day’s journey, even from the
remotest Land Dayak habitation; such commodities as waist cloths
(chawats) and petticoats (jamu) trimmed with a little Turkey-red cloth
are sold previous to the rice harvest to be repaid in padi at many
times their respective values; nor does it end here, the purchaser
being expected to deliver his payment at the house of the Malay
merchant, entailing perhaps a long journey on foot or miles of boat
travelling, and again he is expected to fully provide for those traders
stopping in his house, such necessaries as rice, firewood,
provisions, and the like, which he does without the slightest
grumbling.
According to Hose, the Kenyahs and Kayans migrated into

Sarawak from Dutch Borneo several hundred years ago, and he has
previously published his opinion that the Kenyahs migrated into the
Baram River some hundred years or so before the Kayans; they
were the only people able to resist the constant raids made by the
blustering and warlike Kayans, who almost exterminated the smaller
tribes, and made slaves of the weaker ones. Naturally the Kayans
occupied the best tracts of lands which lay in the undulating hills
between the swampy low country and the mountains at the head
waters of the rivers. They also confiscated all the caves of the
esculent swifts, selling their nests to the traders whenever a Brunei
Malay or Chinaman dared to venture up-river amongst them. Kayans
often travelled as far as Brunei in their long boats, and some few
even ventured as far as Singapore to sell the produce of these
caves, taking passage in Chinese junks from Labuan.
All the tribes, except the Punans and Ukits, are agriculturists; they
clear the jungle off the low hills that flank the tributaries of the large
rivers, but always leave a few scattered trees standing; irrigation is
attempted by the Kalabits only, as the padi (rice) is grown like any
other cereal on dry ground; swamp padi is also grown in the lowland.
In their gardens they grow yams, pumpkins, sugar cane, bananas,
and sometimes coconuts and other produce. They hunt all land
animals that serve as food, and fish, usually with nets, in the rivers,
or spear the fish that have been stupefied with tuba; river prawns are
also a favourite article of diet.
They all live in long communal houses, which are situated on the
banks of the rivers. I have already described this type of dwelling,
but although the different tribes have their own peculiar
modifications, the same general plan is adhered to.
The social organisation is correspondingly higher than among
Punans. Amongst the small Kalamantan tribes the headman has not
much influence, unless he be a man of exceptional power and
energy, but among the larger tribes, and especially among the
Kayans and Kenyahs, the headmen are real chiefs, and exercise an
undisputed sway. In some cases a pre-eminent man will be
acknowledged as the head chief of a considerable district.
Of all these tribes the Kenyahs are perhaps the highest in social
evolution. By their superior solidarity and their undoubted intelligence
they were able to hold their own against the turbulent Kayans. They
are the most expert boatmen of the Baram district, and, what is very
significant, the women are less shy than is the case among other
tribes. Indeed, some of the girls and young women—for example,
those in Tama Bulan’s house—are particularly friendly and lively, but
always behave in a really ladylike way.
All these agricultural tribes are artistic, but in varying degrees.
They are all musical people, and sing delightful chorus songs. Many
of their utensils are decorated with no mean skill. In some tribes the
ends of the beams of the houses are carved to represent various
animals; in some the verandah is decorated with boldly carved
planks, or with painted boards and doors. The bamboo receptacles
are often carved in low relief in very effective patterns, and the bone
handles of the parangs are always carved in an intricate manner.
Lastly, the minor utensils of daily life are often decorated in a way
that reveals the true artistic spirit, such, for example, as the plaited
patterns on the rice baskets and winnowing trays. Nor must the neat
and effective bead-work be overlooked.
The Kenyahs and Kayans smelt iron and make spear heads and
sword (parang) blades; the former are especially noted for their good
steel. The forge with two bellows is the usual form that is widely
spread in Malaysia.
The Iban, or Sea Dayaks, formerly occupied only the Saribas,
Batang, Lupar, and Kaluka rivers and their tributaries, and they still
remain there; but as the Kayans and other tribes on the Lower
Rejang have retreated more into the interior, this river, for a
considerable portion of its course, is also now populated by Iban,
who have migrated at various times from the above-mentioned
rivers. As the country became more settled these truculent people
have rapidly increased, and now occupy most of the best farming
lands.
In more recent years migrations of the Iban have taken place to
the head of the Muka River, the Tatau, and lastly into the Baram, but
in all cases with the sanction of the Government. Before the
establishment of the present Government the Iban were unable to
obtain a footing on the Baram River, as they were afraid of the
Kayans and Kenyahs. They are also found in the head waters of
many of the Kapuas tributaries on the watershed between Sarawak
and Dutch Borneo.
The Iban is short (average stature 5 feet 2½ inches) and has a
broad head (average cephalic index 83). The colour of the skin of the
men is, on the whole, darker than among the inland tribes. They
have the same long, slightly wavy, black hair, showing a reddish
tinge in certain lights that is characteristic of the Borneans generally.
They are an active little people.
In Sarawak these people are spoken of consistently as “Sea
Dayaks,” or more generally “Dayak.” It is customary for the Dutch
and other Europeans to term all the interior tribes of Borneo “Dayak,”
with or without a qualifying designation. As there is such confusion of
the terminology in the text-books, I consider it better to boldly face
the situation and to introduce a new term to science to which a
perfectly definite meaning can be applied.
Most of the Iban inhabit low-lying land; they prefer to live on the
low hills, but this is not always practicable, and so they plant swamp
padi. All those who settle at the heads of rivers plant padi on the hills
in the same manner as the up-river natives. They also cultivate
maize, sugar-cane, sweet potatoes, gourds, pumpkins, cucumbers,
melons, mustard, ginger, and other vegetables. Generally groups of
relations work together in the fields.
Although they are essentially an agricultural people, they are
warlike and passionately devoted to head-hunting. The Iban of the
Batang Lupar and Saribas in the olden days joined the Malays in
their large war prahus on piratical raids along the coast and up
certain rivers. Although they probably never went out a very great
distance on the sea, by coasting they were able to attack numerous
villages round the coast, and they owe their name of Sea Dayaks to
this practice. The great piratical forays were organised by Malays,
who went for plunder, but they could always induce the Iban to
accompany them on the promise that all the heads of the slain
should fall to their share.
Of the Iban, the Balaus, who live in and about the Lingga River,
are the most efficient in handling boats at sea. The inland Iban of the
present day are usually inexpert boatmen in rough weather, and
even in river work they are nothing like so reliable in emergencies as
the up-river Kenyahs.
The Iban women make beautiful cotton cloths on a very simple
loom. The intricate patterns are made by tightly tying up several
strands of the warp with leaves at varying intervals and then dipping
the whole into a dye. On removing the lashing the threads that were
tied are found to be undyed. This process is repeated if a three-
colour is desired. The pattern is produced solely in the warp; the
woof threads are self-coloured, and are not visible in the fabric,
which is therefore a cotton rep. I have accumulated material for a
special study of the numerous designs woven and embroidered by
Iban women, as well as of the elegant patterns engraved in low relief
on bamboos by the men, but there has not been time to work them
out. It is an interesting fact that the decorative art of the two sexes is
entirely distinct in motive and style.
The Iban women did not tattoo, though a few may now be seen
with a little tattooing; but most of the men have adopted the custom
from the Kayans. They admit that the tattoo marks are Kayan
designs, but it very rarely happens that the Iban transfer such a
design to their bamboo decorations, and the Iban women never
adopt Kayan or tattoo patterns for their fabrics.
It is probable that the Iban belongs to the same stock as the
original Malay. If this view is correct, the Iban migration may be
regarded as the first wave of the movement that culminated in the
Malay Empire.
The Malay must have come to Borneo not later than the early part
of the fifteenth century, as Brunei was a large and wealthy town in
1521. Probably the Malays came directly from the Malay Peninsula,
but they must have mixed largely with the Kadayans, Mĕlanaus, and
other coastal people.
The Sarawak and Brunei Malays are probably mainly coastal
Borneans with some Malay blood; but they have absorbed the Malay
culture, spirit, and religion.
The movements of the different peoples which I have so briefly
sketched have a sociological significance which is worth tracing in
detail, but I do not propose to inflict on my present readers anything
more than the merest outline of this interesting line of inquiry.
The Punans represent the lowest grade of culture in Borneo. They
are nomad hunters, who combine with the chase the simple
exploitation of jungle produce. Without social organisation they are
incapable of serious combination, and are alike incapable of any real
endemic improvement or of seriously affecting other peoples.
The purely agricultural tribes that cultivate padi on the low hills or
in the swamps form the next social stratum.
The Kalamantans were evidently a weak people, as they have
been repressed and often subdued by other peoples. For example,
the Kadayans and the Mĕlanaus have been very largely affected by
the Malays, and the Iban have harassed the Land Dayaks, and the
latter had previously been influenced by the Javano-Hindu
colonisation of Borneo. It is also probable that some of the tribes of
this group of peoples have been modified by contact with the
Chinese. It is suggestive that all the stone implements Hose has
collected have been obtained from Kalamantans, either the pure or
mixed stock.
These indigenous tillers of the soil have been hard pressed by
various swarms of foreigners. The Kenyah-Kayan migration was that
of a people of a slightly higher grade of culture. It is true they also
were agriculturists, but their social organisation was firmer, and they
were probably superior in physique. Possibly they introduced iron
weapons; if so, this would give them an enormous advantage. At any
rate they were clever smiths. These immigrant agricultural artisans,
who were directed by powerful chiefs, had no difficulty in taking
possession of the most desirable land.
From an opposite point of the compass in early times came
another agricultural people, who strangely enough have strong
individualistic tendencies, the usually peaceable habits of tillers of
the soil having been complicated by a lust for heads and other
warlike propensities.
Although inclined to raid their neighbours, the Iban do not appear
to have made much headway—certainly not against the Kayans and
Kenyahs. Conquest implies a strong leader, obedience to authority
and concerted action. So far as I can gather, the Iban only became
formidable when led and organised by Europeans, and at the
present time the individualistic temperament of the Iban manifests
itself, even under the leadership of an English civil officer.
The Malay was a yet higher social type. His political organisation
was well established; he had the advantage of religious enthusiasm,
for Islamism had no small share in the expansion of the Malay. In
Borneo he is not a cultivator of the soil, but is a keen trader, and this
is another factor in the Malay expansion, especially when coupled
with pluck and enterprise. Although a trader, the Malay is essentially
a pirate; he seeks to exploit the people with whom he comes in
contact, and there is a sporting element in his character, as I
understand it, which is not compatible with steady trade. It seems
that it was chiefly the Malay in his rôle of pirate who incited and led
the Sea Dayak in his raids on other tribes. While the glory and heads
fell to the Iban, the valuable spoils of war and the slaves were the
booty of the Malay.
Then appeared on the scene the Anglo-Saxon overlord. The
quality of firmness combined with justice made itself felt. At times the
lower social types hurled themselves, but in vain, against the
instrument that had been forged and tempered in a similar turmoil of
Iberian, Celt, Roman, Teuton, and Viking in Northern Europe. Now
they acknowledge that safety of life and property and almost
complete liberty are fully worth the very small price they have to pay
for them.
I do not know what were the conditions of the early Chinese trade
with Sarawak, but at present the Chinaman is a legitimate trader.
Owing to the settled state of the country under the white men’s rule,
he is rapidly increasing his sphere of influence, and by his better
business habits he is ousting the Malay. Even now the intrepid Malay
trader will be found paddling his trading canoe in the upper waters of
the rivers of Sarawak, where the Chinaman dare not venture; but
wherever the Government builds a fort, Chinamen lose no time in
erecting their stores, and proceed to absorb all the trade that
previously was in the hands of the Malay.
The piratical cruises of the Malays have been stopped by the
Anglo-Saxon overlord, and their exploiting trading has had to give
way before the more legitimate commerce of the Chinaman.
Note.—For the most recent information on the geology of

Dutch Borneo the reader is referred to Dr. G. A. F.
Molengraaf’s Geologische Verkenningstochten in Centraal-
Borneo. Leiden: E. J. Brill.
CHAPTER XXI
A TRIP INTO THE INTERIOR OF BORNEO
The following is an account of some experiences on an up-river

trip, when McDougall, Ray, and myself accompanied Dr. Charles
Hose, the Resident of the Baram District of Sarawak, Borneo, on one
of his administrative journeys.
The Baram is the second largest river in Sarawak; it rises about 3°
10′ north latitude in the unnamed and unexplored mountains which
form the division between Sarawak and Dutch Borneo, and enters
the China Sea at the end of a prominent spit at 114° east longitude.
The Government station and fort are situated at Marudi, or
Claudetown, about seventy miles up the river; here is also a large
Chinese bazaar. Hose and the Assistant Resident, Mr. Douglas, are
the only two Europeans resident in a district that comprises at least
ten thousand square miles.
About thirty miles above Marudi the Tinjar joins the Baram; this
affluent is almost as large as the main stream, and for a hundred
miles it runs a course roughly parallel to the sea coast, but distant
from it about thirty to sixty miles, as the crow flies.
On February 6th (1899) we started for a trip up the Tinjar. Only
three or four white men had previously been up this river, and
practically nothing has been written about it; consequently we were
to all intents and purposes breaking fresh ground. But my object in
writing this account is not solely to describe a few incidents of our
visit to some of the interesting and unspoiled aborigines of Borneo,
but also to give an idea of the personal method of dealing with native
peoples, which is the keynote of the Sarawak theory of government.
PLATE XXVIII
SIDE VIEW OF A KAYAN HOUSE
VERANDAH OF A KAYAN HOUSE AT LONG LAMA, BARAM

RIVER

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Advanced Theory of Mind Scott A.

Movements of the Mind: A Theory of Attention,

A Cowboy State of Mind Jennie Marts

John Dewey's Later Logical Theory James Scott Johnston

A Cowboy State of Mind Jennie Marts

A Cowboy State of Mind 1st Edition Jennie Marts

The Explainability of Experience: Realism and

A Wild West of the Mind George Sher

Oxford Studies in Private Law Theory: Volume I Paul B

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2022

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-​in-​Publication Data

Future Directions  287

Figure 1.1. Theory of mind in Peanuts.

successful fulfillment of a desire results in happiness, whereas sadness is the

First-​Order Theory of Mind

in making such judgments in the maximally simple case—​for example, if X

of interest for two reasons: as an important form of cognitive development in

Advanced Theory of Mind

The preceding is a brief summary of a huge research literature. Fuller sources

of a single overarching form of knowledge that makes possible a variety of

What Do We Want to Know?

important. The group comparisons that appear in the theory-​of-​mind liter-

mind. In addition, a focus on advanced theory of mind adds another poten-

Organization of the Book

Theory Description Sources

Theory theory Theory-​of-​mind understanding takes the form Perner (1991);

Theory Description Sources

Modularity Although every theory admits a role for biology, Baron-​Cohen

Table 1.3 Questions of Interest in the Study of Advanced Theory of Mind

What are the major developmental achievements?

At various points this book will adopt all of these organizational

research) but the activities (e.g., inferring, attending, remembering) that

Chapter 9 is also directed to research of both pragmatic and theoret-

Second-​Order False Belief

Chapter 1 offered a brief introduction to second-​order false belief through

As we will see, these differences make a difference. I begin, however, with

More About Assessment

The importance of method of assessment has been a theme throughout this

divergence from the bulk of the first-​order literature, in which explanations

ONE-LOOP RECURSION (Item no.14) TWO-LOOP RECURSION (Item no.15)

Figure 2.1. The thought-​bubbles approach to the study of recursive thinking.

Although the thought-​bubble approach has proved informative, it does

David and Nick are Ben has a big problem on his

and Nick are good birthday.”

Note: From “Scaling of Advanced Theory-​ of-​

Story Type: Pretend

The Strange Stories measure is made up of nonliteral utterances. Because so

present in early childhood—​specifically, the ability to understand nonliteral

Geological Sketch Map of Borneo. After Posewitz

THE GEOLOGY OF THE “MOUNTAIN LAND”

Very little is accurately known about the geology of the “mountain

No Secondary Formations have been described from Sarawak,

THE GEOLOGY OF THE “HILL-LAND”

THE GEOLOGY OF THE PLAINS

Fringing the Tertiary beds almost continuously round Borneo, and

THE GEOLOGY OF THE MARSHES

(b) a sketch of the ethnography of sarawak.

A LELAK MAN, WITH TYPICAL TATTOOING ON SHOULDERS AND UPPER

Their few wants are supplied by barter from friendly settled

According to Hose, the Kenyahs and Kayans migrated into

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Future Directions 287

First-Order Theory of Mind

in making such judgments in the maximally simple case—for example, if X

important. The group comparisons that appear in the theory-of-mind liter-

Theory theory Theory-of-mind understanding takes the form Perner (1991);

Modularity Although every theory admits a role for biology, Baron-Cohen

Second-Order False Belief

Chapter 1 offered a brief introduction to second-order false belief through

divergence from the bulk of the first-order literature, in which explanations

Figure 2.1. The thought-bubbles approach to the study of recursive thinking.

Although the thought-bubble approach has proved informative, it does

Note: From “Scaling of Advanced Theory- of-

present in early childhood—specifically, the ability to understand nonliteral