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Enacting the Security Community
Studies in Asian Security
s e r i e s e dit ors
Stéphanie Martel
No part of this book may be reproduced or transmitted in any form or by any means,
electronic or mechanical, including photocopying and recording, or in any information
storage or retrieval system without the prior written permission of Stanford University
Press.
Figures ix
Acknowledgments xi
Acronyms and Abbreviations xv
Part One
2 “It’s Alive!”: Security Community–Building as Practice 27
3 Ghosts of the Past, Present, and Future: ASEAN’s Approach
to Regional Security 50
Part Two
4 The Bogeymen Are Coming: From Transnational Crime
to “Non-traditional Security” 81
5 Here There Be Dragons: Managing Interstate Conflict
in the Asia-Pacific Region 108
6 Sirens Are Calling: The “People-Centered” Security Community 137
7 To Hell and Back: ASEAN’s Continuing Odyssey 164
It took a village to get here. First and foremost, this book would have never seen
the light of day were it not for the people who kindly and generously made time
to chat with me and agreed to have their voices reproduced here.
I am indebted to faculty, peers, and friends in the Department of Political Sci-
ence during my time at the Université de Montréal, who have shaped the scholar
I became. In the early stages of this project, Dominique Caouette offered so
much more than his role required by making me a member of his barkada. Jean-
Philippe Thérien also provided invaluable guidance and extensive feedback. So
did Frédéric Mérand, director of the Montreal Center for International Studies,
which extended financial support that proved instrumental. I am thankful to the
Centre d’études de l’Asie de l’Est for being my institutional home during those
years. On a more personal note, I am forever grateful to Anne-Laure Mahé and
Camille Dagenais for their friendship, among other friends and colleagues from
the UdeM community I do not have room to name here.
My gratitude also extends to those who have shaped this project through their
guidance and scholarship in those years and beyond. Vincent Pouliot at McGill
University allowed me early on to find my theoretical home and, later, provided
advice on how to turn this project into a book during a fellowship at the Centre
for International Peace and Security Studies. At the Institute of Asian Research
(University of British Columbia), Paul Evans generously welcomed me into his
home in Vancouver, kept watch, and shared feedback and experience drawing
from his extensive knowledge of Asia-Pacific regional affairs, which he has con-
tinued to impart since. I have also benefited tremendously from the kindness
xii Acknowledgments
and mentorship of Brian Job during and since my stay at UBC, as well as David
Welch. Both have followed the progression of this project closely until the very
end, including by participating in a book workshop generously funded and co-
ordinated by the Canadian Defence and Security Network. In this context, Steve
Saideman, Stéfanie von Hlatky, Rebecca Adler-Nissen, Srdjan Vucetic, Veronica
Kitchen, and Jennifer Mustapha also provided extensive comments on an ear-
lier draft that greatly improved the book, as well as guidance on the publication
process. In addition, Jennifer, and also Aarie Glas, contributed moral support as
well as theoretical and practical insights during our weekly writing sessions. This
book further benefited from the insights of See Seng Tan, Richard Stubbs, and
two anonymous reviewers. I am also indebted to the many wonderful scholars
whom I had the pleasure to cross paths with and who provided feedback on
pieces of this project at various stages: Alice Ba, Charlotte Epstein, Laura Shep-
herd, Brent Steele, Lene Hansen, Don Emmerson, Pierre Lizée, Shaun Narine,
Sorpong Peou, Evelyn Goh, and Niklas Bremberg, among others. Any mistakes
and omissions remain of course my own.
I could not have found a better home for this book than Stanford University
Press and its Studies in Asian Security series. I am fortunate that as series co-
editors, Amitav Acharya and David Leheny saw potential in this project early on
and set the revision process on the right track. At the press, I wish to thank Caro-
line McKusick, whom I interacted with most directly, as well as Alan Harvey.
The swiftness with which they handled the final steps as well as their guidance,
flexibility, and professionalism were highly appreciated.
I am immensely thankful to those who provided logistical and other forms of
support during field research. Many of them sent me into productive paths I did
not know to take at first, allowed an outsider in their spaces, and shared their ex-
pertise and contacts. Marc Batac, “Yuyun” Wahyuningrum, and Lina Alexandra
deserve special mention in this regard. So do Pranee Thiparat, Carolina Hernan-
dez, and the late Aileen Baviera, whose generous mentorship well exceeded what
was expected. I also wish to thank the research assistants who contributed to this
project by transcribing interviews (Leilani, Ramon, and Biel), and most recently
by helping with empirical updates and compiling feedback, among other tasks
(Emma Fingler).
Thanks to Sum, Dej, Mike, Oad, Nick, Kat, Janus, Ivy, Sascha, and Gilbert
who offered friendship during my time in Southeast Asia, always making sure I
was working with a full stomach. Thanks also to the BIPA 1 dengan Dette crowd
for their camaraderie in Jakarta.
I am grateful for the support and affiliations provided through research fellow-
ships by the Department of International Relations at Chulalongkorn University,
Acknowledgments xiii
IRASEC, the Centre for Strategic and International Studies ( Jakarta), and the
Asian Center at the University of the Philippines-Diliman during fieldwork, and
most recently by the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada. The research on which
this book is based would not have been possible without funding from the Social
Sciences and Humanities Research Council of Canada, the Fonds de recherche
du Québec (Société et Culture), and the Montreal Council on Foreign Relations.
The Department of Political Studies at Queen’s University, where I currently
work, also contributed funding, course releases, flexibility in my teaching sched-
ule and a community of experienced colleagues full of great advice, all of which
played an important role in bringing the manuscript to completion.
The village’s boundaries, of course, extend well beyond the academic commu-
nity. I am grateful to my friends for listening just long enough and for remind-
ing me that there was, in fact, a life outside the Ivory Tower: Cécile M., Simon,
Julien, Mathilde, J.P., Louis, Cécile P., Patrick, Mike, Julie, Marie-Josée, Marie-
Laurence, Claire, among others. My wonderful godsons, Léon and Laurel, were
probably more effective than anyone in this regard. Family members (my grand-
mother Gertrude and late grandfather Hervé, my aunt Sylvie, and most impor-
tantly my mother, Paule) also contributed to the war effort through money, sus-
tenance, much-needed encouragement, relentless optimism, and, perhaps most
surprisingly, genuine interest in what I do.
I am most grateful to Adrien, who had to share his wife for the last decade
with a very strange nebula that he now knows like the back of his hand, but will
also be happy to bid farewell to. He followed me to the ends of the world and
back, helping me fight many invisible chimeras, and assuming various roles in
the journey: watchman, sounding board, cheerleader, sponsor, life coach, cook,
graphic designer, copy-editor . . . his love and patience mean more than words
can express. Finally, I dedicate this book to the little one who just landed. She
has been on my mind and close to my heart through it all, giving me just what I
needed to bring this book into the world.
Stéphanie Martel
Kingston, Canada
September 25, 2021
Acronyms and Abbreviations
A Cautionary Tale
Discourse in the Making of a Security Community
questions such as ‘Who are we? What do we stand for? and What does ASEAN
mean?’” (ASEAN 2020a). This book starts at a very similar place.
At first glance, that ASEAN could declare itself a “security community” with-
out having provided compelling answers to these questions, while also recogniz-
ing that it is not actually one (yet?), is a blatant example of a gap between rhetoric
and implementation. This gap, it is often suggested, is especially salient in the case
of ASEAN. Yet it is also common in multilateral institutions where the pursuit of
security is concerned. Beyond the surface, it also alludes to another, less obvious,
A Cautionary Tale 3
Puzzle
ASEAN’s tendency to prioritize buzzwords, showboating declarations, and empty
slogans over concrete results despite conducting more than a thousand meetings
a year is well known and often criticized. For its detractors, while ASEAN shares
limitations that are common to multilateralism across various contexts, no other
international/regional institution is more deserving of the label “talk shop.” The
grouping’s bid to transform into a security community is often offered as a case
in point. Indeed, the end point of this initiative remains especially elusive and
ambiguous today.
The ambiguity of ASEAN’s status as a security community, however, has not
prevented scholars and practitioners of Asia-Pacific international relations to con-
sistently suggest that such a community is, in fact, in the making.2 ASEAN is
not only still described by some as “the most successful regional organization in
the Global South” (Stubbs 2019, 941–942) but remains a favorite example of a
“nascent” security community beyond the West (Adler 2008, 206). At the same
time, it departs significantly from how this concept is understood in International
Relations (IR), that is, as a group of states that have renounced the use of force
as a legitimate means of dispute settlement and among which exist dependable
expectations of peaceful change (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998a).
From renewed tensions in the South China Sea to the Rohingya crisis, among
other issues, ASEAN is also widely seen by both its critics and its supporters as in-
effective in the face of pressing security challenges. ASEAN’s impotence also leads
to much frustration for many of its partners as well as non-state actors involved
in Asia-Pacific regionalism. These concerns add to a familiar and fairly consensual
cautionary tale about the organization since at least the turn of the twenty-first
4 chapter 1
century, if not its very inception. If ASEAN is not able to walk the proverbial talk
and offer practical solutions to regional insecurity, this warning goes, it will inevi-
tably become obsolete and be sidelined, if not unravel entirely.
In fact, “ASEAN’s irrelevance or even death has been predicted several times
before” (Acharya 2009b, 265). Its longevity could certainly not be surmised at the
birth of the organization in 1967. After a series of failed attempts at regional co-
operation, many predicted that ASEAN “would probably not survive its infancy”
(T. Koh 2011, ix, in Stubbs 2020, 604). Since then, ASEAN’s future has also
been consistently put into question, as its ongoing difficulty to manage a never-
ending list of crises and other “litmus tests”3 dealt additional blows to its credibil-
ity. And yet, grim prognoses about the grouping’s fate have still not materialized,
as ASEAN recently commemorated its golden jubilee in 2017.
Of course, doubt continues to proliferate over ASEAN’s capacity to meet the
myriad of challenges it currently faces, and for good reason. Multilateral institu-
tions, regional or otherwise, from every corner of the international system are
currently under severe strain. These include some with far more resources than
an organization that is certainly “no NATO” (Hemmer and Katzenstein 2002)
and is still commonly—if unfairly—portrayed as a poor parent of European in-
tegration (Rüland 2017).4 Some of these challenges result from specific events
and developments: Brexit, military coups in Mali and Myanmar, the trade war
between China and the United States, and the rise of illiberal leaders in Turkey,
Hungary, and Poland are just some examples among many. These crises only ex-
acerbate long-standing and ongoing concerns over the ability of multilateralism
to keep “making the world hang together” (Ruggie 1998), to provide solutions to
“wicked problems” like pandemics and climate change, and to continue to offer
key opportunities to “mediate estrangement” (Der Derian 1987) in international
society. ASEAN, in this sense at least, is not as unique as is often suggested.
Despite its many flaws, ASEAN does more than merely carrying on. Not un-
like other multilateral institutions facing similar charges, it continues to defy its
skeptics through the steady extension of its security agenda as well as the continu-
ous commitment of its member states and external partners. The latter category
includes all current and (re)emerging major powers— China, the United States,
Russia, and India. It also extends to many other secondary players—Japan, Aus-
tralia, Canada, South Korea, the European Union, and New Zealand—aspiring
to position themselves favorably in an “Indo-Pacific” order that is bound to be-
come increasingly central to the conduct of world politics. Given the intensifica-
tion of strategic competition between the United States and China, which plays
out first and foremost in the Asia-Pacific region although its impacts are global,
the significance of ASEAN as the institutional focal point of this regional order in
A Cautionary Tale 5
transition is hard to deny.5 The grouping indeed remains at the core of broader
multilateral, regional, and security governance processes that have become stable,
albeit contested, features of world politics. As such, it carries hope for a better
future for the region at least as consistently as it disappoints.
In this context, the idea that ASEAN is a necessary, although not sufficient,
condition for regional peace has proven remarkably persistent, even as a causal
link between the existence of the organization and the absence of war among its
member states might very well be impossible to establish (Emmerson 2005). The
realization of a security community with ASEAN as its locus is widely recognized
as an imperfect but laudable quest that anyone involved in regional affairs should
strive to improve.
As frustrating as it can be to deal with such a “weak” (Stubbs 2014) regional
institution, at least according to Western-centric standards, doing without ASEAN
seems increasingly hard. The organization continues to escape forecasts of its im-
pending doom and proposals for alternatives—whether in the form of an “Asian
NATO” (Heydarian 2021) or something else. It does so despite not having rein-
vented itself (Tay, Estanislao, and Soesastro 2001) to the extent and in the way
many, including its champions, have deemed necessary for it to prevent its de-
cline. Further, the fact that so much criticism is waged at ASEAN for not be-
ing able to resolve the latest wave of major power tensions or the current crisis
in Myanmar is a testament to the high expectations that even its most adamant
detractors keep placing on it. Most tend to agree that, notwithstanding its limita-
tions, the more ASEAN does, the better for regional peace and security.
For these reasons, how ASEAN endures against less than favorable odds is, in
and of itself, a crucial question of world politics (Stubbs 2019, 924). The impor-
tance of this question, however, is severely underestimated in a discipline that,
in theory and as praxis, still struggles when it comes to “worlding beyond the
West” (Tickner and Wæver 2009; see also Shilliam 2015; Acharya and Buzan
2019). This inquiry into ASEAN, Southeast Asia, and the Asia-Pacific region also
serves as a stepping-stone for engaging broader questions that are currently tak-
ing on new salience. Multilateral governance, which increasingly takes place on a
regional basis, is diversifying at the same time as it faces significant challenge and
opposition. In the context of rising concerns about renewed great power rivalry,
the transformation of global order, the crisis of multilateralism and, as a result, the
unprecedented pressure exercised on security community–building institutions
in every corner of the world, asking how these institutions work in practice (Bi-
ally Mattern 2001) remains as relevant as ever.
This book seizes this moment to shed new light on the following: What does
it mean to form a security community? How is such a community brought into
6 chapter 1
existence, in the Global South and beyond? What effects does the diversification
of security governance have on this process today? How do security community–
building institutions that, like ASEAN, seem to be eternally in crisis, with no
clear end point in sight, not only survive repeated foretelling of their demise but
adapt in the face of changing circumstances, even as they consistently fail to bring
about dependable expectations (Deutsch et al. 1957; Adler and Barnett 1998a) of
peace and security?
While these concerns are especially relevant for “nascent” security communi-
ties, they can also shape how we approach “mature” ones like NATO and the
European Union (EU). Further, some of these questions have long shaped the
study of not only security communities, but multilateralism and regional gover-
nance more generally. Others arise from new developments that already attract
sustained attention in these fields of study, such as shifts in the distribution of
global power, the proliferation of transnational and multidimensional problems of
governance on top of more traditional challenges, and the rise of new interpreta-
tions of the rules of international society. In this context, scholars have noted a
need to move past state-centrism, an exclusive concern with formal processes,
and a tendency to center Western experiences as the basis for a “false universal-
ism” (De Lombaerde et al. 2010, 748). Many also share the view that more at-
tention needs to be paid to how institutions, actors, and regions not only interact
but overlap (Breslin, Higgot, and Rosamond 2002; De Lombaerde et al. 2010;
Börzel and Risse 2016; Börzel 2016; Söderbaum 2016; Acharya 2016a; Telò 2017).
This realization is a key driver behind the surge of interest in comparative
regionalism (e.g., Börzel and Risse 2016; Shaw, Grant and Cornelissen 2011; Telò
2017) in recent years, including scholarship that features ASEAN among others as
case studies (e.g., Loewen and Zorob 2018; Coe 2019; Jetschke et al. 2021; Glas,
forthcoming). Similar impulses also characterize ongoing discussions about the
future of multilateralism and security governance that this book participates in.
This interest extends to assessing the implications of the development of a post-
Westphalian (Hettne and Söderbaum 2006) or post-hegemonic global order (Telò
2017) that appears increasingly fragmented and complex (Acharya 2016b). In this
context, regional institutions, particularly those in the Global South, are seen as
playing a growing role in the fostering of peace and security (Glas and Zarnett
2020).
This book tackles these important questions from an innovative angle, by shed-
ding new light on the productive power of discourse in security community–
building. It shows that discourse plays a central role in bringing the security
community into existence, whether it is already recognized as established or, like
ASEAN, remains aspirational. While it does not engage per se in the kind of
A Cautionary Tale 7
“truly comparative” (Börzel and Risse 2016, 5) analysis that many scholars of
regionalism have been calling for in recent years, the book speaks to similar con-
cerns. ASEAN is treated here as an especially “relevant laboratory,” borrowing
from Telò’s (2017, 2) description of the European Union, to yield insights into
the multilayered, multidimensional, and contested character of multilateralism,
regionalism, and security governance in the twenty-first century.6 I argue specifi-
cally that ASEAN can be conceived as a community of discourse, (re)produced
through a never-ending debate between competing, potentially incompatible ver-
sions of its security community. More generally, security community–building,
and especially in the twenty-first century, is a deeply polysemic, omnidirectional, and
contested process.
First, security community–building is informed by distinct interpretations of
(1) what the pursuit of security means for a given community and (2) where the
boundaries of the community lie, thus making it inherently polysemic. In other
words, the security community holds different meanings for social agents in-
volved in its (re)production, with significant effects on the institution that pur-
ports to embody it. The book shows how these positions come together in vari-
ous, relatively self-coherent “epic stories” that states, but also non-state actors,
mobilize to enact the security community in ways that are not easily reconciled.
These stories feature various kinds of “monsters” that the security community
in the making must vanquish in order to be fully realized. Second, this process is
omnidirectional, because these distinct interpretations set the security community
in the making on equally distinct “heroic” quests, which are pursued not just
sequentially, but simultaneously. Third, social agents draw from these compet-
ing interpretations to challenge the views of their counterparts as they all work
to bring the security community into existence, thus making this process deeply
contested. Once combined, polysemy, omnidirectionality, and contestation help
make sense of why security community–building often, and surely in the case of
ASEAN, appears as if it is never-ending.
In the following sections, I situate the value of a discourse-based approach as
the basis for providing a new explanation for ASEAN’s resilience as a regional
security institution, distinct from rationalist but also “mainstream” constructivist
approaches. I then discuss key components of my framework (unpacked in fur-
ther detail in the next chapter) before turning to methodological considerations.
Theory
ASEAN’s resilience remains a paradox for most approaches in International Rela-
tions. Indeed, as Ba (2009, 2 –3) suggests, the preconditions typically put forward
8 chapter 1
but who is a perfect “milky way” of brilliancy, and has made Pindar
himself “take a nobler flight.” Milton alternately strikes Addison with
awe, rapture, and shock at his politics. He
is not only neat, but very largely true. When Dryden shall decay,
luckily there is harmonious Congreve: and, if Addison were not tired
with rhyming, he would praise (he does so at some length) noble
Montague, who directs his artful muse to Dorset,
as to which all that can be said is that, if so, either the verses of
Montague or the verses of Dorset referred to are not those that have
come down to us under the names of the respective authors.
To dwell at all severely on this luckless production of a young
University wit would be not only unkind but uncritical. It shows that at
this time Addison knew next to nothing[575] about the English
literature not of his own day, and judged very badly of what he
pretended to know.
The prose works of his middle period, the Discourse on Medals
and the Remarks on Italy, are very fully illustrated from the Latin
poets—the division of literature that Addison knew best—but indulge
hardly at all in literary criticism. It was not till the launching of the
Tatler, by Steele and Swift, provided him with his natural medium of
utterance, that Addison became critical. This periodical itself, and the
less known ones that followed the Spectator, all contain exercises in
this character: but it is to the Spectator that men look, and look
rightly, for Addison’s credentials in the character of a critic. The Tatler
The Spectator Essays, such as the rather well known papers on
criticisms. Tom Folio and Ned Softly, those in the Guardian, the
good-natured puff of Tom D’Urfey, &c., are not so much serious and
deliberate literary criticisms, as applications, to subjects more or less
literary, of the peculiar method of gently malicious censorship, of
laughing castigation in manners and morals, which Addison carried
to such perfection in all the middle relations of life. Not only are the
Spectator articles far more numerous and far more weighty, but we
have his own authority for regarding them as, in some measure at
least, written on a deliberate system, and divisible into three groups.
The first of these groups consists of the early papers on True and
False Wit, and of essays on the stage. The second contains the
famous and elaborate criticism of Milton with other things; and the
third, the still later, still more serious, and still more ambitious, series
on the Pleasures of the Imagination. Addison is looking back from
the beginning of this last when he gives the general description,[576]
and it is quite possible that the complete trilogy was not in his mind
when he began the first group. But there is regular development in it,
and whether we agree or not with Mr Worsfold’s extremely high
estimate of the third division, it is quite certain that the whole
collection—of some thirty or forty essays—does clearly exhibit that
increasing sense of what criticism means, which is to be observed in
almost all good critics. For criticism is, on the one hand, an art in
which there are so few manuals or trustworthy short summaries—it
is one which depends so much more on reading and knowledge than
any creative art—and, above all, it is necessary to make so many
mistakes in it before one comes right, that, probably, not one single
example can be found of a critic of importance who was not a much
better critic when he left off than when he began.
In Group One[577] Addison is still animated by the slightly desultory
spirit of moral satire, which has been referred to above; and, though
fifteen or sixteen years have passed since the Account, he does not
seem to be so entirely free as we might wish from the crude sciolism,
On True and if not the sheer ignorance, of the earliest period. He
False Wit. is often admirable: his own humour, his taste, almost
perfect within its own narrow limits, and his good sense, made that
certain beforehand. But he has rather overloaded it with somewhat
artificial allegory, the ethical temper rather overpowers the literary,
and there is not a little of that arbitrary “blackmarking” of certain
literary things which is one of the worst faults of neo-classic criticism.
The Temple of Dulness is built (of course) “after the Gothic manner,”
and the image of the god is dressed “after the habit of a monk.”
Among the idolatrous rites and implements are not merely rebuses,
anagrams, verses arranged in artificial forms, and other things a little
childish, though perfectly harmless, but acrostics—trifles, perhaps,
yet trifles which can be made exquisitely graceful, and satisfying that
desire for mixing passion with playfulness which is not the worst
affection of the human heart.
He had led up to this batch, a few weeks earlier, by some cursory
remarks on Comedy, which form the tail of a more elaborate
examination of Tragedy, filling four or five numbers.[578] Readers who
On Tragedy. have already mastered the general drift of the
criticism of the time before him, will scarcely need
any long précis of his views, which, moreover, are in everybody’s
reach, and could not possibly be put more readably. Modern
tragedies, he thinks, excel those of Greece and Rome in the intricacy
and disposition of the fable, but fall short in the moral. He objects to
rhyme (except an end-couplet or two), and, though he thinks the
style of our tragedies superior to the sentiment, finds the former,
especially in Shakespeare, defaced by “sounding phrases, hard
metaphors, and forced expressions.” This is still more the case in
Lee. Otway is very “tender”: but it is a sad thing that the characters in
Venice Preserved should be traitors and rebels. Poetic justice (this
was what shocked Dennis), as generally understood, is rather
absurd, and quite unnecessary. And the tragi-comedy, which is the
product of the English theatre, is “one of the most monstrous
inventions that ever entered into a poet’s thought.” You “might as
well weave the adventures of Æneas and Hudibras into one poem”
[and, indeed, one might find some relief in this, as far as the
adventures of Æneas are concerned]. Tragedies are not even to
have a double plot. Rants, and especially impious rants, are bad.
Darkened stages, elaborate scenery and dresses, troops of supers,
&c., are as bad: bells, ghosts, thunder, and lightning still worse. “Of
all our methods of moving pity and terror, there is none so absurd
and barbarous as the dreadful butchering of one another,” though all
deaths on the stage are not to be forbidden.
Now, it is not difficult to characterise the criticism which appears in
this first group, strengthened, if anybody cares, by a few isolated
examples. It contains a great deal of common sense and good
ordinary taste; many of the things that it reprehends are really wrong,
and most of what it praises is good in a way. But the critic has as yet
no guiding theory, except what he thinks he has gathered from
Aristotle, and has certainly gathered from Horace, plus Common
Sense itself, with, as is the case with all English critics of this age, a
good deal from his French predecessors, especially Le Bossu and
Bouhours. Which borrowing, while it leads him into numerous minor
errors, leads him into two great ones—his denunciations of tragi-
comedy, and of the double plot. He is, moreover, essentially
arbitrary: his criticism will seldom stand the application of the “Why?”
the “Après?” and a harsh judge might, in some places, say that it is
not more arbitrary than ignorant.
The Second Group,[579] or Miltonic batch, with which may be taken
its “moon,” the partly playful but more largely serious examen of
Chevy Chase, is much the best known, and has been generally
ranked as the most important exhibition of Addison’s critical powers.
On Milton. It is not, however, out of paradox or desire to be
singular that it will be somewhat briefly discussed
here. By the student of Addison it cannot be too carefully studied; for
the historian of criticism it has indeed high importance, but
importance which can be very briefly summed up, and which
requires no extensive analysis of the eighteen distinct essays that
compose the Miltonic group, or the two on Chevy Chase. The critic
here takes for granted—and knows or assumes that his readers will
grant—two general positions:—
1. The Aristotelian-Horatian view of poetry, with a few of the more
commonplace utterances of Longinus, supplies the orthodox theory
of Poetics.
2. The ancients, especially Homer and Virgil, supply the most
perfect examples of the orthodox practice of poetry.
These things posed, he proceeds to examine Chevy Chase at
some, Paradise Lost at great, length by their aid; and discovers in
the ballad not a few, and in the epic very great and very numerous,
excellences. As Homer does this, so Milton does that: such a
passage in Virgil is a more or less exact analogue to such another in
Paradise Lost. Aristotle says this, Horace that, Longinus the third
thing; and you will find the dicta capitally exemplified in such and
such a place of Milton’s works. To men who accepted the principle—
as most, if not all, men did—the demonstration was no doubt both
interesting and satisfactory; and though it certainly did not start
general admiration of Milton, it stamped that admiration with a
comfortable seal of official orthodoxy. But it is actually more
antiquated than Dryden, in assuming that the question whether
Milton wrote according to Aristotle is coextensive with the question
whether he wrote good poetry.
The next batch is far more important.
What are the Pleasures of the Imagination? It is of the first
The moment to observe Addison’s exact definition.[580]
“Pleasures of Sight is the “sense which furnishes the imagination
the with its ideas; so that by the ‘Pleasures of the
Imagination.”
Imagination’ or Fancy, which I shall use
promiscuously, I here mean such as arise from visible objects, either
when we have them actually in our view, or when we call up their
ideas into our minds by paintings, statues, descriptions, or any the
like occasion.” We can have no images not thus furnished, though
they may be altered and compounded by imagination itself. To make
this quite sure, he repeats that he means only such pleasures as
thus arise. He then proceeds, at some length, to argue for the
innocence and refinement of such pleasures, their usefulness, and
so on; and further, to discuss the causes or origins of pleasure in
sight, which he finds to be three—greatness, uncommonness, and
beauty. The pleasantness of these is assigned to such and such
wise and good purposes of the Creator, with a reference to the great
modern discoveries of Mr Locke’s essay.
Addison then goes on to consider the sources of entertainment to
the imagination, and decides that, for the purpose, art is very inferior
to nature, though both rise in value as each borrows from the other.
He adduces, in illustration, an odd rococo mixture of scene-painting
and reflection of actual objects which he once saw (p. 404). Italian
and French gardens are next praised, in opposition to the old formal
English style, and naturally trained trees to the productions of the ars
topiaria; while a very long digression is made to greatness in
Architecture, illustrated by this remark (p. 409), “Let any one reflect
on the disposition of mind in which he finds himself at his first
entrance into the Pantheon at Rome, ... and consider how little in
proportion he is affected with the inside of a Gothic cathedral, though
it be five times larger than the other,” the reason being “the
greatness of the manner in the one, and the meanness in the other.”
So the “secondary” pleasures of the imagination—i.e., those
compounded and manufactured by memory—are illustrated by the
arts of sculpture and painting, with a good passage on description
generally, whence he turns to the Cartesian doctrine of the
association of ideas, and shows very ingeniously how the poet may
avail himself of this. Next comes a curious and often just analysis of
the reasons of pleasure in description—how, for instance, he likes
Milton’s Paradise better than his Hell, because brimstone and
sulphur are not so refreshing to the imagination as beds of flowers
and wildernesses of sweets. Or we may like things because they
“raise a secret ferment in the mind,” either directly, or so as to arouse
a feeling of relief by comparison, as when we read of tortures,
wounds, and deaths. Moreover, the poet may improve Nature. Let
oranges grow wild, and roses, woodbines, and jessamines flower at
the same time. As for “the fairy way of writing”[581]—that is to say, the
supernatural—it requires a very odd turn of mind. We do it better
than most other nations, because of our gloominess and melancholy
of temper. Shakespeare excels everybody else in touching “this
weak superstitious part” of his reader’s imagination. The glorifying of
the imagination, however, is by no means confined to the poet. In
good historians we “see” everything. None more gratify the
imagination than the authors of the new philosophy, astronomers,
microscopists. This (No. 420) is one of Addison’s most ambitious
passages of writing, and the whole ends (421) with a peroration
excellently hit off.
It is upon these papers mainly that Mr Worsfold[582] bases his high
eulogium of Addison as “the first genuine critic,” the first “who added
something to the last word of Hellenism,” the bringer of criticism “into
line with modern thought,” the establisher of “a new principle of
poetic appeal.” Let us, as uncontroversially as possible, and without
laying any undue stress on the fact that Mr Worsfold practically omits
Longinus altogether,[583] stick, in our humdrum way, to the facts.
In the first place, supposing for the moment that Addison uses
“imagination” in our full modern sense, and supposing, secondly, for
the moment also, that he assigns the appeal to the imagination as
the special engine of the poet, is this an original discovery of his? By
no means: there are many loci of former writers to negative this—
there is one that is fatal. And this is no more recondite a thing than
the famous Shakespearian description of
as