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American and British Soft
Power in Iran, 1953–1960
A ‘Special Relationship’?
Darius Wainwright
American and British Soft Power
in Iran, 1953–1960
 Darius Wainwright

American and British

Soft Power in Iran,
1953–1960
A ‘Special Relationship’?
Darius Wainwright
Department of History
University of Bristol
Bristol, UK

ISBN 978-3-030-88413-0    ISBN 978-3-030-88414-7 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88414-7

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
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 Acknowledgements

This book would not have been possible without the help and support of
several people. First, my supervisor, Dr Mara Oliva. Her guidance and
feedback have been invaluable, as has her belief in this project and, more
importantly, in myself. Mara’s not just been such a huge help with this
monograph, but with my professional development, too. For both these
things, I am eternally grateful. A huge thanks must also go to the University
of Reading’s Department of History. I arrived as a naïve, eager 22-year-­
old MA student and will leave as a historian and more well-rounded
human being. More than anything else, this is a testament to the depart-
ment’s staff, who have all, in a myriad of ways, helped me achieve my
goals. Discussions on wrestling and Liverpool teams of yesteryear aside,
Dr Dafydd Townley has been an invaluable sounding board for ideas and
a keen listener when I’ve needed to talk things through. He also lived with
me for a week when we undertook research in the United States, which is
no mean feat! A huge thank you, too, must go to Professor Emily West
and Dr Jacqui Turner. Both have frequently enquired about my progress
and have been incredibly supportive. Special thanks must also go to Dr
Maria Ryan and Professor Patrick Major for their considered, thoughtful
feedback on the PhD thesis which formed the basis of this work.
While writing this book, I have taught undergraduates at both Reading
and the LSE’s Department of International History. From the varying
personalities you encounter, the people you help progress and develop
and, most important of all, the thought-provoking ideas students espouse,

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

teaching in higher education is an absolute pleasure and a privilege. A

massive thank you to all my students for all the discussions and questions.
Outside Reading, the Political Studies Association’s American Politics
Group have been a great sounding board for research ideas. Without the
combined financial support of the British Association of American Studies,
the Royal Historical Society and the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library, I would have been unable to afford to undertake research in the
United States. A huge thank you to them, particularly the latter’s Hosting
Committee who made my stay in Abilene, KS, as comfortable and enjoy-
able as possible. A huge shout out must go to Dean. When my travel plans
to depart Abilene fell through, Dean and his family volunteered to drive
me 3 hours to Kansas City. I’ll forever be grateful for that act of kindness,
the introduction to Midwestern cooking and the ice cream! I’d also like to
say a massive thank you to Philip Davies and the Eccles Centre at the
British Library. Receiving an Eccles Centre Fellowship was one of the
highlights of my PhD and something I never thought I’d receive. The
research I was able to undertake proved fruitful for this monograph.
Finally, a huge thank you to everyone at Palgrave, especially Meagan
Simpson, for their assistance and support with this project.
A big shout out to all my family and friends. Thank you for sticking by
me and understanding when I was unable to be there—who knew writing
a book could be such an exhausting, time-consuming experience?! I
hereby promise that I can now be present at all events in both body
and spirit!
 Contents

1 Introduction  1
Methodology, Sources and Chapter Structure  11
References  15

2 Soft Power, the ‘Special Relationship’ and the Roots of

Anglo-American Cultural Diplomacy in Iran 21
American and British Soft Power  23
The ‘Special Relationship’ and the Cold War in the Middle East  33
Iran’s Importance to British and American Foreign Policy Goals  39
American and British Cultural Diplomacy in Iran Before 1951  44
The Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis  49
References  56

3 Maintaining Geopolitical Stability: The USIS and the

Containment of Soviet-Inspired Communism in Iran 61
The Expansion of USIS Initiatives in Iran  63
Initial USIS Initiatives in Iran  72
USIS-Iranian Government Collaboration: The Information
Council  75
USIS and Iranian Government Collaboration Beyond the
Information Council  87
References  92

vii
viii Contents

4 Education and Socio-economic Development: Promoting

the American Way of Life in Iran 95
USIS Rationale for Promoting American Norms, Values and
Ideas in Iran  96
Expansion of USIS Activities in Iran 104
The USIA and the Plan Organisation 117
References 126

5 Maintaining Britain’s Position in Iran: The Information

Research Department, SAVAK and Anti-Soviet Propaganda127
Britain, Iran and the Baghdad Pact 129
IRD-SAVAK Collaboration 141
The Expansion of British Propaganda Activities in Iran 146
References 151

6 Anglicising Iranian Society and Culture Through Education:

The UK Foreign Office and the British Council153
The BBC Persian Service’s Failings and the British Council’s
Return to Iran 154
The British Council and the Anglo-Iranian Cultural Convention 163
The State Department and the USIS’ Response to British
Cultural Diplomacy in Iran 175
References 181

7 The Impact of American and British Soft Power in Iran183

The USIA, USIS and the Containment of Communism in Iran 184
The USIA, USIS and the Promotion of the American Way of Life
in Iran 192
The Foreign Office and the Containment of Communism in Iran 206
The Foreign Office, the British Council and UK Cultural
Diplomacy in Iran 214
References 222

8 Conclusion223

Index 231
 Abbreviations

AIOC Anglo-Iranian Oil Company

BBC British Broadcasting Corporation
BP British Petroleum
CIA Central Intelligence Agency
DPB Department of Press and Broadcasting
FOA Foreign Operations Administration
GATT General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
ICA International Cooperation Administration
IRD Information Research Department
NATO North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NSC National Security Council
NSC 68 National Security Council Document 68
OCB Operations Coordinating Board
PAO Public Affairs Officer
SIS Secret Intelligence Service
TVI Television Iran
UAR United Arab Republic
UN United Nations
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
USIA United States Information Agency
USIS United States Information Service
VOA Voice of America

ix
x Abbreviations

Abbreviation of Terms Used in the Footnotes

BBC WAC British Broadcasting Corporation’s Written Archives Centre

DDEL Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library
FRUS Foreign Relations of the United States
NAII National Archives II (US)
TNA The National Archives (UK)
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

At the heart of the Iran deal was a giant fiction that a murderous
regime desired only a peaceful nuclear energy program.
—‘Remarks by Donald Trump on the Joint Comprehensive Plan of
Action’, The White House, 8 May 2018, https://www.whitehouse.gov/
briefings-­statements/remarks-­president-­trump-­joint-­comprehensive-­
plan-­action/ (accessed 31 May 2019).

In May 2018, the then US President, Donald Trump, withdrew the

United States from the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action. Dubbed the
‘Iran deal’, the agreement pledged that the country would halt its nuclear
programme in return for the lifting of economic sanctions.1 The then
President accused the Iranian government of flouting the agreement by
cultivating plutonium, which Iran’s senior leadership vehemently denied.
The treaty was a key foreign policy achievement of Trump’s predecessor in
the White House, Barack Obama. Presuming that both countries shared
mutual regional goals, he adopted a more conciliatory approach towards
Iran, working with moderate Iranian government elites. Between 2013
and 2015, Obama and his then Secretary of State, John Kerry, worked
with the Iranian President, Hassan Rouhani, and his Foreign Minister,
Javad Zarif, to construct and create an international consensus around the
‘Iran deal.2

1
Peter Baker, ‘President Obama Calls Preliminary Iran Nuclear Deal “Our Best Bet”’,
New York Times, 5 April 2015.
2
Steve Hurst, The United States and the Iranian Nuclear Programme: A Critical History,
Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (2018).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
D. Wainwright, American and British Soft Power in Iran,
1953–1960, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88414-7_1
2 D. WAINWRIGHT

Both presidential administrations’ contrasting approaches towards the

Iranian regime were nothing new. Echoing Trump’s stance, George
W. Bush used his 2002 State of the Union Address to accuse the Iranian
government of financially supporting terrorist groups and of working to
manufacture a nuclear weapon. In his first term, likewise, William
J. Clinton implemented the policy of ‘dual containment’. Grouping the
country with its neighbour, Iraq, he strove to starve Iran’s economy and
deprive it of its regional influence.3 From the 1997 election of reformist
Iranian President Mohammad Khatami, though, Clinton abandoned this
policy, working with his Iranian counterpart to improve US-Iran relations.4
Britain’s relationship with Iran in this period was similarly fractured. An
advocate of the ‘Iran deal’, the UK government led European efforts to
resurrect the agreement considering Trump’s refusal to comply. Despite
this willingness to engage with the country, Anglo-Iranian relations have
frequently been fraught. In 2009, the British Council was forced to depart
Iran after its office in Tehran was vandalised, with the British Embassy fol-
lowing suit in 2011 after protestors attacked its site. Since 2012, more-
over, the Iranian authorities have tried to jam the BBC Persian Service’s
televisual transmissions, threatened its staff and detained relatives of those
working for the broadcaster. The continuance of such aggressive tactics
compelled the BBC in March 2018 to appeal to the UN’s Human Rights
Council in Geneva to force the Iranian government to halt these practices.5
The United States and Britain’s tense relationship with Iran was the
consequence of proceedings during the middle and latter stages of the
Cold War. During the 1979 Iranian Revolution, widespread protests
forced the Shah of Iran, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi, to depart the country.
The monarch was subsequently replaced by an oligarchy of Islamic clerics
opposed to the United Kingdom and United States. Many Iranians were
disillusioned with the Shah’s authoritarian rule, endemic governmental
corruption and the ever-widening income and wealth disparities among
the country’s people. In response to the Carter administration permitting
the deposed Shah to visit New York for hospital treatment, supporters of

3
Anthony Lake, ‘Confronting Backlash States’, Foreign Affairs, 73/2, 44–55 (1994).
4
Donette Murray, US Foreign Policy and Iran: American-Iranian Relations Since the 1979
Islamic Revolution, Abingdon: Routledge, 90–115 (2010).
5
Matthew Moore, ‘Iran: British Council Suspends Work in Tehran’, The Daily Telegraph,
5 February 2009; Kasra Naji, ‘BBC UN Appeal: Stop Harassing Persian Service Staff’, BBC
News, 12 March 2018, http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-43334401
(accessed 26 March 2018).
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

the new regime stormed the US Embassy in Tehran in November 1979,

taking 52 hostages. The subsequent standoff lasted for 444 days. With the
blatant flouting of hitherto sacrosanct diplomatic conventions, the United
States and United Kingdom subsequently led international efforts to
impose political and economic sanctions on Iran.6
Prior to this diplomatic impasse, the United States and Britain enjoyed
a close relationship with Iran. In the 1950s, for instance, American and
British policymakers relied on close ties with the Shah to fight the Cold
War in the Persian Gulf and Arab world. Vehemently opposed to
Communism, the Iranian monarch spearheaded efforts to restrict and
quash the activities of the Soviet-backed Tudeh Party in the country. US
State Department and UK Foreign Office officials, equally, feared that the
USSR, which neighboured Iran, sought to meddle and exercise consider-
able influence over Iranian affairs. In so doing, they could use the country
as a platform to expand their presence across Asia, the Arab world and the
Persian Gulf.7 US and British policymakers, therefore, authorised the pro-
vision of considerable military and economic aid to Iran. In addition to
deterring the Soviets from making incursions into the country, they aimed
to transform Iran into an anti-Communist buffer for the whole region.8
Anglo-American soft power initiatives complemented this military and
economic aid. Rather than deterring or coercing the Soviets, these policies
aimed to persuade and attract Iranians away from the Soviet Union and
more towards Western powers. This book, therefore, establishes how the
United Kingdom and United States used soft power between 1953 and
1960 to combat Communism and promote their respective ways of life in
Iran. It identifies their motives, the types of initiatives employed and the
extent to which they perceived their policies to be a success. Adopting a
thematic approach, the book answers the following questions: What were
6
Ivor Lucas, ‘Revisiting the Decline and Fall of the Shah of Iran’, Asian Affairs, 40/3,
419 (2009); Amin Saikal, ‘Islamism, the Iranian Revolution and the Soviet Invasion of
Afghanistan’, in: Melvyn Leffler and Odd Arne Westad (eds) The Cambridge History of the
Cold War, Volume Three: Endings, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2010).
7
United States interests and objectives in respect of the Near East (NSC 155/1), 14 July
1953, Abilene, Kansas, Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library, White House Office,
NSC Series, Policy Papers; Roger Stevens (British Ambassador, Iran) to Selwyn Lloyd
(Foreign Secretary), 1 June 1957, Kew, Richmond, The National Archives, BW 49/13.
8
Memorandum from Robert Bowie (State Department representative on the NSC
Planning Board) to Robert Cutler (President’s Special Assistant for National Security
Affairs), 1 August 1957, Oxford, Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, Near
East Region; Iran; Iraq, Volume XII.
4 D. WAINWRIGHT

American and British policymakers’ motives for seeking to improve diplo-

matic relations with Iran via soft power initiatives? How did the UK
Foreign Office and the US State Department use cultural and propaganda
initiatives to achieve their diplomatic goals in Iran? What was the nature of
the British Council and United States Information Service’s (USIS) poli-
cies? How successful were the United Kingdom and United States here?
More broadly, what consequences did Anglo-American cultural diplomacy
in Iran between 1953 and 1960 have on the UK-US ‘special relationship’
in the region? And what implications did it have on the wider Cold War?
Soft power is a crucial tenet of Anglo-American foreign policy. The
political scientist Joseph Nye coined the term in the early 1990s. He used
it to describe foreign policy initiatives that persuade and attract others to
do one’s bidding. Examples include propaganda, cultural exchanges and
language teaching. While contrasting with hard power—which involves
the use of force to accomplish diplomatic aims—sources of soft power are
not exclusively non-military. An attractive reputation that may influence
others can also be achieved through military and economic means if these
coercive sources of power are employed in ways widely perceived as legiti-
mate. The employment of armed forces in a manner and for reasons other
actors deem appropriate, for example, can bolster soft power appeal,
which, in turn, potentially leads these countries and organisations to side
with the United States. Political elites may exercise soft power at a state
level to set an example that they wish others to follow. Alternatively, gov-
ernments may boost their soft power through establishing cultural institu-
tions and radio broadcasters—such as the British Council, the Voice of
America (VOA) and, in the case of Iran, the BBC Persian Service—that
operate overseas. These non-state actors accordingly highlight their home
country’s values, culture or economic prosperity to worldwide audiences,
creating a positive perception of their home nation.9
In recent years, British and American political elites have emphasised
the value of soft power policies. In 2015, the UK government’s Strategic
Defence and Security Review extolled the virtues of British soft power. The
paper referred to the United Kingdom as one of the most prominent pro-
ponents of soft power globally. Cultural exchanges and English language

9
Joseph Nye, Soft Power: The Means to Success in World Politics, New York: Public Affairs,
12 (2004); Joseph Nye, ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, Political Science
Quarterly, 119/2, 255 (2004); Joseph Nye, ‘Public Diplomacy and Soft Power’, The Annals
of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, 616, 97 (2008).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

teaching, along with radio and television broadcasts, promote British ‘val-
ues and interests’, provide the United Kingdom with ‘international influ-
ence’ and can help ‘tackle the causes of security threats.’ A Chatham
House Report titled Strengthening Britain’s Voice in the World echoed
these sentiments, calling on the government to ‘ensure continued funding
of key elements of the UK’s soft power such as the BBC World Service and
the British Council’. Similarly, a 2005 US State Department report under-
lined the importance of soft power to wider American foreign policy.
According to the report, policies of attraction and persuasion are the only
way that the United States can effectively ‘inform, engage and influence
foreign publics over the long term’.10
As political scientists devised and elucidated the soft power concept,
more literature exists on soft power from an international relations stand-
point.11 Historians of diplomacy and international affairs have only sys-
tematically investigated the subject in recent decades. A new wave of
historical research on the Cold War, for instance, analysed how the United
States promoted American norms, ideas and lifestyles in their struggle
against the Soviet Union.12 This contributed towards a new, emerging
strand of literature that asserts that the United States ‘won’ the Cold War
through its exertion of soft power. American fashion, music and values,
most notably human rights, and democracy pervaded the ‘Iron Curtain’
into the Soviet Union, fuelling elite and popular desires for political and
economic change.13 Yet such revisionist analyses, despite their greater con-
sideration of soft power, still largely focused on the US government’s
attempts to showcase America abroad. In other words, there has been a
greater emphasis on how institutions such as the State Department

10
‘Cultural Diplomacy: The Lynchpin of Public Diplomacy’, Report of the Advisory
Committee on Cultural Diplomacy, The US Department of State (2005); National Security
Strategy and Strategic Defence and Security Review 2015: A Secure and Prosperous United
Kingdom, Westminster (2015); Strengthening Britain’s Voice in the World: Report of the UK
Foreign and Security Policy Working Group, Chatham House (2015).
11
Colin Elman and Miriam Fendius-Elman, ‘Diplomatic History and International
Relations Theory: Respecting Difference and Crossing Boundaries’, International Security
22/1, 6–9 (1999).
12
John Lewis Gaddis, We Now Know: Rethinking Cold War History, Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 85–86 (1997); Walter Hixson, Parting the Curtain: Propaganda, Culture
and the Cold War, 1945–1961, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 206–207 (1997); Francis
Stonor Saunders, Who Paid the Piper? The CIA and the Cultural Cold War, London: Granta,
252–254 (1999).
13
Nye, ‘Soft Power and American Foreign Policy’, 257.
6 D. WAINWRIGHT

employed cultural initiatives to extol the supposed superiority of American

lifestyles to their Soviet counterparts. How these governmental bodies
applied culture and propaganda to encourage those overseas to adopt US
customs, perspectives and lifestyles has comparably received little scholarly
attention.14 It is only in recent years that this has changed, with a growing
body of work examining how non-state actors have projected soft power
transnationally. Scholars have explored how their messages have been
shaped by the US government and how these actors, in turn, have affected
state responses to developments.15
Still, how the United States and United Kingdom employed soft power
in its diplomatic dealings with Iran during this period remains largely
unexplored. The body of literature exploring US-Iranian relations in the
Cold War has, instead, emphasised the role of elites in exerting military
and economic power. This contrasts with the small body of work on Soviet
cultural diplomacy programmes in Iran in the 1950s and 1960s.16 The
literature’s tendency to neglect cultural aspects of American diplomacy
towards Iran is unsurprising. Despite wider historiographical develop-
ments in the importance of soft power to foreign policy goals, historians
were convinced that, after 1953, US policymakers were uninterested in
fostering cultural ties with Iran.17 As such, historians have focused on
America’s involvement in the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis and the ensuing
August 1953 coup. In April 1951, Mohammad Mosaddegh was elected
Prime Minister of Iran. One of the first acts of his premiership was to halt
the British government-backed Anglo-Iranian Oil Company’s monopoly

14
Kenneth Osgood, ‘Hearts and Minds: The Unconventional Cold War’, Journal of Cold
War Studies 4/2, 85–86 (2002).
15
Peter Biskind, Seeing is Believing: How Hollywood Taught Us to Stop Worrying and Love
the Fifties, London: Henry Holt & Company Inc (1984); Luminita Gatejel, ‘Appealing for a
Car. Consumption Policies and Entitlement in the USSR, the GDR and Romania,
1950s–1980s’, Slavic Review, 75, 125 (2016); Federico Romero, ‘Cold War Historiography
at the Crossroads’, Cold War History, 14/4, 686–688 (2014); Nora Sayre, Running Time:
Films of the Cold War, New York: Bantam Doubleday Dell Publishing Group (1982); Tony
Shaw, Hollywood’s Cold War, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press (2007).
16
Nodar Mossaki and Lana Ravandi-Fadai, ‘A Guarded Courtship: Soviet Cultural
Diplomacy in Iran from the Late 1940s to the 1960s’, Iranian Studies, 51/3, 438–445
(2018); James Pickett, ‘Soviet Civilisation Through a Persian Lens: Iranian Intellectuals,
Cultural Diplomacy and Socialist Modernity, 1941–1955’, Iranian Studies, 48/5,
808–812 (2015).
17
Deborah Kisatsky, ‘Voice of America and Iran, 1949–1953: US Liberal Developmentalism,
Propaganda and the Cold War’, Intelligence and National Security, 14/3, 161–162 (1999).
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

over the Iranian oil industry. By August 1953, however, the failure to
resolve this dispute, combined with significant British diplomatic pressure,
persuaded the CIA to support an MI6-backed coup against Mosaddegh.
The incident marked the beginning of considerable US involvement in
Iran’s political affairs, lasting until the 1979 Iranian Revolution. Scholars
have accordingly focused on President Dwight D. Eisenhower’s handling
of the diplomatic standoff, as well as the coup’s implications for US-Iran
bilateral ties.18
Analyses of US-Iran relations after 1953 have accordingly examined
elite level US-Iran interactions. Historians have seemingly paid more
attention to the Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and Carter White House’s
dealings with Iran. The Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis and its aftermath aside,
there is much less scholarly focus on the Eisenhower administration’s deal-
ings with the country. This noticeable discrepancy stems from the tradi-
tionalist historiographical school of thought on the Eisenhower White
House. Work from this perspective dismissed the President as an ineffec-
tive executive, dominated in the field of foreign policy by his Secretary of
State, John Foster Dulles. As President, therefore, his diplomatic endeav-
ours, in Iran, the Middle East or otherwise, contributed little to US for-
eign policy in the Cold War.19 It is only in recent decades that historians
have proffered more balanced assessments of the Eisenhower presidency.
Fred Greenstein and Richard Immerman, for example, examine the
President’s complex, nuanced foreign policy strategy. The former whole-
heartedly praised Eisenhower for ensuring global stability, while the latter
pointed to certain foreign failures, most notably the mishandling of
Nasserite Arab nationalism. Both scholars, though, agreed that the
President established a strong foundation that subsequent White House
administrations capitalised on.20

18
James Bill, The Eagle and the Lion: The Tragedy of US-Iran Relations, Yale: Yale University
Press, 288–290 (1988); Mark Gasiorowski, US Foreign Policy and the Shah: Building a Client
State in Iran, Ithaca: Cornell University Press (1991); Steve Marsh, ‘HMG, and the Anglo-­
Iranian Oil Crisis: In Defence of Anglo-Iranian’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, 12/4, 148–153
(2001); Barry Rubin, Paved with Good Intentions: The American Experience in Iran, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 64–66 (1991).
19
Walt Rostow, Eisenhower, Kennedy and Foreign Aid, Austin: University of Texas
Press (1985).
20
Fred Greenstein, The Hidden Hand Presidency: Eisenhower as Leader, Baltimore: John
Hopkins University Press (1984); Richard Immerman, John Foster Dulles: Piety, Pragmatism,
and Power in U.S. Foreign Policy, Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield (1998).
8 D. WAINWRIGHT

Interestingly, historians analysing how Eisenhower’s successors dealt

with Iran compare how each presidency responded to developments
within Iran, without comparing presidential approaches to the country
according to party lines. They presume that each administration adopted
their own individual stance towards the Iranian monarch, with little parti-
san influence. In recent years, scholars have refuted the prevailing consen-
sus that American policymakers rode roughshod over Iranian affairs.
Historians have focused on both President John F. Kennedy and Lyndon
B. Johnson’s troubled relationship with the Shah. They have specifically
explored how both leaders were unable to persuade the Iranian monarch
to rein in his authoritarian rule and his regime’s flouting of human rights.
Such publications have formed part of the much broader revisionist Cold
War historiography, which pays significant attention to how Global South
manipulated, or worked with, the United Kingdom, the United States and
the Soviet Union to achieve their foreign policy goals.21 Indeed, several
publications have explored how the Shah worked with President Richard
Nixon to achieve mutual diplomatic objectives. They focus on the motives
surrounding the President’s May 1972 decision to provide the Iranian
monarch with unlimited American military and economic support.
According to Roham Alvandi, this decision stemmed from the Shah’s fre-
quent recommendations to Nixon that he alter his diplomatic approach
towards the Middle East. Instead of trying to maintain a balance of power
between Iran and Saudi Arabia, the Shah persuaded the US government
to solely support his regime.22

21
Roham Alvandi, ‘The Shah’s Détente with Khrushchev: Iran’s 1962 Missile Base Pledge
to the Soviet Union’, Cold War History, 14/3, 423–444 (2014); David Collier, ‘To Prevent
a Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Promotion of Democracy in Iran’, Diplomacy and
Statecraft, 24, 456–475 (2013); Victor Nemchenok, ‘In Search of Stability Amid Chaos: US
Policy Towards Iran, 1961–1963’, Cold War History, 10/3, 341–369 (2010); Ben Offiler,
US Foreign Policy and the Modernisation of Iran: Kennedy, Johnson, Nixon and the Shah,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2015); Tony Smith, ‘New Bottles for New Wine: A
Pericentric Framework for the Study of the Cold War’, Diplomatic History, 24/4, 567–591
(2000); April Summit, ‘For a White Revolution: John F. Kennedy and the Shah of Iran’,
Middle East Journal, 58/4, 560–575 (2004).
22
Roham Alvandi, Nixon, Kissinger and the Shah: The United States and Iran in the Cold
War, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2–4 (2014); Stephen McGlinchey, ‘Richard Nixon’s
Road to Tehran: The Making of the U.S.-Iran Arms Agreement of May 1972’, Diplomatic
History, 37/4, 841–860 (2013); David Schmitz, The United States and Right Wing
Dictatorships, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press (2005).
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

In contrast, there has been much analysis of how the Foreign Office
used institutions like the British Council and the BBC’s foreign service
audio broadcasts to achieve the UK government’s diplomatic goals in the
region. Scholars have also explored the initiatives of the UK Foreign
Office’s Information Research Department (IRD) across the Arab world
and the Maghreb.23 However, many of these histories pay little attention
on the UK’s attempts to forge cultural ties with Iran during the Cold War
specifically. Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh, for instance, eval-
uated the BBC Persian Service’s role in promoting British interests in the
country. They argued that the UK Foreign Office exerted considerable
pressure on the broadcaster to adhere to its foreign policy stance on Iran.
During the 1951–1953 Iranian Oil Crisis, for example, diplomats expected
the Persian Service to be critical of Prime Minister Mohammad Mossagdeh.
Yet, whilst surveying its broadcasts between 1945 and 2012, Torfeh and
Sreberny only analyse the Persian Service and Iran at certain key points.
These include the 1951–1953 Oil Crisis, the 1979 Iranian Revolution and
the 2008 launch of the BBC Persian television channel. The writers con-
sequently pay little attention to proceedings before and between these
events.24
There are, consequently, numerous gaps within the literature. Few his-
tories, crucially, have discussed how these tensions in the US-UK ‘special
relationship’ manifested themselves in Anglo-American interactions with
Iran in this period. A key element underpinning both countries’ bilateral
ties, the relationship is complex and multi-faceted. Policymakers from
both countries realised that they shared an aversion to Communism and a
penchant for free trade. By working together, British and American diplo-
mats and officials were convinced that these objectives could be achieved
more quickly.25 Policymakers on both sides of the Atlantic, together with
academics and media commentators, however, view Britain as the ‘junior
partner’ in this ‘special relationship’, particularly in the Middle East. Prior
to the 1950s, Britain was the dominant Western power in the region,
maintaining control via a permanent Royal Navy presence in the Persian

23
James Vaughan, ‘A Certain Idea of Britain’: British Cultural Diplomacy in the Middle
East, 1945–57’, Contemporary British History, 19/2, 151–168 (2005); Alban Webb, London
Calling: Britain, the BBC World Service and the Cold War, London: Bloomsbury (2014).
24
Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh, Persian Service: The BBC and British
Interests in Iran, London: IB Tauris, 112 (2014).
25
William Wallace and Christopher Phillips, ‘Reassessing the “Special Relationship”’,
International Affairs, 85/2, 270 (2009).
10 D. WAINWRIGHT

Gulf. Foreign Office diplomats and officials also held influential positions
in the courts of many of the state’s ruling regimes.26 Few histories have
discussed how these tensions in the ‘special relationship’ manifested in
Anglo-American interactions with Iran. There has been a greater focus on
the UK and US response to the rise of Arab nationalism, which called for
political and cultural unity and a rejection of Western powers across the
Arab world. Scholars have accordingly explored the contrasting US and
UK responses to these developments. Whereas the Foreign Office encour-
aged its regional allies to sign a non-aggression pact, American policymak-
ers initially sought to appease Arab nationalists, before pushing for a
tougher response to the ideology’s advocates.27
Equally, compared to the significant body of literature on US-Iran rela-
tions, there has been far less research dedicated to the study of Anglo-­
Iranian interactions. This can be attributed to the United States’ emergence
as Iran’s main ally, and the scholarly perception that Britain’s post-war
political and economic decline meant that it was less interested in Iran and
the Persian Gulf after the 1950s.28 Much of the literature written on devel-
opments after this event has been written by British diplomats who for-
merly served in the country or had dealings with its government. These
works largely deal with the Shah’s final years and the Iranian Revolution.29
Historians writing on Anglo-Iranian relations have largely focused on
events before the August 1953 coup. In writing about the 1946 Azerbaijan
Crisis—where USSR loyalists in Northwest Iran formed a breakaway
26
Nigel Ashton, Kennedy, Macmillan and the Cold War: The Irony of Interdependence,
Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 5 (2001).
27
Greg Brew, ‘“Our Most Dependable Allies”: Iraq, Saudi Arabia and the Eisenhower
Doctrine, 1956–1958’, Mediterranean Quarterly, 26/4, 89 (2015); Nathan Citino, From
Arab Nationalism to OPEC: Eisenhower, King Sa-ud, and the Making of US-Saudi Relations,
Bloomington: Indiana University Press (2002); Robert McNamara, Britain, Nasser and the
Balance of Power in the Middle East, 1952–1977: From the Egyptian Revolution to the Six-Day
War, Abingdon: Routledge, 142, (2003); Ray Takeyh, The Origins of the Eisenhower Doctrine:
The US, Britain and Nasser’s Egypt, 1953–1957, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan (2000);
Salim Yaqub, Containing Arab Nationalism: The Eisenhower Doctrine and the Middle East,
North Carolina: The University of North Carolina Press (2004).
28
Juan Romero, ‘Decolonisation in Reverse: the Iranian Oil Crisis of 1951–1953’, Middle
Eastern Studies, 51/3, 462–488 (2015); Simon Smith, ‘Power Transferred? Britain, the
United States and the Gulf, 1956–1971’, Contemporary British History, 21/1, 4–5 (2007).
29
David Owen, Time to Declare, London: Politicos (1991); Anthony Parsons, The Pride
and the Fall: Iran, 1974–1979, London, Jonathan Cape Limited (1984); Edward Posnett,
‘Treating His Imperial Majesty’s Warts: British Policy Towards Iran, 1977–1979’, Iranian
Studies, 45/1, 119–137 (2012).
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

state—Daniel Yergin, Fred Halliday and Louise Fawcett all discuss Britain’s
role in resolving the dispute. Whereas Yergin and Halliday stress the
impact of British and American policymakers here, Fawcett underlines the
role of Iranian politicians in outmanoeuvring senior Soviet officials.30 The
literature on British responses to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, moreover,
analyses both the UK government’s imposition of an oil embargo on Iran
and the Foreign Office’s drawing up of plans to invade Iranian oilfields.31
Much of the work focusing on post-1953 UK-Iran relations focuses on
popular Iranian responses to the British government’s conduct during this
diplomatic dispute. Maysam Behravesh and Ali Ansari suggest that the
Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis cemented the idea of ‘perfidious Albion’ into the
Iranian popular consciousness. According to both scholars, this term can
be used to describe suspicion towards British motives and intentions, the
idea that Britain is involved in Iranian affairs from behind the scenes and
is responsible for unfortunate events that befall Iran.32

Methodology, Sources and Chapter Structure

An appraisal of the historiography concerning the United Kingdom,
United States and Iran indicates a dearth of research on British and
American soft power initiatives in the country. In addressing these key
themes and issues, though, two key issues need to be considered. First, it
is difficult to define the success of soft power initiatives. Due to the intan-
gibility of many of these policies, they are difficult to measure. As
Christopher Layne explains, public opinion does not make foreign policy,
policymakers do. Attitudes are transient, not static, and it is difficult to
establish a causal link between a state’s soft power exertions and the views

30
Louise Fawcett, ‘Revisiting the Iranian Crisis of 1946: How Much More Do We Know?’,
Iranian Studies, 47/3, 379–399 (2014); Fred Halliday, ‘The Middle East, the Great Powers
and the Cold War’, in: Avi Shlaim and Yezid Sayigh (eds) The Cold War in the Middle East,
Oxford: Oxford University Press (1997); Daniel Yergin, Shattered Peace: The Origins of the
Cold War and the National Security State, London: Penguin (1977).
31
Steve Marsh, ‘Anglo-American Crude Diplomacy: Multinational Oil and the Iranian Oil
Crisis, 1951–1953’, Contemporary British History, 21/1, 25–53 (2007); Ian Speller, ‘A
Splutter of Musketry? The British Military Response to the Anglo-Iranian Oil Dispute,
1951’, Contemporary British History, 17/1, 39–66 (2003).
32
Ali Ansari, ‘The Myth of “Perfidious Albion”: Anglo-Iranian Relations in Historical
Perspective’, Asian Affairs, 44/3, 378–391 (2013); Maysam Behravesh, ‘The Formative
Years of Anglo-Iranian Relations: Colonial Scramble for Iran and its Political Legacy’, Digest
of Middle Eastern Studies, 21/2, 386–400 (2012).
12 D. WAINWRIGHT

of targets domestically and overseas.33 Second, there is a scholarly ten-

dency to deal with hard and soft power as separate entities. This raises the
question of where hard power stops and soft power starts. The literature
assumes that methods of coercion, such as military intervention and eco-
nomic embargoes, are far removed from policies of attraction. Both for-
eign policy forms are instead entwined with one another. Policymakers
utilise elements from both at the same time to achieve diplomatic objec-
tives.34 To alter this misconception, Nye recommends that we should refer
to a combination of hard and soft diplomacy as smart power. He claims
that this was frequently exercised by the Obama administration to achieve
US diplomatic goals. In encouraging Iran to halt its nuclear programme,
for example, senior White House officials utilised a combination of eco-
nomic sanctions and cultural overtures.35 Meanwhile, Andras Simonyi and
Judit Trunkos suggest the viewing of hard and soft power through a ‘spec-
tral lens’, with each foreign policy form at either end. As a country’s dip-
lomatic initiatives would be situated in the middle of this spectrum, they
claim that this would enable a better understanding of both foreign policy
tools and the relationship between the different elements of international
affairs.36
The examination of both British and American soft power in Iran means
that primary research has been undertaken in both the United Kingdom
and the United States. The unavailability of appropriate Iranian sources,
outside of the diaries of senior officials and interviews taken from the
Harvard Iranian Oral History Project, means that limited research on
Iranian perspectives to US-UK soft power initiatives was undertaken.
Even if documentary evidence was available, the monograph focuses on
American and British cultural diplomacy, particularly the nature of the
policies pursued and policymakers’ perceptions of their success. As such,

33
Christopher Layne, ‘The Unbearable Lightness of Soft Power’, in: Inderjeet Parmar and
Michael Cox (eds) Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary
Perspectives, Abingdon: Routledge, 56 (2010).
34
Geraldo Zahran and Leonardo Ramos, ‘From Hegemony to Soft Power’, in: Inderjeet
Parmar and Michael Cox (eds) Soft Power and US Foreign Policy: Theoretical, Historical and
Contemporary Perspectives, Abingdon: Routledge, 13–15 (2010).
35
Joseph Nye, ‘Get Smart: Combining Hard and Soft Power’, New Perspectives Quarterly,
26/2, 160–163 (2009).
36
Andras Simonyi and Judit Trunkos, ‘Eliminating the Hard/Soft Power Dichotomy’, in:
Aude Jehan and Andras Simonyi (eds), Smarter Powers: The Key to a Strategic Transatlantic
Partnership, Washington: Center for Transatlantic Relations, 22–29 (2015).
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

there is little scope for research to be undertaken on the Iranian side.

Much of the research undertaken on the UK aspects of this project was at
the National Archives in Kew. The British Council and Foreign Office
papers formed the bulk of the primary evidence for the UK side of this
thesis. The former highlighted the nature of the agency’s 1952 departure
from Iran, as well as its return in 1955. The documents reveal the motives
for UK cultural diplomacy, the nature of the initiatives employed and their
perceived success. The annual reports, notably, provide a fascinating
insight into Britain’s response towards American soft power initiatives.
Interaction between British Council and Foreign Office officials convey
the United Kingdom’s frustration at the superior resources of the United
States and its seemingly greater success at attracting Iranians towards
American norms, ideas and lifestyles. Papers from the Foreign Office’s
Political and Cultural Relations departments complemented the British
Council records, illustrating the government department’s input in shap-
ing the agency’s activities in Iran. Documents from the BBC’s Written
Archives Centre in Reading were also consulted to assess the BBC Persian
Service’s contribution to British cultural efforts.
On the American side, research was undertaken at the National Archives
at College Park, Maryland. The US State Department’s papers identify the
motives behind American cultural diplomacy in Iran. The documents
highlight the State Department officials’ determination to combat
Communism in Iran and change popular political and cultural perceptions
of the United States. They also illustrate certain key USIS cultural and
propaganda initiatives. Documents illuminate the State Department and
Embassy’s input here, as well as the extent of the collaboration with
Iranian governmental officials. Moreover, the National Archives house
documents belonging to the two agencies responsible for US soft power
in Iran, the United States Information Agency (USIA) and its constituent
organisation, the USIS. These papers highlight how the agency used,
among other things, cultural exchanges, Iranian universities and Radio
Tehran to combat Communism and promote the American way of life.
The documentary record also enables judgements on the American use of
soft power in the country to be made. Not only do these sources highlight
the role of these actors in the making, shaping and delivery of foreign
policy, but they will also indicate whether certain societal groups were
more receptive towards US cultural overtures than others. Complementing
this, the NSC and OCB papers from the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential
Library in Abilene, Kansas, place American cultural diplomacy in Iran in
14 D. WAINWRIGHT

its wider context. The documents here provide a background to the

motives and objectives of US foreign policy in Iran. They proffer explana-
tions as to why White House and State Department figures paid so much
attention to shaping the views of Iranian people. To strengthen and sup-
port the findings from both these archives, oral histories from the
Association of Diplomatic Studies and Training’s project were used. With
interviews from key USIS and Embassy personnel, these provide a per-
sonal perspective on the American cultural initiatives employed in Iran.
To assess these Anglo-American cultural and soft power overtures,
reports from Ettelat (Information), one of Iran’s most prominent newspa-
pers in this era, were used. Located on microfilm in the British Library,
they provide an insight into the reception of British and American cultural
initiatives at an elite and popular level. As the newspaper was state-­
controlled, reports provide some insight into the Iranian establishment’s
response to UK and US cultural diplomacy. They also underline the
Iranian public’s reception towards British Council- and USIS-organised
events and exhibitions.
Chapter 2 provides a methodological and contextual framework for the
subsequent analysis. The next two sections pay specific attention to US
cultural diplomacy in Iran. Chapter 3 focuses on the USIS’ attempts to
contain Communism in Iran, as well as protect and bolster the Shah’s
regime. Chapter 4 explores how the USIS promoted the American way of
life in Iran. Chapter 5 proceeds to discuss how the UK Foreign Office
sought to reassert themselves in Iran through working with SAVAK, the
Iranian secret and intelligence service, in the production and dissemina-
tion of anti-Communist propaganda. Chapter 6, on the other hand,
focuses on the British Council’s work in spearheading UK cultural diplo-
macy in Iran. It proceeds to analyse the USIS response to British cultural
diplomacy in Iran. Bringing the American and British sides together,
Chap. 7 assesses the impact of both countries’ cultural diplomacy efforts
in Iran between 1953 and 1960. Though not an exhaustive comparison,
the section makes preliminary inferences on whether one country was
more successful than the other, as well as whether certain sections of
Iranian society were more receptive towards American and British cultural
diplomacy than others. It also explores how the United Kingdom and
United States’ respective soft power policies in Iran impacted on the
Anglo-American ‘special relationship’, as well as how both countries’ ini-
tiatives shaped the Cold War more widely.
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

The analysis of British and American soft power in Iran between 1953
and 1960 makes five key contributions, each of which is revisited in the
Conclusion. First, it views Anglo-American relations with Iran through
the prism of soft power. This is an original take on the topic. Previous
research has emphasised economic and military interactions between the
United States, United Kingdom and Iran. Second, complements and sup-
plements the growing body of work on Eisenhower revisionism. The work
illustrates how this White House administration established the founda-
tions of America’s soft power programme in Iran. Third, it highlights the
role of certain individuals in the making and shaping of foreign policy
initiatives. Fourth, the book explores how Britain and the United States
responded to the changes in their respective global positions. During this
period, the United Kingdom was a declining power, in the process of
relinquishing most of its overseas colonies. The United States, in compari-
son, was a booming superpower, taking a greater interest in the struggle
against Communism in the Persian Gulf and Arab world. Finally, it high-
lights the tensions and competitiveness underpinning Anglo-American
relations in the region. Both countries, while collaborating in many fields,
shared similar aims but different priorities. The monograph points out the
ways in which they cooperated and competed with one another for
regional supremacy.

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 1 INTRODUCTION 19

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 CHAPTER 2

Soft Power, the ‘Special Relationship’

and the Roots of Anglo-American Cultural
Diplomacy in Iran

We saw Turkey on the one hand, and Pakistan on the other. Each was
fairly stable and with some strength, and Iran was in the middle. That
was our picture of the Middle East; so, Iran was very important to us.
It was the soft underbelly of Russia.
—Henry Byroade interviewed by Niel M. Johnson, 19 September
1988, Arlington, Virginia, The Association for Diplomatic Studies
and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, http://www.adst.
org/OHTOCs/Byroade,Henry.toc.pdf (accessed 11 April 2019).

Henry Byroade, the US Assistant Secretary of State for Near Eastern,

South Asian, and African Affairs between 1952 and 1955, served in this
role at a tumultuous time for Iran’s relations with the United States and
Britain. Not only were British and American officials forced to contend
with the fallout from the Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis, but it was also the
period in which America took Britain’s place as the dominant Western
power in the country. Byroade was fervently convinced that, due to the
country’s geographic proximity to the USSR, American policymakers
should prioritise strengthening diplomatic ties with Iran.1 Prior to taking
on this role, Byroade enjoyed a distinguished military career. Graduating

1
Telegram from Henry Byroade (Bureau of Near Eastern Affairs) to the State Department,
15 October 1953, College Park, Maryland, National Archives II (hereafter document, date,
NAII), US State Department papers, Iran, US-Iran Political Relations (1950–1954).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Switzerland AG 2022
D. Wainwright, American and British Soft Power in Iran,
1953–1960, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-88414-7_2
22 D. WAINWRIGHT

from West Point in 1937, he was immediately assigned to the Corps of

Engineers, his preferred choice. Byroade spent most of the Second World
War serving in India and later China. He presided over the building of
runways to service American bomber and fighter planes, as well as freights
supplying Chinese nationalist forces fighting Japanese invaders. It was
thanks to these ties to Chang Kai-Shek and his contemporaries that
General George Marshall appointed Byroade to his staff in 1944. The fol-
lowing year, President Harry Truman sent the General and his advisors on
a mission to China to in a failed attempt to persuade warring Chinese
Communists and Nationalists to form a united government. After the
Marshall Mission’s failure, Byroade was sent back to the Pentagon. His
wartime experiences of supplying Chinese Nationalists by air led to him
presiding over the Berlin Airlift’s logistics. The operation’s success per-
suaded the then Secretary of State, Dean Acheson, to appoint Byroade as
the Director of the State Department’s Bureau of German Affairs.2
Byroade resigned from the army in 1952 to work for the Foreign
Service. Truman immediately appointed him as the Assistant Secretary of
State for Near Eastern, South Asian, and African Affairs. As he had no
prior knowledge or understanding of these regions, the President was con-
fident that this appointment would not be criticised by pro-Israeli or Arab
elements within Congress or the State Department. Despite Byroade’s
lack of Middle Eastern expertise, his prior experiences had made him
acutely conscious of how political and transnational forces could subvert
nation states. He was particularly aware of how and why people were
attracted to Communism.3 Byroade’s close friend, the then US Ambassador
to Iran, Loy Henderson, shared his views. The two had built a close rap-
port in the late 1940s. While Byroade had been the Director of the Bureau
of German Affairs, Henderson worked in the Bureau for Near Eastern and
African Affairs. Byroade relied on his friend to advise him on regional mat-
ters. Henderson had underlined the importance of engaging with Iran to
maintain geopolitical stability in the Middle East. Both feared that if the
country succumbed to Communism, the ideology would spread to the
Arab world and the Indian Subcontinent. They, accordingly, viewed US
cultural diplomacy in Iran as the best means to prevent the expansion of

2
Henry Byroade interviewed by Niel M. Johnson, 19 September 1988, The Association
for Diplomatic Studies and Training Foreign Affairs Oral History Project, http://www.adst.
org/OHTOCs/Byroade,Henry.toc.pdf (accessed 11 April 2019).
3
Ibid.
 2 SOFT POWER, THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE ROOTS… 23

Soviet influence in the region. Byroade and Henderson were convinced

that once Iranians were aware of the superior living standards and the
enhanced socio-economic opportunities in the ‘free world’, they would be
less inclined towards Communism.4
During the early 1950s, Byroade and Henderson used their positions
to push the State Department and US government to fund initiatives pro-
moting the American way of life in Iran. This was a transformative period
for Anglo-American relations with the country, with the United Kingdom’s
standing declining at the United States’ expense. These years also saw the
country become a pressing US-UK foreign policy concern and Cold War
battleground. It culminated in both countries helping to remove the
Iranian government, paving the way for the subsequent autocratic rule of
the Shah, Mohammad Reza Pahlavi. Thanks to these proceedings, Byroade
and Henderson got their wish. Cultural and soft power policies subse-
quently became a mainstay of both the US and UK diplomatic approach
to Iran. These endeavours promoted both countries’ norms and values to
Iranians, as well as steered popular views of the Cold War. This chapter
places these developments in their wider context. It starts by providing a
conceptual overview of Anglo-American soft power, as well as elucidating
the ideological origins of these policies. The chapter proceeds to examine
the tensions underpinning the so-called US-UK ‘special relationship’, fol-
lowed by Iran’s importance to Anglo-American foreign policy goals. The
section finally explores initial American and British cultural policies in
Iran, highlighting how the 1951–1953 Anglo-Iranian Oil Crisis pro-
foundly transformed both countries’ relationship with Iran.

American and British Soft Power

Soft power is generated in many forms, and a detailed account of each type
is beyond this book’s remit. Policies and endeavours in this field usually
encompass more than one form of soft power. They are also either inter-
woven with hard power initiatives or applied in tandem. The monograph
focuses particularly on the production and dissemination of propaganda;
the promotion of lifestyles; the sharing of language and literature; the
advocacy of Anglo-American values, ideas and practices; and the

4
Ibid.; Loy Henderson interviewed by Richard McKinzie, 14 June 1973, Independence,
Missouri, The Harry S. Truman Presidential Library and Museum, https://www.trumanli-
brary.org/oralhist/hendrson.htm (accessed 11 April 2019).
24 D. WAINWRIGHT

promotion of socio-economic advancements. Three key attempts to gen-

erate soft power are explored in this book. The first is cultural diplomacy.
According to Milton Cummings, this is the exchange of norms, values and
ideas across both cultures and borders to foster mutual understanding.
Policies can be undertaken at a state level, through cultural and educa-
tional exchanges, or at a non-state level. Government-affiliated semi-­
independent institutions such as the British Council and the United States
Information Agency (USIA) predominantly undertake such endeavours.
Operating overseas, these organisations, among other things, translate
British and American literature, organise exhibitions and offer language
courses that provide students with an insight into life in the United
Kingdom and United States. When employed effectively, cultural diplo-
macy can help foster a dialogue with the people of a country immune to
either regime change or governmental clashes on the world stage. These
policies can subsequently provide a foundation for nations to reach future
bilateral agreements.5
The second key form of generating soft power covered in this book is
the power and influence of intelligence agencies. These are usually clan-
destine governmental organisations, most notably the American Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA) and the British Secret Intelligence Service
(SIS). Complementing these organisations are open-source intelligence
agencies like the UK Foreign Office’s Information Research Department
(IRD). As Andrew Defty explains, the latter was established to combat
Communist propaganda and coordinate attempts to discredit the Soviet
Union and its allies abroad. The IRD collaborated with foreign political
elites, as well as those it regarded as ‘opinion formers’, typically teachers,
journalists and civil servants.6 According to Richard Aldrich, the IRD, SIS
and CIA exercised soft power via the ‘hidden hand’. They supplied indi-
viduals and organisations at home and abroad sympathetic to their cause
with pro-Western and anti-Communist material for them to publicise and
disseminate. In so doing, these agencies steered foreign and domestic
publics unnoticed and from afar.7 They occasionally collaborated with

5
Milton Cummings, Cultural Diplomacy and the United States Government: A Survey,
Washington, DC: Americans for the Arts, 11 (2003).
6
Andrew Defty, ‘“Close and Continuous Liaison”: British Anti-Communist Propaganda
and Cooperation with the United States, 1950–1951’, Intelligence and National Security,
17/4, 126–128 (2002).
7
Richard Aldrich, The Hidden Hand: Britain, America and Cold War Secret Intelligence,
London: John Murray (2001).
 2 SOFT POWER, THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE ROOTS… 25

counterpart organisations in other countries should they share mutual

goals. This is an area that has only recently gained scholarly attention.
Priscilla Roberts highlights the ways in which the SIS Hong Kong
Department established links with moderates in the Communist Chinese
government during the 1970s.8 Moreover, Pearse Redmond charts the
CIA’s relationship with the Hollywood film industry from the early twen-
tieth century up to the present day. He examines how, during the Second
World War, the Office of Strategic Services, the CIA’s forerunner, openly
collaborated with American film studios in the production and funding of
films that supported the American war effort. Developing these links fur-
ther during the Cold War’s early stages, the CIA covertly continued this
practice, assisting in the production of films that skewed the political mes-
sages behind George Orwell and Graham Greene’s novels.9
The third form of soft power relevant to this monograph is propa-
ganda. This is a contentious term. Andrew Yarrow claims it is the ‘selling’
of ideas domestically and overseas. He suggests that, from a foreign policy
perspective, political elites manipulate popular opinion to cement or
increase support for their approach to international affairs.10 Such a defini-
tion, however, fails to acknowledge propaganda’s complex tenets. Kenneth
Osgood agrees that shaping the views of the public is key but notes the
importance of truth to propaganda’s effectiveness. Campaigns should be
based on facts, even if these have been taken out of context. Osgood pro-
ceeds to note the importance of having a broad conception of propa-
ganda. It is not just present in radio broadcasts, literature and films but
also in cultural initiatives and attractions.11 Equally, the Yarrow conception
fails to recognise that propaganda is a two-way process. Such policies, as
Nick Cull attests, involve both the shaping and listening to public opinion.
He accordingly recommends that the term public diplomacy be used
instead. It lacks the negative connotations of the term propaganda, which
implies that political elites have manipulated or imposed certain ideas and

8
Priscilla Roberts, ‘Rebuilding a Relationship: British Cultural Diplomacy Towards China,
1967–1980’, in: Greg Kennedy and Christopher Tuck (eds) British Propaganda and Wars of
Empire: Influencing Friend and Foe, 1900–2010, Abingdon: Routledge, 192–194 (2014).
9
Pearse Redmond, ‘The Historical Roots of CIA-Hollywood Propaganda’, The American
Journal of Politics and Sociology, 76/2, 280 (2017).
10
Andrew Yarrow, ‘Selling a New Vision of America to the World: Changing Messages in
Early U.S. Cold War Print Propaganda’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 11/4, 9 (2009).
11
Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War: Eisenhower’s Secret Propaganda Battle at Home and
Abroad, Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 22–24 (2006).
26 D. WAINWRIGHT

arguments on their target audiences. Public diplomacy, moreover, sug-

gests that actors have taken on board the views of their target audiences,
using these perspectives in the framing, and shaping, of initiatives.12
Public diplomacy, however, does not just underpin propaganda efforts.
It is key to the success of most soft power initiatives. According to Jan
Melissen, public diplomacy describes foreign policy approaches that target
both the public and non-state actors. It seeks to alter foreign perceptions,
influence domestic audiences, promote the integration of cultures and
encourage bilateral business dealings. Successful public diplomacy makes
use of ‘short run’ instruments such as press releases and radio broadcasts,
as well as long-term educational and cultural programmes.13 William Rugh
explains the workings of public diplomacy. He claims that political elites
elucidate the aims of these initiatives and both embassy officials and non-­
state actors strive to achieve these objectives.14 Concurring, Laura
Belmonte argues that actors must initially explain their decisions to tar-
gets. They can then proceed to finance and encourage pressure groups and
other organisations to protest and advocate in favour of these norms, val-
ues and ideas.15
Certain factors, however, undermine the effectiveness of soft power
initiatives. The money and hegemonic capabilities of Britain and the
United States, as Peter Von Ham concedes, do not guarantee success.16
Focusing on US soft power in the Arab world, Hosam Matar explores the
factors driving popular suspicion of the United States in the region. To
counter supposed Communist—and latterly Islamic Fundamentalist—
threats, the United States has directly intervened in the affairs of Arab
states. In doing so, the Americans undermine many of their soft power
initiatives in the region, many of which promote democracy and human
rights. Moreover, Matar explains the problem of the American ‘deaf ear’.
In formulating and delivering soft power initiatives, policymakers assume

12
Nicholas Cull, The Cold War and the United States Information Agency: American
Propaganda and Public Diplomacy During the Cold War, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 5–7 (2003).
13
Jan Melissen, New Public Diplomacy: Soft Power in International Relations, Basingstoke:
Palgrave Macmillan, 5 (2005).
14
William Rugh, American Encounters with Arabs: The “Soft Power” of US Public Diplomacy
in the Middle East, London: Praeger, 28–30 (2006).
15
Laura Belmonte, Selling the American Way: US Propaganda and the Cold War,
(Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 56 (2008).
16
Peter Von Ham, Social Power in International Politics, Abingdon: Routledge, 72 (2010).
 2 SOFT POWER, THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE ROOTS… 27

it is a one-way process. Many in the Arab world are under the impression
that the United States assumes a supposed moral and intellectual authority
over other actors in the region, imposing their values and ideas on others.17
Outside the US government’s control, Matar states that the actions of
other states regionally and internationally can undermine the effectiveness
of American soft power. Countries and peoples in the Arab world have
historically taken defensive measures against US cultural and public diplo-
macy overtures. They have imposed Internet and media restrictions and
provided clandestine support to paramilitary and terrorist groups opposed
to the United States. Other prominent global powers—such as the United
Kingdom, France, Russia and China—may also devise soft power initia-
tives, competing with those of the United States and crowding it out.
Indeed, Matar argues that the United States has failed to grasp the struc-
tural complexities of the Arab world. He claims that American policymak-
ers have failed to appreciate the importance of Islam to societies here, as
well as failed to recognise the fragmented nature of Arab cultures.18
Matar’s critique brings the question of ‘culture’ to the heart of the
debate on soft power. In Bound to Lead, Nye treats American values as
universal, presuming all peoples and nations are attracted to these norms
and ideas. This Western centrism is not a unique observation. Analysing
American attempts to project US values in East Asia, Michael Hunt high-
lights the same mentality. He explains how attempts of American mission-
aries and business figures to export US-style freedom and liberty to the
region were used to justify the failed intervention on the side of the
Chinese Nationalists during the 1940s. The ‘Luce vision’ also failed to
appreciate the societal complexities of East Asia. Here, there was a suspi-
cion of individualism, a value for order and a view that US prescriptions of
change were paternalistic at best and destabilising at worst.19 Equally, Nye
fails to consider that the exertion of soft power is a two-way process. As
Edward Lock attests, Bound to Lead encourages scholars to focus on the
agent exercising soft power. Not enough attention is therefore paid to the
target, which does more than just receive. Their response to the soft power

17
Hosam Matar, ‘Limits of US Soft Power in the Arab World (2003–2015)’, Contemporary
Arab Affairs, 9/3, 428–444 (2016).
18
Ibid., 436–438.
19
Michael Hunt, ‘East Asia in Henry Luce’s “American Century”’, Diplomatic History,
23/2, 321–323 1999).
28 D. WAINWRIGHT

overtures of others is shaped by public opinion, the actions of non-state

actors and the social and economic actions of states other than the agent.20
It was not until the early-to-mid twentieth century, though, that the
United States and United Kingdom formalised their soft power and cul-
tural diplomacy programmes. Prior to this, they relied on non-state actors
and the transnational spread of ideas to promote their norms, values and
ideas to foreign publics. They aimed to not only expand their informal
empires and acquire new territories but also open new markets for domes-
tic products. Notable groups include religious organisations, like the
Women’s Christian Temperance Union, and American exhibitors, show-
casing technological and cultural items to European audiences.21 For
Britain it was in the years prior to the Second World War’s outbreak that
its government considered the possibility of creating formalised state-run
institutions to devise and implement cultural diplomacy. In 1934, the
Foreign Office established the British Council. Operating overseas, either
through embassies or office buildings, the institution sought to inform
foreign publics about British norms, values and lifestyles. Key to this was
its English language courses, which enhanced students’ linguistic skills,
while also showcasing the way of life in the United Kingdom.22 To give the
British Council’s activities greater authenticity, Foreign Office figures dis-
tanced themselves from the institution. However, it sponsored its initia-
tives while also providing funding so that it could establish offices in cities
across the globe. The government department’s decision to expand
Britain’s cultural diplomacy programmes overseas was motivated by its
desire to bolster British commerce, as well as by the rise of totalitarian
regimes across Europe. Fascist governments in Germany and Italy, as well
as the Communist Soviet regime, were increasingly peddling propaganda
demonstrating their strength and highlighting Britain’s global decline.
20
Edward Lock, ‘Soft Power and Strategy: Developing a “Strategic” Conception of
Power’, in: Inderjeet Parmar and Michael Cox (eds) Soft Power and US Foreign Policy:
Theoretical, Historical and Contemporary Perspectives, Abingdon: Routledge, 32–33 (2010).
21
Jon Miller and Gregory Stanczak, ‘Redeeming, Ruling and Reaping: British Missionary
Societies, the East India Company, and the India-China Opium Trade’, Journal for the
Scientific Study of Religion, 48/2, 332–333 (2009); Robert Rydell and Rob Kroes, Buffalo
Bill in Bologna: The Americanisation of the World, 1869–1922, Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 101–108 (1994); Ian Tyrell, Reforming the World: The Creation of America’s
Moral Empire, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 4–7 (2010).
22
Edward Corse, A Battle for Neutral Europe: British Cultural Propaganda During the
Second World War, London: Bloomsbury (2014); Frances Donaldson, The British Council:
The First 50 Years, London: Johnathan Cape Limited (1984).
 2 SOFT POWER, THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE ROOTS… 29

Foreign Office figures sought to use the British Council’s activities to

counter this perception, combating the propaganda activities of these
states.23
Britain’s advocacy of cultural diplomacy further expanded during the
Second World War. Having transmitted radio broadcasts overseas since
1932, the BBC’s activities in this field increased exponentially in the early
years of this conflict. The broadcaster introduced services in all the major
languages of Europe, the British Empire and countries of geostrategic
interest. The BBC Persian Service was a case in point. Established in 1941,
its twice-daily Farsi news and current affairs programming sought to foster
Iranian support for Britain’s wartime efforts, while also informing and
educating listeners on British culture. From its inception, its transmissions
proved particularly popular in Iran. Surveys undertaken by the BBC in the
country, as well as letters sent to the broadcaster in London, highlighted
that many Iranians trusted the Persian Service’s coverage over domestic
news content.24 The success of these broadcasts in promoting Britain over-
seas encouraged the British government to make cultural diplomacy a key
tenet of its approach to world affairs after the Second World War. In July
1946, the Deputy Prime Minister, Herbert Morrison, published a white
paper calling for the BBC overseas services to be editorially independent
yet funded by the Foreign Office. Such an arrangement, he argued, would
ensure that its broadcasts would not contradict government policy while
also appearing to foreign publics as if the BBC was not an instrument of
the British state. The report received parliamentary assent, forming an
integral part of the 1947 Charter that outlined how the BBC was struc-
tured and funded.25
While sponsoring and influencing policies of institutions such as the
British Council and the BBC, the Foreign Office also implemented cul-
tural initiatives of its own. In January 1948, it established the

23
Donald Birn, ‘The War of Words: The British Council and Cultural Propaganda in the
1930s’, Peace and Change, 14/2, 183–185 (1989).
24
Emma Robertson, ‘“I Get a Real Kick Out of Big Ben”: BBC Versions of Britishness and
on the Empire and General Overseas Service, 1932–1948’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio
and Television, 28/4, 467 (2008); Annabelle Sreberny and Massoumeh Torfeh, ‘The BBC
Persian Service 1941–1979’, Historical Journal of Film, Radio and Television, 28/4,
524–525 (2008).
25
Alban Webb, ‘Constitutional Niceties: Three Crucial Dates in Cold War Relations
Between the BBC External Services and the Foreign Office’, Historical Journal of Film,
Radio and Television, 28/4, 558–559 (2008).
30 D. WAINWRIGHT

IRD. Operating from within the Foreign Office until its 1977 close, this
open-source intelligence agency coordinated the production and dissemi-
nation of British Cold War propaganda. In particular, the IRD strove to
counter pro-Communist publications, discredit the Soviet Union and pro-
mote British values domestically and overseas. Its officials sought to
achieve these aims by working with prominent individuals and organisa-
tions at home and abroad who also opposed Communism.26 In the Middle
East, for example, the IRD provided media outlets in the region wary of
Communism and Arab nationalism with relevant material. Between 1951
and 1953, it supplied the Jordanian government backed–radio station, the
Hashemite Broadcasting Service, with anti-Soviet content. The IRD also
supplied articles to pro-Western Egyptian, Iraqi and Syrian newspapers.
Many of these publications criticised Nasser, highlighted the Soviet
Union’s aggressive expansionism in the Middle East and extolled Britain’s
virtues.27 Beyond Middle Eastern affairs, IRD officials cooperated with the
US State Department to produce and disseminate anti-Communist propa-
ganda when their motives converged. As both countries’ governments
were concerned about the spread of Communism in Southeast Asia, UK
and US officials worked together to devise a psychological programme for
the region. To ensure a streamlined operation, each agency focused their
efforts on a particular area. As the IRD had more experience and contacts
in Singapore and Hong Kong, its officials focused their subversive activi-
ties on these territories and their surroundings. State Department figures,
on the other hand, paid greater attention to proceedings on the Korean
Peninsula, Taiwan and China.28
Indeed, it was by the Cold War’s early stages that the United States
became increasingly interested in cultural diplomacy. Prior to this, its
activities in this field had been confined to the overseas radio transmissions
of the Voice of America (VOA). Established in 1942, its broadcasts, in
English and 40 other languages, initially targeted citizens living in Latin

26
Andrew Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–1953: The
Information Research Department, Abingdon: Routledge, 102–103 (2004); Alban Webb,
‘Auntie Goes to War Again: The BBC External Services, the Foreign Office, and the Early
Cold War’, Media History, 12/2, 117 (2006).
27
James Vaughan, ‘“Cloak Without Dagger”: How the Information Research Department
Fought Britain’s Cold War in the Middle East, 1948–1956’, Cold War History, 4/3,
61–62 (2004).
28
Tony Shaw, ‘The Information Research Department of the British Foreign Office and
the Korean War, 1950–1953’, Journal of Contemporary History, 34/2, 279–280 (1999).
 2 SOFT POWER, THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE ROOTS… 31

America and Europe. The VOA aimed to foster resentment towards Nazi
political parties and occupying German forces, respectively. The United
States’ role in liberating North Africa, Southern Europe and East Asia
enabled the VOA to expand. The American government authorised the
building of transmitters in all three regions, enabling radio broadcasts to
reach new audiences. Such an accelerated expansion in its formative years
made the VOA crucial to the United States’ attempts to combat Soviet
propaganda after 1945. As its transmitters were placed across the globe,
the radio broadcaster was perfectly poised to communicate to overseas
audiences the pitfalls of Communism and the socio-economic benefits of
siding with America.29
With the Cold War’s onset, however, senior figures within the Truman
administration had become increasingly dissatisfied with this informal
arrangement. They feared that the work of businesses, religious groups
and mass culture in promoting America overseas was minuscule in com-
parison to the anti-US ideology espoused and disseminated by the Soviet
state. To better promote America overseas, the US government increas-
ingly looked towards formalising cultural diplomacy, giving them greater
control over the scale, funding and nature of the endeavours pursued. In
January 1948, the US Congress approved the Smith-Mundt Act. The leg-
islation enacted into law the provision of greater funding for state-­
sponsored soft power initiatives more broadly, specifically in the fields of
propaganda and cultural diplomacy. It provided the State Department,
and its constituent overseas embassies, monies to open information cen-
tres, produce broadcast films and print literature. While much of this
aimed at swaying foreign publics away from Communism, its content also
extolled the virtues and values of America.30
The Smith-Mundt Act was the impetus behind President Harry
Truman’s ‘Campaign for Truth’. Launched in April 1950, this was the
United States’ first sustained, unified attempt to combat Communist pro-
paganda and promote America overseas. The campaign was influenced by
the arguments outlined in National Security Council Document 68 (NSC
68), which had been approved by Truman several weeks before. The aim,
therefore, was to contain Communism, through strengthening the will of
the United States and its allies to resist Soviet propaganda, as well as

29
Gary Rawnsley, ‘The Campaign of Truth: A Populist Propaganda’, in: Gary Rawnsley
(ed) Cold War Propaganda in the 1950s, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 33 (1999).
30
Yarrow, ‘Selling a New Vision of America to the World’, 20–22.
32 D. WAINWRIGHT

outlining the faults of the USSR and its satellite states to the people resid-
ing in these nations.31 The VOA played a pivotal role in achieving these
objectives. Targeting citizens beyond the Iron Curtain, its programming
was increasingly critical of the Soviet Union. In tandem with the VOA’s
activities, the State Department established the United States Information
Service (USIS) to conduct all its subversive and propaganda activities. The
in-house agency operated through USembassies across the globe, publish-
ing and disseminating anti-Communist propaganda, while also translating
American books and films into foreign languages.32
The nature and scale of US cultural diplomacy was further developed
during the Eisenhower administration’s first year. Building on his prede-
cessor’s ‘Campaign for Truth’, President Dwight D. Eisenhower sought
to make this aspect of foreign policy central to the United States’ approach
to the Cold War. He had two motives for doing so. First, during his com-
mand of the Allied forces in Europe during the Second World War,
Eisenhower had come to see the merits of cultural diplomacy. Not only
was it cheaper than the use of tanks and guns, but it was also less costly in
terms of lives. Second, there was an increased need to foster public sup-
port for American initiatives. The early years of Eisenhower’s presidency
dovetailed with a period in which technological progress had made infor-
mation and media more accessible. Such developments had resulted in
audiences at home and abroad becoming much more politically aware and
active.33
Upon entering office, Eisenhower established the Jackson Committee.
Comprised of national security officials, intelligence figures and individu-
als within the presidential administration, the committee analysed and
evaluated America’s cultural and propaganda initiatives. Its final June
1953 report called for, among other things, an organisation under the
State Department’s auspices to oversee all American cultural and propa-
ganda campaigns.34 Eisenhower used the Jackson Committee’s findings as

31
Defty, Britain, America and Anti-Communist Propaganda, 1945–1953, 140–141;
Rawnsley, ‘The Campaign of Truth’, 35–36.
32
William Scott Lucas, Freedom’s War: The US Crusade Against the Soviet Union,
1945–1956, Manchester: Manchester University Press, 74–76 (1999).
33
Kenneth Osgood, Total Cold War, 6–8; Shawn Parry-Giles, ‘The Eisenhower
Administration’s Conceptualisation of the USIA: The Development of Overt and Covert
Propaganda Strategies’, Presidential Studies Quarterly, 24/2, 265 (1994).
34
The report of the President’s Committee on International Information Activities (the
Jackson Committee), 30 June 1953, FRUS, 1952–1954, Volume II, part 2.
 2 SOFT POWER, THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE ROOTS… 33

a justification to expand and institutionalise the USIS, establishing the

USIA in August 1953. Reporting to the State Department, this institution
strove to explain and advocate US policies to overseas audiences; provide
information about American officials and initiatives to foreign publics; fos-
ter cultural and economic ties between the peoples and businesses of
America with their overseas counterparts; and advise the US government
on how foreign peoples will receive American policies and overtures.35
The USIA maintained a formal presence in cities across the globe. It over-
saw and coordinated all USIS activities, with the department being insti-
tutionalised and provided with greater autonomy from US embassies and
consulates. The agency would often strive to achieve its objectives through
exhibitions showcasing the American way of life, translating US books and
Hollywood films into foreign languages and by offering English language
teaching courses.36

The ‘Special Relationship’ and the Cold War

in the Middle East

The ‘special relationship’ shared between Britain and the United States is
a key element of Anglo-American foreign policy. Both countries’ similar
visions for the post-war international system became apparent towards the
Second World War’s end. Eager to be the main economic beneficiaries of
the post-1945 world order, the United Kingdom and United States estab-
lished global institutions and treaties to encourage free trade. The 1944
Bretton Woods system agreed by Japan, Australia, North American and
Western European powers maintained favourable currency exchange rates,
tying the US dollar to the value of gold. The agreement here also led to
the establishment of the World Bank, an institution that promoted foreign
investment and international trade by providing loans to developing world
countries. Just three years later, the success of these initiatives encouraged
the Bretton Woods signatories, among others, to agree to the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT). The treaty called for the reduc-
tion of trade barriers to foster free global trade.37

35
Sixth progress report on NSC 59/1, ‘the foreign information programme and psycho-
logical warfare planning’, DDEL, White House Office, NSC Series, Policy Papers.
36
Parry-Giles, ‘Eisenhower Administration’s Conceptualisation’, 271.
37
Eric Helleiner, Forgotten Foundations of Bretton Woods: International Development and
the Making of the Postwar Order, Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 29–31 (2014).
34 D. WAINWRIGHT

The Cold War’s onset consolidated the sense of an Anglo-American

‘special relationship.’ Having annexed Eastern Europe and imposed
Communist governments on the region’s nations, UK and US officials
feared that the Soviet Union desired to further expand its influence. The
British and American governments, moreover, were concerned that the
Soviet Union’s emphasis on state ownership would jeopardise their
attempts to foster a world economy driven by low tariffs and free trade.38
Developments on the world stage by the late 1940s exacerbated their con-
cerns. On 22 September 1949, the Soviet Union successfully tested an
atomic bomb, a capability only the US had hitherto possessed. Having
used such weapons on the Japanese cities of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in
August 1945, American officials presumed it would be 10–15 years before
the Soviets possessed nuclear capabilities. Now that the USSR had access
to atomic bombs, the United States could no longer rely on its supposed
superior weapons arsenal to deter and contain the Soviet Union.39 Further
shaking Anglo-American interests and influence on the world stage was
the October 1949 ‘loss’ of mainland China to Communism. Since 1927,
left-wing revolutionaries led by Mao Tse-tung had wrestled for control of
the country with US-backed Nationalists fronted by Chang Kai-shek.
Presuming the latter would emerge victorious, American and British offi-
cials assumed China would play a vital role in fighting the Cold War in
Southeast Asia. The country’s ‘loss’ to Communism, combined with
Mao’s February 1950 signing of the Treaty of Sino-Soviet Friendship,
meant that the United Kingdom and United States had to play a larger
role in combating Communism in Asia.40
In response to these Cold War developments, American and British
officials further cemented their geopolitical ties. They regarded the Anglo-­
American ‘special relationship’ as the most efficient way to overcome

38
John Lewis Gaddis, The United States and the Origins of the Cold War, New York: Oxford
University Press, 283 (2000); Richard Wevill, Britain and America After World War II:
Bilateral Relations and the Beginnings of the Cold War, London: Bloomsbury, 5–7 (2012);
Lorenz Luthi, Cold Wars: Asia, The Middle East and Europe, Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press (2020).
39
Campbell Craig and Sergey Radchenko, The Atomic Bomb and the Origins of the Cold
War, Yale: Yale University Press, 73–75 (2008).
40
Deborah Kaple, ‘Agents of Change: Soviet Advisers and High Stalinist Management in
China, 1949–1960’, Journal of Cold War Studies, 18/1, 5–7 (2016); Lorenz Luthi, The
Sino-Soviet Split: Cold War in the Communist World, Princeton: Princeton University Press,
24–31 (2008).
 2 SOFT POWER, THE ‘SPECIAL RELATIONSHIP’ AND THE ROOTS… 35

Soviet-inspired Communism. Through sharing similar foreign policy per-

spectives, the United Kingdom and United States could also exert com-
bined diplomatic pressure on other global actors or persuade or coerce
them to do their bidding.41 Both countries, notably, worked together to
circumvent the 1948–1949 Soviet blockade of Berlin. The USSR’s
embargo was in response to Anglo-American attempts to reform and
strengthen Germany’s economy. UK and US officials approved the supply
of food, coal, water and medicine, to the city’s people by air, until the
Soviets reopened the routes into the city.42 Likewise, to deter and contain
Soviet incursions in Asia and Africa, the United Kingdom and United
States maintained a military presence in these regions. The British, thanks
to their naval base in the Persian Gulf, focused on the defence of the
Middle East and North Africa. The Americans, in part motivated by their
desire to bolster their standing in the Pacific, concerned themselves with
preserving Southeast Asia from Communism.43 Beyond military matters,
the British SIS and the American CIA worked closely together to subver-
sively undermine pro-Communist governments and share intelligence.44
At the outset of their collaborative efforts during the Second World
War, both countries were prominent global powers. As the post-war era
progressed, however, it became increasingly clear that the United States
was the ‘senior partner’. The disparity in Anglo-American relations can be
explained by both countries’ contrasting fortunes after 1945. An imperial
power for the previous two centuries, Britain was now facing political and
economic decline. In seeking to secure a greater number of overseas ter-
ritories, the United Kingdom had overstretched itself.45 The Second World
War highlighted the British Empire’s unsustainability. The cost of protect-
ing Britain’s borders, as well as mounting military campaigns in Europe,
North Africa and Asia, forced the UK government to accept considerable
loans from their American counterparts. An inability to juggle repayments

41
David Reynolds, ‘A “Special Relationship”? America, Britain and the International
Order Since the Second World War’, International Affairs, 62/1, 1–20 (1985).
42
Daniel Harrington, Berlin on the Brink: The Blockade, Airlift and the Early Cold War,
Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 293–295 (2012).
43
William Taylor Fain, American Ascendance and British Retreat in the Persian Gulf
Region, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 4–6 (2008).
44
Aldrich, The Hidden Hand, 55.
45
Piers Brendon, The Decline and Fall of the British Empire, London: Vintage, 52 (2008);
Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850–1995, London:
Routledge, 344–347 (2008).
36 D. WAINWRIGHT

with the cost of their global commitments forced the British to begin
relinquishing their overseas territories and responsibilities. In 1947, UK
officials were forced to concede to their American counterparts that they
could no longer provide military and economic assistance to the Greek
and Turkish governments. Fearful that both countries would succumb to
Communism, US President Harry Truman devised the Truman Doctrine.
He asked Congress for permission to provide Greece and Turkey with
military and economic support in Britain’s place.46
In contrast, having been a regional power with considerable standing in
East Asia and Latin America since the nineteenth century, the United
States was now a superpower with a global reach. The country emerged
from the Second World War as the world’s best performing economy, with
its government’s success in establishing a post-war world order enhancing
the United States’ global standing. The country’s involvement in interna-
tional affairs was boosted further by its determination to combat
Communism globally. To prevent the Soviet Union from expanding its
influence into Western Europe, US officials agreed in 1948 to implement
the Marshall Plan. To dissuade the region’s people from turning to
Communism, the programme pledged considerable economic aid and
expertise to rebuild war-torn Western Europe.47 America’s commitment
to fight the Cold War globally was enshrined by 1950 when Truman
approved NSC 68. Established in 1948, the National Security Council
(NSC) met to discuss pressing foreign policy and domestic issues. Meetings
were comprised of White House, Cabinet, State Department, intelligence
and military figures, with policy papers and proposals produced because of
their discussions.48 Fully titled ‘US objectives and programmes for national
security’, NSC 68 called for the United States to commit to containing
Communism by involving itself in world affairs. It was only through
American involvement across the globe that the Soviet Union’s aggressive,
expansionist tendencies could be curtailed. When initially presented with
the document in April 1950, Truman baulked at the recommendations’
financial cost. Communist North Korea’s decision to invade the US-backed

46
David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World Power in the Twentieth
Century, London: Routledge, 52 (1991).
47
Melvyn Leffler, A Preponderance of Power: National Security, the Truman Administration
and the Cold War, Stanford: University of Stanford Press, 182–185 (1992).
48
Elizabeth Spalding, The First Cold Warrior: Harry Truman, Containment, and the
Remaking of Liberal Internationalism, Lexington: University of Kentucky Press, 231 (2006).
Another random document with
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kultaesineitä, mutta jätti kymmenen kertaa kallisarvoisemmat
pikkuesineet ottamatta. Hän otti myös yhtä ja toista itselleen
muistoksi, mutta siitä enemmän edempänä. Tehtyään tämän
kauhean teon hän poistui samaa tietä kuin oli tullutkin. Ei
seuraavana päivänä, jolloin asiasta nousi hälinä, eikä koskaan
myöhemmin koko hänen elämänsä aikana kenenkään päähänkään
pälkähtänyt kohdistaa epäluuloja todelliseen tihutyön tekijään! Eikä
kukaan tietänyt hänen rakkaudestaankaan vainajaan, sillä hän oli
aina ollut luonteeltaan harvapuheinen ja juro, eikä hänellä ollut
ketään ystävää, jolle olisi avannut sydämensä. Häntä pidettiin
yksinkertaisesti murhatun tuttuna eikä aivan läheisenäkään, sillä
viimeisten kahden viikon aikana hän ei ollut käynyt tämän luona.
Ruvettiin heti epäilemään vainajan palvelijana olevaa maaorjaa
Pjotria, ja kaikki asianhaarat vahvistivat tätä epäluuloa, sillä tämä
palvelija tiesi, eikä vainajakaan ollut sitä salannut, että emäntä aikoi
antaa hänet sotamieheksi, koska hänen oli talonpojistaan annettava
rekryyttejä ja koska Pjotr oli yksinäinen mies ja sitäpaitsi
huonokäytöksinen. Oli kuultu Pjotrin äkäpäissään juopuneena
kapakassa uhanneen tappaa emäntänsä. Kaksi päivää ennen
emäntänsä kuolemaa oli Pjotr karannut talosta ja elänyt kaupungilla
tietymättömissä. Murhan jälkeisenä päivänä hänet löydettiin
maantieltä aivan kaupungin luota sikahumalassa, taskussaan veitsi
ja oikea kämmen jostakin syystä veren tahrimana. Hän väitti veren
tulleen nenästään, mutta häntä ei uskottu. Sisäköt myönsivät
tehneensä itsensä syypäiksi siihen, että olivat olleet keinuissa ja että
ulko-ovi kuistissa oli ollut lukitsematta siihen asti, kunnes he
palasivat kotiin. Ilmeni vielä monta muutakin tämänkaltaista seikkaa,
ja niiden nojalla otettiin viaton palvelija kiinni. Hänet vangittiin, ja
oikeudenkäynti alkoi, mutta viikon kuluttua vanki sairastui
kuumeeseen ja kuoli sairaalassa tajuihinsa tulematta. Siihen asia
päättyi, kaikki jäi Jumalan huostaan, ja kaikki, niin tuomarit ja
esivalta kuin yhteiskuntakin, jäivät vakuutetuiksi siitä, että rikosta ei
ollut tehnyt kukaan muu kuin kuollut palvelija. Mutta tämän jälkeen
alkoi rangaistus.

Salaperäinen vieras, joka nyt oli ystäväni, kertoi minulle, että

alussa hänellä ei juuri ollenkaan ollut omantunnon vaivoja. Hänen oli
pitkän aikaa paha olla, mutta ainoastaan sen tähden, että oli
tappanut rakkaan naisen, että tätä ei enää ollut olemassa, että
tappaessaan hänet oli tappanut lempensäkin, intohimon jäädessä
edelleen palamaan hänen veressään. Mutta että hän oli vuodattanut
viatonta verta ja että hän oli tappanut ihmisen, sitä hän ei silloin juuri
ollenkaan ajatellut. Ajatus, että hänen uhristaan olisi tullut toisen
puoliso, tuntui hänestä mahdottomalta, ja sentähden hän oli pitkät
ajat tunnossaan vakuutettu siitä, ettei ollut voinut menetellä toisin.
Häntä vaivasi alussa jonkin verran palvelijan vangitseminen, mutta
vangin pikainen sairastuminen ja kuolema rauhoittivat häntä, sillä
aivan ilmeisesti tämä (niin hän ajatteli silloin) ei ollut kuollut
vangitsemisen johdosta eikä pelästyksestä, vaan vilustuksesta
johtuneeseen tautiin, jonka hän oli saanut karkumatkoillaan
maatessaan koko yön sikahumalassa kostealla maalla. Varastetut
esineet ja rahat eivät häntä paljoa vaivanneet, sillä (niin hän ajatteli
edelleen) varkaus ei ollut tapahtunut voitonhimosta, vaan sen
tarkoituksena oli ollut johtaa epäluulot toisaalle. Varastettu
rahamäärä oli taas vähäinen, ja tämän määrän sekä vielä paljon
enemmän hän lahjoitti kaupunkiimme perustettavaa vaivaistaloa
varten. Hän teki sen vartavasten rauhoittaakseen omaatuntoaan
varkauden johdosta, ja omituista kyllä, hän sai todellakin mielelleen
rauhan joksikin, vieläpä melkoisen pitkäksi aikaa, — hän kertoi itse
minulle siitä. Sitten hän antautui uutterasti virkatoimiin, pyrki itse
huolia tuottavaan ja vaikeaan tehtävään, joka vei häneltä parin
vuoden ajan, ja lujaluontoinen kun oli, melkein unohti mitä oli
tapahtunut; kun se muistui hänen mieleensä, niin hän koetti olla sitä
kokonaan ajattelematta. Hän alkoi harjoittaa hyväntekeväisyyttä, teki
paljon aloitteita ja uhrasi paljon varoja meidän kaupungissamme, tuli
tunnetuksi pääkaupungeissakin, valittiin Moskovassa ja Pietarissa
sikäläisten hyväntekeväisyysyhdistysten jäseneksi. Mutta yhä
enemmän alkoi hänen ajatuksiaan askarruttaa tuska, joka oli hänelle
ylivoimainen. Hän mieltyi erääseen kauniiseen ja järkevään tyttöön ja
meni pian naimisiin tämän kanssa toivoen saavansa naimisellaan
karkoitetuksi yksinäisyytensä surumielisyyden sekä astumalla
uudelle tielle ja täyttämällä hartaasti velvollisuutensa vaimoaan ja
lapsiaan kohtaan irtautuvansa kokonaan vanhoista muistoista. Mutta
kävikin aivan päinvastoin kuin hän oli odottanut. Jo avioliiton
ensimmäisenä kuukautena alkoi häntä lakkaamatta kiusata ajatus:
»Vaimoni rakastaa minua, mutta entä jos hän saisi tietää?» Kun
vaimo tuli ensimmäisen kerran raskaaksi ja ilmoitti hänelle tämän,
niin hän äkkiä huolestui: »Annan hengen, mutta olen itse riistänyt
toiselta hengen.» Tuli lapsia: »Kuinka minä uskallan rakastaa,
opettaa ja kasvattaa heitä, kuinka voin puhua heille hyveestä: minä
olen vuodattanut verta.» Lapset kasvavat suloisina, tekee mieli
hyväillä heitä: »Minä en voi katsoa heidän viattomia, kirkkaita
kasvojaan; en ole sen arvoinen.» Viimein alkoi hänen eteensä
uhkaavana ja katkerana astua hänen murhaamansa uhrin veri, sen
nuori, tuhottu elämä, veri, joka huusi kostoa. Hän alkoi nähdä
kamalia unia. Mutta hänellä oli luja sydän, ja hän kesti tuskan kauan:
»Sovitan kaikki tällä salaisella kärsimykselläni.» Mutta turha oli
tämäkin toivo: mitä pitemmälle aika kului, sitä kovemmaksi tuli
kärsimys. Yhteiskunnassa alettiin häntä kunnioittaa hänen
hyväntekeväisyytensä tähden, vaikka kaikki pelkäsivätkin hänen
ankaraa ja synkkää luonnettaan, mutta kuta enemmän häntä
kunnioitettiin, sitä sietämättömämmäksi kävi hänen olonsa. Hän
tunnusti minulle aikoneensa tappaa itsensä. Mutta sen asemesta
alkoi hänen mieleensä kangastella toinen unelma, — unelma, jota
hän alussa piti mahdottomana ja järjettömänä, mutta joka lopulta niin
imeytyi hänen sydämeensä, että hän ei voinut sitä reväistä irti. Hän
unelmoi tämmöistä: hän nousee, astuu kansan eteen ja ilmoittaa
kaikille tappaneensa ihmisen. Kolmisen vuotta hän oli hautonut tätä
haavetta, se väikkyi hänen mielessään alati eri muodoissa. Viimein
hän alkoi koko sydämestään uskoa, että ilmoittamalla rikoksensa
hän ehdottomasti lääkitsee sielunsa ja saa rauhan lopullisesti. Mutta
tultuaan tästä vakuutetuksi hän tunsi sydämensä kauhistuvan, sillä
miten hän panisi sen toimeen? Silloin sattui tuo tapaus minun
kaksintaistelussani. »Teitä katsellessani olen nyt tehnyt päätökseni.»
Katson häneen.

»Saattoiko todellakin», huudahdin hänelle käsiäni yhteen lyöden,

»niin pieni tapahtuma synnyttää teissä tuommoisen
päättäväisyyden?»

»Päätökseni on ollut syntymässä kolme vuotta», vastaa hän

minulle, »ja teidän tapauksenne antoi sille vain sysäyksen. Teitä
katsellessani minä soimasin itseäni ja aloin kadehtia teitä.» Hän
lausui tämän minulle melkein tylysti.

»Mutta eihän teitä uskota», huomautin. »Siitä on kulunut

neljätoista vuotta.»

»Minulla on todistuksia, sangen hyviä. Esitän ne.»

Minä aloin silloin itkeä ja suutelin häntä.

 »Ratkaiskaa minulle yksi asia, yksi asia», sanoi hän minulle (aivan
kuin kaikki nyt olisi riippunut minusta), »vaimo, lapset! Vaimoni
kenties kuolee surusta, ja lapset, vaikka eivät menetäkään
aatelisarvoa eivätkä omaisuuttaan, — ovat kuitenkin pakkotyövangin
lapsia kaiken ikänsä. Ja millaisen muiston, millaisen muiston
jätänkään heidän sydämiinsä itsestäni!»

Olen vaiti.

»Erota heistä, jättää iäksi? Sehän on iäksi, iäksi.»

Istun ääneti ja luen itsekseni rukousta. Nousin viimein, minua oli

alkanut peloittaa.

»No mitä?» hän katsoo minuun.

»Menkää», — sanon, — »ilmoittakaa ihmisille. Kaikki menee

ohitse, totuus yksin jää. Lapset ymmärtävät suuriksi kasvettuaan,
kuinka paljon jaloutta oli suuressa päättäväisyydessänne.»

Hän lähti silloin luotani niinkuin todellakin olisi tehnyt päätöksensä.

Mutta kuitenkin hän kävi sen jälkeen luonani yli kahden viikon aikana
aivan joka ilta, valmistautui yhä eikä päässyt päätökseen. Hän kidutti
sydämeni pahanpäiväiseksi. Saapuu joskus lujana ja sanoo
liikutettuna:

»Tiedän, että paratiisi alkaa minulle, alkaa heti, kun teen

ilmoitukseni. Neljätoista vuotta olen ollut helvetissä. Tahdon kärsiä.
Otan kärsimyksen ja alan elää. Vääryydellä voi mennä maailman
läpi, mutta ei palata takaisin… Nyt en uskalla rakastaa lähimmäistäni
enkä edes lapsianikaan. Herra Jumala, ymmärtäväthän lapseni
kenties, mitä kärsimykseni ovat minulle maksaneet, eivätkä tuomitse
minua! Jumala ei ole voimassa, vaan totuudessa.»

»Kaikki ymmärtävät teidän sankaritekonne», sanon hänelle, »jos

eivät ymmärrä nyt, niin ymmärtävät myöhemmin, sillä te olette
palvellut korkeinta totuutta, maallisen yläpuolella olevaa…»

Ja hän lähtee luotani ikäänkuin lohdutettuna, mutta seuraavana

päivänä hän tulee taas äkkiä ilkeänä, kalpeana, puhuu pilkallisesti:

»Joka kerta kun tulen teille, te katsotte niin uteliaana: Vieläkäänkö,

muka, ei ole ilmoittanut? Odottakaa, älkää kovin halveksiko. Ei sitä
ole niin helppoa tehdä kuin teistä näyttää. Kenties en ollenkaan
teekään sitä. Ettehän te silloin mene ilmiantamaan minua, vai mitä?»

Mutta minä en suinkaan uskaltanut katsoa häntä

ymmärtämättömän uteliaasti, vaan pelkäsinpä katsahtaakin häneen.
Olin niin kiusaantunut, että olin sairas, ja sieluni oli kyynelien
vallassa. En saanut enää unta öisin.

»Tulen», jatkaa hän, »vaimoni luota. Ymmärrättekö, mitä vaimo

on? Kun läksin, huusivat lapset minulle: 'Hyvästi, isä, tulkaa pian
takaisin lukemaan kanssamme Lukemisia Lapsille.' Ei, te ette
ymmärrä tätä! Toisen hätä ei lisää älyä.»

Hänen silmänsä alkoivat säkenöidä, huulet vavahtelivat. Äkkiä hän

löi nyrkkinsä pöytään, niin että sillä olevat esineet hypähtelivät, —
hän oli niin lempeä mies, ensikertaa hänelle sattui tämmöistä.

»Ja onko tarpeellista?» hän huudahti. »Onko se tarpeellista?

Eihän ketään tuomittu, ei ketään lähetetty minun sijastani
pakkotyöhön, palvelija kuoli tautiin. Vuodattamastani verestä ovat
rangaistuksena minulle olleet kärsimykseni. Eikä minua uskotakaan,
ei mitään todistuskappaleitani uskota. Onko tarpeellista ilmoittaa,
onko tarpeellista? Vuodattamani veren tähden olen valmis
kärsimään tuskia vielä koko elämäni ajan, kunhan vain en vie
vaimoni ja lasteni onnea. Onko oikein tuhota heidät itseni mukana?
Emmeköhän me erehdy? Missä tässä on totuus? Ja ymmärtävätkö
ihmiset tämän totuuden, antavatko he sille arvoa, kunnioittavatko he
sitä?»

»Hyvä Jumala!» ajattelen itsekseni, »hän ajattelee ihmisten

kunnioitusta tämmöisenä hetkenä!» Ja niin sääli tuli minun silloin
häntä, että olisin ollut valmis jakamaan hänen kohtalonsa vain
tehdäkseni hänen olonsa helpommaksi. Huomaan hänen olevan
aivan kuin poissa suunniltaan. Minä kauhistuin, sillä minä ymmärsin
en vain järjelläni, vaan elävällä sielullani, mitä tuommoinen
päättäväisyys maksaa.

»Ratkaiskaa toki kohtaloni!» huudahti hän taas.

»Menkää ja ilmoittakaa», kuiskasin minä hänelle. En jaksanut

lausua sitä ääneen, mutta kuiskaukseni oli luja. Otin pöydältä
evankeliumin venäläisen käännöksen ja näytin hänelle Johanneksen
evankeliumin 12:nnen luvun 24:ttä värssyä:

»Totisesti, totisesti sanon minä teille: ellei maahan pudonnut nisun

jyvä kuole, niin se jää yksinänsä; mutta jos se kuolee, niin se tuo
paljon hedelmätä.» Olin juuri ennen hänen tuloaan lukenut tämän
paikan.

Hän luki. »Totta on», sanoo, mutta hymyilee katkerasti. »Niin,

näissä kirjoissa», sanoo vähän vaiti oltuaan, »on ihmeellisiä asioita.
On helppo työntää ne nenän alle. Ja kuka onkaan ne kirjoittanut,
ihmisetkö tosiaankin?»

»Pyhä Henki on kirjoittanut», sanon.

»Teidän on helppo laverrella», hymähti hän vielä, mutta nyt jo

miltei vihamielisesti. Otin taas kirjan, avasin siitä toisen paikan ja
näytin hänelle Hebrealaisepistolan 10:nnen luvun 31:ttä värssyä.
Hän luki: »Hirmuista on langeta elävän Jumalan käsiin.»

Hän luki sen ja viskasi samassa kirjan pois. Koko hänen ruumiinsa
alkoi vavista.

»Hirmuisen värssyn», sanoo, »valitsittekin, muuta ei voi sanoa.»

Hän nousi tuoliltaan. »No», sanoo, »hyvästi, kenties en tule enää…
paratiisissa tapaamme. Siitä on siis neljätoista vuotta, kun 'lankesin
elävän Jumalan käsiin', — niin siis näitä neljäätoista vuotta
nimitetään. Huomenna pyydän noita käsiä päästämään minut irti…»

Tahdoin syleillä ja suudella häntä, mutta en uskaltanut, — hänen

kasvonsa olivat niin vääristyneet, että oli vaikeata niitä katsoakin.
Hän lähti ulos. Herra Jumala, ajattelin minä, mihin on ihminen
lähtenyt! Laskeuduin polvilleni jumalankuvan eteen ja vuodatin
hänen puolestaan kyyneliä Pyhälle Neitsyelle, ainaiselle puoltajalle
ja auttajalle. Oli kulunut noin puoli tuntia siitä, kun olin kyynelsilmin
rukoillut, ja oli jo myöhäinen yön hetki, noin kello kahdentoista
tienoissa. Äkkiä näen oven avautuvan, ja hän astuu taas sisälle.
Minä hämmästyn.

»Missä olette ollut?» kysyn häneltä.

 »Minä», hän sanoo, »minä luullakseni unohdin jotakin… kaiketi
nenäliinan… No, vaikka en olekaan mitään unohtanut, niin
antakaahan istahtaa.»

Hän istuutui tuolille. Seison hänen edessään. »Istuutukaa», hän

sanoo, »tekin». Minä istuuduin. Istuimme noin kaksi minuuttia, hän
katsoi minuun kiinteästi ja hymähti äkkiä, muistan sen, sitten nousi,
syleili minua voimakkaasti ja suuteli…

»Muista», hän sanoo, »miten tulin sinun luoksesi toistamiseen.

Kuuletko, muista se!»

Ensimmäisen kerran hän sinutteli minua. Sitten hän poistui.

»Huomenna», ajattelin.

Niin tapahtuikin. En tietänyt sinä iltana, että seuraava päivä sattui

olemaan hänen syntymäpäivänsä. Minä en ollut voinut sitä
keneltäkään kuulla. Sinä päivänä hänellä joka vuosi oli paljon
vieraita, sinne saapui koko kaupunki. Saapuivat nytkin. Ja silloin
päivällisen jälkeen hän astuu huoneen keskelle kädessä paperi —
asianmukainen ilmoitus viranomaisille. Ja koska hänen esimiehensä
olivat siellä saapuvilla, niin hän luki ääneen paperin kaikille
kokoontuneille, ja siinä oli koko rikos kuvattu yksityiskohtaisesti.
»Julmurina erotan itseni ihmisten yhteydestä, Jumala on lähestynyt
minua», hän lopetti kirjoituksensa, »tahdon kärsiä!» Samassa hän toi
esille ja pani pöydälle kaikki, millä aikoi todistaa rikoksensa ja mitä
oli säilyttänyt neljätoista vuotta: murhatun kultaesineet, jotka hän oli
anastanut johtaakseen epäluulot pois itsestään, nimittäin murhatun
kaulasta otetun medaljongin ja ristin, — medaljongissa vainajan
sulhasen kuva, murhatun muistikirjan ja lopuksi kaksi kirjettä:
sulhasen kirjeen murhatulle, jossa hän ilmoittaa pian palaavansa, ja
vainajan vastauksen tähän kirjeeseen, jonka hän oli aloittanut ja
jättänyt keskeneräisenä pöydälle lähettääkseen sen seuraavana
päivänä. Molemmat kirjeet oli murhaaja ottanut mukaansa, — miksi?
Miksi hän oli säilyttänyt niitä neljätoista vuotta, sen sijaan että olisi
hävittänyt ne langettavina todistuskappaleina? Ja kävi näin: kaikki
hämmästyivät ja kauhistuivat, eikä kukaan tahtonut uskoa, vaikka
kaikki olivat kuunnelleet tavattomalla mielenkiinnolla, mutta pitäen
kaikkea sairaan puheena; ja muutaman päivän kuluttua oli yleisenä
mielipiteenä kaikissa taloissa, että miesparka oli menettänyt
järkensä. Viranomaisten ja tuomarien oli pakko ryhtyä asiaan, mutta
se pysähtyi heidänkin käsissään alkuunsa: vaikka todisteiksi tuodut
esineet ja kirjeet panivatkin ajattelemaan, niin tultiin tässäkin siihen
johtopäätökseen, että jos nämä todistuskappaleet osoittautuisivatkin
oikeiksi, niin yksistään niiden perusteella ei kuitenkaan voisi nostaa
lopullista syytettä. Olihan mahdollista, että hän oli saanut kaikki
nämä esineet vainajalta itseltään tämän tuttuna ja hyvässä
luottamuksessa. Sain muuten kuulla, että monet surmatun tutut ja
sukulaiset myöhemmin totesivat esineet oikeiksi ja että tässä
suhteessa ei ollut mitään epäilemistä. Mutta tämän jutun ei oltu
sallittu nytkään päästä oikealle tolalle. Viiden päivän kuluttua tuli
kaikkien tietoon, että tuo niin paljon kärsinyt mies oli sairastunut ja
että hänen henkensä oli vaarassa. Mihin tautiin hän oli sairastunut,
sitä en voi selittää: puhuttiin sydämen toiminnan häiriintymisestä,
mutta saatiin tietää, että paikalle kutsutut lääkärit potilaan vaimon
pyynnöstä olivat tarkastaneet myös hänen sielullisen tilansa ja tulleet
siihen päätökseen, että alkava mielenhäiriö oli todettavissa. Minä en
ilmaissut mitään, vaikka kimppuuni käytiinkin kyselyin, mutta kun
tahdoin mennä häntä katsomaan, niin monet minua kovasti moittivat,
varsinkin hänen vaimonsa: »Tehän», sanoi hän minulle, »saatoitte
hänet pois tasapainosta, hän oli jo aikaisemminkin synkkä, ja viime
vuonna kaikki huomasivat hänessä tavatonta kiihtymystä ja hän
käyttäytyi omituisesti, ja juuri silloin te syöksitte hänet turmioon: te
olette hänen kanssaan lukemalla pannut hänen päänsä pyörälle, hän
istui luonanne kokonaisen kuukauden.» Eikä vain hänen vaimonsa,
vaan kaikki kaupunkilaiset kävivät kimppuuni ja syyttivät minua: »Te
olette syynä kaikkeen», sanovat. Minä olen vaiti, mutta iloitsen myös
sielussani, sillä näin Jumalan epäämättömän armon kohdanneen
miestä, joka oli noussut itseänsä vastaan ja itseään rangaissut. Enkä
voinut uskoa, että hän oli menettänyt järkensä. Viimein päästettiin
minutkin hänen luokseen, hän oli itse sitä hartaasti halunnut
sanoakseen minulle jäähyväiset. Astuin sisälle ja näin heti, että ei
vain hänen päivänsä, vaan tunnitkin olivat luetut. Hän oli heikko,
keltainen, kädet vapisevat, hän läähättää, mutta on lempeän ja
iloisen näköinen.

»Se on täytetty!» lausui hän minulle. »Jo kauan olen halunnut

nähdä sinua, miksi et ole tullut?»

En ilmoittanut hänelle, että minua ei ollut päästetty hänen

luokseen.

»Jumala on säälinyt minua ja kutsuu luokseen. Tiedän nyt

kuolevani, mutta tunnen riemua ja rauhaa ensimmäisen kerran niin
monen vuoden jälkeen. Heti tunsin sielussani paratiisin, kun täytin
sen, mitä piti. Nyt uskallan rakastaa lapsiani ja suudella heitä. Minua
ei uskota eikä kukaan ole uskonut, ei vaimoni eivätkä tuomarini;
eivät lapsenikaan koskaan usko. Näen siinä Jumalan armon lapsiani
kohtaan. Kuolen, ja nimeni jää heille tahrattomaksi. Mutta nyt
aavistan jo Jumalan, sydän riemuitsee kuin paratiisissa… olen
täyttänyt velvollisuuteni…»

Hän ei voi puhua, hengitys tukahtuu, hän puristaa lämpimästi

kättäni, katsoo minua palavin silmin. Mutta emme keskustelleet
kauan, hänen vaimonsa pistäytyi tavan takaa meitä katsomassa.
Hän ennätti kuitenkin kuiskata minulle:

»Muistatko, miten minä silloin toistamiseen tulin luoksesi

sydänyöllä? Käskin sinua vielä panemaan sen mieleesi. Tiedätkö,
miksi silloin tulin? Tulin tappaakseni sinut!»

Minä hätkähdin.

»Minä läksin silloin luotasi pimeään, kuljeskelin kaduilla ja

kamppailin itseni kanssa. Ja äkkiä tunsin sinua kohtaan niin suurta
vihaa, että sydämeni tuskin jaksoi sitä kestää. 'Nyt', ajattelen, 'hän
yksin on sitonut minut ja on minun tuomarini, en voi enää vapautua
huomisesta rangaistuksestani, sillä hän tietää kaikki.' Ei se ollut sitä,
että olisin pelännyt sinun ilmiantavan minut (ei ollut ajatustakaan
sinnepäin), vaan ajattelin: kuinka voin katsoa häneen, jos en
ilmianna itseäni? Ja vaikka sinä olisit ollut maailman ääressä, mutta
elossa, niin se ei olisi muuttanut asiaa; se ajatus oli sietämätön, että
sinä olit elossa ja tiedät kaikki sekä tuomitset minut. Vihasin sinua,
niinkuin sinä olisit ollut kaiken alkuna ja kaikkeen syypää. Palasin
silloin luoksesi, muistan, että pöydälläsi oli tikari. Istuuduin ja pyysin
sinua istuutumaan ja ajattelin kokonaisen minuutin. Jos olisin
tappanut sinut, niin olisin joka tapauksessa ollut turmion oma tämän
murhan tähden, vaikka en olisikaan ilmaissut entistä rikostani. Mutta
sitä minä en ollenkaan ajatellut enkä tahtonut ajatella sillä hetkellä.
Minä vain vihasin sinua ja tahdoin kostaa sinulle kaikin voimin
kaikesta. Mutta Jumalani voitti perkeleen sydämessäni. Tiedä
kuitenkin, että sinä et koskaan ole ollut lähempänä kuolemaa.»

Viikon kuluttua hän kuoli. Hänen ruumisarkkuaan saattoi hautaan

koko kaupunki. Esipappi puhui liikuttavia sanoja. Murehdittiin
kaameata sairautta, joka oli päättänyt hänen päivänsä. Mutta koko
kaupunki nousi minua vastaan, kun hänet oli haudattu, eikä minua
enää tahdottu nähdä taloissa vieraana. Tosin jotkut, alussa
harvalukuiset, mutta sitten yhä useammat, alkoivat uskoa tosiksi
hänen selityksiään ja rupesivat yhä enemmän käymään luonani ja
kyselemään suurella uteliaisuudella ja halulla: sillä ihminen näkee
mielellään vanhurskaan lankeemuksen ja hänen häpeänsä. Mutta
minä olin vaiti ja poistuin kohta koko kaupungista, ja viiden
kuukauden kuluttua Herra Jumala soi minun astua varmalle ja
oikealle tielle, ja minä siunaan näkymätöntä kättä, joka minut niin
selvästi tälle tielle ohjasi. Mutta paljon kärsinyttä Jumalan palvelijaa
Mikaelia olen muistanut rukouksissani joka päivä hamaan tähän
päivään saakka.

3.

Luostarinvanhin Zosiman keskusteluja ja opetuksia

e) Venäläisestä munkista ja hänen mahdollisesta merkityksestään

— Isät ja opettajat, mitä on munkki? Sivistyneessä maailmassa

tämän sanan lausuvat meidän päivinämme toiset ivallisesti ja jotkut
haukkumasananakin. Ja sitä enemmän, kuta pitemmälle aika kuluu.
Totta on, ah, totta, että paljon on munkkien joukossa laiskoittelijoita,
hekumoitsijoita, nautiskelijoita ja julkeita kulkureita. Näitä osoittavat
sivistyneet maallikot: »Te olette laiskureita ja hyödyttömiä
yhteiskunnan jäseniä, elätte toisten työstä, olette häpeämättömiä
kerjäläisiä.» Ja miten paljon kuitenkin onkaan munkkien joukossa
nöyriä ja lempeitä, semmoisia, jotka hartaasti haluavat yksinäisyyttä
ja palavaa rukousta hiljaisuudessa. Näitä mainitaan vähemmän,
vieläpä heistä kokonaan vaietaankin, ja kuinka
hämmästyttäisiinkään, jos sanon, että nämä lempeät ja
yksinäisyydessä rukousta haluavat kenties kerran vielä tuottavat
pelastuksen Venäjän maalle! Sillä totisesti he ovat hiljaisuudessa
valmistuneet »päivään ja hetkeen, kuukauteen ja vuoteen».
Kristuksen kuvan he säilyttävät siihen saakka yksinäisyydessään
loistossansa ja väärentämättömänä, Jumalan totuuden puhtaudessa,
semmoisena kuin sen ovat jättäneet ikivanhoista ajoista isät,
apostolit ja marttyyrit, ja tarpeen tullen he tuovat sen esille maailman
horjuvalle totuudelle. Tämä on suuri ajatus. Idästä tämä tähti
nousee.

Tämmöinen on ajatukseni munkista, ja onko se väärä, onko se

pöyhkeilevä? Katsokaa maallisia ja koko Jumalan kansan yläpuolelle
asettunutta maailmaa, eikö siinä ole Jumalan kuva ja Hänen
totuutensa väärentynyt? Heillä on tiede, mutta tieteessä vain se,
mikä riippuu tunteista. Mutta hengen maailma, ihmisolennon
korkeampi puoli, on kokonaan kielletty, karkoitettu jonkinmoisella
voitonriemulla, vieläpä vihamielisyydellä. Maailma on julistanut
vapauden, varsinkin viime aikoina, ja mitä me näemme tässä heidän
vapaudessaan: ainoastaan orjuutta ja itsemurhaa! Sillä maailma
sanoo: »Sinulla on haluja ja sentähden tyydytä niitä, sillä sinulla on
samat oikeudet kuin kaikkein ylhäisimmillä ja rikkaimmilla ihmisillä.
Älä pelkää tyydyttää niitä, vaan lisääkin niiden lukumäärää», — siinä
on maailman nykyinen oppi. Siinä he näkevät vapauden. Ja mikä on
seurauksena tästä oikeudesta lisätä halujaan? Rikkailla
eristäytyneisyys ja henkinen itsemurha, köyhillä — kateus ja murha,
sillä oikeudet on annettu, mutta keinoja halujen tyydyttämiseen ei
vielä ole osoitettu. Vakuutetaan maailman ajan kuluessa yhä
enemmän yhtyvän ja liittyvän veljelliseksi kokonaisuudeksi sen
johdosta, että se lyhentää välimatkat, siirtää ilman halki ajatuksia;
voi, älkää uskoko tuommoiseen ihmisten yhtymiseen. Käsittäessään
vapauden halujen lisäämiseksi ja nopeaksi tyydyttämiseksi he
väärentävät luontonsa, sillä he synnyttävät itsessään paljon
järjettömiä ja typeriä pyyteitä, tottumuksia ja mielettömiä
päähänpistoja. He elävät vain kadehtiakseen toisiaan,
hekumoidakseen ja pöyhkeilläkseen. Päivällisten, huviretkien,
vaunujen, virka-arvojen ja orjamaisten mielistelijäin merkitys on heille
niin suuri, että he pitävät semmoista välttämättömyytenä, jonka takia
uhraavat henkensä, kunnian ja ihmisrakkauden saadakseen tämän
välttämättömyyden tyydytetyksi, vieläpä tappavat itsensä, jos eivät
voi sitä tyydyttää. Niillä, jotka eivät ole rikkaita, näemme samaa, kun
taas köyhät tukahduttavat halujensa tyydyttämättömyyden ja
kateutensa juoppouteen. Mutta pian he viinan asemesta juovat verta,
siihen heitä johdetaan. Minä kysyn teiltä: onko tämmöinen ihminen
vapaa? Olen tuntenut erään »aatteen soturin», joka itse kertoi
minulle, että kun hänelle vankilassa ei annettu tupakkaa, niin sen
riistäminen kiusasi häntä niin, että hän oli vähällä mennä ja hylätä
»aatteensa», kunhan vain saisi tupakkaa. Mutta tämmöinen sanoo:
»Menen taisteluun ihmisyyden puolesta.» No, mihin tuollainen
menee ja mihin hän kelpaa? Ehkä tekemään jonkin nopeasti
suoritettavan teon, mutta kauan hän ei jaksa kestää. Eikä ole ihme,
että he vapauden asemesta ovat joutuneet orjuuteen, ja sen sijaan,
että palvelisivat veljesrakkautta ja ihmisten yhdistymistä, päinvastoin
ovat joutuneet erottautuneisuuteen ja eristäytyneisyyteen, niinkuin
nuoruudessani minulle puhui salaperäinen vieraani ja opettajani. Ja
sentähden maailmassa yhä enemmän ja enemmän sammuu ajatus
ihmiskunnan palvelemisesta, ihmisten veljeydestä ja
yhteenkuuluvaisuudesta, ja totisesti tätä ajatusta ivataankin, sillä
kuinka voi luopua tottumuksistaan, minne menee tuo vanki, jos hän
on siinä määrin tottunut tyydyttämään lukemattomia halujaan, jotka
hän itse on keksinyt? Hän on eristäytynyt, eikä hänellä ole mitään
tekemistä kokonaisuuden kanssa. Ja niin on jouduttu siihen, että
tavaraa on kertynyt enemmän, mutta iloa on alkanut olla vähemmän.

Toista on munkin ura. Kuuliaisuudelle, paastolle ja rukoukselle

nauretaan, mutta niissä kuitenkin on tie oikeaan, todelliseen
vapauteen: minä leikkaan itsestäni pois liiat ja tarpeettomat halut,
taltutan ja alistan kuuliaisuuden alle itserakkaan ja ylpeän tahtoni, ja
saavutan sillä tavoin Jumalan avulla, hengen vapauden ja sen
mukana myös hengen ilon! Kumpi heistä on soveliaampi
kohottamaan suuren ajatuksen ja lähtemään sen palvelukseen, —
eristäytynyt rikas mies vaiko tämä esineitten ja tottumusten
tyrannivallasta vapautunut henkilö? Munkkia moititaan hänen
eristäytymisestään: »Sinä olet eristäytynyt pelastaaksesi itsesi
luostarin seinien sisällä ja olet unhottanut veljellisen ihmiskunnan
palvelemisen.» Mutta katsokaamme vielä, kumpi enemmän edistää
veljesrakkautta. Sillä emme me ole eristäytyneitä, vaan he, vaikka he
eivät näe sitä. Mutta meidän joukostamme on jo vanhastaan lähtenyt
kansan toimenmiehiä, miksi siis niitä ei voisi olla nytkin? Samat
nöyrät ja lempeät paastoojat ja vaikenijat nousevat ja lähtevät
suorittamaan suurta työtä. Kansa on Venäjän pelastus. Venäläinen
luostari taas on ikivanhoista ajoista pitänyt yhtä kansan kanssa. Jos
kansa on eristäytynyt, niin silloin mekin olemme eristäytyneitä.
Kansa uskoo meidän tavallamme, mutta henkilö, joka ei usko, ei
meillä Venäjällä saa mitään toimeen, vaikka hän olisi vilpitön
sydämeltään ja nerokas älyltään. Muistakaa tämä. Kansa nousee
ateistia vastaan ja voittaa hänet, ja syntyy yksi oikeauskoinen
Venäjä. Mutta vaalikaa kansaa ja varjelkaa sen sydäntä.
Hiljaisuudessa kasvattakaa sitä. Se on teidän munkki-urotyönne,
sillä tämä kansa on jumalinen.

f) Yhä ja toista herroista ja palvelijoista ja siitä, voivatko herrat ja

palvelijat tulla keskenään henkisesti veljiksi

— Herra Jumala, kuka väittääkään, ettei kansassakin olisi syntiä.

Turmeluksen palo leviää aivan silminnähtävästi, joka hetki, se tulee
ylhäältäpäin. Kansassakin saa valtaa eristäytyneisyys: alkaa olla
pomoja ja kansan nylkyreitä; kauppias haluaa jo yhä enemmän ja
enemmän kunnianosoituksia, pyrkii käymään sivistyneestä, vaikka
hänellä ei ole hituistakaan sivistystä, ja tämän vuoksi hän iljettävästi
hylkii ikivanhoja tapoja, jopa häpeilee isiensä uskoa. Hän käy
ruhtinaitten vieraana, eikä hän kuitenkaan ole muuta kuin
turmeltunut talonpoika. Juoppous on tehnyt kansasta mädän, eikä
kansa enää voi siitä luopua. Entä miten paljon julmuutta perhettä
kohtaan, vaimoa ja lapsiakin kohtaan, — kaikki juoppouden ansiota.
Olen nähnyt tehtaissa jopa kymmenvuotiaita lapsia: heikkoja,
kuihtuneita, kumaraisia, ja jo siveellisesti turmeltuneita.
Tukahduttava sali, jymisevä kone, koko Jumalan päivän työtä,
irstaita sanoja ja viinaa, viinaa, — sitäkö tarvitsee vielä noin pienen
lapsen sielu? Hän tarvitsee aurinkoa, lasten leikkejä ja kaikkialla
valoisan esimerkin sekä edes hivenen rakkautta kohtaansa. Mutta
eihän sitä saa olla, munkit, eihän saa olla lasten kidutusta, nouskaa
ja saarnatkaa siitä pian, pian. Jumala pelastaa Venäjän, sillä vaikka
rahvaanmies onkin paheellinen eikä enää voi irtautua häpeällisestä
synnistä, niin hän kuitenkin tietää, että hänen häpeällinen syntinsä
on Jumalan kiroama ja että hän tekee huonosti silloin, kun tekee
syntiä. Niin että väsymättä kansamme vielä uskoo totuuteen,
tunnustaa Jumalan, itkee liikutettuna. Toisin on ylempien laita. Nämä
tieteen mukaisesti tahtovat saada olonsa oikeudenmukaiseksi
pelkällä järjellänsä, mutta ilman Kristusta, kuten oli ennen, ja he ovat
julistaneet, että ei ole olemassa rikosta, ei ole enää syntiä. Ja onhan
se oikein heidän kannaltaan: sillä jos sinulla ei ole Jumalaa, niin mitä
rikosta silloin voisi olla? Euroopassa kansa nousee jo väkivoimin
rikkaita vastaan ja kansan johtajat johtavat sen kaikkialla vereen ja
opettavat, että sen viha on oikea. Mutta »kirottu on heidän vihansa,
sillä se on julma». Mutta Venäjän pelastaa Jumala niinkuin on
pelastanut jo monta kertaa. Pelastus lähtee kansasta, sen uskosta ja
nöyryydestä. Isät ja opettajat, varjelkaa kansan uskoa, eikä tämä ole
vain haave: koko elämäni ajan minua on hämmästyttänyt suuressa
kansassamme sen suurenmoinen ja todellinen oivallisuus, itse olen
sen nähnyt, itse voin sen todistaa, olen nähnyt ja ihmetellyt, nähnyt
huolimatta syntien saastastakin ja kansamme köyhästä asusta.
Kansamme ei ole orjamainen, vaikka on ollut kaksi vuosisataa
orjana. Vapaa se on muodoltaan ja käytökseltään eikä ole mitään
menettänyt. Eikä se ole kostonhimoinen eikä kateellinen. »Sinä olet
ylhäinen, sinä olet rikas, sinä olet viisas ja lahjakas, — ole vain sitä,
Jumala sinua siunatkoon. Minä kunnioitan sinua, mutta tiedän, että
minäkin olen ihminen. Sillä, että kunnioitan sinua tuntematta
kateutta, sillä minä juuri osoitankin sinun edessäsi ihmisarvoni.»
Totisesti, jos he eivät puhu näin (sillä he eivät vielä osaa sanoa tätä),
niin he menettelevät tällä tavoin, olen sen itse nähnyt, itse kokenut,
ja uskotteko: kuta köyhempi ja alhaisempi meidän venäläinen
miehemme on, sitä enemmän hänessä huomataan tätä
suurenmoista totuutta, sillä rikkaat pomot ja nylkyrit heidän
joukossaan ovat jo suurin määrin turmeltuneita, ja paljon, paljon
tähän on vaikuttanut meidän huolimattomuutemme ja velttoutemme!
Mutta Jumala pelastaa omansa, sillä Venäjä on suuri
nöyryydessään. Haluan hartaasti nähdä ja ikäänkuin näenkin jo
selvästi tulevaisuutemme; sillä tulee niin olemaan, että
turmeltuneinkin pohatta meillä lopuksi alkaa hävetä rikkauttaan
köyhän edessä, mutta köyhä nähdessään tämän nöyryyden
ymmärtää ja myöntää hänelle kaiken, vastaa ilolla ja
ystävällisyydellä hänen jaloon häveliäisyyteensä. Uskokaa, että tämä
tulee lopputulokseksi: siihen se on menossa. Vain henkisessä
ihmisarvossa on tasavertaisuus, ja se ymmärretään ainoastaan
meillä. Jos vain olisi veljiä, niin tulisi myös veljeys, mutta sitä ennen
ei koskaan jaeta omaisuutta. Me säilytämme Kristuksen kuvan, ja se
on loistava kuin kallis timantti koko maailmalle… Niin tapahtuu,
tapahtuu!

Isät ja opettajat, minulle sattui kerran liikuttava tapaus.

Vaellusmatkoillani tapasin kerran K:n kaupungissa entisen
sotilaspalvelijani Afanasin; erostamme oli silloin kulunut kahdeksan
vuotta. Hän näki minut sattumalta toripaikalla, tunsi, juoksi luokseni
ja, hyvä Jumala, miten hän ilostui, suorastaan syöksähti luokseni:
»Isäkulta, herrani, tekö siinä olette? Näenkö todellakin teidät?» Hän
vei minut kotiinsa. Hän oli jo eronnut sotapalveluksesta, mennyt
naimisiin, saanut jo kaksi pienokaista. Hän eli puolisoineen
harjoittamalla pientä kauppaa torilla kantelemalla tavaroita
kanninlaudalla. Hänen huoneensa oli köyhästi sisustettu, mutta se oli
puhdas ja iloinen. Hän pani minut istumaan, viritti tulen
teekeittimeen, lähetti noutamaan vaimoaan, aivan kuin minun tuloni
olisi ollut hänelle juhla. Hän toi lapsensa luokseni: »Siunatkaa,
isäkulta.» — »Minustako olisi siunaajaksi», vastaan hänelle, »minä
olen yksinkertainen ja nöyrä munkki, rukoilen Jumalaa heidän
puolestaan, ja sinun puolestasi, Afanasi Pavlovitš, rukoilen aina, joka
päivä Jumalaa, olen sen tehnyt tuosta päivästä asti, sillä sinusta,
sanon, sai kaikki alkunsa.» Ja minä selitin hänelle sen niinkuin
osasin. Mutta mitäs mies: katsoo minua eikä mitenkään voi käsittää,
että minä, hänen entinen herransa, upseeri, olen hänen edessään
sen näköinen ja semmoisessa puvussa; hän ihan rupesi itkemään.
»Mitä sinä itket», sanon hänelle, »sinä olet unohtumaton mies,
riemuitse mieluummin puolestani hengessä, ystäväni, sillä tieni on
riemukas ja valoisa». Paljoa hän ei puhunut, huokaili vain ja pudisteli
minulle lempeästi päätään. »Entä missä», kysyy, »on teidän
rikkautenne?» Vastaan hänelle: »Annoin luostariin, me elämme
yhteiselämää.» Teetä juotuani aloin hyvästellä heitä, mutta hän toi
minulle äkkiä puoli ruplaa lahjaksi luostarille ja toisen puoliruplasen,
huomaan, hän tunkee minulle kouraan puhuen kiireesti: »Tämä taas
on teille, sanoo, kulkijalle, vaeltajalle, ehkäpä se voi olla teille
hyödyksi, isäkulta.» Otin vastaan hänen puoliruplasensa, kumarsin
hänelle ja hänen vaimolleen ja poistuin ilostuneena ajatellen
kulkiessani: »Kas nyt me molemmat, hän kotonaan ja minä
kulkiessani, huokailemme ja naurahtelemme iloisesti, riemuitsevin
sydämin, sekä nyökäytämme päätämme ja muistelemme, kuinka
Jumala johti meidät kohtaamaan toisemme.» Enkä minä sen
koommin enää nähnyt häntä. Minä olin ollut hänen herransa ja hän
minun palvelijani, mutta nyt, kun me suutelimme toisiamme rakkaasti
ja hengessä liikutettuina, syntyi meidän välillämme suuri inhimillinen
yhteenkuuluvaisuus. Olen paljon ajatellut tätä, ja nyt ajattelen näin:
onko todellakin järjelle niin käsittämätöntä, että tämä suuri ja vilpitön
yhdistyminen voisi kaikkialla tapahtua meidän venäläisten kesken?
Uskon, että se tapahtuu, ja aika on lähellä.

Palvelijoista lisään seuraavaa: muinoin nuorena minä olin usein

vihainen palvelijoille: keittäjätär tarjosi ruoan liian kuumana,
sotilaspalvelija ei puhdistanut pukua. Mutta minua valaisi silloin
yhtäkkiä rakkaan veljeni ajatus, jonka lapsuudessani kuulin hänen
lausuvan: »Olenko minä ensinkään sen arvoinen, että toinen minua