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An Integrative Guide to Consumer Neuroscience
An Integrative Guide to
Consumer Neuroscience
S V EN B RAE UTIGAM AN D P ETER KEN N IN G
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
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© Oxford University Press 2022
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2022
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above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2021951874
ISBN 978–0–19–878993–2
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198789932.001.0001
Printed in Great Britain by
Bell & Bain Ltd., Glasgow
Oxford University Press makes no representation, express or implied, that the
drug dosages in this book are correct. Readers must therefore always check
the product information and clinical procedures with the most up-to-date
published product information and data sheets provided by the manufacturers
and the most recent codes of conduct and safety regulations. The authors and
the publishers do not accept responsibility or legal liability for any errors in the
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Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
To Brigitte
To Maren
Contents
Preface ix
Abbreviations xi
1. The Road to Consumer Neuroscience 1

2. Cognitive Processes and Behaviours 13
3. The Human Brain 32
4. Mathematical Concepts 53
5. Neuroscience Technologies 80
6. Analytical Approaches 107
7. Individual Consumer Neuroscience 136
8. Social Consumer Neuroscience 146
9. Commercial Consumer Neuroscience 155
10. Gender-Related Aspects of Consumer Neuroscience 169
11. Translational Consumer Neuroscience 188
12. Ethics of Consumer Neuroscience 211
13. Future Directions 221
Appendix 229
References 237
Index 265
Preface
These are complex and challenging times, but also extraordinarily interesting and
exciting times, at least from a scientific perspective. As never before, interdiscipli-
nary research is growing across the spectrum, blurring entrenched boundaries that
have existed for hundreds of years while simultaneously building new and diverse
avenues of exploration and thinking. This is perhaps most visible at the junction of
economics, neuroscience, and mathematics, where scholars and practitioners alike
draw on a vast array of theories and experimental approaches in order to understand
the mechanisms and hidden rules underlying and perhaps determining econom-
ically relevant behaviour. A critical, if not the most important, ingredient in these
endeavours are modern brain imaging technologies, which have become sufficiently
accessible and manageable to allow efficient cooperation of researchers coming from
varied backgrounds.
Out of these new developments, the ‘oldest’ academically advanced interdiscipline,
is neuroeconomics, which attempts to systematically integrate neuroscience and ec-
onomics, where the aim is a unified, biology-based theory of human behaviour. One
might be tempted to argue that the application of neuroimaging brings extra com-
plexity to the study of an already difficult problem. This, however, seems not to be
an issue, where growing evidence suggests that modern brain scanning facilitates a
better understanding of the mechanistic processes that subserve human behaviours
and interactions within an economic setting. Following this lead, the field of con-
sumer neuroscience is gaining momentum, and this is what this book is about.
The need for consumer neuroscience derives from the observation that the con-
sumption of goods and services is one of the main drivers of industrialized societies,
critically influencing the overall structure, wealth, and functioning of a nation.
The study of consumer behaviour is complex, ranging from individual to societal
aspects, from the outright commercial to issues of population health. Moreover, the
modern world faces challenges of possibly epic proportions, and humans will need
to address issues of sustainability (of consumption) along more than one dimension.
We strongly feel that any meaningful attempt to advance will necessarily be founded
on rigorous science, and we endeavour here to provide an integrative guide to con-
sumer neuroscience.
In this guide, we have made efforts to balance depth and breadth of material while
tracing the foundations, technologies and methodologies, applications, translational
aspects, and ethics of consumer neuroscience. Given the strong, albeit not exclu-
sive, reliance of the field on neurotechnologies, we have opted for a detailed exposi-
tion of the relevant technologies beyond the often short and sometimes simplifying
descriptions found in textbooks and articles. To this end, we have included a chapter
entirely dedicated to the mathematical concepts related to the measurement,
x Preface
analysis, and interpretation of neuroimaging data. The purpose of this chapter is

to enable students and consumer researchers with, potentially, limited exposure to
mathematics to build towards a deeper understanding of physical and technological
aspects of consumer neuroscience.
Assuming a primarily scientific and descriptive perspective, this book aims at the
aspiring student, the consumer researcher, as well as the marketing practitioner, al-
though this is not a recipe book that could be applied in a straightforward way to
practical problems. Notably, the emphasis here is on enabling the reader to form
an independent view of consumer neuroscience, and perhaps carry out their own
research or refine their practical approach. The reader is explicitly encouraged to
dive deeper into the field and actively help to further chart the territory of consumer
behaviour with respect to experimental approaches and the consolidation of theories.
In writing this book, we have made attempts to reduce chapter interdependencies
without introducing excessive redundancy. As a consequence, some form of reduc-
tionism has been unavoidable on occasion.
We would like to thank Janine Fisher, Jade Dixon and team at Oxford University
Press as well as the team at Newgen Knowledge Works for their patience, advice, and
continuous support in this matter. Our thanks go to the Department of Business
Administration, Management and Marketing, University of Düsseldorf, and the
Department of Psychiatry, University of Oxford, for facilitating mutual visits. We
thank Mirja Hubert and Carina Hütte for collating various material and providing
help with the literature database as well as administrative tasks.
Düsseldorf and Oxford, 2021

Abbreviations
AN anorexia nervosa
ANN artificial neural network
ANS autonomic nervous system
AW approach–withdrawal
BA Brodmann area
BOLD blood oxygenation level dependent
CBD compulsive buying disorder
CMRR common-mode rejection ratio
CNS central nervous system
COMT catechol- O-methyltransferase
CR conditioned response
CS conditioned stimulus
DCM dynamic causal modelling
DHT dihydrotestosterone
DM decision maker
DNA deoxyribonucleic acid
DOT diffuse optical tomography
EEG electroencephalography
EI emotional index
EPSP excitatory postsynaptic potential
FID free induction decay
fMRI functional magnetic resonance imaging
fNIRS functional near-infrared spectroscopy
FT Fair Trade
GABA gamma-aminobutyric acid
GLM general linear model
HMM hidden Markov model
HRF haemodynamic response function
ICA independent component analysis
IPSP inhibitory postsynaptic potential
LR logistic regression
MA mathematical anxiety
MEG magnetoencephalography
MR magnetic resonance
MRI magnetic resonance imaging
mRNA messenger ribonucleic acid
NIR near-infrared
NMR nuclear magnetic resonance
NMSBA Neuromarketing Science and Business Association
OPC oligodendrocyte progenitor cell
PCA principal component analysis
PLV phase locking value
PNS peripheral nervous system
xii Abbreviations
QZE quantum Zeno effect
RF radiofrequency
rTMS repeated transcranial magnetic stimulation
SHOP Savings Hold or Purchase
SMH somatic marker hypothesis
SNP single nucleotide polymorphism
S-O-R stimulus–organism–response
SQUID superconducting quantum interference device
S-R stimulus–response
SSVEP steady-state visually evoked potential
tACS transcranial alternating current stimulation
TD temporal difference
tDCS transcranial direct current stimulation
tES transcranial electric stimulation
TMS transcranial magnetic stimulation
TPJ temporoparietal junction
tRNS transcranial random noise stimulation
UCS unconditioned stimulus
WOM word of mouth
WTA willingness to accept
WTP willingness to pay
1
The Road to Consumer Neuroscience
Within perhaps the last 20 years, under the label of ‘consumer neuroscience’, a
new direction in consumer and marketing research emerged. The idea is to use
insights and methods from neuroscience to better understand consumer behaviour.
Assuming that the audience is mainly unfamiliar with this research direction, the
goal of this introduction is to provide an overview of the definition, the goal, and the
origin of consumer neuroscience. In addition, in this chapter we will briefly sketch
the structure of our comprehensive guide.
1.1 What Is Consumer Neuroscience?
I don’t need to know anything about the hippopotamus.

Unknown Economist
Within recent years, academic research focusing on the interface between

neurosciences, psychology, and economics has experienced a considerable in-
crease in importance (Foxall et al., 1998; Plassmann et al., 2015). The results of
these scientific investigations were embedded in the discovery and development
of new research areas, which today are referred to as neuro-finance, neuro-leader-
ship, consumer neuroscience, decision neuroscience, neuroeconomics, and even
neuromarketing (Plassmann et al., 2015; Shiv et al., 2005). The common objective
of these research works is to integrate neuroscientific findings, theories, concepts,
and—probably above all—methods into the respective economic subdiscipline
(Kenning and Plassmann, 2005; Plassmann et al., 2015). Despite their increasing im-
portance, however, there is still a lack of scientifically substantiated, monographic
textbooks that would allow these new developments to be systematically integrated
into the mostly economic curricula, and thus create an introduction to the subject.
The necessity of systematic integration stems from the fact that human behaviour is
based largely on biological processes. It is therefore not unlikely that a progressive un-
derstanding of the biology underlying human behaviour could provide an opportunity
to better understand and predict human behaviour—and thus also consumer and buyer
behaviour (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1997; Plassmann et al., 2015). According to this brain-as-pre-
dictor hypothesis, it is assumed that neural processes and certain brain structures play a
major role in this (Berkman and Falk 2012). Hence, these processes and structures are in
focus here. However, customer, buyer, and consumer behaviour have been examined pri-
marily from a psychological perspective in recent years. In this context, the human brain
An Integrative Guide to Consumer Neuroscience. Sven Braeutigam and Peter Kenning, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198789932.003.0001
2 An Integrative Guide to Consumer Neuroscience
was metaphorically regarded as a ‘black box’ (Smidts et al., 2014). The ongoing processes
therein were reconstructed theoretically (Howard and Sheth, 1969) and recorded indi-
rectly (e.g. through surveys). Today, however, modern techniques and procedures from
the fields of radiology and biology allow a direct view into the living brain (Kenning et
al., 2007a; Plassmann et al., 2015). Specifically, this holds for the so-called neuroimaging
techniques (Plassmann et al., 2007a; Riedl et al., 2010b).
In general, consumer neuroscience can be seen as a subfield of neuroeconomics
(Plassmann et al., 2015). The aim of neuroeconomic research is the neurobiolog-
ical explanation of human behaviour and the development of a ‘unified theory of
human behaviour’ (Camerer et al., 2005; Foxall, 2008; Glimcher and Rustichini,
2004; Kenning and Plassmann, 2005). In this endeavour, consumer neuroscience
can explicitly be defined as the systematic integration of neuroscientific theories,
methods, and concepts into consumer research (Fugate, 2007; Grosenick et al.,
2008; Lee et al., 2007). In business practice, but even in academic research, the term
‘neuromarketing’ is often used to identify this development, but the label may be a
misnomer (Hubert and Kenning, 2008; Levalois, 2019; Lim, 2018). The term ‘mar-
keting’ is defined as market-orientated corporate management. Accordingly, the
term ‘retail marketing’ describes the concept of market-orientated management of
retailers. The branch of service marketing is concerned with the market-orientated
management of service companies. Given these exemplary uses for the term mar-
keting, the notion of neuromarketing poses an impractical ambiguity because,
strictly speaking, the term neuromarketing would be the market-oriented man-
agement of neurons. We therefore distinguish between consumer neuroscience as
the scientific basis of this approach, and neuromarketing as the application of the
findings from consumer neuroscience within the scope of managerial practice.
In order to present a guide to consumer neuroscience that is both integrative and
accessible to a wider audience, this book is conceptually organized in three parts,
although these are not explicitly declared. In the first part, comprising this and the
following two chapters, important biological, neurophysiological, cognitive, and
behavioural concepts are discussed. This first part makes only a limited number of
forward references to later chapters and is an essential read for anyone new to the
field of consumer neuroscience. The next three chapters cover, to a considerable
depth, relevant mathematical, physical, technological, and analytical concepts. This
part can be read independently of the rest of the book, but there are some moderate
dependencies: Chapter 4 → Chapter 5 → Chapter 6. Readers with little or no prior
exposure to science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) curricula
are encouraged to allocate some time and study this part in detail. Note that in this
part, relevant citations are provided as reading selections following each subsection
instead of inline (‘cite-as-you-write’) citations as in the rest of the book.
The following six chapters constitute the third part, discussing established applica-
tion domains, emergent research fields, translational aspects, and the ethics of con-
sumer neuroscience. The structure of these chapters recognizes the distinction made
in economics between decision theory and game theory, the practitioner’s intention
The Road to Consumer Neuroscience 3
to apply research results for business and/or sales purposes, and the observation that
consumer neuroscience both has an impact on and is influenced by other research
fields, such as organizational sciences, age research, and cultural analysis. Although
attempts have been made to reduce dependencies, the material covered in the third
part draws, at times heavily, on the preceding parts. Finally, a short outline of future
directions of consumer neuroscience in research and practice is presented in the last
chapter. Overall, the book adopts a primarily scientific and descriptive perspective
with the aim to provide the reader with a solid picture of the situations in which con-
sumer neuroscience can make a meaningful contribution to solving practical and/or
normative issues, thereby not negating the importance and appropriateness of clas-
sical approaches and concepts (Fugate, 2007; Lee et al., 2007).
1.2 A Brief History of Consumer Research
The emergence of consumer neuroscience is closely connected to consumer behaviour

research, whose history of origins is related to the development of economic sciences
and especially marketing. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, economists
recognized that predominating purchasing-power models cannot sufficiently ex-
plain consumer behaviour. At the same time, complementary psychological models
and constructs such as attitudes or motives gained in importance. In this context, con-
sumer behaviour was more and more understood to be a complex interaction of eco-
nomic variables (such as prices) and psychological variables (such as brand image).
Even then, it was recognized that a theory based only on economic and psychological
variables is too imprecise to explain the many facets of consumer behaviour. Therefore,
a more interdisciplinary approach to investigate consumer behaviour, such as by
amending social aspects (e.g. role concepts or system theory), was emphasized.
Nonetheless, during its foundation phase, marketing research focused on eco-
nomic theories that primarily considered aspects of distribution policy (Wilkie and
Moore, 2003). It corresponded to the zeitgeist that economic research of psycholog-
ical provenance basically tried to explain the observable behaviour of customers and
consumers with the help of behaviouristic approaches. With the discovery of the
conditioned reflexes by Ivan Pavlov, behavioural scientists got the opportunity to:
experiment following the example of classical, exact natural sciences and many
psychologists cherished a hope to have found the components of behaviour from which
one can construct the colourful cosmos of behaviour. (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1997, p. 15)
The idea of behaviourism is ultimately based on John Locke’s1 assumption that the
human mind is a blank slate at birth and subsequently filled in by personal experience
1 An influential seventeenth-century English philosopher and physician. Note the term behaviourism was coined
in the early twentieth century.

derived from sense perception, implying that human behaviour can completely be
explained as reactions to external stimuli (Skinner, 1978). In this regard, humans
are assumed to be passively responding to the environment. Thus, it is possible to
condition human behaviour in the desired way with rewards and punishments. Even
then, the assumption of a given human nature ran the danger of being disqualified
from being a biological determinist or reductionist (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1997). At the
same time, in anthropology, a cultural relativism emerged that defined culture as
independent from biology and thus also disconnected culture from neurobiology.
In recent years, this approach found its antithesis in so-called cultural neuroscience
(Chiao et al., 2013), which is in turn confronted with collectivistic concepts and the-
ories (e.g. concept of distributed cognition).
The behaviourism investigated the coherence between environment (stimulus)
and observable behaviour (reaction) with the help of clearly defined experiments
(Plomin et al., 1990). The aim was to scientifically describe behaviour by exclu-
sively applying natural scientific methods. The organism was—according to
B.F. Skinner—regarded as a ‘black box’, because it was not possible to directly
observe internal psychological or physiological processes. Instead, behaviour
was considered as a function of a given stimulus (stimulus–response model (S-R
model)) (Kotler and Armstrong, 2010). It is obvious that due to methodological
constraints at this time, neurobiological methods and techniques did not have a
descriptive relevance.
An important concept of economic research was the idea that people always be-
have rationally. Thus, economic research assumed that, according to the model,
people behave in a reasonable way. Closely related to this assumption is the idea of
the Homo oeconomicus which has often been rebutted in recent years and which
was wrongly objurgated. It has often been ignored that it is a straw man argument.
In fact, the idea of the Homo oeconomicus can not only be applied on a descriptive
level, but rather on an ethical or practical-normative level. In this view, the predica-
tion is not how people actually behave, but how they should behave in certain situ-
ations from an economical point of view (Jacoby, 2002). Today this discussion can
be seen to be resolved. In this context the German marketing researchers Richard
Köhler and Manfred Bruhn come to the following postcritical result: ‘Even experi-
mental game theory moved away from the idea of the Homo oeconomicus. In this
regard, it would be desirable if critics of economic disciplines eventually register that
for decades the idea of the Homo oeconomicus is not object of economics anymore’
(Köhler and Bruhn, 2010, p. 5).
With the postulate of market-oriented management, consumer behaviour re-
search was more and more acknowledged to be an important theoretical basis of
marketing management. The idea spread quickly and can today be considered as
commonly accepted. In 1969, the Association for Consumer Research was founded,
and the first consumer behaviour textbooks and courses appeared in the late 1960s
(Engel et al., 1968; Kassarjian and Robertson, 1968). In these early days of con-
sumer research, the most important frameworks were comprehensive models of
consumer behaviour, which were thought to be ‘processual one-way streets’ (Engel

et al., 1968; Howard and Sheth, 1969; Nicosia, 1966). These models of consumer
behaviour primarily focused on activities associated with satisfying consumer
needs and were based on the theoretical (re-)construction of processes inside the
black box. In contrast to the S-R models, these stimulus–organism–response (S-O-
R) models modelled processes inside the organism more systematically with the
help of theoretical considerations. Today, S-O-R models are still known and signif-
icant (Fig. 1.1).
In the literature, partial models of consumer behaviour which only concentrate
on single psychological factors that influence the decision-making process (e.g. acti-
vating components, involvement, etc.) can be differentiated from total models that
try to explain all of the non-observable processes inside the consumer. These total
models had a certain educational value, because they convey an impression about
the complexity of consumer behaviour. However, these total models were also very
confusing. Furthermore, they suggested a static deterministic mechanic that—as far
as we can see—does not exist in reality.
However, a very important total model of consumer behaviour is the model of
Howard and Sheth (1969) that explains cognitive, controlled decisions in a purchase
situation by arranging different variables in certain ways. The model distinguishes
between three groups of variables: observable input (S) and output (R) variables and
the non-observable hypothetical constructs (I) which reflect the buyer’s internal
state. The hypothetical constructs can be divided into perceptual constructs that are
involved in information processing and learning constructs that are associated with
Input (Stimuli) Organism (Black Box) Output (Responses)

Si Oj Rk
• Demography (e.g. age, The decision-making process

gender) and socio- is influenced by:
economic characteristics of
the person (e.g. education, Cognition
income) • Perception • Product choice
• Social environment and • Thinking • Brand choice
social influences (e.g. • Learning • Choice of shopping
reference persons, opinion location
leaders, role models) • Choice of purchase
• Economic environment time
(e.g. the provider’s price Affects • Purchase quantity
conception) • Emotions
• Motives
• Etc.
Observable (manifest) Unobservable (latent) Observable (manifest)
Fig. 1.1 A stimulus–organism–response (S-O-R) model.

Data from Kotler, Armstrong (2009).
Intention
Overt Confidence
search
Attitude
Stimulus
ambiguity Choice Brand
Motives criteria comprehension
Perceptual
Attention bias Satisfaction
Perceptual constructs Learning constructs
Flow of information
Feedback effects
Fig. 1.2 The Howard–Sheth model.
concept formation. Fig. 1.2 depicts the intervening variables inside the organism.
Beside the input and the output variables there are exogenous variables that con-
struct the frame of the purchase process, but are not directly included in the model
(Howard and Sheth, 1969).
Another relevant total model of buying behaviour is the approach of Engel and
colleagues (Engel et al., 1978, 1995). They differentiated between extensive, lim-
ited, impulsive, and habituated buying-decision types that vary in the degree of in-
volvement and risk perception of the consumer. In this model, the decision-making
process can be classified into consecutive phases. The starting point is the need rec-
ognition defined as the difference between the target state and the actual condition.
If the consumer recognized this difference as a problem, the next phase—the search
for information—begins. The decision-making process is completed with the last
phase—the evaluation of different alternatives.
A further approach to model consumer decision-making and to illuminate the
intervening variables is the decision-net approach of James Bettman (1974). This
model constructs networks that graphically depict consumer behaviour. To iden-
tify these networks, typically, an interviewer accompanies the purchase process of
a customer and records everything that the customer experiences and consciously
notices in order to create networks that reflect purchase behaviour. The aim is to
develop a theoretical structure of the black box by directly collecting empirical data
and to spontaneously record cognitive processes (Bettman, 1974).
Besides these exemplary models that attempt to theoretically construct the

processes inside the organism, technological progress, especially within the med-
ical radiological sector, led at the beginning of this century to new possibilities to
measure processes inside the head of the consumer (Zaltman, 2000). Even though
the whole body of the consumer may be of relevance for explaining behaviour, early
researchers primarily focussed on processes inside the brain. It was assumed that the
brain is the central organ for decision-making and that it influences human behav-
iour to a great extent. Thus, there is a legitimate reason to assume that a better under-
standing of processes inside the brain will lead to a better understanding of human
behaviour and human purchase behaviour (Kenning and Plassmann, 2005). This
hope is manifested in the so-called brain-as-predictor hypothesis. This hypothesis
was used by Berkman and Falk (2013) for the first time and can best be described by
the following quote (p. 45):
One goal . . . is, to understand and predict human behaviour. Psychologists have tradition-
ally used self-report measures and performance on laboratory tasks to achieve this end.
However, these measures are limited . . . We argue that current neuroscientific knowledge
has reached a point where it can complement other existing psychological measures in
predicting behaviour and other important outcomes.
1.3 The Origins of Consumer Neuroscience
Efforts to include biological components are not new in consumer research. In fact,
some prominent consumer researchers referred early on to the significance of neu-
roscience and its methodological possibilities (Kroeber-Riel, 1979). At that time,
physiological processes have been detected with different traditional measurement
methods. For example, the first studies to apply electroencephalography (EEG) to
marketing relevant subjects appeared in the 1970s (Krugman, 1971). However, in
general, consumer research has treated biological processes that determine con-
sumer behaviour only marginally for a very long time. Saad (2008) even talks about
a ‘collective amnesia of marketing scholars regarding consumers’ biological and evo-
lutionary roots’. Recent developments in the area of neuroeconomics and consumer
neuroscience prove that marketing research has succeeded in overcoming this am-
nesia (Camerer et al., 2005; Kenning et al., 2007a; Plassmann et al., 2015).
In neuroeconomics, one of the first economic and methodical relevant studies was
conducted by Alan Sanfey and colleagues and was concerned with neural processes
related to decisions during the ultimatum game (Sanfey et al., 2003). This study re-
vealed the potential of neuroeconomics to better explain economic behaviour. It
still has a high impact and has been cited more than 4000 times according to google
scholar.
The principle of the ultimatum game is the following scenario: two players are
asked to share a certain amount of money (e.g. 10€) by mutual agreement. In the
first step, player A starts by making a suggestion on how to divide the money. In the
second step, player B can either accept the offer or refuse the money. If player B does
not agree, both players get nothing. How should player A behave? His success does
not only depend on his own decision but on the behaviour of player B. According to
the axioms of traditional economic theory, player A behaves rationally if he tries to
maximize his gain. At the same time, player B should accept every amount greater
than zero, because from an isolated viewpoint it is better to receive a small amount
than nothing. However, in reality, this scenario almost never exists and shares that
strongly favour player A are often rejected indignantly by player B, irrespective of
the money loss.
Recent approaches explain this at-first-sight irrational behaviour with the idea
that people have an implicit preference for fairness and therefore often suggest 5€
for both players. But how is it possible to track this implicit preference? Is it observ-
able and how can the effect be measured? In order to answer these questions, Sanfey
et al. (2003) asked people to play the ultimatum game inside a magnetic resonance
(MR) scanner. One main finding was that a specific neural process was observable if
participants were confronted with unfair offers and refused these offers compared to
situations that were perceived as fair. An important role for the processing of unfair
offers plays the activity within the insula, a brain region which is often associated
with the processing of aversive emotions (Sanfey et al., 2003).
From the ground-breaking study of Sanfey et al. (2003) several relevant aspects
for neuroeconomic research and consumer neuroscience can be deduced, with re-
gard to both methodology and content. First, with regard to methodology, the study
showed for the first time that functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI) is able
to map processes relevant for economic and marketing research. It proved that the
spatial and temporal resolution of fMRI is sufficient to capture economically rel-
evant decision processes. Furthermore, it became clear that insights from specific
regions of the brain are adequate to enable a reasonable appreciation of fMRI results.
And third, the study showed that fMRI allows the simultaneous recording of making
a decision and measuring associated processes in the brain, thereby establishing a
link between neuronal activation and behaviour in an economically relevant, exper-
imental context.
With regard to content, the study provided evidence that people are able to
apply and integrate several decision-making processes in the same decision sit-
uation. This may be seen as the empirical proof for dual-process models that are
extensively discussed in the literature (Camerer et al., 2005; Strack and Deutsch,
2004). Furthermore, the study showed that unconscious emotions during the
perception of a certain stimulus can have a great impact on the decision-making
process by framing the decision. In this respect, the study also provided the first
insights for the neural mechanisms of the framing effect. Another important result
was that for the emergence of emotions and the perception of unfairness, the cor-
responding player was important. Every time the unfair offers were generated by a
computer, people behaved in a more rational way and exhibited less activation in
the insula region. This result motivated further academic research in the field of
neuro-information-system (“Neuro-IS”), often in cooperation with partners from
industry (e.g. Riedl et al., 2011).
1.4 Why Consumer Neuroscience Is Important
One central assumption of neuroeconomics and consumer neuroscience is that

progress in neuroscientific methods and research will lead to a better explanation of
human behaviour in economic contexts. In this regard, neuroeconomics and con-
sumer neuroscience aim at increasing the explained variance of existing theories and
concepts, by integrating a new theoretic perspective and by applying new methods.
Note that the emphasis on increasing the explained variance is important as con-
sumer neuroscience does not claim to be a replacement for traditional methods, at
least not yet.
This is nicely illustrated in a Quirk’s Media article describing the efforts of two re-
search firms, one specializing in copy testing, the other in brain wave measurement,
who teamed up to examine fast-food TV ads to compare findings from their respec-
tive diagnostic approaches. Using EEG and a picture sort test, the researchers iden-
tified what they called peak moments in the ads, i.e., moments/sequences of high
attention-getting power:
“. . . we learned is that the peak moments identified by the two diagnostics are not always
the same moments . . . [for] 36 commercials, brain wave measurement identified 113 peaks
of arousal and Picture Sorts identified 149, but only 61 of these moments, or roughly half,
were the same moments. What this tells us is that each approach has something to teach
the other about how the brain functions . . . Remember that with brain waves we are meas-
uring the audience response to the total multichannel experience of the commercial -the
pictures plus the words plus the music -while the Picture Sorts focus on the vision part of
the television commercial . . .” (Young and Sands, 2009)
At a descriptive level, one can distinguish between two fields of study: on the one
hand, the area of individual consumer neuroscience aims at explaining the behav-
iour of individual consumers on the bases of neuronal processes. For example, in-
dividual consumer neuroscience investigates how a consumer perceives marketing
relevant stimuli such as prices. On the other hand, the area of social neuroscience is
concerned with human behaviour in social contexts. In modern economies, coop-
eration with other companies and relationships with other people play an important
role in economic workaday life. Social neuroscience investigates, for example, in-
terpersonal trust building, fairness, altruism, and cooperation-relevant problems in
general.
The determination of cortical areas that are stimulated during consumer decision
processes by applying neurological methods offers various advantages over conven-
tional procedures:
1. The approach of consumer neuroscience enables the researcher to reassess ex-

isting theories that theoretically assume different brain mechanisms (e.g. hem-
isphere theory) by investigating the actual brain activations.
2. The observation of the total brain has the potential to yield new, unpredictable
results, and enhances the explorative character of consumer neuroscience. This
is in contrast to measuring the brain activity by recording only one signal, as it
is used, for example, in electrodermal response or eye tracking, which can be
compared to an effort to capture the musical sounds of an orchestra by meas-
uring only the noise level (Kenning et al., 2007a).
3. Concerning the empirical data ascertainment, the observation of brain activity
can offer another, and more objective, perspective: self-assessment methods
that rely on the ability of the respondent to describe and reconstruct feelings
and thoughts are very subjective. Many effects in the human organism that in-
fluence behaviour are not perceived consciously; hence, the cognitive filter of
the test taker may bias the results. For example, a person who has a temperature
may determine that his or her body feels cold, even though the objective meas-
urement of a clinical thermometer indicates that it is not.
4. Strategic behaviour and social desirability, which can confound findings of self-
assessment methods, can be eliminated, given that the participating subjects
have little to no influence on the measurement of their brain activity (Camerer
et al., 2005).
5. A last, but very important, one advantage of determining the cortical stimula-
tion is the simultaneousness of measurement and experiment. Some processes
might not be stable over time, making it very difficult for researcher and partic-
ipant to reconstruct them ex post (Lee et al., 2007).
It may not be immediately apparent, but both individual consumer neuroscience

and social neuroscience already yield relevant implications for theory and practice.
From a managerial perspective these implications can enable companies to further
develop their marketing strategies. With an improved understanding of consumer
behaviour, companies can better satisfy their customer needs (Reimann et al., 2011).
New insights about consumer behaviour and customer needs might in turn reduce
possible inefficiencies in marketing and can help to further develop the research area
of marketing metrics (Patterson, 2008).
The improvement of corresponding theories can also help to improve market seg-
mentation and aid in planning new actions of differentiation (market positioning
and market differentiation) that might be reasonable from a managerial view-
point. In this respect, consumer neuroscience is important for almost all areas
of market-orientated management. A few years ago, the prominent marketing

researchers Ravi Achrol and Phillip Kotler summarized this idea very accurately in
their article ‘Frontiers of the marketing paradigm in the third millennium’:
To be a skilled consumer researcher may mean one has to be half neurophysiologist with
expertise in, for example, fMRI besides the latest in research design and statistical method.
(Achrol and Kotler, 2012, p. 51)
Thus, it is not surprising that the subject has gained in relevance in the public view
and in academic contexts (Fugate, 2007; Hubert and Kenning, 2008; Lee et al., 2007;
Plassmann et al., 2007a). There are many conferences and journals dedicated to
the subject and the number of published studies and articles in leading marketing
journals is steadily increasing (Fig. 1.3). Moreover and notably, the renowned
Association of Consumer Research has established a new content area code for the
field to address novel research approaches.
1.0
0.8
Relative number of publications
0.6
0.4
0.2
0.0
2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 2019 2020
Year
Fig. 1.3 Surge in publications related to consumer neuroscience. Shown is the relative
number of publications between 2001 and 2020. The data are based on a PubMed (https://
pubmed.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov) search using the (Title and/or Abstract) search string: (consumer
AND neuroscience) OR neuromarketing OR ((shopping OR purchase) AND (fmri OR eeg OR
meg)). Here, the total number of publications in 2020 was 47. Note different search strings
typically yield different absolute numbers of hits but the resulting pattern stays qualitatively
the same.
1.5 Consolidating Questions
Q1. How is consumer neuroscience defined?

Q2. What is behaviourism?
Q3. Is consumer neuroscience a new kind of behaviourism?
Q4. What characterizes Bettman’s decision-net approach?
Q5. What is an S-O-R paradigm?
Q6. Why is consumer neuroscience important for consumer research?
2
Cognitive Processes and Behaviours
Consumer neuroscience, as has been pointed out in Chapter 1, draws on different

fields, many of which themselves are still undergoing development. Both traditional
and modern consumer research are reliant on insights gained from psychology. What
is relevant to consumer neuroscience, however, is often difficult if not impossible to
communicate in a standard psychology textbook fashion. Therefore, in this chapter,
we introduce a variety of mainly psychological concepts and theories in an informal
way, interlaced with insights from functional neuroanatomy (see Chapter 3) based on a
partially overlapping categorization most conducive to consumer neuroscience.
2.1 Memory and Learning
There are two phenomena that are particularly important for consumer neuroscience,
namely learning and memory. Both relate strongly to the formation, storage, and re-
trieval of knowledge and experience needed for adequate decision-making. For ex-
ample, customers who want to assess a product need to be able to remember alternative
prices for the comparison and retrieve them at the appropriate time. Another obvious
example are brand memories, typically formed through advertising, in the hope that
customers will thoroughly enshrine a given brand in their memory. The mechanisms
underlying memory and learning have been studied extensively in psychology and the
neurosciences, providing relevant models for consumer neuroscience.
Accordingly, memory and learning are assumed to reflect a coherent interaction
of several systems, each of which is associated, at least to some extent, with specific
activity in segregated brain regions. Thus, rather than being monolithic entities,
memory and learning are somewhat malleable systems, where the type of infor-
mation decrees storage location as well as encoding and retrieval processes (e.g.
Preilowski, 2009; Rolls, 2000). An important model was put forward by Squire,
which assumes that the medial aspects of the temporal lobes are primarily involved
in explicit, or declarative, memory (Fig. 2.1) (Squire, 2004). In contrast, implicit,
or non-declarative, memory comprises various aspects of perception and reflec-
tion. Note that implicit memory does not necessarily require conscious efforts (cf.
Preilowski, 2009, p. 568), making this form of memory of particular importance for
consumer neuroscience (e.g. buying on a whim).
As an illustrative example, when people rehearse a list of several words, one
can examine their explicit memory by asking them to repeat the words learned,
whereas implicit memory can be tested by presenting a few initial letters and asking
An Integrative Guide to Consumer Neuroscience. Sven Braeutigam and Peter Kenning, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press 2022.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198789932.003.0002
Memory
Declarative Non-declarative
Events Procedural Priming Simple

Facts and classical Non-associative
(Skills learning
and perceptual conditioning
habits) learning
Emotional Skeletal
responses responses
Hippocampus Striatum Neocortex Amygdala Cerebellum Reflex

medial temporal lobe pathways
diencephalon
Fig. 2.1 Memory systems in the brain.

Data from cf. Squire, 2004; Thompson, 2001, p. 370.
the subjects to name the word which comes first to their mind (e.g. ‘ba’ in ‘bath es-
sence’; see Thompson, 2001, p. 407). Note the two types of memory are similar to the
concepts of supported and unsupported degree of awareness in market and adver-
tising research (e.g. Trommsdorff and Teichert, 2011).
In more detail, explicit memory encodes information about episodic, semantic,
and factual knowledge (e.g. the typical price of a 400 mL jar of Nutella®). The
content attributed to this type of memory is based on primarily conscious cog-
nitive processes and can be retrieved through a deliberate act of remembering.
As mentioned previously, the medial portions of the temporal lobes are critical,
where the hippocampus (Richardson, 2004; Strange et al., 1999) and the cortical
structures associated with it (e.g. parts of the para-hippocampus) as well as the
amygdala play important roles in the case of emotionally influenced memories (cf.
Richardson, 2004; see also Preilowski, 2009). Damage to these areas only interferes
with the storage of new information and not pre-existing memories, and it is com-
monly assumed that the hippocampus (whose name derives from the Latin term
for seahorse) is only a short-term store for contents of long-term memory stored
somewhere else (e.g. Kandel et al., 1995).
In contrast, implicit memory is more reflexive and of an automatic nature. It forms
slowly (e.g. through practice) and manifests itself in a better accomplishment of the
Cognitive Processes and Behaviours 15
respective task. An example of this is the learning of a certain skilled craftmanship

or a certain athletic performance (e.g. pole vault). In this respect, implicit memory
is pre-semantic. If, for example, you ask people who have specific craft skills to de-
scribe the respective processes, they are often unable to do so and point out that they
‘somehow’ do it and that it is ‘actually quite simple’.
From the previous remarks, it can already be seen that a corresponding memory
performance is usually the result of a learning process of varying intensity. Explicit
memory thereby includes learning processes that involve verbalized knowledge
about people, places, facts, and things. These learning processes typically require
conscious efforts. Implicit memory, on the other hand, relies on forms of percep-
tual and motor learning that do not require conscious attention. Implicit learning
processes can be divided into two main classes: non-associative and associative
learning (Thompson, 2001, p. 375).
Non-associative learning is characterized by the fact that the learning process is
not linked with a particular associative element. Examples of this are all abstract
learning processes. A subtype is imitative learning, which is important for language
acquisition and is partly used in operative communication. Nevertheless, it should
be noted that in developmental psychology there are also opinions that see word ac-
quisition as being associated with an object and a situation.
Associative learning occurs when the test person is confronted once or several
times with a single stimulus (e.g. a brand advertisement (‘ad’) or a price). Here,
again, two types can be distinguished. In habituation (i.e. the acclimatization to a
stimulus), one can observe a decreasing reaction intensity to a certain stimulus over
time. This issue is relatively well described in classical consumer behaviour research
and is discussed, for example, in the context of the so-called habitualized purchasing
decisions. In the opposite case—that is, with an increasing reaction intensity—one
speaks of a sensitization (also pseudo-conditioning). This effect often occurs with
negative, painful stimuli by which the test person has been sensitized in advance. In
certain cases, this effect can overwrite the effect of habituation. This is also called a
dishabituation. In the context of associative learning, there are two significant types
to be distinguished: classical and operant conditioning.
In classical (or Pavlovian) conditioning, learning a relationship between two
stimuli is paramount. The well- known example is the Pavlovian dog, which
associates the familiar bell with a corresponding food supply. The basic principle is
always the same: a conditioned stimulus (CS) is associated with an unconditioned
stimulus (UCS). The CS is a stimulus that normally does not cause a particular re-
action (e.g. the glow of a certain lamp or the chime of a church clock). The UCS, on
the other hand, is a stimulus that provokes a certain reflex reaction of the organism.
When a CS and an UCS are iteratively coupled, the CS increasingly triggers a new re-
sponse called a conditioned response (CR). Depending on the valence of the respec-
tive stimulus, a distinction is made between conditioned appetence or reward (for
positive stimuli such as food) and conditioned aversion (for negative stimuli such as
pain). However, the intensity of the CR decreases when the CS is offered repeatedly
without the UCS. The organism then forgets the linking again. This process of ex-
tinction represents an extremely important adaptive mechanism. At the same time,
it should be noted that the organism does not simply forget the linking, but learns a
new association (Kandel et al., 1995, p. 676). This observation is important regarding
the hypothesis of somatic markers that will be discussed below.
In contrast, operant conditioning is based on trial and error. Occasionally, this
principle is also referred to as learning from success (Eibl-Eibesfeldt, 1997, p. 114).
In contrast to classical conditioning, in which the characteristics of specific reflec-
tive responses to certain stimuli are changed, operant conditioning changes the
frequency of behavioural patterns. One therefore also speaks more aptly of the fact
that operant behaviour is released rather than created (Kandel et al., 1995, p. 678).
In more general terms, reward-associated behaviours tend to be repeated (more
often) at the expense of other, less rewarding, behaviours. In contrast, unpleasant
behaviours are not repeated. This simple model, known in literature as the law of
effects, explains a large part of the behaviour (e.g. Thorndike and Gates, 1930). It has
found its specification in many different theories of buyer and consumer behaviour,
for example, in research on approach-avoidance conflicts (Elliot and Thrash, 2010).
Generally speaking, operant learning has occurred when a certain subsequent stim-
ulus or the removal of a negative stimulus has reliably increased or decreased the
probability of occurrence of a behaviour above the operant level.
Even though at first sight the two types of conditioning appear to be different, it
is assumed that the underlying neural mechanisms are similar. Thus, in both types
temporal aspects play an important role. Advocates of the theory of contiguity
even assume that everything that coincides in time and space relates to each other
(Winkel et al., 2006, p. 95ff.). If, for example, a finger is held in a flame, pain imme-
diately occurs and the finger is pulled back (Thompson, 2001, p. 377). The next time
we see a candle, a corresponding neural reaction occurs. The temporal connection
is called contiguity. It is an indispensable prerequisite for associative learning. The
example of food aversion still to be described shows, however, that other types of
linkage are also possible.
For both types of conditioning, however, there is an optimal time interval for
learning success. If this interval is too short or too long, it has a negative impact on
the learning effect. In addition, it gradually became clear that certain (neuro-)bi-
ologically induced factors could have an influence on learning success, so that the
basic assumption that humans had the characteristics of a ‘blank slate’ could not be
maintained. This finding also has implications for consumer and purchasing behav-
iour research, because it illustrates once again that inherited or acquired biolog-
ical determinants can also influence specific forms of behaviour and could thus be
considered in corresponding management concepts.
A particularly interesting phenomenon in this context is food aversion. If, for
example, a certain substance is added to a certain food, which leads to immediate
or later nausea, the corresponding taste stimuli are also permanently associated
with nausea. This is evolutionary very meaningful, since the organism might
otherwise die from poisoning. If, on the other hand, the impression of taste is
merely followed by pain stimuli (e.g. if we eat an ice cream that is too cold or a soup
that is too hot), there are no permanent aversive reactions. The choice of a suit-
able reinforcer therefore depends essentially on the type of reaction to be learned
(Kandel et al., 1995).
2.2 Arousal, Attention, and Awareness
As previously mentioned, the formation of different memory contents greatly

depends on whether the learning process occurs consciously or unconsciously. The
neural mechanisms of attention and awareness are closely linked to the construct of
consciousness. Both concepts also play a role in classical consumer and buyer behav-
iour research, for example, in connection with brand management as brand atten-
tion or brand awareness (Pieters et al., 2002).
Arousal is a variable related to cognitive and affective processes, which represents
the body activation level (Gould and Krane, 1992) as a human capacity to react to
external stimuli (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010). Arousal is thus a physiological and
psychological state of alertness (Shapiro and MacInnis, 2002). As a fundamental di-
mension in the study of emotions, arousal has been related to simple processes such
as awareness and attention (Boucsein, 1992), but also to more complex tasks such
as information retention and attitude formation (Holbrook and Hirschman, 1982).
Previous literature suggests that arousal affects ad effectiveness, brand desirability
(Aaker et al., 1986), and memory decoding (Jeong and Biocca, 2012). However,
highly arousing contexts could distract individuals from ad processing, making re-
call more difficult for the focal material (Singh and Hitchon, 1989), reducing the
ability to identify attributes presented in the ad, and increasing the difficulties to en-
code ad content (Shapiro and MacInnis, 2002).
Beside this, there is another research stream that needs to be mentioned when it
comes to arousal. This stream is dealing with the meaning of arousal for marketing
concepts associated with memory (e.g. ad or brand recall). Fundamental for this re-
search is the so-called Yerkes and Dodson law. This law was originally developed by
psychologists Robert M. Yerkes and John Dillingham Dodson in 1908, who found
that there is a non-linear relation between arousal and memory (Box 2.1).
Attention can be defined as the process by which an individual allocates part of his
or her mental activity to a stimulus. Typically, attention entails a state of increased
alertness and tension, which serves selective perception, orientation, and selec-
tive thinking and acting. In this view, attention always precedes perception. One
distinguishes sustained attention, which describes a long-term concentration on
certain relevant objects, from distributed attention, which refers to different rele-
vant objects. According to the capacity resource model, attention consists of a more
or less conscious allocation of cognitive resources towards a particular object (e.g.
Manzey, 1998).
Box 2.1 Yerkes–Dodson law
The Yerkes–Dodson law is an empirical relationship between arousal and performance,

originally developed by psychologists Robert M. Yerkes and John Dillingham Dodson in
1908. The law stipulates that performance increases with physiological or mental arousal,
but only up to a point. When levels of arousal become too high, performance decreases.
The process is typically illustrated graphically as an inverted-U-shaped curve as shown in
the diagram.
Performance
Arousal
Difficult task Easy task
The upward (left) part of the inverted U can be thought of as an energizing, or motivating,
effect of arousal, whereas the downward part reflects negative effects of arousal (or stress)
on cognitive processes, such as attention (e.g. tunnel vision), memory, and problem-solving.
The inverted U should be seen as reflecting the concept ‘neither too little nor too much is
good’ rather than describing a precise mathematical relationship between arousal and per-
formance. The proposition that optimal task performance occurs at an intermediate level of
arousal holds typically in the case of difficult tasks. For easy tasks, the peak may occur at
lower levels of arousal, or there is no peak at all and performance increases monotonically as
a function of arousal up to a certain level.
Neuroscientific studies on the anatomical foundations of attention have verified

that attention—like many other cognitive processes—does not have a strict local-
ization within the brain (e.g. Cohen, 1993). Whereas the parietal cortex seems to
be important for spatial elements, the temporal lobes are significant for specific ob-
ject properties. It is generally assumed that the thalamus—in particular the pulvinar
complex (Thompson, 2001, p. 431)—plays an essential role as a ‘gateway to conscious-
ness’. Depending on which theory is applied, the thalamus is responsible for filtering
the relevant information and, building on this, bringing it into consciousness or
dampening the irrelevant information. In addition, the brainstem seems to play an

important role for the emergence of arousal.
In addition to these structures, recent research suggests that amygdala activa-
tion plays a crucial role for arousal. In particular, there is a large body of evidence
implicating the amygdala in promoting memory for arousing experiences over and
above mechanisms associated with noradrenergic sympathetic arousal (de Voogd et
al., 2016).
Emotion may influence memory both by altering attention and perception during
encoding and by affecting memory retention. To specifically link memory enhance-
ment of arousing material to modulation of memory retention, Sharot and Phelps
(2004) examined recognition of neutral and arousing words at two time points while
manipulating attention during encoding. The results indicate that arousal can yield
better memory performance irrespective of the attentional resources allocated to
stimuli. Note that awareness (e.g. brand awareness, ad awareness) is a marketing and
consumer behaviour term that describes the degree of consumer recognition of a
product, service, or brand by its name (Woodside and Wilson, 1985). It is therefore
the link between arousal and attention on the one side and memory and learning on
the other.
2.3 Motivation
Motivation is the reason for goal-oriented behaviour including processes associ-

ated with initiating, maintaining, or changing psychological and physiological ac-
tivity (Heckhausen and Heckhausen, 2006). The word motivation originates from
the Latin verb movere, meaning ‘to move’ (Hau and Martini, 2012), which effectively
describes what motivation is—the active ‘movement’ of an organism in reaction to
a stimulus or situation. Motives are the ‘whys’ of behaviour—the needs and desires
that drive what we do (Nevid, 2013). Motives are in general not observed directly but
their existence is inferred based on observable behaviour.
Assuming that most human behaviour is driven by a specific motivation, knowing
the underlying motives is crucial to its understanding. While motivation explains
desired behaviours, such as striving for a career or finding a partner, it also accounts
for maladaptive behaviours, such as drug addiction (e.g. Baker et al., 2004; Kalivas
and Volkow, 2005; Koob and Le Moal, 2001) or gambling (Clark et al., 2009). During
the last 100 years or so, disciplines such as psychology, economics, and biology have
investigated motivation in a variety of contexts, to gain a better understanding of
factors that drive human behaviour. However, the findings are largely inconsistent,
implying that a general theory of motivation processes remains elusive (Gneezy et
al., 2011).
Nevertheless, it is ecologically valid to classify motives along two major
dimensions, namely biological/ psychological and economic, with further
subclassification of each dimension. Although the subclasses are not universally
Instinct
Drive or Desire
Biological Operant conditioning

and/or Arousal and libido
Psychological Self-determination
Motive Self-actualisation
Social
Monetary incentive
Economic Performance
Fairness
Fig. 2.2 Overview of the different motives that are used to explain motivated and goal-directed
behaviour.
agreed upon, the scheme shown in Fig. 2.2 is most conducive to consumer neurosci-
ence. Note that other, rather general classifications of motivation exist that partially
straddle the dimensions of this scheme. The most important are inherent versus
learned motives, and intrinsic versus extrinsic motivation. Inherent motives are in-
born and central to survival, as can be seen in instincts and drives directed towards
fulfilling biological needs (James, 1890). Hunger is a typical inherent motive. In
contrast, learned motives are formed through experience and depend on social and
cultural influences (White and Lehman, 2005; Zimbardo, 2007). For example, the
desire to become rich is typically a learned motive (Opsahl and Dunnette, 1966).
Extrinsic motivation involves rewards awarded by some external entity, where the
reward can be tangible, such as money, or non-tangible, such as positive feedback.
In contrast, intrinsic motivation leads to behaviour that on its own is individually
pleasurable or gratifying (Deci et al., 1999). Retail therapy, defined as buying with
the sole purpose of improving one’s mood or disposition, is an example of intrinsic
motivation. A brief exposition of the motives presented in Fig. 2.2 is provided in the
remainder of this section.
Instincts are biologically determined, exist in all species, and are innate drivers of
behaviour (James, 1890; Kubie, 1948; Sherrington, 1916). Instincts as motives typ-
ically yield reflexive, rigid, and predictable patterns of behaviour that are not ac-
quired by learning (Davis et al., 1948; James, 1890). Although humans can react to
environmental stimuli automatically, some instincts are not immutable and can be
voluntarily overridden (Maslow, 1954).
A drive or desire is a state of arousal or tension triggered by physiological or bio-
logical needs, such as food, water, or sex. According to the drive-reduction theory,
drives are thought to arise from physiological needs created by a deviation from ho-
meostasis, that is, the tendency to maintain a balance, or an optimal level, within
a biological system (Hull, 1952). So-called secondary drives are associated with
(primary) drives through experiences or conditioning procedures (Pavlov, 1941).
For example, the desire to receive money, which helps to pay for the satisfaction of
primary drives like food and shelter (Mowrer, 1951; Olds, 1953). Drive is an eco-
logically valid concept; however, one has to be careful when modelling behaviour
because drive-reduction theory largely fails to explain both the role of secondary
reinforcers in regulating tension, and behaviour that is not intended to reduce any
tension, such as a person eating even if not hungry (Cellura, 1969).
Operant conditioning refers to the association of a spontaneous behaviour with
a specific incentive (Flora, 2004; Skinner, 2011), thereby extending the concept of
classical conditioning relying on the presence of a given stimulus that exhibits a nat-
ural reaction (Skinner, 1938). Analogous to drive-reduction theory, one can distin-
guish between primary reinforcers (stimuli provoking a specific response without a
specific association) and the secondary reinforcers often acquired to fulfil the pri-
mary reinforcers, as in the case of gaining money to buy food.
The operant/reinforcement approach as a model for motivation assumes that all
behaviour needs to happen at least once, accidentally or voluntarily, before it can be
modulated or altered, that is, conditioned (Chomsky, 1959; Wiest, 1967). However,
this is not necessarily the case in real life, where an animal might face large and pos-
sible singular choice sets and where there are multiple links between performance
and the outcome (Hsee et al., 2003). Thus, operant conditioning as a motive can be a
useful model on occasion but may provide an incomplete and/or inadequate expla-
nation in complex real-life scenarios.
The arousal theory of motivation suggests that people execute a specific behaviour
in order to maintain an ‘optimum’ level of individual physiological arousal, which
may vary with age but is in general independent of the balance needed to main-
tain biological homeostasis (Keller, 1981; Mitchell, 1982). There is some conceptual
similarity with drive-reduction theory, although the goal here is to maintain arousal
instead of reducing tension. In general, the postulated optimum level is quantifi-
able; however, its existence would be consistent with a variety of so-called inverted-
U phenomena, where the outcome is a non-linear function of some variable (see, e.g.
the Yerkes–Dodson law, mentioned earlier).
Self-determination as a motive for goal-directed behaviour is based on the
premise that the organism is an active system with an inherent propensity for growth
and resolution of inconsistencies (Deci and Ryan, 2000, 2004; Ryan, 2012). Growth
is an essential element of this type of motivation, which distinguishes it from drive-
reduction and arousal theories. Here, motivation is assumed to comprise three
main aspects: competence (capability of producing positive while avoiding negative
outcomes), relatedness (emotionally secure and stimulating proximity to others),
and autonomy (ability to act independently in accordance with one’s own sense of
self (Markland, 1999)). Self-determination as motivation is a useful concept to dif-
ferentiate between personalities; however, the model fails to provide clear-cut meas-
ures to assess and/or predict behaviours.
The term self-actualization is the assumption that individuals have or develop a

drive to develop their full potential (Goldstein, 1939; Modell, 1993). Thus, the pro-
cess of development is considered an important motive for goal-oriented behaviour.
In this view, a person does not have to strive for an objective goal, such as a career,
but rather should develop according to their own potential, a potential that might
be directed towards creativity, spiritual enlightenment, pursuit of knowledge, or the
desire to contribute to society (Goldstein, 1939). As with the related concept of self-
determination, self-actualization is difficult to quantify.
The social cognitive account of human motivation rests on three aspects (or,
groups of motives): achievement (success), power (control over other people), and
affiliation (membership and/or strong social relationships). As with other motives,
behaviour is strongly influenced by expectations, which are to some extent shaped
by social and cultural environments (McClelland, 1987). Social motivation bears a
similarity to self-determination theory but emphasizes more strongly the role of the
environment in creating motives.
Monetary incentives have been reliably shown to promote effort and performance
(Baker, 2000; Baker et al., 1988; Gibbons, 1997; Jenkins et al., 1998). Besides the
clearly financial properties of monetary incentives, incentives also convey symbolic
meaning, such as recognition and status (Benabou and Tirole, 2003) and therefore
serve multiple functions (Hsee et al., 2003; Opsahl and Dunnette, 1966; Steers et
al., 1996). In addition to the positive effect of monetary incentives on motivation,
evidence of negative effects of external rewards also exists (Albrecht et al., 2014;
Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Fehr and Falk, 2002). For example, receiving very large
rewards for a laboratory task (say, a reward equal to an annual salary) was shown
to decrease performance compared to smaller rewards (Ariely et al., 2009). Thus,
monetary incentives can have unwanted or undesirable effects on human behav-
iour (Strang et al., 2014) and one should be careful when making assumptions about
the effect of performance-contingent rewards on actual performance (Strombach et
al., 2015).
According to classical economic theories, performance as a motivation is always
tied to the presence of an external incentive, in contrast to psychological approaches
where the strive to perform well might be intrinsically motivated. In this view, moti-
vation is equated with good performance, yielding a framework that has successfully
modelled the positive effect of monetary incentives on performance in the short run
(Lawler and Porter, 1967; Porter and Lawler, 1982; Kunz and Pfaff, 2002; Schuster et
al., 1971). The framework, however, fails to predict non-linear effects (as mentioned
previously) and has little strength in modelling long-term behaviours.
Evidence from neuroimaging suggests that ‘pay for performance’ does not di-
rectly affect performance by modulating neural activity in task-relevant regions but
affects reward representation in a complex almost antagonistic fashion. Incentives
increase neural activity in the ventral striatum, thought to reflect reward in general,
but decrease activity in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex (VMPFC) thought to be
associated with the processing of subjective value, which might give hints as to why
incentive effects can be non-linear (Strombach et al., 2015).
Fairness is arguably one of the most important of interpersonal (or ‘other-re-
garding’) preferences (Camerer and Hogarth, 1999; Falk et al., 1999; Fehr and Falk,
2002). Other-regarding preferences are one of the core concepts in behavioural eco-
nomics postulating that self-regarding preferences are not sufficient to explain and
motivate behaviour of economic man. By implication, humans in general do not
value their own reward in isolation, but they also compare their own set-point with
reference to others, where, for example, monetary incentives are less effective when
offers are perceived as unfair in some sense (Sanfey, 2007).
Clearly, motivation is complex and often dependent on the situation and context.
In real life, an individual is likely to be motivated by a variety of mechanisms that
operate neither entirely sequentially nor in parallel. This can be seen, for example,
in some developing societies, where people, unfortunately, may suffer from hunger
or are exposed to life-threatening situations on a regular basis, that is, their basal
motives cannot be fulfilled, but nevertheless show motivated behaviours in other
domains.
2.4 Reward
A reward is a subjectively satisfying, often pleasurable experience that typically

follows a certain behaviour or completion of a task. Reward can be classified along
several different dimensions, where, most commonly, one distinguishes broadly be-
tween primary (related to survival and bodily homeostasis), intrinsic (inherently
pleasurable), and extrinsic (attractive and motivating) reward. Reward can facilitate
incentive salience, that is, the motivation, wanting, desire, and possibly craving to
perform even better in some sense to receive more reward. Often, but not always,
reward enhances positive emotions and subsequent behaviour; however, the effect
of reward is complex depending on, among others, the strength or amount of re-
ward, actual context, previous experiences, and the temporal relationship between
the behaviour and the reward it entails. Correspondingly, reward mechanisms in the
human brain are supported by a complex neuronal network comprising many cor-
tical and subcortical structures.
Primarily but not exclusively within the basal ganglia–thalamocortical loop, the
reward system includes, among other regions, the nucleus accumbens, caudate nu-
cleus, putamen, prefrontal cortex, anterior cingulate cortex, insular cortex, hippo-
campus, thalamus, and the amygdala. Note that the reward system overlaps to some
degree with regions supporting associative learning. Although a precise functional
map of the reward system is still elusive, the receptive roles of two regions are worth
discussing. First, the nucleus accumbens, which is part of the dopaminergic ventral
striatum, has been implied in the individual quest for pleasure and might a play a
role in the formation of product preference. Second, the orbitofrontal cortex, which
is part of the prefrontal cortices, is commonly thought to represent emotion and
reward in decision-making, thereby establishing a link between reward and subse-
quent behaviour. In particular, the orbitofrontal cortex is also involved in the repre-
sentation of loss and punishment, which makes it an interesting target region for the
study of consumer responses to unfair or over-priced offers.
2.5 Decision-Making and Cognitive Processes
A very important focus of consumer neuroscience is to investigate how consumers

actually make decisions; thus, it does not define how decisions ideally should be
made. The aim of this research area is the development and testing of models that ad-
equately represent the decision-making process of consumers on a descriptive level
(Sanfey et al., 2006). One important assumption with regard to decision-making is
that there exist cognitive elements on the one hand and affective-emotional elements
on the other hand. These two interacting and competing elements are constantly
changing and need to be assessed in each situation (Sanfey et al., 2006). Examples for
the interaction of these elements are:
• Trading rewards against risks (Foxall, 2008; McClure et al., 2004c; Mohr et al.,
2010).
• Handling uncertainty, risk, and ambiguity (Huettel et al., 2005; Krain et al.,
2006).
• Solving conflicts of goals (Camerer, 2003).
Several studies provide evidence that for decision-making the prefrontal cortex,
and especially the orbitofrontal and dorsolateral prefrontal cortex, plays a decisive
role (e.g. Mohr et al., 2010). This brain region receives information from many other
parts of the brain and interacts with the insula and subcortical structures such as
the striatum (Ernst and Paulus, 2005). In general, the prefrontal cortex is associated
with processing rationally marked stimuli whereas emotionally marked elements
are generated in subcortical structures (e.g. striatum) (Mohr et al., 2010).
It is noteworthy that the prefrontal cortex and especially the VMPFC plays a cen-
tral role for the integration of subconscious emotional elements in the decision-
making process. There is evidence that the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex is important
for decision-making under risk (Mohr et al., 2010). Additionally, Hsu et al. (2005)
show that the effort to make decisions is correlated with activity changes in the orbit-
ofrontal cortex and the amygdala.
Related to the construct of cognitive decision-making is the construct of cog-
nitive processing which is particularly important in neuropsychological liter-
ature. Cognitive processing is the way the brain processes cognitive information.
According to dual process models, the brain seems to distinguish between cognitive
and emotional information. Therefore, each decision-making process is composed
of emotional-affective-reflexive elements on the one hand and rational-cognitive-
reflective elements on the other hand. Ferstl et al. (2005) showed that cognitive
information is primarily processed in the lateral prefrontal cortex whereas emo-
tional information primarily activates the dorsal frontomedial cortex (Ferstl et
al., 2005). Cognitive efforts, elements of short-term memory, and processing of
real-time information are associated with activity changes in the dorsolateral pre-
frontal cortex (Braver et al., 1997; Linden et al., 2003; Owen et al., 2005; Rypma and
D’Esposito, 1999).
2.6 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis
The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a neurobiological theory of human

decision-making that was introduced by Antonio Damasio and colleagues (Bechara
and Damasio, 2005). The model emphasizes the role of emotions and feelings in
decision-making, thereby strongly departing from the rationality assumption that
decisions are primarily driven by logical reasoning based on some type of cost–
benefit calculation (the so-called Homo economicus assumption) (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005; Camerer et al., 2005; Camerer et al., 2004). Since its inception,
the model has been successfully applied in many domains and has inspired many
neuroscientific studies that ultimately led to the emergence of neuroeconomics and
consumer neuroscience (Reimann and Bechara, 2010).
The main assumption underlying the SMH is that human decision-making is
to a great extent influenced or guided by bodily, emotional, and possibly painful
experiences. The term somatic markers is used to denote the entirety of such
experiences that are associated to various degree with perceptions or states of mind,
such as the association of nausea with disgust, or rapid heartbeat with anxiety.
Somatic markers are typically characterized by biological predisposition and limi-
tations which ultimately shape and restrict behaviour. Thus, according to the SMH,
the ability to process emotions and feelings is a necessary prerequisite to success-
fully master everyday life situations, where cognitive abilities alone are generally not
enough to cope with personal, social, or professional requirements (A.R. Damasio,
2006; Tranel and Damasio, 1991).
According to the model, the VMPFC is thought to process somatic markers and
therefore plays an important role in linking emotions to decision-making processes.
Evidence for this assumption comes mainly from observations in patients with
frontal lobe, in particular VMPFC, damage resulting in impaired abilities to organize
behaviour and learn from previous mistakes and experiences, without affecting ge-
neral intellect associated with maintaining working memory and attention as well
as comprehending and expressing language. An important tool is the so-called Iowa
Gain: $50 p=1

Good Decks Penalty: $50 p = 0.5
Average gain per card: $25
B
Gain: $50 p=1

Penalty: $100 p = 0.25
Gain: $100 p=1

Bad Decks Penalty: $250 p = 0.5
Average loss per card: $25
D
Gain: $100 p=1

Penalty: $500 p = 0.25
Fig. 2.3 The Iowa Gambling Task. The subjects are presented with a number of virtual decks
(typically four) of cards on a computer screen. The decks differ from each other in the balance
of reward (good decks) versus penalty (bad decks) cards, that is, some decks will tend to reward
the player more often than other decks. The goal of the game is to win as much (game) money
as possible, and healthy volunteers typically need to sample a total of 40–50 cards from the
decks in order to identify the good decks.
Data from Bechara et al., 1994.
Gambling Task (Fig. 2.3), which has been employed in several hundred studies of
patients with frontal lobe damage and healthy volunteers.
A common finding in patients with frontal lobe dysfunction is that they, in con-
trast to healthy volunteers, continue to persevere with the bad decks, even when
realizing that they lose money overall. Concurrent measurements of the galvanic
skin response show that patients usually lack a ‘stress’ reaction observed in healthy
controls when hovering over the bad decks, long before conscious sensation that the
decks are bad. Moreover, patients with VMPFC damage choose outcomes that yield
high immediate gains in spite of higher losses in the future.
Despite the overarching importance of the VMPFC, many other brain regions
are critically involved in the processing of somatic markers and decision-making.
The complexity of the resultant network can be conceptualized in terms of two re-
action schemata known as the ‘body loop’ and the ‘as-if body loop’ (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005). The former facilitates the default mechanism, where activation and
possibly reactivation of somatic markers cause various alterations, both physiolog-
ical and neuronal, which in turn affect cognition and behaviour (Fig. 2.4). The latter
facilitates mechanisms where decisions are accompanied by neuronal processes nor-
mally associated with somatic maker activation, although real activation of somatic
states is absent. Thus, somatic states are somehow emulated that influence behaviour
and decision-making analogous to body loop mechanisms.
VMPFC SMC/insula VMPFC SMC/insula
Amygdala Amygdala
Brainstem Brainstem
Effectorial structures (hypothalamus,

autonomous centres, periaqueductal grey)
Sensory and neurotransmitters

producing nuclei
Body Body
‘Body loop’ ‘As-If body loop’
Fig. 2.4 Body loop and as-if body loop. SMC, sensorimotor cortex; VMPFC, ventromedial
prefrontal cortex.
Adapted from Bechara, Damasio (2005).
Over the years, the SMH has become an important tool that has identified many
of the brain areas involved in decision-making as well as the neuronal representa-
tion of emotions and body states. The model, however, has failed to demonstrate
how these processes interact at a psychological and evolutionary level. More specifi-
cally, conceptual weaknesses of the Iowa Gambling Task have been pointed out, and
incompatible results have been reported. Nevertheless, the model has reasonably
good ecological validity and will continue to exert its influence on neuroscience. It is
clearly of interest for consumer neuroscience because of the emphasis on emotions
in the decision-making process, making it possible to address concepts like ‘gut
feeling’ or ‘buying on a whim’ rigorously, at least to some extent. In essence, SMH is a
powerful way of holistically approaching many of the mechanisms presented in this
chapter.
2.7 Theory of Mind
The concept of theory of mind (ToM) was introduced by Premack and Woodruff
(1978, p. 515) as follows: ‘An individual has a theory of mind if he imputes mental
states to himself and others’. In essence, ToM explains how people put themselves in
the position of others and how behaviours such as empathy and compassion emerge
(Fletcher et al., 1995; Singer, 2009). Thus, ToM (sometimes loosely referred to as
‘everyday psychology’) comprises psychological mechanisms that people use for

describing mental states of themselves and others.
ToM is presumed to be not hard-wired into the brain but rather emerges independ-
ently of other traits during development. Children as young as 2–3 years of age have
rudimentary social referencing, for example, by reacting to a smile of their mother
or showing empathy (Kovács et al., 2010), whereas the ability to infer the others’
mental state typically develops at about 4 years. A famous experiment to probe ToM
in children is the so-called Sally and Anne puppet show, where Sally places a little
object, say, a marble, in a basket before leaving the stage. Anne has observed Sally
and moves the marble to a box while Sally is absent. Upon Sally’s return to the stage,
the child, who has been watching the show, is asked where Sally will look for her
marble. If ToM is present, the child will point to the basket, because that is what Sally,
not the child, knows. The paradigm also has clinical relevance. For example, it has
been shown that ToM is selectively impaired in children with an autism spectrum
disorder compared to age-matched typically developing children and patients with
Down syndrome (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; Kißgen and Schleiffer, 2002).
Several competing models exists which attempt to account for ToM, where
simulation theory is most relevant to consumer neuroscience. Accordingly, ToM
is available because of an inherent subconscious tendency to empathize with the
person observed and, accounting for perceived differences, to imagine what their
own desire and belief would be. Despite theoretical advances, however, ToM is
still not fully understood, and it is currently assumed that it is supported by more
than one mechanism. This view is supported by neuroimaging studies in adults
suggesting that ToM is supported by a large network of brain regions including, but
not restricted to, the posterior superior sulcus, the medial prefrontal cortex, and, to
various degrees, the temporal poles (McCabe et al., 2001; Singer, 2009; Singer and
Lamm, 2009).
Specifically, the so-called mirror-neuron system has been implicated in ToM
processes. Mirror neurons were first discovered in motor systems and are defined by
their propensity to fire both when an animal acts and when the animal observes the
same action performed by another animal. Thus, the cells mirror the action of the
other, as though the observer were itself acting. Mirror systems thought to play a role
in social cognition have been shown to exist in the human inferior frontal and supe-
rior parietal cortices; however, the underlying neuronal mechanism and the func-
tional significance are not full resolved (Iacoboni and Dapretto, 2006; Saxe, 2005).
The precise relevance of ToM and the mirror neuron system to consumer neu-
roscience is still unresolved, although some promising directions for research have
emerged. ToM might help to explain why commercials can on occasion work better
if the customer can in some way (say, because of gender congruity) associate with
the actor. Also, ToM appears to be relevant to customer–salesperson interactions at
the point of purchase. By extension, the activity of mirror neurons (mirror systems)
might help to explain why ads that emphasize consumption experience can posi-
tively affect brand perception and even buying behaviour (an example is shown in
Fig. 2.5 Example of the application of the mirror neurons concept in advertising.
Sourced from Nespresso
Fig. 2.5). Then, observing consumption is somehow similar to actual consumption,

where the real experience made by someone else becomes available to the observer.
2.8 Reward-Based Learning
As pointed out previously, many different forms of learning (rote, meaningful, in-
formal, etc.) have been identified and the underlying mechanisms studied. So-
called reward-based learning is the most relevant to consumer neuroscience and
is discussed in more detail in this section. Reward-based learning is a form of re-
inforcement learning that, as the name implies, facilitates the acquisition of a new
behaviour, knowledge, or skill through rewarding the desired learning outcome.
From a conceptual perspective, reward plays an important role in the consumer’s
world, where reward can become manifest directly through reward schemes, or less
directly and often multifacetedly through customer satisfaction.
The latter is of particular importance because research has conclusively shown that
customer satisfaction plays a central role in building customer loyalty—the state of
satisfaction causes some form of learning that can positively influence brand image
and future purchasing behaviour. From a more technical perspective, a rich set of
robust and validated mathematical algorithms exists to model learning through re-
ward, where, to some extent, the model parameters both correspond with concepts
of consumer research and can be mapped to neuronal systems.
The most relevant algorithms in this context are known as temporal-difference

(TD) models, the simplest of which can be stated as follows:
V ( st ) = V ( st ) + α Vtarget ( st +1 ) − V ( st ) , with Vtarget ( st +1 ) = Rt +1 + γV ( st +1 ),
where V denotes a suitable state value function with states st, rewards (or,
outcomes) Rt, a learning rate α, and a scale factor γ. The states and rewards are
indexed by some quantity t, which is usually but not necessarily interpreted as
time. In words, the model describes an iterative update process continuously re-
fining the estimates of the value function, where only the current and the immedi-
ately following state are taken into account (hence the term TD). The process starts
by assigning an initial value V to each state, acting as the initial estimates of the
returns obtained when transitioning from one state to the next according to some
policy associated with a given model. Each step yields a target based on the reward
provided by the environment, which is used to update the value of the starting
state according to the formula given (which implies bootstrapping for α ≠ 1). The
term Vtarget – V is known as the one-step TD error (a type of prediction error).
The process continues thereby gradually updating the value function at each state
towards increasingly accurate estimates. Under fairly general assumptions, it can
be shown that TD models converge to an optimal measure of the value function
at each state. An example illustrating one episode of TD learning is shown in Tab.
2.1, where the policy is given by a particular sequence of actions performed to pre-
pare a subject for a combined magnetoencephalography (MEG) and EEG scan.
The initial state values can come from a variety of sources, such as guessing or pre-
vious experience.
In the most general sense, TD models relate to the observation that humans learn
by comparing pre-exiting expectations and actual experiences. As such, the models
are naturally aligned with the confirmation/disconfirmation models of consumer
and marketing research. Moreover, the scale factor γ can be interpreted as some
form of temporal discounting, that is, TD allows the effectiveness of immediate
versus delayed rewards to be studied. Finally, the learning rate allows the degree to
which individuals or groups of individuals respond to (prediction) errors in a given
situation (α =0 implies errors are being ignored) to be modelled.
From a neuroscience perspective, several studies have suggested that dopamin-
ergic activity in subcortical areas such as the ventral segmental area (specifically,
the ventral striatum and the nucleus accumbens) and the midbrain reflect the pro-
cessing of prediction errors (Delgado et al., 2005; McClure et al., 2004a; O’Doherty
et al., 2003; Schultz et al., 1997). Moreover, there is evidence that neuronal activa-
tion of the reward system is stronger if a reward is received immediately compared
to a delayed reward (McClure et al., 2004a; Read et al., 2005; note delay is rel-
ative dependent on the situation), which corroborates the notion that temporal
discounting is associated with specific brain mechanism and therefore amenable
to modelling.
Table 2.1 Preparing for a combined MEG and EEG scan. State values
(V) denote minutes of remaining preparation time and rewards (R;
here, outcomes) denote times between states. For simplicity, both
the learning rate (α) and scale factor (γ) have been set to 1. Thus, the
transition equation reads: V ( st ) = Rt +1 + V ( st +1 ) . The total preparation
time in this example is 52 minutes (=∑ R)
State Vinitial R Vupdate
Subject arrives in laboratory 60 N/a 58 (=50 +8)
Clean skin and wash hair 50 8 50
Apply ECG and EOG electrodes 45 5 47
Fit EEG cap 40 7 39
Apply gel and check impedance 35 4 28
Subject seated in MEG scanner 0 28 N/a
EOG, electro-oculography.
Note this example is conceptually similar to the famous ‘Driving Home’ example (Sutton
and Barto, 2018, chap. 6) cited in many books and lectures.
2.9 Consolidating Questions
Q1. What types of memories can be distinguished?

Q2. What are somatic markers?
Q3. Why is TD learning relevant to consumer neuroscience?
Q4. What is arousal?
Q5. Is there a brain substrate for prediction error?
Q6. What is motivation?
Q7. Is there a unified account of decision-making?
Q8. How are mirror neurons related to ToM?
Q9. Do monetary incentives act in a strictly linear fashion?
3
The Human Brain
The human brain is an organ of extraordinary complexity that has attracted the in-
terest of scholars, philosophers, and scientist for aeons. Arguably, the early Greek
physician Alcmaeon of Croton (sixth century bc) was the first to postulate that the
human brain is the central instance of sensation and thought. The intimate cou-
pling between physical reality and cognitive process implied by Alcmaeon’s claims,
however, was challenged in the centuries to come. Most notably, French polymath
René Descartes (1596–1650) proposed a dualistic system in which the brain is
viewed rather like a machine acting separately from an immaterial mind that ac-
counts for higher mental faculties. Ultimately, it is modern neuroscience, the ad-
vent of which is commonly credited to Spanish anatomist Santiago Ramón y Cajal
(1852–1934) and Italian biologist Camillo Golgi (1843–1926), advanced through
innumerable contributions from all areas of science over time, that makes us argue
that the brain is the central structure of the human nervous system, controlling a
vast range of activities and functions, including but not restricted to motor con-
trol, sensory perception, autonomic and hormonal regulation, language, emotion,
reasoning, and cognition. Such control, however, is a highly dynamic process con-
tingent upon genetic, anatomical, metabolic, and physiological factors, all of which
operate on partly dissociable temporal and spatial scales and interact which each
other in a context-dependent fashion. At present, there is no unifying theory that
can explain the complex functioning of neuronal systems. Acknowledging that the
human brain can only be fully understood in a holistic fashion encompassing all
aspects at all scales, the remainder of this chapter provides an overview of the main
aspects in isolation.
3.1 Neuroanatomy
The human nervous system consists of two main parts: the peripheral nervous system
(PNS) and the central nervous system (CNS). The former contains nerves and a va-
riety of supporting cells that branch throughout the body and communicate with the
CNS. The PNS includes 12 pairs of cranial nerves that emerge directly from structures
within the cranium and not from segments of the spinal cord as all other nerves
do. Three of these cranial nerves (olfactory, optic, and trigeminal) are located en-
tirely within the cranium and are more accurately considered part of the CNS from
a structural perspective. An important division of the PNS is known as the auto-
nomic nervous system (ANS), which acts largely unconsciously and regulates various
An Integrative Guide to Consumer Neuroscience. Sven Braeutigam and Peter Kenning, Oxford University Press. © Oxford University Press
2022. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780198789932.003.0003
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Dense Stars
The agreement of the observational points with the curve is
remarkably close, considering the rough nature of the observational
measurements; and it seems to afford a rather strong confirmation of
the theory. But there is one awful confession to make—we have
compared the theory with the wrong stars. At least when the
comparison was first made at the beginning of 1924 no one
entertained any doubt that they were the wrong stars.
We must recall that the theory was developed for stars in the
condition of a perfect gas. In the right half of Fig. 7 the stars
represented are all diffuse stars; Capella with a mean density about
equal to that of the air in this room may be taken as typical. Material
of this tenuity is evidently a true gas, and in so far as these stars
agree with the curve the theory is confirmed. But in the left half of the
diagram we have the Sun whose material is denser than water,
Krueger 60 denser than iron, and many other stars of the density
usually associated with solid or liquid matter. What business have
they on the curve reserved for a perfect gas? When these stars were
put into the diagram it was not with any expectation that they would
agree with the curve; in fact, the agreement was most annoying.
Something very different was being sought for. The idea was that the
theory might perhaps be trusted on its own merits with such
confirmation as the diffuse stars had already afforded; then by
measuring how far these dense stars fell below the curve we should
have definite information as to how great a deviation from a perfect
gas occurred at any given density. According to current ideas it was
expected that the sun would fall three or four magnitudes below the
curve, and the still denser Krueger 60 should be nearly ten
magnitudes below.[8] You see that the expectation was entirely
unfulfilled.
The shock was even greater than I can well indicate to you,
because the great drop in brightness when the star is too dense to
behave as a true gas was a fundamental tenet in our conception of
stellar evolution. On the strength of it the stars had been divided into
two groups known as giants and dwarfs, the former being the
gaseous stars and the latter the dense stars.
Two alternatives now lie before us. The first is to assume that
something must have gone wrong with our theory; that the true curve
for gaseous stars is not as we have drawn it, but runs high up on the
left of the diagram so that the Sun, Krueger 60, &c., are at the
appropriate distances below it. In short, our imaginary critic was
right; Nature had hidden something unexpected inside the star and
so frustrated our calculations. Well, if this were so, it would be
something to have found it out by our investigations.
The other alternative is to consider this question—Is it impossible
that a perfect gas should have the density of iron? The answer is
rather surprising. There is no earthly reason why a perfect gas
should not have a density far exceeding iron. Or it would be more
accurate to say, the reason why it should not is earthly and does not
apply to the stars.
The sun’s material, in spite of being denser than water, really is a
perfect gas. It sounds incredible, but it must be so. The feature of a
true gas is that there is plenty of room between the separate
particles—a gas contains very little substance and lots of emptiness.
Consequently when you squeeze it you do not have to squeeze the
substance; you just squeeze out some of the waste space. But if you
go on squeezing, there comes a time when you have squeezed out
all the empty space; the atoms are then jammed in contact and any
further compression means squeezing the substance itself, which is
quite a different proposition. So as you approach that density the
compressibility characteristic of a gas is lost and the matter is no
longer a proper gas. In a liquid the atoms are nearly in contact; that
will give you an idea of the density at which the gas loses its
characteristic compressibility.
The big terrestrial atoms which begin to jam at a density near that
of the liquid state do not exist in the stars. The stellar atoms have
been trimmed down by the breaking off of all their outer electrons.
The lighter atoms are stripped to the bare nucleus—of quite
insignificant size. The heavier atoms retain a few of the closer
electrons, but have not much more than a hundredth of the diameter
of a fully arrayed atom. Consequently we can go on squeezing ever
so much more before these tiny atoms or ions jam in contact. At the
density of water or even of platinum there is still any amount of room
between the trimmed atoms; and waste space remains to be
squeezed out as in a perfect gas.
Our mistake was that in estimating the congestion in the stellar
ball-room we had forgotten that crinolines are no longer in fashion.
It was, I suppose, very blind of us not to have foreseen this result,
considering how much attention we had been paying to the
mutilation of the atoms in other branches of the investigation. By a
roundabout route we have reached a conclusion which is really very
obvious. And so we conclude that the stars on the left of the diagram
are after all not the ‘wrong’ stars. The sun and other dense stars are
on the perfect gas curve because their material is perfect gas.
Careful investigation has shown that in the small stars on the
extreme left of Fig. 7 the electric charges of the atoms and electrons
bring about a slight deviation from the ordinary laws of a gas; it has
been shown by R. H. Fowler that the effect is to make the gas not
imperfect but superperfect—it is more easily compressed than an
ordinary gas. You will notice that on the average the stars run a little
above the curve on the left of Fig. 7. It is probable that the deviation
is genuine and is partly due to superperfection of the gas; we have
already seen that imperfection would have brought them below the
curve.
Even at the density of platinum there is plenty of waste space, so
that in the stars we might go on squeezing stellar matter to a density
transcending anything known on the earth. But that’s another story—
I will tell it later on.
The general agreement between the observed and predicted
brightness of the stars of various masses is the main test of the
correctness of our theories of their internal constitution. The
incidence of their masses in a range which is especially critical for
radiation pressure is also valuable confirmation. It would be an
exaggeration to claim that this limited success is a proof that we
have reached the truth about the stellar interior. It is not a proof, but
it is an encouragement to work farther along the line of thought
which we have been pursuing. The tangle is beginning to loosen.
The more optimistic may assume that it is now straightened out; the
more cautious will make ready for the next knot. The one reason for
thinking that the real truth cannot be so very far away is that in the
interior of a star, if anywhere, the problem of matter is reduced to its
utmost simplicity; and the astronomer is engaged on what is
essentially a less ambitious problem than that of the terrestrial
physicist to whom matter always appears in the guise of electron
systems of the most complex organization.
We have taken the present-day theories of physics and pressed
them to their remotest conclusions. There is no dogmatic intention in
this; it is the best means we have of testing them and revealing their
weaknesses if any.
In ancient days two aviators procured to themselves wings.
Daedalus flew safely through the middle air and was duly honoured
on his landing. Icarus soared upwards to the sun till the wax melted
which bound his wings and his flight ended in fiasco. In weighing
their achievements, there is something to be said for Icarus. The
classical authorities tell us that he was only ‘doing a stunt’, but I
prefer to think of him as the man who brought to light a serious
constructional defect in the flying-machines of his day. So, too, in
Science. Cautious Daedalus will apply his theories where he feels
confident they will safely go; but by his excess of caution their hidden
weaknesses remain undiscovered. Icarus will strain his theories to
the breaking-point till the weak joints gape. For the mere adventure?
Perhaps partly; that is human nature. But if he is destined not yet to
reach the sun and solve finally the riddle of its constitution, we may
at least hope to learn from his journey some hints to build a better
machine.
LECTURE II
SOME RECENT INVESTIGATIONS
I T will help us to appreciate the astronomical significance of what

we have learnt in the previous lecture if we turn from the general to
the particular and see how it applies to individual stars. I will take
two stars round which centre stories of special interest, and relate
the history of our knowledge of them.
The Story of Algol
This is a detective story, which we might call ‘The Missing Word
and the False Clue’.
In astronomy, unlike many sciences, we cannot handle and probe
the objects of our study; we have to wait passively and receive and
decode the messages that they send to us. The whole of our
information about the stars comes to us along rays of light; we watch
and try to understand their signals. There are some stars which
seem to be sending us a regular series of dots and dashes—like the
intermittent light from a lighthouse. We cannot translate this as a
morse code; nevertheless, by careful measurement we disentangle a
great deal of information from the messages. The star Algol is the
most famous of these ‘variable stars’. We learn from the signals that
it is really two stars revolving round each other. Sometimes the
brighter of the two stars is hidden, giving a deep eclipse or ‘dash’;
sometimes the faint star is hidden, giving a ‘dot’. This recurs in a
period of 2 days 21 hours—the period of revolution of the two stars.
There was a great deal more information in the message, but it
was rather tantalizing. There was, so to speak, just one word
missing. If we could supply that word the message would give full
and accurate particulars as to the size of the system—the diameters
and masses of the two components, their absolute brightness, the
distance between them, their distance from the sun. Lacking the
word the message told us nothing really definite about any of these
things.
In these circumstances astronomers would scarcely have been
human if they had not tried to guess the missing word. The word
should have told us how much bigger the bright star was than the
fainter, that is to say, the ratio of the masses of the two stars. Some
of the less famous variable stars give us complete messages.
(These could accordingly be used for testing the relation of mass
and absolute brightness, and are represented by triangles in Fig. 7.)
The difficulty about Algol arose from the excessive brightness of the
bright component which swamped and made illegible the more
delicate signals from the faint component. From the other systems
we could find the most usual value of the mass ratio, and base on
that a guess as to its probable value for Algol. Different authorities
preferred slightly different estimates, but the general judgement was
that in systems like Algol the bright component is twice as massive
as the faint component. And so the missing word was assumed to be
‘two’; on this assumption the various dimensions of the system were
worked out and came to be generally accepted as near the truth.
That was sixteen years ago.[9]
In this way the sense of the message was made out to be that
the brighter star had a radius of 1,100,000 kilometres (one and a half
times the sun’s radius), that it had half the mass of the sun, and thirty
times the sun’s light-power, &c. It will be seen at once that this will
not fit our curve in Fig. 7; a star of half the sun’s mass ought to be
very much fainter than the sun. It was rather disconcerting to find so
famous a star protesting against the theory; but after all the theory is
to be tested by comparison with facts and not with guesses, and the
theory might well have a sounder basis than the conjecture as to the
missing word. Moreover, the spectral type of Algol is one that is not
usually associated with low mass, and this cast some suspicion on
the accepted results.
If we are willing to trust the theory given in the last lecture we can
do without the missing word. Or, to put it another way, we can try in
succession various guesses instead of ‘two’ until we reach one that
gives the bright component a mass and luminosity agreeing with the
curve in Fig. 7. The guess ‘two’ gives, as we have seen, a point
which falls a long way from the curve. Alter the guess to ‘three’ and
recalculate the mass and brightness on this assumption; the
corresponding point is now somewhat nearer to the curve. Continue
with ‘four’, ‘five’, &c.; if the point crosses the curve we know that we
have gone too far and must take an intermediate value in order to
reach the desired agreement. This was done in November 1925, and
it appeared that the missing word must be ‘five’, not ‘two’—a rather
startling change. And now the message ran—
Radius of bright component = 2,140,000 kilometres.
Mass of bright component = 4·3 x sun’s mass.
If you compare these with the original figures you will see that
there is a great alteration. The star is now assigned a large mass
much more appropriate to a B-type star. It also turns out that Algol is
more than a hundred times as bright as the sun; and its parallax is
0·028"—twice the distance previously supposed.
At the time there seemed little likelihood that these conclusions
could be tested. Possibly the prediction as to the parallax might be
proved or disproved by a trigonometrical determination; but it is so
small as to be almost out of range of reasonably accurate
measurement. We could only adopt a ‘take it or leave it’ attitude—‘If
you accept the theory, this is what Algol is like; if you distrust the
theory, these results are of no interest to you.’
But meanwhile two astronomers at Ann Arbor Observatory had
been making a search for the missing word by a remarkable new
method. They had in fact found the word and published it a year
before, but it had not become widely known. If a star is rotating, one
edge or ‘limb’ is coming towards us and the other going away from
us. We can measure speeds towards us or away from us by means
of the Doppler effect on the spectrum, obtaining a definite result in
miles per second. Thus we can and do measure the equatorial
speed of rotation of the sun by observing first the east limb then the
west limb and taking the difference of velocity shown. That is all very
well on the sun, where you can cover up the disk except the special
part that you want to observe; but how can you cover up part of a
star when a star is a mere point of light? You cannot; but in Algol the
covering up is done for you. The faint component is your screen. As
it passes in front of the bright star there is a moment when it leaves a
thin crescent showing on the east and another moment when a thin
crescent on the west is uncovered. Of course, the star is too far
away for you actually to see the crescent shape, but at these
moments you receive light from the crescents only, the rest of the
disk being hidden. By seizing these moments you can make the
measurements just as though you had manipulated the screen
yourself. Fortunately the speed of rotation of Algol is large and so
can be measured with relatively small error. Now multiply the
equatorial velocity by the period of rotation;[10] that will give you the
circumference of Algol. Divide by 6·28, and you have the radius.
That was the method developed by Rossiter and McLaughlin.
The latter who applied it to Algol found the radius of the bright
component to be
2,180,000 kilometres.
So far as can be judged his result has considerable accuracy;
indeed it is probable that the radius is now better known than that of
any other star except the sun. If you will now turn back to p. 44 and
compare it with the value found from the theory you will see that
there is cause for satisfaction. McLaughlin evaluated the other
constants and dimensions of the system; these agree equally well,
but that follows automatically because there was only one missing
word to be supplied. In both determinations the missing word or
mass ratio turned out to be 5·0.
This is not quite the end of the story. Why had the first guess at
the mass ratio gone so badly wrong? We understand by now that a
disparity in mass is closely associated with a disparity in brightness
of the two stars. The disparity in brightness was given in Algol’s
original message; it informed us that the faint component gives about
one-thirteenth of the light of the bright one. (At least that was how we
interpreted it.) According to our curve this corresponds to a mass
ratio 2½, which is not much improvement on the original guess 2.
For a mass ratio 5 the companion ought to have been much fainter—
in fact its light should have been undetectable. Although
considerations like these could not have had much influence on the
original guess, they seemed at first to reassure us that there was not
very much wrong with it.
Let us call the bright component Algol A and the faint component
Algol B. Some years ago a new discovery was made, namely Algol
C. It was found that Algol A and B together travel in an orbit round a
third star in a period of just under two years—at least they are
travelling round in this period, and we must suppose that there is
something present for them to revolve around. Hitherto we had
believed that when Algol A was nearly hidden at the time of deepest
eclipse all the remaining light must come from Algol B; but now it is
clear that it belongs to Algol C, which is always shining without
interference. Consequently the mass ratio 2½ is that of Algol A to
Algol C. The light from Algol B is inappreciable as it should be for a
mass ratio 5.[11]
The message from Algol A and B was confused, not only on
account of the missing word, but because a word or two of another
message from Algol C had got mixed up with it; so that even when
the missing word was found to be ‘five’ and confirmed in two ways,
the message was not quite coherent. In another place the message
seemed to waver and read ‘two-and-a-half’. The finishing step is the
discovery that ‘two-and-a-half’ belongs to a different message from a
previously unsuspected star, Algol C. And so it all ends happily.
The best detective is not infallible. In this story our astronomical
detective made a reasonable but unsuccessful guess near the
beginning of the case. He might have seen his error earlier, only
there was a false clue dropped by a third party who happened to be
present at the crime, which seemed to confirm the guess. This was
very unlucky. But it makes all the better detective story of it.
The Story of the Companion of Sirius
The title of this detective story is ‘The Nonsensical Message’.
Sirius is the most conspicuous star in the sky. Naturally it was
observed very often in early days, and it was used by astronomers
along with other bright stars to determine time and set the clocks by.
It was a clock star, as we say. But it turned out that it was not at all a
good clock; it would gain steadily for some years, and then lose. In
1844 Bessel found out the cause of this irregularity; Sirius was
describing an elliptic orbit. Obviously there must be something for it
to move around, and so it came to be recognized that there was a
dark star there which no one had ever seen. I doubt whether any one
expected it would ever be seen. The Companion of Sirius was, I
believe, the first invisible star to be regularly recognized. We ought
not to call such a star hypothetical. The mechanical properties of
matter are much more crucial than the accidental property of being
visible; we do not consider a transparent pane of glass ‘hypothetical’.
There was near Sirius something which exhibited the most universal
mechanical property of matter, namely, exerting force on
neighbouring matter according to the law of gravitation. That is better
evidence of the existence of a material mass than ocular evidence
would be.
However, eighteen years later the Companion of Sirius was
actually seen by Alvan Clark. This discovery was unique in its way;
Clark was not looking at Sirius because he was interested in it, but
because Sirius was a nice bright point of light with which to test the
optical perfection of a large new object-glass that his firm had made.
I dare say that when he saw the little point of light close to Sirius he
was disappointed and tried to polish it away. However, it stayed, and
proved to be the already known but hitherto unseen Companion.
The big modern telescopes easily show the star and rather spoil
the romance; but as romance faded, knowledge grew, and we now
know that the Companion is a star not much less massive than the
sun. It has ⅘ths of the mass of the sun, but gives out only ¹⁄₃₆₀th of
the sun’s light. The faintness did not particularly surprise us;[11]
presumably there should be white-hot stars glowing very brightly and
red-hot stars glowing feebly, with all sorts of intermediate degrees of
brightness. It was assumed that the Companion was one of the
feeble stars only just red hot.
In 1914 Professor Adams at the Mount Wilson Observatory found
that it was not a red star. It was white—white hot. Why, then, was it
not shining brilliantly? Apparently the only answer was that it must be
a very small star. You see, the nature and colour of the light show
that its surface must be glowing more intensely than the sun’s; but
the total light is only ¹⁄₃₆₀th of the sun’s; therefore the surface must
be less than ¹⁄₃₆₀th of the sun’s. That makes the radius less than
¹⁄₁₉th of the sun’s radius, and brings the globe down to a size which
we ordinarily associate with a planet rather than with a star. Working
out the sum more accurately we find that the Companion of Sirius is
a globe intermediate in size between the earth and the next larger
planet Uranus. But if you are going to put a mass not much less than
that of the sun into a globe not very much larger than the earth, it will
be a tight squeeze. The actual density works out at 60,000 times that
of water—just about a ton to the cubic inch.
We learn about the stars by receiving and interpreting the
messages which their light brings to us. The message of the
Companion of Sirius when it was decoded ran: ‘I am composed of
material 3,000 times denser than anything you have ever come
across; a ton of my material would be a little nugget that you could
put in a match-box.’ What reply can one make to such a message?
The reply which most of us made in 1914 was—‘Shut up. Don’t talk
nonsense.’
But in 1924 the theory described in the last lecture had been
developed; and you will remember that at the end it pointed to the
possibility that matter in the stars might be compressed to a density
much transcending our terrestrial experience. This called back to
mind the strange message of the Companion of Sirius. It could no
longer be dismissed as obvious nonsense. That does not mean that
we could immediately assume it to be true; but it must be weighed
and tested with a caution which we should not care to waste over a
mere nonsense jingle.
It should be understood that it was very difficult to explain away
the original message as a mistake. As to the mass being ⅘ths of the
sun’s mass there can be no serious doubt at all. It is one of the very
best determinations of stellar mass. Moreover, it is obvious that the
mass must be large if it is to sway Sirius out of its course and upset
its punctuality as a clock. The determination of the radius is less
direct, but it is made by a method which has had conspicuous
success when applied to other stars. For example, the radius of the
huge star Betelgeuse was first calculated in this way; afterwards it
was found possible to measure directly the radius of Betelgeuse by
means of an interferometer devised by Michelson, and the direct
measurement confirmed the calculated value. Again the Companion
of Sirius does not stand alone in its peculiarity. At least two other
stars have sent us messages proclaiming incredibly high density;
and considering our very limited opportunities for detecting this
condition, there can be little doubt that these ‘white dwarfs’, as they
are called, are comparatively abundant in the stellar universe.
But we do not want to trust entirely to one clue lest it prove false
in some unsuspected way. Therefore in 1924 Professor Adams set
to work again to apply to the message a test which ought to be
crucial. Einstein’s theory of gravitation indicates that all the lines of
the spectrum of a star will be slightly displaced towards the red end
of the spectrum as compared with the corresponding terrestrial lines.
On the sun the effect is almost too small to be detected having
regard to the many causes of slight shift which have to be
disentangled. To me personally Einstein’s theory gives much
stronger assurance of the real existence of the effect than does the
observational evidence available. Still it is a striking fact that those
who have made the investigation are now unanimous in their
judgement that the effect really occurs on the sun, although some of
them at first thought that they had evidence against it. Hitherto
Einstein’s theory has been chiefly regarded by the practical
astronomer as something he is asked to test; but now the theory has
a chance to show its mettle by helping us to test something much
more doubtful than itself. The Einstein effect is proportional to the
mass divided by the radius of the star; and since the radius of the
Companion of Sirius is very small (if the message is right) the effect
will be very large. It should in fact be thirty times as large as on the
sun. That lifts it much above all the secondary causes of shift of the
lines which made the test on the sun so uncertain.
The observation is very difficult because the Companion of Sirius
is faint for work of this kind, and scattered light from its
overpoweringly brilliant neighbour causes much trouble. However,
after a year’s effort Professor Adams made satisfactory
measurements, and he found a large shift as predicted. Expressing
the results in the usual unit of kilometres per second, the mean of his
measurements came to 19, whilst the predicted shift was 20.
Professor Adams has thus killed two birds with one stone. He has
carried out a new test of Einstein’s general theory of relativity, and he
has shown that matter at least 2,000 times denser than platinum is
not only possible but actually exists in the stellar universe.[13] This is
the best confirmation we could have for our view that the sun with a
density 1½ times that of water is still very far indeed from the
maximum density of stellar matter; and it is therefore entirely
reasonable that we should find it behaving like a perfect gas.
I have said that the observation was exceedingly difficult.
However experienced the observer, I do not think we ought to put
implicit trust in a result which strains his skill to the utmost until it has
been verified by others working independently. Therefore you should
for the present make the usual reservations in accepting these
conclusions. But science is not just a catalogue of ascertained facts
about the universe; it is a mode of progress, sometimes tortuous,
sometimes uncertain. And our interest in science is not merely a
desire to hear the latest facts added to the collection; we like to
discuss our hopes and fears, probabilities and expectations. I have
told the detective story so far as it has yet unrolled itself. I do not
know whether we have reached the last chapter.
Unknown Atoms and Interpretation of
Spectra
It should be understood that this matter of enormous density is
not supposed to be any strange substance—a new chemical
element or elements. It is just ordinary matter smashed about by the
high temperature and so capable of being packed more tightly—just
as more people could be squeezed into a room if a few bones were
broken. It is one of the features of astronomical physics that it shows
us the ordinary elements of the earth in an extraordinary state—
smashed or ionized to a degree that has either not been reproduced
or has been reproduced with great difficulty in the laboratory. It is not
only in the inaccessible interior of the star that we find matter in a
state outside terrestrial experience.
Here is a picture of the Ring Nebula in Lyra (Fig. 8).[14] It is taken
through a prism so that we see not one ring but a number of rings
corresponding to different lines of the spectrum and representing the
different kinds of atoms which are at work producing the light of the
nebula. The smallest ring, which is rather faint (marked by an arrow),
consists of light produced by the helium atoms in the nebula—not
ordinary helium but smashed helium atoms. It was one of the great
laboratory achievements of recent times when Professor A. Fowler in
1912 succeeded in battering helium atoms in a vacuum tube
sufficiently to give this kind of light, already well known in the stars.
Two other rings are due to hydrogen. With these three exceptions
none of the rings have yet been imitated in the laboratory. For
instance, we do not know what elements are producing the two
brightest rings on the extreme right and left respectively.
We are sometimes asked whether any new elements show
themselves in the stars which are not present or are not yet
discovered on the earth. We can give fairly confidently the answer
No. That, however, is not because everything seen in the stars has
been identified with known terrestrial elements. The answer is in fact
given not by the astronomer but by the physicist. The latter has been
able to make out the orderly scheme of the elements; and it
transpires that there are no gaps left for fresh elements until we
come to elements of very high atomic weight, which would not be
likely to rise into the atmosphere of a star and show themselves in
astronomical observation. Every element carries a number, starting
with hydrogen which is No. 1, and going up to uranium which is No.
92.
Fig. 8. THE RING NEBULA IN LYRA
Fig. 9. HYDROGEN—THE BALMER SERIES

And what is more, the element carries its number-plate so
conspicuously that a physicist is able to read it. He can, for instance,
see that iron is No. 26 without having to count up how many known
elements precede it. The elements have been called over by their
numbers, and up to No. 84 they have all answered ‘Present’.[15]
The element helium (No. 2) was first discovered by Lockyer in the
sun, and not until many years later was it found on the earth.
Astrophysicists are not likely to repeat this achievement; they cannot
discover new elements if there aren’t any. The unknown source of
the two rings close together on the right of the photograph (a bright
ring and a fainter ring) has been called nebulium. But nebulium is not
a new element. It is some quite familiar element which we cannot
identify because it has lost several of its electrons. An atom which
has lost an electron is like a friend who has shaved off his
moustache; his old acquaintances do not recognize him. We shall
recognize nebulium some day. The theoretical physicists are at work
trying to find laws which will determine exactly the kind of light given
off by atoms in various stages of mutilation—so that it will be purely
a matter of calculation to infer the atom from the light it emits. The
experimental physicists are at work trying more and more powerful
means of battering atoms, so that one day a terrestrial atom will be
stimulated to give nebulium light. It is a great race; and I do not know
which side to back. The astronomer cannot do much to help the
solution of the problem he has set. I believe that if he would measure
with the greatest care the ratio of intensity of the two nebulium lines
he would give the physicists a useful hint. He also provides another
clue—though it is difficult to make anything of it—namely, the
different sizes of the rings in the photograph, showing a difference in
the distribution of the emitting atoms. Evidently nebulium has a
fondness for the outer parts of the nebula and helium for the centre;
but it is not clear what inference should be drawn from this difference
in their habits.
The atoms of different elements, and atoms of the same element
in different states of ionization, all have distinctive sets of lines which
are shown when the light is examined through a spectroscope.
Under certain conditions (as in the nebulae) these appear as bright
lines; but more often they are imprinted as dark lines on a
continuous background. In either case the lines enable us to identify
the element, unless they happen to belong to an atom in a state of
which we have had no terrestrial experience. The rash prophecy that
knowledge of the composition of the heavenly bodies must be for
ever beyond our reach has long been disproved; and the familiar
elements, hydrogen, carbon, calcium, titanium, iron, and many
others, can be recognized in the most distant parts of the universe.
The thrill of this early discovery has now passed. But meanwhile
stellar spectroscopy has greatly extended its scope; it is no longer
chemical analysis, but physical analysis. When we meet an old
acquaintance there is first the stage of recognition; the next question
is ‘How are you?’ After recognizing the stellar atom we put this
question, and the atom answers, ‘Quite sound’ or ‘Badly smashed’,
as the case may be. Its answer conveys information as to its
environment—the severity of the treatment to which it is being
subjected—and hence leads to a knowledge of the conditions of
temperature and pressure in the object observed.
Surveying the series of stars from the coolest to the hottest, we
can trace how the calcium atoms are at first whole, then singly
ionized, then doubly ionized—a sign that the battering becomes
more severe as the heat becomes more intense. (The last stage is
indicated by the disappearance of all visible signs of calcium,
because the ion with two electrons missing has no lines in the
observable part of the spectrum.) The progressive change of other
elements is shown in a similar way. A great advance in this study
was made in 1920 by Professor M. N. Saha, who first applied the
quantitative physical laws which determine the degree of ionization
at any given temperature and pressure. He thereby struck out a new
line in astrophysical research which has been widely developed.
Thus, if we note the place in the stellar sequence where complete
calcium atoms give place to atoms with one electron missing, the
physical theory is able to state the corresponding temperature or
pressure.[16] Saha’s methods have been improved by R. H. Fowler
and E. A. Milne. One important application was to determine the
surface temperatures of the hottest types of stars (12,000°—
25,000°), since alternative methods available for cooler stars are not
satisfactory at these high temperatures. Another rather striking result
was the discovery that the pressure in the star (at the level surveyed
by the spectroscope) is only ¹⁄₁₀₀₀₀th of an atmosphere; previously it
had been assumed on no very definite evidence to be about the
same as that of our own atmosphere.
We commonly use the method of spectrum analysis when we
wish to determine which elements are present in a given mineral on
the earth. It is equally trustworthy in examining the stars since it can
make no difference whether the light we are studying comes from a
body close at hand or has travelled to us for hundreds of years
across space. But one limitation in stellar work must always be
remembered. When the chemist is looking, say, for nitrogen in his
mineral, he takes care to provide the conditions which according to
his experience are necessary for the nitrogen spectrum to show
itself. But in the stars we have to take the conditions as we find
them. If nitrogen does not appear, that is no proof that nitrogen is
absent; it is much more likely that the stellar atmosphere does not hit
off the right conditions for the test. In the spectrum of Sirius the lines
of hydrogen are exceedingly prominent and overwhelm everything
else. We do not infer that Sirius is composed mainly of hydrogen; we
infer instead that its surface is at a temperature near 10,000°,
because it can be calculated that that is a temperature most
favourable for a great development of these hydrogen lines. In the
sun the most prominent spectrum is iron. We do not infer that the
sun is unusually rich in iron; we infer that it is at a comparatively low
temperature near 6,000° favourable for the production of the iron
spectrum. At one time it was thought that the prominence of
hydrogen in Sirius and of metallic elements in the sun indicated an
evolution of the elements, hydrogen turning into heavier elements as
the star cools from the Sirian to the solar stage. There is no ground
for interpreting the observations in that way; the fading of the
hydrogen spectrum and the increase of the iron spectrum would
occur in any case as the result of the fall of temperature; and similar
spurious appearances of evolution of elements can be arranged in
the laboratory.

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An Integrative Guide to Consumer

Neuroscience Sven Braeutigam

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The Student’s Guide to Social Neuroscience 2nd Edition,

Guide to Research Techniques in Neuroscience 3nd

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1. The Road to Consumer Neuroscience 1

analysis, and interpretation of neuroimaging data. The purpose of this chapter is

Düsseldorf and Oxford, 2021

1.1 What Is Consumer Neuroscience?

I don’t need to know anything about the hippopotamus.

Within recent years, academic research focusing on the interface between

1.2 A Brief History of Consumer Research

The emergence of consumer neuroscience is closely connected to consumer behaviour

in the early twentieth century.

consumer behaviour, which were thought to be ‘processual one-​way streets’ (Engel

Input (Stimuli) Organism (Black Box) Output (Responses)

• Demography (e.g. age, The decision-making process

Observable (manifest) Unobservable (latent) Observable (manifest)

Fig. 1.1 A stimulus–​organism–​response (S-​O-​R) model.

Perceptual constructs Learning constructs

Fig. 1.2 The Howard–​Sheth model.

Besides these exemplary models that attempt to theoretically construct the

1.3 The Origins of Consumer Neuroscience

1.4 Why Consumer Neuroscience Is Important

One central assumption of neuroeconomics and consumer neuroscience is that

1. The approach of consumer neuroscience enables the researcher to reassess ex-

It may not be immediately apparent, but both individual consumer neuroscience

of market-​orientated management. A few years ago, the prominent marketing

1.5 Consolidating Questions

Q1. How is consumer neuroscience defined?

Consumer neuroscience, as has been pointed out in Chapter 1, draws on different

2.1 Memory and Learning

Events Procedural Priming Simple

Hippocampus Striatum Neocortex Amygdala Cerebellum Reflex

Fig. 2.1 Memory systems in the brain.

respective task. An example of this is the learning of a certain skilled craftmanship

2.2 Arousal, Attention, and Awareness

As previously mentioned, the formation of different memory contents greatly

Box 2.1 Yerkes–​Dodson law

The Yerkes–​Dodson law is an empirical relationship between arousal and performance,

Neuroscientific studies on the anatomical foundations of attention have verified

dampening the irrelevant information. In addition, the brainstem seems to play an

Motivation is the reason for goal-​oriented behaviour including processes associ-

Biological Operant conditioning

The term self-​actualization is the assumption that individuals have or develop a

A reward is a subjectively satisfying, often pleasurable experience that typically

2.5 Decision-​Making and Cognitive Processes

A very important focus of consumer neuroscience is to investigate how consumers

2.6 The Somatic Marker Hypothesis

The somatic marker hypothesis (SMH) is a neurobiological theory of human

Gain: $50 p=1

Gain: $50 p=1

Gain: $100 p=1

Gain: $100 p=1

VMPFC SMC/insula VMPFC SMC/insula

Effectorial structures (hypothalamus,

Sensory and neurotransmitters

‘Body loop’ ‘As-If body loop’

1. The Road to Consumer Neuroscience 1

consumer behaviour, which were thought to be ‘processual one-way streets’ (Engel

Fig. 1.1 A stimulus–organism–response (S-O-R) model.

Fig. 1.2 The Howard–Sheth model.

of market-orientated management. A few years ago, the prominent marketing

Box 2.1 Yerkes–Dodson law

The Yerkes–Dodson law is an empirical relationship between arousal and performance,

Motivation is the reason for goal-oriented behaviour including processes associ-

The term self-actualization is the assumption that individuals have or develop a

2.5 Decision-Making and Cognitive Processes

2.8 Reward-Based Learning

The most relevant algorithms in this context are known as temporal-difference

Subject arrives in laboratory 60 N/a 58 (=50 +8)

Subject seated in MEG scanner 0 28 N/a