Aristotelica Studies On The Text of Aristotles Eudemian Ethics Christopher Rowe Full Chapter PDF

Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of
Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics

Christopher Rowe
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/aristotelica-studies-on-the-text-of-aristotles-eudemian
-ethics-christopher-rowe/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
Aristotle, De motu animalium: Text and Translation

Oliver Primavesi
https://ebookmass.com/product/aristotle-de-motu-animalium-text-
and-translation-oliver-primavesi/
Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life Sylvia

Berryman
https://ebookmass.com/product/aristotle-on-the-sources-of-the-
ethical-life-sylvia-berryman/
On the Soul: And Other Psychological Works Aristotle
https://ebookmass.com/product/on-the-soul-and-other-
psychological-works-aristotle/
Aristotle on Sexual Difference. Metaphysics, Biology,

Politics Marguerite Deslauriers
https://ebookmass.com/product/aristotle-on-sexual-difference-
metaphysics-biology-politics-marguerite-deslauriers/
The Witch and The Cowboy Ryen Rowe
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-witch-and-the-cowboy-ryen-rowe/
Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good 1st Edition

Marta Jimenez
https://ebookmass.com/product/aristotle-on-shame-and-learning-to-
be-good-1st-edition-marta-jimenez/
John 11–21: A Handbook on the Greek Text Novakovic
https://ebookmass.com/product/john-11-21-a-handbook-on-the-greek-
text-novakovic/
On The Origin of Evolution : Tracing ‘Darwin’s

Dangerous Idea’ From Aristotle to DNA John Gribbin
https://ebookmass.com/product/on-the-origin-of-evolution-tracing-
darwins-dangerous-idea-from-aristotle-to-dna-john-gribbin/
The New Testament in Syriac Peshitta Version: Based on

the Collations of John Pinkerton and on the B.F.B.S.
Text with a Critical Apparatus and an Introduction to
the History of the Text A Juckel
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-new-testament-in-syriac-
peshitta-version-based-on-the-collations-of-john-pinkerton-and-
on-the-b-f-b-s-text-with-a-critical-apparatus-and-an-
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 04/08/23, SPi
Aristotelica
Aristotelica
Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s
Eudemian Ethics
C H R I S T O P H E R R OW E
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,

United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© Christopher Rowe 2023
The moral rights of the author have been asserted
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2022942797
ISBN 978–0–19–287355–2
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.001.0001
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Contents
Introduction vii
Eudemian Ethics I 1
Eudemian Ethics II 22
Eudemian Ethics III 71
Eudemian Ethics VII/IV 102
Eudemian Ethics VIII/V 180
Appendix 228
Index 256
Introduction
The following Studies are designed primarily to explain the reasoning

behind the choices that, line by line, shaped the text of the Eudemian
Ethics (EE) printed in the accompanying Oxford text (OCT). As is well
known, the transmitted text of EE is in many places highly corrupt. The
studies below attempt to justify the solutions I have adopted to the prob-
lems of the text and explain why I have rejected rival solutions; they lay
no claim to exhaustiveness (not all available solutions are considered),
but rather constitute a record of the route by which I arrived at my deci-
sion in each case, in conversation mostly with others, in many cases long
since gone, sometimes with myself. A secondary function of these Studies
is to provide more complete information about the Greek manuscripts
than is given in the apparatus.1 An Appendix, at the end of the present
volume, brings together full sets of data, for the four primary manu-
scripts, that reveal not only the relationships between these four manu-
scripts but also the idiosyncrasies of the three copyists involved, and the
typical errors that we tend to find from time to time in all of them.
Information about such errors is particularly important insofar as it
provides a warning against relying too heavily on ‘what the manuscripts
say’, even when there is unanimity between them. True, since the manu-
scripts represent the only primary evidence we have (with a little help,
for two small portions of the text, from Latin translations), we should
not be too ready to deviate from them. But they do go wrong, in
1 Frequent references will be found, in the following studies, to ‘the B copyist’. This designa-
tion is shorthand for ‘the copyist of B and/or the copyist(s) of any manuscript(s) that may have
preceded in the line of descent from the hyparchetype α´ ’: for all we know, either part or indeed
all of what I attribute to the activity of the B copyist might properly be attributable to an inter-
mediary or intermediaries. But since we shall presumably never know if that is the case, every-
thing in question may as well be assigned to the copyist of B, i.e. the manuscript the contents of
which are actually known to us. L itself may very well be descended directly from the archetype
ω, so that references to ‘the L copyist’ can be taken with some safety as being just that. As for P
and C, even though their antigraphon, α, is lost, the fact that they are non-identical twins
allows us considerable insight into the contributions of their copyist, Nikolaos of Messina.
Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of Aristotle’s Eudemian Ethics. First Edition. Christopher Rowe,
Oxford University Press. © Christopher Rowe 2023. DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780192873552.001.0001
viii Introduction
predictable ways, and quite often all at the same time, as the data put
beyond question.
The Studies are intended to be read with the text and apparatus. They
started life as footnotes to a draft text; they and the apparatus may have
been separated physically from each other, but their shared origins will
be quickly apparent to the reader.
Eudemian Ethics I
[The style of the titles of the books in PCBL varies slightly: the title can
be just ‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων’, or ‘ἀριστοτέλους ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων’, or
‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων ἀριστοτέλους’; varying as it may do within a single
MS, the style used is evidently arbitrary.]
1214a2 συνέγραψεν (PCBL) on the face of it looks unlikely, given (a)

the general pattern of usage of this compound, (b) the fact that such
usage can specifically connect it with the writing of prose (n.b. the
immediately following ποιήσας); ἀναγράϕω, by contrast, as suggested
by Richards, would be a natural choice for the present context, and
for ἀν- to become συν-, perhaps especially after the final sigma of
ἀποϕηνάμενος, would be well within the limits of the sorts of errors we
typically find in these MSS. Nevertheless, the case is still not quite
proven (see Dirlmeier1 ad loc.), and given that the policy of the present
text is to make as few changes as possible where our primary MSS are
unanimous, συνέγραψεν stands.
a5 Αmbr.’s placing of the δέ before ἥδιστον corresponds with its position

as it evidently was in the original, i.e. Theognis 256 = πρῆγμα δὲ
τερπνότατον τοῦ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν, but since Aristotle has announced
the lines as poetry, they should be metrical, as they are in the different
version at NE I.8, 1099a27–8; for that to be the case, unless we read τοῦ
for οὗ, the δέ will have tο follow ἥδιστον. —ἐρᾷ τὸ Bessarion: i.e. Bessarion
in Parisinus 2042, though he also adds ται above the τὸ, then crosses ται
out. (See Preface to text: ‘Bessarion’ in the apparatus here and from now on
refers exclusively to this MS, a vast collection of Aristotelian excerpts
1 The absence of a full reference for an author and work cited indicates that bibliographical
details of the author/work appear in one or more of (1) the Preface in the sister volume of the
present Studies (hereafter ‘Preface to text’), (2) the Bibliography to that Preface, or (3) the list in
the same volume of authors that are cited in the apparatus.
2 Eudemian Ethics I
(1214a5) Cardinal Bessarion wrote out in his own hand; he certainly con-
tributed, especially in the form of marginalia, to other MSS, especially Rav.
210, Marc. 200, and Marc. 213, but since (a) it is usually hard to be sure
exactly what is attributable to him in these, and (b) it hardly matters for
my purposes, I leave him uncredited there, except in special circumstances,
in the same way that I do other named figures we know to have been
involved with our MSS, whether because they commissioned, copied, cor-
rected, or commented on them.) The Aldine later makes the correction to
ἐρᾷ τὸ independently, no doubt from direct knowledge of Theognis.
Bessarion writes out a version of Theognis’ line in the margin of Par. 2042
(πᾶσι δὲ τερπνότατον οὗ τις ἐρᾷ τὸ τυχεῖν) above and to the left of
the first line of EE, and then tries out τερπνότατον δ’ ἐστ’, apparently as a
substitute for the MSS’ ἥδιστον, in the margin opposite that.
a6 συγχωροῦμεν Laur. 81,12: an easy mistake (the ου is corrected by

another hand [= ‘Laur. 81,122’] to omega, s.l.); it might be a conjecture,
but ‘perhaps we don’t agree with him’ is not obviously an improvement
on ‘let us not. . .’.
a10 In B both μὲν here and the δὲ following have what appears to be a
double accent. Similar double accentuation, especially with μὲν, occurs
here and there in B; it is not clear why.
a10–11 καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος: if there is a problem

here, Langerbeck’s solution (simply bracketing καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις)
seems better than either of Spengel’s; the second, indeed, given that we
are actually going to talk about the κτῆσις of the πρᾶγμα in question,
seems to make matters worse. But while there may be some awkward-
ness in the Greek, it seems tolerable. Woods’s bracketing of τοῦ
πράγματος, which after all is prepared for by περὶ ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα
earlier in the sentence, seems high-handed when the context is actually
about ἕκαστον πρᾶγμα (a9). Inwood and Woolf, in their translation of
EE in the series Cambridge Texts in the History of Philosophy (2013:
hereafter ‘Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge translation’), seem cov-
ertly to adopt Spengel’s first solution.
a13 Dirlmeier interprets the MSS’ ἦν as a ‘philosophical’ imperfect, tak-

ing Aristotle to be referring to things he has said prior to the EE (‘once a
Aristotelica 3
Grundsatz, always a Grundsatz’, to paraphrase Dirlmeier). That, however,

involves the unwarranted presupposition that Aristotle thinks of himself
as writing the EE as part of a collected body of work. So if it is that sort
of imperfect, we would evidently need an unusual, as it were forward-
looking, use of it, i.e. ‘whatever turns out to have been appropriate. . .’.
I prefer a suggestion by Christopher Strachan (in correspondence), who
compares Plato, Cratylus 388a10 Τί ἦν ὄργανον ἡ κερκίς; Οὐχ ᾧ
κερκίζομεν: ‘this seems to be a sort of aoristic use, akin perhaps to a
gnomic aorist designating something that is always or generally the
emendation (ὅτιπερ 〈ἂν〉 οἰκεῖον ᾖ) unnecessary.

case.’ This is surely more than plausible enough to render Richards’s
a23 With δαιμονίᾳ (CBL), the following τινὸς would be orphaned and
unexplained; the feminine dative is by attraction to the preceding
ἐπιπνοίᾳ. So P’s δαιμονίου it must surely be (presumably it is an
emendation by the copyist: δαιμονίᾳ, being in both recensiones, is likely
to have been in ω, the common source/archetype). Incidentally,
Bessarion (ap. Par. 2042) also has δαιμονίου. This is not an independent
conjecture of his: my trawl through Par. 2042 makes it almost certain
that there, throughout, he was using either (a corrected version of) P, or
more probably its descendant Pal. 165, which includes many corrections
to P: so for example in the continuation of the present sentence he reads
διὰ τὴν τύχην rather than L’s διὰ τύχην (and so he continues right to
the end of Book VIII/V). This is in one way a surprise, because Bessarion
is otherwise associated with MSS that are mostly descended from L,
i.e. that belong to the other recensio, but in another way it is not so
surprising, given that P is itself sometimes corrected from a represent
ative of the recensio Constantinopolitana; see Harlfinger 1971: 9 on the
complexity of the relationships between the extant MSS of EE.
a24 ταὐτό: C is the only one of the four primary MSS to write in the crasis
mark here (crasis marks are more often than not omitted in all four).
a25 εὐτυχείαν PC for εὐτυχίαν: ει for ι in such endings is a signature
feature of P and C.
a26 τῇ παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων, κτλ: as subject of the sentence, which

all of PCBL make it, ἡ παρουσία appears peculiarly redundant; the
4 Eudemian Ethics I
(1214a26) subject is surely εὐδαιμονία, and translators sometimes (see

e.g. Solomon [in the Oxford Translation of 1915], Woods, and Kenny [in
the Oxford World’s Classics translation]) pretend that it—εὐδαιμονία—and
not παρουσία is actually subject in the transmitted text. One possibility
would be simply to bracket ἡ παρουσία, but it would then be a mystery
how it ever got into the text. For Spengel’s proposal, i.e. to bracket διὰ
instead, and write dative for nominative, a story is much easier to con-
struct: the dative—because of its position, and the lack of an expressed
subject?—was corrupted into a nominative, but then διὰ had to be sup-
rather less well with Spengel’s alternative proposal, 〈ἡ εὐδαιμονία〉 τῇ

plied to make sense of the following genitives. (This story would work
παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων. . . .)

a29 τὶς B2: it is feature of all of PCBL that they tend to accent indefinite
τις/τι, and of B that it likes to give τίς/τί a grave accent. —συναγάγει
in Laur. 81,4, a descendant at this point from C, is corrected to
συναγάγοι (also in Marc. [descended from L], according to Harlfinger);
B too, presumably, was faced with συναγάγει, and made the same cor-
rection. All the variants offered by the MSS would, incidentally, have the
same Byzantine pronunciation. (‘Errors arising from similarity in pro-
nunciation’, comments Christopher Strachan, ‘are among the most com-
mon of all, and very frequent in these MSS.’)
b7 ἐπιστήσαντα in P is by attraction to the following ἅπαντα; the two
dots, vertically arranged, associated with the -τα ending are converted by P2
to the sign for -ας. —Woods claims that ‘ἐπιστήσαντας [sc. τὴν διάνοιαν]
with a dependent accusative and infinitive is doubtful Greek’, but while
admitting that there are no precise parallels I think it possible to construe
the noun clause, i.e. the accusative and infinitive, as being—as it were—in
the dative: ‘paying attention, in relation to these things, [to the fact] that
every person. . .’. Though strictly δεῖ in b12 might govern ἐπιστήσαντας (sc.
〈χρὴ〉 and P2’s 〈δεῖ 〉 (see next note); my own view is that the sentence
ἡμᾶς) here, it is too far away to make that entirely plausible—hence Allan’s
becomes so extended, especially with the—unexpectedly expansive?—

explanatory clause ὡς τό γε . . . σημεῖόν ἐστιν in b10–12, that Aristotle
simply forgets where he started, and in effect starts again. (Pace Woods, I see
no reason why Aristotle should not be claiming that everyone does in fact
Aristotelica 5
set themselves an end: the list of possible ends is restricted to popular-

sounding choices [n.b. also the non- technical/non-Aristotelian use of
καλῶς just before the list], and that it would be very foolish not to set one-
self an end in life [b10–12] could be taken as evidence for the claim rather
than, as Woods suggests, conflicting with it.)
b8 δεῖ post θέσθαι suppl. P2, in the margin: but pace P2, and Woods ad
loc., the point Aristotle is leading up to is that while everyone sets them-
selves an end, they need to be careful about their choice; there is no rea-
son (apart from—what some suppose to be—an orphaned infinitive) for
him to be exhorting them to set themselves an end: cf. preceding note.
b12 ‘δὴ sine causa secl. Spengel’, Susemihl, with justification. —ἐν αὑτῷ
Victorius (‘γρ.’), and then Bekker, followed by other editors: but what is
in the MSS is ἐν αὐτῷ, i.e. ‘in the matter in hand’, to be read with
πρῶτον rather than, or as much as, with διορίσασθαι.
b17 οὐ deest in P1CL: οὐ is added above line in P, surely by a later hand,
with an insertion mark. This is one of a significant number of occasions
on which B is the only one of PCBL to preserve the right reading.
b19 τῆς 〈καλῆς〉 ζωῆς Richards: but καλῆς presumably can and should
be understood in any case.
b24 περὶ πάντων: P2 writes ἴσως: περιπάτων in the margin; L’s

περιπάτων is post corr., but the corrections in L, evidently currente
calamo, are only in the formation of the iota and the alpha, and there
was evidently only ever one word.
b35 Spengel’s τῶν πολλῶν 〈ἐπισκεπτέον〉 is part of a solution to larger

problems that follow.
1215a1 εἰκῇ γὰρ Victorius (Pier Vettori), annotating one of his copies
of the Aldine edition; a brilliant emendation. (This is one of the many
conjectures/corrections of his that is not marked by a ‘fort.’ [see Preface
to text], just with a ‘γρ.’) For P2’s οἱ μηδὲν see next note.
a1–2 περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας P1CL,

περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας B: Chalkondyles in
6 Eudemian Ethics I
(1215a1–2) Ambr. leaves a gap after περὶ—something must be missing

after περὶ in its precursor, L (and in PC). But what? Spengel’s proposal is
pleasingly economical, proposing as it does no more than the loss of the
first part of εὐδαιμονίας, but it has its own problems, the worst of which
is that it leaves us with two different explanations (εἰκῇ γὰρ . . . a1,
ἄτοπον γὰρ . . .) for our not having to consider the views of the many,
the second of which follows as if the first was not there; the transposition
of ἐπισκεπτέον, which causes this double explanation, then also looks
questionable, and one might also ask how likely it is that εὐδαιμονίας
would be corrupted to μόνας in a context about εὐδαιμονία (even
though stranger things do happen in the text of EE). Dodds’s proposal,
for its part, has the advantage over Fritzsche’s (on which it builds, as
Fritzsche’s builds on P2’s) that it comes with a beautifully simple
explanation of how the mess in the MSS came about, i.e. through a
copyist’s eye slipping straight from περὶ to πέρι; but it too has important
weaknesses: in its prolixity and in the unclarity of the reference of the
supplied ταύτης (Fritzsche), seven lines after the περὶ αὐτῆς that might
have explained it. My own proposal for completing the sentence goes
back to P2’s οἱ (i.e., presumably, οἳ?) μηδὲν λέγουσι σχεδὸν περὶ
ἁπάντων δὲ καὶ μάλιστα περὶ τούτων τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν ἐπισκεπτέον
μόνας (written out in full in the margin of P). My first step, after accept-
ing Victorius’ εἰκῇ γὰρ before λέγουσι, is to suppress the δὲ and supply
the περὶ ὧν that is then needed to restore the syntax of the sentence.
μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας,

That would give us, for the sake of argument, περὶ ἁπάντων, καὶ
which would (a) offer a solution that is more economical than either
Dodds’s or Fritzsche’s, (b) avoid the problem of the reference of (the
supplied) ταύτης, and (c) provide the sort of sense that everyone, begin-
ning from P2, thinks is required. But of course P2’s supplements have no
authority, as is confirmed by the lack of syntactical coherence in the sen-
tence he offers us here; and when Aristotle generally spends so much
time on, and attributes so much importance to, the endoxa, could he
really have announced, out of the blue, that actually it is only the σοϕοί,
the experts, that we should listen to on the subject in hand? Surely not.
In the present context, the class to be contrasted with οἱ πολλοί would
more naturally be the ἐπιεικεῖς, a fairly indeterminate group whose
Aristotelica 7
chief distinguishing feature is typically that they are not (the) many, and
καὶ μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν ἐπιεικῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον

who will make an appearance a few lines down (a12). So περὶ ἁπάντων,
μόνας—except that by borrowing an element of Dodds’s solution (see
a story about how the corruption might have started: better 〈περὶ
above), and writing περὶ τούτων, ὧν πέρι, we would begin to have
τούτων, ὧν〉 πέρι, then, since strictly it would be the first περί that was
lost; the comma, too, is important, in order to avoid the appearance of a
mere tautology. Beyond that (apart from noting the double ἐπι-, which
might help explain the loss of ἐπιεικῶν?), I merely repeat that we know
in this case—pace Spengel—that the transmitted text is lacunose. I adopt
the reconstruction proposed on three grounds: first, that it gives an
appropriate sense, i.e. one that at least does not commit Aristotle to
something he would be unlikely to say; second, that it is superior to any
alternative presently on offer (see above); and third, that it would be
unhelpful, even a dereliction, to reproduce the nonsense we find in
PCBL, or to follow Chalkondyles and print a lacuna, or indeed to deploy
the obelus, which fastidious readers can easily import for themselves if
they prefer.
a4 Jackson’s πειθοῦς for πάθους is surely implausible: does persuasion

not typically involve λόγος? The mess in L (the copyist has merely run
ἀλλὰ and πάθους together) is a lapse, and does not indicate uncertainty
around πάθους; and contra Barnes, πάθους/πάσχειν can surely be used
by Aristotle on its own to refer to a bad experience/suffering, as at Rhet.
II.5, 1382b29ff.
a5 There are some traces of a correction above βίον in P, and it is natural

to assume that the correction is to βίου, before τοῦ κρατίστου. The mis-
take, shared by all of PCL, is surprising enough to suggest that βίον was
in ω, the common source of PCBL, in which case B is evidently correct-
ing independently. Ambr. (Chalkondyles) also has βίου.
a9 〈τὴν〉 πᾶσαν σκέψιν Dirlmeier: it is true that not literally all σκέψις
has to be as specified, just ‘this whole [present] σκέψις’, but πᾶσαν σκέψιν
will naturally be read, in the context, as ‘all σκέψις of the sort we are
involved in’.
8 Eudemian Ethics I
1215a10 τῳ B (also P2, crossing out the circumflex accent) provides a

viable alternative—‘if someone should find it presumptuous . . .’—to the
impossible τῷ P1CL. Given that these MSS so regularly confuse omi-
renders Fritzsche’s compromise, τῳ 〈τὸ〉, unnecessary.

cron and omega, Victorius’ τὸ is also possible; the same consideration
a11 καὶ πρὸς τὴν ἐλπίδα: P2 writes ἴσως: καὶ τὴν ἐλπίδα in margin.
a14 ἔσται ci. Walzer, for ἐστι: but we can take the reference to be to the
acquisition of τὰ διὰ τύχην ἢ διὰ ϕύσιν γινόμενα in general, rather than
to what would be true of the acquisition of εὐδαιμονία were it to be one
of these.
a19 [ἃ] τοῖς αὑτοὺς: τοῖς αὑτοὺς is all that is needed if we take κεῖσθαι
to mean ‘be available’ (‘laid up’, ‘in the bank’: see LSJ2 s.v. III); the ἃ could
perhaps be descended from an earlier dittography, i.e. αὐτοῖς for τοῖς
before αὑτοὺς. P2’s ἐν τοῖς αὐτοὺς, in margin, preceded by ἴσως,
looks a non-starter: εὐδαιμονία might lie ἐν τῷ αὐτοὺς/αὑτοὺς
παρασκευάζειν . . ., but scarcely in the individuals doing it. (Woods
accepts ἐν, taking τοῖς as neuter: ‘happiness consists in those things
which cause human beings . . . to be of a certain kind’, but this would
surely be an odd thing for Aristotle to say about happiness, if it is not
just a way of making ἐν τοῖς come to the same thing as ἐν τῷ.)
a27 τῶν μὲν 〈οὐδ’〉 Bonitz, τῶν μὲν 〈οὐκ〉 Rav.: one could try arguing
that the negative is in effect retrospectively supplied by the following
ἀλλ’ ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων χάριν σπουδαζομένων—‘some dispute [the
title in question] but on the grounds that they labour for the sake of the
necessaries of life [sc. and they must clearly be ruled out on the basis of
what has just been said, at some length, about the need to distinguish the
goods that constitute happiness and those that are merely its necessary
conditions]’. But this is surely too much of a stretch, and in any case no
one, or no one that mattered to Aristotle, ever suggested that the ‘vulgar’
and ‘banausic’ lives in question could claim to be best. Rav. sees the need
for a negative, but Bonitz’s emphatic οὐδ’ seems preferable.
2 A Greek–English Lexicon compiled by H. Liddell and R. Scott, revised . . . by H. Jones . . .

9th edn, with a revised supplement. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1996.
Aristotelica 9
a28 In P a first correcting hand puts in an elision mark and rough

breathing over what was plainly once ἄλλως, apparently erasing an
acute accent after the initial smooth breathing; a second correcting hand
then writes ἵσως: τῶν μὲν ὡς τῶν ἀναγκαίων (not ἀλλὰ τῶν μὲν ὡς,
as reported by Walzer/Mingay) in the margin. The problem is with the
ὡς in CBLP2 ἀλλ’ ὡς, which even translators who claim to retain it
appear not to translate, and not surprisingly, because it is worse than
redundant; the sentence actually works better without it. Spengel’s bril-
liant emendation—which gets some slight support from P’s original
error, i.e. ἄλλως for ἀλλ’ ὡς, the latter presumably being what was in the
common source of PCBL—gives a perfect sense: the lives in question
make no claims at all for themselves precisely because they randomly
busy themselves with the necessaries, i.e. with no reference to the larger
question ‘what is it for?’
a29 Woods’s τὰς for τῶν before περὶ χρηματισμὸν and Russell’s 〈τὰς〉
τῶν both tidy up the list, perhaps in an attempt to make it all fit better
together, but it is not clear either that they succeed in that, or that it
needs to be tidier.
a32–3 πρὸς ὠνὰς μόνον καὶ πράσεις scripsi. Ιn P, the rough breathing
over ων is apparently changed to (the sign for) -ας, though with the cir-
cumflex left in place, and ἴσως: πρὸς ὠνὰς is written either by the same
or by a different hand in the margin, apparently with the intention for it
to replace ἀγορὰς. (Harlfinger reports that πρὸς ὠν becomes πρὸς ὧν
[‘πρὸς ὧν C et p. corr. P2’]; I read the evidence differently, but it is
admittedly hard to be quite sure what the sequence of events was.) Ιn C,
the iota of πρᾶσι is overwritten with ει; in L a sigma is inserted between
πρὸ and ὧν, ὧν marked for deletion, and, if this corrector follows the
same convention as others (after all, the point is to make the Greek make
sense, and the correctors like the copyists appear generally either to
speak Greek or to know their Greek well), πράσει is by implication
changed to πράσεις. (Similarly, perhaps, with P2’s correction of πρᾶσι
to πρᾶσις; might he even be implicitly deleting ὦν, with L?) B, for his
part, if he was faced with the same mess as PCL, as he presumably was,
went straight for simplification—and interestingly both Bessarion, in
Par. 2042, and Marc. 213 independently offer the same solution as B;
10 Eudemian Ethics I
(1215a32–3) perhaps it just was the obvious way out. How to explain
the mess in PCBL themselves? My own thought is that ἀγορὰς was
originally a gloss on ὠνὰς μόνον καὶ πράσεις, but became absorbed
into the text, with μόνον corrupted to μὲν—for which, clearly, there is
no use in the context; P2’s reconstruction is consistent with this.
a33 τῶν εἰς L1, τῶν οὖν εἰς L2: L2 inserts οὖν above the line (a decent
conjecture: resumptive οὖν?).
a34–5 τῶν καὶ πρότερον . . . τοῖς ἀνθρώποις secl. Walzer: the whole
clause does have something of the feel of a gloss, and would not be missed;
on the other hand, if a gloss is what it is, or originally was, it is well adapted
to the syntax of the sentence, and there is no compelling reason to expel it.
a36 What appears here in the margin in P, i.e. τρεῖς βίοι εἰσὶν ἀρετὴς
ϕρονήσεως καὶ ἡδονής, is plainly a summary or heading, not a sugges-
tion for emending the text; L, in its margin, has a more laconic
τρεῖς βίοι.
a37 ἐπ’ ἐξουσίας τυγχάνοντες: an alternative to Spengel’s proposals
might be to suppose that an ὄντες has slipped out through haplography,
but it is easily enough understood in any case.
1215b1 The gap in B after ἀπολαυστικόν is not caused—as some gaps

are—by any fault in the parchment; a heavy dot resembling a Greek
colon appears after ἀπολαυστικόν, and the gap may just be B’s way of
indicating the beginning of—what he sees as—a new section (cf. on
b14 below).
b10 ἐρόμενον BP2, ἐρώμενον P1CL: P2 corrects omega to omicron above

the line. Either the omega was in ω, the original common source of PCBL,
and B made the correction independently, like P2, or else PCL all made
the same—very common—mistake (omega for omicron or vice versa).
b14 ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν: both Russell’s and Richards’s emendations are

surely unnecessary; ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν is perfectly intelligible for the
required sense, i.e. ‘if it’s a human being we’re talking about’. —There is
another slightly shorter gap in B here, after μακάριον εἶναι, also with
what looks like a Greek colon (cf. on b1 above).
Aristotelica 11
b19 δι’ ἃ suppl. P2/3: i.e. P2 writes ἴσως: διὰ προΐενται τὸ ζῆν οἷον νόσους
ὠδύνας χειμῶνας in the margin, and then another hand corrects διὰ
to δι’ ἃ.
b20 For P2’s ὠδύνας, see preceding note. —καὶ is surrounded in C with
four dots, indicating deletion.
b23 B2 adds a breathing over the second alpha of ἀνακάμψαι: B is often

lackadaisical about splitting words/observing gaps between words, and
here the ἀν becomes separated from the rest of the word.
b24 The μὲν after ἐχόντων is plainly superfluous, ἐχόντων μὲν being a
doublet of ἐχόντων μὲν in the next line: so, once again, is B independ
ently correcting?
b29 κἂν is in the margin in P, with insertion marks there and beside καὶ,
which is the first word in the line.
b29–30 ἀπέραντον, τί scripsi, ἀπέραντόν τι PCBL: changing the

accents—on which PCBL, as a group, are in any case less than wholly
solution than Rav.’s ἀπέραντόν τι 〈οὐ〉, adopted by editors.

reliable, especially where τις and τίς are concerned—is a more economical
b33 πορίζοι PCBL, πορίζει Bekker: the optative fits well enough, given
the context (‘who would choose . . . without whatever pleasures x, y, z . . .
might provide?’).
b34 πορίζοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is repeated after προτιμήσειε in P but

crossed out, whether by the original copyist, looking back, or more likely
by another hand.
b35 δῆλον appears in the left margin of C, on the first line on the page,
crammed up against the γὰρ, apparently—messily—supplied by a sec-
ond hand, with what looks like a confirmatory eta above, either from
this corrector or a third hand.
b36 διενέγκοιεν L: the -εν is added as a compendium, unusually for

this MS, above the line and above the second iota.
1216a2 μοναρχιῶν: Fritzsche and Susemihl both write μοναρχῶν, fol-

lowing Lat. (the late Latin translation), but Aristotle would surely have
(1216a2) used μόναρχος (so Rackham); but μοναρχιῶν, on which

PCBL all agree, while surprising is not terminally objectionable.
a3 ἐν τῷ: editors before Walzer/Mingay for some reason preferred τοῦ,
but the unity of PCBL around the perfectly acceptable ἐν τῷ is decisive.
—τὶ B: as observed above, there is a general carelessness in B about the
distinction between acute and grave accents, no doubt partly because of
its tendency to integrate accents with characters.
a8 καθεύδοντα δὲ: another independent correction by B (the μὲν is
nonsensical, as Rav. also sees)?
a12 B2 adds οι above the alpha of ταῦθ’.
a18 To reiterate: ‘δὴ] δὲ PCL’ indicates, by elimination, that B has the δὴ
(attributed by Walzer/Mingay to all of Marc.2, Langerbeck, and Allan); a
happy mistake, another independent correction, or did the hyparche-
type α´ reproduce a δὴ in ω?
a19 ϕαίνονται τάττειν PCL, τάττονται B: ϕαίνονται τάττοντες?
a23 ἀληθῶς: the special sign after ἀληθ in C indicating an ending in
-ως (cf. πως in b10) seems to postdate the apparently partly erased sign
for -ους.
a34 The καλῶς proposed by Bonitz for PCL’s καλὰς is found in B.
a36 A definite article before ἡδοναὶ here would not be out of place (B,
Rackham, and by implication Inwood and Woolf in the Cambridge
translation), but ‘there are other pleasures . . .’ makes perfectly good
sense, and since it appears in both recensiones we should probably
keep it.
a38 The ligature used here in B for -αρα in παρὰ is standard, and is barely
distinguishable from the one used for -ερι (see e.g. περὶ at 1217b40);
similarly with the somewhat different ligatures used by P and C, and no
doubt also ω. PCBL all not infrequently confuse the two prepositions.
1216b2 λόγου: an upsilon is introduced by a correcting hand—perhaps
contemporaneous with Rav., perhaps not—in Laur. 81,20 above the iota
of λόγοι; also by Victorius in his Aldine. (The abbreviation λόγ´ in C
Aristotelica 13
[see Walzer/Mingay] indicates that it has the same ending as the previ-
ous word, so: λόγοι.)
b3 The τοῦ for τὸ, before γινώσκειν, preferred by B2 (introducing a

ligature for ου over the tau) is an interesting variation.
b7 P2 changes the breathing but as usual leaves the other part of the
correction—ὥστ’ to ὥσθ’—to be understood.
b8 The μὲν is omitted/deleted in Marc., then by Bekker; Susemihl

restores it.
b12 τέλος post ἕτερον suppl. Casaubon: we certainly cannot under-

stand τέλος, but nor should we; the sense is ‘there is nothing else
belonging to astronomy. . . ’.
b19 The acute accent on ἤ in B suggests but does not quite make it cer-
tain (given B’s sometimes cavalier relation to accents) that the grave on
τι is a later addition.
b23 ἀνδεῖοι P1: the rho is supplied above by P2 with an insertion mark.
b27 Spengel’s conjecture τούτων πάντα (with πάντα as masculine sin-

gular) starts from the order τούτων πάντων preferred, without justifi-
cation, by e.g. Oxon., the Aldine, Bekker, and Rackham, and supposes/
explains χρώμενον in the line below; but Spengel himself remains
undecided between τούτων πάντα (χρώμενον) and τούτων πάντων
(χρωμένους).
b28 P2 writes ἴσως: χρωμένους in the margin.
b35 γνωριμώτατα ends in B in what is apparently a version of the

shorthand used for τατα in MSS like P and C; there is a mark below the
line of a sort apparently used elsewhere (e.g. at 1217a36) to indicate
separation between words, which perhaps suggests that one reader might
have wanted to read the τατα as ταῦτα. —Richards’s ἀντὶ would be in
keeping with Aristotle’s general usage, and I know of no parallels for
μεταλαμβάνειν as it would be used here, with acc. and plain gen., of
taking one thing in exchange for another; nevertheless to print the ἀντὶ
would be to close the door on the possibility that the verb could have
(1216b35) been used in such a way, when PBCL are unanimous in pro-
posing that it can.
b38 The genitive τῶν πολιτικῶν, pace Victorius (‘fort. τὸν πολιτικὸν’ in
margin), looks sound enough, with τὴν τοιαύτην θεωρίαν, and though we
might have expected Aristotle to refer to the politician per se, there is no
reason why he should not for once be referring to politicians in general.
b40 For Fritzsche’s ϕιλοσόϕου, cf. 1217a1; and the difference between
-ον and -ου, when they are written out, is minuscule. However the copy-
ists of PCBL all evidently had ϕιλόσοϕον before them, and it looks
viable enough.
1217a6 τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων B, ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων PCL:
translators (Solomon, Woods, Kenny, Inwood/Woolf), reading ὑπὸ
τούτων τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων, take the preceding ὧν (ὑϕ’ ὧν) as referring
to ‘reasons’ given or ‘arguments’ made by the subject of the preceding
ποιοῦσιν, i.e. the τινες of a1, but this is awkward, because it leaves us
with ὑπό occurring twice, in the same sentence less than ten words
apart, with the causation/agency assigned to two different things. The
difference between them could perhaps be elided, since after all the
arguments will belong to the τινες. But in my view it would be more
natural to take ὧν itself to refer to the τινες (given that they are the
subject of the main verb of the present sentence), in which case ὑπὸ
τούτων τῶν κτλ would be epexegetic of ὑϕ’ ὧν; and then ὑπὸ τούτων
appears out of place, insofar as Aristotle now introduces a further
description of the people already being referred to in the clause (I note
that none of the translators mentioned above appears to translate
τούτων). Langerbeck recognizes the problems and recommends sur-
gery, cutting out the whole of ὑπὸ τούτων τῶν . . . 7 ἢ πρακτικήν (per-
haps as a gloss?). But the lack of ὑπὸ τούτων in B—whether by chance
or by judgement: presumably the copyist of B had the same text in front
of him as those of PCL—offers a more economical solution, namely to
take τῶν μήτ’ ἐχόντων κτλ itself as straightforwardly in apposition to
the relative ὧν; I surmise that the relatively unexpected, though per-
fectly regular nature of the construction led to the introduction of ὑπὸ
τούτων as a false correlative of ὑϕ’ ὧν.—ἔχειν post μήτε suppl. Ross:
Aristotelica 15
Dirlmeier is probably right to say that ἔχειν is to be (and can be) under-
stood. It would certainly have been easier on the eye if Aristotle had
written in the ἔχειν, but that is not always his way in EE, even in its
more fluent parts.
a12 πάντως Langerbeck: but πάντα, ‘in everything’, is surely better.
a14 καὶ διότι is the pair of a11 διά τε τὸ ῥηθὲν ἀρτίως. This edition
does without parenthesizing brackets, chiefly on the grounds that
Aristotle’s parentheses tend to be part of the forward sweep of his argu-
ment: that is, rather than being hermetically sealed units, like their
modern counterparts, they can include elements that are indispensable
to the onward movement of the surrounding argument. That may not be
quite the case here, and brackets would in this instance certainly make
the text more immediately readable; thus Bekker, then Susemihl and
Walzer/Mingay, all bracketing off a13–14 νῦν δ’ . . . τοῖς εἰρημένοις. But
in following his train of thought Aristotle quite often writes unwieldy
sentences, and if brackets make them more reader-friendly, they often
unhelpfully obscure the argument in the process; even here, a13–14 is
actually of a piece with what precedes it. In extreme cases, where a
parenthesis actually interrupts the syntax, I use dashes.
a19 δὲ: καὶ L; δὲ καὶ Ald., and then also Walzer/Mingay, attributing
it to Walzer. The crucial question, introduced by L’s καὶ, is how far
back the proemion is meant to stretch; I take it to be just to the begin-
ning of the last paragraph, which looks to be a proemion par excel-
lence, and so prefer PCB’s δὲ. Walzer/Mingay’s δὲ καὶ derives
immediately from Susemihl’s ‘δὲ om. [Oxon. Marc.] // καὶ secl.
Spengelius Susem.’ Bekker also had δὲ καὶ (‘δὲ om. [Marc.]’). But
PCB all have just δὲ, and I see no compelling reason to combine this,
as the expected connective (though connectives are not infrequently
missing in EE), with L’s καὶ.
a21 ἐπὶ τῷ σαϕῶς (B): i.e. ‘for the sake of clarity’ (see LSJ s.v. ἐπί
Β.ΙΙΙ.2), picking up on the σαϕῶς of 1216b34, with εὑρεῖν not part of
a noun clause (i.e. τῷ σαϕῶς εὑρεῖν) but rather a straightforward
infinitive after ζητοῦντες; το (PCL) for τω and vice versa is a stand-
ard error.
1217a34–5 οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: I understand ‘so not participating in the

relevant goods either (i.e. those involving movement, as πρακτὰ ἀγαθά
do)’—another example of the often elliptical style of EE.
a38 What B writes here is apparently πράξεως; it is hard, at any rate, to
see what else it could be (at first sight it seems to end -κης, but the accent
is against it, appearing as it does over what ought to be a preceding
alpha). The mess may reflect the copyist’s own uncertainty about what
was in his source.
b5 Bessarion evidently saw there was something wrong with τῷ αἴτιῳ,
but changed the wrong word. —The same correction he then makes of
ἀγαθοῦ to ἀγαθοῖς is also later made by Victorius (with a ‘γρ.’).
b10 ἐκείνης: the ἐκείνοις in B is corrected with an eta above the οι.
b21 ἰδέας: editors adopt Marc.’s ἰδέαν (also proposed by Victorius, with
a ‘γρ.’), not knowing of B’s ἰδέας—which Bessarion also reads, it seems
independently, in Par. 2042.
b22 B has a wavy line under the ουο of ὁτουοῦν, perhaps signalling
(wrongly) a need for correction; cf. L at b27.
b27 τῷ ὄντι ἀγαθόν: the evidence overall suggests that ω, the common
source of PCBL, lacked the definite article before ἀγαθόν; P inserts it,
while B adds a τὸ in a different place, creating a new and different, and
wrong, sense. Cf. 1218a14–15 πᾶσι γὰρ ὑπάρχει κοινόν, another exactly
parallel case where we might have expected the article; perhaps also
1218a21, 38 (L has a wavy line under the omega and omicron of τωόντι,
evidently indicating the need for correction; cf. B at b22).
b29 πρός τι for πότε in Marc., as reported by Walzer/Mingay (I have
not checked), would presumably be attraction to the following πρὸς
(τούτοις).
b33 〈τὸ〉 διδασκόμενον is preferred by editors, but the omission of the
second article under these conditions is common in EE. (Walzer/
Mingay attributes the article to Rav., while Susemihl, saying that P and
Pal. 165 omit it, implies that C, Marc., and Oxon. also have it. C does not;
Marc., copying from Rav., presumably does have it, and it would not be
particularly striking, or interesting, if Oxon. supplied it independently.)
Aristotelica 17
b34 παρὰ: B here, unusually, mimics the shorthand for παρά found in
MSS like P and C, which the L copyist presumably misread in ω.
1218a2 Bessarion’s πρῶτον for πρότερον is perhaps just an error of tran-

scription (but cf. Spengel at 1217b13); he goes on to write προτέρου for
πρῶτου in the next line, as does Spengel, independently, and πρῶτον for
πρότερον in a8, all of which plays havoc with the argument (this is a rare
lapse on his part). Spengel himself then writes πρότερον for πρῶτον in a5
and a6; it is not clear whether his version does any better than Bessarion’s.
a8 Barnes calls Rassow’s conjecture of ἔτι for the MSS’ εἰ ‘palmary’, but
(a) the ἢ both provides the required connective and suitably introduces
a new (step in the) argument: ‘or else τὸ κοινὸν turns out to be the ἰδέα’,
i.e. in all cases, whereas we have just been considering the cases ἐν ὅσοις
ὑπάρχει τὸ πρότερον καὶ ὕστερον; (b) ἤ and εἰ are not infrequently
confused, because the ligature for εἰ in these MSS is close in shape to ἤ,
while being clearly distinguishable from ἔτι, which is always written out
in full. The latter is not a decisive consideration on its own, but provides
support for (a), if (a) holds.
a14 Susemihl, and then Walzer/Mingay, accept Rassow’s supplement

(τὸ ἀγαθὸν μᾶλλον ἀγαθὸν τῷ ἀίδιον εἶναι· οὐδὲ) between οὐδὲ and
δὴ, but such a conclusion is surely obvious enough not to need stating
(and in any case one would have expected οὔτε . . . οὔτε . . . rather than
οὐδὲ . . . οὐδὲ . . .). Woods, in his commentary ad loc., thinks even more is
missed out, sketching what he thinks needs to be added to make a
decent argument. But I propose that a satisfactory sense can be made of
what the MSS give us. Just as we can easily supply the conclusion that
the good is not made more of a good by being ἀΐδιον, so we can supply
‘and if the [form of] the good is more of a good’ to complete what fol-
lows: ‘and so (ὥστε), sc. if the ἰδέα is more of a good, then neither
(οὐδὲ) is τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθὸν ταὐτὸ τῇ ἰδέᾳ (the hypothesis we were
working with: a8–9 ἢ συμβαίνει τὸ κοινὸν εἶναι τὴν ἰδέαν, κτλ [hence
οὐδὲ δὴ]), because it—a15 κοινόν = τὸ κοινόν, subject—belongs to
every good [sc. which the form will not if it is somehow more of a good
than other goods]’. This is standard Eudemian ellipse. —ταὐτὸ: C alone
has the crasis mark.
1218a15 ‘γρ. ἢ ὡς’, then (a17) ‘γρ. ἀνομολογουμένων’, Victorius.

a23 τάξις καὶ ἠρεμία: or should we read τάξεις καὶ ἠρεμίαι, rather
than accepting B’s τάξις—which appears in Rav., Matr. 4627, and
Ambr., all independently, it seems, of B—in the same phrase? After all,
we have just had τάξεις . . . καὶ ἀριθμοί (a19), as part of the same dialectical
argument. On the other hand, the plural there could be the cause of the
plural τάξεις here in PCL. —P2’s ἀριθμοί, in the margin, prefaced with
ἴσως, continues the process, substituting for ἠρεμία because of the
plural τάξεις, and in imitation of a19.
a27 γρ: τοῦτο P2 in margin. Τhe γρ is followed by something super-
script; probably αι, as Harlifinger says, so γρ[άϕετ]αι, but possibly (see
on a38 below) -ον, so γρ[απτέ]ον.
a29 ἀλόγοις L: an easy error, perhaps, after the ending -εν. (It is perhaps
worth recording that P, for instance, has two separate ligatures/marks
for -ως, one of which lends itself easily to being confused with that for
-ου; both appear, I notice, in this stretch in P, apparently with no rule as
to when or why one might be preferred over the other.)
a36–7 Cook Wilson actually proposed to bracket a37–8 ἔτι οὐ πρακτόν
as well, but that seems a step too far; it is ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
γεγραμμένον, ἢ γὰρ . . . ἢ πάσαις ὁμοίως that is suspect, for the follow-
ing reasons. Aristotle is summing up (ἔχει ἀπορίας τοιαύτας, κτλ).
Now ἔτι καὶ τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον . . . either (a) refers back, or
(b) refers to some other work. If (a), then he has no need for τὸ ἐν τῷ
λόγῳ γεγραμμένον; the point in question has been made (at consider-
able length, if only implicitly) in 1217b24–1218a1, and the ones men-
tioned in the last sentence were already similarly ἐν τῷ λόγῳ
γεγραμμένα—why, then, describe this point thus and not the others?
So—if it is a backward reference—τὸ ἐν τῷ λόγῳ γεγραμμένον must
have been written by someone else. If (b), i.e. if the reference is supposed
to be to some other work, its form is too vague for Aristotle to think it
could be useful to a reader, or perhaps even to himself (we should not,
I think, rule out the possibility that he could indulge on occasion in
notes to himself ); indeed, it would not even be useful to the glossator.
I conclude that the sentence in question refers back to the discussion we
Aristotelica 19
have just had, and that it was written by someone other than Aristotle; it
was a glossator’s amplification of Aristotle’s own summing up, and got
itself incorporated into it in the process of transmission.
a38 αὐτοαγαθόν B2: there is what looks like a circumflex over the final
letter of αὐτὸ and the gap between it and ἀγαθόν, probably intended to
indicate that the two words should rather be one. Aristotle presumably
cannot be saying that τὸ κοινὸν ἀγαθόν is not itself good, and while
αὐτὸ ἀγαθόν could possibly be Eudemian Greek for αὐτὸ τἀγαθόν
(P2, regularizing, writes in the margin γρ[απτέ]α: οὔτε αὐτὸ τἀγαθὸν
ἐστὶ or ἔστι: the α, or what looks like α, is superscript: Harlfinger reads
γρ[άϕετ]αι), it seems reasonable, in the absence of the definite article
from all of PCBL before corrections, to accept the gift from B2,
αὐτοαγαθόν being an Aristotelian formation (Met. 998a28). (We might
have wished for a definite article with αὐτοαγαθόν itself, but so too we
might have wished for one in 1217b27.) The crasis mark on P2’s
τἀγαθόν appears to be written twice, probably as a result of his moving
it so that it is more clearly over the first alpha: either that, or P2 intends
τ’ ἀγαθόν, which seems unlikely, although oddly Walzer/Mingay prints
it in the text.
1218b2 ὑπάρξη CBL: the final character in B is actually somewhat
ambiguous; it is probably an eta, but is nonetheless close in some
respects to the ligature for ει—thus illustrating the ease with which the
mistake, eta for ει, can be made.
b5 πρακτὸν2 in B is split πρα-κτὸν between two lines, and there is what
looks like a hyphen before the second part.
b6 τοῦτο Laur. 81,42 (and Spengel): but see e.g. 1219a24.
b8 L puts a heavy stop after ϕανερὸν (accenting -ὸν), seemingly taking
it as marking the end of the previous sentence, which suggests how a
connective could have fallen out (and οὖν [Brandis] would perhaps be
the most at risk after -ὸν). Connectives are sometimes absent in EE, but
probably not here, where Aristotle is announcing the conclusion of a
major set of arguments.
b15 τοιαῦτ’/τοιαῦτα is quite defensible, if we take Aristotle to be saying
‘by their being things of such a sort’, i.e. each such as to be something, in
(1218b15) its own way, κύριον πασῶν, sc. ἐπιστήμων. L’s τοιαύτας looks
like a dittography after ἄλλας, which Bekker then makes into proper Greek.
b18 τἄλλα CB1L: B2 adds what looks like a second crasis mark but which
is probably a signal to split up τἄλλα into τὰ ἄλλα.
b19 τοῦ P1CBL, τὸ1 P2: there are clear signs of an erasure after the τὸ in
P; the likelihood is that there was originally a τοῦ, as in CBL, mimicking
the following οὗ. —τοῦ P1CBL, τὸ2 P2: here the correction in P is
achieved by crude overwriting.
b21 Woods adopts Ross’s καίτοι, translating ‘but an efficient cause of

health’s existence, not of its being good’, but (a) this would perhaps be an
unusual way to use καίτοι; (b) ‘not of . . .’ suggests καὶ οὐ rather than
ἀλλ’ οὐ, and (c) τόδε, picking up αἴτιον, as it does, is both a more eco-
nomical solution for the impossible τότε and makes perfect sense.
b28 [μετὰ ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν]: Aristotle might have c hosen
to finish a book with the same words he would use to start the next one
(minus the connective, which of course won’t fit here), as a way of
marking the continuity between Book I and Book II, but it seems more
likely that someone else did it. (P has the title of the following book,
‘ἠθικῶν εὐδημίων – – – – β´ ’ starting a line and λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν, offi-
cially the last two words of Book I, ending the same line, an arrangement
that perhaps suggests the same idea, i.e. that the repetition is there sim-
ply to link the two books.) Susemihl’s proposal to bracket either the
whole of the last sentence of Book I or the first sentence of Book II is
probably excessive, although it must be said that even without μετὰ
ταῦτα ἄλλην λαβοῦσιν ἀρχήν, the end of Book I as the MSS preserve
it, with its threefold ἄριστον, is distinctly problematical (‘turbata quae-
dam in his verbis esse monet Bu[ssemaker]’, Susemihl). Allan’s supple-
ment of καὶ after ποσαχῶς gives the sentence a better structure, but it is
not clear that Book II actually does examine ‘in how many ways τὸ ὡς
τέλος ἀγαθὸν ἀνθρώπῳ καὶ τὸ ἄριστον τῶν πρακτῶν is also τὸ
ἄριστον πάντων’—if that is what Allan intends. Not dissimilar prob-
lems arise with the last full sentence of EE VIII/V: there in EE VIII/V
I emend, and it may be that surgery is needed here too, but it is hard to
see exactly where to begin the cutting. (I might start with the definite
Aristotelica 21
article before the second ἄριστον, and perhaps the one before the first;
but this would be no more than tinkering.) —Against Dirlmeier’s πῶς
for ποσαχῶς in b26 there is the previous use of ποσαχῶς at 1217b1,
where he mistakenly translates λέγεται ποσαχῶς as ‘wie viele
Bedeutungen das Wort hat’, when the reference is plainly to three differ-
ent views (‘Meinungen’) people take, and/or might take, of τὸ ἄριστον
(hence Kenny’s more neutral ‘in how many senses the expression is used’
[Oxford World’s Classics]); in the present context too, in the first few
lines of Book II, Aristotle will reintroduce the main three main views on
the nature of εὐδαιμονία (ϕρόνησις . . . καὶ ἀρετὴ καὶ ἡδονή, ὧν ἢ ἔνια
ἢ πάντα τέλος εἶναι δοκεῖ πᾶσιν: Ι.1, 1218b34–6), between which he
will choose. So ποσαχῶς fits; πῶς will fit too, but not so obviously bet-
ter as to justify the emendation.
Eudemian Ethics II
1218b30 In B, the ordinal number of the book, β-ον, is curiously filled

out as βιβλίον, presumably by a later hand, since the superscript -ον is
still in place.
b31 μετὰ δὲ ταῦτα: PCBL all have ταῦτα (i.e. without elision) here as
well as in b27, which this line echoes; editors from Bekker onwards print
μετὰ ταῦτα there, but μετὰ . . . ταῦτ’ here.
b32 〈ἐν〉 ψυχῇ: P2 writes πάντα ἀγαθὰ ἢ ἐκτὸς ἢ ἐν ψυχῇ in the mar-
gin, perhaps merely picking out something memorable in the text, but
surely indicating that he felt the need for an ἐν. In any case, since ἐκτὸς
is presumably said with reference to the soul (with no mention of body,
ἐκτὸς ἀγαθὰ will have to include bodily ones), and relevant goods that
are not ἐκτὸς τῆς ψυχῆς will be in it, ‘in the soul’ must be meant, and
that cannot be expressed by a plain dative. Bessarion writes ἐν ψυχῇ in
Par. 2042.
b38 The colon (or perhaps a comma, as in Rackham) after ὑποκείσθω
is implicitly introduced by translators (Woods, Kenny, Inwood/Woolf),
and looks necessary.
1219a16 ὑγεία B: perhaps part of the ligature for ει has accidentally

coincided with the iota, but this mistake has occurred in B before.
—ὑγίασις/ὑγίανσις: the latter is what P presumably had before it was
‘corrected’ (by erasure of the nu and extension of the alpha) to ὑγίασις.
a20 Neither ταὐτὸ nor αὐτὸ is needed; the sense clearly is ‘the ἔργον of
the thing [is] also [the ἔργον] of the ἀρετὴ [of the thing]’.
a25 τοῦ: I retain the MSS’ τοῦ—as referring to ζῆν—because (a) it is

quite possible Greek: cf. e.g. 1218b6–7 οὐκ ἔστι δὲ τὸ (τοῦτο Spengel)
ἐν τοῖς ἀκινήτοις, and Plato, Symposium 173a, 211a; and (b) because, if
Aristotelica 23
it is possible, it is lectio difficilior, or at least less expected. Woods objects

that with the reading τοῦ (or τούτου) ‘Aristotle will be saying that the
ἔργον of soul is to produce life, and the ἔργον of living is, in its turn, an
employment and waking state. What seems to be needed is some pre-
miss applying the doctrine that, in the case of some things, their ἔργον
is their χρῆσις itself, and not something over and above it.’ Why is ‘the
ἔργον of living is . . . an employment and waking state’ not such a
premiss?
a26 ἡσυχεία P2: an original iota is overwritten with ει.
a27 καὶ2 is inserted above the line in P, probably by the original hand.
a31–2 ταῦτα δὲ ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι scripsi. Susemihl prints ** αὐτὴ, κτλ

(where the αὐτὴ comes from Bekker, who apparently got it from Marc., or
jecture, 〈τὰ ἐν〉 αὐτῇ: he quite often employs lacunas in this way, in order
possibly Oxon.), which is presumably an invitation to adopt his own con-
to avoid committing himself and the reader to a particular conjecture.

Walzer/Mingay then behaves even more conservatively than Susemihl,
throwing in the towel and printing †αὕτη† δὲ ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια. Bekker
presumably understood ‘and it / εὐδαιμονία itself [is . . .]’; and what it
would be being said to be can be inferred, at any rate, from the ὑποκείμενα
mentioned in 1219a30, the specific reference being perhaps to 1218b32–7.
But this is not quite satisfactory; we would rather expect something pick-
ing up the preceding τὰ δὲ τέλη, κτλ, as with either of Spengel’s proposals
or with Susemihl’s (Mingay’s ἀρετὴ is ingenious, but fails to carry convic-
tion). But the singular ἢ ἕξις ἢ ἐνέργεια then looks intolerable. I propose,
and print, ταῦτα (Spengel) δὲ ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι (Ross): after ταῦτα
had been corrupted to αὕτη (why, in these MSS, is a question that often
cannot be answered), the change from plural to singular would be
natural enough.
a35 ἔσται scripsi: εἶναι PCBL; ἀνάγκη post εἶναι suppl. P2, writing
ἴσως: ἀνάγκη, in the margin, with insertion marks, in order to explain
εἶναι (the beginning of the entry in the Walzer/Mingay apparatus for
a33, ‘ἀνάγκη τῆς ἀρετῆς mg. P2, addito ἴσως’, is wrong: ‘εἶναι ἀνάγκη
P2, addito ἴσως’ would be right, except that only ἀνάγκη is in the mar-
gin, with an insertion mark there and a matching one after εἶναι
24 Eudemian Ethics ii
(1219a35) in the text). Bonitz’s, Fritzsche’s, and Ross’s proposals similarly

aim to explain the infinitive. Aristotle is here reaching an interim con-
clusion, either that ‘the activity of the virtue of the soul’ (Woods, Kenny;
thing of (?) the soul (with Ross’s ἐνέργειαν 〈τὸ〉). The latter interpretation
similarly Inwood/Woolf) is best, or that the activity of virtue is the best
does not strictly require Ross’s extra definite articles (τὴν, τὸ), and
indeed their main function is probably to impose his interpretation on
the text; but it is surely unattractive in any case, not least given the work
that has to be done to accommodate it. If we settle, then, on the other
interpretation, the immediate question is how to explain the infinitive
εἶναι with which the sentence ends in the MSS. Retaining the infinitive
requires at least two emendations, i.e. Bonitz’s ἐνέργειαν for ἐνέργεια ἡ
(which might possibly be intended by P2 as a consequence of his supple-
ment of ἀνάγκη), and either Fritzsche’s supplement of δεῖ or P2’s of
ἀνάγκη; the only alternative is to suppose, with Inwood/Woolf, that the
accusative and infinitive is governed by δῆλον back in a29, and against
this is not only the distance of that δῆλον but the fact that δῆλον is typ
ically followed by a ὄτι-clause rather than an accusative and infinitive.
(The distance problem would be mitigated if we were to bracket a30–2 ἦν
μὲν γὰρ . . . ἢ ἕξεις ἢ ἐνέργειαι, on the grounds that it not only breaks
up the flow of the sentence, but also perhaps is dispensable—after all, it
spells out what we know already. But so does what follows a30–2 [i.e.
this is not intrusive material, as at 1220b10–12, 1225b3–6, or 1228a14:
qqv.]; Aristotle is formally setting out the argument leading to a big con-
clusion, and a30–2 includes parts of that argument.) If, on the other
hand, we retain the MSS’ nominative, ἐνέργεια, with ἡ, of which L’s ἢ is
surely a corruption, the only change required is from εἶναι to ἔσται,
and the Greek will be on any account rather easier to construe. While I
cannot explain how the corruption of ἔσται to εἶναι could have
occurred, or provide any precise parallels, it is, plainly, much easier to
defend ἐνέργεια ἡ than it is to defend εἶναι. That is not to say that
Bonitz, and P2, may not have been right (if the latter really did intend
ἐνέργειαν for ἐνέργεια ἡ), and after all, as noted before, Aristotle in EE
is not obviously much concerned with making things easy for the reader.
But in such cases the more economical solution must, I think, be held to
trump the less; we do not need to make Eudemian style spikier than it
Aristotelica 25
already is, any more than we need to make it less spiky. (An alternative
would be to obelize εἶναι, with ἔσται as a conjecture in the apparatus;
but that then entails keeping ἐνέργεια ἡ, which would more or less
compel the reader to accept ἔσται in any case, and would amount to
using the obelus in the way Susemihl uses the lacuna: see previous note.
The only real alternative to emending εἶναι is to obelize the whole of
ἐνέργεια ἡ τῆς ψυχῆς ἄριστον εἶναι, and that seems like overkill if the
only obvious problem is with εἶναι.)
a40 κατὰ ἀρετὴν BL, κατ’ ἀρετὴν PC: the reading in BL is preferred
according to the rule I have adopted, that if the arguments for each of
two readings are equally balanced, the one that figures in both recen-
siones is to be adopted.
1219b12 ὁποῖός τις ἐστίν: τίς in P is inserted above the line by a

later hand.
b16 τοῦ post ἔπαινος suppl. Bonitz: this supplement would be neces-
sary in most other texts, and every second time I return to this passage
I find the omission of the definite article disturbing. That means, how-
ever, that I also find no conclusive case for inserting it, in the notori-
ously laconic EE (note the following τέλους without article, though that
is much less surprising). Cf. Fritzsche’s description of b5 μίαν ἡμέραν
εἶναι as ‘mutilata’, which is surely a reaction to its brevity; his proposals
for rewriting (reported by Susemihl) miss the point.
b18 Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 186 in defence of the δέ

(secl. Langerbeck) deals with only half of the issue, i.e. the placing of the
δέ after the participle; the other half is the question why we should need
δέ as well as καὶ. The answer is that καὶ is ‘also’; its position, at the
beginning of the sentence, perhaps itself causes the displacement of the
δέ. —ποθὲν οὐθὲν CB: an easy dittography; hardly a significant shared
error. (Pace Walzer/Mingay, P has ποτ’, like L.)
b20 καθεύδονται BLC2: the ending in both P and C appears above the
οντ; in P it is an unambiguous (shorthand) -ες, while in C there is a
mess that is legible as -αι: this I take to be a ‘correction’ against another
manuscript of an original -ες as in P. By contrast with the last, this is an
(1219b20) interesting shared error. Both B and L are interpreting hands,

like that in PC, that use shorthand, and the shorthand for -ες is nothing
like αι; in addition to which, is the middle of καθεύδειν attested any-
where? Either the B and L copyists just happened to make the same
strange error, or καθεύδονται was in ω, the common source of PCBL, and
PC καθεύδοντες is a correction, perhaps made in α. (Or, if -αι in C is
after all original, then καθεύδονται was in α too, and Nikolaos is mak-
ing the correction in P but not in C.)
b22 τῆς ψυχῆς P1: P2 marks τῆς for deletion by surrounding it with
four dots.
b25 Rackham’s supplement of the definite article before ὀρεκτικὸν

would be right, e.g. for NE; for EE it is unnecessary (albeit the
αἰσθητικὸν and the ὀρεκτικὸν are different things).
b30 εἶναι post ψυχῆς suppl. Russell: another example of unnecessary
regularizing or filling out of Aristotle’s Greek.
b35 καὶ secl. Ross: Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 319, for this
καὶ, is helpful; ‘it has different δυνάμεις all the same, (and) actually τὰς
εἰρημένας’.
b36 καμπύλῳ: P2 writes στρεβλῷ above καμπύλῳ; perhaps a gloss
rather than an emendation? B has what is by now clearly to be taken as a
separation mark (B2, presumably) below the line between καμπύλῳ
and the following τὸ, B being particularly inclined to run words
together.
b37–8 ἀλλὰ κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς: ‘but [it is white] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς’

works well enough for us not to need Richards’s ἀλλ’ ἢ (but see
1221a23, which if we followed Spengel would be another case of the
corruption of ἀλλ’ ἢ to ἀλλά). —οὐκουσία vel οὐκουσιᾳ P (iota sub-
script [never adscript] generally being omitted in these MSS): the way
in which P preserves the necessary οὐκ suggests how it might
have fallen out of the others, i.e. by haplography; in C the process may
have been helped by the fact that the preceding καὶ is the last word in
the line (so, was οὐκ at least in α; even in α´ and ω too?). —τοῦ for τῇ
Aristotelica 27
before αὑτοῦ is a standard error. Bonitz’s οὐσίᾳ τὀ αὐτό is a possibility,

but leaves the MSS’ genitive unexplained and gives a less good sense: ‘the
straight is not white but [only] κατὰ συμβεβηκὸς, and [it is] not the
same thing [as it is] οὐσίᾳ’? —ἀϕῃρήσθω Fritzsche: but it is a fact that
the μέρος ἀϕῄρηται (b32–3).
b39 Victorius’ conjecture (very necessary correction) is once again pre-

ceded by γρ.
b40 Susemihl’s γὰρ for δὲ, adopted by Walzer/Mingay, comes from the
late Latin translation (‘In.’), and is unnecessary; Ross’s supplementary
negative, also adopted by Walzer/Mingay, completely ruins the sense
(see Donini’s note ad loc.).
b41 καὶ αὐξητικοῦ Bonitz, καὶ ὀρεκτικοῦ PCBL: the question is whether
an appearance of τὸ ὀρεκτικόν here can be squared with Aristotelian doc-
trine as both (a) usually understood and (b) reflected in the EE itself. If the
answer is no, as I think (Aristotle’s very next sentence surely proves it), then
unless we bracket the words, as Susemihl hesitantly suggests, we have little
option but to accept Bonitz’s emendation. These copyists, and evidently
their predecessors, do make mistakes for no presently observable reason,
and this is surely one such case. —εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος: i.e. ‘if [a human being is
being considered] as a human being’. The reader is here being asked to sup-
ply quite a lot, but not, I think, impossibly much. Dodds’s supplement of
ἀνθρώπου would make life easier, and ἀνθρώπου could well have dropped
out before the following ἄνθρωπος, but εἰ ᾗ ἄνθρωπος as it stands seems
to me viable (Eudemian) Greek. Deleting εἰ, with Ross, is another option,
but how then did the εἰ get in? Perhaps by reduplication (η and ει are some-
times confused), but then the story is already too complicated if the trans-
mitted text works. I note that whatever text we adopt, the sense has to be the
same, and that is itself reason enough for changing as little as possible.
(Walzer/Mingay claims that C has ᾗ, PL ᾖ, Susemihl that P has ᾖ—Susemihl
then proceeding to attribute ᾗ to Bonitz; in fact C and L both have ᾗ, of
course without the iota subscript, as does B, and there is less doubt about
the breathing in P than about the eta itself, which is a bit of a mess. The
problems may start with Bekker, who reads ᾖ without comment.)
1220a1 ἐκεῖναι CB: it is difficult to be quite certain about what B offers;

probably ἐκ- rather than ἐν-, but the case shows how easily they are con-
fused. —Walzer/Mingay reports that Ross thought καὶ πρᾶξιν corrupt,
and Allan’s ὄρεξιν for πρᾶξιν is more than a little tempting: after all,
πρᾶξις is not exactly an ingredient in the mix (whatever mix it is) in the
same way as λογισμός, and palaeographically speaking the distance
between πρᾶξις and ὄρεξις is not great. On the other hand, reading
ὄρεξιν here would render the conclusion in a2–3, ἀνάγκη ἄρα ταῦτ’
ἔχειν τὰ μέρη, somewhat lame, and it is certainly true that πρᾶξις con-
stitutes the general context within which the relevance or otherwise of
the various parts of the soul is being judged.
1220a15 ἀνῆκται/ἀνῆκον: for ἀνήκω, cf. NE VIII.1, 1155b10; it may

also be read at IX.6, 1167b4.
a18 Richards’s τὸ καὶ is perhaps right, but the MSS’ reading is perfectly
defensible.
intolerable without a verb, then prima facie Dirlmeier’s 〈ἔχοιμεν〉

a19–20 ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ καὶ ὑγίειαν: if we conclude that the clause is
πάντες; but ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ 〈ἔχοιμεν〉 καὶ ὑγίειαν ὅτι would only work
might be the favourite, because it picks up a17 ἔχοντές τι ζητοῦσι
if we accepted Dirlmeier’s bizarre claim ‘dass ἔχειν = εἰδἐναι ist’.

(Besides, we have just had ἔχειν in a quite different sense.) I propose we
should understand, but not print, ζητοῦντες ἔχοιμεν, i.e. ὥσπερ ἂν εἰ
καὶ ὑγίειαν [ζητοῦντες ἔχοιμεν] ὅτι, κτλ. (To deploy the obelus, with
Walzer/Mingay, or with Allan suppose a lacuna, which probably comes
to the same thing, is to suggest a locus desperatus; that it surely is not.)
a28 πὼς/πῶς: this is actually a distinction without a difference, given

that some modern editors, e.g. Bywater in NE, prefer to write πῶς
instead of πώς in such cases. (Walzer/Mingay curiously leaves out the
accent altogether; so too in a33.)
a33 καὶ2 deest in BL: and also in PC, except that what follows, 34–5 πρὸς
ταῦτα ἡ χρῆσις αὐτῆς ὑϕ’ ὧν καὶ αὔξεται καὶ ϕθείρεται (not καὶ πρὸς
ταῦτα . . . ϕθείρεται, as reported by Walzer/Mingay), occurs twice in both,
linked with a καί. Thus the necessary καὶ before the πρὸς in 34
does appear the second time round. How this bizarre state of affairs came
Aristotelica 29
about is a mystery; it originated, presumably, in α, the source MS for P and

C, since Nikolaos would surely not have created an identical mess for him-
self on both occasions. There is a gap in P, between the first αὐτῆς and the
first ὑϕ’ ὧν, in which there are signs of deletion.
a34 ταὐτὰ Bussemaker: but ταῦτα is a perfectly decent antecedent for the
following relatives.
B2; καὶ πρὸς ἃ 〈καὶ〉 Russell. B2—or is it the original hand?—adds πως
a35 καὶ πρὸς ἃ Langerbeck: πως ἃ PC; καὶ ἃ B1; πρὸς ἃ L; πως καὶ ἃ
over line between the preceding ϕθείρεται and καὶ, and the necessary
extra accent to ϕθείρεται. I refrain from treating the καὶ before πρὸς as
a supplement because the spread of the MSS readings suggests that καὶ
πρὸς ἃ, in whatever order, could well have been in their common
source, ω; it is in any case clearly what is needed.
a35–40 σημεῖον . . . δῆλον secl. Allan: a strange proposal, unless σημεῖον

δ’ ὅτι is taken as ‘And there is a proof that . . .’, instead of ‘And there is
proof [of what we have just said], namely. . .’.
1220b1 ὅτι secl. Russell (having bracketed the preceding ἐστὶ too): but
the ὅτι is surely unproblematic, as Susemihl saw; pace Susemihl, so is
the following τὸ [sc. ἐθιζόμενον] ὑπ’ ἀγωγῆς μὴ ἐμϕύτου. On this last
(and on other issues), see P. Ferreira, ‘EE 1220a39–b6’, Archai 20, May–
Aug. 2017: 123–40.
b3 τὸ ἐνεργητικόν: keeping the τὸ, I construe ‘that is how [we] already

[get] the [whatever it may be that is] capable of acting [in accordance
one for Aristotle’s Greek/the Greek of EE. Allan’s 〈αὐ〉τὸ is problematic

with the acquired ἦθος]’, which is a stretch but not, I think, too much of
to the extent that ‘it’ should have a clear reference, which (so far as I can
see) it does not.
b5 τοῦτο μὴ PCL, τοῦτον B: B2 inserts ὴ over the end of a flowery nu

that already resembles a mu.
b5–6 ψυχῆς κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον δυναμένου [δ’ ] ἀκολουθεῖν

[τῷ λόγῳ] ποιότης scripsi: Fritzsche’s supplement of τοῦ ἀλόγου μὲν
after λόγον, enabling the retention of the following δέ (Bonitz’s vari
ation on this, λογικοῦ μὲν οὐ for λόγον δυναμένου, is ingenious but
(1220b5–6) leaves κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν up in the air), makes this account

of ἦθος mimic the description of the ethical ἀρεταί only a few lines
before (1220a10–11) even more closely than the patently corrupted text
in the MSS (ψυχῆς κατὰ/καὶ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον/ων δυναμένου δ’
ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ ποιότης) already does. I speculate that the trans-
mitted text has its origin in a gloss referring back to those lines, a pro-
cess that Fritzsche’s supplement would in effect complete. The proposed
reading strips back the account of ἦθος to the bare essentials, as well as
avoiding the anyway odd repetition of λόγος and the partial reduplica-
tion involved in κατὰ ἐπιτακτικὸν λόγον . . . ἀκολουθεῖν τῷ λόγῳ.
(The Aldine, incidentally, omits τῷ λόγῳ; Victorius restores it in the
margin, at the same time as correcting the Aldine’s δυνάμει to
δυναμένου.) We end up, on this reading, with just ‘a ποιότης of [that
part of] soul that is capable of following according to reason’ (for
ἀκολουθεῖν used without a following dative and with a prepositional
phrase, see 1233b33–4); except for his retention of τῷ λόγῳ this is also
Dirlmeier’s solution. The shorthand δυναμένου (sc. μέρους) might look
unlikely on its own, but is well prepared for by a9–11, of which the pre-
sent passage (I propose) is a summary. (Perhaps a truly conservative edi-
tor might declare the passage a locus desperatus. But stripping away a
redundant δέ to restore sense, and a hardly less redundant τῷ λόγῳ,
belongs to a different order of intervention from Fritzsche’s/Bonitz’s
remedies by speculative supplement.) —δυναμένη, in the margin of P,
marked as a replacement for δυναμένου, is well worth considering.
(There is also a mark beneath the δ’, in P, possibly indicating deletion;
nor would it be unusual for a corrector to make a partial correction and
leave the rest to be understood. But can a ποιότης have capacities?)
Ross’s own δυναμένης is probably a bridge too far, just after a separate
part of the soul has been identified as capable of following reason, i.e. in
1220a8–11. Finally: B too makes a mess of it, but it is perhaps worth
noticing that he puts in a mark resembling a Greek colon after ψυχῆς,
which seems to indicate that he tried to make sense of his καὶ by taking
ψυχῆς with (what on his reading is) the immediately preceding ἦθος.
b7 Spengel’s ποιότης τὰ for ποί’ ἄττα is perhaps neat, but unnecessary.

(Editors write ποῖ ’ ἄττα, like B, but ποί’ ἄττα, i.e. ποιὰ ἄττα, is surely
Aristotelica 31
the right accentuation: see Plato, Republic 438b1, etc.) The sense is ‘what
it is in the soul that makes our character traits to be of a particular kind’
(Kenny, in the Oxford World’s Classics translation); another example of
Eudemian brevity.
1220b10–12 μετὰ ταῦτα ἡ διαίρεσις ἐν τοῖς ἀπηλλαγμένοις τῶν

παθημάτων καὶ τῶν δυνάμεων καὶ τῶν ἕξεων secl. Barnes (CR 42.1
[1992]: 29). A plainly intrusive sentence; either an editorial note (as
Barnes suggests), or a marginal gloss. For the phrasing cf. 1221b34–5
τῶν διαιρέσεων τῶν περὶ τὰ πάθη καὶ τὰς δυνάμεις καὶ τὰς ἕξεις.
b11 ἀπηλαγμένοις P1: P2 adds a second lambda over the first.
b13 ἐπι το πολὺ –––– L: there is no accent on either of the first two
words (if the second is meant to be separated from the third: το ends the
line). A slightly uneven line under the tau apparently indicates the need
for correction; there then follows a gap, half filled by an extended line
itself about four characters long.
b15 ποιός τις as against ποιότης PCBL: ποιός τις is preferable here
to ποιότης insofar as it helps explain the following ἀλλὰ πάσχει,
called by Rackham ‘pravum glossema’. I construe ‘[a person] is not of
a certain sort κατὰ ταῦτα but [merely] πάσχει’. The της and the τις
in (ποιό)της and (ποιός) τις are distinguished in the context of an
MS like P and C, and probably also in the MSS that the copyists of B
and L had before them, only by the presence or absence of a pair of
dots (indicating an iota) above a sigma over the tau, the space between
ποιός and τις often being hardly greater than that between ποιό and
της (as in P here); and that ποιότης and ποιός τις can actually be
confused is shown by the fact that BL have the first and PC the sec-
ond at the end of this very sentence—either BL get it the wrong way
round there, or PC do. We do not have ποιότης twice in all four MSS,
nor do I think we want it twice; and where we need ποιός τις is here
before ἀλλὰ πάσχει and not where PC have it, at the end of the
sentence.
b16 τὰς secl. Susemihl: the term being explained might normally come
without the definite article, but since Aristotle has just said τὰς
(1220b16) δυνάμεις, λέγω . . . τὰς δυνάμεις looks unobjectionable (a copyist

might once have mistakenly repeated the article, but we shall never know).
b16–17 Ross’s emendation seems to me to miss the point: κατὰ τὰ

πάθη goes first with λέγονται, and only then with οἱ ἐνεργοῦντες.
b25 The elongation of the alpha in ὁποιᾳοῦν in P suggests the origin of
the stray nu in B’s ὁποιανοῦν.
b26 It is tempting to interpret B’s καὶ ἀν as καὶ αὖ, but it is more likely
to be a careless repetition of καὶ ἀν(επιστημονικῇ) in the line before.
b34 B’s ἄττα is split after the alpha between two lines; B2 mistakenly
adds an extra tau at the end of the line.
1220b38–1221a12: for the bracketing of the third item in each group,

see on 1221a12.
1221a9 κακ ρία B1, καρτερία B2: the copyist of B seems to have written
κακ, followed by a gap, then ρία; then someone else wrote τε over the
gap and a rho before that, the rho ending up more over the alpha than
the second kappa.
a12 The arrangement of the foregoing list in columns is down to editors

(in the MSS, the gap between one trio and the next is the same as that
between the items in each trio), but the reference to a ὑπογραϕή is
enough to justify it. —Christof Rapp proposed, in discussion (in Athens,
in 2017), to follow Spengel and bracket the last trio on the basis that it is
too intellectual, and is in danger of duplicating the earlier trio κέρδος
ζημία δίκαιον, but the list is probably already problematic enough to
make it unsafe to start ridding ourselves of particular items or groups of
items. The biggest problem is that Aristotle will immediately say ‘all
[these πάθη and suchlike, τὰ . . . πάθη ταῦτα καὶ τὰ τοιαῦτα . . . πάντα]
λέγεται τὰ μὲν τῷ ὑπερβάλλειν τὰ δὲ τῷ ἐλλείπειν, which is plainly
untrue of the third member of each group. If we were to put every third
member in square brackets, as somebody’s, probably not Aristotle’s,
spelling out of the μεσότης to which each successive pair relates, then
that might remove the first of Rapp’s problems and mitigate the second:
this is Allan’s suggestion, in his review of Dirlmeier, Gnomon 38 (1966),
Aristotelica 33
at 148 (‘I think there would be a strong temptation for a shallow sys-
tematizer to interpolate the list of virtues, having failed to observe that
this would be premature, and that the passage is of a different kind from
the comprehensive sketch in E.N. 2, 7’). Allan may well be right; at any
rate, given what (according to our MSS) Aristotle says in a13–14, an edi-
tor who prints a13–14 as transmitted, i.e. with that πάντα, surely cannot
avoid following Allan’s lead. (At any rate δίκαιον in a4 is surely a mis-
take by someone: δίκαιον may be by far the commonest term for justice
in EE, but it does not refer to the inner state of a person, rather to the
state of affairs between persons.) Can we really leave him saying, for
example, that πανουργία, εὐήθεια, and ϕρόνησις are related to each
other in terms of excess and defect? The idea of the middle or mean will
not be (re-)introduced until later, as Allan notes (‘. . . this would be pre-
mature’). Round brackets might be of marginal help, insofar as it would
allow for the possibility that it was Aristotle himself who indicated the
μεσότης to which each successive pair relates, but I have forsworn
round brackets in general; and if it was Aristotle, he would not have
used them either.
a13 Walzer/Mingay’s reference to Denniston 473 (‘[ο]ὖν emphasising a

prospective μέν’), in response to Ross’s supplement of οὖν, is puzzling;
Ross is surely only proposing to supply a connective. But connectives in
EE do quite frequently go missing. —τὰ τοιαῦτα: Walzer/Mingay fol-
lows Bekker and Susemihl in omitting the τὰ despite having access to
the full range of MSS: only P of the primary MSS leaves it out, so it will
presumably have been in ω. Given that the items that have just been
listed might appear (mostly?), at least prima facie, not to be πάθη in the
sense defined just before, at 1220b12–14, the τὰ could be important,
insofar as it might allow the subject of the sentence to range wider than
πάθη, were that to be desirable. In any case there are no obvious grounds
for suppressing the article. (Further on πάθη here: one of the most strik-
ing points thrown up in a virtual workshop on EE III held in July 2021—
based in Dublin, with Giulio di Basilio and Margaret Hampson as
organizers—was that the descriptions of the ἀρεταί in EE III tend to
focus rather more on πάθη of the agent, what he/she πάσχει, than on
his/her actions. Is this perhaps another special feature of EE that marks
(1221a13) it off from NE, and might it go some way towards explaining
πάθη here in 1221a13?)
a18 ὃ B1: B2 strikes through the accent.
a19 δὲ καὶ: B2 inserts καὶ above the line. —ὁ del. Bekker: this pro-
posal of Bekker’s surely represents the beginnings of a solution to the
problems of the present sentence, if we take it that ἐπιθυμητικὸς
describes someone ruled by his or her ἐπιθυμίαι, and that this is to
be taken as suggesting someone (καὶ in 20 epexegetic?) who takes all
possible opportunities for ὑπερβολή—thus making him/her like the
coward (ὁμοίως); but this then seems to make 19 καὶ2, and also
(Jonathan Barnes suggests) ὁ1 in 20, redundant. I accordingly bracket
both. Barnes’s own solution, the deletion of a19–20 καὶ ὁ ἐπιθυμητικὸς
καὶ, gives a neater outcome, but leaves the problem of explaining how
these words got in, in the first place. (Victorius suggests [‘fort.’] brack-
eting the καὶ in 20 [that is, just καὶ, not καὶ ὁ, as Susemihl reports];
Dirlmeier prefers [ὁ] ἀκόλαστος καὶ [ὁ] ἐπιθυμητικὸς [καὶ] ὁ
ὑπερβάλλων.)
a23 πλεονεκτικός, split πλεονεκ-τικός in B between lines, has (what
looks like) a hyphen both in the right-hand margin after the first part
and in the left-hand margin before the second.
a23–4 ‘An Spengel’s ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉 ist nicht zu denken’, says Dirlmeier, with
some justification (calling in aid Cook Wilson, ‘On the use of ἀλλ’ 〈ἢ〉
in Aristotle’, CQ 3 [1909], 121–4). The two other proposals are elegant
enough but too elaborate; Dirlmeier’s gives us all we need, and his
explanation of how the corruption might have occurred is not wholly
implausible. —There are two dots over what is probably a version of the
shorthand sign for the second δὲ (ἀλαζὼν δὲ) in B.
a25 κόραξ B1: the rho is overwritten with a lambda by B2 (or perhaps
the original hand).
a32 In the Teubner μὲν has dropped out either accidentally or because it
is missing in Marc. (but Bekker has it).
1221b1 ἐπὶ secl. Spengel: this ἐπὶ perhaps originated by false analogy
with the next one (ἐπὶ τοῖς ἀναξίοις).
Aristotelica 35
b1–2 τοῖς ἀναξίοις εὖ πράττουσιν: there is no compelling reason to

adopt either of Spengel’s proposals for rewriting a perfectly comprehen-
sible phrase.
b7 B leaves a small gap after τὰς λογικάς, of three or four characters,
perhaps marking the beginning of a new section.
b13 Bekker leaves out ὁ before θυμώδης (with Ald.), and is followed by
Susemihl and Walzer/Mingay, Bekker and Susemihl noting that it is in
Marc. and P, Walzer/Mingay that it is in C and L too (it is also in B)—
Walzer/Mingay strangely citing the Aldine as authority for omitting it
(the Aldine does omit it, but it omits a whole lot else that it should not);
just as strangely, neither Susemihl nor Walzer/Mingay here follows their
usual practice of printing in square brackets what they are leaving out
from their primary MSS (Bekker generally does not use such brackets in
the text; maybe the others were just following him on this occasion). But
could Aristotle not be saying ‘A person is quick-tempered by virtue of
becoming angry too quickly, while the θυμώδης too is χαλεπός by
doing it for too long . . .’? In III.3 χαλεπότης takes over as the opposite
of πραότης, and covers all the varieties of anger treated here (see
1231b17–19). Admittedly we do immediately go back to the formula-
tion ‘a person is . . .’ with 14 πικρὸς δὲ . . ., but this is not a sufficient rea-
son for following Ald., Bekker, etc. and omitting the article. —τῷ] ὁ B1,
τῳ B2, writing it above the ὁ, complete with iota subscript (worth men-
tioning, because such iotas tend to be omitted).
b15 The text as it stands is surely intelligible without Susemihl’s lacuna after
τῆς ὀργῆς: the type in question is marked out by the severity of the ‘punish-
ment’ it metes out in its anger.
b16 An accent in B over the second omicron of ὀψοϕάγοι—itself added by
a later hand?—is crossed out by another hand.
b16–17 πρόσω ποτέρας P1CB: P2 corrects P1 by striking through the
omega and inserting a ὁ before ποτέρας.
b19 ἄν πως PCBL: Walzer/Mingay reports L as having ἄνπερ, but it
actually has ἄν πως, though unusually—in order to fit the word in at the
end of the line and the page—it uses the shorthand for ως (which is
(1221b19) followed by a mysterious oblique stroke, of a sort that in PC-

like MSS marks an -ον: did some later reader think L was aiming at
πότερον?). —τὸ for τῷ Richards, construing ‘if this [τὸ μᾶλλον
πάσχειν] is taken as a question of manner (πῶς)’; I prefer Kenny’s ‘if
how means experiencing to excess’ (Oxford World’s Classics).
b21 οὐκ ἔστι γὰρ is marginally to be preferred because less expected,

and also more emphatic? (For the record, Victorius seems to have
preferred it.)
b22 συνηλημμένον P1: what is apparently another hand overwrites eta

with (the sign for) ει.
b26 ἐπὶ secl. Eucken, ἔχει Ross: but ἐπὶ with accusative is not impos
sible here: see LSJ s.v. ἐπί C.I.5.
b29 διανοητικαί secl. Ross: perhaps a gloss, but the case is not
proven.
b39 πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ (PCB) must surely be wrong. In order to talk
about soul in general, Aristotle needs only ψυχή, and does not need
to specify that the subject is all soul; and—assuming that ἡ ἡδονή at
the end of the sentence is to go, as it must—it cannot be soul that is
πρὸς ταῦτα καὶ περὶ ταῦτά ὑϕ’ οἵων κτλ. It seems reasonable, then,
to focus on L’s πάσα γὰρ ψυχῆς, which plainly invites us to supply a
subject to go with it (how else would the genitive arise?), and to sup-
pose that PCB’s πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ was one reaction to the loss of the
a third. So πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχῆς 〈ἕξις〉 it is, ἕξις being the only candidate
subject, L2’s (πάσης γὰρ ψυχῆς) another, the introduction of ἡ ἡδονή
available (it could replace ἡ ἡδονή, as Bonitz suggests, if we adopted

PCB’s πᾶσα γὰρ ψυχὴ, but it cannot be said that the resulting sen-
tence reads convincingly, and πᾶσα remains a problem). This is
another instance where obeli might be employed (‘[s]i tratta di un
passo probabilmente guasto e variamente corretto dagli editori’,
Donini), but I think the case for the text printed is sufficiently strong
to make this unnecessary.
1222a1 ἡ ἡδονή PCBL: ‘ ἡδονή is a fairly clear case of a word sub-

stituted for the right one (here ἕξις ) through anticipation of a
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of Suomalaisia
näyttelijöitä
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
Title: Suomalaisia näyttelijöitä

Lapsuuden ja nuoruuden muistoja
Author: Aarni Kouta
Release date: February 9, 2024 [eBook #72915]
Language: Finnish
Original publication: Hämeenlinnassa: Arvi A. Karisto, 1911
Credits: Tapio Riikonen
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK

SUOMALAISIA NÄYTTELIJÖITÄ ***
SUOMALAISIA NÄYTTELIJÖITÄ
Lapsuuden ja nuoruuden muistoja
Kirj.
AARNI KOUTA
Hämeenlinnassa, Arvi A. Karisto Oy, 1911.

SISÄLLYS:
Esisanat.
Ida Aalberg.
Kaarola Avellan.
Emelie Stenberg.
Aurora Aspegren.
August Aspegren.
Taavi Pesonen.
Axel Ahlberg.
Adolf Lindfors.
Knut Weckman.
Katri Rautio.
Aleksis Rautio.
Iisakki Lattu.
Olga Poppius.
Kaarle Halme.
Esisana.
Ihaillessamme jotakin suurta ja jo täyden kasvuvoimansa
saavuttanutta puuta ei liene monenkaan meidän mieleemme
juohtunut ne eri kehityskaudet ja -muodot, jotka tämä puu on elänyt
ja taistellut muodostuessaan pienestä, tuskin maankamaraa
ylemmästä idusta siksi korkeaksi kasviksi, joka majaamme varjostaa.
Me näemme ihastuksella vain puun, joka työntää latvansa taivasta
kohti, ojentaa oksansa ilman tuulien tuuditeltaviksi, mutta emme
ajattele pientä tainta, joka maan uumenista kerran pyrki ja pääsi
päivän valoon, juurrutti ja levitti juurensa tahdon rantavoimalla
syvälle mullan mustaan helmaan, mistä sitten imi elämisen voiman ja
tarmon. Ja lähemmin tarkastaessamme on tässä alkutilassa ja
alkukamppailussa yhtä paljon mieltäkiinnittävää ja ihastuttavaa kuin
myöhemmässä kypsyyden kaudessakin. Vieläpä tuon taimen
kehitysilmaisuja tutkistellessamme voimme nähdä viittauksia
vastaisuuteen, edellytyksiä, edellyttäviä luonteenominaisuuksia ja
hentoja yhdyssiteitä tulevaisuuteen.
Edellinen on sovitettavissa ihmiseenkin, varsinkin voimakkaammin

ja huomattavammin kehittyneeseen ja rakentuneeseen ihmiseen,
joka on pystynyt luomaan itsestään jotakin, kyennyt kohoamaan ja
kasvamaan johonkin tehtävään, joka on jättänyt jälkiä häntä
ympäröivään elämään, vieläpä antanut parhaimmassa tapauksessa
uusia sysäyksiä kehityksen yhä etenevään ja edistyvään kulkuun. —
— Nämä muutamat rivit vain sen sarjan esisanoiksi, jossa

rupeemme kertomaan vanhempien näyttämötaiteilijaimme
lapsuuden ja nuoruuden vaiheista ja muistoista sellaisina kuin ne
haastattelujen muodossa olemme heidän omilta huuliltaan kuulleet.
Heidän taiteellisen työnsä tulokset ovat jo täysin kypsinä meidän
nähtävinämme ja arvioitavinamme; heidän varhaisimmat
sielunliikuntonsa ensimmäisistä itsetiedottomista aavisteluista
elämänuran ratkaisevaan ensi askeleeseen saakka ovat meille
tuntemattomampia, ainakin jo paljon etäisempiä asioita, joihin
kuitenkin kannattaa kerran vielä kääntää katseensa ja joiden
muistelemisesta voi koitua paljon iloa, vieläpä sangen suurta
mielenkiintoakin.
Helsingissä v. 1910.
Aarni Kouta.
Ida Aalberg.
Mainitessamme vapaaherratar Ida Aalbergille aikeestamme ja

pyytäessämme häntä kertomaan meille lapsuutensa ja nuoruutensa
vaiheista, väitti hän, että niistä ei pitkältä puhetta riittäisi. Hän muisti
olleensa tavattoman paha lapsi, ainoa tyttö kolmen veljen joukossa,
joille hänen olisi tullut olla hyvänä esimerkkinä, mutta muuttuikin joka
kohdassa aina vain varoittavaksi esimerkiksi. Hänellä oli ollut hyvin
paljon mitä pahimpia vikoja. Ensimmäinen, ja ehkä pahin, oli niistä
tietysti ollut jokin vaarallisen itsetietoinen piirre luonteessa, minkä
ilmenemismuotoja oli ollut itsepäisyys, jonkinlainen hallitsemishalu,
tahto määräysten jakelemiseen. Myöskin oli ylpeyden raskas peri- ja
helmasynti päässyt juurtumaan hänen jo niin aikaisin
turmeltuneeseen luonteeseensa. Ei ollut voinut lainkaan pitää muita
pikku tyttöjä vertaisinaan ja leikkitovereikseen kelvollisina, tuskinpa
ikäisiään ja itseään vanhempia poikiakaan, joiden kanssa oli
kuitenkin jonkunverran paremmin viihtynyt. Heissä oli sentään ollut
hiukan voimakkaampaa ainesta, mutta sitäkin vain hiukan. Hyvinkin
nuorena oli vitsaa koetettu vääntää, eikä oltu myöskään vähemmän
ahkerasti käytetty tätä samannimistä pelottavaa asetta
vääntökeinona. Mutta väännöstä ei syntynyt käännöstä —
parempaan päin. Kaukana siitä. Vuosi vuodelta nämä huonot
ominaisuudet yhä vain kasvoivat, vieläpä ilmestyi entisten lisäksi
uusiakin turman tuumia nuoreen mieleen. Kaikkein pahin niistä oli
mielikuvitus. Se oli pakottanut jättämään leikinlyönnin, unohtamaan
leikkitoverit kokonaan. Ypöyksin nuori tyttö oli kiertänyt metsiä ja
maita, koristellut itseään ruohoilla ja kukkasilla ja puhellut ääneen
itsekseen. Synkästi uskonnollisen äidin vitsa oli yhä uutterammasti
tehnyt työtään — olihan entisen itsepintaisuuden lisäksi nyt vielä
tullut paha maailmallinen mieli, mikä ilmeni päälle päätteeksi
muodossa, joka oli omiaan herättämään hämmästelyä ja naurua
muissa ihmisissä. Näin "pahaksi" lapseksi suurin
näyttämötaiteilijattaremme kuvasi itsensä, mutta lisäsi, että hän
samalla oli ollut hyvin onneton. Lapsuus oli onneton, nuoruus oli
onneton. Se oli yhtä ainoata kaipuuta, vaikka hän ei tiennyt kaipuun
syytä eikä sen päämaalia. Yhtä ainoaa kuvittelua se myöskin oli,
vaikka nämä mielikuvat eivät voineet milloinkaan kiteytyä miksikään
selviksi näyiksi ja kuvasarjoiksi. Mutta kaikesta huolimatta ne
kuitenkin elivät elämäänsä, eikä vitsa voinut niitä kuolettaa, yhtä
vähän kuin hänen omat kärsimyksensäkään.
"Mutta pahuudestani huolimatta", huomautti taiteilijatar leikillisesti,

"ovat ihmiset aina pitäneet hyvää huolta minusta, vieläpä minua
rakastaneetkin." — Täten hän esim. oli joutunut kotiseudullaan
siihen aikaan oleskelevan Minckwitzin perheen suojatiksi ja päässyt
heidän mukanaan Helsinkiin ja täällä oppilaaksi neiti Tavaststjernan
perustamaan ruotsalaiseen tyttökouluun, jonka koulun toiminta ei
kuitenkaan ollut pitkäaikainen. Kovin pitkäaikaiseksi ei taiteilijattaren
kouluopillinen ura käynyt myöskään rouva Qvistin täkäläisessä
oppilaitoksessa; keskeytymisen syynä oli tällä kertaa varojen puute,
sillä kodin piti kustantaa etupäässä veljien kalliit opinnot. Rouva
Qvistin koulussa käynnin huomattavin tapaus on mielestämme
kuitenkin se, että siellä Ida Aalberg sai ensimmäisen hänen
taiteensa osalle tulleen tunnustuksen. Kevättutkinnossa olivat
oppilaat lausuneet runoja, heidän joukossaan myöskin Ida Aalberg
"Adlercreutzin" Vänrikki Stoolin tarinoista. Tutkinnossa oli ollut läsnä
rouva von Kothen, ja oli hän, silloisen Suomen kirjallisesti ja
taiteellisesti sivistynein nainen, lausunut julkisesti ihailunsa mainitun
runon lausumisen johdosta.
Tästä johduimme kysymään sitä kappaletta ja osaa, jossa

taiteilijatar oli ensi kerran esiintynyt. Maalla, kotipuolessa se oli
tapahtunut. Joululomaansa oli sinne tullut viettämään kuopiolaisia
ylioppilaita, jotka olivat panneet toimeen pienet juhlat kansakoulun
hyväksi. Siellä oli esitetty pieni näytelmäkappale "Kassan avain",
jossa emännöitsijän osassa oli esiintynyt Ida Aalberg, silloin nuori,
tuskin nelitoistavuotias tyttönen. Hän oli jo sitä ennen paljon
uneksinut teatterista. Ensimmäisen mielenkiinnon tähän
taidelaitokseen herättivät vanhat, äidin maitokamarin seiniin
liisteröidyt ruotsinkieliset sanomalehdet, joissa oli julkaistuina
teatterien ohjelmat. Kovin oli niissä kiihottanut mielikuvitusta se, että
jonkin kuninkaan tai kuningattaren nimeä oli seurannut tavallisen
kuolevaisen nimi. Kuningattarena kuolevainen ihminen jonakin iltana!
Sellaiseksi hänkin tahtoi, niin mahdotonta kuin se olikin, sillä pitihän
jumalaa pelkäävä koti teatteria synnillisimpänä, saastaisimpana ja
turmiollisimpana laitoksena maan päällä. Kun nyt nämä ylioppilaat
tulivat esiintymispyyntöineen, oli nuoren mielikuvittelijan ilo rajaton,
mutta — sitä ei saanut näyttää. Lavalle hän kuitenkin näin
kotitanhuvilla pääsi, mutta siihen sen piti pysähtyäkin.
Niin ei kuitenkaan käynyt, onneksi suomalaisen näyttämötaiteen.
Rippikoulun käytyään, nelitoistavuotiaana, Ida Aalberg näki ensi
kerran oikean teatterin Hämeenlinnassa, jonne Suomalaisen
teatterin henkilökunta oli saapunut antamaan vierailunäytäntöjä.
Silloin hänen päätöksensä kypsyi. Tämän jälkeen häntä ei voinut
pidättää enää koti, ei rakkaus vanhempiin eikä sisaruksiin, vaan hän
karkasi heidän luotaan eräänä kevättalvisena päivänä, joutui
Helsinkiin ja pääsi Suomalaiseen teatteriin. Ensi kerran hän esiintyi
jonkun rakastavan tytön osassa näytelmäkappaleessa "Lemun
rannalla", ja sai senkin jälkeen esittää yhä edelleen pieniä
vaatimattomia tytönosia, sillä tohtori Bergbomin mielestä Ida Aalberg
oli luotu naiviksi näyttelijättäreksi. Mitään riemuvoittoja naivi
näyttelijättäremme ei voittanut, hänen ainoa ilonsa oli pyrkimys
eteenpäin, hänen ainoa murheensa se, ettei saanut oppia kyllikseen
uutta, ei tarpeeksi edistyä, päästä eteenpäin, ja ihmetteli, kuinka
toiset saattoivat olla niin levollisia, vaikka eivät olleet sen
onnellisemmassa asemassa kuin hänkään. Mutta varmasti
vakuutettu hän oli siitä, että eteenpäin hänen täytyi päästä, kaikista
vastuksista huolimatta.
Näihin aikoihin oli taiteilijattaren veli matkustanut Dresdeniin

opintojaan jatkamaan, ja kirjoitti sieltä usein sisarelleen ja kuvaili joka
kirjeessään etenkin mainitun kaupungin teatteria, joka oli hänen
mielestään maailman suurenmoisin taidelaitos. Sinne alkoi tietysti
sisarenkin halu palaa. Siellä jos missä hänkin saattoi edistyä ja oppia
jotakin uutta, ja saatuaan resetin Oulussa sekä hiukan yksityistä
avustusta, hän läksi ylpeänä matkalle kukkarossaan seitsemisen
sataa markkaa, mikä mahtava summa kestäisi tietysti vuosikausia.
Mutta pitkälle eivät sellaiset rahat riitä, niistä kun sai luovuttaa jo
opettajalleenkin 25 mk tunnista. Tästä samasta opettajasta, rouva
Seebachista tuli kuitenkin taiteilijattaren suurin turva ja opastaja tällä
hänen ensimmäisellä ja suorastaan ratkaisevalla opintomatkallaan.
Rahat loppuivat tietenkin pian, mutta into ja tarmo eivät loppuneet.
Aivan pennittömänä, perin pohjin nälkäisenä hän vain ponnisteli
edelleen, vahvasti uskoen siihen, että kaikki käy hyvin, kaikki
onnistuu vielä kerran. Nälkä tuli lopulta ilmi, mutta samalla myöskin
taiteilijattaren suuret lahjat ja uupumaton tarmo, horjumaton tahdon
lujuus. Kotimaasta toimitti rouva Seebach rahaa, joten jatkuva
oleskelu ja opiskelu ulkomailla kävi mahdolliseksi ja
hedelmöittäväksi. — Lopuksi mainittakoon vielä, että samainen
rouva Seebach oli tohtori Bergbomille kirjoittanut kirjeen ja
vakuuttanut, että tämä erehtyi toivoessaan Ida Aalbergista naivia
näyttelijätärtä, hän itse oli huomannut tässä nuoressa naisessa
piilevän syvät traagillisen näyttämötaiteilijan lahjat. Kun Ida Aalberg
palasi sitten kotimaahan, oli tohtori Bergbom antanut hänelle
koetteeksi osan Anzengruberin "Valapatosta", josta muodostui
taiteilijattaren ensimmäinen suuri voitto. "Keväällä erosin naivista
näyttelijättärestä, lokakuussa kohtasin traagillisen taiteilijattaren", oli
tohtori Bergbom esityksen jälkeen huudahtanut.
Kaarola Avellan.
Käydessämme haastattelemassa neiti Kaarola Avellania, puuttui

hän itse ensinnä puheeseen. "Haastatella ei tulisi milloinkaan itse
asianomaista henkilöä, jos mieli päästä perille hänen
luonteenomaisimmista piirteistään", lausui taiteilijatar. "Tällaisia
seikkoja olisi pikemmin tiedusteltava omaisilta ja lähimmiltä ystäviltä,
joilla on ollut tilaisuus kaiken aikaa seurata toisen kehitystä ja tehdä
huomioita sen eri ilmenemismuodoista, kuitenkin aina tarpeellisen
välimatkan päästä. Itse tulee usein vaienneeksi monesta asiasta,
jotta ei vain tekisi itserakkaan vaikutusta, usein taas tahtomattaankin
ja itsetiedottomasti hairahtuu lausumaan jonkin pienen epätotuuden,
sillä ihminen on liian lähellä omaa itseään." Myönsimme nämä
mietteet suhteellisesti sangen oikeiksikin, mutta väitimme vastaan,
että toiselta puolen vaikenemiset, toiselta pienet epätotuudet
saattoivat nekin painaa osaltaan leimansa luonnekuvaan, jonka silti
ei tarvinnut lainkaan olla väärä. Itsestään puhuessaan ihminen
kaikesta huolimatta kuvastelee vain omaa sisintä itseään, tavalla tai
toisella, ja ehkä lopultakin aina sattuvammin ja todemmin kuin
syrjäinen.
"Itsetietoinen halu antautua taiteilijauralle heräsi minussa

verrattain myöhään", alotti taiteilijatar kuvauksensa. "Monet syyt
aiheuttivat sen. Olosuhteet ja kasvatus ennen kaikkea, mutta
samassa määrin ehkä myöskin sisäänpäin vetäytyvä luonne ja
melkein voittamaton kainous." Teatteri ainakin oli se viimeinen
taidemuoto, jota neiti Avellan ajatteli, ellemme sanoisi — vihdoin
viimeinen. Koko nuoruus, silloiset olosuhteet ja ankaran
kristillismielinen kasvatus koettivat parhaansa mukaan saada häntä
loittonemaan tästä synnillisestä laitoksesta, kunnes hän viimein
kaikesta huolimatta heräsi Björnsonin "Kalastajatytön" lailla
uneksimaan naisesta, joka näyttäisi maailmalle "hvordan en Kvinde
er, naar hun er yndig, hvordan hun er, naar hun er syndig". Pitkät,
aavistuksettomat taipaleet erottavat kuitenkin lapsuuden ja
nuoruuden tästä heräämisestä, mutta itsetiedottomat sielunliikunnot
ja niiden eri ilmestysmuodot täyttävät sittenkin nämä taipaleet, ja
niitä nyt lähemmin tarkastellessamme ei suinkaan ole vaikea
huomata, että ne ovat suoranaisessa ja elimellisessä yhteydessä
taiteilijattaren myöhemmän elämänuran kanssa, ovat selviä ja
suoranaisia viittauksia siihen.
Ensimmäisenä kuvaavana ja edellyttävänä piirteenä mainitsi
taiteilijatar pukeutumishalunsa, tahdon esiintyä toisen henkilön
hahmossa. "Lapsethan yleensä tahtovat pukea ja laitella itseään",
hän sanoi, "mutta taiteilijanhan juuri täytyy olla lapsi, lapsi kehdosta
hautaan saakka, jos hänen mieli jotakin uutta ja suurta luoda." —
Ohimennen johtaa tämä ajatus mieleemme Nietzschen sanat:
"Viattomuus on lapsi ja unhoitus, uudestaan-alkaminen, leikki,
itsestään pyörivä pyörä, ensimmäinen liikunto, pyhä myöntäminen.
Niin, luomisen leikkiin, veljeni, tarvitaan pyhää myöntämistä." Siinä
ehkä kaiken suuren taiteen psykologia ja — lohdutus.
Tämä pukeutumishalu oli herännyt taiteilijattaressa jo varhain ja

herättänyt samalla mielikuvituksen rajattoman maailman eloon.
"Kalaretket isäni seurassa olivat tämän mieliteon ensimmäisenä
virikkeenä", virkkoi neiti Avellan. "Kesät vietimme aina
Ahvenanmaan saaristossa, jossa isäni ja hänen neljä tytärtään —
minä yhtenä niistä — viettivät usein vuorokausiakin kalaretkillä."
Perheessä ei ollut yhtään poikaa, senvuoksi tytöt puettiin kaikeksi
kesäksi pojanpukuun, sillä "hameet eivät saaneet alukseen astua".
Näin kului taiteilijattaren varhaisin lapsuus, kaksivuotiaasta aina
yhdenteentoista ikävuoteen saakka, kesät merellä, talvet luistin- ja
hiihtoretkillä Helsingin jäillä. Siis vapaata ja täyttä luonnonelämää,
missä mikään ei häirinnyt mielikuvitusta ja nuoren raikasta mieltä.
Mutta sitten tuli häiriö, vieläpä melkein naisluostarin muodossa.
Neiti Avellanin vanhempi sisar oli jo jonkun aikaa ollut Cecilie

Foyxellen pensioonissa Kalmarissa, ja sinne nyt lähetettiin kesken
purjehdus- ja luistinretkiä yksitoistavuotias Kaarolakin. Tässä
laitoksessa muuttui kaikki synniksi, mitä kuolevainen ihminen teki.
Kaunokirjallisuuden lukeminen oli syntiä, samoin jokainen oma
ajatus. Synnillistä oli seurustelu toisen sukupuolen kanssa, jota
syntiä kuitenkin harjoitettiin kaikessa viattomuudessa ja — pienten
vuoroserenaadien muodossa, sillä tämän "luostarin" läheisyydessä
oli maanviljelyskoulu, jonka oppilailla oli hyvä lauluääni. Kaikkein
suurin synti oli sittenkin teatteri. Neiti Avellan muisti, miten hänkin oli
ihmetellyt ja surrut ihmisten ääretöntä kevytmielisyyttä kulkiessaan
tämän taidelaitoksen ohi Kalmarissa ja kuullessaan sieltä soiton
säveliä. Muutoin oli hän taas itse puolestaan herättänyt paljon surua
ja murhetta kelpo johtajattarensa hyvässä sydämessä. Hänet oli
melkein joka päivä kutsuttu "ylös" nuhteita saamaan, "vaikka en
suinkaan ollut mikään paha lapsi, kuten vapaaherratar Ida Aalberg
on itsestään sanonut", lausui taiteilijatar. "Paha ehkä silloin, kun
minua pahalla koetettiin taivuttaa, mutta taipuvainen ja hellä kuin
vaha, silloin kun minua hyvyydellä Kohdeltiin." Tämän
äärimmäisyydestä toiseen liikahtelevan luonteenominaisuuden oli
neiti Foyxellekin huomannut, sillä eräässä kirjeessä neiti Avellanin
vanhemmille hän oli ihmetellyt tyttöstä, "jonka silmät toisena hetkenä
saattoivat säkenöidä kiivaudesta, toisena taas olla täynnä kyyneliä".
"Luonteeni onkin aina ollut äärimmäisyyksiä rakastava", lausui
taiteilijatar. "Näyttelijänä tahdoin ennen kaikkea esittää murtuvien
osia, onnetonta rakkautta j.n.e., mutta toiselta puolelta myöskin ihan
keveitä ranskalaisia salonkinäytelmiä. Ainoastaan jalojen ja
tahrattomien luonteiden esittämistä olen taiteessani aina kammonnut
ja tahtonut niitä väistää — silloisesta lapsellisuudestani huolimatta."
Mielikuvitustaan sai taiteilijatar tässä pensioonissa kuitenkin

kehittää. Pukeutumishalu sai ensinnäkin tyydytyksensä
voimistelutuntien urheilupuvuista sekä laajempi mielikuvituksen
viljeleminen niistä pienistä juhlista, joita tytöt omin päinsä saivat
panna toimeen. Niihin sommitteli Kaarola aina ohjelman. Historian
opetus ja luku aukaisi hänen mielikuviensa maailmalle uusia ja
tuntemattomia aloja. Hän tutustui mieltäkiinnittäviin
personallisuuksiin ja tapahtumiin, joissa hänen silmänsä näki aina
jotakin toimintaa ja käyntiä, ja joista hän sitten muodosteli
draamallisia kohtauksia ja sarjoja. Niitä esitettiin laitoksen puistossa,
vieläpä Kalmarin unioonin aikaisia tapauksia itse Kalmarin
historiallisessa linnassa. Parempaa näyttämöä ja ympäristöä nuori
kuvittelija ja luoja tuskin voi luomilleen toivoakaan. Tällaista elämää
kesti aina taiteilijattaren seitsemänteentoista ikävuoteen saakka,
jolloin hän palasi jälleen kotimaahan.
Täällä hän sitten ensi kerran elämässään kävi teatterissa, jotka

käynnit alkoivat yhä tiheämmin uusiintua. "Paratiisissa sitä pienillä
säästörahoilla istuttiin, sillä vanhemmat eivät siihen aikaan antaneet
lapsilleen niin runsaita käsirahoja kuin nykyään", virkkoi taiteilijatar.
— "Silloinko teissä heräsi halu antautua taiteilijauralle?" kysyimme.
— "Kaukana siitä. Näytelmätaidetta ja näyttämötaiteilijoita kyllä
rajattomasti ihailin, näin heissä suorastaan yliluonnollisen korkeita
olentoja, mikä mielikuva sitten myöhemmin kyllä perinjuurin särkyi,
mutta itse olin ihan liian nöyrä ja häveliäs moista ajattelemaankin.
Neiti Foyxelle oli myös ihan Ruotsiin saakka kuullut näistä teatterissa
käynneistäni ja sieltä hän kirjoitti asian johdosta pitkän
varoituskirjeen vanhemmilleni ja pyysi heitä palauttamaan nuorta
sielua pois synnin poluilta." — "Eihän sitäpaitsi ollut vielä olemassa
suomenkielistä näyttämöä, joka olisi ollut ainoa, mihin minä olisin
liittynyt, huolimatta siitä, että en osannut sanaakaan tätä kieltä.
Sellainen oli aika silloin", lisäsi neiti Avellan.
Oli kuitenkin juuri siihen aikaan olemassa silloinen suomalainen

ooppera, jonka lavalla Kaarola Avellan ensi kerran esiintyi, tosin vain
muiden mukana kuorossa laulamassa. Hänen sisarensa,
myöhemmin rouva Aura Thuring, kuului tämän laitoksen esiintyviin
taiteilijoihin, ja tämän osat valmisti ja opetti hänelle aina Kaarola
sisar. "Sain kuitenkin elää taiteessa, vaikkakin vain toisen henkilön
hahmossa; itse olin liian arka, tässä oli minulle jo kylliksi. Siinä ehkä
myöskin syyt luonteeni pedagoogisiin ominaisuuksiin." —
Kaarola Avellanin ollessa yksikolmattavuotias, piti Aura sisaren

lähteä Tukholmaan lauluopinnoitaan jatkamaan ja Kaarolan seurata
häntä sinne kaunolukua opiskelemaan. Kihlaus pidätti kuitenkin
sisaren kotimaahan, ja Kaarola sai lähteä yksin matkalle.
Opettajakseen hän sai rouva Betzy Almlöfin, joka sittemmin,
oppilaansa uutteruuteen ja tarmoon sekä suuriin lahjoihin
ihastuneena, tarjosi tälle paikan Tukholman kuninkaallisessa
teatterissa. "Elämäni suurin tragedia on se, etten ottanut tätä
tarjousta vastaan. Minun täytyi päästä suomenkieliselle näyttämölle,
ja oppia yht'aikaa — vieras kieli ja tekotavan suuret vaikeudet!"
Seuraavaksi kesäksi asettui Kaarola Avellan ihan yksikseen

Kangasalle, missä sanakirja kädessä, pelkkien talonpoikien joukossa
opetteli suomea. Syksyllä hän sitten liittyi Suomalaiseen Teatteriin ja
esiintyi ensi kerran Aleksis Kiven Leana Hämeenlinnassa
marraskuun 26 p:nä 1876. —
Mitään unelmia taiteilijattarellamme ei näyttelijäurasta ollut

milloinkaan ollut, sille jouduttuaan hän unelmoimatta ajatteli vain
työtään. Suurimmat taiteelliset ilonsa hän tunsi kotona osiaan
valmistellessaan ja niitä tutkistellessaan, lavalla hän ei koskaan
voinut täydellisesti antautua, ei päästää temperamenttiaan valloille;
vieraan kielen käyttö kytki kaiken rautakahleisiin. Kun neiti Avellan
sitten myöhemmin erosi teatterista, tarjosi toht. Bergbom hänelle heti
kaunoluvun opettajan toimen, "jossa toimessa sitten taas sain
vapaasti elää elämäni taiteessa, jota vailla kaikki olisikin tyhjää",
lopetti taiteilijatar haastattelun.
Emelie Stenberg.
— Mitä minun pitäisi teille nyt oikeastaan kertoa? alotti neiti

Stenberg haastattelun. Pelkäänpä melkein, että olette turhan tautta
matkustanut tänne maalle saakka kuulemaan niitä vähiä muistoja,
mitä minulla on lapsuudestani ja nuoruudestani. Syntynyt olen
Turussa, jota tapausta en muista, yhtä vähän kuin sitäkään, että jo
vuoden vanhana jouduin Poriin isoisäni ja -äitini silloin lapsettomaan
perheeseen. Syystalvella sinne vanhempani matkustivat ja jättivät
minut sitten sinne kovien pakkasten takia. Vuoden päästä kun
palasivat noutamaan, eivät minua enää saaneet, niin olivat
vanhukset pienen tyttärensä tyttären seuraan jo ehtineet kiintyä.
— Entäpä muistot tuosta uudesta lapsuuden kodista? koetimme

udella.
— Muistoja ei mitään. Olin aina vain täysikasvuisten seurassa,

jossa hyvin viihdyinkin. Varsinaiset lapsuuden muistot liittynevät
leikkitovereihin, ja sellaisina minulla oli vain kotitalon kanat ja kukot
sekä naapurin koira.
— Minkä ikäisenä sitten aloitte ensi kerran teatteria ajatella?
— En sitä milloinkaan ole ajatellut. Ensikiintymykseni tähän

laitokseen sain niistä kiertävistä seurueista, jotka silloin tällöin
antoivat näytäntöjään Porissakin, ensi kiintymykseni ja ensimmäisen
— korvapuustin. Kävelin näet isoäidin kera eräänä päivänä
kaupungilla, ja vastaamme tuli muuan nuori näyttelijä, jonka esitystä
olin juuri jonakin iltana ihaillut, 'katsokaahan, isoäiti, tuota kaunista
näyttelijää', virkoin. 'Kauniin näyttelijän' palkaksi paukahti
korvapuusti. "Vai sellaisissa mietteissä nuoret tytöt kulkevat!"
— Kuinka sitten itse jouduitte ensi kerran näyttämölle?
— Porissa esitettiin usein seuranäytelmiä. Kun minua pyydettiin

niihin avustamaan, en milloinkaan kieltäytynyt. Noin
yksikolmattavuotiaana esiinnyin siellä ensi kerran näytellen Rebekan
osaa Topeliuksen kappaleessa "Ett skärgårdsäfventyr", ellen aivan
väärin muista.
— Siitä pitäenkö ajattelitte näyttelijäuralle antautumista?
— Kuten sanottu, en ole sitä koskaan ajatellutkaan. Eihän minua

koirat ja kanat sellaiseen voineet opettaa, eikä mokomaan ollut
sitäpaitsi aikaakaan, sillä kahdeksantoistavuotiaana, jolloin
vanhempani kuolivat, sain kaikki nuoremmat sisarukset
hoidettavikseni.
— Mutta tästä kaikesta huolimatta jouduitte kuitenkin teatteriin.

Mikä sitten aiheutti tämän jyrkän käänteen elämässänne?
— Veljeni Elis Oskar Stenbergin sairastuminen. Syksyllä 1874 hän

kirjoitti minulle Helsingin klinikasta, jossa silloin makasi, ja pyysi
minua saapumaan sinne seurakseen. Minä saavuinkin, ja eräänä
kauniina päivänä Eos (= E.O.S.), kuten häntä toveripiirissä
nimitettiin, ilmoitti minulle päättäneensä toht. Bergbomin kanssa, että
minun oli liityttävä Suomalaiseen teatteriin. Suomalaiseen teatteriin
— osaamatta sanaakaan suomenkieltä, siitä nyt ei milloinkaan tule
mitään! Mutta siitä täytyi kuitenkin tulla jotakin, ja sitä mieltä olen
aina ollut, että kaikki käy, mitä ihminen vain lujasti tahtoo. — Ja
lujasti siinä täytyikin tahtoa, jatkoi taiteilijatar kertomustaan. Viisi
viimeistä elinkuukauttaan veljeni opetti minulle suomea, jonka kielen
opinnot hän itse oli alkanut sommittelemalla sanakirjojen avulla
kokoon yksinkertaisen, mutta sitten koko lyhyen elämänsä
johtotähdeksi käyneen lauseen: sinua rakastan, suloinen kieli. Ja se
lause muuttui minunkin elämäni johtotähdeksi. Kun veljeni sitten
seuraavana keväänä kuoli, matkustin yksin Hämeeseen
kieliopinnoitani jatkamaan.
— Tiesikö veljenne sitten jo edeltäpäin näyttämölliset

taipumuksenne? kysäisimme.
— Ei hän niistä mitään tiennyt. Parooni Troil oli nähnyt minun

esiintyvän seuranäytelmissä Porissa ja toi siitä mieltymyksensä
viestit Helsinkiin toht. Bergbomille ja veljelleni.
— Milloin sitten liityitte varsinaisesti teatterin palvelukseen?
— Vuoden 1875 syyskesällä, heti Hämeestä palattuani. Elokuun 5

p:nä matkustimme Ouluun ja siellä esiinnyin sitten ensi kerran
Guldborgin osassa "Sven Dyringin kodissa" nimisessä näytelmässä.
— Millaiseksi olitte uneksinut tämän uuden elämänuranne?
— Tietysti pidin sitä hyvin korkeana, mutta mitään unelmia minulla

ei siitä ollut. Olin näet jo kolmenneljättävuotias, siis iässä, jolloin
ihminen ei enää unelmoi, vaan ottaa tosiasiat sellaisina kuin ne ovat.
— Entä ensimmäiset huolenne ja murheenne?
— Ei ollut ensimmäisiä eikä viimeisiäkään, sillä siinä iässä ei

ihminen myöskään enää huolehdi eikä murehdi, hän tekee vain
työnsä. Kieli tietysti oli haittana; usein sanoinkin, että työni
teatterissa oli kuin halonhakkuuta, mutta kernaasti sitä kuitenkin tein,
sillä yleisö oli minuun, kielitaitoni vajavaisuudesta huolimatta,
tyytyväinen. Ja saikin luvan olla, sillä ei ollut ketään, joka minun

Aristotelica Studies On The Text of Aristotles Eudemian Ethics Christopher Rowe Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Aristotelica Studies On The Text of Aristotles Eudemian Ethics Christopher Rowe Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aristotelica Studies On The Text of Aristotles Eudemian Ethics Christopher Rowe Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Aristotelica: Studies on the Text of

Aristotle's Eudemian Ethics

Aristotle, De motu animalium: Text and Translation

Aristotle on the Sources of the Ethical Life Sylvia

On the Soul: And Other Psychological Works Aristotle

Aristotle on Sexual Difference. Metaphysics, Biology,

Aristotle on Shame and Learning to Be Good 1st Edition

John 11–21: A Handbook on the Greek Text Novakovic

On The Origin of Evolution : Tracing ‘Darwin’s

The New Testament in Syriac Peshitta Version: Based on

Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,

The following Studies are designed primarily to explain the reasoning

1214a2 συνέγραψεν (PCBL) on the face of it looks unlikely, given (a)

a5 Αmbr.’s placing of the δέ before ἥδιστον corresponds with its pos­ition

a6 συγχωροῦμεν Laur. 81,12: an easy mistake (the ου is corrected by

a10–11 καὶ περὶ τὰς πράξεις τοῦ πράγματος: if there is a problem

a13 Dirlmeier interprets the MSS’ ἦν as a ‘philosophical’ imperfect, tak-

Grundsatz, always a Grundsatz’, to paraphrase Dirlmeier). That, however,

­emendation (ὅτιπερ 〈ἂν〉 οἰκεῖον ᾖ) unnecessary.

a26 τῇ παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων, κτλ: as subject of the sentence, which

(1214a26) subject is surely εὐδαιμονία, and translators sometimes (see

rather less well with Spengel’s alternative proposal, 〈ἡ εὐδαιμονία〉 τῇ

παρουσίᾳ [διὰ] τούτων. . . .)

becomes so extended, especially with the—­unexpectedly ­expansive?—

set themselves an end: the list of possible ends is restricted to popular-­

b24 περὶ πάντων: P2 writes ἴσως: περιπάτων in the margin; L’s

b35 Spengel’s τῶν πολλῶν 〈ἐπισκεπτέον〉 is part of a solution to larger

a1–2 περὶ ἁπάντων καὶ μάλιστα περὶ ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας P1CL,

(1215a1–2) Ambr. leaves a gap after περὶ—­something must be missing

μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν σοϕῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον μόνας,

καὶ μάλιστα περὶ 〈τούτων περὶ ὧν τὰς τῶν ἐπιεικῶν〉 ἐπισκεπτέον

μόνας—­except that by borrowing an element of Dodds’s solution (see

a4 Jackson’s πειθοῦς for πάθους is surely implausible: does persuasion

a5 There are some traces of a correction above βίον in P, and it is nat­ural

1215a10 τῳ B (also P2, crossing out the circumflex accent) provides a

renders Fritzsche’s compromise, τῳ 〈τὸ〉, unnecessary.

2 A Greek–English Lexicon compiled by H. Liddell and R. Scott, revised . . . by H. Jones . . .

a28 In P a first correcting hand puts in an elision mark and rough

1215b1 The gap in B after ἀπολαυστικόν is not caused—­as some gaps

b10 ἐρόμενον BP2, ἐρώμενον P1CL: P2 corrects omega to omicron above

b14 ὡς ἄνθρωπον εἰπεῖν: both Russell’s and Richards’s emendations are

b23 B2 adds a breathing over the second alpha of ἀνακάμψαι: B is often

b29–30 ἀπέραντον, τί scripsi, ἀπέραντόν τι PCBL: changing the

solution than Rav.’s ἀπέραντόν τι 〈οὐ〉, adopted by editors.

b34 πορίζοι τοῖς ἀνθρώποις is repeated after προτιμήσειε in P but

b36 διενέγκοιεν L: the -εν is added as a compendium, unusually for

1216a2 μοναρχιῶν: Fritzsche and Susemihl both write μοναρχῶν, fol-

(1216a2) used μόναρχος (so Rackham); but μοναρχιῶν, on which

b3 The τοῦ for τὸ, before γινώσκειν, preferred by B2 (introducing a

b8 The μὲν is omitted/deleted in Marc., then by Bekker; Susemihl

b12 τέλος post ἕτερον suppl. Casaubon: we certainly cannot under-

b27 Spengel’s conjecture τούτων πάντα (with πάντα as masculine sin-

b28 P2 writes ἴσως: χρωμένους in the margin.

b35 γνωριμώτατα ends in B in what is apparently a version of the

1217a34–5 οὐδὲ τῶν ἀγαθῶν: I understand ‘so not participating in the

1218a2 Bessarion’s πρῶτον for πρότερον is perhaps just an error of tran-

a14 Susemihl, and then Walzer/Mingay, accept Rassow’s supplement

1218a15 ‘γρ. ἢ ὡς’, then (a17) ‘γρ. ἀνομολογουμένων’, Victorius.

a5 Αmbr.’s placing of the δέ before ἥδιστον corresponds with its position

emendation (ὅτιπερ 〈ἂν〉 οἰκεῖον ᾖ) unnecessary.

becomes so extended, especially with the—unexpectedly expansive?—

set themselves an end: the list of possible ends is restricted to popular-

(1215a1–2) Ambr. leaves a gap after περὶ—something must be missing

μόνας—except that by borrowing an element of Dodds’s solution (see

a5 There are some traces of a correction above βίον in P, and it is natural

1215b1 The gap in B after ἀπολαυστικόν is not caused—as some gaps

a25 τοῦ: I retain the MSS’ τοῦ—as referring to ζῆν—because (a) it is

intolerable without a verb, then prima facie Dirlmeier’s 〈ἔχοιμεν〉

(1221b19) followed by a mysterious oblique stroke, of a sort that in PC-