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A R IST OT LE ’S ONT OL O G Y OF AR TEF AC TS
It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as

examples or analogical cases. This book, however, shows that
Aristotle gives a specific, coherent account of artefacts that in various
ways owes much to Plato. Moreover, it proposes a new, definitive
solution to the problem of artefacts’ substantiality, which comprises
two controversial positions: (i) that Aristotle holds a binary view of
substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all;
(ii) that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit less of
a unity than natural wholes. Finally, responding to the contemporary
debate on ordinary objects, the book identifies the main propositions
for an ontology of artefacts that aspires to use Aristotle as its authority
and can serve as a guideline for current metaphysical discussions.
This title is part of the Flip it Open Programme and may also be
available Open Access. Check our website Cambridge Core for
details.
marilù papandreou is a post-doctoral researcher at the University

of Bergen and the Humboldt University of Berlin.
Published online by Cambridge University Press

ARISTOTLE’S ONTOLOGY
OF ARTEFACTS
MARILÙ PAPANDREOU
University of Bergen Humboldt University of Berlin

Shaftesbury Road, Cambridge cb2 8ea, United Kingdom
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education, learning and research at the highest international levels of excellence.
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9781009340502
doi: 10.1017/9781009340557
© Marilù Papandreou 2024
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception and to the provisions
of relevant collective licensing agreements, no reproduction of any part may take
place without the written permission of Cambridge University Press & Assessment.
First published 2024
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accurate or appropriate.

To my parents,
Anna e Giorgio

Contents
List of Figures page x

Acknowledgements xi
List of Abbreviations xiv
Introduction 1
0.1 Artefacts in the Contemporary Debate 2
0.2 Artefacts in Aristotle: Some Preliminary Observations 8
0.3 Aristotelian Scholarship: The Status Quaestionis 15
0.4 A Piecemeal Approach 20
0.5 Aristotle’s Ontology of Artefacts 27
1 The Platonic Heritage 31

1.1 Plato’s Metaphysics of Artefacts 32
1.1.1 Plato’s Ideas of Artefacts in the Cratylus and Republic X 32
1.1.2 The Doubts of the Young Socrates in the Parmenides 36
1.1.3 Divine Craftsmanship in the Timaeus 39
1.2 Building on Plato’s Theoretical Shortcomings 41
1.2.1 Final Causation 41
1.2.2 Models, Likenesses and the Notion of Imitation 42
1.3 Platonic Intuitions as the Source of Aristotle’s Account of Artefacts 46
1.3.1 Ideas and Forms 46
1.3.2 Axiology and Metaphysics 48
1.3.3 Carving Nature at the Joints 52
1.3.4 Parts and Whole 55
2 Using Artefacts against Plato 58

2.1 The Arguments 58
2.1.1 Against the Arguments from the Sciences 58
2.1.2 The Threat of Aporia 61
2.1.3 The Logical or Semantic Argument 66
2.1.4 Aristotle’s Argument from Evidence 67
2.2 The Notion of Separation 70
2.3 Aristotle’s Dialectical Use of Artefacts 71
vii

viii Contents
3 Aristotle’s Building Blocks in the Physics 75
3.1 The Theory of the Four Causes and the Art Analogy 76
3.2 The Salient Difference between Artefacts and Natural Beings 81
3.2.1 The Definition of Nature in Phys. 2.1 83
3.2.2 Daedalus’ Statues, Machines, the Olive Tree and the Swallow’s
Nest 87
3.3 Artefacts Will Typically Come-to-Be by Art 88
3.3.1 Art as Principle 89
3.3.2 Other Dependent Objects 92
3.4 Some Artefacts Will Only Come-to-Be by Art and Some Natural Beings
Will Also Come-to-Be by Art 100
3.4.1 Inadvertently Made Objects 100
3.4.2 The Case of Artificial Mixtures 103
4 Artefacts as Hylomorphic Compounds 109

4.1 Artefacts Undergo Unqualified Coming-to-Be 110
4.1.1 Intrinsic Change in the Matter 110
4.1.2 Per Se Unities 121
4.1.3 Nature-Facts and Found-Objects: The Paperweight
and the Strigil 123
4.2 It’s Not Bronze, It’s a Brazen Statue 125
4.2.1 The Eikeininon Rule 125
4.2.2 Actuality-Inducing Action as the Relevant Change in Matter 129
4.3 Synonymy Principle 136
4.3.1 The Synonymy Principle Applied to Artefacts 138
4.3.2 The Form in the Mind of the Artisan as the Form of the Object
in Thought and as in Actuality 141
4.3.3 The Form in the Object in Potentiality: The Artisans’ Tools 143
4.4 Neither Just Matter nor Accidental Beings 147
5 Forms of Artefacts as Inert and Intermittent 150

5.1 Art as the Form in the Mind of the Artisan 151
5.1.1 Art as Efficient Cause of Qualified Coming-to-Be 151
5.1.2 Art as Efficient Cause of Unqualified Coming-to-Be 157
5.2 Against Transmission Theory: How the Form in the Object Is Not
an Efficient Cause Explained through Biology 161
5.2.1 On the Difference between the Semen and the Tools 161
5.2.2 Heartless Artefacts 165
5.3 Autonomy, Life and Substantiality 168
5.4 Eternity and Substantiality 174
6 The Relation between Matter and Form in Artefacts 181

6.1 Artefact-Kinds as Functions 181
6.2 Diachronic and Synchronic Matter 187
6.2.1 Remote and Proximate Matter 192

Contents ix
6.2.2 The Proximate Matter of Artefacts: The Many-to-Many
Relationship 194
6.2.3 The Sources of Hindrances in the Remote Matter of Artefacts 202
6.3 The Synchronic Matter of Artefacts: Functional Matter and the
Homonymy Principle 207
6.4 What Then? Persisting Matter 214
6.5 The Unity of Matter and Form and Substantiality 215
7 The Relation Between Parts and Whole in Artefacts 219

7.1 How to Explain What a Thing Is: The Differentiae in H 2 221
7.2 The Static Picture 227
7.2.1 Unity by Contact 227
7.2.2 Unity by Continuity 229
7.2.3 Unity by Wholeness 230
7.3 Unity and the Substantiality of Artefacts 232
7.3.1 Having a Form, but with Parts in Actuality 232
7.3.2 Failing Met. Z 13’s Substantiality Criterion 237
7.3.3 Hylomorphism and Substantiality Diverge 241
7.3.4 Unqualified Coming-to-Be Reconsidered: Production and
Destruction 243
8 The Physics and Metaphysics of Artefacts 251

8.1 The Dynamic Picture: Maintenance and Performance 251
8.2 Back to the Physics? 261
8.3 Artefacts as Objects of Inquiry 264
8.3.1 The Physicist, the Artisan and the User 265
8.3.2 The Metaphysician 268
8.3.3 The Cheap Coppersmith and the Spit-and-Lampstand 271
Conclusions 276
Bibliography 281
Index Locorum 294
Subject Index 297

Figures
4.1 Difference between a matter that is potentially the object page 133
and a matter that is part of the object

Acknowledgements
This book began as a doctoral dissertation at the Munich School of Ancient

Philosophy (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich). My primary debt
is to my supervisor and mentor Christof Rapp for his profound and
manifold influence on me as a scholar. I am indebted to my second reader,
Peter Adamson, for his formative feedback, kindness, support and always
prompt advice. I could not wish for a better place than MUSAΦ to
conduct, and learn how to conduct, research in ancient philosophy.
Christian Pfeiffer and Laura Castelli have been particularly generous and
commented on various chapters during my PhD. I also owe them a great
deal of gratitude for inspiring, with their respective work, many of the
decisions I made in reconstructing Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts. I wish
to thank Oliver Primavesi for unerringly sharing his most recent work on
the text of Aristotle’s Metaphysics, thus securing a robust foundation and
philological soundness for my project. Colleagues and friends at MUSAΦ
have been an outstanding source of help too, in particular Andreas
Anagnostopoulos, Jonathan Greig and Melina Vogiatzi.
The University of Milan is where I first became passionate about ancient
philosophy and started rambling over lunch about whether there are Ideas
of artefacts. I truly cannot thank enough Filippo Forcignanò, Mauro
Bonazzi and Franco Trabattoni for instilling in me such a deep affection
for the topic. Back then, I also had the fortune to have my PhD project idea
discussed with Maddalena Bonelli and Simone Seminara, to whom
I would like to show appreciation as well.
During and after having completed my PhD, I have fortunately been
allowed to present part of my research on several occasions. I would like to
offer thanks to the audiences in Berlin, Berkeley, Cambridge, Falconara,
Milan, Pavia and Paris. I wish to express my gratitude to those who took
extra time and showed interest in my research, by challenging it in an
incredibly obliging and always sympathetic manner: Riccardo
Chiaradonna, Nicholas Denyer, Andrea Falcon, Andreas Lammer, Gyula
xi

xii Acknowledgements
Klima and David Sedley. One who revealed to me connections I was not
aware of was Thomas Kjeller Johansen, to whom I am exceedingly grateful
for taking the time to meet with me in Oslo. Furthermore, I would like to
extend thanks to Stephen Menn for allowing me to cite his work in progress.
My understanding of the contemporary metaphysics of artefacts owes an
immense debt to Kathrin Koslicki. I wish to thank her for sharing and
discussing with me her chapter on artefacts in Munich in 2017 and for
continuing this conversation in Berlin in 2022. To tell the truth, I would
not have been able to place Aristotle into dialogue with contemporary
metaphysicians without her work.
The book in its final form owes the most gratitude to the anonymous
referees, who provided a wealth of astounding advice. I cannot express how
grateful I am for how thoroughly they engaged with my book and how
attentive and acute their comments were. It is impossible to exhaustively
name the ways their feedback improved my book, but I would like to
especially highlight two major debts I collected towards them. I was guilty
of underestimating the importance of the Platonic heritage and the role of
Aristotle’s Physics. I owe to the reviewers the very structure of the book as
revolving around Aristotle’s response to Plato, as well as the rehabilitation
of the Physics and the emphasis on its significance even concerning
Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts.
Individual chapters were considerably improved thanks to having been
given the opportunity to present their drafts. I wish to thank Pierre-Marie
Morel and Ulysse Chaintreuil for inviting me to Paris to present Chapter 8.
Moreover, I thank Chiara Blengini, Federico Casella and Beatrice Michetti
for inviting me to Pavia to share my thoughts on the very peculiar case of
mixtures (Chapter 3.4.2).
I cannot fail to acknowledge the University of Bergen, where I am
currently a post-doctoral researcher. Without a doubt, they have offered
me the best conditions imaginable to bring the book to publication. I wish
to thank Steinar Bøyum in particular, whose supportive leadership imme-
diately made me feel in the right place. Furthermore, I would like to
express my gratitude to Hallvard Fossheim and Kristian Larsen for their
insightful feedback on the first chapter.
If this book is at all readable, it is thanks to Chad Jorgenson and his
unmatched competence as English language editor. He not only made my
English clearer and more idiomatic, but also acted as an encouraging
teammate along the way. Moreover, if this book is at all a book, it is thanks
to the editor Michael Sharp, with his brilliant guidance and great support
along the way.

Acknowledgements xiii
On a more personal note, this book has been written and revised in
numerous locations, all of which have felt like home to me. This feeling
plays no negligible part in the writing process. I cannot but wholeheartedly
thank my parents – to whom I dedicate this book – and my family in Italy,
in particular Alice and Ivan, as well as my friend Benny. Most of the effort
that went into this book, however, was in Munich, where I was surrounded
by great friends. Their presence, encouragement and interest has benefitted
me and this book in ways that are nearly impossible to explain. My sincere
thanks go to Biene, Blake, Brett, Connie, Elena, Felix, Minna and
Tommaso. A special thank you also goes to the Center for Advanced
Studies (Ludwig Maximilian University of Munich), and to Annette
Meyer in particular. Nobody taught me to look outside of my own bubble
and allowed me to understand my role, however small, in the wider
academic and research world than Annette did. I was furthermore incred-
ibly fortunate to often be able to revise my book in Norway, particularly in
Bø in Telemark and on the island Jomfruland. I wish to thank Turid and
Halvor for taking care of me and making sure I could work undisturbed in
such wonderful places. It turns out that nothing helps me more as a writer
than Norwegian kos. Finally, I would like to thank Jostein Gåra, for sharing
this journey with me since its beginning and for infallibly being my
compass and dearest human being. I cannot ever hope to repay him.

Abbreviations
An. Post. Posterior Analytics

Cael. On the Heavens
Cat. Categories
DA On the Soul (De anima)
EE Eudemian Ethics
GA Generation of Animals
GC Generation and Corruption
HA History of Animals
MA Movements of Animals
Mech. Mechanics
Met. Metaphysics
Meteor. Meteorology
MM Magna Moralia
NE Nicomachean Ethics
PA Parts of Animals
Parm. Parmenides
Phaed. Phaedrus
Phys. Physics
Pol. Politics
Rep. Republic
Symp. Symposium
Theaet. Theaetetus
Top. Topics
All references to Aristotle’s text follow Bekker pagination.
All references to Plato’s text follow Stephanus pagination.
All translations are my own, unless otherwise specified.
xiv

Introduction
This book concerns the ontological status of products of art (technê) in

Aristotle, in particular material objects. It makes three main advances with
respect to the existing literature: the first will be of interest to contemporary
metaphysicians, the second to historians of philosophy, and the third to
both contemporary metaphysicians and historians of philosophy. First, the
metaphysics of artefacts is increasingly gaining the attention of contem-
porary metaphysicians, in particular among supporters of hylomorphism,
who all refer to or draw on Aristotle. However, there is no consensus about
the place of artefacts within Aristotle’s ontology; indeed, there is no
consensus as to whether Aristotle articulates a single coherent account of
artefacts in the first place. Hence, the first contribution made by this book
is to offer a complete picture of Aristotle’s account of artefacts that is
sensitive to current issues and that can therefore serve as a guide for the
contemporary (neo-)Aristotelian debate. Second, when it comes to technê,
historians of philosophy have primarily focused on the art analogy and
Aristotle’s use of examples taken from the artificial realm. They have often
concluded that Aristotle’s appeal to artefacts does not leave us with any
positive result about the status of technical objects. To date, little effort has
been invested in demarcating Aristotle’s notion of artefacts in a way that
goes beyond the art analogy and a handful of commonly used examples.
The book’s second contribution is to show that Aristotle gives a specific,
coherent account of artefacts and that he did not merely employ them as
examples or analogical cases. Its third and final contribution is to address
an issue of key interest to both Aristotle scholars and contemporary
metaphysicians concerning the ontological status of artefacts, namely the
question of whether they are substances and, if not, why they fail to attain
this status. No consensus has yet been reached regarding the substantiality
of artefacts: there is agreement neither as to whether artefacts are sub-
stances, at least to some extent, nor as to the ultimate reason why they are
ontologically inferior to living beings. This book proposes a new solution
1
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781009340557.001 Published online by Cambridge University Press

2 Introduction
to this problem. I shall now begin by offering some preliminary, founda-
tional remarks on the topic and the method.
0.1 Artefacts in the Contemporary Debate

The vast majority of our sensory experience is filled with human-
dependent objects. ‘Other than the sky and some trees, everything I can
see from where I now sit is artificial’, as Henry Petroski (1992) puts it at the
beginning of his The Evolution of Useful Things. Petroski’s book aims to
examine the way in which such objects have come to look the way they do,
by adopting a historical perspective. This perspective is non-philosophical
insofar as it presents a sort of common-sense view of artefacts as, in general,
objects that are designed – that is, objects from our daily lives employed in
specific cultural settings that came-to-be as a result of occasionally rather
complicated design-histories. Artefacts are therefore objects that human
beings have designed, such as forks, paper clips, hammers, nails and spikes.
A similar, yet nonetheless different approach is represented by the arch-
aeological conception of an artefact: something made or given shape by
humans, usually found buried along with a body, among votive offerings,
in hoards, or in a domestic setting or midden. Examples include stone
tools, pottery vessels, metal objects such as weapons, and items of personal
adornment, such as buttons, jewellery and clothing. By contrast, neither
non-portable remains, such as hearths, nor biofacts and manuports are
considered artefacts by archaeologists.1
Within a non-philosophical perspective, we find the frequent common-
sense identification of artefacts with artworks, such as paintings, drawings
and other creative products. Although works of art can, in many respects, be
conceptualised as artefacts, they make up only a small portion of this group.
A simple semantic shift would suffice to invalidate this identification:
common sense does not wholly identify crafted items with works of art.
Indeed, the very word ‘artefact’, in opposition to ‘craftwork’, allows for
a misrepresentation of the class of objects as being artistic products in the
ordinary meaning of the term. This is part of the reason why several
contemporary thinkers prefer to talk about technical artefacts in order to
disambiguate and explicitly exclude artworks from their surveys.2 The
adjective ‘artificial’ exhibits similar ambiguity. The ordinary understanding
1
Biofacts are objects that are merely handled by humans but not made by them. Usually biofacts refer
to the residual material of a formerly living being. Manuports are natural objects that humans have
moved, but not changed.
2
See Baker (2007).

of this term takes it to mean either ‘made according to art’/‘man-made’ or
‘not sincere’. Thus, the replacement of ‘artificial’ by either ‘crafted’ or
‘technical’ helps to avoid ambiguity. In this book, I shall employ the word
‘artefact’ – and, consequently, ‘artificial’ – to refer to a class of human-
dependent objects that are typically brought into existence through a specific
set of skills (i.e. art or craft).
If we define artefacts as both artistic and technical items that are brought
into existence by human agents, why are they interesting? From an ordinary
point of view – without yet entering into philosophical discussion – artefacts
are interesting because nobody can do without them. Of course, one could
very well take the decision to push technology out of one’s life, but technical
items are far more numerous than technological items, such as smartphones,
computers and consoles. The world we live in is filled with roads, beds and
tools. Anyone interested in the world would have to acknowledge the vast
quantities of artefacts present in it. Even when not acknowledged, artefacts
play a major role in shaping societies and people’s lives.3
The omnipresence of artefacts has been widely underestimated by
philosophers and interest in technology is a recent development. Two
branches of philosophy have shown the most interest in artefacts: philoso-
phy of technology and aesthetics. The former emerged as a discipline over
the last two centuries and was primarily associated with questions of
philosophy of science and engineering.4 The latter was specifically engaged
with questions regarding works of art, leaving aside tools and other objects
of this sort that constitute the majority of artefacts.
The metaphysics of artefacts has received comparatively limited interest.5
This is probably due to a tradition that downgrades manifest things6 and
denies the value of artefacts. One contemporary controversy has, in fact,
focused on whether artefacts deserve a place in our ontology at all. The idea
that artefacts might deserve their own ontological position has often been
rejected. Puzzles such as that of Theseus’ Ship7 or the problem of coinciding
3
For a discussion on the ways in which well and badly designed artefacts affect our lives, see, for
instance, Norman 2001; and for a consideration of artefacts as ‘collaborative actions’, see Preston
2012.
4
It is still difficult to understand what the discipline of philosophy of technology consists of and
whether it is a self-contained discipline in the first place. For an overview, see Franssen 2009; Reydon
2012.
5
I shall set aside the treatment of artefacts in semantic, mereology and formal ontology.
6
In the modern discussion, the class of ‘manifest things’ includes macroscopic beings such as artefacts
and living beings.
7
The puzzle of Theseus’ Ship has acquired special notoriety. It is presented by Hobbes in his De
Corpore (1655) and reconsidered by Simons (1987) and Wiggins (2001).

4 Introduction
objects8 seem to threaten their identity and existence. The so-called ‘Denial
Thesis’ proposed by Van Inwagen (1990) has been highly influential, accord-
ing to which not only artefacts, but also inanimate material objects do not
exist.9 This scepticism about taking artefacts seriously may also reflect a more
general scepticism towards ordinary things (natural as well as artificial beings
present in our daily experience – such as dogs and chairs) of the sort that we
find, for instance, in Unger’s (1979) article. As Baker (2007, 4–5) states:
Some contemporary metaphysicians reject ordinary things10 because they take
irreducible reality to be exhausted by a completed physics; some reject ordinary
things because they take common sense objects to be too sloppy – they gain and
lose parts; they have no fixed boundaries – to be irreducibly real. Many of
today’s philosophers take concrete reality to be nothing but fundamental
particles and their fusions, or instantaneous temporal parts, and/or a few
universals, and see no ontological significance in ordinary things like trees
and tables.
Baker is therefore part of the minor trend of taking ordinary things to be
irreducibly real and, hence, as deserving a spot in our ontologies.
However, growing interest in artificial objects has also been witnessed
recently in metaphysics, where the main questions are about the kind of
entities they are and whether they exist at all – since their identity condi-
tions seem unclear with respect to both particular objects and artificial
kinds. Metaphysics has mostly focused on works of arts alone, and espe-
cially on the question of the ontological category to which they belong.
Many philosophers have, in fact, defined works of art as events, processes
or actions.11 The metaphysics of technical artefacts, or artefacts in general
(including both technical artefacts and artworks), has certainly received
a limited attention due to widespread scepticism about their metaphysical
value. However, two leading approaches to defending artefacts as serious
objects of philosophical thinking have been promoted in recent years. The
first is to reject the arguments against the ontological value of artefacts.
Thinkers following this first path include Rea (1995, 1998) and Soavi
(2009).12 The second way of securing a place for artefacts within our
8
See Rea 1997.
9
By proposing a theory of composition, Van Inwagen claims that only living beings and their simples
exist.
10
The class of ordinary things is broader than the class of artefacts. Ordinary things also include living
beings. Some philosophers do not merely exclude artefacts from ontology, but they do so by
excluding ordinary things as a whole from their discussion.
11
For an overview of the positions concerning the ontological status of artworks, see Livingston 2011.
12
Soavi (2009), for instance, examines and rejects three arguments against the reality of artefacts:
Wiggins’ argument that artefact kinds are not sortals (Wiggins 2001), Van Inwagen’s composition

ontology is to defend the value of a super-category that includes artefacts,
as well as other things.13 Often, this latter approach is pursued alongside the
rejection of arguments levelled against the super-category in question. For
instance, Elder (2007) includes some – though not all – artefacts in the
class of copied kinds and argues that they ‘have genuine, mind-independent
existence – existence caused by us, to be sure, but not constituted by our
believing what we do about where artifacts are to be found’. Thomasson
(2007a) includes artefacts in the super-category of ordinary objects and
argues in favour of a realist position, by opposing the idea that dependence
on human beliefs and intentions cannot coexist with the reality of artificial
and institutional objects. Baker focuses on the super-category of familiar
things and defends their value: she explains that the everyday world is the
locus of human interest and concern (Baker 2007, 7) and that it figures in
the causal explanations that we make. Also in favour of the reality of
artefacts is Koslicki,14 who declares her willingness to include artefacts in
her discussion, despite being sceptical as to whether they can be counted as
hylomorphic compounds. While still constituting a minority, supporters
of taking artefacts seriously in metaphysical discussions have been growing
in number and strength in recent years. It seems that the complaint made
by Houkes and Vermaas (2009) about analytic philosophers of artefacts
was not unheard: ‘Only those philosophers who aim at a very complete
and/or a very general understanding of the world care, at some point in
their projects, to examine artefacts.’ A prominent, but unwelcome feature
of analytic studies of artefacts is their lack of specificity: they touch upon
artefacts merely because they are dealing with a larger range of beings, if not
all beings. On the one hand, numerous works have associated artefacts with
a range of other beings, so as to create a more general class of beings sharing
a particular metaphysical feature: examples of this include copied kinds
(Elder 2007) and ordinary objects (Van Inwagen 1990). On the other hand,
some works have focused on specific kinds of artefacts, such as artworks, or
have discussed artefacts without drawing a distinction between artefacts
and other human-dependent things, resulting in the wider class of ID-
objects. Analytic metaphysicians of artefacts have mostly addressed them in
argument (Van Inwagen 1990, 90, 98) and Merricks’ argument from causal overdetermination
(Merricks 2001, 56–8). She argues (29–30) that the three accounts suffer from the same fundamental
flaw: none of them establishes a clear-cut distinction between artefacts and natural beings. More
recently, Koslicki (2018), while addressing author-based accounts, points out their difficulties in
dealing with objects that are clearly classifiable neither as natural beings nor as artefacts.
13
Works defending the metaphysical seriousness of artefacts include Rea 1995, 1998; Thomasson 1999,
2007; Elder 2004, 2007.
14
Koslicki 2008, 2018.

6 Introduction
what Houkes and Vermaas (2009) call the ‘detached way’, on the grounds
that ‘artefacts are compared with objects that are independent from human
interests or it is examined whether artefacts are sufficiently independent to
qualify as objects or as members of a natural kind’. Only more recent
developments have given rise to an ‘involved perspective’, in which our
involvement with objects is taken as relevant to their real nature.
Philosophers such as Baker, Thomasson and Elder place intention along
with actions such as design, production and modification at the centre of
their enquiry.
However, even among thinkers who are willing to include artefacts in
their enquiries there are controversies, in particular about the definition of
the class of artefacts and the essence of a given artefact. As regards the first
controversy, an initial definition of what an artefact is supposed to be is
provided by Hilpinen (1993), who identifies an artefact with an object that
has an author. In the same year, Dipert (1993) described an artefact as
something intended by its author to be recognised as having been inten-
tionally made for a certain purpose. However, both focus their attention on
artefacts that are works of art. By contrast, a definition of artefacts, in the
sense of technical artefacts, is advanced by Thomasson (2003, 2007), who
defines artefacts as intended products of human activity. The discussion
concerning the definition of the class of artefacts (i.e. of what things are
artefacts) has occasionally overlapped with the debate about how to pin-
point the essence of a given artefact. This overlap is primarily due to the
predominant identification of artefactual essences with the author’s inten-
tions or acts: the definition of an artefact as something produced for a given
purpose coincides with the artefact’s essence as ‘being produced for the
purpose K’. It is too often the case that the extensional question concerning
precisely what things are to be counted as artefacts is confused with the
question of the essence of a given artefact; that is, of how artefactual
essences ought to be conceived. At any rate, artefactual essences have
been singled out in several different ways. Most essentialist accounts
identify these essences with the maker’s intentions.15 As has already been
mentioned, Thomasson claims that the author’s intentions are constitutive
of artefactual essences, hence artefacts are essentially mind-dependent
human products. Baker (2007) describes the essences of technical artefacts
as proper functions, namely the practical goal that the object is supposed to
achieve. Elder (2004, 2007) speaks about functions as well, but he does so
from a historical perspective in which they are copied from earlier products
15
I leave aside conventionalist accounts. For an overview, see Koslicki 2018, 237–9.

of the same kind. In his view, an artefact’s essence includes the production
of certain effects. More recently, Evnine (2016) has identified artefactual
essences with acts of creations: an act of creation involves the agent
performing the action, as well as the events underlying the action, such
as bodily movements and other actions. Another angle is provided by
Kornblith (2007), who suggests that a given artefact’s essence might be
redefined by subsequent user intentions, as opposed to the original maker’s
intentions.
In addition to the two major disputes about artefacts, in the current
metaphysical discussion, hylomorphic accounts are open to several other
challenges, which are highlighted by Koslicki (2018). One challenge is what
Koslicki calls the ‘easy ontology’ challenge, consisting of the following
problem: if the intentions of the maker are sufficient to bring about a new
object, it appears ‘too easy’ to create not only new items but also new kinds.
According to this challenge, not only biofacts, ready-mades and found-
objects, but also a potentially endless number of prototypes might come to
populate our world. Another challenge is called the ‘scope’ challenge and
concerns the ontological status of things that are neither natural nor qualify
as artefacts; for example, animal artefacts, by-products, residues and unin-
tended products of human activity. The lack of a clear definition of the
class of artefacts is a real problem with in the contemporary debate and
ultimately influences the ontological question regarding such entities as
well.16 Aristotle provides us with conceptual tools to deal with such
challenges.17 Moreover, Aristotle provides a definition of the class of
artefacts that marks them off from both the class of ordinary objects and
the class of human-dependent objects.
Baker (2007, 5) declares that Aristotle was quite the exception in the
history of philosophy, in that he was willing to accommodate artefacts
within his ontology. Aristotle was arguably the first philosopher to make
such large-scale use of artefacts and, more important, to include them in
specifically metaphysical discussions. Moreover, he did so in an ‘involved
way’. Today, several metaphysicians either call themselves Aristotelian, or
are supporters of hylomorphism, or again they draw on Aristotle for some
of their claims. In order to side with Aristotle, however, one requires a clear
overview of Aristotle’s account of artefacts and the main propositions it
advances.
16
See Soavi 2009, 29–30.
17
For a discussion on how Aristotle would face the challenges highlighted by Koslicki (2018), see
Papandreou 2018.

8 Introduction
0.2 Artefacts in Aristotle: Some Preliminary Observations
The topic of artefacts is currently debated by contemporary philosophers
to the same extent that it was traditionally understudied by historians of
philosophy. Despite excellent work on the notion of technê, which has been
chiefly surveyed up to the Hellenistic age,18 comparatively little attention
has been dedicated to artefacts. Considering that the current debate on
artefacts flourished within an Aristotelian framework, it is all the more
striking that most work done by historians of ancient philosophy on
artefacts concerns ancient Platonism.19 In particular, the debate within
the Academy about whether there exist Ideas of artefacts has received
deserved attention.20 Moreover, the same controversy has been studied
in Late Antiquity, especially with reference to Proclus and Syrianus.21
However, Aristotle and the history of Aristotelianism has, surprisingly,
not received the same attention. The only book-length discussion of
artefacts in Aristotle is Katayama’s (1999). The other contributions by
Aristotle scholars only touch upon artefacts, rather than focusing on
them. Moreover, like most contemporary metaphysicians, Aristotle
scholars primarily address artefacts by including them in a super-category
worthier of explanation. For instance, while for Cohen (1996) the super-
category of interest is that of ‘incomplete substances’, for Kosman (1987) it
is ‘animals and other beings’.
Before diving into Aristotle’s conception of art, the resulting inventory
of Aristotelian artefacts and the issue of their ontological status, it is
important to mention certain difficulties concerning the method and the
nature of such an investigation. For instance, the reader might reject the
project at the outset, because it supposedly lacks a subject-matter. Above
all, while Aristotle has a specific term for referring to art or craft (technê), he
lacks a single term to signify ‘artefact’.22 This semantic deficiency gives rise
to general issues, the main one being whether he really deals with artefacts
at all. The Latin word artefactum comes from the ablative of ars, meaning
‘by skill’, and the past participle of facere, meaning ‘made’. Aristotle does
not have such a term at his disposal in Ancient Greek. However, there are
18
See, e.g. Isnardi Parente (1966) and Löbl (1997, 2003, 2008). The most recent contribution to the
topic is Johansen (2021), which covers the notion of productive knowledge in ancient philosophy up
to Late Antiquity, with a chapter on Plotinus and one on Proclus.
19
I am referring to contributions concerned with artefacts as such. Certainly, there is a vast literature
on the art analogy and teleology. I will return to these aspects in Chapter 3.1.
20
For example, Fine (1993) and Broadie (2007). 21 D’Hoine (2006a, 2006b).
22
This is not the case for Aristotle’s commentators. Already with Alexander of Aphrodisias, ta phusika
(natural beings) are opposed to ta technêta (artefacts). See, for instance, Mantissa 121.17–18.

certainly clauses that correspond to ‘artefact’. First, ‘being by nature’
(phusei) is often opposed to ‘being by art’ (technêi). As opposed to ‘being
nature’ (estin hê phusis), which is being the sort of principle that nature is,
‘being by nature’ refers to the things that have such a principle. Similarly,
‘being by art’ refers to those things whose principle is art (technê). In the
case of natural beings, ‘being by nature’, in turn, coincides with ‘having
a nature’ (echei phusin).23 In the case of artefacts, ‘being by art’ does not
coincide with ‘having art’. However, ‘being by art’ is as close to ‘being in
accordance with art’ (kata technên),24 as ‘being by nature’ is to ‘being
according to nature’ (kata phusin). The difference in both cases is that
‘according to’ applies to substances, as well as to properties, whereas ‘being
by’ seems to refer only to substantial cases. Aristotle refers to artefacts as
beings kata technên, especially in the Physics and in the biological works.25
Another way to refer to artefacts is as to technikon, in the sense of ‘done by
rules of art’ – and not in the sense of ‘skilful’ – which is a parallel
construction to to phusikon (i.e. ‘caused by nature’).26 Things that exist
by art are often qualified as things that have been put together apo technês.27
In several places, Aristotle drops the mention of technê and refers to phusis
in a negative sense: he speaks about things that are not put together by
nature, referring to things such as a vessel, a house, a couch, a coat and
a ship.28 A broader term, encompassing artefacts, as well as other products
that are not natural, is poioumena (i.e. things that are made).29 This term
can refer to artefacts, as well as other things resulting from production, as
well as to productive branches of knowledge. Aristotle explicitly refers to
art in NE 1014a10–16. In Phys. 2.1 poioumena refers to artefacts, such as
a house, as well as to manufactured objects (cheirokmêta).30 By ‘manufac-
tured objects’, Aristotle seems to mean items an unskilled maker could
build, such as a well.31 This intuition is confirmed by Met. A, where the
term refers to the things produced by mere manual workers (hoi
cheirotechnai).32 Moreover, in several places in GA, Aristotle refers to
artefacts or to the works of Nature when comparing it to an artisan as
23
Phys. 2.1, 192b27–193a1.
24
Aristotle appeals to kata technên for instance in NE 1099b22–3; Met. 1070a17 but also in Protrepticus
fr. 12 line 8.
25
GA 730b21, 734b36, 767a17 and 775a21; PA 639b15–16; Phys. 193a32, 194b7, 199a17–19, 199a33, 199b1,
200b1.
26
Phys. 2.1, 193a31–3.
27
Cael. 277b31, GC 335b28, Met. 1032a27–8, 1032a32, 1032b22–3, 1032b24–5, 1034a12, 1034a34, PA
640a29, 640a32, Phys. 2.1, 192b18 and Protrepticus fragment 12 line 2.
28
In Met. 1043b22 and Phys. 192b13, 254b31. 29 Met. 1050a31, 1064a12.
30
Phys. 2.1, 192b27–32. 31 Meteor. 353b25–6, 381a30. 32 Met. A 1, 981a30–b2.

10 Introduction
‘things that are crafted’ (dêmiourgoumena).33 Also things that come-to-be
apo dianoias, such as, for instance in Met. Θ 7, 1049a5, demarcate the class
of human-dependent beings which is broader than the class of artefacts.
One might add to this list the term for ‘inanimate’, since, from the
standpoint of its meaning, it seems to designate a place for artefacts,
since artefacts are, in fact, inanimate objects. However, Aristotle mostly
uses the adjective apsuchos to refer to inanimate natural beings, such as
copper and silver, whose main difference with respect to living beings is
their lack of sense perception (Phys. 244b13).34 The Aristotelian scala
naturae is a continuum ranging from those inanimate natural beings
considered as lifeless (apsucha) to animals35 (i.e. those beings most fully
endowed with life), by way of plants, which represent the bridge between
the non-living and the living (HA 588b6–10, PA 681a13 and Theophrastus
On Plants 1.1, 816a35). Leaving aside the adjective apsuchos, Aristotle has
several alternative ways of referring to artefacts and the one this book is
most interested in is ‘being technêi’, which defines substance-like cases of
things made by art. Common sense regards substance-like cases (i.e.
material objects)36 as paradigms and this book, too, focuses on such cases
(i.e. those cases that would count as substances in the Categories). While
material objects are certainly not the only products of some art, since it has
been shown that being according to art is a broader concept, the notion of
interest here is that of material objects as substance-like cases.
For this reason, the Categories will be briefly discussed here, since art is
trans-categorical. The first feature of substances is a negative one: they are
not in a subject, but they are subjects of predicates. Something can be
predicated of a substance, but a primary substance cannot be the predi-
cated of anything. An artefact that falls under the category of substance is
thus the subject of predication and not a predicate. This first crucial feature
of substances eliminates from consideration all properties that are brought
about by art. If a doctor makes the patient healthy (i.e. brings about
a qualitative change in them), then the patient’s health is not the kind of
artefact we will be dealing with here. The second feature of substances is
that each is a tode ti (i.e. this particular thing). This feature applies to
primary substances, since they are individual things that are numerically
one. Secondary substances are rather said to be poion tina: man is said of
33
GA 724a34, 743b23, 762a16, 767a19. See also NE 1094b14.
34
Mostly but not always, since, for instance, in Met. Δ 12 on the meanings of capacity (dunamis),
Aristotle uses it to refer to tools.
35
Between animate and inanimate there is no intermediate state. See On Plants 1.1, 816a5–10.
36
On products of art that do not qualify as material objects, see Chapter 3 (Section 3.3).

many men; thus, it does not refer to one individual thing. Our journey into
the realm of artefacts will be guided by a focus on items that are individual
and numerically one. Another feature of substances is that each substance
admits contraries (i.e. undergoes changes) while still remaining identical to
itself and numerically one. This feature is exclusive to substances. Any
spatially extended object can undergo changes from one contrary to the
other, while remaining what it is. When Aristotle, at the end of Cat. 5,
repeats this necessary and exclusive feature of substances (i.e. that they
admit of contraries), he says that a substance can remain what it is even
when changing from disease to health, or from whiteness to blackness.37 It
is noteworthy that health is mentioned here. This gives us further reason to
locate it within another category and, more specifically, under the category
of disposition: health can easily be removed and can quickly change. By
contrast, habits such as virtues and vices are more difficult to change, and
they are generally stable and long-lasting. Certainly, in this passage, as well
as in others in the Categories, Aristotle introduces health without any
concern about its origin: whether health occurs spontaneously or by art
is unimportant; what is important is that health is always the health of
something else (i.e. of a substance). However that may be, the last and most
relevant criterion rules processes out of consideration. Given the three
main aspects of substance, only some of the various things that can be
brought about by art pass the test for substantiality in the Categories. These
things therefore represent the focus of my enquiry: spatially extended
(concrete) individual objects such as tools, garments, furniture and craft-
works. Things that fail the test of the Categories are properties, such as
health, events/processes, such as boiling, and states of mind, such as
persuasion and agreement: these will all be set aside.38 Note that this
book does not argue for the exclusion of health and persuasion from the
class of genuine artefacts, but rather for the exclusion of such things from
the scope of the present enquiry. As we have said, art is trans-categorical:
health is a property brought about by medicine, while persuasion is an
affection of a subject produced by the art of the orator. These things are all
products of art in that they come-to-be by art. This means that one should
not ascribe to Aristotle the view that artefacts are substance-like. Since
a considerable part of the effort of this book is dedicated to situating
artefacts within ontology and understanding the extent to which they are
not proper substances – if they are even substances at all – this book,
methodologically speaking, excludes from consideration those things that
37 38
Cat. 4b13–9. I shall briefly address them again in Chapter 3 (Section 3.3.1).

12 Introduction
could potentially produce confusion. In other words, if one focuses on
health as the reference case, one might end up excluding all artefacts from
the realm of substances for the wrong reasons, because health fails to be
a substance, first and foremost, because it is a property and not because it is
an artefact. The focus is therefore on those things that, according to the
Categories, would count as substances in order to see whether they continue
to be substances within the framework of the Metaphysics.
Another objection might derive from the undeniable fact that Aristotle
did not dedicate any specific work or extended, well-structured argumen-
tation to artefacts.39 This might mean that he was not interested in artefacts
and/or that he did not find them sufficiently problematic. Certainly, there
are works dedicated to arts, such as the Rhetoric and the Poetics, but none
that specifically deals with artefacts in the way specified.40 Diogenes
Laertius lists among Aristotle’s works of ‘excellence’ two compilations of
technai composed of two books each, and a work on Technê in one book.
We do not know the content of these works, but it seems again that the
primary focus is the art rather than its products.41 The closest we get to
a work concerned with artefacts – or, at least, with their physical behav-
iour – is the Mechanics, whose authorship is highly disputed. By contrast,
Aristotle’s interest in animals is obvious from the enormous efforts he
dedicated to them and the undeniable fact that he established biology as
a discipline. Why did he not dedicate one-tenth of this effort to artefacts?
One immediate, simple answer is that Aristotle was more interested in
what he regarded as axiologically superior beings. He was more interested
in living beings, especially animals, than in inanimate beings. It is thus no
surprise that he did not display a fiery passion for coats and cups. However,
although Aristotle did not write a treatise on artefacts, he was clearly
puzzled by them. His teacher Plato had made use of some aspects of
artificial production, but he clearly did not have any philosophical reason
to concentrate on them. The Academy debated the existence of Ideas of
artefacts, but only in order to buttress the Platonic theory of forms. Indeed,
another reason why he does not set out his views on artefacts has to do with
Plato, for Aristotle can readily assume some points made by Plato to then
39
One might say that the so-called ‘chemical treatise’ (i.e. Meteor. 4) concerns artefacts at a chemical
level. However, the focus is on chemical processes, irrespective of whether they are brought about
naturally or artificially. Moreover, as I will argue in Chapter 3 (Section 3.4.2), the homoiomerous
bodies are natural beings, even the ones produced by art.
40
For a brief discussion of the products of arts such as rhetoric, poetics and politics, see Chapter 3
(Section 3.3.1).
41
For a conjecture on the possible content of such works, see Bolton 2021.

set up analogies. Aristotle is possibly the first philosopher to take up
artefacts and to try to situate them in an ontology. Although he did not
address artificial objects at length or in depth, it is still of interest to
a modern reader to know what the Aristotelian answer to the problems
posed by artefacts would be. This book thus aims at delineating the best
theory that Aristotle could be committed to given his explicit statements
on the matter.
Aristotle has no single and consistent term for artefacts, no extended
argumentation and no work dedicated specifically to the metaphysical
status of artefacts. If this were not enough, he often merely uses artefacts
to shed light on more important cases. As a result, scholars have often
concluded that Aristotle employs artefacts only in order to shed light on
cases of greater worth and interest, but that there is no theory of artefacts
that we can extrapolate from this. However, despite Aristotle’s often
pedagogical use of artefacts, there is, in fact, a theory lying behind these
examples. In order to see the broader picture, it is important to outline the
contexts and the discussions in which artefacts show up and to understand
their significance. Why does Aristotle mention artefacts? To what extent
are they merely tools for understanding something else? Is there room for
a specific analysis of artefacts?
In general, Aristotle’s use of artefacts can be divided into two groups:
positive and negative. By positive use, I mean those cases in which artefacts
are used to draw attention to a similarity between them and natural beings,
or more general principles. The positive use of artefacts includes both the
art analogy, which is employed to draw conclusions about the natural
realm, and the use of artefacts as examples to illustrate a certain general
principle or notion. By contrast, negative use corresponds to those cases in
which Aristotle emphasises the differences between artefacts and natural
beings, in order to highlight the unusual character of artefacts, or more
generally, human-dependent objects.
As regards the positive use, the art analogy has both methodological and
epistemological value.42 Structures and mechanisms that are not clearly
recognisable within the natural world are brought out by means of the
analogy with art. Of course, this strategy provides some information about
artefacts, but it also has the side-effect of downgrading artefacts and
encouraging scholars to see them as having little importance. Indeed,
artefactual models are employed mainly to highlight the teleological struc-
ture in the natural world that would otherwise be difficult to grasp.43 Since
42 43
I discuss the implications of the art analogy in Chapter 3 (Section 3.1). Sedley 2010.

14 Introduction
art imitates nature, one can move from art to nature in order to understand
the latter better. The main result of this strategy is deployed against the
materialists: there is a final cause and it has priority over the efficient
cause.44 In Physics 2.8–9, the task seems to be to show that the material
cause is insufficient and that an appeal to their material constituents alone
falls short of giving an account of organisms and what is best for them.45
The examples provided by artefacts are helpful because they more clearly
display the distinction between the four causes, particularly the importance
of the final cause and the relation of hypothetical necessity involving the
material cause. The causes of artefacts are clearer not so much because the
objects at issue are inanimate (as we shall see, this feature is helpful for
other purposes), but because they are created by humans. Artificial pro-
duction is a man-made process that is clearly guided by the final cause (i.e.
the goal the artisan aims at). The example of man does not show the
distinction between the four causes with the same degree of clarity.
However, although the final cause is most evident in the operation of
arts, it might turn out that teleology applies to living beings more fully than
it does to artefacts.
Examples constitute a different case of the positive use of artefacts.
Artefacts are often employed to clarify principles that might be difficult
to grasp, whether these principles apply to natural things as such or to
a broader range of things. Notoriously, Aristotle often appeals to the
method according to which we should start our inquiries from what is
better known to us and move towards what is less known to us, but more
evident in itself. Artefacts are therefore employed, for instance, to illustrate
several metaphysical principles (e.g. the theory of actuality and potentiality
or the theory of form and matter). Especially in the Metaphysics, Aristotle
uses artefacts as examples in order to clarify the distinction between matter
and form.46 The examples are only partially adequate, since the relation
between form and matter in artefacts is different than in living beings.47
The second positive way in which artefacts are used is highly slippery since,
most of the time, it is difficult to use these examples in order to account
fully for the substantial case of living beings. Examples drawn from
artefacts fall short of fully representing the best substances, such as animals,
but might still be helpful because they are inanimate and, hence, form and
matter are more clearly distinguished. Examples serve as the basis for
inductions: the general principle that Aristotle intends to illustrate might
44
For a more detailed discussion, see Vattimo 1961; Cardullo 2005. 45 Quarantotto 2005.
46
Waterlow 1982. 47 This topic will be addressed in detail in Chapter 6.

0.3 Aristotelian Scholarship 15
work differently when applied to substances. In this sense, the vertical line
from the example to the general principle can be misleading: while the art
analogy starts from an obvious truth about artefacts, artefactual examples
start from a principle that can be presented in this way, but that might be
fully true neither of the artefacts nor of substances (or whatever is at issue).
As regards the negative use of artefacts, Aristotle does not always
mention them as mere undistinguished tools that help to shed light on
something else more worthy of explanation. In some passages, he seems to
mention artefacts in order to make a point about their specific character or
to highlight the extent to which they differ from something else, and
primarily from natural beings. These passages constitute a precious source
of information. When Aristotle clearly identifies a distinctive trait of
artefacts, such as their lesser degree of unity, we can be more confident
that the information is not misleading and that we are learning something
specific about them. The definition of nature in Phys. 2.1 is an illuminating
example: Aristotle draws a distinction between natural and non-natural
beings that is of crucial importance. Throughout the Metaphysics, we can
spot this negative use of artefacts several times, which is employed to mark
a contrast with natural or living beings. In some places, Aristotle also
distinguishes artefacts from other things that have come-to-be spontan-
eously. I shall not appeal to artefacts insofar as they are used as examples to
provide evidence for my claims. When I appeal to the positive usage, this
will only regard the art analogy. By contrast, the negative use of artefacts is
wholly embraced as a source of information exclusively concerning arte-
facts or, more generally, human-dependent objects. The negative and
informative usage will be employed within the framework of crucial
discussions, such as of coming-to-be, the unity between matter and form
and the unity between parts and whole. A chapter will be dedicated to each
of these topics.
0.3 Aristotelian Scholarship: The Status Quaestionis

Contemporary metaphysicians debate the existence, the essence and the
identity conditions of artefacts, which demonstrates a philosophical inter-
est in them. However, this did not emerge spontaneously in contemporary
philosophy without any antecedents. One of these forerunners, and per-
haps the first one, was Aristotle, who is quite exceptional in the history of
philosophy in that he was not only interested in artefacts, but also willing
to situate them in his ontology.

16 Introduction
The main question addressed within the Aristotelian metaphysical
debate concerns the substantiality of artefacts.48 Scholars agree that
material artefacts, such as tables and chairs, are substances within the
framework of the Categories. Regardless of whether we endorse an onto-
logical or a linguistic interpretation of the Categories, we would still place
artefacts in the category of substance, since a table is both concrete
particular and subject of predication. Besides, if artefacts did not belong
to the category of substance, it is not at all clear where else in the schema
they would fall. But things get trickier with the Metaphysics since there is
consensus about the metaphysical deficiency of artefacts in comparison to
living beings. All scholars agree that artefacts are not substances to the
highest degree and that for Aristotle substances are, in the first instance,
living beings. When Aristotle presents catalogues of recognised sub-
stances, he does not mention artefacts. Δ 8’s overview of the notion of
substance mentions elements, simple bodies, animals, divine beings and
their parts (1017b10–13). In Met. Z 2, 1028b8–13 recognised substances are
bodies, such as animals, plants, their parts, elements, bodies constituted
by the elements and heavenly bodies. Met. H 1’s catalogue of recognised
substances includes natural substances, such as the elements, plants (and
their parts), animals (and their parts) and the heavens (with its parts)
(1042a7–11).
However, there are two points of disagreement. The first has to do with
whether one espouses a binary or a scalar view of substantiality. On the
binary view, something either is or is not a substance: thus, artefacts are not
substances at all. By contrast, on the scalar view, something can be more or
less of a substance: thus, artefacts are not paradigmatic substances.49
Advocates of a binary view emphasise those passages that seem to exclude
artefacts from the class of substances. In Z 17, Aristotle states that those
things that are substances are constituted in accordance with and by nature
(1041b28–32). In H 2, he defines the differentiae of several human-
dependent objects as merely analogous to the actualities of substances. In
H 3, 1043b21–2, he says that it is perhaps the case that only things put
together by nature are substances. In Λ 3, 1070a18–19, Aristotle applauds
48
In focusing on the metaphysical debate, I am consciously leaving aside contributions concerning the
art analogy, such as Scharle’s (2015), and the usage of artefacts in other disciplines, such as Angier’s
(2010).
49
We learn from the Categories that substance does not admit of the more and less (3b33–4). One way
of understanding the scalar view is not compatible with what we find in the Categories; another is
compatible. The former merely states that something is more or less of a substance; the latter argues
that every substance is equally a substance but certain substances satisfy the criteria more fully
(Shields 2008, 132 n. 8).

Plato for positing Ideas of living beings alone.50 By contrast, advocates of
the scalar view draw attention to passages where Aristotle seems to suggest
that there are degrees of substantiality. In Met. Z 7, 1032a18–19, Aristotle
affirms that human beings and plants most of all (malista) appear to be
substances. In Z 8, 1034a3–4, he refers to human beings who generate
human beings as instances of substances in the fullest sense. Furthermore,
in Met. Z 11, he asserts that the soul is primary substance.51
The second point of disagreement concerns the reasons why artefacts do
not qualify as paradigmatic substances or substances at all. Several different
answers have been given, with the same answers sometimes being proposed
by both supporters of the binary and supporters of the scalar view. Among
those embracing the binary view (i.e. those who deny any degree of
substantiality to artefacts), we find Katayama’s (1999) Aristotle on
Artefacts, the only book-length discussion of artefacts in Aristotle.
Katayama focuses on whether artefacts are substances at all and answers
in the negative, setting up eternity and actuality as criteria of substantiality.
Although this problem is raised in the Metaphysics, Katayama argues that
the solution is to be found in the biological works. His solution, however,
excludes from the class of substances not only artefacts, but also those
animals that are unable to reproduce, since the criteria of substantiality are
actuality and eternity. Hence, the only substances will be God, the heav-
enly spheres and those animals and plants that are able to reproduce (i.e.
that are able to partake of the eternal and the divine). The same solution,
which excludes artefacts and some living beings from the ranks of sub-
stance, is also presented in an article by Katayama (2008), in which the
main criterion of substantiality is unity. Katayama thus downgrades arte-
facts to mere things (pragmata). It is important to stress that, with the
exception of Katayama, Aristotle scholarship for the most part merely
touches upon the problem of artefacts without thematising it as a central
concern.52 For instance, Ross (1924), commenting on the passage from H 2,
links the non-substantiality of artefacts to the idea that forms of artefacts
do not belong to the category of substance. A similar solution is proposed
by Morel (2015), who at first seems to deny the presence of a form in
artefacts, before ascribing to the forms of artefacts an intermediary status
50
Outside the Metaphysics, one possible relevant passage is – according to Shields (2008) – Phys. 2.1,
192b32–4. However, as I will explain in the Section 0.4, the Physics does not engage in metaphysical
questions.
51
Outside the Metaphysics, in DA 2.1, Aristotle states that bodies seem most of all to be substances,
particularly natural ones, since they are principles of the others (412a11–13).
52
Exceptions include Gerson (1984), Koslicki (1997), Morel (2017) and Corkum (2023).

18 Introduction
between matter and proper substantial form (Morel 2017).53 Among the
supporters of the binary view, we also find Lewis and Shields. Lewis (1994)
concludes that artefacts are not substances because, unlike natural beings,
they do not possess an inner principle of motion and rest. Shields (2008)
argues that artefacts are not substances because, unlike living beings, they
lack a self-directing and self-regulating principle (i.e. an inner principle
that also is a soul). Living beings are teleonomical systems whose ends are
not determined by convention. Artefacts, by contrast, are compared to
mere heaps – which means that they do not possess a form at all. Most
recently, Corkum (2023) has proposed a version of the binary view accord-
ing to which artefacts are substances in the fullest sense but are not
fundamental substances like living beings.54
Some supporters of the scalar view – according to which artefacts, while
not paradigmatic substances, are nonetheless substances to a certain
degree – appeal to similar reasons as Lewis. For instance, Gill (1989) and
Irwin (1988), focusing on Met. Z 11, 1037a5 and similar passages in which
Aristotle defines the soul as ‘primary substance’ (prôtê ousia), conclude that
artefacts are not genuine substances because they do not possess psycho-
logical activity, or, more simply, a soul. This situation is not specific to
artefacts, since lack of a soul is a condition that concerns inanimate beings
in general. Another reason advanced by supporters of the scalar view
concerns the relation between matter and form in artefacts. The unity of
matter and form is accidental, and this would be the main ontological
deficiency of artefacts in comparison to living beings. Furth (1988) and
Koslicki (1997) are in favour of this position. Kosman (1987, 2013) seems to
endorse the scalar view but does so on grounds that resemble those of Ross
and Morel: artefacts are not paradigmatic substances because they are
simply accidental compounds, just like horse-being-white. Artefacts are
also accidental compounds on Cohen’s (1996, 118) interpretation, which
goes as far as to deny that artefacts have essences. It might be true that
artefacts are accidental compounds or that they are not fundamental
substances. However, what these readings fail to explain is why the
53
Morel (2017, 193): ‘Forms of artefacts are thus neither matter itself, nor substantial forms in the
fullest sense. My hypothesis is that they correspond rather to an intermediary formal modality,
between the properties of proximate matter and the form that is genuinely substantial.’ (my
translation).
54
Artefacts are substances because they can ground nonsubstances as their qualities, but they are
merely fundamental because they are themselves partly grounded in natural substances. Corkum
(2023) aligns with a binary view of substantiality in that he understands the distinction between
most-of-all substances and substances that are not most-of-all substances as ‘the distinction between
absolute and relative fundamental entities’ (5).

characteristics in question merely make an artefact less of a substance,
rather than not a substance at all. Moreover, none of these characteristics
stand in direct contradiction with any stated criterion of substantiality.
The aim of this book is to provide a definitive answer to the question of
why artefacts are metaphysically deficient when compared with Aristotle’s
favourite substances, such as animals and other living beings. Since I do not
share Katayama’s dismissive attitude towards the Metaphysics, I shall pri-
marily refer to this work.55 In fact, one of the main claims that I shall make
is that we can extrapolate Aristotle’s account of artefacts from the
Metaphysics. This approach will be pursued without assuming from the
outset that, on Aristotle’s view, artefacts are not substances at all. I believe
that it is worth asking in what sense artefacts could be ontologically
inferior, without taking for granted that they are not paradigmatic sub-
stances or not substances at all. The only possible starting point is the
undeniable fact that natural beings are still better candidates for substanti-
ality in the Metaphysics. This does not, however, necessarily entail a scalar
view of substantiality. When Aristotle speaks of substances ‘most of all’
(malista), malista might well refer to our understanding. For instance, Z 7
can be understood to mean either ‘what we call substances-most-of-all’ or
‘what most of all we call substances’. Even though I shall ultimately argue
that artefacts are not substances at all, there is much to be gained by not
assuming this from the outset.
An assessment of Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts is worth undertaking
not only because scholars do not agree on the reasons for their non-
substantiality or lesser-degree substantiality. There is another advantage
in pursuing this study, as well: it is highly probable that an examination of
the case of artefacts will provide insights into the nature of real substances.
Outlining the reasons why artefacts are different from living or natural
beings and understanding the reasons why they are not substances has
several advantages. First, it will help us to understand whether primary
substances are living beings or natural beings. Second, it will help us to
finally grasp why living beings or natural beings are substances. Third, it
will show whether Aristotle is committed to a binary or a scalar view of
substantiality. Fourth, the attempt to define what artefacts are will help us
to better understand what precisely makes something a natural thing.
Aristotle’s philosophy of technology thus might turn out to offer a new
perspective on classic problems.
55
Certain notions are presented in the Physics, but they can be proven to be accepted by Aristotle also
in the Metaphysics.

20 Introduction
0.4 A Piecemeal Approach
This book reconstructs Aristotle’s account in a piecemeal fashion. In order
to extrapolate Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts, one needs to make use of
passages from different works and of different passages from the same
work. This is the case because Aristotle’s perspective on artefacts depends,
to varying degrees, on his critique of Plato56 and on the general scope of the
work at issue. The most relevant works for fully reconstructing Aristotle’s
metaphysical account of artefacts are the Physics, the Generation of Animals
and, above all, the Metaphysics. Although an ontology of artefacts could be
reconstructed within the Metaphysics alone, Aristotle takes over here some
of the results achieved in the Physics and hints at notions that will be better
qualified in GA.
In the Physics, Aristotle employs artefacts for both heuristic and peda-
gogical purposes. He makes use of the art analogy for heuristic purposes
and introduces examples taken from the realm of artefacts for pedagogical
purposes.57 In the first case, Aristotle wants to draw conclusions that are
valid for natural beings as well; in the second case, he wishes to clarify
a notion or principle that is otherwise difficult to grasp. In the first case,
Aristotle draws an inference that holds of natural beings based on the fact
that it holds of artefacts too. In the second case, Aristotle merely clarifies or
illustrates a principle or notion by means of a reference to artefacts, without
that fact necessarily holding true of artefacts too – at least not in the same
way or without further qualification. Whether the approach is heuristic or
pedagogical, the Physics is concerned with the nature and behaviour of
natural beings. It elaborates a theoretical framework that is the paradigm
for more specialised studies of particular natural beings (e.g. elements or
heavenly bodies). Hence, although the heuristic use of artefacts provides
significant information about them, they are not the focus of the Physics’
attention. After speaking about the principles at issue in the study of
nature, Aristotle defines nature by excluding artefacts from the realm of
natural things, as early as in the first chapter of the second book. Nature is
an inner principle of motion and rest; for this reason, artefacts are not
natural beings, since the principle of their motion and rest lies outside of
them, for instance, in the artisan or the user. Although in the remainder of
his work Aristotle makes widespread use of artefacts – both for heuristic
56
I lay out the ways in which Aristotle’s account of artefacts is in debt to Plato in Chapter 1.
57
In this sense, I do not use the expression ‘art analogy’ as Sedley (2010) and Witt (2015a) use the
expression ‘craft analogy’. They refer it to both the heuristic analogy and the examples taken from
the artificial realm.

and pedagogical purposes – natural philosophy is not concerned with
them. Yet, this does not detract from the fact that what is said about
them in the art analogy and the definition of nature is true. Most import-
ant, we learn that artefacts have intrinsic ends.58 The theory of the four
causes thus fully applies to them, such that no cause is left out. In order to
draw a complete and fully justified picture of Aristotle’s ontology of
artefacts, it is therefore necessary to appeal to the Physics as well. Indeed,
Aristotle’s use of the art analogy, which is typical of the Physics and absent
from the Metaphysics, provides crucial information about Aristotle’s own
stance on artefacts, the most important being that artefacts have intrinsic
ends (i.e. proper functions). This feature is found also in the Metaphysics
and plays a fundamental role in Aristotle’s use of examples taken from the
realm of artefacts, as well as in his concerns and clarifications about their
status. Moreover, the second book provides a definition of nature that
turns out to also include a definition of ‘artefact’ (i.e. a product lacking an
inner principle governing its behaviour). The remainder of the Physics
focuses on qualified comings-to-be, but the account in Phys. 1, as well as
the definition of nature in 2.1, also cover unqualified coming-to-be (i.e.
generation). This fact is important because Aristotle ascribes to artefacts
proper unqualified coming-to-be. They are generated and undergo cor-
ruption just like natural beings.59
For this reason, GA too represents an important source for our under-
standing of unqualified coming-to-be. One might wonder why we would
draw on biological works when enquiring about inanimate beings and
question whether we are justified in using them, given that they are neither
concerned with artefacts nor primarily focused on metaphysical issues.
One part of the answer is that, in the Metaphysics, Aristotle hints at notions
that will be better qualified in GA. Another part of the answer to this
question takes us back to the Physics. Although Aristotle’s definition of
nature as an internal principle of motion and rest is wide enough to
encompass both unqualified and qualified coming-to-be, the Physics,
after excluding artefacts from its focus, mostly deals with qualified coming-
to-be – while GC deals generally with coming-to-be and passing-away. The
Generation of Animals is tasked with discussing the unqualified coming-to-
be of living beings, in particular of animals. In doing so, GA not only
borrows the theoretical framework of the Physics, but, like the Metaphysics,
also accepts its conclusions concerning artefacts. The difference between
art and nature as principles plays a significant role. Although artefacts are
58 59
See Chapter 3 (Section 3.1). I argue for this in Chapter 4 (Section 4.1).

22 Introduction
similar to living beings in many respects, they lack a principle comparable
to the heart in blooded animals or equivalent organs in other animals.
Moreover, artefacts are used to mark similarities as well as irreducible
differences. I shall draw on GA here not merely because Aristotle happens
there to recall certain disanalogies between living and non-living beings,
but, more importantly, because unqualified coming-to-be occurs in both
the natural and the artificial realms, with significant consequences.
Unqualified coming-to-be happens in such a way that it has repercussions
on the metaphysical status and substantiality of the object.
In order to understand how this state of affairs translates into an ontology
of artefacts we must appeal to the Metaphysics.60 Here, Aristotle never
employs the art analogy; that is, he never draws conclusions about natural
beings on the basis of the claim that art imitates nature. The reason for this is
simple: the Metaphysics does not concern the behaviour of natural things as
such. While the heuristic use of artefacts is absent, the pedagogical use is still
widespread. In general, the Metaphysics takes up the conclusions of the
Physics concerning artefacts (i.e. that they possess intrinsic ends) and never
questions it. That artefacts have intrinsic ends (i.e. functions) is treated as an
established result. Whenever artefacts are used in the so-called negative sense,
this never concerns the status of their forms as functions or their having
a final cause.61 Hence, the Metaphysics is filled with examples taken from the
artificial realm, which aim particularly to clarify the status of matter and
form, as well as that of actuality and potentiality. Such examples make sense
precisely on the assumption that artefacts do, in fact, have forms that are
functions or intrinsic ends. It is because the art analogy is still considered
valid that artificial examples work – while still failing to be perfect examples,
since things are more complicated in the case of living bodies. For instance,
Aristotle is especially fond of using the example of a statue to illustrate the
distinction between matter and form, as well as the distinction between
actuality and potentiality. What holds true for natural substances is that they
are composed of matter and form, but since matter and form are related in
them in such a way as to be scarcely distinguishable, it is beneficial to
illustrate hylomorphic structures by means of the example of a statue, as
an artefact. What holds true of natural substances does not, however,
necessarily hold true of artefacts in the same way: while a statue is
60
The final chapter will reassess the relationship between the Physics and the Metaphysics in light of the
results achieved.
61
As we shall see in the final chapter, this is the case not only because the presence of intrinsic ends in
artefacts is readily assumed, but also because the Metaphysics as such does not primarily concern itself
with a functional analysis.

a compound of matter and form, the relation between its matter and form is
different than in natural substances.62
Aristotle does not mention artefacts only for pedagogical purposes in the
Metaphysics.63 In other words, not only does he use artefacts, but he also
defines some of their characteristics with no other purpose than defining
them – in particular as opposed to natural substances. In several passages,
Aristotle identifies a disanalogy between natural and artificial beings and
we have no reason to doubt that he means what he says about artefacts. For
instance, when Aristotle points out that objects made one by art constitute
less of a unity than organisms, this can be taken at face value.64 To be clear,
he does not specify a certain difference in order to remind us that
Metaphysics is not concerned with artificial beings but only with natural
things, as he does in Phys. 2.1, when he specifies that artefacts have an
external principle governing their behaviour. He does not need to clarify
this point, because in the context of the Metaphysics it does not hold:
metaphysics is not a natural science concerned with natural beings, but
a science with a wider scope that is, to some extent, indifferent as to
whether something is artificial or natural. Indeed, it is not surprising that
Aristotle deals with, for instance, heavenly bodies and mathematical
objects as well. This leads us to the topic of the unity of the Metaphysics,
and to the question of how artefacts fit into it.
Despite the composite structure and history of Aristotle’s Metaphysics,
most scholars agree that it represents a unitary enquiry. However, scholars
disagree about what makes the Metaphysics a single project. The readings
that have been proposed are roughly the following: archaeological, theo-
logical, ontological and ousiological. On an archaeological reading, the
Metaphysics is the enquiry into the first causes and principles, as announced
in A 2.65 On a theological reading, the Metaphysics as a whole is the study of
62
I deal with this problem extensively in Chapter 6.
63
Metaphysics Δ neither adopts the art analogy nor does it make use of artefacts as examples for
pedagogical purposes. The aim of Δ is different and pedagogically oriented, in the sense that its
purpose is to clarify the various ways in which a certain philosophical notion can be understood.
Most notions include a way of being used that pertains to artefacts. For instance, one meaning of
principle is the choice to make, one meaning of cause is the material and moving cause (i.e. the
bronze and the art of sculpture), one meaning of nature is the matter in artefacts and so on. It is
difficult to assess the metaphysical significance of the mentions of artefacts in Δ, but at least when he
emphasises the difference between beings by art and beings by nature, we have no reason to doubt
his sincerity (see Chapter 7).
64
On this and similar passages, see Chapter 7.
65
The first advocate of this reading was Alexander of Aphrodisias, who takes metaphysics to be an
enquiry into principles and not to coincide with theology. Metaphysics is theology only insofar as
one of the principles is the divine as final cause. For a modern account that is also compatible with an
ontological reading, see Buddensiek 2018.

24 Introduction
non-perceptible and eternal substances; its agenda is therefore announced
in E 1 and culminates in Book Λ.66 A third option is the ontological
reading, which is based on the introduction of the study of the being qua
being.67 Another influential reading defines the science of the Metaphysics
as ousiology (i.e. the enquiry into substance as addressed in Book Z). In the
scholarship, there are also nuanced positions that attempt to harmonise
a number of these readings.68 The question of the unity of the Metaphysics
is therefore open and complicated. However, one point accepted by all
parties is that Plato and Platonic doctrines are a target. Moreover, an
ontological reading appears to fare better when it comes to artefacts. If
the Metaphysics is responding to the question ‘what is being and what is it
for something, anything, to be?’,69 then this effectively explains why it
shows such an interest in artefacts.
There are two related philosophical reasons why artefacts belong in the
Metaphysics. The first concerns the agreement that Plato is a target and,
hence, its Platonic ancestry. The second concerns the ontological reading
and thus the scope of the Metaphysics, in general, and of the middle books, in
particular. The two reasons are deeply connected because addressing Plato –
whether in the form of a direct aporia or a silent credit – is part of what it
means to do ontology.70 With regard to the first reason, artefacts appear
frequently, albeit somewhat randomly, because Plato is a target. In these
66
The theological reading is, for instance, defended by the Neoplatonic School of Alexandria. In
Ammonius’ view not only the Met. but the whole of the Aristotelian corpus is theologically oriented.
For a discussion of the theological reading and its relation to ontology, see Menn (n.d., Iα1).
67
For example, Kirwan 1993.
68
Besides the developmental reading famously promoted by Jaeger (1912, 1923), there are interpret-
ations that are in different ways both ontological and theological like those of Ackrill (1981), Natorp
(1888), Owens (1951) and Merlan (1957). Owen (1960) proposes the focal meaning interpretation,
which Frede applies to the Metaphysics: the being of the divine substance is the focal meaning ‘in
terms of which all other ways of being have to be explained’ (Frede 1987, 87). The attention to Book
Z also initiated so-called ‘zetology’, according to which the theory of substance as presented in Book
Z is the theoretical centre of the Metaphysics. For an overview of the zetological approach, see
Galluzzo (2006). The Metaphysics can also be viewed as a unitary enquiry into principles. Aristotle
repeats that the enquiry is concerned with principles in the opening chapters of several different
books (Γ 1, 1003a21–32, E 1, 1025b3–4, H 1, 1042a4–6). The archaeological reading might also apply
to the central books on substance theory. The question of what a substance is can be reduced to the
question of what the primary cause of ‘its being the case that it is a substance’ is (Code 1997, 359).
69
Politis 2004, 260. His ontological reading incorporates the theological section of Λ 6–10 as
ontological. More recently, Buddensiek (2018, 138) has argued that the objects of the ‘science
being sought for’ are first causes and principles. However, he considers an ontological reading to
be compatible with his archaeological interpretation: ‘a science of being – as it may seem to be
indicated in some aporiae – should not be a rival to a science depending on archai, but should be
integrated within such a science’ (139). This latter reading too seems able to explain why the
Metaphysics shows an interest in artefacts.
70
For example, Politis 2003.

contexts, Aristotle speaks specifically about artefacts, neither introducing the
art analogy (which, as we have seen, is absent from the Metaphysics) nor using
artefacts as illustrative examples. Aristotle does, however, use artefacts in
three ways related to the Platonic ancestor. First, he uses artefacts as counter-
examples or central elements of a counter-argument against the Platonic
separation of forms.71 Aristotle introduces artefacts in order to draw atten-
tion to an inconsistency in the Platonic conception of Ideas as objects of
knowledge and as causes of movement (B 4 and K 2). Artefacts are intro-
duced in order to refute the arguments from the sciences and the view that
the eternity of movement must be referred back to the Ideas. Moreover, in
Met. Z 7–9, Aristotle criticises Plato for separating out the Ideas, thus
making them unable to cause the coming-into-being of substances.
Artefacts are introduced to show that coming-into-being occurs even with-
out positing corresponding Ideas and that the synonymy principle, accord-
ing to which there is an efficient cause down here that has the same form as
the product is sufficient to account for artificial production, as well as natural
generation. Second, he avoids shortcomings of the Platonic theory by
incorporating artefacts.72 Third, he builds on sound Platonic intuitions by
accommodating artefacts.73
With regard to the second reason, artefacts show up most prominently
in the middle books of the Metaphysics. The reason why Aristotle is
interested in artefacts in Z–H is that he is investigating per se being/
being according to the Categories, which raises the question of what kind
of being something is. In Z 1, the investigation of being is narrowed down
to the analysis of substance. Hence, Aristotle investigates the causes and
principles of substances, including hylomorphic substances. This is
a broader enquiry than that of the Physics because it cannot simply be
assumed that the only substances that exist are natural substances. Hence,
one must also come to terms ontologically with artefacts, because they are
beings and, therefore, fall within the scope of an analysis of being
qua being. If metaphysics is, in fact, universal and, so to speak, explains
every being, artefacts should be covered by it as well.74 The extent to which
artefacts are reflects the extent to which artefacts are one or constitute
71
See Chapter 2. 72 See Chapter 1 (Section 1.2) and Chapter 3. 73 See Chapter 1 (Section 1.3).
74
Now, part of the problem with the latter is that one might argue that there is no science of artefacts,
so perhaps they do not fall within the scope of metaphysics after all. This position has been recently
defended by Bolton (2018), who argues that artefacts are conventional items and that there is no
science of them because they do not have a phusis that is specifiable into kinds. I shall challenge
Bolton’s view in different ways: artefacts can be shown to have a form that is specifiable in terms of
function and, thus, there exist artefact-kinds, which metaphysics, as well as natural philosophy, can
target.

26 Introduction
a unity. At this point, a clarification about the relation between being and
being one in general is perhaps necessary. From a certain point of view, the
two notions do not coincide. In fact, the question of what is most fully one
and the question of what is most fully being lead to different answers. What
is most fully one is what is most indivisible, and what is most indivisible is
the numerical one. By contrast, what is most fully being is what is most
fully separate and determinate, which is substance. It thus seems that we
obtain two different answers that cannot be said to coincide: the numerical
one is not a substance. There is no such substance as the numerical one.
Nevertheless, Aristotle suggests a way in which being and one are the same,
and this is the point of view from which the two notions coincide. In
Met. Γ 2, 1003b26–33, we are told that ‘being and one are the same and are
one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and
cause are’, that there are as many species of being as of unity and that ‘unity
is nothing apart from being’. In Met. Ι 2, 1054a13–19, Aristotle addresses the
same issue: the meanings of ‘one’ correspond to the categories of being, and
the one is not comprised within any category. Rather, in each category
there is a correspondence between what a thing is and its way of being one.
In the category of substance, which we are dealing with, some beings are
unitary and simple, but their very nature does not coincide with being one.
To spell this out: the being of a house is not to be one, but when I search for
the cause of being of a house, I end up with something (the substance as
actuality) that is also that through which a plurality of parts constitutes
a unity. What a house is corresponds to its way of constituting a unity. In
Z 16, the reason why elements are not substances turns out be their lack of
unity. Artefacts, by contrast, appear to be unities in the requisite sense and
hence an investigation of them is needed. Book H then examines how
perceptible substances (i.e. substances that have matter, exist and are one):
‘These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have matter’
(H 1, 1042a25). Because artefacts are perceptible substances, they enter into
the framework of the analysis carried out in H. This book will highlight the
differences between the cases of natural substances and artefacts. While H 2
claims that the actualities of artefacts are only analogous to the actualities of
natural substances, H 4 stresses the differences between natural and artifi-
cial matter. The analysis is then clearly transposed into the schema of
actuality and potentiality in Book Θ.
To be clear, there are two questions that the Metaphysics inherits from the
Categories. The first is what kind of being something is; the second is whether
something is a substance. Now, with regard to the first question, Aristotle
needs to incorporate artefacts into his ontology because they are one, to some

extent, and therefore, to this same extent, they are. With regard to
the second, more specific question, in Z 13 Aristotle provides a criterion of
substantiality that does, in fact, have to do with unity. A thing is a substance
if it is not composed of constituents present in it in actuality; for if they were
present in it in actuality, the thing would not be one but many. In Z 16, we
learn that the elements and parts of living beings fail to meet precisely this
criterion of substantiality: although there is a sense in which they are, they
fail to be substances to the extent that they are not a unity. By contrast,
because artefacts are a unity, at a least to some extent, the following analysis
must take them into account – as H and Θ do. This analysis, however, also
highlights the differences between artefacts and living beings, especially in
terms of the status of their forms and the unity between matter and form. In
order to explain this state of affairs, Aristotle must call to mind coming-to-
be; that is, the way in which things have come to acquire the forms that they
have and to exhibit the relation between matter and form that they display.
For this reason, both H and Θ engage in a discussion of artificial and natural
coming-to-be, expanding on the account proposed in Z 7–9.
Now, that there is an extent to which artefacts are a unity is not
obvious. This is suggested, however, by the presence of artefacts in the
middle books of the Metaphysics, since this presence is not due to their use
as examples or analogical cases, but to a specific interest in them.
Aristotle’s engagement with artefacts here appears to be prompted by
specific philosophical reasons concerning the relationship between being
and being one. Still, in the absence of further evidence, one might find
this to be an unsatisfactory explanation of why artefacts are said to
constitute a unity to some extent. Here, Book Δ comes in handy. In
particular, chapter 4 on the notion of nature, chapter 6 on the notion of
oneness, chapter 26 on the notion of whole and chapter 27 on the notion
of mutilation provide important confirmation that there is an extent to
which artefacts are a unity. These chapters provide a negative and
therefore highly informative treatment of artefacts. They reinforce several
of our intuitions concerning artefacts, the first one being that there are
also strong philosophical reasons for including artefacts in the
Metaphysics.
0.5 Aristotle’s Ontology of Artefacts

Aristotle’s Ontology of Artefacts defends three main claims. The first is that
Aristotle provides a coherent and detailed ontology of artefacts. This claim
conflicts with the common view that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as

28 Introduction
examples or analogical cases but is ultimately interested in shedding light
on other things that are worthier of explanation. The second claim is that
this account is, in several ways, in debt to Plato. As the third claim, the
book does not challenge the widely shared view that for Aristotle sub-
stances are, in the first instance, living beings. It does, however, defend two
controversial positions, both of which are of central importance for deter-
mining the place of artefacts in Aristotelian metaphysics, and indeed for his
metaphysics as a whole. The first is that Aristotle holds a binary view of
substantiality according to which artefacts are not substances at all.
The second is that artefacts fail to be substances because they exhibit less
of a unity than natural wholes. My position therefore consists in a binary
view of substantiality and a scalar view of unity. I shall elaborate this
interpretation through a reconstruction of Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts
that is divided into eight chapters:
Chapter 1 – ‘The Platonic Heritage’ – illustrates what Aristotle has
inherited from his Platonic background and shows the motivations behind
Aristotle’s own interest in artefacts. I first present Plato’s metaphysics of
artefacts by examining mentions of Ideas of artefacts in the Cratylus and the
Republic, as well as doubts about the range of forms voiced by young
Socrates in the Parmenides. I also consider the Timaeus and its description
of the cosmos as the product of art. I then divide Aristotle’s reactions to
Plato into three kinds. First, as Chapter 2 will show, Aristotle uses artefacts
against Plato, either as counter-examples or as central components of
a counter-argument against the Platonic theory of forms. Second, mindful
of the fact that artefacts represent potential threats if they are not accom-
modated, Aristotle incorporates them while reacting to Plato’s shortcom-
ings. Third, Aristotle identifies and builds on Plato’s correct metaphysical
intuitions.
Chapter 2 – ‘Using Artefacts against Plato’ – is devoted to presenting
Aristotle’s use of artefacts as counter-examples or crucial elements of
counter-arguments against the Platonic theory of forms, especially
Platonic separation. Far from presenting arguments against the substanti-
ality of artefacts, the passages in which Aristotle states that no one would
posit a separate form for artefacts are tailored specifically to Plato. In
particular, artefacts are used to point at the internal incoherence of the
Platonic theory of Ideas and its incompatibility with sensible experience as
well as to refute the Platonic version of the arguments from the sciences
and the semantic/logical argument.
In Chapter 3 – ‘Aristotle’s Building Blocks in the Physics’ – the focus is
on the deficiencies of Plato’s theory as a source of an account that

incorporates and further discusses artefacts. It sets out Aristotle’s com-
plaints about Plato’s failure to recognise final causes and his notion of
imitation as a means of accounting for the relationship between universals
and particulars. I therefore present Aristotle’s theory of the four causes and
art analogy as a response to both criticisms. Moreover, the description of
particulars as created by the Demiurge through the imitation of the Ideas
seems to turn all particulars – whether natural or artificial – into artefacts.
Aristotle’s distinction between ‘artificially caused’ and ‘artefact’ is pre-
sented as a device that responds to the story told in the Timaeus and, at
the same time, provides us not only with the salient feature of artefacts but
also with an inventory of artificial things from Aristotle’s perspective.
In Chapters 4–7, I present the main body of Aristotle’s ontology of
artefacts. The content of each chapter explores Aristotle’s use of Platonic
metaphysical intuitions as the source of his account of artefacts. At the
same time, each chapter challenges one or more interpretations advanced
by modern scholars about the ontological status of artefacts in Aristotle.
Chapter 4 – ‘Artefacts as Hylomorphic Compounds’ – argues that
artefacts are hylomorphic compounds. The view that artefacts possess
inherent substantial forms is controversial, since in the scholarship it is
often argued that artefacts are either mere matter or matter arranged in
a certain way (i.e. either heaps or accidental beings). For this reason,
I provide three arguments in defence of the hylomorphism of artefacts:
(i) they undergo unqualified coming-to-be as opposed to qualified coming-
to-be; (ii) they comply to the ‘ekeininon’ rule, according to which the
identity of an object cannot be reduced to its matter; (iii) they conform to
the synonymy principle insofar as the form in the mind of the artisan is the
form in the object being thought. Once the presence of a form in artefacts
has been established, the next step is to grasp the nature of this form and
the extent to which it differs from the form of a living being.
Chapter 5 – ‘Forms of Artefacts as Inert and Intermittent’ – identifies the
form in the mind of the artisan as the only form with efficient powers. By
means of the rejection of the transmission theory – according to which the
form in the mind of the artisan is transmitted to the object during the
process of production – I argue that the inherent forms of artefacts lack
efficient powers (i.e. they are not principles of motion and change),
although this is still not the reason why they are not substances.
Moreover, even if the inability of forms of artefacts to reproduce means
that artefacts are not eternal, the non-eternity of artefacts and of their
forms does not contradict any substantiality-criterion, as some claim.

30 Introduction
In Chapter 6 – ‘The Relation between Form and Matter in Artefacts’ –
I argue that forms of artefacts are functions and that they enjoy a many-to-
many relationship with the diachronic matter, as well as a contingent
relation with the synchronic matter. Although the focus on the unity
between matter and form is the right approach to the solution of the
substantiality issue, it does not yet provide us with the immediate reason
for which artefacts are not substances.
This immediate reason is arrived at only by means of the consideration
of matter as parts and the focus on the relation of parts and whole, which is
undertaken in Chapter 7 – ‘The Relation between Parts and Whole in
Artefacts’. Indeed, artefacts fail to satisfy the substantiality criterion,
according to which no substance is composed of parts present in it in
actuality. I show that Aristotle regards living beings as constituted of parts
in potentiality, while he conceives of artefacts as constituted of parts
present in actuality. Because their parts are in actuality, artefacts are not
as unified as substances, but because artefacts still possess an inherent form,
they cannot be downgraded to mere heaps. Thus, artefacts are hylo-
morphic compounds, but not substances at all.
Finally, after shifting the focus from the maker to the user, Chapter 8 –
‘The Physics and the Metaphysics of Artefacts’ – reconsiders the previous
two chapters as respectively representing the perspective of the natural
philosopher, the maker, and the user and that of the metaphysician on
artefacts. It discusses the relationship between the Physics and the
Metaphysics and redefines their respective role in and specific contribution
to our reconstruction of Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts.
In the conclusion, I revisit the discussions in modern metaphysics and
situate Aristotle’s model within the landscape of theoretical options.
Furthermore, I identify those pillars of Aristotle’s ontology of artefacts
that can serve as guidelines for the modern debate.

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It is commonly believed that Aristotle merely uses artefacts as

marilù papandreou is a post-doctoral researcher at the University

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List of Figures page x

1 The Platonic Heritage 31

2 Using Artefacts against Plato 58

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4 Artefacts as Hylomorphic Compounds 109

5 Forms of Artefacts as Inert and Intermittent 150

6 The Relation between Matter and Form in Artefacts 181

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7 The Relation Between Parts and Whole in Artefacts 219

8 The Physics and Metaphysics of Artefacts 251

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This book began as a doctoral dissertation at the Munich School of Ancient

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An. Post. Posterior Analytics

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This book concerns the ontological status of products of art (technê) in

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0.1 Artefacts in the Contemporary Debate

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0.3 Aristotelian Scholarship: The Status Quaestionis

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