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THE PALGRAVE MACMILLAN
ANIMAL ETHICS SERIES

Animals and
Business Ethics
Edited by
Natalie Thomas
The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series

Series Editors
Andrew Linzey
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
Oxford, UK

Clair Linzey
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics
Oxford, UK
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the ethics of our treat-
ment of animals. Philosophers have led the way, and now a range of other
scholars have followed from historians to social scientists. From being a
marginal issue, animals have become an emerging issue in ethics and in
multidisciplinary inquiry. This series will explore the challenges that
Animal Ethics poses, both conceptually and practically, to traditional
understandings of human-animal relations. Specifically, the Series will:

• provide a range of key introductory and advanced texts that map out
ethical positions on animals;
• publish pioneering work written by new, as well as accom-
plished, scholars;
• produce texts from a variety of disciplines that are multidisciplinary
in character or have multidisciplinary relevance.

For further information or to submit a proposal for consideration, please

contact Amy Invernizzi, amy.invernizzi@palgrave-usa.com.

More information about this series at

https://link.springer.com/bookseries/14421
 Natalie Thomas
Editor

Animals and Business

Ethics
Editor
Natalie Thomas
Department of Philosophy
University of Guelph
Guelph, ON, Canada

ISSN 2634-6672     ISSN 2634-6680 (electronic)

The Palgrave Macmillan Animal Ethics Series
ISBN 978-3-030-97141-0    ISBN 978-3-030-97142-7 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97142-7

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2022
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
­publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
­institutional affiliations.

Cover illustration: Chris Strickland / Alamy Stock Photo

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 For my parents, with love.
In honour of your sixty years of marriage and in gratitude for your constant
encouragement to us, your three “girls”.
 Series Editors’ Preface

This is a new book series for a new field of inquiry: Animal Ethics.
In recent years, there has been a growing interest in the ethics of our
treatment of animals. Philosophers have led the way, and now a range of
other scholars have followed from historians to social scientists. From
being a marginal issue, animals have become an emerging issue in ethics
and in multidisciplinary inquiry.
In addition, a rethink of the status of animals has been fuelled by a
range of scientific investigations which have revealed the complexity of
animal sentiency, cognition, and awareness. The ethical implications of
this new knowledge are yet to be properly evaluated, but it is becoming
clear that the old view that animals are mere things, tools, machines, or
commodities cannot be sustained ethically.
But it is not only philosophy and science that are putting animals on the
agenda. Increasingly, in Europe and the United States, animals are becom-
ing a political issue as political parties vie for the “green” and “animal”
vote. In turn, political scientists are beginning to look again at the history
of political thought in relation to animals, and historians are beginning to
revisit the political history of animal protection.
As animals grow as an issue of importance, so there have been more
collaborative academic ventures leading to conference volumes, special
journal issues, indeed new academic animal journals as well. Moreover, we
have witnessed the growth of academic courses, as well as university posts,
in Animal Ethics, Animal Welfare, Animal Rights, Animal Law, Animals
and Philosophy, Human-Animal Studies, Critical Animal Studies, Animals

vii
viii SERIES EDITORS’ PREFACE

and Society, Animals in Literature, Animals and Religion—tangible signs

that a new academic discipline is emerging.
“Animal Ethics” is the new term for the academic exploration of the
moral status of the non-human—an exploration that explicitly involves a
focus on what we owe animals morally, and which also helps us to under-
stand the influences—social, legal, cultural, religious, and political—that
legitimate animal abuse. This series explores the challenges that Animal
Ethics poses, both conceptually and practically, to traditional understand-
ings of human-animal relations.
The series is needed for three reasons: (i) to provide the texts that will
service the new university courses on animals; (ii) to support the increas-
ing number of students studying and academics researching in animal-­
related fields, and (iii) because there is currently no book series that is a
focus for multidisciplinary research in the field.
Specifically, the series will

• provide a range of key introductory and advanced texts that map out
ethical positions on animals;
• publish pioneering work written by new, as well as accomplished,
scholars, and
• produce texts from a variety of disciplines that are multidisciplinary
in character or have multidisciplinary relevance.

The new Palgrave Macmillan Series on Animal Ethics is the result of a

unique partnership between Palgrave Macmillan and the Ferrater Mora
Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics. The series is an integral part of the mis-
sion of the Centre to put animals on the intellectual agenda by facilitating
academic research and publication. The series is also a natural complement
to one of the Centre’s other major projects, the Journal of Animal Ethics.
The Centre is an independent “think tank” for the advancement of pro-
gressive thought about animals and is the first Centre of its kind in the
world. It aims to demonstrate rigorous intellectual enquiry and the high-
est standards of scholarship. It strives to be a world-class centre of aca-
demic excellence in its field.
We invite academics to visit the Centre’s website www.oxfordanimaleth-
ics.com and to contact us with new book proposals for the series.

Oxford, UK Andrew Linzey

 Clair Linzey
 Acknowledgements

I want to thank all of the authors who contributed chapters to this vol-
ume. Each chapter is unique and reflects the span of expertise in areas
related to animals and business practices. I appreciate your patience, work
and knowledge. I am quite honoured to bring all of your voices together
in this volume and look forward to seeing the reception and promotion of
your work by others who are motivated to respond and further develop
this important area of research. I also am thankful to Dr Clair Linzey and
Professor Andrew Linzey for supporting me over the years and for provid-
ing a place for this book to land. Your unceasing efforts to better the lives
of animals is an ongoing source of inspiration and your support for those
working in the field is deeply appreciated.
Thanks also goes to Don Dedrick and Patricia Sheridan of the
Philosophy Department at the University of Guelph for supporting my
Adjunct position there and for supporting my work.
Many, many thanks go to Adam Langridge, who worked with me on
our chapter and who continues to share his mind with mine. We make a
great team and I look forward to many more years of working together.
Finally, I want to acknowledge the billions of animal lives that are used
by and for humans, and I hope that the work here will help us all to think
more on their suffering and on the many ways we can work to reduce it.

ix
 Contents

1 Animals and Business Ethics  1

Natalie Thomas

Part I Animals and Business Practices, Work, Labour and

Jobs  19

2 Are Animals Always Commodified in the Context of

Business? 21
Katy Fulfer and Patrick Clipsham

3 (Not) Serving Animals and Aiming Higher: Cultivating

Ethical and Sustainable Plant-­Based Businesses and
Humane Jobs 43
Kendra Coulter and Josh Milburn

4 Prospects for an Animal-Friendly Business Ethics 67

Brian Berkey

5 Working Animals, Ethics and Critical Theory 91

José-Carlos García-Rosell and Philip Hancock

xi
xii Contents

Part II Animal Welfare, Animal Agriculture and Animals as

Food 111

6 Competition, Regulation, and the Race to the Bottom in

Animal Agriculture113
Steven McMullen

7 Corporate Disclosure Initiative for Animal Welfare131

Carrie P. Freeman and Eugenia Ferrero

8 McVeg*n: A Critical Analysis of Vegetarianism, Business

Ethics and Animals as Food157
Kay Peggs

9 Animal Suffering, Environmental Impact, and

Lab-Cultured Meat179
Trevor Hedberg

10 Gene Editing, Animal Disenhancement and Ethical

Debates: A Conundrum for Business Ethics?203
Natalie Thomas and Adam Langridge

Part III Human and Animal Relationships in the Context

of Businesses and Industries 227

11 Moral Feelings, Compartmentalization and

Desensitization in the Practice of Animal
Experimentation229
Rebekah Humphreys

12 Denied Relationship: Moral Stress in the Vocational

Killing of Non-Human Animals251
Tomaž Grušovnik and Maša Blaznik
 Contents  xiii

13 Dolphins, Captivity and Cruelty271

Thomas I. White

14 Animals as Stakeholders297
Joshua Smart

Index325
 Notes on Contributors

Brian Berkey is an assistant professor in the Department of Legal Studies

and Business Ethics in the Wharton School at the University of
Pennsylvania, with a secondary appointment in the Department of
Philosophy at Penn. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University
of California-Berkeley in 2012, and did his undergraduate work in
Philosophy and Politics at New York University. Before moving to Penn,
he was a postdoctoral fellow at the Center for Ethics in Society at Stanford
University. His academic work is in moral and political philosophy, and he
has written about issues such as the demandingness of morality, individual
obligations of justice, climate change mitigation obligations, effective
altruism, and entitlements of justice for non-human animals.
Maša Blaznik obtained her Honours degree in Psychology from the
Open University, UK. She is an independent researcher and writer whose
work focuses on dysfunctions within families and society. Her article
“Training Young Killers: How Butcher Education Might Be Damaging
Young People” was accepted for publication in the Journal of Animal
Ethics. She is working as a crisis response counsellor for children and ado-
lescents. Her rescue cats Taxi and Buby are gentle reminders of animal
sentience.
Patrick Clipsham is an assistant professor in the Department of
Philosophy at Winona State University. His research focuses on a number
of topics in ethics and moral philosophy, including metaethics, ethical
issues surrounding conscientious objections, and animal ethics. His publi-

xv
xvi Notes on Contributors

cations have appeared in such venues as Philosophical Studies, Public

Affairs Quarterly, and Between the Species.
Kendra Coulter is an associate professor and Chancellor’s Chair for
Research Excellence at Brock University, Canada. She is a member of the
Royal Society of Canada’s College of New Scholars, Artists, and Scientists
and an award-­winning author. She has written widely on the intersections
of animals and labour and developed the concept of humane jobs as a way
to conceptualize and encourage work that is underscored by multispecies
respect. Her most recent book is Animals, Work, and the Promise of
Interspecies Solidarity (Palgrave Macmillan/Springer, 2016).
Eugenia Ferrero originally from Florida, graduated from St. Thomas
University in 1996 with a B.A. in English and Psychology. She continued
her studies at The American University in Washington, D.C., receiving an
M.A. in Public Communication in 2000. Ferrero’s thesis focused on envi-
ronmental communication, public relations, and advertising. Upon grad-
uation, Ferrero began law school, earning a J.D. from The University of
Georgia School of Law in 2003. During law school, she served on the
Editorial Board and as a notes editor for the Georgia Journal of
International and Comparative Law. Ferrero’s legal practice began in civil
litigation but later, she specialized in commercial real estate as well as con-
tract preparation and negotiations. Ferrero continued her academic pur-
suits, earning a PhD from Georgia State University in August 2016. Her
dissertation focused on the First Amendment, media ethics, and strategic
communication. Ferrero returned to academia in 2011, as an adjunct pro-
fessor for local universities and colleges. She joined St. Thomas University
as a full-­time faculty member in August 2015, and then as assistant dean
for the School of Leadership, Education, and Communication. She has
taught a variety of courses in the Department of Communication.
Carrie P. Freeman is Associate Professor of Communication at Georgia
State University in Atlanta. She is a critical/cultural studies media
researcher who has published in over 15 scholarly books and journals on
strategic communication for activists, media ethics, environmental com-
munication, and critical animal studies, with a specialty in animal agribusi-
ness and veganism. She is the author of a 2014 vegan advocacy book
Framing Farming: Communication Strategies for Animal Rights (www.
framingfarming.com), co-edited the anthology Critical Animal & Media
Studies: Communication for Nonhuman Animal Advocacy, and co-
 Notes on Contributors  xvii

authored media style guidelines for respectful coverage of animals at www.

animalsandmedia.org. Freeman has been active in the animal rights and
vegetarian movement since the mid-1990s, leading and volunteering with
local grassroots groups in Florida, Georgia, and Oregon. She co-hosts an
environmental radio programme (In Tune to Nature, Tuesdays 6:30 pm)
and an animal rights programme (Second Opinion Radio, Wednesdays
6 pm) on Atlanta’s indie station WRFG 89.3FM.
Katy Fulfer is Assistant Professor of Philosophy and Women’s Studies at
the University of Waterloo. Her research interests are in feminist bioeth-
ics, specifically around reproduction and animals, and the philosophy of
Hannah Arendt. Her publications have appeared in Hypatia, Developing
World Bioethics, and IJFAB: International Journal of Feminist Approaches
to Bioethics.
José-Carlos García-Rosell is Senior Lecturer in Tourism Studies at the
University of Lapland, Faculty of Social Sciences, Multidimensional
Tourism Institute (MTI). His research interests are in the areas of sustain-
able business development, corporate social responsibility, stakeholder
theory, responsible tourism, tourism product development, management
education, action research and ethnographic research. He obtained a PhD
in Management from the University of Lapland, a Licentiate Degree in
Marketing from the University of Oulu, and a Master’s degree in
Agricultural Economics from the University of Natural Resources and Life
Sciences, Vienna. He has published his research in various books and jour-
nals such as Management Learning, Journal of Business Ethics, Journal of
Sustainable Tourism, and Society and Leisure.
Tomaž Grušovnik is Associate Professor of Philosophy of Education and
scientific associate at the Faculty of Education, University of Primorska,
Koper, Slovenia. His main areas of research include environmental and
animal ethics, philosophy of education, the philosophies of later
Wittgenstein and Stanley Cavell, and pragmatism. He was a Fulbright vis-
iting colleague at the Department of Philosophy, University of New
Mexico (2009), and guest lecturer at the Centre for Development and the
Environment, University of Oslo (2010). Since 2018, he has been presi-
dent of Slovenian philosophical association. He has published two books
on environmental and animal ethics, a book of fictocritical essays (all in
Slovenian), as well as a number of papers and essays on various fields of
interest. He is co-editor (together with Eduardo Mendieta and Lenart
xviii Notes on Contributors

Škof) of the book Borders and Debordering: Topologies, Praxes,

Hospitableness (2018).
Philip Hancock is Professor of Work and Organisation at Essex Business
School, University of Essex, UK. He has previously held posts at the
University of Warwick and Glasgow Caledonian University. His research
interests include the aesthetic management of work and society, critical
approaches to workplace recognition, and Christmas as a global medium
of sociomaterial organization. He has published in a range of journals
including Academy of Management Review, Organization Studies, Human
Relations, Organization, Gender, Work and Organization, and Work
Employment and Society. He is also a co-author of The Body, Culture and
Society and Work, Postmodernism and Society: A Critical Introduction, and
a co-editor of Art and Aesthetics at Work (Palgrave), The Management of
Everyday Life (Palgrave), and Understanding Corporate Life.
Trevor Hedberg is a postdoctoral scholar with Ohio State University. He
received his PhD in Philosophy from the University of Tennessee in 2017,
and his primary research interests are in applied ethics and epistemology.
His prior work has appeared in venues such as Environmental Values,
Synthese, Journal of Business Ethics, and Philosophia. His recent book The
Environmental Impact of Overpopulation: The Ethics of Procreation was
published in 2020 by Routledge.
Rebekah Humphreys is Lecturer in Philosophy at the University of
Wales, Trinity Saint David. Her research interests include applied ethics
(especially animal ethics and environmental ethics), environmental phi-
losophy, and moral philosophy in general. She has teaching interests in
additional areas. Selected publications include “Justice and Non-Human
Beings” (co-authored with Robin Attfield), Part II, in Bangladesh Journal
of Bioethics (8:1), 2017, 44–77; “Justice and Non-Human Beings” (co-
authored with Robin Attfield), Part I, in Bangladesh Journal of Bioethics
(7:3), 2016, pp. 1–11; “Dignity and its violation examined within the
context of animal ethics”, in Ethics and the Environment (21:2), Fall 2016,
143–162; “Biocentrism”, Encyclopedia of Global Bioethics, Springer, online
publication 2014, hard copy published 2016; and “The Argument from
Existence, Blood-Sports, and ‘Sport-Slaves’”, Journal of Agricultural and
Environmental Ethics, (27:2), 2014, 331–345.
Adam Langridge is Assistant Professor of Philosophy in the Philosophy,
Political Science and Economics Department at Nipissing University in
 Notes on Contributors  xix

North Bay, Canada. His research interests are primarily in the history of
philosophy, although Langridge has teaching interests in theoretical and
applied ethics.
Steven McMullen is Associate Professor of Economics at Hope College
in Holland, Michigan. His research has focused on animal ethics and eco-
nomics, including the publication of Animals and the Economy (Palgrave
Macmillan, 2016). He has also published applied microeconomic research
in education policy, focusing on homework and school calendar reform.
He received his PhD in Economics from the University of North Carolina
at Chapel Hill in 2008.
Josh Milburn is a philosopher who is a Lecturer in Political Philosophy
at the Loughborough University, UK. He is interested in questions about
animals in both moral and political philosophy. His publications include
papers in the European Journal of Political Theory, the Journal of Applied
Philosophy, and the Journal of Social Philosophy, and chapters in collections
from Routledge, Palgrave Macmillan, and Oxford University Press. He is
an editor of the journal Politics and Animals, and was the winner of the
2016 Res Publica essay prize for a paper on in vitro meat.
Kay Peggs is Professor of Criminology and Sociology at Kingston
University, UK and is Fellow of the UK Oxford University Centre for
Animal Ethics. Publications include: Identity and Repartnering after
Separation (Palgrave 2007) with Richard Lampard, Animals and Sociology
(Palgrave 2012) and chapters and articles in journals such as Sociology,
British Journal of Sociology, and Sociological Review. She is co-editor of
Critical Social Research Ethics (2018) and Observation Methods (2013)
with Barry Smart and Joseph Burridge and is assistant editor of the Palgrave
Handbook of Practical Animal Ethics. Forthcoming publications include
“Experiments, Animal Bodies and Human Values” and the co-authored
“Consuming Animals: Ethics, Environment and Lifestyle Choices”.
Joshua Smart is a member of the Philosophy department at Southern
Illinois University. He received his PhD in Philosophy from the University
of Missouri in 2017. His primary research is in epistemology and metaphi-
losophy, and he has also published work in the philosophy of science.
Natalie Thomas is an adjunct faculty member in the Philosophy depart-
ment at the University of Guelph. She received her PhD in Philosophy
xx Notes on Contributors

from the University of Waterloo in Ontario, Canada, where she focused

her research on animal ethics and the study of animal minds. She is a fel-
low at the Oxford Centre for Animal Ethics, and a Woman for Humane
Canada. She teaches applied ethics courses including business ethics,
media ethics, environmental ethics, and animal ethics at various universi-
ties and colleges. In 2016, she published Animal Ethics and the Autonomous
Animal Self as part of the Animal Ethics Series with Palgrave Macmillan.
Thomas I. White is the Conrad N. Hilton Professor Emeritus of Business
Ethics at Loyola Marymount University in Los Angeles, and Founder and
Director of the International Business Ethics Case Competition. He is also
a visiting professor at Mount Holyoke College in South Hadley,
Massachusetts. White is the author of seven books and numerous articles
on topics ranging from sixteenth-­century renaissance humanism to con-
temporary applied ethics. The main focus of his research is the philosophi-
cal and ethical implications of the scientific research on whales and
dolphins. He argues that such practices as the captivity of dolphins and
orcas, the deaths and injuries of dolphins in connection with hunting and
fishing practices, and attempts to bring back commercial whaling are all
ethically indefensible. White is a fellow of the Oxford Centre for Animal
Ethics. He is also a scientific advisor to the Wild Dolphin Project, a
research organization studying Atlantic-­spotted dolphins in the Bahamas,
and served as U.S. Ambassador to the U.N.’s 2007/2008 Year of the
Dolphin Program.

Contributors
Brian Berkey Department of Legal Studies and Business Ethics and of
Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania, Philadelphia, PA, USA
Maša Blaznik Independent Researcher, Ljubljana, Slovenia
Patrick Clipsham Department of Philosophy, Winona State University,
Winona, MN, USA
Kendra Coulter Department of Labour Studies, Brock University, St.
Catherines, ON, Canada
Eugenia Ferrero Department of Communication, Georgia State
University, Atlanta, GA, USA
 Notes on Contributors  xxi

Carrie P. Freeman Department of Communication, Georgia State

University, Atlanta, GA, USA
Katy Fulfer Department of Philosophy and Gender & Social Justice
Program, University of Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
José-Carlos García-Rosell Tourism Studies, Multidimensional Tourism
Institute (MTI), Faculty of Social Sciences, University of Lapland,
Rovaniemi, Finland
Tomaž Grušovnik Faculty of Education, University of Primorska, Koper,
Slovenia
Philip Hancock Essex Business School, University of Essex,
Colchester, UK
Trevor Hedberg Ohio State University, Columbus, OH, USA
Rebekah Humphreys Department of Philosophy, University of Wales
Trinity Saint David, Ceredigion, UK
Adam Langridge Department of Philosophy, Political Science and
Economics, Nipissing University, North Bay, ON, Canada
Steven McMullen Department of Economics, Hope College,
Holland, MI, USA
Josh Milburn International Relations, Politics and History,
Loughborough University, Loughborough, UK
Kay Peggs Department of Criminology and Sociology, Kingston
University, Kingston upon Thames, UK
Joshua Smart Department of Philosophy, Southern Illinois University
Edwardsville, Edwardsville, IL, USA
Natalie Thomas Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph,
Guelph, ON, Canada
Thomas I. White Loyola Marymount University, Los Angeles, CA, USA
 CHAPTER 1

Animals and Business Ethics

Natalie Thomas

The human relationship with other animals is fraught with moral contra-
dictions, and this is due, in part, to the socioeconomic framework that it
is embedded in. This framework originated from and continues to be
based on the benefits it provides for humans, and as such it is due time that
we exert effort and place priority on analysing the ethics of our use of
animals in business practices. This volume arises from concerns about the
ethical implications of our uses of other animals and does so from theoreti-
cal perspectives in animal welfare, animal ethics, human-animal studies,
business ethics and other related disciplines. We are animals ourselves of
course, and yet we have distinguished ourselves from other animals based
on things like religion, rationality and culture that are used to give license
and justification to our use of animals for profit. We love our pets, giving
rise to a global pet industry of an estimated $100 billion (USD) by 2020
(Arenofsky 2017), and yet we annually slaughter billions of other mam-
mals, who arguably possess similar levels of intelligence and emotions
under conditions that cause much suffering (Halteman 2011). Indeed, as
McMullen claims, “While many human-animal interactions are

N. Thomas (*)
Department of Philosophy, University of Guelph, Guelph, ON, Canada
e-mail: natevans@uoguelph.ca

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Switzerland AG 2022
N. Thomas (ed.), Animals and Business Ethics, The Palgrave
Macmillan Animal Ethics Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97142-7_1
2 N. THOMAS

positive, …humans benefit at the expense of other animals. Moreover, the

harm that non-human animals experience at the hands of humans is largely
determined by economics. Among those animals that are owned by
humans, property laws and economic function dictate their experiences in
life and death.” (2015, 11). As beliefs and social norms about the welfare
and ethical treatment of animals and workers in animal-related industries
have changed and evolved in recent years, it is incumbent on businesses to
ensure that this is taken into account when using animals for profit, as
many academics and the public are calling for (Janssens and Kaptein 2016;
Keeling 2005; Lusk and Bailey Norwood 2010; Sorensen et al. 2001;
Wang and Chan 2017). As such, the purpose of this book is to engage
with some of the main ethical issues that arise from the use of animals in
various business practices, and to provide direction for the improvement
of both human and non-human lives in animal-related industries. The goal
here is to expand business ethics by including considerations about the
welfare, treatment and ethical value of animals from an interdisciplinary
perspective. So far, this topic has largely been ignored by business ethics
scholars despite the rapid growth in animal ethics scholarship and societal
concerns about the ethical implications of practices like animal agriculture
and experimentation (Peggs 2013). This volume is an attempt to expand
the field of business ethics to include the ethical consideration of animals
in business practices in ways that have not previously been addressed, or at
least have not been addressed in much detail.1
So far, there has been little consideration of animals in the scholarly
business ethics literature, despite mentions of the need for greater connec-
tions to be made between the fields of animal welfare, animal ethics and
business ethics, particularly given the advent of new technologies that
enable humans to modify animals in the pursuit of greater productivity
and efficiency in agriculture and experimentation, as well as rising environ-
mental concerns such as climate change and loss of biodiversity (Peggs
2015; Rossi and Garner 2014; Ilea 2009; Frawley and Dyson 2014). The
study of business ethics, broadly speaking, engages with a broad range of
frameworks, theories and concepts as they pertain to the practices of busi-
nesses, corporations, management and their implications for civil society,
but most often animals are only mentioned as a sub-topic in relation to

1
For simplicity, I will be using the term ‘animal’ to refer to non-human animals. It is fully
recognized that humans are also animals and that this is easy to forget and can symbolize our
separation from animals in morally significant ways.
 1 ANIMALS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 3

environmental sustainability and social responsibility, if at all. Given the

increasing pressure for businesses to demonstrate corporate social respon-
sibility and corporate citizenship, as well as appropriate and adequate
stakeholder management, these chapters in this volume seek to under-
stand and analyse ways that animals can be included in these frameworks.
To do this, both simple and more complex questions need to be asked.
These include such questions as to whether or not animals should be
treated as commodities, given their sentience, whether or not animals
should be considered stakeholders and to what extent their interests ought
to be considered by management and businesses generally. Further to
these questions, we must also consider the effects of animal-related work
on the humans that perform such labour, as well as how businesses and
management ought to be making decisions that have ethical impacts on
the animals, humans, and natural environments they use for profit.
This volume is a timely contribution to the study of business ethics for
a number of reasons. The first is that consumers are becoming more aware
of animal welfare concerns related to the use of animals for food, products,
research and experimentation and tourism (Webster 2005; Norwood and
Lusk 2011; Marie 2006; Janssens and van Wesel 2016; Auger et al. 2003;
Bell et al. 2017; Kline 2018). Animal agriculture in particular, due to its
scale and global impact raises a number of urgent ethical issues for agri-­
food industries and farms to address. The consumer awareness of these
issues is translated into a greater demand for transparency regarding how
the animals were raised and treated in addition to the increased demand
for more ethically produced animal products. Any business that makes
claims of social responsibility can be held accountable for their actions as
they affect their stakeholders and the environment, and due to rising con-
sumer concerns about the ethical treatment of animals, this must also be
accounted for by businesses and how they treat the animals they use for
profit. This is apparent with greater demand for the cessation of animal
testing for products such as cosmetics, the demand for fair trade products,
and the rise and success of plant-based and vegan foods. For example, the
rising number of those adopting vegetarian, vegan and flexitarian diets has
created a multi-million dollar market for meat-free products, and about
5% of Americans refuse to eat meat with approximately 8.5 million people
identifying as vegetarian, and 7.5 million as vegans (Potts 2017, 21).
There are also extensive debates concerning animal research and experi-
mentation and the ethics of using animals for the pursuit of knowledge
and for profit, such as developing animal models of disease and in the
4 N. THOMAS

development and testing of pharmaceuticals (Linzey and Linzey 2018;

Garrett 2012; Clark 2014). The debates about the ethics of animal
research and experimentation are driven by concerns about animal welfare
and ethics and despite various forms of regulation in place to protect ani-
mals, it still remains relative to the individual company or business as to
the degree to which they adhere to them or to ethical standards and poli-
cies. Additionally, there can be significant, harmful effects on the humans
that perform such research (psychological and emotional), further dem-
onstrating the need for deeper ethical analyses of business practices involv-
ing animals and humans.
Second, with the urgency of climate change, many people are increas-
ingly aware of the environmental implications of animal agriculture. A full
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report (IPCC 2014)
not only outlines the impact of animal agriculture on CO2 and green-
house gas emissions levels but also urges people to reduce or eliminate
their consumption of animal products, especially of beef and dairy, in
order to mitigate climate change, global warming and the disastrous
effects that we all may face in the very near future. Although the estimates
vary to an extent, it is generally accepted that animal agriculture accounts
for 10–12% of global anthropogenic greenhouse gas emissions (IPCC
2014). This includes emissions from the cutting down of forests to grow
feed for livestock, along with the gases emitted by the livestock, to the
energy required for machinery and transportation involved in the full
product life cycle. This means that ethical issues for animal agriculture can
relate to many different industries and businesses that are part of the jour-
ney from the field to the farm to the plate. In addition to the harms com-
mitted directly to the animals themselves, harms to animal habitats and
wildlife due to the clearing of land and forests, for example, threaten to
displace animals and further contribute to the human-caused loss of bio-
diversity and extinction of species that we are already witnessing (Bulliet
2005; Kolbert 2014). Concern about the link between the agri-food
industry globally and the environmental effects of natural resource use,
pollution, deforestation and climate change is on the rise now more than
ever, and businesses need to address these concerns if they are to justify
industrial agriculture while making claims to social responsibility and sus-
tainability (Lerner et al. 2013; Maloni and Brown 2006; Kimmerer 2015).
Lastly, to meet the growing demand for animal products and animal
research, more technologies are being developed to increase yields and
productivity in the agri-food industry and animal models for research
 1 ANIMALS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 5

industries, raising ethical concerns about the nature, uses and conse-
quences of these technologies for animals, humans and the environment.
In farming, this is reflected by the shift from animal husbandry practices to
industrial and intensive farming practices which focus more on efficiency
and productivity. The development of artificial insemination, cross-­
breeding and genetic manipulation (including transgenic and gene-editing
technologies) of livestock, and improved control over animal diseases
resulted in greater efficiency, higher production and lower prices which
result from an increased demand for animal products, in part as a result of
a growing global population (Norwood and Lusk 2011). However, these
advances, while resulting in cheaper prices for consumers, have also
resulted in lower welfare and well-being for animals and for the humans
who work with them. In fact, much more awareness has been brought to
the suffering of workers in industries that cause suffering to animals,
including the agri-food industry and animal experimentation (Ellis 2014,
Porcher and Schmitt 2012, Porcher 2017, Stull and Broadway 2004,
Potts 2017). Although farm animals are primarily valued for the produc-
tion of goods and are valued primarily as commodities, their sentience
demands ethical consideration for their basic desires to avoid suffering
(Webster 2013). Business ethics, however, cannot address these ethical
issues without being informed by animal welfare and animal ethics. Animal
ethics in particular provides the reasons and arguments for why we ought
to care about animal use, their welfare and their suffering.
While those in the field of animal welfare seek to improve the lives and
experiences of animals in various industries that use them for profit, animal
ethics studies the foundations and applications of the moral value of ani-
mals themselves, and they tend to ask more theoretical questions about
whether or not animals should be ‘used’ at all, and under what sorts of
circumstances the uses of animals are morally acceptable. The study of
animal ethics has resulted in an increased recognition of the moral value of
animals beyond their uses for profit or as commodities. This academic field
of study is populated by those from a range of disciplines and focuses on
the elaboration and examination of views and arguments that support the
notion that animals are morally considerable, both directly and indirectly.
Although there is some disagreement as to the basis of this moral consid-
erability, it is generally accepted that many, if not most, animals possess
interests due to their sentience and ability to feel pain and suffering and to
feel pleasure and positive emotions and mental states similar to humans
(Thomas 2016). Views on animal ethics can be conceived of as existing on
6 N. THOMAS

a scale, where on one end there are those who accept the use of animals
for human purposes and profit with considerations made for their welfare
and well-being. On the other end of the scale are those who believe ani-
mals should not be used for any human purposes, such as animal aboli-
tionists (Francione 2008). Along that scale are those who argue for greater
or lesser moral consideration of animals, based on different characteristics
that species or individual animals possess, or on the grounds of particular
moral theories (e.g., Dawkins 2012; Garner 2005; Gruen 2011; Gruen
2015; Korsgaard 2018; Milligan 2015; Rollin 2006; Singer 2006; Sunstein
and Nussbaum 2004; Taylor 2009; Waldau 2011; Thomas 2016; Williams
and DeMello 2007). If animals are understood to possess certain cognitive
capacities, including agency, consciousness and self-awareness, intelligence
and rationality, all of which are now studied in a variety of disciplines
(Thomas 2021), then the view that most animals possess traits that make
them morally considerable is justifiable from evolutionary and psychologi-
cal perspectives. It can then be further specified within ethical theories
such as deontological or utilitarian, for example, the degree to which ani-
mals can flourish or live according to their interests and preferences
(Thomas and Langridge 2021). As a result of the increasing knowledge
we have about animal minds, behaviours, and capabilities, as well as our
knowledge of how these capabilities exist across and within different ani-
mal species, it becomes more and more difficult to ignore calls for greater
attention to be paid to not only how we treat non-human animals, but
also to how we ought to treat them. All of these views on animals entail dif-
ferent positions on the ethical and legal status of animals, and all can be
applied to the ethical assessment or judgement of business practices as
they affect animals and the human-animal relationship (Thomas and
Langridge 2021). What is important here, as demonstrated by the various
contributions in this book, is that particular views of animal ethics are not
all necessarily, mutually exclusive. The unifying goal of animal ethics is to
question, analyse and develop views on how animals ought to be treated,
given what we know about their physical, psychological and emotional
traits. The chapters in this book provide such analyses of how animals are
and ought to be treated in business practices involving animals in agricul-
ture, tourism, experimentation and research.
Although there are a number of different industries that use animals in
various ways, many of the chapters in this book focus on animal agricul-
ture, animal experimentation and research involving animals. The focus on
these particular topics is a result of both the magnitude of the numbers of
 1 ANIMALS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 7

animals that are used and consumed in order to produce food and food
products, along with the dismal conditions animals must endure in large-­
scale and intensive animal production and research facilities. They are also
ethically significant given the impacts on human workers (psychologically
and physically) and the environmental effects such as pollution, loss of
biodiversity and global warming. It is estimated that over 2 billion mam-
mals (including cows, pigs, sheep and goats) are slaughtered each year
globally, along with another 50 billion chickens, and over 150 million tons
of seafood (Thornton 2019; Potts 2017; Meat atlas 2014) for food. Due
to rising population and income levels in Africa, India and Asia, the
demand for meat and animal food products is rising dramatically, and is
predicted to continue to rise as much as 80% in those locations by 2030
(World Economic Forum 2019). The consumption of animal products in
Europe and North America per person is still the highest in the world,
despite the slowing down of consumption of cattle and sheep over the last
ten years or so (Potts 2017). However, the consumption of poultry and
pork is rising steadily in both developing and industrialized countries
(Thornton 2019; Potts 2017; Norwood and Lusk 2011).
Animals used in experimentation and research each year are conserva-
tively estimated to be around 115 million (Linzey and Linzey 2018),
while animals killed for their fur numbered over 150 million in 2014/15
(Humane Society International 2020). Animals are also used for enter-
tainment purposes, including hunting, and are confined and forced to per-
form in zoos, circuses, rodeos, film, television and aquariums (Gruen
2011). The fields of animal studies, human-animal studies and critical ani-
mal studies provide ethical analyses of these uses of animals and their
labour that are useful perspectives to incorporate into business ethics (e.g.,
Kaushik 1999; DeMello 2012; Kaloff and Fitzgerald 2007; Malamud
2013; Sorenson 2014; Coulter 2016). There is also profit to be made
using animals in tourism, as pets, and as materials for clothing, medicines
and jewellery. The ethics of using animals for profit in such industries as
tourism, for example, is being increasingly examined and debated, given
our knowledge of the impacts of such businesses on wildlife (Shani and
Pizam 2007; Fennell 2012; Fennell 2014; Kline 2016). The roles that
media play in advertising that create or perpetuate positive or negative
perceptions of animals for human use are also being examined and anal-
ysed from ethical perspectives (e.g., Almiron et al. 2016; Arluke and
Sanders 2009; de Jonge and van den Bos 2005; Gross and Vallely 2012).
All of these topics are in need of ethical examination and analyses if
8 N. THOMAS

businesses are to take animal welfare and animal ethics seriously, not only
to improve their level of social responsibility and moral behaviour, but also
to adequately address stakeholder concerns and global demands for animal
products that are now jeopardizing environmental sustainability and long-­
term profits.
Animals are used and consumed by humans on a massive scale. They
play a large part in our global economy both directly and through other
related industries, and as such, their use and treatment should be ethically
scrutinized in these business practices. This book is the first of its kind and
is devoted to the ethical analysis of the use of animals in business, includ-
ing industries such as animal agriculture, tourism, experimentation,
research and entertainment. These uses of animals not only raise ethical
issues concerning the animals themselves as labourers and as objects or
commodities, but also for the humans who perform work in these indus-
tries. Ethical issues involving the effects of labour in these industries, both
for animals and for humans, and the ethical implications and harms of such
labour are also addressed in this book. The following chapters provide an
overview and analysis of some of these issues while also providing direc-
tion for further study in business ethics. In a time when we are facing
global challenges with food security and environmental sustainability, and
as we are more informed about the mental, emotional and physical lives of
animals than ever before, the study of animals in business ethics brings
together interdisciplinary thinkers that can provide theoretical and applied
solutions to these ethical issues.
The chapters in this volume have been organized into three distinct
parts based on some of the key themes and topics that unify them. In Part
I, the included chapters focus on issues related to more general areas of
ethical concerns raised by the use of animals in businesses and industries.
The labour and work of animals and humans within animal-related indus-
tries, as well as how and why animals ought to be considered in business
ethics, are discussed in the chapters of this first part. The chapters included
in Part II all relate to issues that arise from the use of animals as food.
Animal welfare and animal suffering within the context of animal agricul-
ture is an ethical issue that needs to be addressed by these industries, and
the chapters in this section focus on what sorts of policies or changes in
views on animals should be revised or reconsidered. Given new related
technologies such as gene editing and lab-cultured meat, some chapters
also consider the ethics of these and whether or not they have the potential
for benefits to animals, humans and the environment. Part III is the final
 1 ANIMALS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 9

section of this volume and it focuses on ethical issues raised within the
context of human-animal relationships in industries such as animal experi-
mentation and entertainment. Whether or not animals ought to be con-
sidered stakeholders and to what extent is also examined, providing a
fitting conclusion to this volume by raising the opportunity for new ways
to include animals in business ethics.
Part I begins by considering one of the inevitable consequences of
using animals and their bodies for products and services which is that they
are turned into commodities that can be bought and sold in the market-
place. If animals are sentient, intelligent creatures, then this presents an
ethical issue for animal-related business practices, as we are reducing their
value to that of something, rather than recognizing them as individuals.
Focusing on this problem, the second chapter of this book addresses the
question of when it is ethically acceptable to use animals to generate a
profit. Clipsham and Fulfer present and apply their anti-commodification
principle to distinguish between permissible and non-permissible uses of
animals in business. In particular, they examine the animal entertainment
industry, the pet or companion animal industry, and the animal agribusi-
ness industry to see if there are ways for these types of businesses to avoid
morally problematic animal commodification.
As a result of increasing ethical concerns related to animal agriculture
and the consumption of animals as food, there has of late been a rise of
vegan and plant-based food products and industries. For those that want
to avoid supporting animal-related food industries, these companies pro-
vide alternatives to the continued commodification of animals into food
products. With the rise of these new companies, we also see different sorts
of ethical issues that are related to practical, economic and labour issues
that are addressed by Coulter and Milburn who look at both the chal-
lenges and benefits they bring with them. By applying the lens of humane
jobs to these issues, they also elaborate on the potential that these compa-
nies bring to provide opportunities for the prioritization of work well-­
being and environmental protection. Their chapter allows us to envision
plant-based companies that create more ethical food choices while also
creating a more humane workforce and working environment.
The issue concerning to what extent business ethics ought to relate to
or rely on moral theory is discussed by Berkey, and he argues that standard
theoretical approaches in business, such as Shareholder and Stakeholder
theories, for example, are inadequate in accounting for animal interests. If
we are generally in agreement that animals possess interests and have
10 N. THOMAS

moral value, then business ethics should adopt a more animal-friendly

theoretical approach. Berkey points out that the principles of business eth-
ics that apply to managerial conduct are often separated from moral prin-
ciples governing personal conduct. In order to achieve animal-friendly
business ethics then, it requires greater commitments to moral theory.
Looking at animals in tourism, Garcia-Rosell and Hancock examine the
workplace management and exploitation that can occur within relation-
ships between human and non-human animals. They do this using the
work of Theodor Adorno and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory as
a framework that they apply to a unique example of a working environ-
ment that includes both human and non-human animals. Specifically, they
focus on Christmas tourism in Lapland, where reindeer and human work-
ers are used to create memorable experiences for visiting tourists. Their
analysis of this industry demonstrates the interconnections between ethics
and the structures of economic activities that can lead to the problematic
exploitation of both human and non-human animals.
Part II begins with a chapter that considers how the practices and insti-
tutions of animal agriculture can be understood to determine the actual
treatment of animals in the economy. The intensification of industrial ani-
mal agriculture has resulted in both greater efficiency and productivity but
has also resulted in decreased quality of life for many animals. McMullen
examines this trend by focusing on the market incentives that encourage
farmers to participate in an ethical race to the bottom where animal wel-
fare is often sacrificed in order to achieve greater quality and volume of
products such as meat, dairy and eggs. Rather than condemn the actions
of farmers, McMullen examines the implications of this competitive sys-
tem, noting that farmers often have less latitude for ethical action than
most ethicists assume, and the regulation of animal industries need to
account for the dynamic of competition and constraint in order to be
effective. Finally, he claims that the regulation of animal agriculture can be
beneficial to both producers and consumers by creating a system that
enables all participants within it to act ethically.
Businesses who aim to achieve greater corporate social responsibility
must also have in place an effective communication strategy to achieve
transparency and accountability with their stakeholders. Although this is a
commonly accepted claim within business ethics, so far it hasn’t been
explicitly applied to businesses that use animals to address the harms that
are caused to those animals, as well as to their habitats. Freeman and
Treadwell acknowledge the increased public interest in the treatment of
 1 ANIMALS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 11

animals and growing concerns about the environmental crises we face and
argue that corporations ought to consider animals as stakeholders. To
increase corporate transparency in relation to their treatment and use of
animals, they propose a Corporate Disclosure Initiative for Animal Welfare
(CDIAW). This innovative initiative is based on both business ethics and
communications ethics frameworks, and as such, provides an effective
measure for businesses to achieve greater corporate social responsibility
and accountability to humans, animals and the environment.
With the increasing prevalence of vegetarianism and veganism, there
are also more opportunities to generate profits for the food industry and
for charitable organizations. One example of this is McDonald’s licensed
use of the United Kingdom Vegetarian Society Vegetarian Approved
trademark on a wide range of its products. Peggs examines this increasing
trend with a focus on the ethical paradoxes and dilemmas that can arise
when a global food corporation, with animal products as its main source
of profits, enters into relationships with charities that have an ethical com-
mitment to animals as their mandate. Peggs’ examination of the resulting
tensions of such relationships raises important and timely ethical questions
about implications and motivations behind such connections, especially as
we see a sharp rise in global fast food corporations promoting vegan and
vegetarian options in their menus.
The trend towards increasing alternatives to meat products can include
plant-based foods, but given the rising global demand for meat, it can be
argued that an ideal transition to plant-exclusive farming would fail to
meet this demand. A different possibility for meeting this demand is the
development of lab-cultured meat, which would also reduce animal suffer-
ing and lessen the environmental impacts that intensive animal agriculture
causes. Hedberg argues that lab-cultured meat provides the best option
for changing animal agriculture in the ways that morality demands, as it is
practically and morally achievable in ways that non-industrialized animal
agriculture and widespread shifts to meat-free agricultural systems cur-
rently are not. Although lab-cultured meat is unable to perfectly solve all
problems associated with animal agriculture, Hedberg contends that it can
go much further in the ethically and practically correct directions than
other alternatives, once it is technologically and economically feasible for
widespread creation and consumption.
Gene-editing technologies have become much easier to implement in
animal agriculture, and the use of these technologies to potentially disen-
hance animals to reduce their suffering, or to change characteristics like
12 N. THOMAS

creating cattle that do not possess horns, for example, has the potential to
reduce the suffering that factory-farmed animals experience. Thomas and
Langridge provide an overview of the philosophical ‘conundrum’ about
the use of gene-editing to disenhance animals in order to reduce their suf-
fering, while arguing that as it is businesses that make the final decisions
regarding the implementation of such technologies, the ethical issues they
raise must be addressed by business ethics, in conjunction with other
applied ethics such as animal ethics. Companies that use animals must
make much more explicit Corporate Social Responsibility policies that
serve to protect animals, human workers and the environment as their
actions can harm all of these stakeholders.
In the first chapter of Part III, Humphreys considers that in addition to
the harms inflicted on animals that are used by businesses for various pur-
poses and in different industries, there are associated harms for those
humans who work within them. We are increasingly becoming aware of
these harms, and as workers and employees are key stakeholders in these
industries, it is imperative for companies who aim towards corporate social
responsibility to consider the ways in which these workers are harmed
specifically through the nature of their work with animals. Humphreys
examines the emotional effects of working with animals used in research
and experimentation through a virtue ethics framework to elucidate the
impacts and implications that the acceptance of desensitization to animal
suffering plays in this context. She argues that despite the reasons given for
the acceptance of this emotional desensitization, we should not overlook
the importance of exercising moral feelings in direct response to the suf-
fering of animals used in experimentation. Her arguments can also be
applied to other animal-related business practices where humans are
exposed to animal suffering, such as intensive animal farms and slaughter-
houses, and as such, provides an important contribution to the growing
body of literature on human labour within animal-related industries.
The consideration of the human emotional costs of participating in the
animal-industrial complex is examined in detail in the chapter by Grušovnik
and Blaznik where they argue that significant moral stress is caused for all
those who work in industries that entail the creation of suffering for and
the killing of animals. By first examining the process of psychological dis-
tancing that must occur between animals and humans for the performance
of these jobs, they point out that slaughterhouses and the evolution of
cookbooks are examples of the denial of animal suffering and death in our
societies on a larger scale. The cost of such psychological distancing is a
 1 ANIMALS AND BUSINESS ETHICS 13

repression of empathy and, in some cases, the development of ‘perpetration-­

induced traumatic stress’, or PITS. Indeed, they claim that not only does
the moral stress caused by the unnecessary harming and killing of non-­
human animals provide the strongest evidence for the moral unacceptabil-
ity of the mistreatment of non-human animals, but also that these harms
to humans are almost as injurious to humans as they are to non-human
being. As such, they conclude that the animal-industrial complex in its
entirety is morally problematic for both humans and non-human animals.
In recent years there has been increasing attention and pressure on
companies that keep captive cetaceans in parks for human entertainment
purposes, like SeaWorld. White examines the ethics of such businesses
through the application of Nussbaum’s ‘capabilities approach’ and deter-
mines that dolphins kept in such facilities are not able to meet the condi-
tions for cetacean ‘flourishing’. Dolphins not only possess the ability to
suffer and feel pleasure in various ways, but due to their sophisticated
intelligence and emotional abilities and their capacity for self-awareness,
they have many needs that require fulfilment in order for them to flourish
and to obtain satisfying and successful lives. Given the conditions that
dolphins must endure in places such as SeaWorld, they are far from achiev-
ing lives that obtain ‘cetacean dignity’. As such, captivity for dolphins not
only constitutes various forms of harm, but also sinks to the level of ‘cru-
elty’ which compounds the ethical failures of SeaWorld to also include
harms to their customers, investors and employees. White’s analysis pro-
vides an in-depth examination of the ethical failures of companies who
generate profit from captive cetaceans by looking at both the harms to the
animals themselves and their human stakeholders.
Throughout the previous chapters there has been at least some consid-
eration given to animals as stakeholders in companies who use them to
generate profit. However, there has been a lack of systematic consider-
ation to how stakeholder theory might be applied to animals, given that
much of the ethical debate regarding the use of animals in business prac-
tices tends to be polarized between those who call for the complete abol-
ishment of animal use for human purposes versus those who simply want
to continue using animals without substantive ethical evaluation of their
practices. Smart provides an application of stakeholder theory to the use
of animals in businesses in a moderate and principled way that allows for
the creation of a realpolitik for animal-business relationships, while taking
the interests of animals seriously. Smart reviews the theoretical grounds of
14 N. THOMAS

stakeholder theory and how it can be applied to animals in a practical and

applicable way.
This volume provides an overdue examination of the ethics of using
animals for business purposes. The authors presented here are all con-
cerned with the welfare and well-being of animals, humans and the envi-
ronment and seek to address these concerns from within their various
disciplines. As we continue to use animals for human purposes as part of
our economy, we are increasingly called upon to ethically evaluate these
uses and create business solutions to ensure the success of industries while
also reducing or eliminating the harms to humans and animals that can
result. The articles in this volume demonstrate unique and ground-­
breaking perspectives on animals and business ethics and provide inspira-
tion and foundations for future research in this area.

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 PART I

Animals and Business Practices, Work,

Labour and Jobs

The chapters included in this first part of the book provide an examination
of animals in business ethics related to particular practices, broad business
ethics principles, the nature of animal-related work and labour, as well as
jobs. Not only do humans work within animal-related industries, but ani-
mals too perform labour of various kinds. This leads to questions regard-
ing their status as both labourers but also as commodities within an
animal-based economy. The effects of working in these industries on
human labourers can cause emotional and physical distress, and so the
concept of humane jobs is considered as potentially beneficial for both
humans and animals.
 CHAPTER 2

Are Animals Always Commodified

in the Context of Business?

Katy Fulfer and Patrick Clipsham

Introduction
The anti-commodification approach to animal ethics claims that there is
something prima facie wrong with the commodification of nonhuman ani-
mals (Clipsham and Fulfer 2016).1 In this chapter, we aim to expand this
approach beyond its initial articulation as a defense of ethical veganism
and illuminate its usefulness in considering animal use in business

1
Hereafter we will refer to nonhuman animals as “animals.” We choose this language for
ease of use, rather than in adherence to a descriptive or normative hierarchy between human
and nonhuman animals.

K. Fulfer (*)
Department of Philosophy and Gender & Social Justice Program, University of
Waterloo, Waterloo, ON, Canada
e-mail: kfulfer@uwaterloo.ca
P. Clipsham
Department of Philosophy, Winona State University, Winona, MN, USA
e-mail: PClipsham@winona.edu

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Switzerland AG 2022
N. Thomas (ed.), Animals and Business Ethics, The Palgrave
Macmillan Animal Ethics Series,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-97142-7_2
22 K. FULFER AND P. CLIPSHAM

contexts. Although commodification has been of interest in moral phi-

losophy and in some domains of bioethics (e.g. assisted reproduction and
organ donation), this concept has not received systematic treatment in
business ethics or in the literature on animal ethics. In the animal ethics
literature, for example, commodification tends to be viewed as problem-
atic only because it is a symptom of a broader set of injustices (see, e.g.,
Adams 1990; Torres 2007; Wyckoff 2014; McMullen 2016). It is our
contention that the commodification of animals may often be present or
facilitate broader forms of injustice, but it is also a prima facie wrong itself.
We refer to the claim that the commodification of animals is itself a prima
facie wrong as the anti-commodification principle.
Following from the anti-commodification principle, our motivating
question is this: When, if ever, can animals be used to generate a profit in
the context of business without this use constituting morally problematic
commodification? In the first section of this chapter, we outline the anti-­
commodification approach and situate it in relation to two of the most
prominent approaches to animal ethics: welfarism and animal rights.2 In
the remaining sections of the chapter, we apply the anti-commodification
approach to three cases of animal use in business: the use of animals for
entertainment, the use of animals in the pet industry, and the use of ani-
mals in commercial food production. We will argue that there are some
circumstances wherein the use of animals in the context of business does
not amount to morally problematic commodification. The applications
provide a guide for determining whether the use of animals in a specific
business practice problematically commodifies them.

The Anti-Commodification Approach

In developing an anti-commodification approach to animal ethics, we
extend our (Clipsham and Fulfer 2016) anti-commodification defense of
ethical veganism. We defined commodification as follows: “X commodifies
Y when X treats Y as the sort of thing for which it is appropriate for the
norms of the market to entirely regulate Y’s production, exchange, and
enjoyment” (286).

2
The third prominent approach to animal ethics is feminist care ethics, but we do not
consider this approach in this chapter.
 2 ARE ANIMALS ALWAYS COMMODIFIED IN THE CONTEXT OF BUSINESS? 23

Commodification is not problematic in all cases. For many consumer

products (e.g., video game systems), their value is appropriately deter-
mined by the non-moral preferences of consumers, and those products are
thus appropriately regulated by market norms. Other cases of commodifi-
cation seem straightforwardly problematic (e.g., humans). We take it as a
plausible starting point that it is prima facie wrong to commodify humans
because of their moral status. As philosophers from diverse theoretical
standpoints have argued, humans and animals share a comparable moral
status (e.g., Singer 1975/2009; Regan 1983; Nussbaum 2006; Donaldson
and Kymlicka 2011). We take these diverse defenses of the moral status of
animals to give us good reason to accept the claim that, as it is for humans,
it is a prima facie wrong to commodify animals.
An animal will be understood to be problematically commodified when
someone treats that animal as the type of thing whose value can be regu-
lated by the market; that is, as something that can be justifiably produced,
bought, sold, damaged, destroyed, or altered simply to make it more suit-
able for satisfying the non-moral desires of individual owners and custom-
ers (Clipsham and Fulfer 2016, 291). A person who transforms an animal
into something whose value is determined by market norms commodifies
them, but so too does anyone who participates in the processes whereby
an animal is transformed into a commodity.
There are three features of the anti-commodification approach that are
important to highlight. First, commodification is a separable, additive
harm or wrong that builds onto welfare harms or rights-violations
(Clipsham and Fulfer 2016, 288). If animals are wronged when used
instrumentally and held in captivity, being commodified is an additional,
distinct moral wrong. This feature is relevant to distinguishing the anti-­
commodification principle from welfarism and animal rights theories. (We
will return to this point). Second, commodification is a separate concern
from ownership and the restriction of liberty (287). While problems with
restricting an animal’s liberty or owning an animal may often intersect
with problematic commodification, the two are not necessarily linked.
Thus, a person may commodify an animal without owning it. Third, a
person may commodify an animal while simultaneously assigning it a non-­
market value (287). What matters for commodification is that the value of
an entity is determined by an agent’s non-moral preferences. In other
words, a person might pay above market value for a vintage video game
that has nostalgic (or some other non-economic) value to them, but the
price of the game has been determined according to the non-moral
24 K. FULFER AND P. CLIPSHAM

preferences of the market for vintage games. The important insight of this
point is that caring for an animal is not, in itself, a sign that the animal is
not being commodified.
To apply the anti-commodification view to business ethics, we begin
with the specific claim that there is something prima facie morally serious
about the everyday practices of animal use in business, as these practices
normally and centrally involve the treatment of animals as commodities.
While we focus on commodification, this view does not claim that com-
modification is the only morally relevant feature of the use of animals in
business. Causing animal suffering and premature animal death (for exam-
ple) is also plausibly prima facie morally wrong. The anti-commodification
approach is not meant to contradict these intuitively plausible principles.
Rather, we want to point to the fact the commodification of animals is a
serious moral issue that is separable from these other issues and has not
received sufficient attention in the literature. Furthermore, anyone inter-
ested in animal welfare should be especially concerned with the ethical
issues associated with animal commodification, as the attitude that the
production, distribution, and enjoyment of animals can be appropriately
regulated by market norms no doubt leads to conditions for these animals
that are severely detrimental (McMullen 2015). Thus, even if a person
disagrees with us about our starting point, that commodification is a
prima facie moral wrong, our argument is still useful in raising questions
about the commodification of animals that deserve attention in busi-
ness ethics.
Before applying the anti-commodification approach to specific cases in
business, we wish to clarify how this view relates to some of the dominant
theories in animal ethics, namely welfarism and animal rights theories. We
understand both welfarism and animal rights theories to be robust system-
atic theories that provide guidance as to how humans should treat animals.
The anti-commodification approach focuses on a singular category of
analysis and does not systematically outline a robust framework for our
ethical treatment of animals. In some contexts, as we will demonstrate in
our case applications, the anti-commodification approach may challenge
some ways in which these theories analyze our treatment of animals.
However, the anti-commodification approach may also provide theoreti-
cal tools that adherents of these theories (or other systematic moral frame-
works) may incorporate into their analyses. Furthermore, pluralists may
adopt the anti-commodification approach as helpful in teasing out morally
 2 ARE ANIMALS ALWAYS COMMODIFIED IN THE CONTEXT OF BUSINESS? 25

salient features in a given context without being committed to a substan-

tive moral theory.
Like welfarism, the anti-commodification approach is organized around
a singular moral principle. The anti-commodification approach is more
narrow than welfarism, however, because it does not seek to address all
aspects of our treatment of animals. The anti-commodification approach
requires more distinction from strong rights-based approaches, like those
developed by Tom Regan (1983) as well as by Donaldson and Kymlicka
(2011). Like the anti-commodification approach, rights-based views
emphasize that there is something inherently wrong with treating sentient
animals as means to human ends. However, the anti-commodification
approach is narrower than most rights-based approaches, which tend to
focus on instrumental use as a broad category. For example, Regan equates
“renewable resources, or replaceable receptacles, or tools, or models, or
things” as equivalent kinds of problematic use (399). As Donaldson and
Kymlicka (2011) describe a strong animal rights position:

What are the implications of recognizing animals as persons or selves with

inviolable rights? In the simplest of terms, it means recognizing that they are
not means to our ends. They were not put on this earth to serve us, or feed
us, or comfort us. Rather, they have their own subjective existence, and
hence their own equal and inviolable rights to life and liberty, which pro-
hibit harming them, killing them, confining them, owning them, and enslav-
ing them. Respect for these rights rules out virtually all existing practices of
the animal-use industries, where animals are owned an exploited for human
profit, pleasure, education, convenience, or comfort. (40)

Unlike this description of what a commitment to animal rights entails, the

anti-commodification principle does not require that we delineate a com-
prehensive set of rights that ought to be extended to animals.
Commodification is one wrong, perhaps among many, that deserves spe-
cial attention. Further, the anti-commodification view is not committed to
some infelicitous trappings of a strong rights-based approach to ethics
(Warren 1986; O’Neill 1997), but rather is founded on a single prima
facie moral principle, namely, the anti-commodification principle. Anti-­
commodification is not best interpreted as an inviolable right, but as a
specific moral consideration that is defeasible and can thus be overridden
by sufficiently pressing considerations. Where strong-rights-based views
will tend to cast all use as morally problematic, the anti-commodification
26 K. FULFER AND P. CLIPSHAM

approach is open to some use being acceptable (i.e., when animals are not
problematically commodified).
Some animal ethicists may question the usefulness of the anti-­
commodification approach compared to approaches that are grounded in
substantive moral theories. They might argue that the wrongfulness of
commodification is captured by either a substantive welfare- or a rights-­
based analysis. We would defend the anti-commodification approach in
virtue of its minimal theoretical commitments.
First, we view it as a strength that the anti-commodification approach is
minimalistic enough that proponents of a substantive moral theory may
incorporate it into their systematic approaches. Given that commodifica-
tion is often equated with other harms, it may be that our approach allows
the proponent of, for example, a strong animal rights view to articulate the
wrongfulness of commodification as a rights-violation when that feature is
especially salient for their analysis.
Second, the anti-commodification principle is especially relevant for
answering ethical questions about the ways animals are used and exploited
in the context of business. This is because the anti-commodification
approach specifically engages with the question of when, if ever, market
norms can appropriately regulate the ways animals are used. Since business
inherently involves creating products and services in response to consumer
demands, the anti-commodification approach is particularly well-suited to
help us tease apart permissible use in business from use that is problematic.
Even if one believes that the anti-commodification principle is best
explained by another higher-order ethical theory (such as a rights- or
welfare-­based theory), emphasizing commodification rather than rights-­
violations (for example) will likely be very useful for helping us identify the
attitudes and practices that are essential elements of the ethical use of
animals in business.
Third, and most significantly, on our view, the anti-commodification
approach can reveal these moral insights without requiring more substan-
tive moral commitments. As Mylan Engel (2012) has pointed out, people
tend to casually dismiss claims that an animal is being treated inappropri-
ately by “rejecting the ethical theories on which they are predicated”
(215). The minimal theoretical commitments of the anti-commodification
principle make these reactions less likely and less plausible. Business own-
ers or managers who must make decisions about how and when to use
animals in business need not be committed to any particular substantive
 2 ARE ANIMALS ALWAYS COMMODIFIED IN THE CONTEXT OF BUSINESS? 27

moral theory for our arguments about the morally problematic commodi-
fication of animals to be persuasive.

Applying the Anti-Commodification Principle

to Business

We return to our central question: Can humans use animals in business

without commodifying them? Answering this question begins with a rec-
ognition that not all market-based behaviors are ethically equal. Consider
the case of the commodification of human labor. Humans are problemati-
cally commodified when their consent, interests, and autonomy are
ignored when decisions are made regarding how their labor can be pro-
duced, enjoyed, or exchanged (e.g., if a person was forced to work in a
specific capacity without these other values playing a significant role in this
decision). When a human sells her labor (in ideal conditions, at least), her
interests are represented (as she is the one doing the selling), and her con-
sent and autonomy are respected (as no one can force her to accept a
contract) (Clipsham and Fulfer 2016, 288). Thus, selling human labor
does not necessarily commodify humans. Some consensual employment
relationships may be exploitative, but as long as the individual’s labor is
being valued as something whose production, distribution, and enjoy-
ment cannot appropriately be regulated entirely by market norms, the
worker and her labor are not being commodified.
There is a direct application of this general principle to the issue of the
use of animals in business. When animals are being treated as commodities
they are being conceptualized and treated as the sorts of entities whose
production, distribution, and enjoyment can be appropriately regulated
by the market mechanisms of supply and demand. As we outlined in the
previous section, there is a plausible prima facie moral claim that conceiv-
ing of sentient animals in such a way is wrong. However, animals are not
commodified in all circumstances where they are used or exploited, as
other values often play a role in deciding how to make use of animals in
the context of business. Thus, some methods of using animals in the con-
text of business will not amount to commodification, and the moral case
against them will be considerably weaker. We will examine three cases of
animal use in business to explore commodification: the use of animals in
entertainment, in the pet industry, and in food production.
Another random document with
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trembling, resembling a corpse, but for the still bright eye, and the
convulsive quivering of every nerve in her delicate frame. She
uttered not a syllable, but remained in a corner of the room, on a
rude settle to which she had been carried by the soldiers; and the
sentinel’s heavy tread, as he paced backwards and forwards before
the door of the apartment, was the only sound that broke the dreary
stillness.
In less than an hour Desgrais returned. He came accompanied by
a voiture de poste, having directly after the capture of his prisoner
ordered it to be in waiting, as well as despatched a courier with
commands to have everything in readiness along the road for fresh
relays. He now entered the room, and requested Marie to
accompany him into the carriage.
‘You have played a sorry part, monsieur, in this drama,’ she said to
him, ‘and you have triumphed: do not think I am stooping to you if I
make one request: could you see how deeply I feel myself to be
degraded in asking this favour, you—even you—might pity me and
grant it. You have played with the name of a person this evening,
and won your stake off it. Will you allow me to write to him?’
‘Provided I see the letter, and you can write it in ten minutes,’
replied Desgrais. ‘We must reach Dinant to supper, where also you
will rest the night.’
‘Half that time will be sufficient,’ said Marie. ‘Give me the means,
and for a few minutes leave me to myself.’
Desgrais produced his tablets, and tearing a few blank leaves from
them gave them to the Marchioness, as well as a style he carried;
then placing the sentinel again before the door, he withdrew.
As soon as he was gone Marie traced a few words upon the
paper, and then spoke to the guard.
‘What is your name?’ she asked in a low, hurried tone.
‘Antoine Barbier,’ replied the man gruffly, ‘archer in his Majesty’s
service.’
And he continued his march. In less than a minute she again
addressed him.
‘See!’ she exclaimed, taking a massive jewelled ornament from
her hair. ‘The sale of this will provide you with good cheer for many a
long day, and I will give it to you if you will forward this letter for me
to its address. There is nothing in this against your orders. See,’ she
continued, adding the address. ‘“M. Camille Theria, à Liége;” he is
an apothecary in the town. Will you do this for me?’
‘Give it to me,’ said the man. ‘I will find some one when I am
relieved who will pay attention to it.’
‘Take the wages, then, at the same time,’ added Marie.
‘No,’ replied the archer, as he put the proffered gift on one side. ‘I
do not want payment for this.’
In a minute or two Desgrais came back to know if the letter was
concluded, as the carriage was ready to start. Marie shrunk from him
when he entered as though he had been a serpent—her horror of
the exempt was not feigned.
‘I cannot write, monsieur,’ she said. ‘I am at your service. Allons!’
She put away the arm of the officer as he held it forward for her to
take, and passed into the passage, which was lined with the archers.
As she passed the sentinel who had kept guard over her in the inn,
she whispered to him ‘Remember,’ and then entered the carriage
without another word, throwing herself into a corner and muffling her
face in her cloak.
Desgrais was about to follow, when Barbier slipped the note into
his hand. He read—

‘My dear Theria—I have been taken by Desgrais, and am

on my road to Paris: save me at all hazards.
‘Marie.’

‘Lose not an instant,’ cried the exempt, as he entered the carriage.

‘On—on with your horses as fast as whip and spur can urge them!’
 CHAPTER XXXV.
NEWS FOR LOUISE GAUTHIER AND BENOIT

The outcry raised against Louise Gauthier as she left the ghastly
scene in the Carrefour du Châtelet had for the moment well-nigh
deprived her of her senses. She saw the man who had accused her
of being an empoisonneuse and an accomplice of Madame de
Brinvilliers, thrown down by one of the crowd, and fearful that a
desperate riot was about to commence, she seized the opportunity
which the confusion afforded, and broke through the ring of the
infuriated people who had surrounded her, whilst their attention was
diverted. But the person who had come to her assistance followed
her; and when a turn in the street gave them an opportunity of
escaping from the resistless current of the mob, she discovered that
it was a well-looking young man to whom she had been indebted for
her safety.
‘Pardon me, mademoiselle,’ exclaimed the student—for such by
his dress he appeared to be—raising his cap, ‘for introducing myself
to you thus hurriedly. Is your name Louise Gauthier?’
‘It is, monsieur,’ replied the Languedocian timidly.
‘And mine is Philippe Glazer,’ said the other. ‘Now we know one
another. I was sent to look after you by Benoit Mousel, who is at
home by this time. They lost you in the Rue des Lombards.’
‘How can I thank you for your interference?’ said Louise.
‘Thank our Lady rather, for the lucky chance that brought me to
you at such a moment. I despaired of seeing you in such a vast mob,
although Benoit has described you pretty closely. But come, we will
find our way to the quay.’
‘You know Benoit Mousel, then?’ said Louise, as they moved on
together.
‘Passably well, mademoiselle. I had him under my care for a while,
after he had been somewhat unceremoniously pitched out of a
window at the Hôtel de Cluny, during one of the merrymakings that
M. de Lauzun is accustomed to hold there whenever he is not in the
Bastille.’
Louise Gauthier recollected the evening too well, and shuddered
as she recalled to mind its events. She did not speak again, but
keeping close to Philippe’s side, as if she feared a fresh attack from
the people about, kept on her way in silence towards the water-side.
They descended to one of the landing-places at the foot of the
Pont Notre Dame, and found the boat lying there, into which the
student assisted his companion, and then, with a few strokes of his
powerful arm, reached the boat-mill. There was a light in the
chamber, and the instant they touched the lighter Benoit and his wife
appeared with a flambeau, and broke forth into exclamations of joy
at the return of Louise.
In two minutes more the party were assembled in the room, to
which the reader has been already introduced. Bathilde bustled
about, with her usual good-tempered activity, to place the repast on
the table; and when all this was settled, she opened the door of the
stove, to let its warm light stream out over the room; and they then
took their places.
‘I need not make a secret of my mission, mademoiselle,’ said
Philippe, when they were seated; ‘for I presume there is nothing you
would wish to conceal from our friends.’
‘Because if there is, you know, Louise,’ said Benoit in continuation,
‘Bathilde and I will——’
‘Pray stop, mon ami,’ interrupted Louise; ‘what can I wish to keep
from you—you, who know everything, and have been so kind to me?
Well, monsieur?’ she added, looking anxiously at Philippe.
‘You know this writing,’ observed Philippe, as he handed her a
small packet sealed, and bearing an address.
Louise tremblingly took the parcel and looked at the
superscription. As she recognised it, she uttered a low cry of
astonishment.
‘It is indeed his,’ she exclaimed, as she bowed her head down,
and allowed the parcel to drop in her lap. The next minute her tears
were falling quickly after one another upon it.
Bathilde took her hand kindly and pressed it as they watched her
grief in silence, which Philippe Glazer was the first to break.
 ‘I found that in Monsieur de Sainte-Croix’s escritoire,’ he said; ‘one
of the few things that Desgrais did not seize upon. I told him it was
mine, for I saw what they had discovered made mischief enough,
and I did not care to have it extended. It was only to-night I
discovered by chance that you were with Benoit and his wife.’
Tearfully, and with hesitating hands, Louise opened the packet,
and produced from its folds a document drawn up evidently in legal
style, and a small note, which she handed to Philippe.
‘Read it, monsieur,’ she said; ‘I cannot. How long it is since I have
seen that writing! I used to wait day after day for some message
from him, to show that I was not forgotten—if it had been but one line
—until my heart was sick with the vain expectation. And now it has
come; and—he is dead.’
The student took the note, and hastily ran his eye over it, before
he communicated its contents to the little party. Bathilde and Benoit
watched his face anxiously, as they saw it brighten whilst he
scanned the writings; it evidently contained no bad news. ‘Joy!’ he
exclaimed, as he finished it; ‘joy to all. I think I shall give up medicine
and take to farming.’
‘Go on, monsieur!’ exclaimed Benoit and his wife in a breath.
‘What is it?’
‘The conveyance of a terrain on the Orbe, in Languedoc,’
continued Philippe, reading, ‘with a plantation of olives and
mulberries to Louise Gauthier, to be held by her in common with
whomever may have befriended her in Paris, and of which the
necessary papers are in the hands of M. Macé, notary, Rue de
Provence, Beziers!’
‘I knew it!’ said Benoit, as he slapped the table with a vehemence
that sent some things jumping off it, after a few seconds of
astonishment. ‘I knew some day fortune would turn. Continue,
monsieur.’
Philippe Glazer proceeded to read the note, whilst Louise gazed at
him, almost bewildered.

‘“When you receive this,”’ he went on, ‘“I shall have

expiated every crime. I feel convinced that my death, come
when it may, will be violent and sudden: and whatever may
 have been my faults, I shall have been punished for them. All
I had to dispose of I have left you: in possessing it, do not
forget any that have assisted you. It has been kept through
every embarrassment to this end; but circumstances
prevented my giving it to you in my lifetime. Beware of the
Marchioness of Brinvilliers; forgive me for the misery I caused
you, which has been repaid one hundredfold, and forget, if
possible,
‘“Gaudin de Sainte-Croix.
‘“To be delivered into the hands of Louise Gauthier, or,
failing to find her, of Benoit Mousel, at the mill-boat below the
Pont Notre Dame, in trust for her.”’

‘There,’ said Philippe, as he concluded, and put the papers on the

table; ‘my task is accomplished.’
‘I cannot accept it,’ said Louise after a short pause.
‘Cannot! mademoiselle,’ said the student; ‘you must. Better you
take it than it fall into M. Macé’s hands for want of a claimant; and
from him to a stranger, or the king, or any of his favourites.’
‘It would only be on one condition,’ continued the Languedocian.
‘That Benoit and his wife shared it with me.’
‘Pardieu! Louise; the terms are not hard,’ said Benoit: ‘and our
hard work will lighten the feeling of dependence. Sacristie! a chance
of seeing Languedoc again, eh, Bathilde!’
‘And a farm,’ said his wife; ‘and olives, and mulberries—perhaps
chestnuts.’
‘And no more living by my wits,’ continued Benoit, ‘which are
wearing away from constant use, when the mill is out of work. No
more mountebanking nor singing songs, nor being pitched out of
windows for so doing, instead of being paid. Oh—you will go, Louise;
we will all go.’
‘And in a patache,’ said Bathilde, ‘with Jacquot to draw us: six
leagues a day at least! What shall be our first stage?’
‘There is plenty of time before you to settle that point,’ said
Philippe, smiling at the eager desire of Bathilde to leave Paris. Then
turning to Louise, he added, ‘You can have no scruples, now,
mademoiselle, about this bequest, were it only for the sake of these
good people. Think that it may not be so much to benefit yourself as
to render them happy. You consent?’
‘I do,’ replied Louise, after pausing a few seconds. ‘I cannot look
for happiness myself—at least, on earth—but through me they may
attain it. I care not how soon we quit this heartless, terrible city—
never to return.’
‘We will talk of that to-morrow,’ said Benoit. ‘I think enough has
taken place for this day. Ventrebleu! what a whirl my head is in: the
river may rock the boat like a cradle, and the mill click all night,
before it sends me to sleep. You two women get to bed, and
Monsieur Glazer and myself will make ourselves comfortable here. I
would not recommend him to go along the quays so late, for the city
is in a troubled state to-night, and the execution has drawn all the
gallows-birds abroad.’
And as Louise and Bathilde retired, the two others drew to the fire,
and lighted mighty pipes, whose capacious bowls indicated a lengthy
sitting.
 CHAPTER XXXVI.
THE JOURNEY—EXAMINATION OF THE MARCHIONESS

Hurried on by the orders of the exempt, and escorted by a body of

archers, who kept at full gallop round the carriage, the postilions
spurred and lashed their horses, bringing Desgrais and his prisoner
to Dinant sooner even than they expected. But, beyond the
advantage of losing as little time as possible upon the road, there
was no absolute necessity for this speed. Theria had not received
the letter, as we have seen; and if he had, he could have rendered
but little assistance to the Marchioness. Still Desgrais knew his
prisoner; and uncertain as to what trouble she might cause him by
her wonderful art and powers of inventing stratagems, he determined
not to relax his vigilance until Marie was safe and secure within the
walls of the Conciergerie.
No great deal occurred upon the road worthy of chronicling. The
Marchioness threw herself in the corner of the carriage, and covering
her face with a veil, remained so throughout the journey. From the
attempt she had made at self-destruction, Desgrais kept his eye
upon her; and upon their arrival at Dinant he ordered all the knives to
be removed from the supper table, leaving her under the guard of
Antoine Barbier, the archer who had watched her at Liége, whilst he
went to arrange with a courier to start directly for Rocroy, and inform
the magistrates of that place that the Marchioness would be there on
the morrow; in order that they might interrogate her, unexpectedly,
before she had sufficient time to plan her answers.
As soon as Marie saw that she was left with the same man to
whom she had given the note intended for Camille Theria, she
uttered an exclamation of surprise.
‘I thought you were to remain at Liége,’ she said. ‘You have come
with us, and the letter has not been delivered!’
The man was taken rather suddenly aback by the Marchioness’s
affirmation. He became confused, and turned away without replying.
 ‘You have deceived me!’ she continued with violence, ‘and I am
utterly lost. Now I see why you would not take a reward from me.
Where is the letter?’
‘I have not got it,’ replied the archer. ‘I can answer no more
questions, or I shall be punished.’ And he continued his march.
She would, in spite of this, have spoken to him again, but a
servant of the inn entered the room bearing a tray, on which was
some refreshment. Marie refused it, as the man placed it on the
table; but directly afterwards, correcting herself, told him to leave it
and retire. The archer glanced at the service to see that there was
nothing with which the Marchioness could commit suicide, and then
dismissed the attendant, as he continued his monotonous patrol
before the door. Suddenly Marie seized one of the drinking-glasses
and dashed it upon the ground, breaking it into several pieces. The
noise alarmed the sentinel, and as the Marchioness sprang forward
to seize one of the bits, with the intention of swallowing it, he also
rushed from his post and seized it from her.
‘Again foiled!’ she muttered through her teeth, as she retreated to
the table. ‘Why have you done this?’
‘My orders are to watch you closely,’ said the man, ‘and at present
I have nothing to do but obey the directions of Monsieur Desgrais.’
The Marchioness again was silent for some time. She pushed the
cover laid for supper away from her, and remained gazing intently at
the fire. At last she spoke.
‘My friend,’ she said to the archer, ‘I believe you have done well.
The moment of insanity has passed, and I am grateful to you; you
shall see that I will not forget you, in consequence.’
The man roughly inclined his head, and continued his promenade.
‘Does your condition of life please you?’ asked Marie.
‘Mass!’ replied the archer, as he stopped and leant upon his pike.
‘There might be better and there might be worse. I like it well
enough: there is no choice if I did not.’
‘You can leave it, if you choose,’ said the Marchioness. ‘Listen. I
have gold enough at Offemont to buy land in Italy that would support
you and yours for life. Is there no one you would care to share it
with?’
 The man did not answer. He looked at Marie, and vainly
endeavoured to fathom her meaning.
‘You are my only sentinel,’ she went on. ‘What is to prevent our
flying together. Once at my château, I will load you with wealth, and
you can pass the frontier before our flight has been discovered. I can
also put myself beyond the reach of——’
‘No more, madame!’ replied the archer sternly. ‘You have mistaken
your man. Has not one lesson been enough?’
The conversation was broken by the entrance of the servant of the
hotel—a powerful coarse Flemish woman, with a repulsive manner
and countenance, under whose charge Marie was to be placed for
the night, a change of guard being posted outside her chamber. She
shuddered at this ill-favoured creature, as she followed her to the
sleeping apartment, wherein six hours of repose were to be allowed
to her before they again started on their journey.
On arriving at Rocroy the next day she was taken before M. de
Palluan, as they had previously arranged, and subjected to a severe
examination. But unexpectedly as the interview was brought about,
the magistrate could elicit nothing from her; even in the face of a
confession in her own hand-writing, which a courier had brought
after her from Liége, having found it amongst some more of her
effects in her chamber at the convent. She met every question with a
firm denial or an evasive answer, given with a readiness and self-
possession that astonished her interrogators, who, finding that
nothing had been gained by this course, which they imagined would
have decided any question of her innocence, however slight, that
existed, broke up their court, and made arrangements for proceeding
with her at once to the Conciergerie—the chief prison in Paris.21
 CHAPTER XXXVII.
THE LAST INTERVIEW.

A long and dismal interval followed the arrest of the Marchioness

before she was brought to trial. The chain of circumstances,
connected with the charges every day increasing against her, was so
intricate that it required the utmost attention and indefatigable
research to connect and arrange its links; and the first legal
authorities were engaged, both for the prosecution and the defence.
Meanwhile public excitement was raised to the highest pitch. The
mysterious circumstances connected with the deaths of M. d’Aubray
and his two sons; the station of society in which Marie moved; her
reputation for beauty and gallantry, and, more than all, the
revelations expected from the proces upon a subject of so dark a
nature—treating of a crime from the action of which no one felt
secure, and about which such terror prevailed, as the mortality by
poison hitherto attributed to unknown pathological causes increased,
forming so fearful an episode in the reign of Louis Quatorze; all
these things together invested the proceedings with a general
interest never equalled. The Provost of Paris, the Procureur du Roi,
the Lieutenant-Criminal of the Châtelet, and other dignitaries
arranged a terrible array of facts, fixing the guilt upon the
Marchioness beyond all doubt; whilst the officials of a lower grade
built up fresh accusations every day, by their ingenious connection of
circumstances that they arrived at by the strangest methods possible
to conceive.
But of all the pleadings connected with this interesting affair the
defence set up by M. Nivelle, the advocate of the Marchioness, was
most remarkable. Marie had contented herself with simply denying
every fact that was brought forward against her; but Nivelle took up
the charges in order, one after the other, and endeavoured with the
most consummate skill to refute the whole of them, even down to the
apparently most unimportant. The liaison between Marie and Sainte-
Croix he allowed,—indeed it was generally received; and, in fact,
avowed as the subject had been, it would have been ridiculous to
have attempted to deny it. But upon Gaudin he threw all the blame.
He endeavoured to show that, being a gambler, Marie’s lover had
not only thrown away his own property, but a large portion of hers;
and being subsequently thrown into the Bastille by M. d’Aubray, had
been influenced as much by avarice as by revenge, and had made
the unfortunate Marchioness of Brinvilliers his dupe and instrument.
He proved that Marie, with her husband, enjoyed a fortune of more
than eight hundred thousand livres; that every advantage of position,
wealth, and connections had fallen to her lot; and that it was folly to
think, for one instant, she would have thus far placed herself in the
fearful position which she was assumed to have taken when there
was nothing to gain, but everything, both in this world and beyond it,
to lose. ‘And, moreover,’ he added, ‘the Marchioness of Brinvilliers is
persuaded that the too common but fatal mistake of trusting to
popular prejudication can never have any effect upon the minds of
judges so eminent for impartiality, nor give rise to any suspicions of
the candour of their decision. She knows that they would never
condemn upon appearances alone, nor upon common rumour. On
the contrary, the more atrocious the crimes were said to be by the
popular tongue, judging from the mere form of the accusation, the
more care would be required to examine closely all the evidence
brought forward, and only to allow those allegations to be received
which were consistent with the common course of justice. She
hopes, also,’ he went on, ‘that the sacred laws of religion are held in
too much veneration by her judges to allow them to give their
countenance to any violation of a confession—one of the most
important mysteries of our religion: and that since the present
accusation brings forward an array of charges—the most frightful
and infamous—against a woman of birth and quality, she trusts her
judges will not place the least reliance upon the imperfect
attestations brought forward, when the clearest and most convincing
are necessary to enable them to form a just opinion. She has been
deceived by the arts of Sainte-Croix—the only author of all the
crimes laid to her charge—and, for the unfortunate connection which
placed her in the position to be thus deceived, she has already been
sufficiently punished by the misery she has since undergone, and a
series of wretched inflictions and trials, which are in themselves
sufficient to excite the compassion, not only of those who still think
well of her, but of her bitterest enemies.’
The original impression of the document is now lying before us;
and it is impossible to avoid being struck with the wondrous ingenuity
with which the whole paper is drawn up.
But cleverly as M. Nivelle advocated her cause, the collection of
facts was too strong to allow her defence to make the favourable
impression he desired. The prosecutors, aware of the importance
with which the trial was invested by the entire population of Paris,
comprising both those who were for and those who were against her,
were as keen in their search for condemnatory testimony as Nivelle
had been for any that might exculpate her. Amongst the evidence
brought forward was that of her servant Françoise Roussel, who
deposed to having been made sick, almost to death, by substances
which the Marchioness had administered to her in cakes and
confections. The archer, Antoine Barbier, related all that had passed
upon the road from Liége; Desgrais himself spoke of the papers
found in her chamber after she had been carried from that town; and
even Glazer’s assistant, the miserable Panurge, proved that whilst
Sainte-Croix occupied the rooms in his master’s house the
Marchioness was in the habit of coming there and preparing
compounds with him, which were afterwards ascertained to be
deadly poisons. There could not be the slightest doubt of her guilt.
The behaviour of Marie during this trying ordeal excited the
strangest feelings amongst the official dignitaries. Although the most
acute and experienced legal men in Paris were engaged upon the
side of the Crown, they found it impossible to elicit from her anything
that tended to prove, from her own actions, that she was guilty, as
long as the trial continued; but when it was brought to a close, and
the decision of the Chambers was finally given against her, her
stubbornness appeared to give way, and the Court, with some
respect for her rank, then requested the Doctor Pirot, of the
Sorbonne, to attend constantly upon her. There were always two
priests regularly attached to the Conciergerie; but constant
communion with the lowest of criminals had made them—so the
opinion of the Court went—unfit to administer to the Marchioness;
and the good father, who was esteemed highly in Paris for his gentle
piety, was accordingly chosen as her last religious adviser.
He attended at the prison every day, and every day he made an
impression upon his charge. He has described her as a woman
naturally intrepid, and rising above all difficulties, expressing herself
in but few words, yet always to the purpose, and finding, with the
most astounding readiness, expedients to free herself from any
charges that might be brought against her. She appeared in any
position of difficulty at once to decide upon what line of argument or
conduct she meant to pursue, even when she was in the most
embarrassing situations. Her physiognomy and conversation offered
no grounds for supposing that she was any other than a persecuted,
gentle, and confiding woman; and her beauty, which had become a
proverb, was of that class which appears inseparable from an
equally perfect morale. True it was, that the harassing trials she had
lately undergone had marked her face with a few lines, but ‘les yeux
bleus, doux et parfaitment beaux, et la peau extraordinairement
blanche,’22 still remained; and these attributes, with her other
singularly fascinating qualities, were more than enough to enlist
many sympathies in her favour.
Day after day did Pirot seek the Conciergerie with the earliest
dawn, never leaving his charge but at night; and gradually he found,
to his gratification, that her proud spirit was yielding to his
unremitting and earnest attention. To him the task was allotted of
breaking to her the verdict of the assembled Chambers; and to his
gentleness was she indebted for the state of mind that enabled her
to receive the terrible tidings with comparative serenity. And so
things went on until the eve of the fearful day named by the Court for
the expiation of her crimes, Marie never feeling at rest but when he
was with her; and Pirot taking so deep an interest in his charge that,
although his meek disposition and retiring habits almost disqualified
him for the task imposed upon him by the Chambers, he resolved
never to leave her until the final parting should take place in the
Place de Grêve; and as that time drew nigh, the closer did Marie
cling to him for consolation and support. She watched the time of his
arrival, and regretted his departure, as earnestly as she would once
have done with less holy motives, when others were concerned, until
the period above alluded to drew nigh.
It was, then, the night before the execution. Pirot had business
which had taken him from the Conciergerie during the day, but at
nightfall he was once more at the prison, for the Marchioness had
promised to make a full confession of all the events of her life. In the
morning, during a brief interview of an hour, he had been gratified to
find that his unaffected simplicity, his piety, and gentle manners, had
in part elicited from Marie a circumstantial avowal of many of the
deeds with the commission of which she was charged; and thus far
he had accomplished more than her judges had done, or the fear of
the torture had led her to confess. As he entered the cell in which
she was confined, she rose to receive him with an earnestness that
showed how welcome his presence was to her; but started back
upon perceiving that the good old man was pale, and evidently
shaken.
‘You are ill, mon père,’ she said; ‘you are so good—so charitable
thus to bestow your time on me, that I fear your health is suffering.’
‘It is not that, madame,’ he said as he advanced; ‘but they have
been telling me news in the porter’s lodge that has thus affected me.
You have heard the sentence?’
‘The greffier has told it to me, but not formally,’ she said. ‘I am
prepared for everything. See—take my hand; is it trembling?’
Pirot seized the small hand presented to him: Marie had power
over every muscle to keep it immovable; but her skin was hot and
fevered.
‘You have heard that they were going to cut this hand off,’ she
said.
‘So they have told me,’ replied Pirot, in a low tone, almost choked
with emotion.
‘It is,’ she said, ‘but an idle story of the people about the prison. On
that point you can be calm. And, see,—they are bringing in my
supper. You must take some with me; it is the last, you know.’
Pirot gazed at her, as he listened to the calm manner in which she
spoke, with unfeigned astonishment; and ere he could reply, some of
the attendants had brought in a tray and placed it on the table; whilst
Marie almost led the doctor to one of the rude settles, and placed
herself opposite to him.
There was something terrible in her unconcern. Her face
preserved its usual unfathomable expression, and at times she
smiled; but an unwonted brightness sparkled in her eyes, and she
spoke in loud and rapid tones, somewhat resembling a person under
the first influence of opium. As she took her place at the table, she
did the honours of the homely repast as though she had been at the
head of a party in her own house; she even partook of some of the
dishes; but Pirot was too much overcome to swallow a morsel.
‘You will let me drink to your health,’ she said; ‘it is a compliment
you need not return.’ And with her own hands she filled Pirot’s glass,
continuing, as he bowed to her, ‘To-morrow is a fast-day. I will keep it
so—at least, as much of it as I shall enjoy. And yet I have much to
undergo.’ Then altering her voice, she added, ‘I would pay you more
attention, my father, and serve you myself; but you see they have left
me neither knife nor fork.’
And in this singular manner did she continue to talk until the meal
was over, when she appeared anxious that Pirot should take her
confession. He had writing things with him, and at her request
produced them, as she said—
‘Alas! I have committed so many sins that I cannot trust to the
accuracy of a verbal catalogue. But you shall know all.’
This document, for obvious reasons, remained a secret; nor has it
since been found. It occupied more than two hours in being drawn
up; and just as it was finished the jailor announced that a female
wished to see the Marchioness. It was the first request of the kind
that had been made since her imprisonment; but she gave orders
that the stranger should be admitted; whilst Pirot, remaining at her
own request, retired into a corner of the chamber and occupied
himself at prayer. The man of the prison ushered in a woman, with
her face carefully concealed. Marie advanced to receive her; when
the other threw back her veil and discovered the features of Louise
Gauthier.
The Marchioness recoiled a step or two as she recognised the
stranger, and her face underwent a rapid and fearful change.
 ‘You have done well,’ she said in irony, ‘to let me see you enjoy
this last triumph. A sight of me to-morrow, in the streets, was not
enough; you must come to gloat upon me here.’
‘By your hopes of heaven, speak not thus!’ cried Louise earnestly,
as she advanced towards her. ‘You are mistaken. I have come in all
good feeling—if you will but receive me.’
‘What would you do?’ asked Marie; ‘am I to believe you?’
‘By all that one who is not utterly lost can call to strengthen her
asseverations, you may,’ replied the Languedocian. ‘By the memory
of him whom we both loved—in the name of Gaudin de Sainte-Croix,
do not believe my nature to be so base.’
The Marchioness gazed at the girl for a minute with a glance of
most intense scrutiny. Then she said coldly, once more gaining a
command over her temper—
‘Well, mademoiselle, you can continue.’
‘At this terrible moment,’ said Louise, in a low impressive accent,
‘when your life is reckoned in the past, and the future is as nothing
on this side of the grave, you will perhaps listen to me, and believe
that I have come to you in charity and peace. I forget all that has
been; I have thought only that Gaudin loved you—and though—
heaven knows—you crushed my heart for ever in encouraging his
attachment, I have come at this fearful hour to seek you, and let you
know that there is one of your own sex who, for his sake, will
undertake any mission or pilgrimage that will serve you.’
Marie made no answer: her pride was struggling with her will, and
she could not speak.
‘You have seen no friend during your dismal imprisonment,’ said
Louise; ‘let me therefore be your confidant, if there is aught you will
stoop to trust me with. Remember that we shall meet no more. O
madame! for your own sake! as you valued Gaudin’s love! do not go
forth to-morrow in enmity against one who, if she wronged you, did it
innocently. What can I do to serve you?’
She uttered the last words with such truthful earnestness that
Marie’s pride relaxed, and Pirot at the same instant rose from his
prie-dieu and came towards them. As Louise extended her hand the
Marchioness took it, and he saw, for the first time since he had been
with her, that she was weeping. He led them to one of the prison
seats, and in a few minutes Marie was confiding a message to
Louise, at his request, for her children.
The interview lasted half an hour; and when it finished the
Marchioness was perfectly exhausted. She had scarcely strength
sufficient to tell Pirot that she wished him with her at daylight, when
she fell back, unable to keep up any longer, against the damp wall of
the prison. The good doctor summoned the females who had
attended upon her since her capture, and then, when he saw she
was recovering, he took his leave, accompanied by Louise, who left
him in the Rue de Calandre to return to her friends at the boat-mill.
 CHAPTER XXXVIII.
THE WATER QUESTION—EXILI—THE PLACE DE GRÊVE

The early morning of the terrible day arrived. With its first dawn the
good Pirot, according to his promise, was at the gates of the
Conciergerie; and being immediately conducted to the cell in which
Marie was confined, discovered that she had not been to bed that
night, but since the departure of Louise Gauthier had been occupied
in writing to various branches of her family.
She rose to receive him as he entered; and at a sign the person
who had been in attendance took her departure. Pirot observed that
her eyelids were red with watching, not from tears: but a fire was
burning in her eyes with almost unearthly brilliancy. Her cheek was
flushed with hectic patches, and her whole frame was trembling with
nervous excitement. As the doctor saluted her with the conventional
words of greeting she smiled and replied—
‘You forget, monsieur, that I shall scarcely witness the noon of to-
day. A few hours—only a few hours more! I have often tried to
imagine the feelings of those who were condemned; and now that I
am almost upon the scaffold it appears like some troubled dream.’
‘We will not waste this brief interval in speculations,’ replied Pirot.
‘The officers of the prison will soon interrupt us. Have you nothing to
confide to me before they arrive?’
‘They will take charge of these letters I have written, and will read
them before they send them forth,’ replied Marie. ‘But here is one,’
she continued, as her voice hesitated and fell, ‘that I could wish you
yourself would deliver. It is to M. de Brinvilliers, my husband; it
relates only to him, and—my children!’
Pirot looked at her as she spoke, and her face betrayed the violent
emotion that the mention of her children had given rise to. She
struggled with her pride for a few seconds, and then broke down into
a natural and violent burst of tears. Her sympathies had been
scarcely touched whilst merely thinking of her two little daughters;
but the instant she named them to another her wonderful self-
possession gave way. She leant upon the rude table, and covering
her face with her mantle wept aloud.
Pirot took the letter from her hand, and read as follows—thinking it
best to allow the violence of Marie’s grief to have full play, rather than
to attempt to check it by any reasoning of his own:—

‘For the last time, Antoine, and on the point of delivering up

my soul to God, I write to you, wishing to assure you of my
friendship, which will continue until the latest moment of my
life. I am about to suffer the degrading punishment my
enemies have condemned me to. Forgive them, I beseech
you, as I have done: and forgive me also, for the shame
which, through my actions, will fall upon your name.
Remember that we are but on earth for a short period; and
that, before long, you yourself may have to render a just
account to God of all your actions, even the most insignificant,
as I shall have to do in a few hours. Instruct and watch over
our poor children: Madame Marillac and Madame Cousté will
inform you of all they will require. Let your prayers be
continually offered up for my repose, and believe that I die
thinking of you only.
‘Marie.’

He had scarcely concluded the epistle when the Marchioness

recovered from the access of emotion, and raised her face towards
him, as she hurriedly wiped her eyes.
‘This is childish,’ she exclaimed. ‘What must you think of me,
monsieur? And yet I would sooner you should have witnessed this
weak ebullition than others in the prison. Come, sir, we will pray for
the forgiveness of those under whose directions and hands I am
about to suffer, and for the salvation of my own soul.’
She threw open the leaves of a religious book that was lying on
the bench, and prayed long and earnestly. Pirot joined her: and thus
they continued for more than an hour, until their devotions were
interrupted by the arrival of the concierge and one or two officers,
who came to announce to her that the chief greffier was waiting in
the lower room to read the sentence of the Court to her. Upon this