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ARMENIA’S FUTURE,
RELATIONS WITH TURKEY,
AND THE KARABAGH CONFLICT
Levon Ter-Petrossian
Edited by Arman Grigoryan
Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey,
and the Karabagh Conflict
Levon Ter-Petrossian
Armenia’s Future,
Relations with Turkey,
and the Karabagh
Conflict
Edited by Arman Grigoryan
Levon Ter-Petrossian Edited by
Armenian National Congress Arman Grigoryan
Armenia, Armenia Department of International Relations
Lehigh University
Bethlehem, Pennsylvania
USA
ISBN 978-3-319-58915-2 ISBN 978-3-319-58916-9 (eBook)

DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58916-9
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017946712
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the Publisher,
whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of translation,
reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in any
other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval, electronic adaptation,
computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information in
this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the publisher
nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, express or implied, with respect to the material
contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The publisher
remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institutional
affiliations.
Cover illustration: © Tigran Hayrapetyan / Getty Images
Printed on acid-free paper
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

The registered company is Springer International Publishing AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
ACKNOWLEDGMENT
A number of individuals have made important contributions to this project.

Several of the documents have been translated by Ara Arabyan, Alexander
Arzoumanyan, Melissa Brown, Gerard Libaridian, and Rouben
Shougaryan. Meline Toumani has done a superb job editing the entire
text. Ashot Sargsyan has provided invaluable help with many of the anno-
tations. Avetis Avagyan has compiled the index, helped with editing the
text, and acted as a go-to person for any problem that has arisen during the
process of preparing the manuscript for publication. I would also like to
thank the Palgrave Macmillan team, and Alina Yurova and Ben Bailey in
particular, for their patience and dedication to this project.
Arman Grigoryan
v
CONTENTS
1 Foreword: The Struggle to Change the Logic of

Armenia’s History 1
2 The Early Challenges to the Traditional Narrative,

1989–1991 13
3 Armenian-Turkish Relations After Independence

and the Continued Struggle with the Traditional Narrative 23
4 The Karabagh Conflict and the Future of Armenian

Statehood 35
5 Views on the Karabagh Conflict and the Armenian Turkish

Relations Following the Return to Politics 61
6 The Politics and Geopolitics of the Process of Normalization

of Armenian-Turkish Relations 79
7 Peace with Neighbors Has No Good Alternatives 131
vii
viii CONTENTS
Appendix 153
Bibliography 169
Index 171
CHAPTER 1
Foreword: The Struggle to Change the Logic

of Armenia’s History
Levon Ter-Petrossian, whose select articles, speeches, and interviews dealing

with Armenian-Turkish relations, the Karabagh conflict, and the future of the
Armenian statehood are presented in this volume, was the first president of
independent Armenia. He served in that capacity from 1991 to 1998 when
he resigned following a political crisis triggered by his endorsement of a plan
for settling the Karabagh conflict.1 Ter-Petrossian had briefly served as the
Chairman of Armenia’s Supreme Soviet prior to Armenia’s independence and
adoption of a presidential system. He had assumed that post in the summer of
1990 when the Armenian National Movement (ANM) unseated the Com-
munists in the elections to the Supreme Soviet in the summer of 1990,
becoming the first noncommunist government of a constituent republic of
the Soviet Union. Ter-Petrossian was one of the leaders of the ANM, which
had started as a movement demanding the transfer of the jurisdiction of
the Nagorno Karabagh Autonomous Region from the Azerbaijani to the
Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic,2 but which then transformed into a
movement for democratic rule and independence from the Soviet Union.
As such, it became an integral part of the wider democratic movement in the
Soviet Union, while Ter-Petrossian became a highly respected figure in it,
providing important critiques of the Soviet system, and forming particularly
close ties with Boris Yelstin and the Russian liberals.
After his resignation in 1998, Ter-Petrossian returned to his vocation as a
historian of the medieval Middle East,3 and maintained total silence on
political matters for an entire decade. Concerned about the direction in
© The Author(s) 2018 1

L. Ter-Petrossian, Armenia’s Future, Relations with Turkey, and the
Karabagh Conflict, DOI 10.1007/978-3-319-58916-9_1
2 1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . .
which Armenia was headed and responding to public demand, he returned

to politics in 2007 and stood as a candidate for president in the elections of
2008. The ruling regime clung to power by falsifying the elections then
resorting to force after Ter-Petrossian’s supporters launched a campaign of
protests.4 Following the crackdown, Ter-Petrossian started an oppositional
mass movement, which he christened the Armenian National Congress
(ANC), and embarked on a protracted struggle for the two things that
have defined his political career—a democratic Armenia and Armenia that is
at peace with its neighbors.
The collection of articles, speeches, and interviews contained in this volume
provides a unique window into that struggle. But it is more than information
about a single politician’s views. It is an invaluable resource for tracing the most
important issues, problems, and disputes that have animated Armenian politics
for the last three decades. This is not a memoir designed to justify controversial
decisions or to respond to accusations. It is also not something that was written
to appeal to a foreign audience. Rather the material contained in this volume is
a debate with opponents in Armenia about why Armenia needs to normalize its
relations with Turkey and to settle the Karabagh conflict. As such it reveals a
fascinating political picture of a country that has been engaged in a protracted
conflict while transitioning from communism. The picture is made that much
more fascinating by the fact that it is radically different from the one painted
in most Western media and academic writings on Armenia.
The preponderant opinion on the conflict in Karabagh in the Western
media and academia, as on “ethnic conflicts” in general, draws inspiration
from two general arguments. They differ in their theoretical logics in signifi-
cant ways, but what they have in common is the insistence that these conflicts
are always irrational as far as the “real” interests of the ordinary members of
the groups in question are concerned and that the ideas driving them are
profoundly illiberal. According to the first of these arguments, “ethnic
conflicts” are the direct consequence of nationalist narratives, which simulta-
neously contain hostile myths about certain “others” as victimizers or inferiors
and myths of martyrdom and chosenness about the group itself. These
narratives become the fuel for nationalist mobilizations especially when mul-
tiethnic states and empires collapse, taking the deterrence against such politics
with them. The Karabagh conflict features prominently in the literature as an
example of such a conflict. In what is perhaps the most straightforward
articulation of this argument and its application to the Karabagh conflict,
Stuart Kaufman maintains that the conflict was the result of Armenians’
peculiar interpretation of their history as that of victims, and especially victims
1 FOREWORD: THE STRUGGLE TO CHANGE THE LOGIC OF. . . 3
in the hands of Turks and their ethnic kin—the Azeris. Armenians, in fact, did
not even distinguish between Turks and Azeris, he further explains, and saw
the problem of Karabagh as part of a larger existential conflict with the
“Turks.” The genocide committed by Turks was seen by them as a warning
for what was in store for Karabagh Armenians. He also tells the readers about
the Armenian mythology of Christian martyrdom dating all the way back to a
sanctified fifth-century battle, which Armenians fought against Sassanid Iran as
they resisted the latter’s attempt to convert Armenians to Zoroastrianism. The
subsequent history of a subjugated Christian minority in various Islamic states
cemented the Armenian self-image of Christian martyrs. Kaufman insists that
the combination of hatreds, fears, and a sense of a righteous mission that this
narrative generated led to the bloodshed in Karabagh.5
Michael Croissant hits on all the same points and more—the importance
of the unique religious identity in the Armenian nationalist narrative, the
suffering as Christian subjects of Islamic empires, and especially at the hands
of Turks, the gaze toward Russia as a Christian savior, Armenian claims to
historic rights over Karabagh as the indigenous group in the region, the
Armenian contempt for Azeris, and, last, but not least, the overwhelming,
existential fear of Pan-Turkism combined with a desire to correct historic
wrongs ostensibly committed in the name of that doctrine.6 The conflict in
Karabagh was almost inevitable, given this narrative, or so argues Croissant.7
In an otherwise well-informed and intelligent book, which, in fact, is the
book of reference on the Karabagh conflict, Thomas de Waal writes along
similar lines:
A . . . more crucial factor in starting the [Karabagh] conflict was the ease with
which hatred of the other side could be disseminated among the population.
The Turkish historian Halil Berktay calls these mass expressions of fear and
prejudice “hate narratives.” They were the dark side of the “renaissance” of the
1960s. . . Armenian and Azerbaijani academics had been denigrating the claims
of rival scholars others’ republic for twenty years. In 1988, all that was needed
was injection of politics—of full-strength “alcohol”—into the mixture. In a war
of pamphlets, drawing on years of tendentious scholarship, sarcasm, and innu-
endo, and selective quotation incited ordinary people into hatred.8
This general outlook pervades the media coverage as well. For example,
it is difficult to find a reference to the Karabagh conflict in the New York
Times that fails to call it a conflict between “Christian Armenians and
Muslim Azeris,” implying that the conflict was a clash of conflicting

identities rather than conflicting political preferences.
The second argument propping up the conventional wisdom agrees with
the first on the role of hatreds and exclusion in certain nationalist mobili-
zations, but provides a specific mechanism focusing on the manipulation of
masses by political elites. According to this argument, corrupt, venal elites
resort to exclusionary and aggressive nationalism to divert the attention of
the masses from their social and economic problems especially in times of
political and economic transitions. The masses succumb to such manipula-
tion not because they are irrational, but because elites control the market-
place of information and ideas. Jack Snyder’s remains the most influential
statement of this logic.9 Snyder applies it to the Armenian case, among
others, insisting that the Armenian mobilization was essentially a mask for
patronage politics with “nationalist discourse [serving] as cover for [the]
corruption of democratic politics.” Snyder also mentions Ter-Petrossian as a
major culprit in that process.10 A similar argument is made by Henry Hale in
his authoritative study of patronage politics in the post-Soviet space with
Ter-Petrossian again at the center of his discussion of the Armenian case.11
The same standard opinion considers the current state of Armenian-
Turkish relations, which is characterized by intense hostility, and absence of
diplomatic relations, normal and predictable. The components of that view-
point are well known: Armenians demand recognition of the genocide com-
mitted by the Ottoman Empire against their ancestors, they seek restitution
for that crime, and they are ready to line up with any country that has
problems with Turkey and is willing to confront it. At the same time,
Armenians fear destruction by the Turks and seek protection from Russia.
As I have already pointed out, some authors even think that the
Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict is a manifestation of Armenians’ interpretation
of their history as victims of the Turks.12
In sum, with few exceptions,13 media and academic writings portray
modern Armenian nationalism as a monolithic, reactionary force—a force
that is responsible for the conflict in Karabagh and at least in part for
Armenia’s cold war with Turkey. In what is a particularly telling example,
Snyder credits the Armenian nationalist mobilization in the early 1990s to
the Dashnak Party,14 which indeed was (and remains) a party of revisionist,
ethnic nationalists, despite the fact that it was in bitter opposition to the
ANM and Ter-Petrossian and despite the fact that its candidate received
4 percent of the vote in the presidential elections of 1991 compared to
Ter-Petrossian’s 83 percent. Kaufman’s and Croissant’s discussions of the
Armenian mobilization show complete unawareness of any philosophical or

ideological differences between different segments of the Armenian political
class. In fact, no one else in the Western media or academia has demon-
strated awareness of such differences beyond tepid acknowledgments that
Ter-Petrossian adopted a more moderate stance on Karabagh toward the
end of his presidency, which led to his resignation.
Were there such differences, what were they, and were these differences
sufficiently meaningful? The answer to all of these questions must be an
emphatic yes. The Armenian political thought, in fact, went through a
revolutionary transformation in the late 1980s and early 1990s, and
Ter-Petrossian was one of the most important agents of that transformation.
There was indeed a nationalist narrative in Armenia, which identified Azeris
with Turks; which insisted that both Turkey and Azerbaijan were in the grip
of the Pan-Turkist doctrine; which insisted that this doctrine saw Armenians
as an obstacle to be removed; which attributed the Armenian genocide to
that doctrine; which placed the struggle for Karabagh in the context of an
existential struggle with the “Turks”; and which simultaneously saw Russia
as the protector against the “Turks” and the agent of Armenian demands
against them, including the demand for Karabagh and territorial claims
against Turkey. The problem is that the ANM unequivocally and vehe-
mently rejected this narrative and subjected every single item comprising it
to a scathing criticism.
The very first document in the current collection (Chap. 2, document 1),
which is a document of immense importance, is a full-frontal attack on that
narrative. It is a response by the ANM to a speech by a prominent propo-
nent of that narrative, where the said proponent had laid out all the earlier-
listed points. The ANM document, which was authored by Ter-Petrossian,
argued that treating the problem of Karabagh as anything other than a
problem of the rights of its inhabitants, and especially treating it as a
problem of “historic justice” or an existential conflict between Armenians
and Azeris/Turks, was exactly the wrong thing to do. The document
launched an assault against the idea that Armenians could not survive
without Russian protection or that Armenians and Russians share a com-
mon interest in combating Pan-Turkism, warning that such claims turn the
just struggle for the self-determination of Karabagh Armenians into a
manifestation of revanchism. It argued finally, that such claims were aimed
at retarding Armenian people’s aspirations for freedom and independence.
The latter argument runs through the next several documents, where
Ter-Petrossian insistently and repeatedly argues that normal relations with
the neighbors, as opposed to reliance on a great power to extract conces-

sions from them, are the most important “guarantee for any state’s exis-
tence.” In his speech during a conference on genocide that took place in
Yerevan in 1995 (Chap. 3, document 4), Ter-Petrossian attacked another
taboo: he argued that the Armenian genocide was a failure of politics, not a
clash of cultures or the culmination of the millennial Turkish hatred for
Armenians. The overarching theme in all of these arguments is that Arme-
nians have to begin to think and act like a people with a state, rather than a
stateless ethnic group, and that doing so requires pragmatism, rational
calculation, and rejection of historic grievances, including the ideology of
the Armenian Cause,15 as a basis of politics. The commitment to these ideas
was only strengthened following Ter-Petrossian’s return to politics in 2007.
In speech after speech, he defended the idea that Armenia’s future as a viable
state depends on normalized relations with Turkey and the peaceful resolu-
tion of the Karabagh conflict.
One can get the impression when reading some of his speeches in this
period that he succumbed to the political temptation of attacking the
Armenian government for its readiness to make certain concessions in
order to normalize the relations with Turkey during the so-called “soccer
diplomacy.”16 Ter-Petrossian was particularly critical of the Armenian side’s
willingness to agree to a historians’ commission that would be authorized to
investigate the claims that what happened to Armenians in the Ottoman
Empire during World War I was genocide (see Chap. 6, documents 4, 5, 6,
7, 9, 10). This, however, was a principled position based on two concerns—
(a) that the Armenian government was allowing the Armenian genocide to
become a bargaining chip; (b) and that by doing so the Armenian government
was hoping to delink the Armenian-Turkish relations and the Karabagh con-
flict, which he thought was an irrational hope. Events proved him right, as the
Turkish government eventually reaffirmed its traditional stance on Karabagh
and refused to move forward with full normalization. Ter-Petrossian also
criticized Western governments, arguing that they were willing to turn a
blind eye on the trampling of democracy in Armenia in exchange for the
Armenian government’s willingness to become more flexible in the
Armenian-Turkish negotiations, which he argued sullied that process and
raised doubts about its legitimacy. His fundamental position on the need for
normalization of relations with Turkey, however, did not change. He expressed
them clearly and forcefully in several articles and interviews (Chap. 6, docu-
ments 3, 8, 10). Ter-Petrossian also clearly expressed his overall approval for
the policy of normalization even if he was critical of its certain elements
(Chap. 6, document 3), making a special point of distinguishing between the

right and wrong criticisms of that policy (Chap. 6, document 8).
The reality was equally different from the conventional wisdom about the
Karabagh conflict and what role Ter-Petrossian and the ANM played in
it. They were staunch defenders of Karabagh’s right to self-determination,
but they insisted on drawing a sharp distinction between that right and
claims about “historic justice” or a millennial conflict with the “Turks.”
They were uncompromising on Karabagh Armenians’ rights and their
security, but they also thought that the conflict must and could be settled
through compromises. Indeed, the ANM’s new doctrine, which combined
aspirations of independence, rejection of the revisionist ideology of the
Armenian Cause and the role of a Russian garrison in the Caucasus, directly
implied a preference for a compromise solution to that conflict. Such a
solution proved elusive, unfortunately, but the responsibility for that was
largely Azerbaijan’s as the latter badly miscalculated its chances on the
battlefield and hardened its bargaining position as Armenia’s was softening
following the ANM’s assent to power in 1990.17 Turkey, incidentally, played
a very unfortunate role in that process by strongly siding with Azerbaijan and
creating an impression that Azerbaijan could rely on more Turkish support
than Turkey was in a position to provide. Ter-Petrossian addressed this
problem in one of his press-conferences (Chap. 3, document 5).
Ter-Petrossian was not able to prevent the war, but even after the
Armenian side prevailed in that war—the war ended in 1994 with a cease-
fire that left Nagorno Karabagh and seven adjacent Azerbaijani regions under
Armenian control, but no political solution—he remained dedicated to the
idea that a permanent solution based on compromises must be found to that
conflict. He made a bid for such a solution despite the fact that he faced fierce
resistance, including from certain influential members of his own administra-
tion who had hardened their positions and concluded that Armenia
and Karabagh could indefinitely maintain the post-1994 status quo.
Ter-Petrossian explained why that was, in fact, an untenable position first in
a lengthy article called “War or Peace? Time to Get Serious” (Chap. 4,
document 1) and then in a speech during a meeting of the National Security
Council (Chap. 4, document 2). Unfortunately, he was unable to break the
resistance of the hardliners and resigned the presidency in February 1998.
He has continued to advocate for a compromise solution to the
Karabagh conflict after his return to politics in 2007. Indeed, Karabagh
took up a good part of his first major speech following his return. He argued
that the decade following his resignation had vindicated his arguments and
that Armenia and Karabagh needed to settle the conflict with Azerbaijan as
urgently as ever. Even though such advocacy was politically costly,18 he kept
it as one of the central items of his agenda both as a candidate for the
presidency in 2008 and as the leader of the opposition afterward. That
advocacy culminated in a particularly important and lengthy speech on
December 17, 2016, which was delivered at a meeting of the ANC in
preparation for the parliamentary elections set for April 2, 2017 (Chap. 7,
document 3). Ter-Petrossian argued that peace and reconciliation with
Azerbaijan should become the centerpiece of the ANC’s electoral platform
and that not only the conflict should be settled though compromise but also
Armenian and Azerbaijani societies should undergo a deeper process of
reconciliation. In an important gesture to further that cause, Ter-Petrossian
expressed “equal sorrow” for the suffering the conflict had inflicted on both
peoples.
Ter-Petrossian has insisted throughout his career that peaceful and good-
neighborly relations with the neighbors have no alternative, given the
realities of power and resource constraints. Seeing him only as a realist
driven by pragmatic calculations of power is too limiting, however. It
obscures too much of what Armenian politics has been about since the
country became independent. Specifically, Ter-Petrossian and his sup-
porters have regarded peaceful and good-neighborly relations with the
neighbors not only as fundamental for Armenia’s security and economic
development but also essential if Armenia was to develop as a “normal
state.” Such a state would be tasked to protect its citizens from external
and internal predation, provide basic services and infrastructure, provide
welfare to its vulnerable citizens, and do not much else. It would have no
totalizing ideology or a mission. Its policies would reflect the preferences of
its citizens, whatever they are. “Normal,” in other words, meant “liberal.”
All of this may sound trivial to a Western reader, because liberalism as a
philosophy of governance is not seriously contested in any Western society.
Adherence to such a philosophy was not a trivial matter in Armenia. It was
and remains bitterly contested. The traditional narrative, which I described
earlier in the text, implied a very different kind of state from the one the
ANM aspired to build. The proponents of that narrative were also joined by
those who expressed explicit contempt for the idea of building a “normal
state,” calling instead for a state bound by “national ideology”—a kind of
state that would have a special mission, a kind of state that would not allow
its mission to be determined by the mundane and vulgar preferences of the
public, and certainly a kind of state that would be inspired by the aspiration
of correcting historical wrongs. Its chief proponent—Vazgen Manoukyan,
NOTES 9
who was Ter-Petrossian’s opponent in the 1996 presidential elections—

explicitly dismissed democracy as a desirable form of governance for
Armenia19 and argued that a state that simply wants to create security and
prosperity was not worth having.20
Ter-Petrossian was the most vocal critic of this philosophy. He triggered
the fury of nationalists by stating that “national ideology” was a false
political category and went on to explain why thought so on numerous
occasions. One such example is contained in this volume (Chap. 3, docu-
ment 5). But Ter-Petrossian has always been aware that the choice between
two trajectories of development—a “normal state” or a state bound by a
“national ideology”—is not a matter of mere intellectual disagreement.
Rather, Armenia’s chances of becoming a “normal state” are closely tied
to normalization of relations with its neighbors. The alternative is a state,
where every democratic challenge is menacingly described as a threat to
unity, where the public even refrains from issuing such challenges lest it wets
the enemy’s appetite, and where the defense minister is seriously pushing
the idea of turning the nation into an army (Chap. 7, document 3).
Arman Grigoryan
NOTES
1. The conflict was over the status of a region called Nagorno Karabagh, which
had an Armenian majority (79 percent), but was part of Azerbaijan as an
autonomous district (oblast) during the Soviet period. In 1988, exercising a
right granted by the Soviet constitution, Karabagh Armenians demanded a
transfer of their region from Azerbaijani to Armenian jurisdiction, which
produced mass movements both in Armenia and Azerbaijan and a conflict
between them. The conflict escalated to war in 1991 as the Soviet Union
started crumbling. In 1994, a ceasefire was signed with Armenians in full
military control of Karabagh and seven adjacent Azerbaijani districts. Parties
have been negotiating a permanent political settlement ever since without
success. They came closest in 1997–1998 when Ter-Petrossian endorsed a
plan brokered by Russia, the USA, and France, but powerful members of his
government opposed the plan. Unable to overcome their resistance, Ter-
Petrossian resigned in February 1998.
2. It was called the Karabagh movement after it erupted in February 1988 and
before it was officially renamed the Armenian National Movement in 1989.
3. Ter-Petrossian had a distinguished academic career prior to getting involved
in politics. He was a senior researcher in one of the most important academic
institutions in Armenia—the Museum of Ancient Manuscripts —when he
joined the Karabagh movement in 1988. The research he conducted follow-

ing his resignation was on the interaction of Armenians and crusaders, which
resulted in the publications of a two-volume study on the subject—The
Crusaders and Armenians, Vol. I (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo, 2005), The
Crusaders and Armenians, Vol. II (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo, 2007).
4. For a comprehensive analysis of the elections see “Armenia’s 2008 Presiden-
tial Elections,” Policy Forum Armenia. Available at http://www.pf-armenia.
org/sites/default/files/documents/files/PFA_Election_Report–FINAL.pdf
5. Stuart Kaufman, Modern Hatreds: The Symbolic Politics of Ethnic War (Ith-
aca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2001), ch. 3.
6. Pan-Turkism or Pan-Turanism is a doctrine calling for the political unifica-
tion of the Turkic-speaking peoples, which emerged in the late nineteenth
century. Many Armenians believe that the existence of Armenians in the
region is incompatible with that doctrine and that the Armenian genocide
was a consequence of the Young Turks’ embrace of it. They also believe that
Communists administratively subordinated Karabagh to Azerbaijan rather
than Armenia in 1921 under Turkish pressure, which they interpret as
another manifestation of the Pan-Turkist plan.
7. Michael P. Croissant, The Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict: Causes and
Implications (Westport, CT: Praeger, 1998), ch. 1.
8. Thomas de Waal, Black Garden: Armenia and Azerbaijan Through Peace
and War (New York, NY: NYU Press, 2003), p. 142.
9. Jack Snyder, From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist
Conflict (New York, NY: W. W. Norton, 2000).
10. See ibid., p. 230–232.
11. Henry Hale, Patronal Politics: Eurasian Regime Dynamics in Comparative
Perspective (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2015), pp. 104,
136–137.
12. See Kaufman, Modern Hatreds; Croissant, The Armenian-Azerbaijani Con-
flict; Thomas Goltz, Azerbaijan Diary: A Rogue Reporter’s Adventures in an
Oil-rich, War-torn, Post-Soviet Republic (London, UK: Routledge, 1999).
13. See Ronald Grigor Suny, Looking toward Ararat: Armenia in Modern
History (Bloomington, IN: Indiana University Press,1993), ch. 14; Eric
Melander, “The Nagorno Karabagh Conflict Revisited: Was the War Inevita-
ble?” Journal of Cold War Studies, Vol. 3. No. 2 (Spring 2001), pp. 48–75.
14. Snyder, From Voting to Violence, p. 223. Dashnak, or more accurately
Dashnaktsutyun, is the Armenian name for the Armenian Revolutionary
Federation (ARF), which was the most influential Armenian nationalist
party that emerged in the late nineteenth century. It governed Armenia
during the country’s brief period of independence following the Russian
Revolution in 1918–1920, and went into exile after Armenia was Sovietized.
NOTES 11
After the doors were opened to political pluralism in the Soviet Union, the
ARF reestablished its presence in Armenia in 1990.
15. Armenian Cause was born as the Armenian Question after the Russian-
Turkish War of 1877–1878. Initially it described the politics of reforms in
the Armenian populated areas of the Ottoman Empire under the supervi-
sion, and sometimes the pressure, of European great powers. When the
problem vanished from the international agenda following the Treaty of
Lausanne in 1923, the Armenian Question acquired a new meaning in the
Armenian diaspora and was rebranded as the Armenian Cause. Establishing
sovereignty over historic Armenia, which includes the territories where
Armenians were exterminated during WWI, forms the basis of that ideology.
16. The process was launched by the Armenian president Serge Sargsyan, who
published an op-ed in the Wall Street Journal (“We Are Ready to Talk to
Turkey,” July 9, 2008) and invited his Turkish counterpart to Armenia to
watch a match between the Armenian and Turkish national teams together.
The invitation was not only to watch a soccer match, of course, but to
attempt to restart a dialogue about normalizing the relations between the
two countries. The process culminated in the signing of protocols regarding
the establishment of diplomatic relations in 2011, but the Turkish side
reverted to the position that the normalization of Turkish-Armenian rela-
tions could only happen after the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and
refused to ratify the protocols.
17. See de Waal, Black Garden, ch. 8; Melander, “The Nagorno Karabagh
Conflict Revisited,” pp. 69–70.
18. It was costly, because positions had continued to harden in both Armenia
and Karabagh, not the least because of the relentless nationalist propaganda
during the decade following Ter-Petrossian’s resignation, which had not
been challenged by anybody.
19. Gerard J. Libaridian, Armenia at the Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood
in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA: Blue Crane Books, 1991), p. 46.
20. Vazgen Manoukyan, “We Are a Global Nation,” Hayastani Hanrapetutyun
[Republic of Armenia] [in Armenian], December 16, 1990.
CHAPTER 2
The Early Challenges to the Traditional

Narrative, 1989–1991
1 THE DANGEROUS SCARECROW
Karabagh Committee’s Response to Zory Balayan’s Speech on Pan-Turanism1
The Armenia Committee of the Karabagh Movement [Karabagh Commit-

tee] is deeply concerned with the antidemocratic character of the current
session [of the Supreme Soviet] and with the fundamentally flawed and
shortsighted political program presented there.
Based on the sense of responsibility it has assumed on behalf of the
interests of the Armenian people, the Karabagh Committee feels obligated
to make the following statement from the podium of the highest authority
in Armenia:
Despite our bitter experience, and disregarding the many disappointments
our people have suffered, some of our intellectuals are still feverishly
preaching the politically bankrupt and dangerous idea according to which
Armenia, being surrounded by enemy peoples of another religion, can survive
only when it is under the protection of a powerful state. This mentality is
leading our people to moral bankruptcy and denying it the opportunity to
become a political partner, which is the only guarantee of success in political
life. The concept of Armenia as an obstruction to Pan-Turanic plans and,
therefore, as a political tool serving Russia’s interests, pushes the Armenian
question into the complex sphere of international relations, which has always
been pregnant with dangerous consequences for our people.

14 2 THE EARLY CHALLENGES TO THE TRADITIONAL NARRATIVE. . .
As an ideology, Pan-Turkism was born during the First World War and at
the present has lost its value as a political factor, since Turkic-speaking
peoples have opted for the path of national development. Calls to crusade
against Pan-Turanism and Pan-Islamism are bound to again make Armenia
a political tool and turn it into a target for both.2
The Karabagh Committee, leading the popular movement for over a
year, has rejected from the start the dangerous mentality of seeing Pan-
Turkism as a permanent threat and placing our hopes on an external
savior. The Committee has consistently worked to act according to the
principle that the Armenian people can achieve their national goals by
relying on themselves, and only themselves. This political path has
already produced obvious positive results by moving the Artsakh3 issue
from the denial to the solution stage. Because of its just constitutional
struggle, the Armenian people have made a number of allies within the
international community: in Moscow, in Leningrad, in the Baltic repub-
lics, and among democratic movements elsewhere. That is the result of
the appreciation for the substantial contribution of the national move-
ment in Armenia to the process of democratization of the Soviet Union,
but it is also the best guarantee for the just solution of the problem of
Artsakh, which we should cherish above all else. Conscious of this reality,
certain forces are trying to drive the problem of Artsakh into a deadlock
and to that end they are plotting a conspiracy against our people, and
some Armenian intellectuals are participating in it wittingly or
unwittingly.
Focusing on Pan-Turkism and raising the issue of the Armenian terri-
tories occupied by Turkey at this juncture serves only one purpose: to
portray Armenians as revanchists, to discredit the just cause of Artsakh,
and to deny the Armenian people the support of its allies.
For that reason, the Karabagh Committee condemns, in the harshest
terms, the periodic attempts to turn the Armenian question into a cheap
card in the game of international relations. We are convinced that the
only available path to achieve our national goals is to guarantee the
permanence of the democratization of the country and the unity of the
Armenian people according the principles articulated by the Armenian
National Movement. We are convinced that had the ANM been formally
recognized in time and a mechanism created for the dialogue between
the leaders of the republic and the representatives of the people, we
would have avoided the political recklessness, which this statement
champions.
2 HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT OUR RELATIONS WITH OUR NEIGHBORS? 15
2 HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT OUR RELATIONS

WITH OUR NEIGHBORS?
Excerpt from an interview to the newspaper Republic of Armenia4
. . . The fourth key problem confronting Armenia is its isolation, which we

must overcome if we want to improve our value as a political partner. I am
talking about direct relations with foreign countries. We must embark on a
serious effort and adopt a flexible diplomatic posture so that we can establish
if not friendly, then at least normal relations with our immediate neighbors.
First of all, I have in mind Georgia with which we have an age-old tradition
of friendship, then Iran, with which we have not had a conflict since 1828,
therefore no psychological barriers either for the Armenian or the Iranian
side. The religious factor, in my view, should be irrelevant, because there are
influential actors both in Iran and Armenia who understand that state
interests are more important than religious sentiment, and that the relations
between the two states can be built on the basis of that understanding.
The establishment of relations between Armenia and Turkey are a little
more complicated from the perspective of social psychology and historical
justice. Nevertheless, old animosities should not prevent the establishment of
at least commercial, then broader economic relations, given our state interests,
and without without any compromise on the core issues. I think we should
take advantage of this opportunity for the sake of our own interests. This, in
my view, will fortify our aspirations for progress as an independent nation.
Normal relations with neighbors are one of the guarantees, and perhaps
the most important guarantee, for the secure existence of any state. We
should transcend our emotions without forgetting our valid grievances. We
must think as a state and have the people’s interests as our guide when
entering any relationship. Otherwise we are condemned to destruction. The
establishment of normal relations with our neighbors will only increase our
value as a political partner. It gives us more room to maneuver and increases
our value in the eyes of the Union, the Center.5 As long as the Center is
convinced that we are condemned to be attached to it and as long as we do
not have any access to the outside world, it can afford to ignore us. But we
have another route available to us. That is the route of reaching direct
agreements with the republics of the USSR, converting the vertical relation-
ships into horizontal ones. I particularly value direct relations with the
Russian Soviet Federal Socialist Republic, and some steps have already
been taken in that direction. Indicative of those steps are Yeltsin’s letter to
me and my letter to Yeltsin. They establish a baseline for certain actions and
demonstrate understanding that the interests of our republics, of our peo-
ples should not be subordinated to those of the empire.
3 THE MOST IMPORTANT GUARANTEE OF ARMENIA’S

INDEPENDENT EXISTENCE
Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Armenian Supreme Soviet (22 October,
1990)6
. . . And finally, the fifth and the most important guarantee, which is essential
for the normal functioning of any state, is our relations with our immediate
neighbors—Iran and Turkey. These relations should be built on a pragmatic
understanding of what the Armenian people want and need. This issue has
become subject to political distortion, but rational actors understand the
imperative very well. And it is the authorities of Armenia that must design
and implement this policy. I am convinced that Armenian society, which has
reached a high level of political maturity, is capable of distinguishing mean-
ingful political goals from ideas that are the product of political distortion.
The people of Armenia should aim to make our republic into a self-
governing entity both politically and economically—one that can take
maximum advantage of the propitious circumstances and withstand the polit-
ical and economic challenges of our era. It is high time to draw serious lessons
from our bitter history, to abandon the identity of an emotional, romantic
nation, and to become a rational, realistic, and pragmatic one, which takes
every step on the basis of a well thought out and careful calculation.
Flexible diplomacy and the ability to maneuver should become the most
important political weapons we possess. We must monitor the relations of
our political partners and adversaries carefully and be able to take advantage
of the smallest disagreements among them. We must, therefore, altogether
reject pompous and unserious rhetoric, which unnecessarily antagonizes
our political partners and opponents, produces no political results, and
only causes disillusionment among our people.
Politics is a system, not a simple sum of random actions. Therefore, no
elected government that is implementing its own political program can
afford to appease peripheral pressures and veer off its main course.
A systematically developed political strategy can only be confronted with a
4 REJECTING FANTASIES AND NORMALIZING RELATIONS WITH TURKEY 17
different systematically developed political strategy, not demands for iso-

lated acts that are incompatible with it. Needless to say, this does not mean
that a political strategy should be a dogma and that it is not subject to
revision as needed.
To summarize this brief analysis, I would characterize the strategy
adopted by Armenia’s current democratically elected government as fol-
lows: to create the necessary guarantees for the continued existence and
prosperity of our republic by avoiding serious confrontations, flamboyant
and rash moves, by allowing us a space for flexible diplomacy and maneu-
vering, and at the same time by taking prompt and clear decisions. We will
have fulfilled our duty if we succeed in achieving that goal, leaving the
fulfillment of our other national aspirations to future generations.
4 REJECTING FANTASIES AND NORMALIZING RELATIONS

WITH TURKEY
Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at the Second Congress of the Armenian

National Movement7
. . .Another accusation, which has a history, is that the Armenian National

Movement has given up on the Armenian Cause and on the historic claims
of the Armenian people. We have explained our position, but our explana-
tions have no effect on our opponents. Unfortunately, the nature of this
debate is that explanations have no chance of swaying the other side. The
debate, instead, is for the purpose of convincing the public. No matter how
persuasive our arguments and clarifications are, they are going to keep
repeating the same accusations, because they have no other cards to play.
What can be said about this? Our attitude toward the Armenian Cause is
unequivocal. First, there is the erroneous perception that the Armenian
Cause is the diaspora’s cause and the cause of the Western Armenians.
Not at all, because at least half of the population of Armenia consists of
descendants of Western Armenians. And the sentiments that are so preva-
lent in the diaspora are not alien to the Armenians living in the homeland.
Therefore, claiming the Armenian Cause as the diaspora’s monopoly
is profoundly wrong. That is the first point. Second, we have stated on
numerous occasions that the Armenian National Movement does not
renounce the historical rights of the Armenian people and the demand for
international recognition of the Armenian genocide, but while considering
it normal for political parties and organizations to include these issues in

their programs and agendas, they cannot become part of the state’s agenda.
This is our approach. There are 1500 national and political leaders in this
hall. You have to realize that these accusations are not going to stop, but we
cannot afford to waste our time on responding to such slander. We should
ignore them and that is the only way to make sure that they will fade away. I
am glad that our congress is being broadcast on television, which gives me
the opportunity to present our position clearly regarding this issue. The
Armenian Cause —the cause of restoring the rights of Western Armenians
in their historic homeland—will become a part of the state’s policy agenda
only when the Armenian state is in a position to solve that problem relying
on its capabilities.
There is another related question, which has become subject to political
speculation. Through no fault of our own, this question has attracted more
attention than it deserves. The question has to do with our relations with
Turkey. We do not distinguish this relationship from our relations with our
other neighbors. But for some reason people forget about the other neigh-
bors and insist only that we speak about Turkey. This is understandable, but
it has both objective and subjective causes. Objectively, it is difficult for our
people, who have internalized a certain attitude, to make a psychological
U-turn and see that it is in fact possible to have a dialogue with Turkey. The
subjective element is the exploitation of that fact by those who know very
well that relations with Turkey are of vital importance to us. The normal-
ization of these relations is not an end in itself, it is the rational thing to do,
and our society finally understands this. I think that the most important
revolution in our political thinking that has taken place in the last few years is
the rejection of the bankrupt idea of relying on third parties and pinning
hopes on protection by other countries. For 300 years our national con-
sciousness has been poisoned by the illusion that our national aspirations
will be fulfilled sometimes by Western Europeans, and more typically, by
Russia. Remaining committed to this idea has cost us dearly. It is only today
that the Armenians are giving up that fantasy, rejecting that naïve dream and
seeing that even the Soviet state, which provided certain guarantees for our
survival (and that is a reality, since in the Soviet period there were no bullets
fired across Armenia’s borders, and the Armenian people were able to live
and create in peace, despite the disintegration of the village and the horrible
losses sustained during Stalin’s terror), is no longer able to provide those
guarantees as it is on the verge of dissolution. Therefore it is we who must
seek and find more reliable guarantees for our people’s continued survival.
5 THE MAIN GUARANTEE OF OUR SECURITY IS NORMALIZATION OF. . . 19
The normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is but one of the many

links in the chain of guarantees, but, as I already pointed out, thanks to
certain psychological factors it has attracted more of our society’s attention
than relations with other neighbors.
In order to rule out any misunderstandings, I want to emphasize once
again that normalization of relations with Turkey means first and foremost
the establishment of economic, commercial ties, and does not in any way
mean renunciation of our historic rights. At the same time, we are guided by
the principle that parties should be realistic and should avoid insisting on
preconditions for the establishment of relations given the delicate nature of
the issue (and it must be pointed out that these questions are no less delicate
and thorny in Turkey). Only such an approach would make it possible to
implement the normalization of relations with neighbors, including Turkey,
that are so important for Armenia.
5 THE MAIN GUARANTEE OF OUR SECURITY

IS NORMALIZATION OF RELATIONS WITH NEIGHBORS
Excerpt from an Interview with the Russian Newspaper Nezavisimaya

Gazeta8
– Mutalibov9 has claimed that what is taking place is “Armenian expansion.”

Some of your statements in the media containing claims about “historic rights”
can also be interpreted as intent to restore Greater Armenia. That is cause for
some concern in Turkey. . .
We have already clarified our position on that question, including in the

pages of Nezavisimaya Gazeta. I have spoken not about “historic rights,”
but about the facts of history. We do have disagreements with Turkey as far
as interpreting the facts of history is concerned. We characterize the events
of 1915 and the subsequent years as genocide. Turks think differently. But
that should not affect our current relations. That is a separate issue.
Armenia has always considered Russia to be the guarantor of our
people’s survival. During the last three years, however, Armenians came
to the bitter realization that the guarantee is not there anymore. During
the pogroms in Sumgait and Baku, the Russian army did not protect the
innocent victims.
Besides, one cannot rule out the possibility that the Soviet army will leave
the Caucasus regardless of what we want. There are precedents of that in
history. The Russian army evacuated Western Armenia during World War I
after a victorious campaign against Turkey. That happened in 1918.
We realize that we cannot, in such a short time, create a modern and
strong economy that would allow us to face all probably threats by our-
selves. For that reason alone, all the talk about “Armenian expansionism” is
pure idle speculation. The main guarantee of our security, as for any state, is
the normalization of relations with our neighbors. Consequently, we have
expressed our desire to establish mutually beneficial bilateral relations with
Turkey. The ambassador of that country visited Armenia. There are more
than a few complications we need to overcome, but what deserves emphasis
is the fact that the two peoples have begun the process of establishing
relations. We have already received verbal assurances that there will be
no political preconditions for establishing and developing economic and
cultural ties. Those ties, in fact, will create favorable conditions for the
resolution of political problems.
NOTES
1. This document was read in the Armenian Supreme Soviet on 24 June, 1989. An
earlier translation of it was published in Gerard J. Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the
Crossroads: Democracy and Nationhood in the Post-Soviet Era (Watertown, MA:
Blue Crane Books, 1991), pp. 155–156. It was issued in response to a speech in
the Armenian Supreme Soviet by Zory Balayan, who was a prominent intel-
lectual and activist, and who subscribed to the traditional Armenian nation-
alist narrative. In that speech, he reiterated some of the most important
postulates of that narrative: (1) Turkey and Azerbaijan are inspired by the
Pan-Turkist (or Pan-Turanist, which is a term used interchangeably with
Pan-Turkist) doctrine of political unification of Turkic-speaking peoples;
(2) the existence of Armenians in the Caucasus is an impediment on the
path of realization of that goal, hence that doctrine implies the extermination
of Armenians; (3) only Russian protection can stave off that threat; (4) Russia
and Armenia have a common interest in fighting Pan-Turkism, because the
idea of political unification of Turkic-speaking peoples threatens the stability
and integrity of the Soviet Union; (5) Moscow should support the Armenian
claims over Karabagh, because of that common interest; (6) Moscow should
similarly support Armenian claims over the territories of historic Armenia,
which are under Turkish control. See, Zory Balayan, “The Threat of Pan-
Turanism,” in Libaridian, ed., Armenia at the Crossroads, pp. 151–154.
2. Some proponents of the traditional nationalist narrative argued that Armenians
had been victimized not just by Turks, but by Muslims in general, as they had
NOTES 21
endured conquest and subjugation by various Islamic states and empires

since the Arab conquest of Armenia in the seventh century. They claimed
simultaneously, and against all evidence, that there was pan-Islamic unity,
which regarded all Christians, including Armenians as enemies.
3. Artsakh is the historic Armenian name for Karabagh.
4. Republic of Armenia, 9 October, 1990; Levon Ter-Petrossian, Selected
Speeches, Articles, and Interviews (Yerevan, Armenia: Printinfo, 2006),
pp. 135–136.
5. “Center” is a reference to the central government in Moscow.
6. Ter-Petrossian, Selected Speeches, Articles, and Interviews, pp. 149–150.
7. Republic of Armenia, 28 November, 1990; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Speeches,
Articles, and Interviews, pp. 161–163.
8. Nezavisimaya Gazeta, 28 May, 1991. Interview of Alexander Banggersky
with Levon Ter-Petrossian; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles, Speeches, and
Interviews, pp. 213–214.
9. Ayaz Mutallibov was the president of Azerbaijan in 1991–1992.
CHAPTER 3
Armenian-Turkish Relations After

Independence and the Continued Struggle
with the Traditional Narrative
1 THE OBSTACLES ON THE PATH OF NORMALIZATION

OF RELATIONS BETWEEN ARMENIA AND TURKEY
Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Fourth Congress of the Armenian

National Movement1
The strategy being worked out with regard to our relations with Iran and
Turkey is familiar to you in its basic contours. The current Armenian
administration has adopted the position that the guarantee of the survival
of any country rests in its ability to establish normal relations with its
neighbors. That is the cornerstone of our foreign policy. We cannot create
a security system that is based on reliance on powerful but distant actors like
Russia, Europe or the United States. We must strive to solve our problems
locally, with our immediate neighbors.
The relations with Iran present no complications. On the contrary, the
parties have common interests, in addition to not having any historical
disagreements, which helps facilitate the development of Armenian-Iranian
relations. I should express my satisfaction with the pace of development of
relations with Iran, which has accelerated recently, and we will soon enjoy
the benefits of that process.
There is no question that the process of establishing relations with
Turkey is more complicated, although, as mentioned earlier, we have

24 3 ARMENIAN-TURKISH RELATIONS AFTER INDEPENDENCE AND THE. . .
succeeded in removing psychological barriers along that path. In particular,

we have succeeded in impressing upon our people that in our relations with
Turkey we must be guided exclusively by state interests and principles of
realism.
Although our position on this question is well established, I find it
necessary to reiterate it once again: as neighboring countries, Armenia and
Turkey have overlapping interests, which can be the basis for developing
close commercial, economic, scientific, and cultural ties. Because both
parties stand to gain from acting on these interests, they should ensure
that ties can be established without preconditions.
I should point out that Turkish officials basically agree with this point of
view. Some Turkish officials, however, have gone on the record
contradicting it. This was predictable and should not put us off. There are
two issues here, which we need to analyze with cool heads and without
being surprised by inconsistencies in the Turkish position.
The first is the question of Artsakh. Naturally, Turkey was not going
to be indifferent to the fate of its ethnic kin. We should not forget that
aside from official policy, there is also public opinion and a political
opposition in Turkey, which is exploiting the problem of Artsakh for
political gain. In other words, it seems like the problem of Artsakh is
gradually becoming an internal political problem in Turkey. All political
parties and politicians are jumping over each other to prove their dedi-
cation to the welfare of their Azeri kin. This, to be sure, is a dangerous
trend. For now the Turkish government is able to withstand that pres-
sure. We should appreciate this fact, because the administration is at least
guided by the genuine interests of the country, and would in all likeli-
hood not want the problem of Artsakh to become an obstacle on the path
of normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations. Be that as it may, the
Turkish government is subject to a certain degree of pressure and is
forced to make concessions in response to public opinion and to lend
Azerbaijan diplomatic and PR support on the world stage.
The second issue has to do with the collapse of the Soviet Union and
with the subsequent position of Russia, which I talked about earlier, and
which has created a vacuum in the Caucasus. As a powerful state with a rich
diplomatic tradition, Turkey had the instinct to take advantage of that
vacuum. That is why it has lately moved away from the principle of no
preconditions for establishing relations with Armenia and instead has put
forward such preconditions. This happened both in Prague during the
meetings of the CSCE (Commission on Security and Cooperation in
2 THE HIGH POINT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN ARMENIA AND TURKEY 25
Europe)2 and during the last visit of the Turkish ambassador Volkan Vural.
This is also quite natural and easy for us to explain. I was compelled to be
very frank and to tell the ambassador the following: “You are trying to take
advantage of the existing situation. Seeing that the system guaranteeing the
security of post-Soviet republics is very shaky, you are trying to extract
certain statements from us.” I tried to explain to him that this was not a
realistic approach and that its ultimate consequence would be to torpedo
the process of normalizing Armenian-Turkish relations, and that this would
not be in the interests of either Turkey or Armenia. A proposal was made to
the ambassador to establish diplomatic relations on the basis of existing
international norms. Since both states are members of important interna-
tional organizations like the CSCE or the UN, they must build their
relations on the basis of the principles enshrined in the doctrines of these
organizations, putting aside the bilateral Armenian-Turkish agreements for
the time being. Clearly, those political issues deserve to be discussed, but
only in the second phase of our relationship, following the establishment of
diplomatic, economic, and commercial ties. We will discuss all the contro-
versial and thorny issues then, and I am sure the interests of both our states
will force us to find compromises and solutions acceptable to both parties.
2 THE HIGH POINT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN ARMENIA

AND TURKEY
Excerpt from the press conference on November 11, 19923
– What is Armenia’s policy toward Turkey?
In our relations with Turkey we have been guided by the strategy of

building normal relations with our neighbors, and we have been very
consistent in that pursuit since the day our movement became a political
and civic organization and articulated its guiding principles. We never
veered from this course since taking power, with the possible exception of
the speech of our foreign minister that was mentioned a little while ago.4
I should mention that we see if not a similar then an adequate attitude on
the part of Turkey, even though we should realize that this question is as
complicated for Turkey as it is for us.
The problem of the normalization of relations with Armenia has wide
public resonance in Turkey as well. It is subject to political manipulation and
political wrangling. The recent session of Turkish parliament, where the

question arose of confidence in the government for the decision to allow the
transit of wheat to Armenia, is a demonstration of that. The Turkish
government has to be responsive to the public opinion, and it has to take
into account pressure coming from the opposition. That is the reason why
we don’t see a desire on the part of the Turkish government to expedite the
process of normalizing relations. Of course, the problem of Karabagh adds
to the difficulty, because Turkish people are quite sensitive on this matter,
which is something we should also take into account.
The permission for the wheat supply was not just a manifestation of good
will, because as it became clear in that parliament session, the decision
entailed a certain risk, which means there must have been more serious
motives behind it. Turkey is also interested in normalizing relations with
Armenia. As I already pointed out, the problem of NKR is the most difficult
obstacle. Under the pressure of public opinion, Turkey is forced to sacrifice
its neutrality and manifestly act as Azerbaijan’s advocate in international
fora. But I am convinced that Turkey is interested in the peaceful resolution
of the Karabagh conflict. This is also a big opportunity for us, because if
Turkey were opposed to the process of a peaceful resolution, that is, the
establishment of a ceasefire and an end to the war, we would have been
confronted with many more difficulties. The faster we reach an agreement
on the ceasefire, the faster our relations with Turkey will develop. Despite
the existing problems, I would evaluate the state of these relations today as
satisfactory, especially given the issue of the wheat supply. As you know,
given our difficult condition, Hafez Al Assad granted Armenia 6000 tons of
wheat as a gift. We will transport that wheat via Turkey as well, in all
likelihood using their motorways.5 We would like to make the Margara6
road available also, which would make things easier. The Ministries of
Foreign Affairs have already reached an agreement on the protocols for
the establishment of diplomatic relations. If things go as planned, we should
be able to sign these protocols by the end of the year. Last Sunday, I had a
15-minute telephone conversation with Prime Minister Demirel, who had
called me. I raised another question during our conversation, which had to
do with the possibility of using Turkey as a transit route for transmitting
electricity to Armenia from Germany and Bulgaria. Technically it is possible,
and the Prime Minister promised to take care of it. He has instructed his
Ministry of Energy officials to look into the issue, and they are already in
touch with officials in our Ministry of Energy. If this initiative succeeds, we
4 INAUGURAL ADDRESS TO THE “PROBLEMS OF GENOCIDE” CONFERENCE 27
will have an additional 100–150 megawatts of electricity this winter, which

will be a great help to us.
3 RESPONDING TO ACCUSATIONS OF RUSSOPHOBIA

AND TURKOPHILIA
Excerpt from a speech delivered at the 5th Congress of the Armenian National
Movement7
One of the devastating sins attributed to the current administration is

Russophobia, and also, horror of horrors, Turkophilia. I do not want to
expand on the charge of Russophobia, limiting myself to the following
statement, even if it may seem unsubstantiated to some. In the 300-year
history of Armenian-Russian relations, our ties have never been as close, as
open, and as friendly as they are under Yeltsin and Ter-Petrossian, and that
is solely due to the fact that both countries are led by truly democratic
governments that conduct themselves according to humanistic values and
the norms of international law.
As far as the charge of Turkophilia is concerned, if that is the label
attached to the efforts to establish normal relations with Turkey as a
neighboring country, the efforts to develop mutually beneficial coopera-
tion, then we accept the label. If that is the label we have to earn for using
Turkish roads as transit for transporting grain to Armenia, then call us
Turkophiles. Only let us not forget that way back in 1918, one of Aram
Manoukyan’s8 first initiatives was to accept 20,000 poods9 of grain for
starving Armenians—from that notorious killer of Armenians, Khalil Pasha.
10
4 INAUGURAL ADDRESS TO THE “PROBLEMS OF GENOCIDE”

CONFERENCE
(April 21, 1995)11
Mr. Chairman,
Honorable Guests,
Armenians are commemorating the 80th anniversary of their national
tragedy and bow their heads to the sacred memory of the 1.5 million
martyrs. In so doing, the Armenians assert yet again their unbreakable will
to live and their determination to take their rightful place among the
family of nations.
We see this International Conference, held in the capital of Armenia, first
as an expression of respect to the memory of the victims of the genocide;
and second, as a gesture of friendship toward our new and independent
statehood.
Deeply appreciative of your professionalism and competence, I would
not dare enter the depths of the complex issues related to the historical and
legal aspects of the Armenian genocide. I merely wish to register some well-
known facts that I consider central to the formation of contemporary
Armenian political consciousness. In view of the necessity to subject history
to rational analysis and thereby avoid the mistakes of the past, I believe it is
time to assess the facts with sound judgment and to set aside sentimental
approaches and conditioned responses.
1. It is a mistake to explain the Armenian genocide by any religious,

ethnic or racial antagonism between the Armenian and Turkish peo-
ples or by economic and social competition, since the modus vivendi
that had evolved within the Ottoman Empire had secured more or
less their peaceful coexistence. Undoubtedly that modus vivendi was
based on an altogether unequal treatment of Muslim and Christian
subjects; nonetheless, the Ottoman state did establish a clearly
defined balance. The Armenian genocide was a strictly political pro-
gram dictated by the specific interests of the Ottoman Empire. Fol-
lowing the liberation of the Balkan peoples, the Armenian Question
entered the international political arena by the will of the major
European Powers, and as a program of reforms in the Armenian
provinces of the Ottoman Empire, under Article 61 of the Treaty of
Berlin. It then became clear to Turkey that in the next war it would
lose Armenia. The only way to avoid that loss was the physical
annihilation of the Armenian people, which Turkish authorities
were to achieve systematically during the years between 1878 and
1915. There is no doubt that Sultan Abdul Hamid II and the Young
Turks bear full responsibility for the conception, development and
execution of the plan for the extermination of the Armenian people.
2. During the 1878–1914 period, the European Powers, such as
England, France, Germany and Russia, not only failed to take any
steps in the direction of pursuing the implementation of reforms in
4 INAUGURAL ADDRESS TO THE “PROBLEMS OF GENOCIDE” CONFERENCE 29
the Armenian provinces of the Ottoman Empire, but also, through

their uncoordinated and unsystematic interventions, created a direct
threat to the Armenian people’s physical existence. That is to say,
while provoking the Ottoman authorities with the internationaliza-
tion of the Armenian Question, the major Powers did not give any
thought to the minimum guarantees for the physical survival of the
Armenian people. This is a measure of their moral responsibility for
the genocide and, in the case of Germany, of its share of direct
responsibility.
3. In view of the huge imbalance in the comparative strength of the
Ottoman state and the Armenian people, as well as of the antagonisms
among the major Powers, it is not difficult to admit that in that life
and death struggle, Armenians were doomed, a priori, to total anni-
hilation. Even if all resources had been mobilized, the Armenian
people would not have been in a position to abort the evil plan
developed by the Ottoman state, especially when one considers the
painful fact that Armenians lacked even the awareness of such a plan.
4. The dominant view—that the Armenian people could have escaped
the genocide by not asking for the intervention of European Powers
and by seeking the implementation of reforms by cooperating directly
with Turkish authorities—does not in any way correspond to the
reality of the situation. Regardless of Armenian actions, the
European Powers were going to meddle in Turkish affairs and use
reforms in the Armenian provinces as a pretext.
Be that as it may, we must state, for the record, that both currents of
Armenian political thought—the clerical-bourgeois and the revolu-
tionary—albeit unsystematically, did, from time to time, attempt to
cooperate with the Turkish authorities. The high point of that coop-
eration was the one between the Ittihad ve Terakke12 and the ARF.
But that cooperation served only to altogether dull the Armenian
people’s circumspection, as a result of which the period between
1908 and 1914 was not used to organize appropriately for self-
defense. As bitter as it may be, we must confess that those two
approaches not only failed to thwart the state plan for the extermina-
tion of the Armenian people, which, as stated above, was an inevita-
bility, but they also failed to take even elementary measures to
minimize its impact.
5. The Armenian people lost its last opportunity to avoid the worst
consequences of the genocide, if not the genocide itself, when, in
1914, by a decision of its World Congress convening in Erzurum, the

Dashnaktsutiun assumed responsibility for the participation of Arme-
nians in the general conscription declared by Ottoman authorities.
Regardless of that decision, the Armenian people could not have
avoided their fate. Indeed, rejecting conscription would have pro-
vided an additional pretext for the authorities to justify their terror.
However, by rejecting the draft and preserving the fighting force of
the nation, it might have been possible to organize a more substantial
self-defense in several places, especially in Taron,13 and to escape total
annihilation.
6. Still faithful to the Entente countries, the leaders of the Republic
of Armenia, in 1920, were unable to appreciate the new situation
created by the emergence of a stronger Soviet Russia and a more
powerful Kemalist Turkey. As a result, they lost the independence
of Armenia and portions of the territory of the Republic. They
could have secured a better future for Armenia had they managed
the situation through direct Armenian-Turkish and
Armenian-Russian negotiations.
7. Today, Armenia and Turkey, as neighboring states, are compelled to
establish mutually beneficial trade and economic relations, and
through good neighborly relations, to gradually overcome historic
antagonisms and restore the mutual trust of the Armenian and Turk-
ish peoples. For that, it is necessary for the two parties to display both
political will and moral fortitude.
I extend my wishes for the success of this international conference

convened on the occasion of the commemoration of the 80th anniversary
of the Armenian genocide. I am certain that this conference will be seen as
an important milestone in the scholarly inquiry into this most heinous of
crimes.
Thank you for your attention.
5 WHY IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR TURKEY NOT TO NORMALIZE

RELATIONS WITH ARMENIA AND WHY “NATIONAL IDEOLOGY”
IS A BAD IDEA
Excerpt from the press conference on September 26, 199714

5 WHY IT WAS A MISTAKE FOR TURKEY NOT TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH. . . 31
– SEVAN DEYRMENJIAN, “Jamanak newspaper,” Istanbul—I would

like to inquire about the current state of Armenian-Turkish relations.
What shape will they take during your presidential term?
We have laid out our position on this question many times before. One
could even say, everything has already been said. We do not have any
barriers. We are ready today to establish serious economic and commercial
ties with Turkey, to open the borders, to make our roads available as transit
for Turkish commerce. It seems like Turkey agrees with all of that, but it has
created a trap for itself, which it cannot escape, since it has made the
normalization of its relations with Armenia conditional on the normaliza-
tion of Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, and particularly on the resolution of
the Karabagh conflict. We tried to persuade them to separate Armenian-
Turkish relations from Armenian-Azerbaijani relations, but we failed.
Maybe it was our fault; we did not do an adequate job of explaining. Be
that as it may, I really think that Turkey should be interested in building
friendly relations with Armenia if it wants to contribute to the resolution of
the Karabagh problem, which it has essentially made a precondition for the
establishment of relations. It is my firm conviction, in fact, that Turkey
would have had an easier time reaching this goal if it had established
relations with Armenia. Had it done so, it would have contributed to the
peaceful resolution of the Karabagh conflict.
– ARAYIK MANOUKYAN, Armenpress—Mr. President, in recent

years many of our politicians frequently speak about national ideology
and the need for a national program, while you have on one occasion
argued that national ideology15 is a false category. Could you tell us
whether your statement was a political, scientific, or a philosophical
interpretation of that concept? Also do you think individuals can change
history, particularly during periods of state formation?
My idea was not a philosophical, political, or a scientific one. My idea was a

simple one stemming from my understanding of democracy. I have stated
that “national ideology” is a false political category, and I am prepared to
repeat it today and again tomorrow. What did my statement mean? What do
the authors of the concept have in mind when they talk about “national
ideology”? One thing only: the whole nation should subscribe to that
national ideology. It is my understanding that the entire nation accepts a
single ideology only in totalitarian, ideological states. When you have a
democracy, by contrast, nobody can force anybody to subscribe to any

ideology. All the ideologies that exist in Armenia today—whether commu-
nist, social-democratic, liberal-democratic, nationalist, extreme national-
ist—are national ideologies in my view, since the proponents see the key
to the solution of the nation’s main problems in each of these ideologies.
Imposing one national ideology on the nation means saying goodbye to
democracy. It is one or the other. Yes, it is possible to impose a national
ideology on the nation. We have witnessed such a thing. And we have seen
its consequences.
NOTES
1. Republic of Armenia, 2 April, 1992; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 273–290.
2. It was later renamed to Organization of Security and Cooperation in
Europe.
3. Republic of Armenia, 14 November, 1992; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
4. In the spring of 1992 the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Armenia Raffi
Hovannisian delivered a speech in Istanbul, which diverged from the official
foreign policy line of the Republic of Armenia on Turkey. He was removed
from his post as a consequence of that speech.
5. The wheat was delivered successfully, and several months later the Turkish
railroad was used to transport 30,000 tons of wheat, which was an aid from
the European Union.
6. Margara is a bridge on the Arax River connecting the Armavir Province of
Armenia with the Turkish province of Agri.
7. Republic of Armenia, 28 June, 1993; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
8. Aram Manoukyan was the interim head of the government of Armenia in
1918.
9. Pood is a Russian unit of measuring weight equivalent to 16.38 kilograms.
10. Khalil Pasha was a general in the Ottoman Army, who had committed
numerous crimes against Armenians in 1915–1918.
11. Ter-Petrossian, Articles, Speeches, and Interviews, pp. 477–481.
12. This is the Turkish name for the Committee of Union and Progress, other-
wise known as the Young Turk party.
13. Taron was a province of historic Armenia.
14. Republic of Armenia, 27 September, 1997; Ter-Petrossian, Selected Articles,
NOTES 33
15. The proponents of this “ideology” never clearly defined what they meant by
it. Armenia was an independent state at the time, so it was not the standard
“nationalist ideology,” demanding liberation from an empire and statehood.
It was usually brandished as an implicit (and sometimes explicit) critique of
liberalism, democracy, and constitutionalism, insisting on the idea that
Armenians as a nation should have a special mission and that they all should
be unified around it. They never articulated with sufficient clarity what that
mission should be, what the process of determining that mission should be,
and what should be done to those who do not subscribe to it.
CHAPTER 4
The Karabagh Conflict and the Future

of Armenian Statehood
1 WAR OR PEACE? TIME TO GET SERIOUS
(November 1, 1997)1
My September 26 press conference, more accurately that portion of the

press conference that was devoted to Karabagh, became an occasion for
fueling intense passions in the press and at gatherings organized by the
opposition. This did not surprise me; to some extent, I had expected an
even more passionate reaction.2
What surprised me was the quality of the debate, or rather, the absence of
any debate. I must confess that I failed to achieve my objective, which was to
stimulate, in the press and at public gatherings, a serious discussion of the
thorniest problem facing the Armenian people, namely, the possible paths
to resolving the Nagorno Karabagh conflict.
The opposition’s response did not get beyond profanity, accusation,
name-calling, and distortion. No rational proposal was made, no alternative
plan was offered, no well-grounded counterargument was introduced. One
can reach two conclusions: the opposition does not have a plan for the
resolution of the Karabagh conflict or, if it has one, it is hiding it and is not
acting in the nation’s interests. I will refrain from harsher characterizations.
What did the public take away from the uproar made by the opposition?
People understood that we have shed blood for Artsakh, that returning the
occupied territories will endanger the existence of Artsakh, that the

36 4 THE KARABAGH CONFLICT AND THE FUTURE OF ARMENIAN STATEHOOD
Armenian people are ready once again to shed blood for Artsakh, that we
don’t give a damn about world public opinion, that we will bring both
Azerbaijan and the international community to their knees, and that the
whole nation will turn into fedayees.3
Then what? No one tried to give answers to the following simple
questions:
Will doing all of that bring about our desired goal?

How will the world react if we tell it we don’t give a damn about it?
Will it be the blood of the 500 who gathered at the Cinema House4 or
the blood of our innocent people that will be shed?
That last question, at least, has an unequivocal answer. None of the

500 who gathered at the Cinema House will lose a single hair from their
heads, despite their declarations of readiness to sacrifice everything for the
contrary. When Artsakh was in danger, when the enemy had just about
reached Gandzasar,5 not one of the 500 responded to Vazgen Sargsyan’s
appeal and none joined the mahaparts’ unit.6 Our people should have had
enough, by now, of those who seek glory and behave as heroes at the
expense of others’ lives.
Confusion within the ranks of the opposition can be explained not only
by partisan considerations but also by their ignorance. That is natural, since
there are only six individuals in all of Karabagh and Armenia who are fully
informed at the expert level about the process of the resolution of the
conflict: Arkadi Ghukasyan, Robert Kocharyan, Alexander Arzumanyan,
Vardan Oskanian, Jirair Libaridian, and I.7
1.1 The Object of the Debate

At any rate, no debate ensued. This should disappoint neither me nor our
public. Any political leader or intellectual aspiring to determine the fate of
the nation will be compelled, sooner or later, to set aside the cursing (I am
not talking about the mentally ill) and to present the people with a concrete
and reasoned plan.
Without waiting for that to happen, I am ready today to discuss seriously
any reasonable plan for the resolution of the Karabagh conflict and I agree
to participate in a public debate at any level.
But a debate will be meaningful only when it includes as starting points
the answers that the participants must provide to a few key questions:
1 WAR OR PEACE? TIME TO GET SERIOUS 37
– Should the question of Karabagh be resolved through war or through

negotiations?
– Is it possible to maintain the status quo and the unresolved state of the
Karabagh question forever or even for an extended period of time?
– What is in the interest of Karabagh and Armenia: the resolution or the
nonresolution of the conflict?
– Will the question be resolved through compromise or with the defeat
of one side? And which of the parties will be the defeated one?
I have often expressed my position clearly on these questions and still

maintain that:
– War must be off the table; the question of Karabagh, therefore, must
be resolved exclusively through peaceful negotiations.
– It is not possible to maintain the status quo for too long because
neither the international community nor Armenia’s economic
resources will permit it.
– The unresolved state of the conflict is not in the interest of Karabagh
or Armenia, because it is palpably hindering Armenia’s economic
development and, therefore, Karabagh’s; it is creating complications
in our relations with the international community and, especially, with
neighboring countries, which can have fatal consequences.
To solve the problem of Karabagh we have only one option, a compro-

mise solution, which does not mean that one side is the victor and the other
the loser; it does mean finding an agreement based on what is possible now
that the conflict is ripe for resolution.
The opposition should not mislead the people by arguing that there is an
alternative to compromise: the alternative to compromise is war.
Rejecting compromise and pursuing a strategy of maximalism (the drive
to obtain the maximum rather than the possible) is the shortest path to the
ultimate destruction of Karabagh and the deterioration of the situation in
Armenia.
This is not a debate about losing or not losing Karabagh. Rather, it is
about keeping Karabagh Armenian. Karabagh has been inhabited by Arme-
nians for 3000 years and so it must remain for another 3000 years.
The path I have chosen will secure that prospect and the means to
preserve it, to reach our desired goal. The path of recklessness will lead to
certain defeat. Already once, “having turned Istanbul into a sea of blood,”8
we lost Western Armenia; and on another occasion, in demanding the

territories designated by the Treaty of Sevres, we lost half of Eastern
Armenia.9
Besides the substance of the compromise, its timing is also important. It
is obvious that in the case of a compromise, the stronger party has the
chance to obtain the maximum possible gains. Today Armenia and
Karabagh are stronger than ever. But in the event of the nonresolution of
the conflict, within a year or two, they will be substantially weakened. That
which we are rejecting today, we will be asking for tomorrow, but then we
will not get it, as has often happened in our history.
We must be realistic and understand that the international community
will not for long tolerate the situation created around Nagorno Karabagh,
because that situation is threatening regional cooperation and security, as
well as the West’s oil interests. Sooner or later, the parties will be presented a
compromise plan for the resolution of the conflict. This plan will provide for
a political, not legal, solution, although the major powers will be offering it
as a model articulation of international law. Neither Azerbaijan nor
Karabagh and Armenia will be able to reject the compromise, just as was
the case with the parties in the Bosnian and Arab-Israeli conflicts.
A mutually acceptable compromise should not be seen, however, as
surrender. On the contrary, the conflicting parties themselves must exert
enormous efforts to achieve it, because the alternative, as stated, is war and
new suffering for the peoples involved.
Compromise is not a choice between the good and the bad, but rather
between the bad and the worse; that is, compromise is simply a means to
avoid the worst. Parties benefit from it when they have come to understand
what the worst is and are able to display the necessary political will and
courage to avoid it.
In reaching for a compromise, parties generally are guided by a few
considerations: to liberate themselves from a conflict that is full of dangers
and hinders their normal functioning and development; to buy time, to
gather their forces and resolve things at a more advantageous moment; and
to avoid unpredictable complications, hoping that in the future, people’s
thinking and values may shift, as a result of which the issue may lose its acute
character, and borders, for example, may lose the significance they have
today. Such thinking and reassessment of values are dominant now in
Europe; tomorrow they could also become dominant in the Near East.
The Arab-Israeli peace process may be a testimony to that.
Compromise will satisfy every party to the conflict to a certain extent, but
at the same time, it will not fully satisfy any of them. President Aliyev will
present that compromise as Azerbaijan’s victory, while I will try to present it
as Armenia’s. The Azerbaijani opposition will charge that Aliyev has com-
mitted an act of treason and sold Karabagh. The opposition in Armenia will
consider that I have acted treacherously and sold Karabagh.
In such circumstances one cannot rule out the possibility of the Rabin-
Peres syndrome. One should also not ignore the Netanyahu syndrome:
despite having come to power with uncompromising positions, within a
short time, albeit unwillingly, he was compelled to continue the peace
process started by Rabin and Peres.
1.2 Some Misconceptions

As part of the propaganda campaign undertaken in the aftermath of my
press conference, the opposition has circulated a number of misconceptions,
some of which I need to address briefly.
The first misconception, or dangerously misleading premise if you wish,
is that Karabagh’s antagonist in this conflict is Azerbaijan, which can easily
be brought to its knees. In reality, however, the antagonist is the interna-
tional community before which, in fact, we are throwing down the gauntlet.
Not to understand this simple fact means making our people vulnerable to
grave risks.
The second misconception is the baseless insistence that Karabagh has
won the war and, therefore, has no need to accept a compromise. Unfor-
tunately, Karabagh has won the battle, not the war. A war is considered won
only when the adversary has been forced to surrender. Confusing the battle
for the war has brought misfortune to many.
The third misconception is that since we have succeeded in everything so
far, success awaits us in the future as well. That is, so far we have defeated
Azerbaijan, we are certain to do so in the future; we have been able to resist
external pressures in the past, we can continue to do so in the future, and so
on. This may be the most dangerous of the misconceptions because it
predicts future successes on the basis of the past experience rather than
projections of the balance of power in the future. Those who think this way
have a serious problem with the elementary rules of logic. If future victories
were predicated on past successes, then once a victor, a party would always
remain a victor. The Roman Empire, for example, should never have fallen.
The next misconception, or rather absurdity, is the assertion that the

President of Armenia is selling out Karabagh to keep himself in power. It is
hard to imagine that even a mentally retarded person could concoct the
argument that an Armenian leader could maintain power by selling out
Karabagh.
Incidentally, I must say a word about this appetite for power. What
would have compelled me to cling to power at any cost: the benefits, the
glory, or the need to become a hero? During my presidency, I have received
neither any advantages nor wealth (you can check on that) and do not wish
to receive any.
Had I been motivated by the need to achieve glory or to become a hero,
I simply would have stayed out of the 1996 elections, and thus remained in
the eyes of future generations as a president who brought independence,
won the valiant war in Karabagh, and expanded Armenian territories,
regardless of whether my getting credit for any of this would be justified.
Why should I have been concerned about what would have happened or
who would bear responsibility for the worsening of the situation in the
aftermath? It would make no difference, my approval rating would not have
suffered as a result; on the contrary, under such circumstances, it might even
have gone up. I repeat, from a personal point of view that might have been
the best strategy, but it also would have constituted nothing less than
cowardly desertion, a habit which, fortunately or unfortunately, I do not
have. I have been reelected with a cool awareness of the difficulties facing
me and the responsibility I carry in the task of overcoming them; and I have
no regrets.
Is it possible that I am not aware of the cheap tactics of projecting myself
as a hero and as the embodiment of all national aspirations, and to please the
public at any cost? Couldn’t I have cursed the Turks night and day, raised
the issue of the recognition of the genocide at the UN, revoked the Treaty
of Kars,10 demanded from Turkey the territories designated by the Treaty of
Sevres, presented an ultimatum to Azerbaijan, recognized the indepen-
dence of Karabagh, declared that we will cede none of the territories, and
so on?
I could have used all these ploys cleverly, at any rate no less cleverly than
any one of those gathered at the Cinema House. Was it my education that
was inadequate or my wits? I could have easily earned the reputation of a
brave and great patriot, become the idol of the nation, and the symbol of
unity for Armenia and the diaspora.
What, then, is stopping me from doing all of that? Is it my lack of courage,

my cosmopolitan thinking, my essence that is indifferent to a national ideology,
or my faulty education? The only obstacle is the reality of the political calcula-
tion and the desire to keep our people safe from misfortune. If I had acted
differently, catastrophe would have been unavoidable and we not only would
have lost Karabagh but also endangered Armenia’s very existence. We need not
go far for illustrations. Let us remember the fortunes of our neighbors. We
were eyewitness to the behavior of Gamsakhurdia and Elchibey who opted for
the politics of heroism and became national idols, but brought innumerable
calamities to their nations.11
1.3 Myths and Riddles

In the arena of Armenian political thinking and public opinion, there are
also recurring claims that would be better categorized as myths and riddles.
First Myth: Armenia is exerting pressure on the authorities of Nagorno

Karabagh.
Regarding this claim, I can state with full responsibility that Armenia has
exerted pressure on Nagorno Karabagh only once. That was in 1993, to
convince it to participate in the Minsk Group12 negotiations; that partici-
pation has fully justified itself.
Armenia has no intention to exert pressure on Nagorno Karabagh
either today or tomorrow. It is the authorities of Karabagh that make
decisions in the name of Karabagh, naturally bearing responsibility for
their decisions not only before the population of Karabagh but also the
entire Armenian people. This does not mean that Armenia will not
consult with the Karabagh authorities on certain issues and try to influ-
ence them where appropriate. But the final decision remains with the
Karabagh authorities.
Second Myth: If Armenia were to adopt a tough position vis-a-vis Turkey and
confront it with the issues of genocide recognition, of revoking the Treaty of
Kars, and of territorial demands, then Turkey and Azerbaijan would make
more concessions on the question of Karabagh.
It is my deep conviction, which I can demonstrate through detailed
political analysis, that such a position would not bring any advantages to
the solution of the Karabagh problem. It would also result in new
Another random document with
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Tvoj rod se je dvignil, oj Trubar,
In ti si rešítelj njegov,
Ko z drago domačo besedo
Duhá si otel mu okóv.
Povejte, prijatelji modri,

Kdo národu pravi je kralj:
Kdor vlada telesu — ali
Kdor duhu življenje je dal?
Vladarjeva slava je senca,

Ki spremlja vse dní ga zvesto,
Zvestó ga spremlja do groba —
In ž njim strohní pod zemljó.
A z narodom tvoja slava

Na veke, na veke živí;
Oj Trubar, ti národ si vstvaril,
Življenje podaril mu tí.»
Takó je govoril Ungnad ...

Navdušenost sije v očéh,
Veselo pojó kozarci
O lepših bodočih dnéh.
Romantika.
Na zemlji noč temnà leží;
Tam v cerkvi mlad menìh klečí:
«Oj večni bog, gospod svetá,
Ti gledaš mi na dnò srcá,
Na dnò srcá, kjer noč in dan
Te vnovič križa greh strašan:
Le ona polni mi glavó,
Povsod le gledam njó, le njó;
Kot večne luči sveti žar
Gorí očíj prelepih par,
Kot zárije večerne kras
Žarí nebeški njen obràz ...
Kakó kipí mi vroča krí,
Kakó si je srcé želí
Kedàr jo vidijo očí ...
O bog dobrotni, ti me čuj,
Ljubezni grešne me varuj!»
Na zemlji noč temnà leží

Tam v cerkvi deklica klečí!
«Ti veš, Madona, kaj trpím,
Ti sáma veš, kakó greším ...
Ne tečejo mi več solzé,
Nobeden vzdih več ne pové
Kakó umíra mi srcé ...
Le k njemu sili moj korak,
Le njega vidi pógled vsak;
Njegovo lice je bledó,
Ah, belo kot mrtvaški prt;
Temnó njegovo je okó,
Iz njega gleda črna smrt;
In kadar stopi pred oltar,
Obkroža ga svetniški žar ...
Kakó ga ljubim presrčnó,
Kakó jaz zanj živim samó ...
O ti, Madona, ti me čuj,
Ljubezni grešne me varuj!»
V sanjàh polnočnih spava svet,
S kopréno lunino odét;
In sredi cerkve, bled in tih
Leží tam v krsti mlad menìh ...
«O bog, ti duši pókoj daj,
Ti vsprejmi jo v nebeški raj ...»
Ko zvon mrtvaški zazvoní,
Deklè na postelji leží, —
Obràz je bled, mrtvé očí ...
Teló ji s cvetjem potresó,
Glavó ji z vencem ovijó.
Sultanove sandale.
Vsi vezirji in vse paše,
Vse klečalo je pred njim:
«Slava ti, nebeško solnce,
Slava, sultan Ibrahim!
Nihče, kar jih je sedelo

Na prestolu kdaj popred,
Do kolena ti ne seže
Niti prorok Mahomed.
Ah, kedàr te vzame Allah

K sebi v sveti sedmi raj,
Kaj bo z nami, kaj bo z nami
S hlapci tvojimi tedaj!»
To so tarnali, jokáli,
In še bolj in zmirom bolj;
On pa sname z nog sandale,
Položí jih na prestòl.
«Ne prestanite, otroci,

Le togujte še naprej:
Tukaj dam vam te sandale,
Da slavíte jih odslej.»
In vse paše, vsi vezirji,

Vse hitelo je navskriž:
«Oj sandale, naša radost,
Ve naš bog, naš paradiž —»
To poskoči takrat sultan,

To jim zakričí v obraz:
«Uh, vi tepci, vi sleparji,
Kaj ste rekli, da sem jaz? ...
Ibrahim je na prestolu —
On je solnce, on je kralj;
Na prestolu so sandale,
In vaš kralj je par sandal.
Pridi, Omar, pa jih ženi

Po vsem mestu naokrog
In oznanjaj: «To so hlapci
In sandale so jim bog!»
Dve nočí.
Tam v deželi čudolepi
Kjer nebeško solnce vzhaja
Vladal je nešteta ljudstva
V davnih časih moder kralj.
Svetla noč zemljó objame;

In objame kralja žalost,
In zahrepení mu duša
Med duhove tja v višave.
Jasno je nebó visoko
In nad jasnim nebom vlada
Na prestolu čudokrasnem
Zemlje in nebá vladár.
Klanjajo se mu duhovi,
Vsi v prelepih zlatih haljah;
Vsi duhovi duša jedna,
Duša jedna, lepa, jasna
Lepa kot nebó večerno,
Jasna kot pomladni dan
In kot beli cvet nedolžna ...
Žalosten ozrè se kralj
Tjà na črno, tiho zemljo;
Črna kot zavržen angelj
Plava trudna pod višavo,
In na zemlji bleda žalost,
Strast in greh in hladna smrt.
Zadrhtéla je od sráma,
Ah od studa zadrhtéla
Mu je duša idealna.
«To ní bajka, — dà, iz íla,
Iz umazanega blata
So ustvarjena ta trupla;
In razgnílo je že davno
Kar je bilo duše v njih ...»
Trdo je na zémljo pala
Kraljeva mogočna róka,
In drhtèl je grešnik v strahu,
V strahu róke vil in molil ...
—————————
Plava kralj v opojni sreči
V svojem tihem, lepem hramu;
Síje mu v obràz goreči
Skozi okno lunin žar,
Síje v belo, krasno líce
Králjeve ljubimke mlade.
In teló se trese njemu,
In poljublja v sladki strasti
In objemlje dèkle krasno ...
«Ah ti sladka moja duša,
Ti življenje moje drago —
Rož duhtečih si nasula
V srce moje žálostno —
Odgrníla je gardíne,
Sence temne je razgnala
Tvoja róka od baržuna, —
Da je solnce posijalo
Na ves lepi, jasni svet ...»
In po zemlji vsi prostrani
Srečo trosi kralj mogočni,
In ves narod se mu klanja
In ves svet mu poje slavo.
Intermezzo v nebesih.
Visoko tam nad zvezdami
Ob oknu bog sloní
In Azraelu, angelju,
Otožno govorí:
«Oj smrtni angelj Azrael,

Poglédi na zemljó,
Poglej pod nama starca tam
Kakó strmí v nebó —
Kakó vzdihuje, moli spet:

‚Le jedno si želím,
Popréd ko pred obrazom ti
Na smrtni dan stojím.
Prelepe tiste dní, gospod,

Dočakati mi daj,
Ko pošlješ nam na zemljo dol
Svoj mirni, jasni ràj;
Ah, daj mi gledati, gospod,

Prelepe tiste dní,
Kot sta nam jih oznanjala
Tolstoj in Bellamy ...‘
Nagíblje se, oj starec moj,

Na véčer že tvoj čas,
A večno ne živí nihčè
Kot Ahasver in jaz.
Razpnì peroti, Azrael,

Poléti na zemljó,
Pa z róko svojo žámetno
Zatísni mu okó ...»
In tiho dvoje temnih kril

Na zemljo dol hití ...
Visoko tam nad zvezdami
Ob oknu bog sloní.
Slavina.
Pol kraljestva dal je tebi Kruko
In še vedno ti je čelo mračno!
Kjer počíje pógled tvoj, o Henrik,
Zemljo krasno vidiš, zemljo svojo:
Ta ravnina pod teboj zelena,
Bistri viri in šumeče reke,
Črni gozdi in visoke gore
In v daljavi jezera bleščeča —
Vse je tvoje, ti pa si otožen!
«Kaj mi hoče moje svetlo žezlo,

Kaj mi hoče moja krasna zemlja?
Da imel bi jo pod žezlom svojim
Vso državo Lótarja vladarja,
In še večjo, večjo ... in vso zemljo!
Da sedèl bi na prestolu zlatem,
Da bi kronal me sam Oče rimski,
In pred mano bi ves svet se klanjal, —
Pa ostalo srce bi nesrečno! ...
Ti, Slavina, si kraljestvo moje;
In ko dala žezlo bi mi v roko,
Na glavó mi krono položila,
Kralj na svetu bil bi najsrečnejši! ...
Naj mi skloni tilnik jeza božja,
Če ne pahnem te s prestola, Kruko!
Pol podaril si mi zemlje svoje,
Zemlje, ki si mojemu očetu
Bíl iztrgal jo z nasilno róko ...
A imej jo, zemljo dedov mojih,
Dar tvoj vrnem ti v naročje željno, —
Vse bogastvo moje, vse gradove,
Vzemi vse, a meni daj Slavíno ...
Ne, prositi nečem te pohlevno:
Ti očetu zemljo si iztrgal —
Sin iztrga tebi lepo ženo ...»
To premišlja Henrik v strasti svoji

Tam ob Peni na visokem gradu,
Na visokem gradu kralja Kruka.
Tàkrat zástor težki se razgrne
In Slavína obstojí med vrati;
Lice belo skríva si v kopréno,
Zatrepeče glas ji v polutemi:
«Ako ljubiš, knez, življenje svoje,
Hitro konja brzega zajaši,
Pa odbeži skrivno v temni noči;
Kralj te vabi jutri na gostíjo, —
A ne vabi te na rujno vino, —
Piti hoče tvojo kri, — o Henrik! ...»
———————————
In prisije v jutru zlato solnce.
Hrup in šum po gradu se razlega:
Kralj pripravlja víteško gostíjo.
Po vseh potih na konjičih iskrih
Proti gradu vítezi hitijo.
Po dvoranah šetajo se lahno
Deve krasne s krasnimi junaki;
A najlepša je kraljica mlada
In junak je Henrik najkrasnejši.
Kruko sede na visoki préstol —
V hipu vtihne govorjenje sladko.
Svetle čaše nosijo strežaji,
Z rujnim vinom polnijo jih gostom.
In s prestola vstane temni Kruko,
Mirno stopi Henriku pred lice
In visoko dvigne čašo zlato:
«Henrik, srcu mojemu najdražji,
V trdno zvezo pij iz čaše moje!»
«Kaj z levico mi napíjaš, Kruko,

A desnico pa za pasom skrívaš?
Glej, prečrne, kralj, so misli tvoje,
Da ostale bi ti v podli duši,
In morílec iz očíj ti gleda! ...
Ti si hotel, da se kri prelíje,
Naj zgodí se, Kruko, volja tvoja!»
Kralju vroča kri privrè iz prsij,
Obledí mu lice v bolečíni
In k nogám se knezu mrtev zgrudi.
Mirno stopi Henrik do prestola,
Meč krvavi mu drží desníca,
Po dvorani zrè okó ponosno:
«Kaj molčíte, ko na zlati préstol
Kralj vam novi seda z žezlom v roki?»
Družba kliče v strahu, začudenju:
«Bog te žívi, novi kralj naš, Henrik!»
In Slavina sede poleg njega.
«Kaj na mizah vino vam počíva
Ko poroča se vladar vaš, Henrik ...?»
Po dvorani čaše zazveníjo.
«Bog te žívi, novi kralj naš, Henrik,
Bog te žívi, o kraljíca krasna!»
Noveleta.
Noč pomladna je objela
Beli dvorec ob Ljubíji;
Tam za vrtom, izza góre
Prisijál je mrzli mesec.
V žalostnem, mrtvaškem svitu

Zablestí zidovje belo,
A na stenah, kot duhovi
Dvígajo se temne sence.
Gori v hramu razsvetljenem,

Tam počíva bolna mati.
Líca trhla in upala
Kot bi smrt dahníla nanje;
Stisnjena so vela ustna;

Iz očí globokih, temnih,
Zdí se, da odseva jasno
Vse življenje v svoji bedi ...
Težko vzdihne bolna mati,

Položí koščeno róko
Okrog vráta mlade žene,
Lepe kot jesenska noč;
Sklonjene nad mrzlo postelj

Kakor bledi smrtni angelj.
Polugasel ogenj sije
V teh očéh udrtih, trudnih;
Onemoglost je razlíta
Na prozorno bledih licih;
Trudno ji ležé na vzglavji
Njene mehke, bele róke.
————————
«Ali, ah, kakó iz greha
Sreča bi se ti rodila?
Ah, kakó bi pač vzcvetele
Rože iz solzá neštetih?
Iz solzá, ki jih jokala

Záte je nesrečna mati,
Dèkle mlado, zapuščeno,
Samo v neizmernem jadu.
Jasno gledam one dneve,

Kot bi jih živela danes,
In srcé, kar je trpelo,
Čuti vroče kot nekdàj ...
Mati moja je jokala,
Vzdihovala in molila,
Sestra je kot na neznanko
Zrla náme in molčala.
Oče moj z obrazom tolstim

In od gnjeva osivelim,
Stiskal je pestí pred mano:
‚Kdo je óni? Odgovôri!‘
Jaz pa sem pisala njemu,

Klicala ga kakor dete,
Klicala ga in prosila,
Da me reši iz sramote.
‚Žalostno mi je živeti,
Žalostno brez tebe, ljubček;
Vsi me gledajo kot tujko,
Samo ti si mi ostàl.
Ah, saj si dejal mi, ljubček,

Da se vrneš hitro, hitro,
In me pred oltar povedeš ...
Pridi k meni, zapuščeni.‘
In prišlò je belo pismo,

Vse dišeče po parfumu,
Z zlatim robom naokoli;
Pismo pa je pisal on.
‚Ni mogoče, draga moja,

Ni mogoče ... Ah, verjemi,
Da sem jokal kakor dete, — —
Ali draga, — ni mogoče.
Res bi rad pohitel k tebi,

Ali služba, to je služba,
In verjemi, nì trenotek
Oddahniti si ne morem.
Pa napósled, — ali prosim,

Da tegà za zlò ne vzameš, —
Mislim, da bi tebe, draga,
Jaz osrečiti ne mogel.
Pač te ljubim kakor nekdaj;

Ali prvo, to je meni
Tvoja sreča ... ah, in zanjo
Hočem darovati svojo ...‘
Ah, kakó je bílo takrat

Mrzlo, pusto srce moje,
Kakor belo, tiho polje
Pod meglenim zimskim nebom ...
Kamor zrè okó boječe —

Vsi obrazi hladni, temni ...
Sama na sovražnem svetu
S tabo, detetom nesrečnim.
In potem brezčutna, mrtva,

Kakor kip od mramorja
Videla ne čula nisem
Kaj se je z menoj godilo ...
A pozneje me zaprosi
Znanec mojega očeta;
Pravil je, da je zaljubljen
V mirni, bledi moj obràz.
Ne jokala, ne prosila,
Nísem se braníla starca;
Vsi so z rámeni majali,
Gledali so čudom náme.
‚Tako lepa, tako mlada ...‘

Ali oče moj je hotel;
In jaz trudna in brezčutna —
Kaj naj plakam, naj vzdihujem?
Ali studa in bojazni

Mogla nísem udušiti;
Kot otrok sem vztrepetala
Kadar se me je dotaknil.
Ta njegov odurni pógled

Iz očíj vodenih, mirnih;
To ledeno, trdo lice,
Kakor líto iz železa! ...
In odvedel me je sabo
V tihi dvorec, na posestvo;
Od takràt je bilo meni
Kakor da živím v okovih.
Kadar so v očéh gorele

Solze ob spomínu nate,
Kadar je bledèl obraz moj
Od bolesti, od kesanja —
Stopil je moj mož pred mene,

Gladil me z rokó po licih:
‚Ah, moj Bog, kakó si krasna,
Ženka moja, kadar plakaš!‘
Jaz pa sem sklenila róki:

‚Daj mi dete, če me ljubiš,
Da ne ginem od obupa ...‘
In klečala sem pred njim ...
Bog odpusti mu brezsrčnost,

Jaz mu nisem odpustila, —
Ah, kakó si, dete moje,
Zaslužilo ti sovraštvo? ...
S svojo težko, trdo róko
Vodil je življenje tvoje;
Zapuščenega otroka
Dal je rokam neljubečim.
Koliko nočíj nemirnih

Gledala sem te pred sabo
Vso razplakano, nesrečno;
In jokala sem s teboj ...
Ali takrat! ... Proti mraku

Vrne se domú iz mesta;
Po večerji pride k meni
Pa naznani mi smehljaje:
‚Skoro da bi bil pozabil:

Dora te pozdravlja ... veš-li?
Jutri je poroka njena.
Mož je sicer malo star —
A bogat je! ... Kakšna škoda,

Da ne moreš z mano v mesto;
Pa bolehna si in nečem,
Da se mi kakó vznemirjaš.‘
Meni je zastalo srce

Od sovraštva, od bolesti,
In v očéh njegovih zlobnih
Brala sem usodo tvojo ...
Reci, če je bilo čudno,

Da sem mirna in brezsrčna
Zrla mu v obràz upali
In v očí umirajoče?
Tretjo noč po onem dnevu

Príšel je domú ves truden;
Vozil se je v mrzli noči
Vroč, pijan in pol razgaljen.
Legel je bolan na postelj

In čez mesec dnij pod zemljo;
A nì jedna gorka solza
Ní mu groba orosila ...
Hladni, mračni duh njegov

Pa ostàl je poleg mene;
Spremljal me je z zlobnim smehom
Po teh mrtvih, temnih sobah.
In sedàj, v trenotkih zadnjih

Spet me gleda porogljívo
Iz očíj ugaslih tvojih,
Iz bolestnega obraza;
Gleda me življenje tvoje

Brez veselja, brez pomladi,
Z vso ljubeznijo brezupno,
Z vsem trpljenjem neizmernim ...»
Skozi polodprto okno

Diha nočni zrak opojni;
Kakor iz daljave daljne
Čuje se šepet valóv ...
————————
«Dora ... Dora! ... To so ženske:
Blebetanje, vzdihovanje!
Jaz te čakam; jutri zgodaj
Vrneva se že domú!» —
Izza temne portijère

Zahreščàl je glas staríkav;
Ona vstane; v bolnem srdu
Zableščé se ji očí.
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Armenias Future Relations With Turkey and The Karabagh Conflict 1St Edition Levon Ter Petrossian Full Chapter PDF

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Armenias Future Relations With Turkey and The Karabagh Conflict 1St Edition Levon Ter Petrossian Full Chapter PDF

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Armenia’s Future, Relations with

Turkey, and the Karabagh Conflict 1st

Russia’s Relations with the GCC and Iran 1st Edition

Resource Conflict and Environmental Relations in Africa

Polarity in International Relations: Past, Present,

Jews in Ancient and Medieval Armenia: First Century BCE

Russia's Interventions in Ethnic Conflicts: The Case of

Biological Reaction Engineering: Dynamic Modeling

The Wiley Handbook on What Works with Girls and Women

Political Islamists in Turkey and the Gülen Movement

ISBN 978-3-319-58915-2 ISBN 978-3-319-58916-9 (eBook)

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017946712

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

Cover illustration: © Tigran Hayrapetyan / Getty Images

Printed on acid-free paper

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by Springer Nature

A number of individuals have made important contributions to this project.

1 Foreword: The Struggle to Change the Logic of

2 The Early Challenges to the Traditional Narrative,

3 Armenian-Turkish Relations After Independence

4 The Karabagh Conﬂict and the Future of Armenian

5 Views on the Karabagh Conﬂict and the Armenian Turkish

6 The Politics and Geopolitics of the Process of Normalization

7 Peace with Neighbors Has No Good Alternatives 131

Foreword: The Struggle to Change the Logic

Levon Ter-Petrossian, whose select articles, speeches, and interviews dealing

© The Author(s) 2018 1

which Armenia was headed and responding to public demand, he returned

Muslim Azeris,” implying that the conﬂict was a clash of conﬂicting

Armenian mobilization show complete unawareness of any philosophical or

the neighbors, as opposed to reliance on a great power to extract conces-

(Chap. 6, document 3), making a special point of distinguishing between the

who was Ter-Petrossian’s opponent in the 1996 presidential elections—

joined the Karabagh movement in 1988. The research he conducted follow-

The Early Challenges to the Traditional

1 THE DANGEROUS SCARECROW

Karabagh Committee’s Response to Zory Balayan’s Speech on Pan-Turanism1

The Armenia Committee of the Karabagh Movement [Karabagh Commit-

© The Author(s) 2018 13

2 HOW SHOULD WE THINK ABOUT OUR RELATIONS

Excerpt from an interview to the newspaper Republic of Armenia4

. . . The fourth key problem confronting Armenia is its isolation, which we

3 THE MOST IMPORTANT GUARANTEE OF ARMENIA’S

different systematically developed political strategy, not demands for iso-

4 REJECTING FANTASIES AND NORMALIZING RELATIONS

Excerpt from a Speech Delivered at the Second Congress of the Armenian

. . .Another accusation, which has a history, is that the Armenian National

it normal for political parties and organizations to include these issues in

The normalization of Armenian-Turkish relations is but one of the many

5 THE MAIN GUARANTEE OF OUR SECURITY

Excerpt from an Interview with the Russian Newspaper Nezavisimaya

– Mutalibov9 has claimed that what is taking place is “Armenian expansion.”

We have already clariﬁed our position on that question, including in the

endured conquest and subjugation by various Islamic states and empires

Armenian-Turkish Relations After

1 THE OBSTACLES ON THE PATH OF NORMALIZATION

Excerpt from a speech delivered at the Fourth Congress of the Armenian

© The Author(s) 2018 23

succeeded in removing psychological barriers along that path. In particular,

2 THE HIGH POINT OF COOPERATION BETWEEN ARMENIA

Excerpt from the press conference on November 11, 19923

– What is Armenia’s policy toward Turkey?

In our relations with Turkey we have been guided by the strategy of