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Asking and Telling in Conversation
F OU N DAT IO N S O F H UM A N I N T E R AC T IO N
General Editor: N. J. Enfield, Max Planck Institute for Psycholinguistics, Radboud University,
Nijmegen, and the University of Sydney
This series promotes new interdisciplinary research on the elements of human sociality, in
particular as they relate to the activity and experience of communicative interaction and
human relationships. Books in this series explore the foundations of human interaction from
a wide range of perspectives, using multiple theoretical and methodological tools. A premise
of the series is that a proper understanding of human sociality is only possible if we take a truly
interdisciplinary approach.
Series Editorial Board:

Michael Tomasello (Max Planck Institute Leipzig)
Dan Sperber (Jean Nicod Institute)
Elizabeth Couper-Kuhlen (University of Helsinki)
Paul Kockelman (University of Texas, Austin)
Sotaro Kita (University of Warwick)
Tanya Stivers (University of California, Los Angeles)
Jack Sidnell (University of Toronto)
Recently published in the series:

Agent, Person, Subject, Self
Paul Kockelman
Exploring the Interactional Instinct
Edited by Anna Dina L. Joaquin and John H. Schumann
Relationship Thinking
N. J. Enfield
Talking About Troubles in Conversation
Gail Jefferson
Edited by Paul Drew, John Heritage, Gene Lerner, and Anita Pomerantz
The Instruction of Imagination
Daniel Dor
How Traditions Live and Die
Olivier Morin
The Origins of Fairness
Nicolas Baumard
Requesting Responsibility
Jörg Zinken
Accountability in Social Interaction
Jeffrey Robinson
Intercorporeality
Edited by Christian Meyer, Jürgen Streeck, and J. Scott Jordan
Repairing the Broken Surface of Talk
Gail Jefferson
Edited by Jörg Bergmann and Paul Drew
The Normative Animal?
Neil Roughley and Kurt Bayertz
When Conversation Lapses
Elliott M. Hoey
Communicating & Relating
Robert B. Arundale
Face-to-Face Dialogue
Janet Beavin Bavelas
Asking and Telling
in Conversation
A N I TA P OM E R A N T Z
1
3
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford. It furthers
the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship, and education
by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of Oxford University
Press in the UK and certain other countries.
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America.
© Oxford University Press 2021
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by license, or under terms agreed with the appropriate reproduction
rights organization. Inquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above.
You must not circulate this work in any other form

and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer.
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Names: Pomerantz, Anita, author.
Title: Asking and telling in conversation / Anita Pomerantz.
Description: New York, NY : Oxford University Press, [2021] |
Series: Foundations of human interaction | Includes bibliographical references and index. |
Identifiers: LCCN 2020036195 (print) | LCCN 2020036196 (ebook) |
ISBN 9780190927431 (hardback) | ISBN 9780190927448 (paperback) |
ISBN 9780190927462 (epub) | ISBN 9780197522875
Subjects: LCSH: Conversation analysis. | Questioning. | Social interaction. |
Interpersonal communication.
Classification: LCC P95.45 .P66 2021 (print) | LCC P95.45 (ebook) | DDC 302.34/6—dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020036195
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020036196
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190927431.001.0001
9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
Paperback printed by Marquis, Canada
Hardback printed by Bridgeport National Bindery, Inc., United States of America
Contents
Series Editor’s Preface vii

Acknowledgments  ix
Glossary of Transcript Symbols  xi
Introduction  1
1. Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features
of Preferred/Dispreferred Turn Shapes  11
Commentary  60
2. Compliment Responses: Notes on the Co-operation
of Multiple Constraints  65
Commentary  98
3. Offering a Candidate Answer: An Information Seeking
Strategy  103
Commentary  123
4. Telling My Side: “Limited Access” as a “Fishing” Device  127
Commentary  140
5. Attributions of Responsibility: Blamings  143
Commentary  154
6. Investigating Reported Absences: “Neutrally” Catching
the Truants  157
Commentary  179
7. Extreme Case Formulations: A Way of Legitimizing Claims  183
Commentary  195
8. Giving a Source or Basis: The Practice in Conversation of
Telling “How I Know”  199
Commentary  220
vi Contents
9. Inferring the Purpose of a Prior Query and Responding

Accordingly  223
Commentary  241
10. Concluding Remarks  245
Index  257
Series Editor’s Preface
In December 1975, just two weeks after her doctoral supervisor, Harvey Sacks,
was tragically killed at age forty, freshly minted PhD Anita Pomerantz presented
at the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in San
Francisco. Her paper was titled “Why Compliments Get Rejected.” The study,
which appears as a chapter in this book under the title “Compliment Responses,”
is the type of work that exemplifies her foundational contributions to research
on human interaction and language-mediated sociality. Pomerantz’s puzzle
concerning compliments begins with a “Dear Abby” column: Perplexed won-
ders why his wife “can’t accept a compliment without putting herself down.”
Pomerantz’s analysis invokes the idea of preference in interaction, and with this
she explains the awkwardness of accepting compliments. There is a conflict of
incentives: It is socially preferable to agree with what others say, but at the same
time it is socially preferable not to praise oneself. Problems of constraint satis-
faction are usually encountered in theoretical domains of economics or evolu-
tionary psychology. Pomerantz’s pioneering work instead is grounded squarely
in social practice. This collection is a landmark in research on social interac-
tion, bringing together core analysis and findings of studies from throughout
Pomerantz’s long career as a conversation analyst. It is a searching inquiry into
the sociality of information exchange.
N.J.E.
Sydney, June 2020
Acknowledgments
I am grateful to the publishers for their agreements to republish the following

papers in this volume:
Pomerantz, A. (1984). Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some

Features of Preferred/Dispreferred Turn Shapes. In J. M. Atkinson and
J. Heritage (Eds.), Structures of Social Action. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 57–101. Reproduced with permission of Cambridge
University Press.
Pomerantz, A. (1978). Compliment Responses: Notes on the Co-operation
of Multiple Constraints. In J. Schenkein (Ed.), Studies in the Organization
of Conversational Interaction. New York: Academic Press, 79– 112.
Reproduced with permission of Elsevier.
Pomerantz, A. (1988). Offering a Candidate Answer: An Information Seeking
Strategy. Communication Monographs 55: 360–373. Reproduced with per-
mission of Taylor and Francis.
Pomerantz, A. (1980). Telling My Side: “Limited Access” as a “Fishing”
Device. Sociological Inquiry 50, nos. 3–4: 186–198. Reproduced with per-
mission of Wiley-Blackwell.
Pomerantz, A. (1978). Attributions of Responsibility: Blamings. Sociology
12: 115–121. Reproduced with permission of Clarendon Press/Oxford
University Press.
Pomerantz, A. (2004). Investigating Reported Absences: “Neutrally” Catching
the Truants. In G. Lerner (Ed.), Conversation Analysis: Studies from the
First Generation. Philadelphia: John Benjamins, 109–129. Reproduced
with permission of John Benjamins.
Pomerantz, A. (1986). Extreme Case Formulations: A Way of Legitimizing
Claims. Human Studies 9, nos. 2–3: 219–229. Reproduced with permission
of Springer Nature.
Pomerantz, A. (1984). Giving a Source or Basis: The Practice in Conversation
of Telling “How I Know.” Journal of Pragmatics 8: 607–625. Reproduced
with permission of Elsevier.
Pomerantz, A. (2017). Inferring the Purpose of a Prior Query and Responding
Accordingly. In G. Raymond, G. H. Lerner, and J. Heritage (Eds.), Enabling
Human Conduct. Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 61– 77.
Reproduced with permission of John Benjamins.
Glossary of Transcript Symbols
The transcript notation used in this book was developed by Gail Jefferson.
[ Left square brackets indicate the onset of overlapping, or simultaneous, speech
by two or more speakers.
Cust: I haven’t got the [other one.
Rep: [What’s thuh date on the bill?
] Right square brackets indicate the point where overlapping speech ends. This
may not be marked if it is not analytically important to show where one person’s
speaking “in the clear” begins or resumes.
Andy: We’re all gonna meet ‘n come back he[re `n then we’ll go back.]
Mom: [I don’t understand that-] See- I
thought you w’d meet here
(0.5) Numbers in parentheses indicate a timed pause (within a turn) or gap (between
turns) represented in tenths of a second.
Ted: Or you could have a barbecue at uh (0.2) Indian School.
(3.5)
Carol: Just be easier he:re.
(.) A dot in parentheses indicates a “micropause,” hearable but not readily measur-
able; conventionally less than 0.2 seconds.
Eddie: Oh yeah. (.) Yeah, that’s right, yeah.
: Colons are used to indicate the prolongation or stretching of the sound just pre-
ceding them. The more colons, the longer the stretching.
Cop: Go over the:re, go over there and siddown and be coo::l. A’right?
- A hyphen after a word or part of a word indicates a cut-off or self-interruption,
often done with a glottal or dental stop.
Doc: And for the p-for the pain I’ve g-I’ve given you something called
Dolobid.
. A period indicates a falling, or final, intonation contour, not necessarily the end
of a sentence.
Dad: I did not know. that you needed to know the location of the-(.) film.
? A question mark indicates rising intonation, not necessarily a question.
Dad: If you? (.) wanna look at em now? you can look at em now?
xii Glossary of Transcript Symbols
, A comma indicates “continuing” intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary.

Gor: D’y’ave a goo-(0.4) you had a good time?
Den: Yeah I di:d, I had a lot of fun.
= Equal signs within or between turns mark speaking as “latched,” with no break
or pause, when a speaker makes two grammatical units vocally continuous, or
the onset of a next speaker’s turn follows the prior speaker’s turn immediately
without break or pause.
Carl: And-you know=you know what’s uh goin’ on right now?=It’s theSa:n
Genaro festival.
=...= Two equal signs are used to show the continuation of an utterance from the end
of one line to the start of a successive line when overlapping speech comes be-
tween the two lines.
Ava: Yea:h. Like group therapy. Yuh know [half the grou]p thet we had=
Bee: [0 h : : : ]
Ava: = la:s’ term wz there en we wz jus’ playing arou:nd.
Word Underlining is used to indicate some form of contrastive vocal stress or emphasis.
Pat: And uh: erm I need, really nee:d (0.2) um:: (0.5) reading glasses.
WORD Capital letters are used to indicate markedly higher volume.
Staff: She called the number?
Boss: And she should [’ve gotten a fair]
Staff: [she GOT THIS] co:nference?
°word° The degree sign indicates that the talk following it was markedly quiet or soft.
When there are two degree signs, the talk between them is markedly softer.
Doc: How long has this been going on?
(1.2)
Pat: About three or four months?
Doc: °Mm mm.°
↑ or ↓ The up and down arrows occur prior to marked rises or falls in pitch.
Staff: Well- my question is ↓this,=she sa:ys that she gave them the
information they ↑wan↓ted.
>< The stretch of talk between inequality signs in the order “more than”/“less than”
indicates that the talk between them is compressed or rushed.
Mar: Yeah,=b’t we don’ wannen extre:me scen[a:rio
Mal: [>No,=I know<
<> The stretch of talk between inequality signs in the order “less than”/“more than”
indicates that the talk between them is markedly slowed or drawn out.
Ann: They sponsored this vide↓o (0.5) <a:nd (.) the sci:ence depa:rtment
ma::de>, (0.4) six hundred
Glossary of Transcript Symbols xiii
hhh Hearable aspiration or laugh particles; the more h’s, the longer the aspiration.
Aspiration or laugh particles within words may appear within parentheses.
Les: aa,hhhhwhich ‘e dzn’t ↓no:rmally (.) bother to do.
Skip: So’ee said where the devil do you(hh)u ↑come vro(h)m
·hh Hearable inbreaths are marked with h’s prefaced with a dot (or a raised dot).
Ellen: I mean (0.4) well I think it’s kinda good news. [·hhh]
Jeff: [↑Tell] me
(word) Parentheses around all or part of an utterance, or a speaker identification, indi-
cate transcriber uncertainty, but a likely possibility.
Mom: (I don’t understand that-see-) I thought you w’d meet he:re ’n
have a barbecue.
( ) Blank space inside single parentheses instead of a speaker ID indicates the tran-
scriber could not tell who spoke; blank space inside single parentheses in the
transcript indicates that something was being said but it was unintelligible; the
size of the space is relative to the amount of talk that was unintelligible.
Dad: Well. That-(0.2) Ya don’t need ta:: (0.2) Well yeah, once we take th’
cover [off]. As long as the cover’s =
( ): [( )]
Dad: = o:n (0.2) ah, we don’t need ta >worry and it’s heating up ni:ce.
(( )) Matter within double parentheses is a transcriber’s comment or description.
Mark: When I went to one of their meetings at Bouchard ((a tugboat
company)) they had a couple of attorneys there
Introduction
This book brings together nine of my papers on the topic of asking and telling.
Each paper analyzes complexities that are involved when people ask or tell some-
thing to other people. Some complexities that are illuminated in the papers are:
• Asking and telling is not only about information exchange. It includes

sharing our opinions, reactions, and evaluations via assessments.
• Implicit and explicit knowledge claims and expectations are foundational to
asking and telling activities.
• Participants engage in, and understand, asking and telling activities in
relation to the sequence of actions in which those activities reside and,
when relevant, as part of a course of action or interactional project being
realized.
• Actions that are performed through asking and telling may be regarded as
relationally supportive or unsupportive and/or as helpful or detrimental to
the participants’ interactional projects.
• The ways participants perform actions reflect the participants’ orientations
to the actions and implicitly propose how the actions should be regarded.
• The participants’ sense of what is appropriate/inappropriate to ask and tell
bears on whether and how they do so.
• Participants directly and indirectly seek information, and they directly and
indirectly provide information.
• Participants use reports to perform other actions.
For each of the nine papers, I wrote a short lead-in that precedes the paper
and a commentary that follows it. The lead-in, in italics, identifies the research
interests that drove the analysis. The commentary provides my current sense
of the paper, including a critique of it when relevant. As I conducted some
of the research, including the work on preference organization, nearly fifty
years ago, I have had ample time to reflect on these papers. In the remainder
of the introduction, I briefly describe the atmosphere during the early years
of Conversation Analysis (CA), my approach to the field, themes that occur
across several of the papers, the order of the papers, and the central points of
each paper.
Asking and Telling in Conversation. Anita Pomerantz, Oxford University Press (2021). © Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190927431.003.0001
2 Asking and Telling in Conversation
The Early Years of Conversation Analysis
In the late 1960s and first half of the 1970s, the climate that the CA cohort ex-
perienced was one in which we saw language and social interaction scholars
exploring and developing a different way of doing social science than had been
accepted theretofore. The excitement of doing this kind of innovative research
was rooted in the sense of discovering new ways of seeing everyday ordinary in-
teraction. The focus on discovery led us away from searching for prior research
to build upon and cite and toward immersing ourselves in the details of social
interaction and social life.
During this period, I came to understand that the goal of CA is to analyze
how social life and social interaction are constituted. This includes describing
the resources available in our culture that interactants use in performing and
interpreting actions, activities, persons, scenes, and so on. This sense of CA can
be seen in Harvey Sacks’s lecture “Suicide as a Device for Discovering if Anybody
Cares” (Sacks, 1992), when he discussed how isolated old ladies sitting in the
park organize their days:
Even though they have almost no money they, for example, never purchase at
supermarkets and never purchase more than a day’s food. Because if they did,
they’d have nothing to do the next day. And they routinely will get up—you’ll be
sitting in the park talking to them, the only person who’s talked to them since
God knows when—they nevertheless get up and say “It’s 11 o’clock, I have to go
home and check the mail.” Now there’s nobody who’s writing to them. What it
is, is that there’s that trash mail coming, and that’s something. (p. 39)
From its inception, CA’s goal has been to discover how meaning is created and
maintained in and through the practices engaged in by members of the culture.
One further aspect of the early work is that it dealt with not just word selec-
tion, categories, and sequences but also, importantly, with the inferential work
that was associated with the talk and action. An example can be seen in Sacks’s
analysis of the MIR device. He asserted that categories for members of the cul-
ture are inference-rich and then gave examples of how that feature is used in in-
teraction (Sacks, 1992, pp. 40–48).
My Approach to Conversation Analysis
I learned to analyze interaction in the early days of CA’s development. I took a

course with Harvey Sacks in the Sociology Department’s master of arts program
at UCLA in the 1960s and was intrigued by his novel approach to understanding
Introduction 3
social interaction. When he left UCLA to teach at UC Irvine in the late 1960s,
I transferred to a doctoral program at UC Irvine to continue to work with
him. I attended his lectures and participated in his graduate seminars, and on
occasion I went to UCLA to sit in on Harold Garfinkel’s seminars. Our training
consisted of participating in data sessions in which we listened to audio-recorded
phone interactions or watched videotaped interactions, attending seminars
in which we presented our analyses to each other, and writing papers that we
handed in for feedback. Harvey Sacks and Manny Schegloff were on my disser-
tation committee and provided ways of thinking and analyzing data that I value
and have carried with me throughout my career.
CA works to account for the orderliness of human action. While identifying
regularities of conduct is an important step in working up an analysis, it is not it-
self a complete analysis. An analysis involves not only identifying regularities but
also, importantly, proposing an organization that can account for them. Some
regularities may be accounted for by noting the participants’ orientation to rights
and obligations and/or to maxims. A regularity that Sacks noticed is that when
a baby cries and a woman picks it up, observers see the woman as the mother of
the baby. To explain the basis of that regularity, Sacks proposed the following
viewer’s maxim: “If a Member sees a category-bound activity being done, then
if one can see it being done by a member of a category to which the activity is
bound, see it that way” (Sacks, 1992, p. 259). He also discussed the subversion of
viewer’s maxims, situations in which a person adopts an appearance that is asso-
ciated with a category when that person would otherwise be seen in a different
category (p. 254).
There are many models aimed at explaining social action. One model is
that social action is a consequence of normative constraints; people generally
follow norms and are sanctioned for observably violating them. Another model
proposes that social action occurs when actors select strategies to actualize their
interests and goals. A third model views social actors as responding to moment-
to-moment contingencies, including interactional and practical problems that
arise. My view of social action draws from all three of these models. In my pa-
pers, I sometimes argue that participants’ ways of performing actions are shaped
by normative constraints. Other times I have treated participants’ strategies as
responsive to the problems they face at particular interactional junctures. All of
my papers appreciate the fact that the point at which a participant contributes
talk and gestures within a sequence of actions is fundamental to understanding
of talk and gestures. I believe all of my research seeks to discover the shared
understandings and reasoning associated with practices that I analyzed.
Sacks provides a good example of participants using a culturally available
practice to solve an interactional problem. He observed that when a psychiatrist
asked a potential patient “How are you feeling?” the potential patient responded
with “It’s a long story” or “It’ll take hours” (Sacks, 1992, pp. 14–15). Sacks argued
that the dilemma the potential patients face is that they want to present their
troubles but feel it is inappropriate to do so directly following a ceremonial
opening such as “How are you feeling?” In responding with something like “It’s a
long story” or “It’ll take hours,” patients offer a tentative refusal while inviting the
psychiatrist to give the go-ahead to talk about the problem. The culturally avail-
able device of tentatively refusing is a solution to their dilemma.
As a conversation analyst, I had significant exposure to two disciplines. I was
trained as a sociologist and had my first positions in sociology departments, then
spent the remainder of my academic career in communication departments.
Whereas sociologists study the constitution of social order with an interest in the
cultural machinery or apparatus that provides for meaning-making, communica-
tion scholars consider strategy as a key concept and study how strategies are used to
accomplish the participants’ goals. My research draws on both disciplines.
Complexities in Asking and Telling Activities
Several kinds of complexities are made visible in the analyses of asking and
telling practices. In what follows I indicate four of the complexities: (1) the
interconnections between knowledge claims and asking and telling, (2) the ways
asking and telling activities depend upon their places in sequences of actions
and interactional projects, (3) how responsibility is attributed and negotiated for
blameworthy or praiseworthy attributes and actions, and (4) the ways in which
moral orientations influence how asking and telling activities are performed.
Knowledge Claims
Knowledge claims are part and parcel of asking and telling. I analyzed their place
in asking and telling activities throughout my career, from my earliest works to
my most recent papers. The entitlement to assess a referent is gained by having
had firsthand experience of the referent, and an implicit claim of knowledge is
made when an assessment is offered (Chapters 1 and 2). The knowledge claims
of the speaker and the speaker’s assumptions about the recipient’s knowledge are
central to performing indirect actions (Chapters 4 and 5). Participants exhibit
carefulness by invoking or implying limited knowledge when damaging evi-
dence is sought or presented (Chapter 6). In discussing various question forms,
I presented a radically different approach to epistemics than was popular at that
time (Chapter 3).
Introduction 5
Sequences of Actions and Interactional Projects
The prior actions and/or the anticipated upcoming actions are central for deter-
mining the actions being performed by reports. When a report is in response po-
sition, the prior action constrains what is relevant to report. When certain kinds
of reports are in sequence-initial position, they can prompt specific actions in
response. This is particularly visible in Chapters 1, 2, 4, and 5. Understanding a
report’s place in a sequence of actions is part of understanding what action the
report is performing.
In addition to the relevance of sequences of actions for asking and telling activ-
ities, interactional projects shape the participants’ understanding of the actions.
Alternating between the terms “an interactional project,” “a course of action,”
“an interactional line or stance,” and “a thematic thread,” Schegloff described the
phenomenon as follows:
Under whatever term, what is at issue here is a course of conduct being devel-
oped over a span of time (not necessarily in consecutive sequences) to which
co-participants may become sensitive, which may begin to inform their inspec-
tion of any next sequence start to see whether or how it related to the suspected
project, theme, stance, etc. (Schegloff, 2007, p. 244)
When the attendance office clerk called the home of an absent student, the insti-
tutionally defined interactional project was to merely gather and provide infor-
mation, not to arrive at a judgment about the status of the absence (Chapter 6). In
response to requests for information, recipients take into account the request in
relation to the inferred purpose of the question and the questioner’s interactional
project (Chapter 9).
Attributing and Negotiating Responsibility
When participants talk about praiseworthy or blameworthy actions, attributes,

or outcomes, they negotiate how much and what kind of credit or blame is de-
served. When responding to compliments, participants have ways of negoti-
ating the amount of credit they deserve and/or who or what deserves the credit
(Chapter 2). Participants report unhappy outcomes to involved parties to elicit
the recipients’ accounts of how and why they performed the blameworthy
actions (Chapter 5). A speaker may back away from taking authorship respon-
sibility for a delicate or offensive formulation by attributing the formulation to a
person other than oneself (Chapter 8).
Moral Judgments Regarding Actions
In social conversations between friends, participants treated the actions of

agreeing with co-participants’ evaluative observations as supportive and dis-
agreeing with them as potentially threatening or disruptive (Chapters 1 and 2).
On some occasions participants treated the action of directly seeking informa-
tion as normal and unproblematic (Chapter 3), while on other occasions they
treated it as intrusive and/or offensive and sought the information indirectly
(Chapter 4). Participants often treated the actions of criticizing and accusing co-
participants of wrongdoing as delicate or offensive, and they opted to perform
them indirectly (Chapter 5) or to attribute authorship to sources other than one-
self (Chapter 8).
The Order of the Papers
After experimenting with numerous ways of sequencing the papers, I decided that
none of them stood out from the other possibilities. I ended up putting my papers
on the preference organizations that apply to responses to assessments as the first
two chapters. One reason for the early positioning is that assessments, including
evaluative observations, understandings of reports, reactions to experiences,
compliments, self-deprecations, and so on, are pervasively sought and told, and
hence belong in a lead position in a book on asking and telling. Another reason
for placing “Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features of
Preferred/Dispreferred Turn Shapes” and “Compliment Responses: Notes on the
Co-operation of Multiple Constraints” early in the book is that I am best known
for my early publications on preference organization.
The next three chapters concern direct and indirect actions. Chapter 3,
“Offering a Candidate Answer: An Information Seeking Strategy,” discusses
features of various methods of directly seeking information and analyzes
the complexities of one explicit information- seeking practice. Chapter 4,
“Telling My Side: ‘Limited Access’ as a ‘Fishing’ Device,” describes the kind of
telling that is used to indirectly seek information. Chapter 5, “Attributions of
Responsibility: Blamings,” illuminates a kind of telling that functions to prompt
recipients to address their responsibility for untoward outcomes.
Chapter 6, “Investigating Reported Absences: ‘Neutrally’ Catching the
Truants” is the only case study included in this book. I analyzed telephone
interactions drawn from a single setting: calls in which the interactional
project involved the exchange of information. The practices for seeking and
reporting information that I analyzed in this setting are used in other settings
as well.
Introduction 7
The papers in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 contain analyses of different phe-

nomena under one rubric. Chapter 7, “Extreme Case Formulations: A Way of
Legitimizing Claims” analyzes three distinct functions of the formulations in the
collection. Chapter 8, “Giving a Source or Basis: The Practice in Conversation of
Telling ‘How I Know,’ ” analyzes at least two uses of including a source or basis
of an assertion or action. Chapter 9, “Inferring the Purpose of a Prior Query
and Responding Accordingly,” analyzes three kinds of inferences that recipients
make and describes resources used to make each type of inference.
Brief Description of Papers
In “Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features of Preferred/

Dispreferred Turn Shapes” (Chapter 1), I examine features of responses in two
sequential environments: when neither party is responsible for the evaluated ref-
erent and when a prior speaker has offered a self-deprecation. I demonstrate that
the relevant alternatives for responding in each of these sequential environments
are produced very differently, and I propose an organization that accounts for
the differences.
In the paper “Compliment Response: Notes on the Co-operation of Multiple
Constraints” (Chapter 2), I start with a puzzle as to why recipients of compliments
do not simply accept the compliments. I propose that when an initial evalua-
tion credits the recipient with a positive attribute, action, or accomplishment,
responding to the compliment involves a situation in which multiple constraints
operate. Speakers rely on a variety of resources to deal with the conflicting
constraints. The resources and ways of responding are detailed in the paper.
As discussed in “Offering a Candidate Answer: An Information Seeking
Strategy” (Chapter 3), questions built with candidate answers (also referred to
as polar or yes-no questions) are used massively in conversational interaction.
Although they seem simple and straightforward, analysis reveals several kinds of
complexities associated with these types of questions. Candidate answer queries
carry claims about the speaker's knowledge. They are understood as the speaker's
best guess and hence display the speaker’s knowledge about the matter at hand.
They also have a moral dimension. Candidate answers may reference a normal,
legitimate possibility versus an abnormal, illegitimate one. The moral status of
the incorporated candidate answer may be read as reflecting the speaker's atti-
tude and sympathy about the matter at hand. Finally, by incorporating a candi-
date answer in a query, a questioner provides a model of what would satisfy the
questioner's purpose in asking.
“Telling My Side: ‘Limited Access’ as a ‘Fishing’ Device” (Chapter 4) describes
a way of seeking information without going on record with an explicit request.
The practice involves a speaker’s reporting recognizably limited access to, and
knowledge of, a situation in which the recipient was an actor. A 'limited access'
formulation may be likened to an outsider's or observer's version of a situation.
This practice is used when there are negative sanctions for directly seeking the
type of information being sought. Its success relies on participants' orienting
to a sequence of actions: the limited access report setting up the relevance of
recipient's providing information. The recipient needs to infer that the speaker
seeks further information and, furthermore, is willing to provide it.
The paper, "Attributions of responsibility: Blamings" (Chapter 5) describes a
practice that may serve as an alternative to directly blaming or accusing the re-
cipient. In reporting an 'unhappy event,' a speaker identifies an unwanted out-
come without indicating what or who is responsible for the outcome. While this
type of report appears to be an informing, it is used to elicit the recipient's ac-
count if offered to a recipient who is implicated in, and possibly responsible for,
the unwanted outcome. The report provides the recipient with the opportunity
to volunteer an account that relates to their responsibility for the unwanted out-
come. The practice relies on the participants' orientation to a sequence of actions.
The report of the unwanted outcome is a sequence initial action. A relevant next
action is for the recipient to offer an account that deals with their responsibility
for the outcome.
The data for the paper “Investigating Reported Absences: ‘Neutrally’ Catching
the Truants” (Chapter 6) consist of telephone calls initiated by a high school at-
tendance office clerk to the home of absent students. The primary purpose of the
calls was to exchange information relevant to a later determination of whether
the student’s absences were legitimate or not. The clerk’s interactional project was
to merely investigate, not to make judgments about the status of the absences.
A primary finding is that when a parent’s report indicated a likely conclusion of
truancy, the clerk sought and provided information differently than when the
parent’s report pointed to a legitimate absence. When the clerk suspected tru-
ancy, she assumed a “neutral” stance, displaying cautiousness by affirming only
what could be asserted with certainty at that time.
One important function described in the paper “Extreme Case
Formulations: A Way of Legitimizing Claims” (Chapter 7) is that these types of
descriptions are used to convince, defend, or justify a claim. When we tell or de-
scribe things in the course of selling, convincing, arguing, defending, justifying,
accusing, complaining, and so on, we design our descriptions in ways that por-
tray a state of affairs as believable, obvious, compelling, unreasonable, illogical,
et cetera. Characterizing an attribute with an extreme case formulation works to
strengthen and/or legitimize the claim being made.
“Giving a Source or Basis: The Practice in Conversation of Telling ‘How
I Know’ ” (Chapter 8) describes several uses for giving a source or basis of an
Introduction 9
assertion. Reporting a source may be used to argue for the validity of a claim,
back away from the validity of a claim, and/or remove oneself from authorship
accountability. The credibility of the cited source is crucial for whether a claim
is portrayed as more or less believable. Interactants report their sources during
disputes, in situations of doubt, and when they perform sensitive actions.
The starting point of the paper “Inferring the Purpose of a Prior Query and
Responding Accordingly” (Chapter 9) was a claim previously made by conversa-
tion analysts: as part of making sense of talk and action, participants answer the
question “Why that now?” The paper examines three different types of inferred
purpose along with the sequential features of each inferred purpose. The process
of inferring the purpose of the prior query relies on the nature of the query, the
actions prior to the query, the ongoing activity, and the relevant membership cat-
egories of the participants.
References
Sacks, H. (1992). Lectures on Conversation. Oxford: Blackwell.
Schegloff, E. A. (2007). Sequence Organization in Interaction. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
1
Agreeing and Disagreeing
with Assessments
Some Features of Preferred/Dispreferred Turn Shapes
This project was driven by two issues. The first was to understand why assessments
are so prominent in our interactions. A partial answer is that assessments are
requested and are offered as the products of experience. We ask for and provide
assessments when we share experiences, calibrate our views and opinions with
others, and demonstrate our understanding of the point of a story or the import of
news. In other words, seeking and providing assessments are fundamental to living
in an intersubjective social environment. Intersubjectivity includes not just what
members of society treat as “fact” but also their understandings and assumptions
about when assessments should be offered and how to interpret them.
The second issue that drove this research was to understand why some alter-
native actions are performed so differently. I especially wanted to understand
why participants understate their disagreements. The short form of the answer is
that participants have assumptions about whether the action in question would
be appreciated or unappreciated, approved or disapproved, appropriate or inap-
propriate, normal or abnormal, supportive or unsupportive, advantageous or dis-
advantageous, and so on. These types of assumptions bear on how participants
perform the actions.
Introduction
When persons partake in social activities, they routinely make assessments.

Participating in an event and assessing that event are related enterprises, as the
following excerpt illustrates:
(1) [VIYMC 1:4]

J: Let’s feel the water. Oh, it
R: It’s wonderful. It’s just right. It’s like bathtub water.
Asking and Telling in Conversation. Anita Pomerantz, Oxford University Press (2021). © Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780190927431.003.0002
In response to J’s suggestion to “feel the water,” R proffers a series of

assessments that are purportedly derived from her participation in feeling the
water. The references within those assessments (“It’s wonderful. It’s just right. It’s
like bathtub water”) refer to the water that R claims, via the assessments, to have
experienced. Assessments are produced as products of participation; with an as-
sessment, a speaker claims knowledge of that which he or she is assessing.
The feature of the connectedness between (1) a speaker’s proffering an assess-
ment and (2) that speaker’s presumed access to, and knowledge of, the assessed
referent is visible in declinations to assess. In each of the following fragments,
an assessment that is requested in a prior turn is not proffered. A declination is
accomplished with a claim of no access to, or insufficient knowledge of, the par-
ticular referent in question:
(2) [SBL:2.2.-2]
A: An how’s the dresses coming along. How d’ they look.
→ B: Well uh I haven’t been uh by there-. . .
(3) [SBL:2.2.-1]
A: How is Aunt Kallie.
B: Well, I (suspect) she’s better.
A: Oh that’s good.
B: Las’ time we talked tuh mother she was uh better
B: Uh Allen, (she wants to know about ),
(2.0)
→ B: No, Allen doesn’t know anything new out there either.1
The speakers’ claiming insufficient knowledge serves as a warrant for their not
giving assessments because assessments are properly based on the speakers’
knowledge of what they assess. One of the ways of warranting a declination,
then, is to deny the proper basis, that is, sufficient knowledge, for its production.2
Although assessments may be seen as products of participation in social activ-
ities, the proffering of them is part and parcel of participating in such activities.
That is, they are occasioned conversational events with sequential constraints,
where one major locus of their occurrences is on the occasions of participa-
tion. Recall excerpt (1), in which J suggests that he and R feel the temperature
of the water. While participating in that activity R proffers the assessments “It’s
wonderful. It’s just right. It’s like bathtub water.” Part of participating includes
proffering assessments.
Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments 13
A second locus of assessments occurs within speakers’ reports of their par-

taking in activities. The connection between participating and assessing may be
seen in such reports. Each of the following excerpts has a sequence of two parts.
In the first part, a speaker references an occasion in which he or she had direct
experience, for example, “We saw Midnight Cowboy yesterday.” The depiction of
the event in question is not complete with the referencing alone. A conclusion or
point is needed: a summary of the actor’s sense or experience of the event. In the
second part, then, the speaker indicates a sense of his or her experience by giving
an assessment.
(4) [JS:11:41]
J: [1]‌I -n then I tasted it [2] it w’ z really horrible . . .
(5) [SBL:2.1.7.-1]
B: [1]‌I just saw Wengreen outside [2] an’ she’s an she’s in bad shape
(6) [JS:II:61]((J and L are husband and wife.))

J: [1]‌We saw Midnight Cowboy yesterday -or [sum-Fri day
E: [Oh?
L: Didju s- you saw that, [2]‌it’s really good
(7) [NB:VIII.-3]
A: [1]‌We’re painting like mad in the kitchen and, [2] Oh ev’rything’s workin’
out so pretty here with our-
(8) [FD:1]
C: Uh what’s the condition of the building.
D: Well, I haven’t made an inspection of it.[1]‌but I’ve driven by it a few times,
[2] and uh it doesn’t appear to be too bad, . . .
A third locus of assessments is in next turns to initial assessments. Recall that

proffering an assessment is a way of participating in at least some activities; for ex-
ample, assessing the water is a way of participating in “feeling the water.” Persons
also have ways of co-participating in activities. One way of co-participating with
a co-conversant who has just proffered an assessment is by proffering a second
assessment. It is a description of some features of second assessments that is the
aim of this paper.
Second Assessments
Second assessments are assessments produced by recipients of prior assessments

in which the referents in the seconds are the same as those in the priors. A sample
of a larger corpus of assessment pairs—initial assessments followed by second
assessments—is presented here. Initial assessments are notated with A1, second
assessments with A2.
(9) [NB:IV.7.-44]
A1 A: Adeline’s such a swell [gal
A2 P: [Oh God, Whadda gal. You know it!
(10) [JS:II:28]
A1 J: T’s-tsuh beautiful day out isn’t it?
A2 L: Yeh it’s jus’ gorgeous . . .
(11) [NB:I.6.-2]
A1 A: . . . Well, anyway, ihs-ihs not too co:ld,
A2 C: Oh it’s warm . . .
(12) [VIYMC:1.-2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake.))

A1 J: It’s really a clear lake, isn’t it?
A2 R: It’s wonderful.
(13) [M.Y.]
A1 A: That (heh) s(heh) sounded (hhh) g(hh)uh!
A2 B: That soun’ — that sounded lovely . . .
(14) [SBL:2.2.4.-3]
A1 A: Oh it was just beautiful.
A2 B: Well thank you Uh I thought it was quite nice,
(15) [NB:VII.-2]
A1 E: e-that Pa:t isn’she a do:[:ll
A2 M: [iYeh isn’t she pretty,
(16) [NB:VII.-13]
A1 E: . . . yihknow he’s a goodlooking fe1’n eez got a beautiful wi:fe.=
A2 M: =Ye:s::. Go:rgeous girl- . . .
(17) [SBL:2.2.3.-46]
A1 B: Well, it was fun Cla[ire,
A2 A: [Yeah, I enjoyed every minute of it.
(18) [MC:1] ((“He” refers to a neighborhood dog.))

A1 B: Isn’t he cute
A2 A: O::h he::s a::DORable
(19) [JK:3]
A1 C: . . . She was a nice lady--I liked her
A2 G: I liked her too
(20) [MC:1.-45]
A1 L: . . . I’m so dumb I don’t even know it. hhh! --heh!
A2 W: Y-no, y-you’re not du:mb, . . .
(21) [NB:IV:1.-6]
A1 A: . . . ·hhh Oh well it’s me too Portia, hh yihknow I’m no bottle a’ milk,
(0.6)
A2 P: Oh:: Well yer easy tuh get along with, . . .
(22) [NB:IV:11.-1]
A1 A: God izn it dreary.
(0.6)
A: [Y’know I don’t think
A2 P: [·hh- it’s warm though,
When a speaker assesses a referent that is expectably accessible to a recipient,

the initial assessment provides the relevance of the recipient’s second assessment.
That relevance is particularly visible when initial assessments have a format to
invite/constrain subsequence, for example, as interrogatives:
(15) [NB:VIII.-2] ((Pat is M’s friend whom E recently met.))

→ E: e-that Pa:t isn’she a do:[:ll?
M: [iYeh isn’t she pretty,
(18) [MC:1] ((“He” refers to a neighborhood dog.))

→ B: Isn’t he cute
A: O::h he::s a::DORable
or with interrogative tags:
(10) [JS:II:28]
→ J: T’s-tsuh beautiful day out isn’t it?
R: Yeh it’s jus’ gorgeous . . .
(12) [VIYMC:1.-2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake.))

→ J: It’s really a clear lake, isn’t it?
R: It’s wonderful.
That relevance, however, does not rely for its operation upon an interrogative
format; initial assessments that are asserted also provide for the relevance of, and
engender, recipients’ second assessments:
(13) [ M.Y.] ((A and B both participated in the performance that they
reference.))
→ A: That (heh) s(heh) sounded (hhh) g(hh)uh!
B: That soun’ --that sounded lovely . . .
(17) [ SBL:2.2.3.-46] ((A and B both attended the bridge party that they
reference.))
→ B: Well, it was fun Cla[ire,
A: [Yeah, I enjoyed every minute of it.
The discussion thus far may be summarized as follows. One systematic en-
vironment in which assessments are proffered is in turns just subsequent to co-
participants’ initial assessments. Just as the proffering of an initial assessment
is the first speaker’s claim of access to the assessed referent, the proffering of a
second is the second speaker’s claim of access to that referent.3 The description
of assessment pairs as serial claims of access, however, leaves unexplicated the
procedures used to coordinate the assessments: the initial one with an antici-
pated next and a subsequent one with the just prior. This analysis now turns to
some of the features of the coordination of second assessments with their priors.4
Second assessments have been described as subsequent assessments that refer
to the same referents as in the prior assessments. This feature may be restated as
a speaker’s procedural rule: a recipient of an initial assessment turns his or her
attention to that which was just assessed and proffers his or her own assessment
of this referent.
Though speakers do coordinate their second assessments with the prior ones
by assessing the same referents, there are finer ways in which they coordinate
their talk. Consider the following sequence of assessments:
(10) [JS.II.28]
J: T’s-tsuh beautiful day out isn’t it?
L: Yeh it’s jus’ gorgeous . . .
J’s initial assessment is an expression of approval, incorporating the positive

descriptor “beautiful.” In proffering a praise assessment, he invites the recipient
to co-participate in praising the referent, that is, to agree with him by proffering a
subsequent praise assessment.
In a next turn to an assessment that invites agreement, a recipient may, and
often does, elect to agree with the prior. In datum (10) above, L’s second assess-
ment is a second praise assessment; it is a second expression of approval, incor-
porating the positive descriptor “gorgeous.” The initial assessment invites a
subsequent agreement; the second assessment is proffered as an agreement.
While a recipient may elect to agree with a prior assessment that invites agree-
ment, the recipient may alternatively elect to disagree. The following excerpt
illustrates this option:
(22) [NB:IV:11.-1]
A1 A: God izn it dreary.
(0.6)
A2 B: [·hh- It’s warm though,
A’s initial assessment is a complaint about the weather, incorporating the nega-
tive descriptor “dreary.” In proffering the complaint, A invites the recipient, P, to
co-participate in complaining about the weather—to agree with her by proffering
a subsequent complaint assessment.5
P’s second assessment is proffered as a partial disagreement with A’s prior

complaint. The inclusion of “though” does the work of claiming to agree with the
prior while marking, and accompanying, a shift in assessed parameters which
partially contrasts with the prior. It contrasts insofar as it is not proffered as a
subsequent complaint assessment.6
It was proposed earlier that the proffering of an initial assessment to a recipient
who may expectably claim access to the referent assessed provides the relevance
of the recipient’s second assessment. It was also suggested that this proposal, as
it stands, leaves unexplicated the ways in which the parts of the assessment pairs
are coordinated one with the other. A refinement of the earlier proposal is now
in order.
In proffering an initial assessment, a speaker formulates the assessment
so as to accomplish an action or multiple actions, for example, praise, com-
plain, compliment, insult, brag, self-deprecate. In the next turn to the initial
proffering, an action by the recipient is relevant: to agree or disagree with the
prior. Agreement/disagreement names alternative actions that become relevant
upon the profferings of initial assessments. Such agreements and disagreements
are performed, by and large, with second assessments.
The proffering of an initial assessment, though it provides for the relevance of
a recipient’s agreement or disagreement, may be so structured that it invites one
next action over its alternative. A next action that is oriented to as invited will be
called a preferred next action; its alternative, a dispreferred next action.
Agreement is a preferred next action across a large diversity of initial
assessments.7 Agreement is not invariably—across all initial assessments—a
preferred next action. What is the preferred next action is structured, in part,
by the action performed with the initial assessment. For example, subsequent
to a self-deprecation, the usual preference for agreement is non-operative: an
agreement with a prior self-deprecation is dispreferred. (See the section “Second
Assessment Productions: Agreement Dispreferred.”)
An import of the preference status of actions is that it bears on how those
actions are performed. Isolatable turn-and-sequence shapes provide for dif-
ferent kinds of actualizations of the actions being performed with and through
them. Two types of shapes are of interest for this study. One type is a design that
maximizes the occurrences of the actions being performed with them, utilizes
minimization of gap between its initiation and the prior turn’s completion, and
contains components that are explicitly stated instances of the action being
performed. The other type minimizes the occurrences of the actions performed
with them, in part utilizing the organization of delays and non-explicitly stated
action components, such as actions other than a conditionally relevant next. The
respective turn shapes will be called preferred-action turn shape and dispreferred-
action turn shape.
The thesis of this paper is that an action, by virtue of how the participants
orient to it, will be housed in and performed through a turn shape that reflects
their orientation. That is, there is an association between an action’s preference
status and the turn shape in which it is produced.
This paper describes the kinds of organizations that bear on the productions of
second assessments. To show the relevance and operation of preference status on
second-assessment productions, two environments with differing preferences
are examined: (1) second assessments that are produced when agreements
are preferred, and (2) second assessments produced when agreements are
dispreferred.
Second Assessment Productions: Agreement Preferred
Subsequent to initial assessments that invite agreement, recipients’ agreements

and disagreements, respectively, are performed in differently organized turns
and sequences. In general, agreement turns/sequences are structured so as to
maximize occurrences of stated agreements and disagreement turns/sequences
so as to minimize occurrences of stated disagreements. Some overall features of
the respective turn and sequence shapes are summarized in the points below:
1. Agreements have agreement components occupying the entire agreement

turns; disagreements are often prefaced.
2. Agreements are accomplished with stated agreement components;
disagreements may be accomplished with a variety of forms, ranging from
unstated to stated disagreements. Frequently disagreements, when stated,
are formed as partial agreements/partial disagreements; they are weak
forms of disagreement.
3. In general, agreements are performed with a minimization of gap between
the prior turn’s completion and the agreement turn’s initiation; disagree-
ment components are frequently delayed within a turn or over a series
of turns.
4. Absences of forthcoming agreements or disagreements by recipients with
gaps, requests for clarification, and the like are interpretable as instances of
unstated, or as-yet-unstated, disagreements.
Agreements (Agreement Preferred)
For a recipient to agree with a prior assessment, he or she should show that his
or her assessment of the referent just assessed by the prior speaker stands in
agreement with the prior speaker’s assessment. Different types of agreements are
produced with second assessments. As will be shown, the types are differentiated
on sequential grounds, particularly with respect to their capacities to occur in
disagreement turns and sequences.
One type of agreement is the upgrade. An upgraded agreement is an assess-
ment of the referent assessed in the prior that incorporates upgraded eval-
uation terms relative to the prior.8 Two common techniques for upgrading
evaluations are:
(1) Given graded sets of descriptors, a stronger evaluative term than the
prior is selected:
(10) [JS:II:28]
J: T’s-tsuh beautiful day out isn’t it?
→ L: Yeh it’s just gorgeous . . .
(13) [M.Y.]
A: That (heh) s(heh) sounded (hhh) g(hh)uh!
→ B: That sound’ --that sounded lovely . . .
(18) [MC:1]
A: Isn’t he cute
→ B: O::h he::s a::DORable
(2) An intensifier modifying the prior evaluative descriptor is included:
(23) [CH:4.-14]
M: You must admit it was fun the night we we[nt down
→ J: [It was great fun . . .
(24) [SBL:2.1.8.-5]
B: She seems like a nice little [lady
→ A: [Awfully nice little person.
(25) [JS: I:11]

E: Hal couldn’ get over what a good buy that was, [(Jon),
→ J: [Yeah That’s a r-e (rerry
good buy).
Upgrades following assessments may be considered strong agreements

on sequential grounds. When they occur, they occur in agreement turns
and sequences and not in combinations with disagreements.9 Upgraded
agreements often occur as parts of clusters of agreements, or agreement series,
for example:
(25) [JS: I:11]

E: Hal couldn’ get over what a good buy that was, [(Jon),
J: [Yeah That’s a r-
e (rerry
good buy).
E: Yea:h, Great bu:y,
(18) [MC:1]
A: They keep’im awful nice somehow
B: Oh yeah I think she must wash’im every [week
A: [God- che must (h) wash’im
every day the way he looks [to me
B: [I know it
A: He don’ t get a chance to roll in the dirt [even
B: [Right,
B: (Yeah)
Another type of agreement is same evaluation. In this type, a recipient asserts

the same evaluation as the prior speaker’s evaluation. To assert the same evalua-
tion, a recipient may repeat the prior evaluative terms, marking it as a second in a
like series with, for example, “too”:
(19) [JK:3]
C: . . . She was a nice lady—I liked her
→ G: I liked her too
(26) [J & J]
A: Yeah I like it [( )
→ B: [I like it too . . .
or include proterms indicating same as prior:
(27) [GTS:4:6]
R: Ohh man, that was bitchin.
→ J: That was.
(28) [GTS:4:15]
K: . . . He’s terrific!
→ J: He is.
(29) [SBL:2.1.8.-5]
B: I think everyone enjoyed just sitting around talking.
→ A: I do too.
Same evaluations, of course, occur in agreement turns and agreement

sequences. But they also, importantly, occur as components within disagreement
turns and sequences. The following data show that same evaluations, indicated
by (1), may preface disagreements, indicated by (2).
(26) [J & J]
A: Yeah I like it [( )
B: [(1) I like it too (2) but uhh hahheh it blows my mind.
(6) [JS:II:61] ((E is J’s mother. J and L are husband and wife.))
E: . . . ’n she said she f-depressed her terribly
J: (1) Oh it’s [terribly depressing.
L: [(1) Oh it’s depressing.
E: Ve[ry
L: [(2) But it’s a fantastic [film.
J: [(2) It’s a beautiful movie
(30) [NB:IV: 4]
P: I wish you were gunnuh sta:y
A: (1) I do too. (2) But I think Oh I’ve got suh damn much tuh do. I really,
I’ve gotta get home fer-hh I may stay next week.
In that at least some same evaluations are regularly selected as disagreement

prefaces, they may be considered a kind of weak agreement.10
A third type of agreement is the downgrade. A downgraded agreement is an
assessment of the same referent as had been assessed in the prior with scaled-
down or weakened evaluation terms relative to the prior.
(31) [GJ:1]
A: She’s a fox!
→ L: Yeh, she’s a pretty girl.
(15) [NB:VII:2]
E: e-that Pa:t isn’she a do:[:ll?
→ M:
[iYeh isn’t she pretty,
(14) [SBL:2.2.4.-3]
A: Oh it was just beautiful.
→ B: Well thank you Uh I thought it was quite nice.
(32) [KC:4:10]
F: That’s beautiful
→ K: Is’n it pretty
Downgraded agreements frequently engender disagreement sequences. One

response that conversants make when disagreed with is to reassert the positions
that they have previously taken. In response to downgraded assessments,
participants often reassert stronger assessments.
(31) [GJ:1]
A: She’s a fox.
L: Yeh, she’s a pretty girl.
→ A: Oh, she’s gorgeous!
(15) [NB:VII:2]
E: e-that Pa:t isn’she a do:[:ll?
M:
[iYeh isn’t she pretty,
(.)
→ E: Oh: she’s a beautiful girl.
(33) [AP:1]
G: That’s fantastic
B: Isn’t that good
→ G: That’s marvelous
(14) [SBL:2.2.4.-3]
B: An I thought thet uh (1.0) uhm Gene’s (1.0) singing was --
A: Oh, was lo[vely.
B:
[pretty much like himse[lf
→ A: [Yes, uh huh, it’s-
Oh it was wonderful
On the basis that at least some downgraded agreements regularly engender

disagreement sequences, they, like same evaluation agreements, may be consid-
ered a kind of weak agreement.
When an initial assessment is proffered, agreement/disagreement is relevant
upon the completion, or more accurately, upon a possible completion point, of
the proffering.11 The temporal coordination of the recipient’s second assessment
relative to the prior assessment’s possible completion is a feature that bears on
the accomplishment of the agreement or disagreement. When agreements are
invited, strong or upgraded agreements are performed with a minimization of
gap (in fact, frequently in slight overlap):
(34) [NB:PT:19:r]
L: God it’s good.=
→ E: =Isn’t that exci:ting,
(35) [JS:I:17]
B: Isn’at good?=
→ E: =It’s duh::licious.
(24) [SBL:2.1.8.-5]
B: She seems like a nice little [lady
→ A:
[Awfully nice little person.
(25) [JS:I:ll]
E: Hal couldn’ get over what a good buy that was [(Jon)
J: [Yeah
That’s a r-a (rerry [good buy).
→ E: [Yea:h, great bu:y,
(18) [MC:1]
A: They keep’im awful nice somehow
B: Oh yeah I think she must wash’m [every week
A: [God-
che must (h) wash’im every
day the way he looks [to me.
B: [I know it
Disagreements (Agreement Preferred)
When conversants feel that they are being asked to agree with coconversants’
assessments, they may nonetheless find themselves in the position of disagreeing
with them. A substantial number of such disagreements are produced with
stated disagreement components delayed or withheld from early positioning
within turns and sequences. When a conversant hears a co-participant’s assess-
ment being completed and his or her own agreement/disagreement is relevant
and due, he or she may produce delays, such as “no talk,” requests for clarifi-
cation, partial repeats, and other repair initiators, turn prefaces, and so on.
Incorporating delay devices constitutes a typical turn shape for disagreements
when agreements are invited.
One type of delay device is “no immediately forthcoming talk.” Upon the
completion of an assessment that invites agreement or confirmation, a con-
versant, in the course of producing a disagreement, may initially respond
with silence. In the fragments below, gaps are notated with →, disagreement
turns with D.
(22) [NB:IV:11.-1]
A: God izn it dreary.
→ (0.6)
D B: [·hh It’s warm though,
(36) [SBL:2.1.7.-14]
A: ( ) cause those things take working at,
→ (2.0)
D B: (hhhhh) well, they [do, but
A: [They aren’t accidents,
B: No, they take working at, But on the other hand, some people are born
with uhm (1.0) well a sense of humor, I think is something yer born
with Bea. —
A: Yes. Or it’s c-I have the-eh yes, I think a lotta people are, but then
I think it can be developed, too.
→ (1.0)
D B: Yeah, but [there’s
A: [Any-
A: Any of those attributes can be developed.
(37) [TG:3]
A: You sound very far away.
→ (0.7)
B: I do?
A: Ymeahm.
(D) B: mNo I’m no:t,
Another class of delay devices includes repair initiators. In the course of pro-
ducing a disagreement, a recipient may request clarification with “what?,” “hm?”
questioning repeats, and the like. In the following excerpts, clarification requests
are marked with *, disagreements and disconfirmations with D.
(38) [MC:1: 30]

L: Maybe it’s just ez well Wilbur,
* W: Hm?
L: Maybe it’s just ez well you don’t know.
(2.0)
D W: Well.(.) uh-I say it’s suspicious it could be something good too.
(39) [TG:1]
B: Why whhat’sa mattuh with y-Yih sou[nd HA:PPY, hh
A: [Nothing.
* A: I sound ha:p[py?
B: [Ye:uh.
(0.3)
D A: No:,
(37) [TG:3]
A: . . . You sound very far away.
(0.7)
* B: I do?
A: Meahm.
D B: mNo? I’m no:t,
Disagreement components may also be delayed within turns. Conversants

start the turns in which they will disagree in some systematic ways. One way
consists of prefacing the disagreement with “uh’s,” “well’s,” and the like, thus
displaying reluctancy or discomfort.12 Another way is to preface the disagree-
ment by agreeing with the prior speaker’s position. Agreement prefaces are of
particular interest because agreements and disagreements are, of course, con-
trastive components. When they are included within the same turn, the agree-
ment component is conjoined with the disagreement component with a contrast
conjunction like “but.” An apparent puzzle regarding the agreement- plus-
disagreement turn shape is why recipients agree with assessments when they will
shortly disagree with them.
Agreement components that occur as disagreement prefaces regularly

are weak agreements. They are primarily agreement tokens, asserted or
claimed agreements, same evaluation agreements, and qualified or weakened
agreements:
Tokens
(40) [JG:II.1.-15]
C: . . . you’ve really both basically honestly gone your own ways.
→ D: Essentially, except we’ve hadda good relationship et home.
→ C: ·hhhh Ye:s, but I mean it’s a relationship where . . .
(41) [K::1.-13]
W: I sew by hand ( ), --(uh huh), I’m fantastic (you never [saw anything
like it)
→ L: [I know but I,
I-I still say thet the sewing machine’ s quicker,
(42) [JG:II:1.-27]
C: . . . ·hh a:n’ uh by god I can’ even send my kid tuh public school b’cuz
they’re so god damn lousy.
D: We::ll, that’s a generality.
C: ·hhh
D: We’ve got sm pretty [(good schools.)
→ C: [Well, yeah but where in the hell em I gonna live.
Asserted Agreements
(43) [GTS 4:32]

R: Butchu admit he is having fun and you think it’s funny.
→ K: I think it’s funny, yeah. But it’s a ridiculous funny.
(36) [SBL:2.1.7.-14]
A: . . . cause those things take working at,
(2.0)
→ B: (hhhhh) well, they [do, but-
A: [They aren’t accidents,
→ B: No, they take working at but on the other hand, some people . . .
(44) [SBL:2.1.7.-15]
A: Well, oh uh I think Alice has uh:: i-may-and maybe as you say, slightly
different, but I think she has a good sense [of humor
→ B: [Yeh, I think she does too but
she has a different type.
Weakened and/or Qualified Agreement Assertions
(45) [SBL:1.1.10.-9]
B: I think I’ll call her and ask her if she’s interested because she’s a good
nurse, and I think they would like her don’t you?
→ A: Well, I’ll tell you, I haven’t seen Mary for years. I should-As I re-
member, yes.
B: Well do you think she would fit in?
→ A: Uhm, uh, I don’t know, What I’m uh hesitating about is uh —uhm
maybe she would.
(1.0)
A: Uh but I would hesitate to uhm —
(41) [MC:1.-13]
L: I know but I, I-I still say thet the sewing machine’s quicker.
→ W: Oh it c’n be quicker but it doesn’ do the jo:b,
(36) [SBL:2.1.7.-14]
B: . . . well a sense of humor, I think is something yer born with Bea.
→ A: Yea. Or it’s c-I have the-eh yes, I think a lotta people are, but then
I think it can be developed, too.
(46) [MC:1.-22]
W: . . . The-the way I feel about it i:s, that as long as she cooperates, an’-
an’ she belie:ves that she’s running my li:fe, or, you know, or directing
it one way or anothuh, and she feels happy about it, I do whatever
I please (h)any (h)wa(h) ·HHH! [( )
L: [Yeah.
→ L: We::ll(.) eh-that’s true: (.) I mean eh-that’s alright, --uhb-ut uh, ez
long ez you do::. But h-it’s-eh-to me::, —after anyone . . .
Just as the agreement components that preface disagreements are characteris-

tically weak, so are the disagreement components that follow.
Disagreement types may be differentiated as strong or weak on sequen-
tial grounds: they differ in their relative capacities to co-occur with agreement
components. A strong disagreement is one in which a conversant utters an evalu-
ation which is directly contrastive with the prior evaluation. Such disagreements
are strong inasmuch as they occur in turns containing exclusively disagreement
components, and not in combination with agreement components, for example:
(20) [MC:1.-45]
L: . . . I’m so dumb I don’t even know it hhh! —heh!
→ W: Y-no, y-you’re not du:mb, . . .
(47) [SPC:144]
R: . . . well never mind. It’s not important.
→ D: Well, it is important.
The disagreements that occur in the agreement-plus-disagreement turns

are not the strong type, that is, same referent–contrastive evaluation construc-
tion. Co-occurring with agreements, the disagreement components are formed
as partial agreements/ partial disagreements: as qualifications, exceptions,
additions, and the like.
(43) [GTS 4: 32]

R: Butchu admit he is having fun and you think it’s funny.
→ K: I think it’s funny, yeah. But it’s a ridiculous funny.
K, after asserting an agreement (“I think it’s funny, yeah”), produces a qualifi-
cation of the agreement by specifying a kind of funny (“it’s a ridiculous funny”).
The disagreement component is formed as partial agreement/partial disagree-
ment with the prior.
(40) [JG:II.l.-15]
C: . . . you’ve really both basically honestly gone your own ways.
→ D: Essentially, except we’ve hadda good relationship et home.
Another random document with
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Älä kainostele! Tanssithan sinä minulle mökissä.
IMANDRA
Niin, mökissä, mutta en hovissa.
PRINSSI
Ja taisit hiukan koetella luontoani, villi veitikka!
IMANDRA
Minä tahdoin vain saada Metsä-Matin mustasukkaiseksi.
PRINSSI
Kas, kas vaan! Kylläpä sinulla on juonia pienessä päässäsi. No

niin!
Pitäisihän minunkin pyytää sinulta anteeksi sitä menettelyäni
metsässä.
Olkaamme siis ystäviä, olen sinuun tyytyväinen. Olet kutonut
kaunista
hääkangasta.
IMANDRA
Olen iloinen, jos se mielyttää prinssiä.
PRINSSI
Mutta en voi kuitenkaan olla iloinen, sillä minun korkea

morsiameni on yhä mykkänä. Viidestä valtakunnasta olen
kutsuttanut tietoniekkoja, mutta he eivät voi mitään tälle oudolle
taudille.
IMANDRA (ilostuen)
Eikö siis häitä vietetäkään!
PRINSSI
Ei tänään. Mutta miksi sinä hymyilit, ilahuttaako tämä sinua?
IMANDRA
Minä olen niin iloinen, mutta en ymmärrä, miksi.
PRINSSI
En ymmärrä sinua. — Niin, mutta Metsä-Mattiin en ole

tyytyväinen, miksei hän tule tänne, vaikka olen käskenyt?
IMANDRA
Hän on sairaana, hän nyrjäytti jalkansa.
PRINSSI
Miksi!
IMANDRA
Hän haki minua metsästä, kun olin karannut.
PRINSSI
Niinkö? Te taidatte elää kuin koira ja kissa. Sairas? Ehkä hän on
vain tekosairas, laiska, leväperäinen. Kyllä minä tiedän…
IMANDRA
Prinssi kulta, kyllä hän on oikein sairas, minä hieroin hänen

jalkaansa, jonka hän nyrjäytti minun tähteni.
PRINSSI
Minä en usko. Hän on huono vartija, on päästänyt tulen niinkuin

varkaan metsään. Hänhän voi vielä polttaa koko huvilinnani! Minä
panen hänet viralta, minä häädän hänet mökistäni.
IMANDRA
Älkää tehkö niin, hyvä prinssi! Kyllä hän palkitsee kaikki

parannuttuaan, hän on niin heikko, hänellä ei ole ruokaa.
PRINSSI
Eikö hän hanki sinulle ruokaa?
IMANDRA
Mistä hän hankkisi, kun ei ole. Ja sitten…?
PRINSSI
Ja sitten?
IMANDRA
Sitten pyysi hän, että minä pyytäisin… "Ei siihen köyhän auta",
sanoi Metsä-Matti. Niin, niin, minä vaikka kerjään, antakaa meille
hiukan jauhoja, että minä voisin keittää hänelle puuroa ja hautoa
häntä hauteilla.
PRINSSI
Hän käskee sinun kerjätäkin! Mokoma mies! Kuolkoon nälkään!
IMANDRA
Prinssi, prinssi, hän ei saa kuolla nälkään! Jos hän kuolisi, niin
minä menehtyisin omantunnon tuskista.
PRINSSI
Turhia tuskia! Mutta tyttö parka, ehkä sinun on nälkä.
IMANDRA
Mitä minusta.
PRINSSI
Oletko syönyt tänään mitään?
IMANDRA
Enhän minä… mutta kyllä minä kestän, kunhan Matti saisi jotain
hengen pidoksi.
PRINSSI
Mattia on syytetty raskaista rikoksista. No niin! Olen antanut asian
neuvoskunnan ratkaistavaksi. Siihen asti saa hän olla vapaana. Ja
minä toimitan sinulle, ymmärrä, en hänelle, kaksi tynnyriä rukiita.
IMANDRA
Oi, kiitos, armollinen prinssi. Uskokaa minua, Matti ei ole tehnyt

mitään pahaa, pahat parjaajat ovat tämän tehneet.
PRINSSI
Minä teen tämän siksi, että olet tehnyt niin kauniin

morsiuskruunun. (Ottaa morsiuskruunun ja katselee sitä.) Etkö sinä
panisi tätäkin päähäsi?
IMANDRA
En ole tämän kruunun kelvollinen. Ei, ei, en minä, minä olen vain
halpa rahvaan nainen!
PRINSSI
Mutta mitä tässä kruunussa on, mitä sinä olet siihen ommellut?
IMANDRA
Peilinpalasen.
PRINSSI
Noidan peilinpalasen, jota sinä välkyttelit minulle mökissä? Kerro

mitä tiedät!
IMANDRA
Mökkiin tuli kerran vanha tietäjä ja hän sanoi, että tässä

peilinpalasessa on ihmeellinen voima.
PRINSSI
Tuntuu niinkuin minä tuntisin sen.
IMANDRA
Siinä näkee itsensä sellaisena kuin todella on.
PRINSSI
Sehän on merkillistä! Sehän on mainiota! Tämän peilinpalasen

avulla minä saan tietää, millainen minun hoviväkeni on, hoviherra,
hovirouva ja monet muut.
IMANDRA
Ja taikasanan avulla voi tulla mielensä mukaiseksi.
PRINSSI (katsoo peiliin)
Sano se sana!
IMANDRA
Katso itseesi!
PRINSSI
Katso itseesi? Merkillistä! En tunne itseäni. Minä toivon, toivon,
toivon, että olisin metsänvartija ja sinä prinsessa. Mitä tämä on?
Olenko tajuissani? Silmäni aukenevat. Minä olen nähnyt sinut, minä
näen sinut sellaisena kuin todella olet. Katso itseesi! Sinä olet…?
IMANDRA
Ei, ei, se peili valehtelee, älkää katsoko siihen! Minä en ole…
PRINSSI
Sinä olet…
IMANDRA
Ei paimenelämä ole sellaista kuin mitä kirjoista luin eikä hovielämä

niin loistavaa kuin mitä lapsena luulin.
PRINSSI
Nyt minä tunnen. Sinä olet… te olette prinsessa Imandra.
IMANDRA
Oh, prinssi, te tunsitte minut, nyt minä olen hukassa.
PRINSSI
Armollinen prinsessa, minä tunsin teidät jo äsken, kun hypitte

harakkaa.
IMANDRA
Minä en kehtaa katsoa kasvoihinne, tahtoisin vaipua maan alle.
PRINSSI
Mikä omituinen sattuma — niinkuin sadussa.
IMANDRA
Oi, miksi, miksi minä särin peilin, tämä tuli minulle vitsaukseksi.
Minä olen ansainnut alennukseni.
PRINSSI
Prinsessa, älkää sanoko niin! Te olette vain kohonnut katseissani.

Unohtakaa monet sopimattomat sanani, minä en voinut ajatella,
minä en aavistanut.
IMANDRA
Oh, olisinpa tämän aavistanut. Nyt minun kai täytyy mennä.
PRINSSI
Ei, ei, viipykää ja viihtykää täällä! Uskokaa, että minä tunnen

samalla lailla kuin silloin Suvikunnan hovissa.
IMANDRA
Se on mahdotonta, sen jälkeen mitä on tapahtunut, mitä minä

onneton olen rikkonut teitä vastaan.
PRINSSI
Minä polvistun teidän edessänne, minä rukoilen teiltä
rakkauttanne.
IMANDRA
Prinssi, nouskaa, minä en voi. Voi, minua, voi, meitä! Tämä peili
on lumonnut minut, se on lumonnut teidät. Te ette tiedä, mitä te
sanotte, te puhutte vastoin tahtoanne. Kun lumous laukeaa, niin ette
muista enään sanojanne.
PRINSSI
Minä vannon, valitkaa!
IMANDRA
Minä en voi!
PRINSSI
Antakaa arvan ratkaista! Katsokaa, tämän liinan alla on valkoinen

ja musta leipä, valitkaa minun ja Metsä-Matin välillä.
IMANDRA (syöksyy liinan luo)
Oi, leipää!
PRINSSI
Ei, ei! Arvatkaa, kumpiko leipä on valkoinen.
IMANDRA
Mi-minä en uskalla. Minä en kestä kauempaa. Minulla on nälkä
kuin sudella! (Riuhtaisee liinan ja tarttuu toisella kädellä valkoiseen,
toisella mustaan leipään.)
PRINSSI
Mutta prinsessa! Te koskitte molempiin leipiin yht'aikaa!
IMANDRA (syö vuorotellen kumpaakin leipää)
Hahhaa, minä unohdin aivan koko arvoituksen! Kylläpä tämä on

hyvää!
Prinssi, teillä on erinomainen hovileipuri! Hahhaa, muistatteko,
kuinka minä tukistin teitä. Hahhaa! Ei, minä olen nälästä hullu.
Hahhaa! Minä kuolen naurusta. Minä en voi muuta kuin nauraa,
haahhaa!
(Kuuluu melua pihalta.)
PRINSSI
Mikä siellä on!
IMANDRA
On niin valkeata. Pihalla kantavat jo hääsoihtuja.
PRINSSI
Tämä on omituista! Ei tämä tunnu hää-ilolta. Prinsessa, kuulkaa!
INKERI (syöksyy huoneeseen)

Tuli on irti! Metsämökki palaa!
IMANDRA (vaipuu lattialle)
Metsämökki? Ja Metsä-Matti! Voi, minua onnetonta! Minun sairas

ylkäni palaa! (Syöksyy ovelle.)
PRINSSI
Tyyntykää, prinsessa! Ei hän pala. (Prinssi ja Inkeri pidättävät

prinsessaa.)
IMANDRA
Prinssi, päästäkää minut, minä en voi jäädä tänne, kuuletteko, hän

palaa, palaa! Oh, auttakaa häntä, hän ei saa kuolla, hän ei saa
kuolla!
INKERI
Prinsessa, rauhoittukaa, ei hän kuole!
IMANDRA
Inkeri, Inkeri, älä estä, minä tahdon hänen luoksensa. Voi, voi, hän
on sairas ja hän palaa ilmielävänä näkemättä minua! Oi! Miksi minä
jätin hänet yksin! Minä olin mieletön. Päästäkää, päästäkää,
päästäkää, minä tahdon pelastaa tai palaa hänen kanssaan! Voi,
minua! (Syöksyy ovesta, Inkeri ja prinssi rientävät jälessä. Kujeilijat
tulevat naurellen. Hepuli pitää selkänsä takana nahkaista viinipulloa.)
HEPULI
Näitkö sinä! Hahhaa!
KEPULI
Hahhaa! Näinhän minä, kuinka hovirouva pisti hoviherran pään

suihkun alle.
HEPULI
Niinkuin jäniksen pään pensaaseen. Tämä on sitä

hovimetsästystä!
KEPULI
Kas näin! (Painaa Hepulin päätä.)
HEPULI
Älä, älä! En minä ole mikään jänis enkä hoviherra.
KEPULI
Olet aika hepuli!
HEPULI
Sen varsin valehtelit, senkin kepuli!
KEPULI
Sytytetään vahakynttilät, niin näemme paremmin valehdella…
HEPULI
Ja näemme, kuinka korvat liikkuvat. Hovissa ei koskaan puhuta
totta.
KEPULI
Mutta nyt täytyy hoviherran ja hovirouvan puhua totta.
HEPULI
Koska taikapeili puhuu totta.
KEPULI
Mutta nämä hovin hupsut eivät vielä tiedä taikapeilistä muuta kuin
että saavat toivoa kolme toivomusta.
HEPULI
Älä sinä mene puun ja kuoren väliin!
KEPULI
Tiedätkö, mitä siellä on?
HEPULI
En.
KEPULI
Siellä on toukka.
HEPULI
Luulet olevasi rikkiviisas.
KEPULI
Ja sinä nenäviisas. Unohdat, että nenä on yläpuolella suuta.
HEPULI
Mutta silmät ovat yläpuolella nenää. Minä näen, ettet näe mitään.
KEPULI
Hovissa on vaarallista nähdä liian paljon.
HEPULI
Ja vaarallista ajatella liian paljon, kun on liikaa täällä

yliskamarissa. (Kopauttaa otsaansa.) Katsos, otsa on silmiä
ylempänä. Hei, Kepuli, otetaan pieni partakyynärä!
KEPULI
Hei, sinä löysit hoviherran kätköpaikan.
HEPULI
Hys, löysin tämän puutarhasta.
KEPULI
Sinun päävärkkisi on jo tyhjä kuin ullakko.
HEPULI
Ja sinun järkesi putoaa vatsaan, toisin sanoen viinikellariin. Ota
vielä kulaus hoviherran nahkanassakasta.
KEPULI
Sinä unohdit jalat, jolleivät ne kannata!
HEPULI
Kyllä kannattaa, tänään kannattaa juoda, sillä tänäänhän on häät.
KEPULI
Mutta on pitkä loikkaus ullakolta maahan.
HEPULI
Mutta lyhempi huippaus neitsytkammiosta morsiusvuoteeseen.
KEPULI
Prinsessa Imandran malja!
HEPULI
Hän on väärentämätön, väkevä viini.
KEPULI
Mutta hovirouva on pippurivedellä sekoitettu hapan viini. Katsos,

tuolta tulee jo pöyhkeänä riikin riikinkana! Ja jälessä jumppii tietysti
riikin riikinkukko.
HEPULI
Jolla on kanan höyhenet.

KEPULI
Ja riikinkanalla kukon kannukset.
HEPULI
Voi, kanan villat! Sammuta tulet, niin että he kerran saavat puhua
totta.
KEPULI
Tai puhuvat itsensä pussiin.
HEPULI
Ja piru sitoo pussin suut. Siinä paha missä mainitaan. (Kuuluu

kolinaa)
KEPULI
En pelkää pirua, mutta pirukin pelkäisi tätä akkaa! Hepuli, hei,

paetkaamme!
HEPULI
Hyvässä järjestyksessä! Hip ja heijaa! (Hepuli ja Kepuli kulkevat

takaperin sivuovesta sammutettuaan tulet.)
HOVIROUVA (tulee perältä sarvilyhty kädessä.) Hys, mitä kuulin!

Vai kuulinko vain omat askeleeni! (Katselee varovasti ympärilleen,
tutkii tornikomeroa ja pöytälokeroita.)
HOVIHERRA (tulee varpaillaan perältä, sarvilyhty kädessä)

Hys, mitä! Oh, hovirouva!
HOVIROUVA (ottaa pöydältä morsiusseppeleen, keimailee ja

asettaa sen päähänsä.)
Oo, oo!
HOVIHERRA
Hän puhuu itsekseen. Voi vietävä!
HOVIROUVA
Uh! Mitä se oli? Hoviherra, te täällä? (Pudottaa lyhdyn, joka —

sammuu.)
HOVIHERRA
Armollinen rouva, enhän minä mitään… (Pudottaa lyhdyn, joka

sammuu.)
HOVIROUVA
Uh, nyt me olemme pimeässä! Sytyttäkää lyhtynne! (Hoviherra

sytyttää.)
HOVIHERRA
Minun kuningattareni, kruunu päässä!
HOVIROUVA
Sopiiko se? Näkisinpä nyt kuvani peilissä!

HOVIHERRA
Mutta mikä teidän päässänne kiiltää? Mutta siinähän se on!
HOVIROUVA
Mikä, mikä!
HOVIHERRA
Taikapeili, jota minä…
HOVIROUVA
Tekin! Haitteko tekin sitä? Siis tässä se nyt on! Nyt minä siis saan
toivoa. Niin, minä toivon…
HOVIHERRA
Ei, ei, antakaa minun…
HOVIROUVA
Minä toivon, että te toivoisitte myöhemmin.
HOVIHERRA
Ei, ei!
HOVIROUVA
Seis! Minä ensin…

HOVIHERRA
Mutta minähän ilmoitin ensin…
HOVIROUVA
Minä toivoisin teidät niin kauas kuin pippuri kasvaa.
HOVIHERRA
Nyt meni teiltä jo kaksi toivomusta hukkaan. (Ivaillen.) Minä toivon

taas palaavani pippurimaasta.
HOVIROUVA (kiivastuen)
Ja minä toivon, että te ette toivoisi enään mitään.
HOVIHERRA
Nyt toivoitte viimeisen kerran!
HOVIROUVA (raivostuen)
Te, te, te, olette pilannut koko asian. Kas, kas, te ette saa enään
toivoa kuin kerran.
HOVIHERRA
Mutta minä olenkin nyt varovaisempi, minä mietin.
HOVIROUVA
Ettehän te mieti koskaan mitään.

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Series Editorial Board:

Recently published in the series:

Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press

© Oxford University Press 2021

All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in

You must not circulate this work in any other form

Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data

Series Editor’s Preface vii

9. Inferring the Purpose of a Prior Query and Responding

I am grateful to the publishers for their agreements to republish the following

Pomerantz, A. (1984). Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some

, A comma indicates “continuing” intonation, not necessarily a clause boundary.

• Asking and telling is not only about information exchange. It includes

The Early Years of Conversation Analysis

My Approach to Conversation Analysis

I learned to analyze interaction in the early days of CA’s development. I took a

Complexities in Asking and Telling Activities

Sequences of Actions and Interactional Projects

Attributing and Negotiating Responsibility

When participants talk about praiseworthy or blameworthy actions, attributes,

Moral Judgments Regarding Actions

In social conversations between friends, participants treated the actions of

The Order of the Papers

The papers in Chapters 7, 8, and 9 contain analyses of different phe-

Brief Description of Papers

In “Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features of Preferred/​

When persons partake in social activities, they routinely make assessments.

(1) [VIYMC 1:4]

In response to J’s suggestion to “feel the water,” R proffers a series of

A second locus of assessments occurs within speakers’ reports of their par-

(6) [JS:II:61]((J and L are husband and wife.))

A third locus of assessments is in next turns to initial assessments. Recall that

Second assessments are assessments produced by recipients of prior assessments

(12) [VIYMC:1.-​2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake.))

(18) [MC:1] ((“He” refers to a neighborhood dog.))

When a speaker assesses a referent that is expectably accessible to a recipient,

(15) [NB:VIII.-​2] ((Pat is M’s friend whom E recently met.))

(18) [MC:1] ((“He” refers to a neighborhood dog.))

or with interrogative tags:

(12) [VIYMC:1.-​2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake.))

J’s initial assessment is an expression of approval, incorporating the positive

P’s second assessment is proffered as a partial disagreement with A’s prior

Second Assessment Productions: Agreement Preferred

Subsequent to initial assessments that invite agreement, recipients’ agreements

1. Agreements have agreement components occupying the entire agreement

Agreements (Agreement Preferred)

(2) An intensifier modifying the prior evaluative descriptor is included:

(25) [JS: I:11]

Upgrades following assessments may be considered strong agreements

(25) [JS: I:11]

Another type of agreement is same evaluation. In this type, a recipient asserts

or include proterms indicating same as prior:

Same evaluations, of course, occur in agreement turns and agreement

In that at least some same evaluations are regularly selected as disagreement

In “Agreeing and Disagreeing with Assessments: Some Features of Preferred/

(12) [VIYMC:1.-2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake.))

(15) [NB:VIII.-2] ((Pat is M’s friend whom E recently met.))

(12) [VIYMC:1.-2] ((J and R are in a rowboat on a lake.))

Weakened and/or Qualified Agreement Assertions

The disagreements that occur in the agreement-plus-disagreement turns