NIGERIAN DEFENCE ACADEMY

FACULTY OF ART AND SOCIAL SCIENCES

DEPARTMENT OF POLITICAL SCIENCE AND DEFENCE STUDIES
MASTER IN INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS AND STRATEGIC STUDIES (MIASS)

COURSE TITLE
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS

COURSE CODE
812

TOPIC:

Critically discuss the Foreign Policy Dimensions of Rwanda Genocide focusing on

National Interest as the Key Determinants of States’ Action or Inaction, Causal Factors
and Key Players, the Role of Domestic and Foreign Actors, as well as the Mediating
Role of Third-Party Actors.

BY

AFOLABI KAZEEM O.

JANUARY, 2023
Introduction

The role of the national interest in domestic politics, particularly in the creation of a national
identity and its integration with foreign policy, has been addressed in both strategic/conflict
studies and foreign policy. This is particularly discussed in the literature of genocide with
specific reference to 1994 Rwandan crisis. Some of these studies have highlighted how the
international community has failed to prevent and stop the Rwanda Genocide. There are
numerous interrelated and complex factors that have led to international inaction, such as a
misguided view of African conflicts, the bureaucratic nature of the United Nations, and the
weak peacekeeping in general. However, this paper focuses on three reasons that the authors
consider the most important. First, the “shadow of Somalia” was still present, making states
and the UN Secretariat unwilling to participate in another peacekeeping operation in Africa.

Second, the inaction was driven by national interest: the United States decided not to
intervene in Rwanda because there were no national interests at stake. France, with national
interests at stake, did not seek to save Rwandan lives but actively contributed to the genocide.
Third, because the media did not cover the genocide, there was no internal pressure from
citizens to influence policymakers. The argument of this paper runs as follows. The main
actors: Belgium, the UN Secretariat, the USA and France. – knew that a genocide was taking
place in Rwanda; yet they were obliged to prevent and stop it purposely in order to safeguard
their national interests.

In order to achieve the clarification of the above arguments, each actor is rated individually.
Following this analysis, it will be shown how the three factors above led to inaction at
international Security Council level, where member states focused on the ongoing civil war
rather than discussing genocide, which would have compelled them to act under the 1948
Genocide Convention. This paper further shows that this international failure had dire
consequences for the United Nations Assistance Mission for Rwanda (UNAMIR), which,
without a strong mandate or adequate resources, became a mere eyewitness to the genocide.
The following section gives the conceptual clarification of terms, theoretical framework and
the background overview of the Rwandan genocide. The final part discussed the foreign
policy dimensions of Rwanda Genocide focusing on national interest as the key determinants
of states’ action or inaction, causal factors and key players, the role of domestic and foreign
actors, as well as the mediating role of third-party actors.

1
Conceptual Explorations

In this section, the concept of foreign policy, national interest, and its objectives are
presented.

Conceptual Review of Foreign Policy

Foreign policy is one of the means by which the process of international politics works. It is
not detached from the national policy of a state, but part of it. As an essential part of national
politics, foreign policy consists of promoting national interests in relation to other states.
Almost all states determine the course of their foreign policy within the limits of their power
and the realities of the external environment. Modelski (1962:6-7) defines it as “the system of
activities developed by communities to change the behavior of other states and to adapt their
own activities to the international environment.”

Based on this definition, he emphasized only those aspects of politics aimed at changing the
current behavior of states as primary goals of foreign policy. In fact, foreign policy includes
both changing existing behavior and continuing behavior at different times. It addresses both
change and the status quo as long as it serves the national interest.

In the words of Padelford and Lincoln (n.d.), foreign policy is a key element in the process by
which a state translates its broad goals and interests into specific courses of action to achieve
those goals and advance its interests. From Padelford and Lincoln’s definition above, two
functions of foreign policy can be derived, and these include: the achievement of broad goals
and, second, the advancement of national interests.

Concept of National Interest

There is no specific definition for the term national interest. The concept of national interest
has been defined differently by different scholars of foreign policy analysis. Against this
background, the concept is a controversial one that lacks a universally acceptable definition.
Rosati (2006) contends with the view of the possibility of having anything being referred to
as “national” in view of the multitude of prevailing personal, group, class, sectional and
public interest in a state. This is because there is no definitive measure for the streamlining of
all these conflicting concepts to a “nation-al” interest (Folarin, 2014).

According to Marchall (1994), interests refer to whatever contributes to the general well-
being or fulfillment of a purpose, of an individual. Thomas Hobbes on the other hand, equates
interest with self-preservation, a view embedded in a philosophy founded on a materialist

2
view of human nature. According to this view; self-preservation is the underlying motivation
of all human actions in relation to other human beings. Different scholars therefore have
various perceptions of the concept in line with their understanding of the subject- matter.
Implicit in various attempts is the problematic issue of determining who actually determines
national interest. Is it the leadership or the citizens of the nation? The leadership has the
responsibility of protecting the people as well as providing them the good life and controlling
the affairs of the state for positive change; while the citizens of the country are directly
affected either positively or negatively by the drive of the country’s national interest. Hence,
the national interest of a state aims at promoting the national development and by extension
image, prestige and respect both at home and abroad.

Bello, Dutse and Othman, (2017) identify what constitutes the core of national interest to
include: national security, political independence, territorial integrity, promotion of economic
interests of the nation and world peace. Inherent in the above perception is the passionate
desire by nations to secure and maintain political independence, secure its territory and
project its economic interest to enhance the standard of living of its citizens and the
maintenance of national integrity, territorial integrity and self-respect. National interest can
therefore be viewed as the ideal goals upon which the domestic and foreign policies of a state
are hinged (Rosati, 2006). The concept of national interest therefore, has continued to play a
significant role in the foreign policies of a sovereign state. A state’s foreign policy is not
operated in a vacuum. The main policy instrument in the conduct of foreign policy is
invariably the promotion and pursuit of national interest. Thus, national interest can further
be illustrated to mean the totality or the aggregate of interests of individuals and groups
within a given nation-state.

Theoretical Framework

In addressing the foreign policy dimensions of Rwanda Genocide, the realist theory of
international relations is relevant. Realism is one of the theories of international relations and
it sees the international system as being anarchical in nature. Realism draws its postulation
from the works of Machiavelli, Thomas Hobbes and Charles Darwin. Some of the modern
scholars include Charles Morgenthau, E. H. Carr, George Schwatzenberger and Kenneth
Wattz.

The basic arguments of the realist theory of international relations are that, the history of
human civilization is generalized as being in a constant state of conflict. as such, that man is

3
seen as wicked and sinful. In the samelight, the history of man is for the continuous struggle
of power, especially by sovereign states. The state is the principal actor in the international
arena and its primary function is to promote the “national interest” through peaceful means or
by engaging in war.Matters of national securities override any social or economic imperatives
because the quest for survival is the most important agenda of all states.

The international system is anarchical in nature because there is no world governor that can
effectively regulate states behaviour. Since the international system is anarchical in nature, it
is a dangerous arena. Thus, states have to continuously harm themselves and prepare for any
eventualities. While many aspects of international relations are in a constant state of change,
such as technologies, political ideologies or culture, the character of human nature remains
essentially fixed. This is evident given the recurrent patterns of human behaviour in history as
they relate to struggle, power and security. The international system is anarchical in nature, as
such, every actor seeks power and security within the purview of their national interest.

Overview of the Rwandan Genocide

The Rwandan genocide was one of the largest conflicts in Africa and the world. It was
essentially a product of the Rwandan colonial experience. Before colonialism, between the
7th and 10th centuries, Hutu farmers migrated to what is now Rwanda, while pastoral Tutsi
later followed around the 14th to 16th centuries. A feudal monarchy later developed, which
lasted for centuries before Rwanda was absorbed into East Africa by Germany in 1899.
Belgium occupied the territory in 1916 and from 1920 became part of Rwanda-Burundi
administered by Belgium under a mandate from the League of Rwandan Nations. Belgium
controlled what is now Rwanda and Burundi until becoming independent in 1962 (Hayman,
2005). Prior to European occupation, the Kingdom of Rwanda was a somewhat loose
hierarchy, with a Tutsi king and an elite that mainly dominated Hutu peasants and a Tutsi
underclass, although social mobility and intermarriage blurred the distinction between the
Twa at the base of the social order. Traditionally, the population consists of 85% Hutu, 14%
Tutsi and 1% Twa. Both the Germans and the Belgians retained the monarchy to administer
the colony through indirect rule.

This agreement gave the Tutsi power and control of economic resources, and sharpened
ethnic and class divisions. In the 1940s, many Tutsis were expelled from Rwanda by the
Belgians because they had campaigned for independence. The moderate Tutsi king Mwanni

4
Matari III, who ruled for almost 3 decades, died in 1959. Shortly after Kigari V succeeded his
father, an uprising commonly known as the Peasants’ Revolution began.

The Hutus took over the government and abolished the monarchy. The Belgian colonial
government supported the Hutus. One Hutu, Gregoire Kayabinda, became president of the
new republic immediately after a large-scale massacre took place, over 20,000 Tutsi were
killed and over 100,000 people fled the country, mostly to Uganda. Under Kayabinda’s rule,
the country became a one-party state for the emancipation of the Hutus (PARMEHUTU),
dominated by the Hutus of central Rwanda. During this period, ethnic violence against Tutsis
increased and class and regional disparities widened.

A bloodless coup in July 1973 brought the incumbent Juvenal Habyarimana and a northern-
based Hutu regime to power; 1975 with the founding of a new party, the National
Revolutionary Movement for Development (NRMD) (Alusala, 2005). Habyarimana was
unopposed president in 1978 and 1983. In the 1980s his government was plagued by rivalries
between the Hutu elites and severe economic problems caused by the political crisis. Internal
and international pressures prompted the government to commit to allowing multiparty
elections in Rwanda. In October 1990, the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF) invaded Rwanda
from its base in Uganda, made up of Tutsi who fled independence in during the Hutu
takeover.

They camped in northern Rwanda and engaged government troops in guerrilla warfare. Hutu
extremist groups used the RPF invasion to brand all Tutsi in Rwanda as traitors and to justify
anti-Tutsi violence. The RPF and the international invasion of Rwanda silenced Habyarimana
in April 1992 to speed up political reforms. He formed a coalition government of the NRMD
and four other opposition parties. A peace agreement was also signed with the RPF in 1993 in
Arusha, Tanzania. It included a power-sharing agreement that gave the RPF equal
representation in the Hutu-controlled government and military. Hutu extremists tried to derail
the peace process by orchestrating the massacre of thousands of Tutsi. On April 6, 1994, a
plane carrying Habyarimana and Burundian President Cyprian Ntaryamira was shot down.
Following this, Hutu soldiers and civilians killed between 500,000 and 1,000,000 Tutsis and
moderate Hutu between April and June 1994 signalling the collapse of civil order in Rwanda.

Causes of the Rwandan Genocide

Several studies have been conducted on the 1994 Rwandan Genocide. In the following
sections, some of the main causes of the genocide are identified from different disciplinary

5
perspectives. King and Elliott (1996) mention several factors that played a role in the 1994
genocide, but note that rapid population growth (what they call demographic trapping) was
by far the most important cause: “It is the combination of all these and other factors that
make population pressure critical.

It was inevitable that the pressure would be expressed through the resumption of tribal
dislocation” (King and Elliott, 1996). A more or less similar view was expressed in a
UNHCR presentation at the UN Conference on Population and Development in Cairo in
1994: “The recent conflict in Rwanda is a striking example of ethnic conflicts fuelled by
population pressures and declining resources on Earth” (UNHCR 1994 cited in Berry and
Pott-Berry, 1999). May (1996) reported on the demographic situation in Rwanda in the 1980s
and early 1990s (before the 1994 genocide) and described the negative consequences of rapid
population growth for agriculture, land use, land and the environment. He points out, for
example, that more and more marginal areas have been cleared (e.g. steep hills), fallow
periods have been reduced and grasslands and forests have been converted to arable land.

He also referred to the inadequacy of the existing agricultural policy and the lack of success
in implementing the national family planning program. André and Platteau carried out a neo-
Malthusian analysis of the crisis in Rwanda. Population study in a small, densely populated
area of Rwanda and examined the economic and other changes that took place between 1988
and 1993. They show an increase in landlessness in the households studied and an increase in
land inequality. the poor were forced to sell land to those with more capital, and this was
despite the fact that in many cases this was a violation of existing Law.

In addition, the size of their own farms decreased and the size of their households increased.
This increase in household size is the result of a tendency for children to stay longer with
their parents and delay marriage due to lack of land. to start and an independent home. They
also show that disputes over land have increased, as have disputes within families over the
transfer of land to children. André and Platteau conclude as follows: “Rwandan Genocide
documents how the “Malthusian trap” can result in bitter tensions within families, intra-
community hatreds and violence” (André and Platteau, 1998).

Magnarella used what he calls a human-materialist theoretical framework and concluded that
the ultimate cause of the genocide was: “The country’s difficult economic situation, caused in
large part by the global economy and Rwanda’s growing imbalance in relation on land, food
and population that led to malnutrition, starvation, periodic famines and fierce competition

6
for arable land.” He adds that the immediate root cause was “the political indoctrination that
demonized the Tutsi and convinced many Hutu of it that the eradication of the Tutsi was the
economic and political remedy for the country” (Magnarella, 2002).

Foreign Policy Dimensions of the Rwandan Genocide

Foreign policy is a surprisingly understudied aspect of the Rwandan genocide. Belgium, as a

former colonial ruler of Rwanda, had deep political ties to this country. There were other
reasons for Belgium’s participation in the Rwanda Genocide peacekeeping mission. After the
Cold War, Belgium needed a justification for maintaining a large and well-equipped national
army; In order to maintain its status, Belgium tried to present itself as an African
peacekeeping specialist (African Rights, 1995). First, Belgium knew about the ethnic and
political killings and began lobbying for a stronger UNAMIR mandate, but no other state was
interested in supporting the mission (Des Forges, 1999). After ten Belgian peacekeepers were
killed on April 7, the day after the genocide began, Belgian public opinion, previously
disinterested, began to urge that “the children be sent home” (African Rights 1995). In order
to save face and not lose its status as “African Peacekeeping Specialists”, Belgium began to
demand the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, which was supported by the Security Council
as no other state was interested in the mission (Des Forges, 1999) UN Secretary-General
Boutros-Ghali (1999) said that Belgium was “stricken by the ‘Somali Syndrome’: withdrawal
at first encounter with serious problems” (Maritz, 2012).

After the debacle with the dead Belgian peacekeepers, the country showed only interest in
Rwanda when Belgian, French and American soldiers came to rescue the emigrants on April
7-10 (Melvern, 2000). The extraterrestrial rescue mission showed what would have been
possible if the international community had been serious about stopping the genocide (PBS
2004). Belgium knew the nature of the killings and was able to prevent and stop the genocide.
However, the ‘shadow of Somalia’, their fear of losing face and pleasing voters back home,
prevented them from doing so.

In the same light, the United Nations Secretariat is the bureaucratic arm of the United
Nations. As such, it transmits important information to decision-making bodies such as the
Security Council, which is responsible for “maintaining international peace and security”
(UN Charter 5(23)). However, the Secretariat and Secretary-General have been heavily
criticized for failing to share information before and during the Rwandan genocide (Barnett

7
2002). Despite extensive reporting of the genocide, the staff spoke of a “civil war” and the
need to reach a ceasefire (Des Forges, 1999).

On a similar not, UNAMIR Force Commander Dallaire (2004) recalls how his “reporting of
the genocide in New York seemed to sink into the abyss of inaction time and again”. As a
result, the non-permanent members of the Security Council, relying on information from the
Secretariat, did not consider the killings to be genocide (OAU, 2000). The Department of
Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) had just a few hundred overworked staff responsible for
17 missions and more than 70,000 peacekeeping forces (Power, 2001). With large and
complex missions in Bosnia and Somalia, Rwanda occupied low status (Wheeler, 2000).

Furthermore, the UN put pressure on the Secretariat over the US rangers killed in Mogadishu.
UN officials were determined to avoid another peacekeeping failure, fearing it could spell the
end of UN peacekeeping (Des Forges, 1999). In the words of Barnett (2002): “It is practically
impossible to exaggerate the influence of Somalia on the UN. What later came to be called
‘the shadow of Somalia’ was pervasive and cast a dark cloud over it headquarters, to guide
future practices”. While UN personnel were “honorable and hard-working individuals,” their
bureaucratic thinking led them to believe they were acting sensibly in withholding vital
information to save the future of peacekeeping (Barnett 2002:21).

The United States is often accused of being primarily responsible for the inaction in Rwanda.
This is partly because “no international Action” has taken place since the end of the Cold
War can be taken without the role of the United States” (Destexhe, 1995). As early as 1993,
CIA studies warned of impending massacres with up to 500,000 potential victims (Des
Forges, 2000). Before the genocide began, the major powers knew “that something terrible
was happening in Rwanda” and that there were plans for genocide (OAU, 2000). Kuperman
(2000) claims that the US must have known about the genocide on April 20. However, since
the death of its rangers in Somalia, the US had decided “no longer to put the UN agenda
ahead of US interests” (Clinton in Melvern, 2000).

President Clinton, concerned about his poll results after taking home body bags from African
missions, had decided that a number of factors must be met for the US to authorize future UN
peacekeeping maintenance missions (Bellamy and Williams, 2010): The Presidential
Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25), although only published in May 1994, strongly influenced
decision-making in the US in April 1994 (Scheffer, 2004). Unfortunately for the Rwandan
people, their country did not “qualify” for a US-sponsored peacekeeping operation under

8
PDD-25 (Power 2003). Aside from memories of Somalia, the United States has never had a
“national interest” in Rwanda, one of the many requirements of PDD-25 (Power, 2003).

Power (2003) argues that Washington simply “remembered Somalia and listened to no US
calls for intervention”. Citizens have a powerful voice to urge their government to put issues
on the political agenda. However, there was no such pressure in 1994, due in large part to
Rwanda’s lack of international media (Power, 2003). Accounts of the conflict also show a
Western misunderstanding of African conflicts: instead of seeing the killings as
extraordinary, there was a belief that “these people do this from time to time” (Power, 2003).
Government officials realized they would look ridiculous if they mentioned the killing in
Rwanda Genocide and then do nothing (PBS, 2004). In addition to moral obligations, there
are also legal requirements. According to the 1948 Genocide Convention, the international
community has an obligation to act when genocide occurs anywhere in the world (1948
Genocide Convention). This led to a “G-word avoidance dance” in the US (Power, 2003).
The US response to the Rwandan genocide reveals the three main reasons for inaction:
inaction due to a lack of national interest and internal pressure.

So far, the role of Belgium has been considered, the UN Secretariat and the US in France, the
country with the longest and deepest political and military involvement in Rwanda, whose
actions directly contributed to the genocide. Despite knowing that ethnic massacres were
taking place in Rwanda, France continued to provide military and political support to the
interim government (Melvern 2000:24; Wallis 2006:103). When the Rwandan Patriotic Front
(RPF) attacked Rwanda from Uganda in October 1993, France sent troops and arms to
support its French-speaking ally in against an “Anglo-Saxon invasion” (Wallis 2006).

France, concerned about its “international standing and reputation”, sees the Anglo-Saxon
countries as a threat to its position (African Rights, 1995). This led to rapid and thorough
intervention in Rwanda (Prunier, 1997). Janvier Afrika, a former Hutu supporter of Rwanda,
recalls French involvement in Rwanda in 1992 (Wallis, 2006): We had two French military
officers who helped train the Interahamwe. The French military taught us how to capture and
tie up people. the French showed the Interahamwe how to throw knives and how to assemble
and disarm weapons. A few days after the start of the genocide, the French embassy was
abandoned, leaving only a pile of shredded documents and at least seventy French soldiers
(Wallis, 2006). These soldiers continued to distribute firearms, train militias, and even
manned checkpoints and demanded identification papers, arresting Tutsi and handing them
over to the Rwandan army (Melvern, 2000).

9
In France, as elsewhere, there was virtually no media coverage of the genocide between April
and May (Prunier, 1997). Therefore, the French citizens did not ask for an intervention;
However, as soon as there was enough pressure from NGOs and the media, official French
intervention was considered again from the beginning of June (Prunier, 1997). On June 22,
the Security Council approved a “multinational humanitarian operation” with a Chapter VII
mandate, and on July 9, France began deploying its troops (UNDP, 1996).

The real reasons for French intervention, however, were to keep Rwanda French-speaking by
halting the RPF advance and to send a signal of engagement to other French-speaking
African countries (African Rights, 1995). Although France had a national interest in Rwanda,
this did not result in Rwandan lives being saved. As the only western country willing to send
a force, it could have supported UNAMIR. Rather, France’s role in the genocide was that of a
‘silent accomplice’ (Wallis, 2006).

As outlined above, the flow of information from the UN Secretariat to the Security Council
was inadequate. While France and the US were well informed about the genocide, the non-
permanent members who rely on the Secretariat for their information have never heard the
truth about the killings in Rwanda; Instead of speaking of genocide, the UN Secretariat
repeatedly reported on the breach of the ceasefire, thereby legitimizing the great powers’
decision not to intervene (Wheeler, 2000). According to the Czech ambassador at the time,
the Council devoted about 80% of its time to withdrawing peacekeeping forces, 20% to
reaching a ceasefire, and no time to discussing the genocide (Power, 2003). Security Council
countries have been extremely reluctant to use the word genocide, as this would have forced
them to act in accordance with the Genocide Convention (Melvern, 2000).

In addition, Rwanda had a seat on the council where its representative could “openly express
his racist philosophy” (Destexhe, 1995). At the same time, he passed information about
Western apathy to the Rwandan government, which gave him the impression of moral and
legal impunity (Melvern, 2000). Meanwhile, France put pressure on its “French-speaking
African client states” in the Council to approve all their decisions (Wallis, 2006). These
Security Council decisions had dire consequences for Rwandans.

On April 21, two weeks after the death of Belgian peacekeepers and Belgium’s request for
the complete withdrawal of UNAMIR, the Security Council voted in favour of Resolution
912 (UNPDI, 1996), which called for a 90-troop reduction of UNAMIR % to 270 soldiers
(PBS, 2004). Although the Council established UNAMIR II with a Chapter VII mandate and

10
approved 5,500 troops in Resolution 918 a few weeks later on May 17 (UNDPI, 1996),
Western countries were still unwilling to contribute physically or financially, so that
UNAMIR II could not be deployed until the end of the genocide (Melvern, 2000). This
allowed France to deploy its own mission. The authors of Independent Inquiry (1999)
conclude that “the Security Council bears responsibility for its lack of political will to do
more to stop the killing.”

On the ground, UNAMIR was not well equipped to stop the killings due to “constant pressure
from the Security Council on UNAMIR to save money” (Independent Research, 1999). First,
it did not have a sufficient mandate. UN Security Council Resolution 872, which authorized
UNAMIR on October 5, 1993, limited UNAMIR to simple “surveillance”, “assistance” and
“investigation” under a Chapter VI mandate (UNDP, 1996). The only time Dallaire was
allowed to use force, other than in self-defense, was when he was asked to help evacuate
foreigners between April 7 and 10 (Power, 2003). This shows that Western countries are
simply prioritizing the lives of whites over Africans. Second, UNAMIR did not have enough
resources, especially after the Belgian peacekeepers withdrew: “UNAMIR does not have
heavy weapon systems, ammunition, let alone safe transport. The troops were very tired and
sick from lack of adequate food and medicine” (Dallaire, 2003). The result was that
UNAMIR “watched helplessly as people were massacred before their eyes.” (Prunier, 1997).
This is even more tragic when one considers that a modest force of 5,000 soldiers, UNAMIR,
could have prevented the worst killings (Carnegie Corporation, 1997).

Conclusion

In this paper, it was shown that the “shadow of Somalia”, the national interest and the lack of
internal pressure, as well as “the lack of political will”, were the main factors that led to the
failure of the international community to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda. The key
players, Belgium, the US and France, had sufficient information about what was happening,
and the quick and effective evacuation of foreign nationals and the intervention of France in
July show that they too were in a position to intervene. In addition, the 1948 Genocide
Convention bears not only moral but also legal responsibility. The lack of political will led to
the collapse of the Security Council, which is responsible for international peace and security.
Its malfunction meant that UNAMIR was never able to protect or save the lives of the
Rwandans and became a bystander of the genocide. Acknowledging the international failure
to prevent and stop the genocide in Rwanda should be the first step in ensuring that a state
never again fails another state in the face of genocide.

11
12
References

African Rights (1995). Rwanda: Death, Despair and Defiance. London: African Rights.

André, C. and J.P. Platteau (1998), Land relations under unbearable stress: Rwanda caught in
the Malthusian trap, Journal of Economic ‘Behavior and Organization, Vol 34, p. 1-
47.

Barnett, M. (2002). Eyewitness to a genocide: The United Nations and Rwanda, London:
Cornell University.

Bellamy, A. J. and Williams, P. D. eds. (2010). Understanding Peacekeeping, 2nd ed,

Cambridge: Polity Press.

Berry, J. and C Pott Berry (eds), (1999), Genocide in Rwanda: A Collective Memory,
Howard Univ Press, Washington.

Boutros-Ghali, B. (1999). Unvanquished: A U.S.-U.N. Saga. New York: Random House.

Carnegie Corporation (1997). Preventing Deadly Conflict: Final Report with Executive
Summary. Accessed 12th Jan., 2023. Available at www.janeliunas.lt/files/Preventing
%20Deadly%20Conflict.doc.

Dallaire, R. (2004). Shake Hands with the Devil: The Failure of Humanity in Rwanda,
London: Arrow Books.

Des Forges, A. (1999). Leave none to tell the story, New York: Human Rights Watch.

Destexhe, A. (1995). Rwanda and genocide in the twentieth century. London: Pluto Press.

Independent Inquiry (1999). Report of the Independent Inquiry into the actions of the United
Nations during the 1994 genocide in Rwanda. Accessed 12th Jan., 2023. Available at
http://daccess-ddsny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N99/395/47/IMG/N9939547.pdf?
OpenElement.

King, MH and Elliott, CM (1996), UNICEF’s call to greatness: an open letter to Carol
Bellamy, National Medical Journal of India, Vol 9, 130.

Magnarella, P. (2002), Explaining Rwanda’s genocide, Human Rights and Human Welfare,
Vol 2 (1), p. 25-34.

13
Maritz, D. (2012). Rwandan Genocide: Failure of the International Community? E-
International Relations retrieved https://www.e-ir.info/2012/04/07/rwandan-genocide-
failure-of-the-international-community/ 11th Jan., 2023

May, J. (1996), Demographic pressure and population policies in Rwanda, 1962-1994,

Population and Sociétés, INED: Paris.

Melvern, L. (2000). A people betrayed: The role of the west in Rwanda’s genocide, London:
Zed Books.

Modelski G. (1962), a Theory of Foreign Policy, London: Pall Mall Press.

Organisation of African Unity (2000). Rwanda: The Preventable Genocide: International

Panel of Eminent Personalities. Accessed 12th Jan., 2023. Available at
http://www.visiontv. ca/old/RememberRwanda/Report.pdf.

PBS (2004). “Ghosts of Rwanda”. Frontline. DVD.

Power, S. (2003). A Problem from Hell: America and the age of genocide, London:
Flamingo. Prunier, Gérard. 1997. The Rwanda Crisis: History of a genocide. London:
Hurst & Company.

Scheffer, D. (2004). ‘Lessons from the Rwandan Genocide: A Look Back’. Georgetown
Journal of International Affairs: 125-132. The White House. 1994. Presidential
Decision Directive/NSC-25. Accessed 12th Jan., 2023. Available at
http://www.fas.org /irp/offdocs/pdd/pdd-25.pdf.

United Nations (1945). United Nations Charter. Accessed 5 October 2011. Available at
http://www.un.org/en/documents/charter/. United Nations Department of Public
Information (UNDPI).

Uvin, P. (2001). ‘Reading the Rwandan Genocide’. International Studies Review 3(3): 75-99.

Wallis, A. (2006). Silent Accomplice: The Untold Story of France’s Role in the Rwandan
Genocide. London: I.B. Tauris.

Wheeler, N. J. (2000). Saving Strangers: Humanitarian Intervention in International Society.

Oxford: University Press.

14