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Rebecca Moody and Victor Bekkers

Big Data and Public Policy


Course, Content and Outcome
Rebecca Moody
Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands

Victor Bekkers
Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam, The
Netherlands

ISBN 978-3-031-16030-1 e-ISBN 978-3-031-16031-8


https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16031-8

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2023

This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively
licensed by the Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is
concerned, specifically the rights of translation, reprinting, reuse of
illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on microfilms or in
any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or
dissimilar methodology now known or hereafter developed.

The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks,


service marks, etc. in this publication does not imply, even in the
absence of a specific statement, that such names are exempt from the
relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general
use.

The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the
advice and information in this book are believed to be true and accurate
at the date of publication. Neither the publisher nor the authors or the
editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have
been made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional
claims in published maps and institutional affiliations.

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered


company Springer Nature Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham,
Switzerland
Contents
1 Introduction
2 Big Data
3 Public Policymaking
4 Big Data and Public Policymaking
5 Research Strategy
6 DARE in Rotterdam
7 Food Security in Denmark
8 Noise Pollution in Dublin
9 Analysis
10 Discussion
Index
List of Figures
Fig.​2.​1 The Data–Information–Knowledge–Wisdom hierarchy (Rowley,
2007)

Fig.​3.​1 The policy process

Fig.​3.​2 Ecosystem and approaches to policy

Fig.​4.​1 Features of technology

Fig.​4.​2 Institutional features

Fig.​4.​3 Policy arena

Fig.​5.​1 Conceptual framework

Fig.​9.​1 Features of technology

Fig.​9.​2 Institutional features

Fig.​9.​3 The policy arena

Fig.​9.​4 New conceptual framework


List of Tables
Table 1.​1 Societal transitions and big data

Table 2.​1 Features of the positions in the technology debate (Moody,


2010)

Table 3.​1 Characteristics of the approaches

Table 3.​2 Big data and approaches to public policymaking

Table 5.​1 Framework of analysis

Table 9.​1 Features of technology

Table 9.​2 Institutional features

Table 9.​3 The policy arena

Table 9.​4 Course, content and outcome of the public policymaking


process
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
R. Moody, V. Bekkers, Big Data and Public Policy
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16031-8_1

1. Introduction
Rebecca Moody1 and Victor Bekkers1
(1) Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands

Government and society face all kinds of different but often intertwined
challenges to which they must respond. These challenges relate to a
wide range of questions. For instance, how can policies be developed
that ensure an open and inclusive society, able to protect us against
pandemic diseases like the COVID-19 virus? Or, how can the transition
of the production and distribution of energy be organized in such a way
that climate change is dealt with by reducing fossil fuel emissions? How
can the lifestyle of people be changed in such a way that we are able to
reduce the costs of health care that rise due to an older population,
while at the same time ensuring the quality of and access to these
services? And, how can policies that support migrants integrate in
society in such a way that they can become self-supporting be
developed without widening the gap between people who have and
those who have not? Last but not least, how can we ensure that a
citizen in need of all kinds of social support and social benefits
(because, e.g., of unemployment or incapability to work) is being dealt
with as a ‘whole person,’ or being defined from a holistic perspective?
One step in dealing with these questions is to bring the information
governments have regarding all relevant aspects of the challenges at
hand—and that are often gathered and stored by different
organizations that operate in different domains—together, in order to
get a better and more integrated understanding about possible causes
and effects, but also to understand the consequences of possible policy
approaches.
At this moment we are riding the wave of a fourth information
revolution, which influences the way in which governments deal with
the challenges raised before. In the 1970s and 1980s the introduction
of the mainframe computer and the personal computer fundamentally
changed the way in which we process information. In the 1990s a
second revolution was launched by the introduction of the internet and
the World Wide Web, while since the mid-2000s the rapid penetration
of social media like Facebook, Instagram, LinkedIn, Twitter and
YouTube has changed the way in which we communicate and share
different types of information, often information that goes beyond the
traditional text message, thereby making use of smaller and smaller
smart devices like the smart phone. Pictures and videos contributed to
the emerge of a visual society (Bekkers & Moody, 2015). This can be
considered the third revolution.
At this moment we already have crossed a new threshold, entering
the area of the fourth revolution. New applications are being
introduced. They are framed in terms of ‘big data,’ ‘algorithmic
governance,’ ‘the embedded internet,’ ‘the internet of things,’ artificial
intelligence, machine learning and even robotization. Although we
should be careful to lump these concepts and applications together
(given their differences in working and backgrounds), they share some
common characteristics. They all try to make use of the data and
datasets (derived from text, figures, pictures but also the spoken word)
that are processed and stored in different databases and different data
networks (like for instance a traffic mobility network). Moreover, this
data is also produced when people are involved in all kinds of different
actions, like shopping and surfing on the internet, sharing pictures by
making use of social media platforms like TikTok, or to withdraw cash,
or when we are being filmed by a surveillance cameras when driving
through the streets. We are not only able to gather and produce large
amounts of data, we have also been able to increase the capacity to
process them and combine them. As a result we are able to produce
more advanced, more sophisticated calculations and scenarios (making
use of algorithms) that help to improve our understanding and learning
in terms of what is happening or will be happening. Societal
phenomena and social processes like our behaviour and movements
can be made more transparent, not only in terms of registration, but
increasingly in terms of comprehension (Bekkers & Moody, 2015).
Within this information revolution we speak about ‘big data,’ and while
we will elaborate on the meaning and the term in Chap. 2 in depth, we
do have to define the term. We regard big data as having a large volume,
not in absolute terms, but in relative terms, meaning larger than before.
Furthermore, big data holds a large amount of variety, meaning that it
comes from different sources and is stored in different formats. Not
only does big data hold a larger volume as before, it is also generated
and updated quicker and faster. Furthermore big data might be
objectively observed. It might not be interpreted objectively, and once
combined with other data it accounts for subjective information and
might therefore be misleading or unreliable. When looking at the
potential of this fourth information revolution, which we will frame in
terms of ‘big data’ (and which we will explain in more detail later on), it
is quite obvious that this potential fosters the governance or steering
capacity of government, when dealing with some of the questions with
which we started this opening chapter. Of course, steering has always
been a core task of governments, so it is not a surprise that steering
questions remain important as well. The question is whether the
steering capacity of governments has changed due to big data. Not only
are we faced with the question whether it has changed, but also how.
Big data could serve as a potential to increase the steering capacity of
governments, a potential that can not only be defined in terms of
promises but also in terms of perils. These promises and perils become
visible in the ways in which governments develop and implement
policies that are directed to deal with all kinds of problems that are
defined as a societal and political challenges to which government and
politics have to respond. The ability to generate, process and combine
data and datasets in more advanced ways does not only help increase
the transparency of a specific policy problem in terms of
understanding, but may also open the door to more advanced ways of
monitoring and control that might be exercised by government
agencies or other private or societal parties. But at the same time, the
ability to develop all kinds of more advanced scenarios that enable
policymakers, politicians or even the wider public to grasp the
consequences of specific measures might also stimulate a process of
mutual learning and foster a more open dialogue that might contribute
to the quality of political deliberation processes that lay behind the
drafting of new policy programmes. That is why in this book we want to
show how big data influences the content of different policy
programmes, and the course and outcomes of different policy
processes. In the following chapters we will take up this challenge.
Before we proceed, it helps to discuss in more detail the governance
and steering potential of big data. Governance or steering capacity
refers to the capacity of governments to influence societal phenomena,
processes and behaviour in a desired way. This capacity is based on the
availability of resources. Data, ICT and the knowledge and experience
that people possess can be seen as relevant resources. The effective and
efficient combination of the these three resources might increase the
ability to gather, process and combine data in such a way that more
advanced information and knowledge can be created and shared. In
doing so it might contribute to the governance or steering capacity of
government and society. As such it might improve the intelligence of
government and society. That is why we will sketch two ‘ideal types’ in
which we will address how big data helps to contribute to ‘an
intelligent state’ versus ‘an intelligent society,’ thereby acknowledging
that the creation of this intelligence has not only positive but also some
negative outcomes. In Sect. 1.3 we will pick up this challenge. This
steering potential, and the role of big data as a potential resource that
can be used to enhance this potential, plays an important role when
policymakers are engaged in drafting public policies. However, the
important question is, what do we really know about the role of big
data in these public policymaking processes? In Sect. 1.4 we give a
short overview of the existing literature. What emerges from this
overview is that a rather fragmentated picture exists, mostly focusing
on one specific issue. A more overall view seems to be lacking.
The governance or steering potential of big data does not stand on
its own. It is embedded in a number of fundamental transitions that
take place in our society. Understanding these do not only helps us to
grasp some of the characteristics that lay behind many of the policy
problems with which governments are wrestling, it might also help us
to understand why ‘big data’ is seen as a way of coping with these
transformations. In the next section we will address these major
transitions and their implications for the use of big data in
policymaking processes.

1.1 Government Steering and the Quest for


Transparency in a Changing World
In this section we will sketch five images of fundamental
transformations that lie behind many of the policy problems that
governments face (Bekkers & Homburg, 2017). These transformation
do not stand on their own, but are closely interconnected, while at the
same time their effects are not limited to one specific societal domain,
like the economy, culture or politics. Effects become also visible in
different domains, which stimulates their intertwining. Simultaneously
these transformations also challenge the role and position of
government in society and the transparency that is being pursued,
thereby filling in the potential role of knowledge, information and data.

1.1.1 Living in a Fragmented but Structured


World?
During the last two centuries our society has become increasingly
complex, and this will only continue. The reason behind this is that we
live in a highly specialized society that is mirrored in the variety and
unrestrained growth of the amount of organizations that constitute
society, organizations that are full of all kinds of rather specialized
tasks, while at the same time they are interdependent from other
organizations in order to fulfil their own tasks. The result is that we live
in a rather fragmented but interwoven and highly organized and
structured society, in which a change in the tasks and operations of one
organization will also have consequences for the change of other
organizations. A possible change in one organization is very often
dependent on the support of other organizations, which also leads to all
kinds of coordination costs (Willke, 1991).
Moreover the structured nature of society also influences the way in
which people are able to exercise influence, to pursue specific actions
and to strive for change. Social life is organized around all kinds of
practices and formal (e.g. regulations) and informal rules. These rules
become manifest in all kinds of (information) systems, procedures,
routines and ingrown habits that have to be followed (Giddens, 1984;
March & Olsen, 1989). They are practices and rules that reproduce the
fragmentation and organization of societies, every time they are
followed. For instance, if you want to reduce the costs of health care,
you see that health care is organized through a wide variety of highly
professionalized organizations, like general practitioner practices,
hospitals, dedicated nursing and other care-providing homes, health
insurance companies, associations of all kind of health-care
professionals, a ministry of health care and so on. And at the same, if a
hospital wants to reduce the number of days that an elderly patient is in
hospital it is dependent on the capacity of these dedicated nursing
homes.
This has at least two consequences. First, we do not really know the
world in which we are living, because we have a rather fragmented
image of what is happening in society, because each organization only
understands one specific part of the overall societal challenge, given the
highly specialized task it is performing. A more holistic perspective is
lacking. Moreover the knowledge and information being gathered not
only reflect the specific aspect that is relevant, given the task that is
being performed. The only relevant information and knowledge is the
information and knowledge that reflects this task and that is being
governed by the practices and rules that have been established and
defined as being relevant for the functioning of an organization. This
also colours their perception and assessment of reality and the
production and use of ‘facts.’ For instance, a health insurance company
will look at the quality of the health system from a predominantly cost-
oriented perspective: what are the medical but also housing costs that
are related to a specific surgery, while a surgeon will also look the
quality of care he or she is offering. This colours ‘the facts’ that are
being presented.
The second consequence is that the image of a fragmented and
structured world is also mirrored in the way in which government is
organized. When we look at the history of government we see that ‘the
government’ does not exist, but that government itself consists of
specialized government agencies that operate in demarcated
jurisdictions. For instance, in many countries you have local, regional
and central government, executing different tasks that relate to
different competencies and responsibilities, while at the same time
specialized agencies have been erected to fulfil dedicated tasks in the
field of taxes, social benefits, policing and crime, water management,
vehicle, food and building safety inspection and so on. Some of these
organizations are primarily focused on developing policies, while
others focus on implementation and enforcement. One of the challenges
of government is how to overcome the structured fragmentation of
society and how to align these specialized government organizations in
such a way that a collective approach, at the level of society as whole,
can be developed and pursued. This is the governance challenge with
which many governments wrestle. For instance, the promotion of a
more healthy lifestyle among young people in order to tackle obesity
mobilizes all kinds of organizations: local, regional and central
government, general practitioners, hospitals, schools, sport and leisure
clubs, youth and child-care organizations, community-care
organizations, but also the food industry, supermarkets and so on. The
challenge is how to align these organizations in such a way that they
have a shared understanding regarding the necessity of dealing with
obesity.
What is the big data promise in this fragmented and structured
world? Governments operate in a political world, and the essence of
politics is the binding allocation of values for society a whole (e.g.
providing public health care, creating solidarity with the
underprivileged, safeguarding privacy or stimulating economic
prosperity) in the context of scarcity (the amount of money needed to
fulfil all kinds of wishes is limited, which implies choices), given the
challenges with which society as a whole is wrestling (Easton, 1965;
Stone, 2008). Given the political assignment that lays behind many
policy programmes, a more holistic understanding about what possible
causes and effects of, for instance, climate change is therefore
necessary. The ability to link data stored in different databases that are
located in different public, semi-public but also private organizations—
thereby creating new datasets that can be used to get a better overall
understanding about the effects of the rise of the sea level—might help
to overcome the barriers that are set by organizational boundaries and
jurisdictions. In doing so, big data enables governments to overcome a
highly specialized and thus narrow perspective, thereby taking all kinds
of relevant aspects into account. In this highly fragmented and
structured world, the promise of big data is that it might foster a wider,
broader form of transparency on the one hand, taking more relevant
aspects into account, while on the other hand improve a more in-depth
understanding about relevant mechanisms that lay behind a specific
problem.
However, there is also a dark side that can be discerned. This refers
to the idea that the data stored in ICT systems reflects a specific bias,
and each time a data system is used, this bias is being reinforced,
thereby reproducing a specific view on reality, or even specific interest,
given the specific task an government organization. The idea of ethnic
profiling refers to this notion of bias. Behind working with profiles,
especially in terms of policing and law enforcement, the data that is
used or the data that is being coupled is based on this specific bias. That
is why Kraemer and King (1986) talk about ‘the automation of bias’ and
stress that is important to unravel the assumptions behind the use of
computer systems, the use of big data, and try to link them to the biases
that guide these assumptions.

1.1.2 Living and Working in a Networked World?


The second relevant image of the network society, as coined by Castells
(1996, 1997, 1998). In the network society two major reinforcing
developments merge together. These are digitalization and
globalization. The result is a networked world.
The pervasiveness of modern information and communication
technologies (ICT) that have come in different waves of changes during
the last 60 years has fundamentally changed the production process in
modern society. Information and communication—which as such refers
to different types of data—are the most vital sources in the production
and distribution of new products and services in modern society, and
this is supported by ICT. As a result, technologies have penetrated all
domains of social and human life, constituting the fabric of modern
society (Castells, 1996). The collecting, processing, refinement and
distribution of data, besides the production and distribution of material
goods, constitute a vital and important growing part of our economy:
more and more economic and social activities are data-driven activities.
As a result, the possibilities that ‘big data’ is offering can be seen as the
outcome of the revolutionary process of digitalization and the
omnipotent pervasiveness of ICT in the veins of society.
This process is not only restricted to the private sector. ICT has
penetrated the public sector substantially. First, in the fight against
crime and terrorism, data stemming from different sources is combined
in order to develop the profiles of potential perpetrators. Second, in the
rendering of social benefits to citizens algorithms play an important
role in deciding who will receive this benefit and who will not, or even
who will be subject to a closer investigation because fraud is suspected.
And again, also in relation to the previous discussion about the
automation of bias (Kraemer & King, 1986), a shadow side can be
distinguished here. The connective capacity of network technology in
linking data, datasets and data sources is also very often steered by
specific biases. It is this bias that influences the kind of connections that
are being made. For instance, in the Dutch social security and tax
domain all kinds of databases are being connected by making use of
several information brokers that offer access to specific data. The idea
behind setting up these brokers was, apart from improving the
integrated nature of the services delivered, fraud detection, which has
become more and more important over the last ten years. Citizens were
primarily defined as potential cheaters.
In the network society as described by Castells (1996), the capacity
that ICT offers to create, process, transport and store data, information
and knowledge supports another striking development. This is the
globalization of production and consumption patterns. On a global scale
we witness a process of specialization in the production of goods and
services, in which these goods and services (or parts thereof) are
produced or assembled at locations where the production or assembly
costs are the cheapest, which is seen as an important competitive
advantage. In the slipstream of these distributed production and
service models all kinds of flows emerge: flows of goods, components,
people, data, information, knowledge and communications; flows that
also are also connected to each other, sometimes loosely, sometimes
strongly, thereby creating all kinds of interdependencies. The result is a
network of flows in which increasingly the real-time sharing of data,
information and knowledge takes place that support all kinds of social
practices, like buying and selling or exchanging ideas (Castells, 1996). A
classic example is the capital market in which worldwide stock markets
and brokers, banks, private equity firms, pension funds, insurance
companies and so on buy and sell all kinds of financial products (bonds,
shares, warrants, futures and other complicated financial products).
Behind this buying and selling automated algorithms can be discerned
that govern this process in such a way that buying and selling take place
in a split second. It makes no difference in what time zone or location of
the world a stockbroker operates.
In the network society these flows very often come together in
specific nodes. Nodes are characteristically organized around the
resources, especially sophisticated knowledge and expertise, necessary
to organize and coordinate flows. For instance, London and New York
are nodes in the global stock market, because all the services that are
needed to buy and sell all kinds of financial products can be found in
these cities: specialized providers like banks and brokers, but also
supporting services like consultancy firms or law firms. The same can
also be said for the ports of Rotterdam, Shanghai or Antwerp. These
ports are nodes in which not only material flows (carriers like ships,
trains, lorries and containers) come together but also the relevant
information and knowledge (e.g. in terms of logistical planning and
specialized firms, but also organizations like tax and customs agencies,
insurance companies and expert companies) that is necessary to
support these material flows (Castells 1996; Bekkers & Homburgl,
2017). When we have a closer look at these nodes we see that they are
closely linked to specific metropolitan regions, because also in an
information-, knowledge- and data-driven economy, physical locations
are still important (Sassen, 1994). However, these metropolitan areas
also compete with each other on a global scale as being attractive
places to live and work, which is not only determined by economic
factors (e.g. tax regimes, local labour markets), but also by other factors
like the quality of schools, the presence of knowledge and innovation-
driven organizations, the quality of the environment, cultural
provisions and the quality of the traffic infrastructure. The central role
that these metropolitan areas play ensure that people move towards
these areas, which facilitates further urbanization. The result is that
these nodes not only fulfil an important regional function, but they also
enable the networks of these global flows to do their work.
What does this image of the network society imply in terms of big
data? First, the emergence of big data is inherently connected with the
rise of the network society, thereby suggesting that data can be viewed
as raw material that can be used to develop new products and services.
Second, the data moves around the world and the social activities that
we set up or are being engaged create parallel flows of data that can be
used and that can be exploited. Third, it is important to understand that
the data flows come together in nodes in which the knowledge and
expertise that is necessary to exploit the data are brought together.
That is why it is no surprise that high-tech firms that are engaged in the
innovation of data-driven products and services make use of the same
urban or metropolitan ecosystems. That is why it is important to view
the use of big data and the creation of big data products and services in
terms of an ecosystem, in which the creation of these big data
applications is seen as the outcome of close, often regional
collaboration between different but interdependent public, private and
semi-public stakeholders, which constitute an innovation milieu in
which each stakeholder provides necessary resources. Technological
and data-driven innovation should not be considered innovations
standing on their own (Castells, 1996). Fourth, if these data flows have
a global character, then what is the power of the state to regulate these
flows as well as the exploitation of data in these flows, in terms of
unwanted or perverse effects (e.g. privacy) that cross the borders of
territorial jurisdiction of the state (Castells, 1996)?

1.1.3 Living in the World of Risk?


Living in a highly fragmented but also interconnected world also
creates all kinds of risks. The history of humankind can be told by
referring to dramatic stories about flooding, fires, earthquakes,
pandemics and famines, stories that refer to the classical risks that
societies are facing and to some extent can be defined as ‘given.’ Beck
(1999) defines these risks as classical risks. However, he draws our
attention to another type of risk: new risks. These ‘new’ risks are
related to the process of modernization and rationalization that has
taken place during the last two or even three centuries and which has
become manifest in the given descriptions of the fragmented and
networked society. Typical for these new risks is that in our society
choices are made and deliberately taken, because the chance that such
an event take place is (statistically) acceptable, given also the efficiency
and effectiveness gains that can be achieved. For instance, cities allow
that housing, commercial activities or even new plants are allowed to
be planned nearby a river because the chance that the river will flood
will be once in, for instance, a hundred years. According to Beck (1999)
we increasingly make decisions in which the risks that companies and
government are taking are perceived as a ‘managerial’ challenge that
can be handled by making use of all kinds of advanced risk models that
forecast a risk event or introduce all kinds of risk-management systems
and techniques (like monitoring systems). In doing so we do not
address the political nature of the risks we undertake. A critical
discussion about what type of risks we want to take as a society as a
whole, what type of risks we define as politically acceptable and
legitimate, is not being pursued. Instead of having this discussion we
try to rationalize in such a way that an illusion of safety is being
created. Calculated risks are not seen as political risks but as risks that
can be managed and thus governed. In doing so a more ‘social
engineering’ perspective prevails (Beck, 1994).
Why do these new risks deserve a political debate? Typical for the
world in which we are living is that people in all kinds of specialized
organizations take decisions that refer to calculated risks that are
acceptable from their point of view, given the specialist task they fulfil.
But a serious challenge occurs when we look at how the effects of the
decisions will work out, thereby taking into account the wider, societal
picture. A typical example is the financial crisis of 2008, which started
with the fall of Lehmann Brothers Bank. Working with a bonus scheme
that could be very rational in order to stir up profit, brokers were
encouraged to take higher and higher risks. The idea was that having all
kinds of monitoring and scrutiny systems in place would ensure that
the risk calculations that were made by brokers could be managed.
However, in the short term this worked, but in the long term the
financial risks that were taken were not covered, and Lehman went
bankrupt. In its wake other banks followed, which led to a collapse of
the whole financial system. However, given the vital position of banks in
our society, national governments had to support these banks, which
also influenced the financial position of these governments. Because
they wanted to prevent ‘bank runs,’ banks were nationalized with
government money, which in many countries led to substantial cut-
back operations within the public sector in order to compensate for the
money that was spent on saving these banks. In the European Union the
government debts endangered the monetary union, given the
arrangements that were made in terms of the national debt an EU
country is allowed to have. This example shows how these ‘new risks’
work out: “it becomes an event with a beginning and no end; an open
end festival of creeping, galloping and overlapping waves of
destruction” (Beck, 1999). Furthermore it shows that, before the effects
become visible, risky behaviour is not always visible and is hidden
behind a wall of measures that provides an illusion of safety. What can
also be witnessed is that risks are no longer local risks but, due to the
process of globalization and the network interdependencies of the
world in which we live, effects spread rather rapidly and become visible
in other places and affect all kinds of other related domains, due to all
kinds of chain reactions. Given the changed nature of the risks that we
are facing, Beck stresses the importance of having a public debate,
involving all kinds of relevant stakeholders, regarding the question,
which kind of risks are acceptable for society and which kinds of risks
are not, and what kind of knowledge is needed to have this political-
ethical discussion. Moreover, he also stresses that it is important to link
these risks with the ways in which society has organized itself, how it
functions, and how economic growth and prosperity is being defined
(Beck, 1999).
The idea of the risk society has two important consequences when
talking about big data. First, the use of big data in relation to setting up
all kinds of risk analysis models, the use of data in drafting all kinds of
scenarios in which risks are visualized, as well as the introduction of
algorithms to calculate the acceptability of risks, can be seen as forms
of social engineering that contribute to the illusion of safety. Big data
strengthens a process in which “the calculation or risk” (Beck, 1994)
suppresses a more fundamental public and political debate. Second,
and turning the previous argument around, it can be argued that big
data—and especially if big data is used in providing all kinds of
scenarios—might stimulate and foster a public and more open debate,
because the presence of data-driven scenarios might help to create a
shared frame of reference for all the participants in the debate in
making transparent what is happening. However, this presupposes that
the assumptions on which these scenarios are based are also made
transparent. Furthermore, the use of big data might also help to ensure
that specific data, stemming from other systems and sources that are
not the dominant ones, are also taken into consideration.

1.1.4 Living in a Liquid World?


From a cultural perspective, a fundamental transformation in society
can also be witnessed. This transformation can be framed as living in a
liquid world (Baumann, 2000). Baumann (2000) defines the present
state of humankind as being “light and liquid.” This lightness refers to
the fact that the institutions on which society has relied for centuries
are losing their functions. Institutions like the family, the school, the
church, the army, the police, the labour union or even politics provide
order and stability (Dahlgren, 2009). They provide meaning by
stressing specific values that we as society deem important. People
internalize these values and prescribe how we have to think, act, and in
a broader sense, behave and live in relation to specific circumstances:
what is appropriate and what not. As such these institutions, and the
values they embody and that they protect, are defined by (groups in)
society as being leading and binding. However, during the last few
decades people have liberated themselves from the socializing
influence of these institutions, which has led to new and other
authority relations in society. The rather vertical power relationship
that existed for a long time between, for instance, a father and mother
and their children or between a teacher and his or her pupils, has been
turned into a more horizontal one. These leading persons are no longer
seen as the persons that you automatically obey. For instance, in the
world of politics citizens no longer consider themselves members of a
constituency but as clients, while government is primarily defined as a
producer of services. Citizens see themselves as the consumers of
government services and products, which presupposes a market-
driven, thus horizontal relationship (Bekkers & Homburg, 2017). The
declining influence of these institutions has the effect that people
perceive themselves as persons that are liberated, that they have gained
more freedom to organize their lives in their own ways, freed from all
kinds of compulsory social norms, traditions and conventions. In
pursuing this freedom, making use of the autonomy that they have
acquired, they are inspired to follow and develop their own life course,
to find their own, individual style. Life has become more liquid and has
become lighter, because the loss of authority of these institutions that
no longer impose all kinds of burdens. As such this process of
individualization has stimulated the further liberalization and
emancipation of people and groups of people in society (Dahlgren,
2009).
Several consequences of this transformation should be mentioned
(Bekkers & Homburgl, 2007). First, people have rather high
expectations of what life should offer them. That is also translated in
terms of the expectations that they have from government, from
politics and policy. The primary task of government is to facilitate their
well-being, their personal growth and development, so safeguarding
that life should be light and liquid. Second, and as a result of the
previous one, the idea is that government should develop policies
ensuring that life is free of risk, free of uncertainty and anxiety
(Boutelier, 2002). The third consequence is that identity is still
important, although this identity is no longer related to a sense of
institutional belonging. In this fluid world people do not want to get
lost, they want to be recognized and appreciated as individuals and
unique people. Furthermore the importance of an identity is also linked
to finding and creating your own style, defining your own life course.
The fourth consequence refers to the changing role of politics. The
diminishing role of ideology and the values that lay behind it has led to
the increased penetration of image and image-building in politics and
democracy. People have liberated themselves from the socio-economic,
cultural and ideological background of their parents or grandparents.
They have increasingly become floating voters. The identification with
politics and politicians is increasingly influenced by the personal image
and style of a politician and the emotions this person generates
(positive or negative; Bennett & Entman, 2001; Bennett, 2007). As a
result politics is increasingly seen as a spectacle show, a theatre in
which the focus is put on paying attention to unexpected, dramatized
and even staged events, stressing that politics is about fighting a battle
between the good and the bad, between David and Goliath (Elchardus,
2002; Bennett, 2007). Modern mass media, ranging from television and
newspapers to social media, not only facilitate but even strengthen this
process. Democracy and politics have become mediated democracy and
politics. The logic that lies behind the functioning of the media plays a
vital role in how politics and politicians are portrayed, while at the
same time politics and politicians make use of the same logic to draw
attention, thereby influencing the way in which they communicate
(Bennett & Entman, 2001; Elchardus, 2002). The latter brings us to the
last consequence. Due to the massive and rapid penetration of the
internet and social media in society, we see that we increasingly live in
a liquid world that in essence is a mediated world. As such the
entanglement of these new media with our daily social practices adds
to the liquid nature of present society, in which also (multiple)
identities are being created through the use of these media and which
manifest themselves in terms of virtual identities (Deuze, 2007).
The next question we should ask is what this implies when taking
the promises and perils of big data into account. At least two
consequences can be noticed. First, data and the linking of data can be
used to create or construct all kinds of identities. A specific identity can
be substantiated by making use of the combination of the specific data
that is derived from different sources. Where before one would simply
belong to a specific religion or a specific political party, now we use
several sources of data to construct who we are. We have a certain
social media presence, we buy specific brands, hold specific, often
unrelated political opinions, listen to specific music and so on, and we
have the possibility of making this public through social media,
constructing a very individual identity, which is a lot less general than
the public identity we had before. Second, the knowledge that is put
forward by traditional institutions, like government or science, has lost
its natural authority. This also refers to the data and information that
lie behind these claims. That is why in this liquid world facts are being
questioned as well as the truth claims based on them. As a result,
‘alternative facts’ are being presented that are based on other, non-
institutional data sources and datasets, which are increasingly open
and accessible to everyone. By making use of ‘big data’ applications
groups are capable of presenting their own facts, supported by the
combination of data that they define as relevant, given their interests
and truth claims. In this liquid world facts are increasingly becoming
disputed by presenting other alternative facts (Andersson, 2003). Big
data fuels this argument as to who is right or who has the most
convincing claim on having the truth on his or her side. It has become
rather easy to produce and construct the facts and truth claims that suit
a specific interest or viewpoint.

1.1.5 Living in a Stateless World?


The last transformation we want address refers to the institutional loss
that especially has influenced the role of the state in governing society.
This process has been framed in terms of ‘hollowing out the state’
(Rhodes, 1997). The state is no longer considered as having the
monopoly, the expertise or resources that are necessary to govern
society, especially when dealing with all kinds of societal challenges.
What we witness is a shift from government towards governance (Van
Kersbergen & Van Waarden, 2004). When governing, governments are
increasingly dependent on a variety of other actors—in the private,
public and not-for-profit domain—to achieve their goals (Newman,
2001). This implies a shift from a rather centralized and hierarchical
point of view, in which governments intervene in society from a
superordinated position, towards a rather horizontal perspective. In
this horizontal perspective government is just one of many actors that
try to influence societal challenges in a desired direction. Government
is merely one actor in a network of actors. The challenge for
government is to mobilize this network of actors around specific policy
problems in such a way that each actor is willing and able to put in the
resources they have (like legal competences and thus authority, money,
information, knowledge, expertise, contacts or reputation) and to direct
them jointly towards a shared challenge (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004). In
doing the collective capacity to govern by bringing in all the relevant
actors is being mobilized. This is what is now termed governance,
thereby making use of the governing capacities of actors that operate in
other government domains, like local and regional government or even
international government agencies, and in other societal domains, like
making use of the market and private organizations or by making use of
non-profit organizations, societal organizations, grassroots
organizations or even citizens and citizen groups (Van Kersbergen &
Van Waarden, 2004). Public value, for instance in terms of creating an
energy transition that is efficient and sustainable, is being achieved
through the collaboration of many. In this case it requires the
collaboration between national, regional and local governments,
municipalities, energy production and energy distribution companies,
(social) housing companies, real estate developing companies and
banks.
From a governance perspective the mobilization of data that is
distributed among the actors in a network is one of the major
advantages that big data could bring. The easiness with which data and
data sources can be connected, thereby creating new information and
knowledge that can be used to develop and implement policies,
enhances the governance capacity in a network of actors that play an
important role in dealing with specific policy problems. This
governance capacity refers to the ability to mobilize resources, and data
can be seen as an important source that adds to this capacity. That is
why Dunleavy et al. (2005; see also Perri et al., 2002) speak about the
potential of digital-era governance as a way of making use of new
information and communication technologies (digitalization) to create
a more need-based holistic view on how to integrate information in
such a way that government policies, services and actions can be
improved.

1.1.6 Summary
In the previous subsections we described several fundamental
transformations that influence the way in which governments, often in
close collaboration with other public, private and societal
organizations, develop and implement policies that are directed
towards social challenges. These are summarized in Table 1.1.
Table 1.1 Societal transitions and big data
Image of Dominant characteristics Role of big data
societal
transition
Fragmented Societal specialization and Big data helps to create an
society organizational fragmentation overall picture
Institutionalization of specialized Data reflects the bias that is
and highly structured based on a narrow-centred
perspectives and related narrow perspective
interests
Network Globalization of specialization Big data creates new global
society Production can be defined in flows and new information
terms of global flows that come products and services that are
together in nodes organized around nodes

Globalization is facilitated by Pervasiveness of ICT creates


pervasiveness of ICT in social life (big) data that can be used
and is data-driven
Reduction role of the state in
global playing field
Risk society Emergence of new risks is related Big data stimulates the ‘risk
to a further rationalization of risk calculus’ and helps to create an
behaviour illusion of safety
New risks are often invisible but Big data might help to facilitate
when they become manifest they an open debate about scenarios
have a devastating impact on in order to create a political
society debate
Liquid society Loss of authority of institutions Authority of institutionalized
and ideology (liquidity), which big data is being questioned
create freedom and stimulate Big data facilitates the creation
individualization of alternative facts and
Importance of identity in a liquid identities
world
Increased mediatization of
politics and democracy
The stateless Central superordinated role of the Big data as the outcome of the
society state in society is being mobilization of data in
questioned collaboration networks
Image of Dominant characteristics Role of big data
societal
transition
Importance of collaboration in Big data helps to create a
governance networks of public, shared frame of reference
semi-public and private actors within a collaboration network
The general picture that emerges from Table 1.1 shows the impact
of big data when connecting it with the sociological transformations
described earlier. This impact is based on the ide that big data might
help to create an overall picture of what is happening in society, thereby
taking into consideration that society has increasingly become complex,
due to processes of specialization, globalization and digitalization. As
such it might help to overcome possibly narrow perspectives by linking
data to those open, new, other and complementary perspectives. This
helps to enhance the transparency of societal phenomena, while
helping to create a better and more advanced understanding. At the
same time big data helps us to generate scenarios (in terms of what will
happen, if …) of possible policy interventions, thereby sketching a
better overall picture of possible effects. Last but not least we see that
big data may also help to foster a more open political and democratic
debate, if these scenarios are the subject of this debate. However, this
overview also shows some pitfalls. First, we see that it is important to
look at the assumptions that lay behind the data or data models that
are being used, given the fact that there is always a bias present due to
the high degree of specialization and related interest that is typical in
present society. Second, big data is not set in stone. The mouldability of
data, datasets and models can also be used to politically strengthen
specific viewpoints and related ‘truth claims,’ which might fuel the
political and societal debate regarding specific policy issues.

1.2 Governance Capacity: Two Images of the


Potential of Big Data
In the previous section we described a number of fundamental
transformations with which policymakers wrestle when dealing with
all kinds of societal challenges. In many cases possible approaches are
formulated in terms of public policies that need to be implemented.
However, when drafting these policies policymakers have to recognize
the barriers but also chances that these transformations imply. As such
they influence the margins of public policy interventions. When we
define what public policy means (and we will go further into this
definition in Chap. 4) we find that it refers to a course of action that is
the manifestation of considered judgments, which also relate to a
specific field of activities that is in essence value-laden (Parsons, 1995;
Goodin et al., 2006). As such we can state that public policies result
from the decisions made by politicians, while at the same time the
decision to do nothing can be regarded as a policy (Howlett & Ramesh,
1995).
One important issue when drafting these policy interventions is the
governance capacity of governments, which is often realized in close
collaboration with other relevant actors (other governments, societal
organizations, citizens, companies etc.). These actors bring in resources
that help to increase governance potential. In doing so they help to
increase the societal problem-solving capacity, which can be described
as the ability to mobilize and combine relevant resources in a
structured way in order to achieve specific goals or to handle societal
problems. ICT and big data applications especially can be defined as
powerful resources. Other relevant resources are finances, people,
competences, knowledge and legal actors (Koppenjan & Klijn, 2004).
Moreover, the use of ICT itself can be viewed as an act of
governance, given the potential of ICT to create specific politically
desirable outcomes. This refers to a social practice in which data and
data technologies, often linked to specific interests and powerful
positions, but also embedded in specific systems, routines, procedures
and cultures, are used to facilitate specific interventions in order to
create desired outcomes (Kling, 1986). The use of big data can be
defined as “a social and technological intervention in which there are
many potential choices, about what kinds of technologies are used, how
they are organized and supported, how people work with them and
how they alter the character of worklife at all” (Kling, 1986). One of the
choices made—deliberately or more emergently—is how to link these
big data technologies to the ideas that the involved actors have
considering the governance potential that they want to achieve. Views
and ideas on big data co-evolve with specific governance aspirations,
which also explains why big data looks as it looks in the public sphere
(Bekkers, 2012).
In the following sections we will sketch how the governance
capacity of public administration through the use of big data is being
organized. How does this influence the outlook of big data, when
applying it to public policy issues? Two images can be discerned: the
intelligent state and the intelligent society (Bekkers, 2012).

1.2.1 The Intelligent State


Big data enables that transparency can be accomplished in rather
advanced ways, not only through the coupling of data, datasets and data
sources but also through pattern recognition, which helps to develop all
kinds of profiles of people and their behaviour. Scholars describe this
development in terms of the rise of a panoptic state (Lyon, 2001) or the
‘e-ubiquitous state’ (Taylor & Lips, 2008). Big data enhances the
intelligence of the state, which strengthens the governance position of
the state in society (Bekkers, 2012). The intelligence of the state is
being fostered by the capacity to have increased access to data, data
sources and datasets as well as by the capacity to process this data in a
more advanced way. Problem definitions and possible approaches are
being enriched, because it is possible to detect meaningful patterns in a
rather endless ocean of data. Patterns help us to understand specific
societal processes, movements in society but also human interaction.
Furthermore, it is also possible to understand the effects of specific
interventions in a more sophisticated way. Feedback loops not only
become shorter (sometimes even in real time) but also the effects that
are being witnessed can be seen from a more holistic point of view. Big
data opens the possibility of creating ‘the overall picture.’ Moreover, big
data also opens new and more sophisticated ways of influencing
people’s behaviour. The development of ‘nudging’ as a new policy
instrument is not only made possible by applying behavioural insights
(stemming from psychology and economics) but also by the use of big
data techniques to understand the mechanisms that lay behind the
behaviour that policymakers want to influence in a specific way. Last
but not least, big data also enhances more traditional ways of
monitoring and control in terms of trying to enhance compliance with
specific rules and regulations, for instance by developing profiles in
which a specific pattern (in terms of the combination of specific
characteristics and factors) defines people as being possibly non-
compliant. As such this transparency might open the door to more
advanced methods of control and discipline, which leads to a further
centralization of the role of government in society, in which the
relationship between government and society are primarily defined in
terms of a vertical, superordinated position of government, which is
based on the information position that government has created. As
such this image of the influence of big data strengthens the weakened
position of government as has been described earlier in the previous
subsection in which we described a rather stateless society.

1.2.2 Intelligent Society


However, there is also another story that can be told about the
governance potential of big data (Bekkers, 2012). It is not only
government that is able to create a more integrated and more
sophisticated picture about what is happening in society. Big data
technologies are also at the disposal of society, of citizens or citizen
groups, thereby enhancing the collective problem-solving capacity that
might contribute to the intelligence of society. First, we see that the
knowledge, expertise and experience necessary to make use of these
new technologies is also available on the internet and on social media
platforms, while at the same time this knowledge can be made available
through apps. As such the internet and social media not only provide a
technical infrastructure but also a social infrastructure that connects
people, and thus knowledge and expertise around specific themes in
specific digital communities. In doing so the internet and social media
facilitate processes of self-organization, deliberation and co-creation,
which might lead to the development of alternative, often citizen-
driven, policy communities (Bekkers, 2004). Second, we also see that
increasingly data and datasets, but also the calculation models that are
being used, have been accessible to the wider public. Data has
increasingly become open data. The open access to data and the ability
to connect to other people and thus to other types of knowledge and
experiences enhance the intelligence of society to come up with
alternative problem definitions and possible solutions, to present
alternative scenarios (Lievrouw, 2011). Contrary to the authoritative
and institutionalized knowledge presented by government, alternative
bodies of knowledge are created that make use of peer-to-peer
exchange, open-source collaboration platforms and crowdfunding to set
up these collaborations. Lievrouw (2011) refers to this development as
the creation of ‘commons knowledge.’ As a result we notice that citizen
initiatives emerge that advocate alternative policy approaches, based
on other calculations and making use of other data and datasets. In
doing so a system of checks and balances is being created that
challenges the intelligence of a more central and state-driven approach.
As such this contributes to a more horizontal relationship between
government and society. However, some people question the quality of
the knowledge that is created, like Keen (2007), who speaks about the
“cult of the amateurs.” Another concern, referring to Gresham’s law that
‘bad money drives out good money from the circulation,’ is that ‘poor
knowledge drives out solid knowledge’ or that ‘poor data drives out
good data,’ because it undermines the reliability and validity of the
knowledge and data that being used. Hence, much relies on quality
assurance, the corresponding expertise but also the openness to
criticism, that is organized into these communities. A perverse effect
can be witnessed when looking at the role of ‘alternative truth claims’
that are also cherished in some communities, for example in relation to
COVID-19 and the role of vaccines.
However, one could define these images on the role of big data in
enhancing the intelligence of the state and society as two opposing
images. The challenge is to connect both. For governments it is
interesting to enhance its own problem-solving capacity by connecting
the knowledge and knowledge production that is present in society,
while the same is true for citizens and citizen initiatives. The challenge
is to create a productive knowledge alliance. At the same time the
knowledge and intelligence that is present in society can also be seen as
a way of creating ‘checks and balances’ in relation to the informational
power that resides in the state (Bekkers, 2012).

1.3 A Fragmented Picture


Public policy processes are shaped in the context of a number of
societal transitions. Sometimes they are influenced by characteristics of
these transitions, in terms of generating specific governance barriers,
like the fragmentation of society and government. Sometimes they are
directed in terms of dealing with the specific outcomes of these
transformations, like dealing with the risks that emerge in a highly
fragmentated and rationalized world. The actors that are involved in
these public policy processes cherish all kinds of governance ambitions
when drafting them. Big data can be defined as a powerful resource
that can be used when formulating these governance ambitions. In
general terms, in the previous sections I have explored the potential
and pitfalls of big data and its relation to government and society. The
aim of this book is to, as stated in the beginning, understand whether
and how the governance capacity to steer the challenges we face is
altered by the emergence of big data. We have explored several impacts
of big data when related to government steering and have painted two
images of how governmental steering could look because of big data.
But we are not the first to take this line of reasoning. Other researchers
have preceded us, and have already created a body of knowledge on the
topic. When we look at what the actual state of this body of knowledge
is, we find several points being made.
When looking at existing literature we find that there are those
focusing on the political aspects of big data in public policymaking
(Moody & Gerrits, 2015; Pencheva et al., 2018; Clark & Golder, 2015)
dealing with issues such as legitimacy, communication and the way big
data can, or cannot, be used to push certain issues to serve one’s
political agenda. Other authors have looked at a more institutional
approach and stress issues dealing with fitting existing norms or
existing organizational practices, claiming that the use of big data in
policymaking needs to fit institutional structures and standards
(Klievink et al., 2017; Welch et al., 2016). This raises questions as to
how we should look at big data when relating it to government steering
capacity: Is it a political tool, or should it be viewed in a more
institutional manner? And when asking this question, new questions
arise as to how this relates to, for example, the political definition of
what is acceptable as risk, the bias of data and the acceptability of this
data as we have described it in Sec. 1.1.3, as well as new questions on
how this relates to the decline of institutional powers as we have
described in Sec. 1.1.4.
Furthermore we find that some authors have focused on the societal
impact of big data use in the public policymaking process (McNeely &
Hahn, 2014; Stough & McBride, 2014) while taking the technical part of
big data use as given. Others have focused on the information-systems
approach and the infrastructure of data and calculations (Kruizinga et
al., 1996; Merz, 2005) but stop there and do not look at the societal
ramifications of big data use in public policymaking. This leads to a new
discussion. In the previous section we treated big data and ICT as
things that are given. They are there and they impact society. The
question we should be asking is, is that really the case? What is big data
and ICT, or technology as such, and how should we regard them? Do
they indeed drive us, or are we the architects of technology and do we
decide how technology is used, implemented, or are we co-creators of
the effects they may have? These are important questions, and we find
that in the literature there is a division between those who research the
technology as such—its design, its characteristics, while omitting the
effects it may have—and those who research the effects of technology
but do not take into consideration the meaning of the technology itself.
In this book we aim to take both into account, the technology itself as
well as its effects. While doing so, this demands that we take a
standpoint on the meaning of technology itself and dive into the
technology debate and discuss the relevant constructivist and
determinist elements.
While some authors have focused on the data itself, for example in
terms of completeness, correctness and quality (Ribes & Jackson, 2013;
Moody et al., 2019), others have taken the data as given and have not
looked at the consequences of the quality of the data within the public
policymaking process. As we have demonstrated in the previous
sections it is important to take into account the data itself, especially
when speaking about biases that data might incorporate because of its
quality or completeness and when dealing with alternative truths as we
have discussed in both the liquid world as well as the stateless world.
When looking at the debate currently being held on big data we find
a focus on privacy. We find this same focus in literature. A lot of
literature deals with legal issues, mostly relating to privacy (Ohm, 2010;
McNeely & Hahn, 2014; Stough & McBride, 2014), and other authors
have stressed that there are challenges with big data use in the public
policy process that are larger than legal, and deal with ethics in general,
which is, according to their research, far more influential than legal
considerations (Stough & McBride, 2014; Moody et al., 2019). These
issues refer to what is acceptable and what is not. When governments
use big data certain things are set in motion, and these things can relate
to a large number of perils ranging from profiling people to deciding
which risks are acceptable and which are not. These are not only pure
political considerations but move beyond that, and are dealt with in the
ethical domain rather than the political. Both the notion of the
intelligent state as well as the notion of the intelligent society evolve
around ethical questions relating to the use of big data by citizens as
well as governments and the results of this usage.
When looking at the use of ICT and big data we find that they do not
exist in a vacuum. Not only are the characteristics of the technology and
data important, and not only do the political, ethical and institutional
factors matter. One can decide to use ICT and big data. However, that
decision does not necessarily mean it will be implemented as desired.
The implementation of big data and big data solutions also depends on
the capacity of organizing this implementation. This brings us to the
more organizational aspects of big data use by governments as a
resource to steer. In the literature we find researchers looking at this in
a number of different ways. The way ICT within public organizations
aligns with business has been seen as a very important determination
on whether the implementation of big data solutions will be successful
(Henderson & Venkatraman, 1999; Romero, 2011; Mergel et al., 2016;
Boyd & Crawford, 2012; Janssen et al., 2014; Pencheva et al., 2018), but
also on whether the organizational structure and the ability to change
are seen as important variables in explaining the role of big data within
the public policymaking process (Moon & Norris, 2005; Welch et al.,
2016).
What can be noticed from this short overview of the literature is
that the existing body of knowledge on the relation between big data
and the steering capacity of governments focuses on especially a
specific issue, thereby stressing a specific, rather one-dimensional
perspective, for instance embracing a political, legal, technological or
organizational perspective. What we find missing is a more integrated
approach that takes into account the all-encompassing set of factors
that are relevant to address the role of big data in public policymaking.
In this book we aim to come to a holistic view on what this role in
practice entails.

1.4 Outline of the Book


As stated at the start of this chapter, our aim is to understand whether
and how the steering capacity of governments has changed through the
existence and use of big data. We have addressed several possible, more
general transformations. In the remainder of the book we aim to
concretely answer this question. We will start off by defining what big
data is, and what the relation is between big data and different
perspectives on technology. We do not regard technology as a given and
will deal with different frames people have about technology in general,
and big data specifically. In Chap. 2 we will look at what big data is, and
how this relates to the positions in the technology debate. We will also
demonstrate that big data is not just a technical matter but influences a
large part of the society in which we live.
In Chap. 3 we will elaborate on the steering capacity of
governments, and will do so from a public policy perspective. We will
deal with politics and policies and outline four perspectives on the
policymaking process that will help us later on to conceptualize it and
relate it to big data use.
We will move on in Chap. 4 with outlining what is already known in
contemporary literature on how the steering capacity of government,
and thus public policy, is influenced by the existence and use of big
data. The literature as described above deals with with matters relating
to technology, data and the infrastructure. Second, we will be dealing
with institutional features such as legality, organizational factors and
factors relating to government–citizen relationships, and we will
elaborate on issues surrounding the political process, legitimacy,
transparency and accountability.
In Chap. 5 we will combine all the previous discussion into a
conceptual framework that we can research for the purpose of
answering our main question on how the existence and use of big data
influences the public policy process and therefore governments’
steering capacity. All methodological considerations will be dealt with
there as well.
In Chaps. 6, 7 and 8 we will look at three case studies that we will
analyse according to the lines of our conceptual framework. The first
case study deals with the city of Rotterdam, the Netherlands, in which
four subprojects were implemented in the field of welfare and well-
being. The second case revolves around food safety in Denmark, and the
third case elaborates on noise pollution in the city of Dublin, Ireland.
In Chap. 9 the cases will come together and will be analysed in
order to make some analytical generalizations so we can conclude and
answer our main question in Chap. 10.

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© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2023
R. Moody, V. Bekkers, Big Data and Public Policy
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-16031-8_2

2. Big Data
Rebecca Moody1 and Victor Bekkers1
(1) Public Administration, Erasmus University Rotterdam, Rotterdam,
The Netherlands

Before moving towards the policy process or even assessing what big
data actually might impact within the policymaking process, we need to
account for the background of big data. But there is a step before this as
well. Before we can even look at big data and the way data is processed,
stored and used, we need to look at the conceptualization of the
technology we use to gather, process, store and use big data. First, we
will look at the epistemological debate on technology to make sure the
reader understands how we, from a philosophy of science perspective,
regard, interpret and study big data. We will argue that we not only
want to look at the more political and sociological dimensions of big
data use, but we also want to consider the more technological aspects
of big data. Second, we will take these considerations into account
when diving deeper into what big data is, while placing it within the
epistemological debate. Finally, we want to link big data to the
information society by means of explaining how we, in this book, will
take a more holistic view and how the information society interacts
with other fundamental changes within our society.

2.1 Big Data and Technology


After conceptualizing what data entails and what big data, in our book,
means, it becomes clear that big data and technology cannot be
regarded separately. Not only is technology needed to generate, store
and process big data, it also matters how technology is perceived for
the way we perceive big data.

2.1.1 The Technology Debate


When we want to conceptualize how we can perceive big data it is
firstly important to place big data within our own views of technology.
When we look at the relevant literature we find that there are several
ways to perceive technology. These viewpoints on technology come
together in what is termed the technology debate.
The technology debate is an ongoing debate in the philosophy of
science as well as in sociology and technical studies. The technology
debate revolves around the relationship between technology and
humans, between technology and society and the nature of technology
itself. It reflects on questions about who drives technology, whether
humans drive technology or technology drive humans? Does
technology possess any values of its own and are these values given to
technology by humans, or does technology have no values whatsoever
and is it completely neutral? What is the relationship between
technology and society? Does technology constitute society or is it the
other way around? A large number of authors have described the
technology debate and offered their opinions (see Smith & Marx, 1994;
Scharff & Dusek, 2003; Kaplan, 2004; Bekkers & Moody, 2015)
In the technology debate several issues are discussed. A central
issue is, who masters the other? Are humans masters over technology,
or does technology control humans? Another key theme is the question
whether technology is autonomous and determines its own causality.
Another key feature is whether technology incorporates values or
should be seen as neutral. Finally, the relationship between technology
and society is important. Which drives the other?
Within the technology debate four positions can be identified:
technological instrumentalism, technological determinism, social
construction of technology and information ecology. Below each
position will be elaborated on and the key features will be explained.

2.1.1.1 Technological Instrumentalism


The first approach to be dealt with is technological instrumentalism.
Several authors have contributed to develop this approach (see Noble,
1999; Postman, 1993). In this approach technology is seen as a neutral
and value-free tool. This means a number of things. First, that the
technology can be used to any end. It is the goal that people or
organizations pursue that gives meaning to the use of technology.
Second, this implies that technology is indifferent to politics, that the
technology can simply be used in any social or political context since it
is not intertwined within any context. It is neutral. Third, technology is
viewed as being rational. It can therefore be transferred into any other
context as well. Finally, technology is seen as universal. It stands under
the same norm of efficiency in any and every context (Feenberg, 1991).
Within the approach of technological instrumentalism, technology is
not attributed with any agency. This means that technology itself
cannot account for any form of causality. Humans generate causality.
Technological progress therefore is viewed as desired progress since it
is the human actor who pursues it (Bekkers & Homburg, 2005). In
technological instrumentalism it can therefore be stated that
technology will only be developed and used if we as humans desire to
do so. A situation in which technology is forced upon us by others is not
possible. Assuming that we have do go along with technological
progress would be mistaken in this position in the technology debate.
The relationship between technology and society within the
approach of technological instrumentalism is unambiguous. Technology
is seen as integrated into culture since its sole purpose is to help users
achieve their goals. Technology therefore does not interfere with the
dignity or integrity of the culture in which it is introduced (Postman,
1993).
Big data within this position of the technology debate can also be
seen as neutral. One could use it any way he or she would want. This
links to the concept of veracity. The data can be interpreted in whatever
way one would like and therefore would indeed be unambiguous.

2.1.1.2 Technological Determinism


A second approach in the technology debate is technological
determinism, to which a number of authors have contributed (Ellul,
1954, 1990; Ellul & Illich, 1995; Zuboff, 1988; Heilbroner, 1994;
Winner, 1977, 1980, 1983, 1993). Contrary to technological
instrumentalism, this approach holds that technology is not neutral or
value-free. Technology can be good or bad or a mixture of both, and this
goes for effects as well as consequences. These consequences may not
be dependent on the desired goal but are dependent on the technology
(Frissen, 1996). Technological development therefore does not depend
primarily on the intention of the user but is fixed within the technology
itself. It is inevitable and cannot be steered or controlled by humans
(Ellul, 1990; Ellul & Illich, 1995; Bimber, 1994).
Agency here is not given to the human user but is attributed to
technology. It is argued that certain political and social norms and
values are hidden inside the technology. Therefore, the technology will
bring about consequences according to these norms and values (van de
Donk & Depla, 1994). The outcome of the implementation of
technology is therefore fixed and the consequences of the use of the
technology cannot be traced back to the intention of the user (Bekkers
& Homburg, 2005).
The relationship between technology and society differs from the
approach of technological instrumentalism as well. In technological
determinism the position is held that technology shapes the world
(Zuboff, 1988). The nature and the characteristics of technology
determine the societal consequences (Bekkers & Homburg, 2005; van
de Donk & Depla, 1994; Ellul, 1954, 1990). Therefore, technology can
account for certain behaviours in society and organizations, like for
example forms of standardization or discipline, thereby inherently
trying to monitor and control behaviour, processes and outcomes
(Beniger, 1986; Frissen, 1996). An example is that because of the
omnipresence of a mobile internet, employees now have to be available
for their employer all the time to answer email. The 24-hour and place-
independent characteristics of the internet cause people to behave as
24-hour-oriented and place-independent.
The relationship between technology and society can be
characterized in five ways. Firstl, automatism holds that the choice for a
certain mean to reach a goal is done by technology and not by humans.
This is so because technology will destroy any non-technological
activity, like for example emotion. A second characteristic is self-
augmentation. This means that technology is moving forward and
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Demurely she passed through the lounges: they all knew her and looked
her up and down as she went, discussed her frocks in whispers, with smiling
or stony faces. In the streets they stared, and she liked it; she admired her
own reflection in the shop windows. An elderly French count, with two
rolls of fat in the back of his neck, entreated Mamma for her daughter’s
hand in marriage. It was a very good joke.
Then, one evening after dinner, while she sat in the lounge with Mamma
and discussed the clothes of her fellow-visitors, she saw Julian walk in. He
wore an old white sweater with a rolled collar, and his long hair was wild
upon his pale chiselled forehead. His face, hands and clothes were grey
with dust, his cheeks flushed and his eyes bright with extreme weariness.
He stood alone by the door, unself-conscious and deliberate, his gaze roving
round to find her among the staring, whispering company. Even before she
recognized him, her heart had leapt a little at sight of him; for his fine-
drawn blonde length and grace were of startling beauty after a fortnight of
small dapper men with black moustaches and fat necks.
‘It’s Julian!’
She ran across the room and took his hand in both her own, joyfully
greeting him. A friend from England! He was a friend from England. How
much that meant after all! He had, romantically, kept his promise and come
to find her, this distinguished young man at whom they were all staring. He
and she, standing there hand in hand, were the centre of excited comment
and surmise: that was flattering. She was pleased with him for contriving so
dramatic an entry.
He had motored from Paris, he said, going all day over execrable roads
in stupefying heat. He had found her hotel at the first guess.
He booked a room and went off to have a bath and to change. Judith
went back to explain to Mamma, who asked for no explanations. It was, she
remarked, pleasant to see a new face; and those Fyfes had always looked
well-bred. She was glad Judith would now have a congenial companion
while she finished her cure. If to her cat-deep self she said: “So that’s the
one!” her diamond-like eyes did not betray her.
He came down half an hour later, elegant in his dinner-jacket, sat down
beside Mamma and started at once to entertain her with the easy, civilized,
gossiping conversation she enjoyed.
Then, when the band started to pluck voluptuously at the heart-strings
with Einmal kommt der Tag, he turned for the first time to Judith, crying:
‘We’ll dance to it, Judith.’ He jumped up. ‘What a tune! We’ll express
our sentimentality.’
Mamma’s rasping little laugh of amusement sounded in her ears as she
rose and followed him.
He put an arm closely round her and murmured:
‘Come on now. Perform! Perform!’—and they went gliding, pausing and
turning round the empty floor, while everyone stared and the band smilingly
played up to them. The rhythm of their bodies responded together, without
an error, to the music’s broken emotionalism.
‘Once, Julian, you refused to dance with me.’
‘Ah, you were a little girl then. It would have been no use. Et
maintenant, n’est-ce-pas, la petite est devenue femme? We shall get on very
well.
After a silence he said:
‘You wear beautiful clothes. You carry yourself to perfection. You have
an air.... There is nobody in this room to touch you. What are you going to
do with it all?’
‘Oh, exploit it, exploit it!’
He held her away from him a moment to look down into her face.
‘Tiens! Tiens! Is gentle Judith going to start being a devil?... It would be
amusing to see her try.’
‘Oh, I will! I’d be most successful. You shall see.’
He laughed, watching her.
‘May I help you? Shall we tread the primrose path together?’
She nodded.
‘Well, start by looking a little more as if you were going to enjoy it.
Have you ever been happy? No. Whenever you come near to being, you
start thinking: ‘Now I am happy. How interesting.... Am I really happy?’
You must learn a little continental abandon—I’ll teach you.’
‘You!’
‘—— and scornful as well! Oh, Judith, you’re getting on. I like to see
your mouth trying to be hard. It has such pretty points.’
The music stopped, and she disengaged herself. A few people clapped,
and she nodded and smiled to the band ... performing, performing;
conspicuously self-possessed....
‘Good!’ said Julian. ‘Oh, good!’
She turned to him and said:
‘Thank you, Julian. That was exhilarating.’
‘Yes, you look as if you’d found it so.’
His eyes, brilliant with nervous fatigue, pierced her with a glance too
penetrating.
‘What a pity,’ he said, ‘you’re so unhappy.’
‘If it were so,’ she said, starting to walk back towards her chair, ‘it would
be a pity.... Or perhaps that would be exhilarating too.’
‘Oh, don’t be enigmatical with your old friend,’ he said plaintively.
She laughed and gave him her hand.
‘Good night, Julian. You go to bed. You’re so tired you can hardly stand
upright. To-morrow we’ll start enjoying ourselves frightfully. You’ll stay a
bit, won’t you?’
‘Oh, I’ll stay,’ he said. ‘I think the moment is auspicious for me.... Didn’t
I always say I could wait my turn?’
‘Yes, you said so. You have a flair undoubtedly. You are full of finesse....
Good night.’
She waved a hand and left him.
Something was afoot.... He had come casting shadows before and behind
him. Old things were stirring: the old illness of remembering was going to
start again. And ahead was not a glimmer.

9
In that thick, steamy world, in the mingled soils of sickly heat, bilious
faces, rich food, sensual dancing, heavy scents of women, applied bow
mouths, soft perspiring flesh—sprouted and flourished her response to
Julian. Rooted in reluctance, nourished by his skilful arts, it grew, a curious
plant: stronger and more curious with every stab of reawakening memory.
Julian must save her this time: surely his wit and wisdom, surely the
unknown world of sexual, emotional and intellectual experience which he
held so temptingly, just out of reach—surely these would, in time, heap an
abiding mound upon the past.
Neither by touch nor look did he seem to desire her. He wove his net
with words: he understood her and she felt him coming closer, a step at a
time.
He made himself the perfect companion—gossiping and exchanging
cynicisms with Mamma, executing commissions for her, his car always at
her disposal; taking them to hear music, to eat delicious meals; playing
tennis with Judith and her hotel acquaintances.
He even went so far as to say tennis was good for his asthma and played
in the tennis-tournament, with herself for partner; and they were barely
defeated in the finals by the Brazilian brother and sister, amid scenes of
hilarious enthusiasm.
His car was waiting outside the ground to whisk her away from the hot
crowd.
Happy, perspiring, dazed with heat and fatigue, she climbed in beside
him and lay back.
‘We’ll go and find somewhere to bathe,’ he said.
‘Yes!’
‘And have supper at an inn, and stay out much later than we ought.’
‘Yes. Oh, Julian, we have done nice things together. I shall always
remember them.’
She put a hand on his knee, and he smiled and nodded, all simple and
brotherly.... He had tried his very hardest to help her win. She was grateful
to him for fitting himself to her mood.
The car went spiralling up the vine-covered hills, and the electric air
quivered away on each side of them in visible waves. The sun sank
magnificently, without a cloud, a blood-red lamp. Its rays had long ago
passed from the tortuous, steep and rock-bound way through which they
now went; and a grey-green tranquil coolness blessed every sense. Then the
road ran into profounder, wooded loneliness, and she espied a stream,
leaping and plunging in little falls, far down in the gully below the side of
the road.
‘Stop here, Julian. We must bathe.’
She went springing down towards the water and he followed with the
bathing suits and towels.
The stream was shallow and broken up with boulders: no use for
bathing.
‘Let’s follow it, Julian. We’ll find something, I know.’
Soon it took a turn deeper into the wood’s heart, and began to grow in
depth and volume; then all at once plunged in a smooth gentle cascade into
a wide rock basin. There it had pause, deep and silent, before dropping
again at the basin’s further edge in a sheer plumed column, and racing on
downwards, and downwards again.
‘Oh, Julian, what a bathing-pool! Is it possible? Look at that colour I ask
you. Is it limestone?’
The whole circular sweep of the rock shimmered in faint silver through
the dim bluish depth of water.
‘And deep enough to dive into, Julian—if we dare break into such
fairiness.... What do you suppose lives here? It may put a spell on us.... I
don’t care! I long to be spell-bound. Don’t you think, if one plunged in, one
might come out all silver-blue and cold and gleaming? I’d love to walk
through the hotel lounge naked like that, with long blue dripping hair! Oh,
come on, Julian—let’s both try! I’ve had no luck for ages, have you?
Perhaps it’s turned to-day. You undress here and I’ll go behind this bush and
talk to you out of it, like God. Come—off with our lendings!’
And, in a flash, with the uttering of the last words, Jennifer came back,
slipping the clothes down off white shoulder and breast, talking and
laughing. A tide of memories; Jennifer’s head burning in the sunlight, her
body stooping towards the water—the whole of those May terms of
hawthorn blossom and cowslips, of days like a warm drowsy wine, days
bewildered with growing up and loving Jennifer, with reading Donne and
Webster and Marlowe, with dreaming of Roddy.... Where had it all gone—
Where was Jennifer?—Whom enchanting now?—How faintly
remembering Judith? Compared with that tumultuous richness, how sickly,
how wavering was this present feeling—what a sorry pretense! Would one
ever be happy again?
Julian, lean and hairy in his bathing-suit, was already feeling the water
with his toe when she emerged and, spurring her flagging spirits, leapt
down through the bushes, paused a moment beside him, cried ‘Ah!’ and
dived into liquid twilight.
He plunged in after her, and they came up together, ‘You shouldn’t have
dived like that,’ he cried. ‘Don’t do it again. There’s a great jag of rock just
below where you went in,—you might have hit your head. You’re a very
naughty girl.’
‘Pooh!’ She splashed and kicked round him, and went swimming close
under the waterfall, feeling its weight press down and bubble upon her
shoulder. The water was cold: the sun could never reach it save in light
flecks through leafy branches. The pouring of the falls made a soft, full,
lapsing speech. Nothing in the world was so smooth as the polished silk of
their down-curving necks.
‘Hey!’ cried Julian.
She looked round and saw him near the further edge of the basin, trying
to save himself from being carried over. She laughed, but he did not laugh
back, and dragged himself out and sat on a rock in silence; and she saw that
his legs and arms were grazed and bleeding. She went to him remorsefully
and washed the blood away with palmfuls of water and sat by him,
murmuring little sympathies until the stinging pain eased. He was not
strong, she must remember: the shock and pain had made him white about
the lips. Poor Julian.... How smooth and creamy her limbs looked beside
his....
‘One more dip before dressing, Julian. You sit there and rest.’
He sat and watched while she slipped in again and, lying on her back,
pushed off vigorously from the side with both feet and floated in a great
ruffle of water to the other edge. Then she climbed out and stood opposite
him, dripping and smiling.
Something leapt into his eyes as they rested, for once, full on her: not
admiration or desire, but something harsh and hostile, as if the sight of her
exasperated him.
‘Oh, yes, it shows you off well,’ he said.
‘What does?’
‘Your maillot. I suppose you weren’t aware of it?’
‘No!’ She spat the word at him; and went quickly away.
They had supper at a white inn by the edge of the wood, about half a
mile farther on. The same stream flowed, sedately now, through the garden;
and a dark plump Madame with great glossy raven plaits brought omelettes
and trout and salads and fruits to their table beneath the plane-tree. Birds
were singing the last of their songs in all the branches.
‘Listen, Julian!—if that isn’t a thrush? What is he doing out of England?
Can you imagine a French thrush? Oh, he sounds homesick!’ A sudden
nostalgia overcame her. ‘I want to go home, too! I’m not a traveller. Sick
for home—that’s what I am. This thrush and our pool are probably the
things I shall most remember about France—and all because they made me
think of England.... There was a girl at College I used to bathe with....
You’d have loved to look at her. Her name was Jennifer Baird....’
‘Oh, I think I’ve met her.’
What was he saying so casually?
‘You’ve met her?’ Hands clasped, heart thumping, she stared at him.
‘Yes, I’m sure that was the name. I was staying in Scotland with some
cousins of hers.’
‘When, Julian?’
She could scarcely speak.
‘Last year, I believe. I remember now she was at Cambridge and said she
knew you; but she wasn’t very forth-coming about you. I’d never have
guessed from her that you were bosom friends.’ His voice sounded
mocking.
‘No, you wouldn’t!’ she retorted, stung and scornful. ‘She doesn’t tell
just anybody when——’ She checked herself; for perhaps after all it had
been that Jennifer had not remembered her much in absence. She added
quietly: ‘She was a person I knew well for a time. Tell me.... What did you
think of her?’
‘Oh, mad as a hatter. But she was more alive than most people. A flame,
let us say.’ His voice was ambiguous, unkind.
‘You didn’t like her, then?’
‘No, nor she me.’ He laughed briefly. ‘But she had a power, I admit. I
intend to go and find her again some day. I dare say I might make her—like
me.’
‘I don’t think you could!’ She wanted to strike him for his cold-blooded
self-assurance. ‘If you think you could—manage her, control her, I pity you,
that’s all! I’d like to see you try! You’d think you’d got her easily—and
then in another moment she’d have slipped through your fingers.... How I’d
laugh!... Personally I didn’t need to make her like me: she just did.’
She felt that she was speaking wildly, and fell silent, weak before the
flooding onslaught of the past.
It was too much pain. What was the use of trying to go on? You could
never get free of the past. It came all around again at a word, and in a trice
all save its shadows was trivial and insubstantial.
Julian was watching her; raising his eyebrows in a pretense of polite
surprise and watching closely.
‘Well, well!’ he said. ‘Calm yourself, my serpent. You have convinced
me my best endeavours would be wasted.’
She hid her face, stooping it over the table with both hands across her
forehead, feeling the nausea and sweat of faintness.
He helped himself to grapes and remarked:
‘Not that I shan’t be sorry never to see her on a horse again. She looked
magnificent.’
‘Oh, yes! She....’ Still with her face hidden she added, summoning a
faint but steady voice: ‘I’d go to her now, this minute, if I knew where she
was. But I don’t.’
There was a silence; and then he said gently:
‘I’ll find her for you if you like, my dear.’
She stretched a hand across the table to him.
‘No. Help me forget her ... and everything else....’
He stroked the hand; and without a word left her, to pay the bill. When
he came back she was able to raise a calm and smiling face to him.

The stars were out when they took the road again, and the coming dark
flowered like a field of pansies.
‘Hadn’t we better go home now, Julian?’
‘No. I’m not going to take you home yet.’
She sat beside him, silent and dully apprehensive.
‘It’s a pity you’re so unhappy,’ said Julian. ‘I think I said so before.’
She made no answer.
‘You know,’ he said, ‘you’re a fool to take on like this.’
Silence.
‘You’re simply destroying yourself over it and it can’t be worth it. Why
don’t you tell me about it? I’ll be nice.’
She shook her head.
‘Do tell me, darling. You know, things have a way of swelling to
monsters if we lock them up inside us. You see if you won’t feel better after
you’ve once got it out of you.’ He spoke like a kindly father, and put an arm
round her.
‘I’m in love with someone,’ she whispered. ‘That’s all. I thought it was
finished.... Oh, dear, dear, dear, how awful!...’ She drew deep choking
breaths.
‘Poor devil,’ he said.
‘You needn’t be sorry.’ She collected herself. ‘It’s good for me. Besides,
it is finished really: I scarcely ever think of it now.’
‘Does that yellow-haired female come into it then?’
‘Jennifer? No. Though she’s gone too ... and that makes it all far
worse....’ She added quickly: ‘It’s nobody you know.’
His silence told her that he was not deceived.
‘Anyway,’ she said lightly, ‘there’s one bad thing over in my life: falling
in love, I mean. I’m free of it!’
‘Oh, don’t be ridiculous, my dear child! Don’t be such a fool! Why, you
haven’t mastered your infant primer yet. I know! Do you mean to tell me
this unknown fellow has absorbed all your powers of loving to the end of
your life? I’m sorry then: you’re less of a person than I thought you. Ah,
you think I’m mocking, and you hate me. And I do mock. Yes, yes! And
I’m so sorry for you I—— But of course you won’t believe that.’
He spoke with passion, slowing the car down till she scarcely crawled,
then finally stopping her altogether by the edge of the road, beneath an
overhanging rocky hillside. It was getting very dark: she felt rather than saw
the tense expression of his eyes and mouth.
‘You won’t believe that,’ he repeated, ‘and you’re thinking at this
moment that such a brute as I never before existed.’
‘No.’ She felt dazed. ‘I think you’re meaning to be kind. But you don’t
understand.’
‘Aha! Of course not. How can a coarse male animal like myself
understand the feelings of a refined and sensitive young lady?’
‘Oh, Julian—unfair ... unkind!’
‘Well, damn you, don’t you see I love you myself?’ he cried in a perfect
fury. ‘Here am I, alone with you at last for a paltry ten days—after waiting
years, mind you, years for my opportunity, and I find you moping and
moaning over your lost schoolgirl illusions! Good God! Haven’t you the
guts to snap your fingers at a fellow who can’t be bothered with you?
Aren’t you attractive and intelligent? Can’t you laugh? Aren’t there plenty
of others? What am I here for? Go to the devil for a bit—I’ll help you. I’ll
see you through it. But don’t moan.’
He paused for breath, and went on:
‘Here am I, as I said, with ten days of your company as my limit—ten
days in which to make you look back into my eyes, not through them, to
make you stop smiling and being polite and tolerant and sorry for me—oh,
anything rather than your damned indifference! Why don’t you hate me? I
could do some good with you then. I thrive on hatred. Here am I, of all
people, not able to sleep or eat for wanting to kiss you, shaking all over
when I see you coming, raging when you talk to another man—and here are
you, making a fool of yourself—obstinately wasting our time making a
romantic fool of yourself.’
‘Well, we’re quits then,’ she interrupted quickly. ‘I love without being
loved and I’m a fool. I agree with you. You love without being loved.
You’re another.’
He turned to her and said delightedly:
‘You’re angry. I’ve stung you up. You’ve lost your temper.’
‘Oh, you’re impossible.’
‘No, no, I’m not,’ he said coaxingly. ‘Look, I’ll be so nice now. Listen to
me, Judy darling. You’re not the sort of person to have one abortive little
romance and go to your grave an old maid. An old maid who’s had a
disappointment, Judy!—isn’t that what it’s called? There, I’m teasing again
and I said I wouldn’t. Darling, what’s the use of being so damned constant?
Do find someone else quick. You’ve no idea how delightful you’ll find it
when you’re old to remember what a lot of people you’ve loved. And it’s
the very best remedy, Judy, for your indisposition.’
‘Shall you employ it if——’
‘If you turn me down? Probably. But don’t turn me down—not without a
trial. Here am I, ready to hand: you could do a damned sight worse than
take me. I’ll see we have a good time.’
Moths flittered and spun in the light of the head-lamps; beyond the two
still long shafts of brightness the night looked very dark. How many miles
from home?
At length she said:
‘I take it this is not a proposal of marriage, Julian.’
He laughed.
‘No, my dear, it is not. Nothing so grim.’
‘Ah, I see—your mistress.’
Her voice and her words made her wonder if she were not holding a
conversation in a dream: there was the same feeling of having made a
pronouncement of the first importance; but whose meaning you could not
detect.
Julian’s mistress.... The idea was for some reason profoundly shocking.
A French, an Austrian, a Russian; and now an English.... But perhaps he
had been lying then. He did tell such lies about his experiences.
‘I’m not made for matrimony any more than you are,’ he said in a voice
of gentle explanation. ‘Can you imagine me as a husband? What hell for
some poor fool!... Yet,’ he added with a sigh, ‘I’d be fond of my children.
I’d like to bring up a son. But I shall never have one.’
‘If you would marry Mariella,’ she said, still out of her dream, ‘you
could bring up Peter. She’d like that. I think she loves you.’
He took no notice; and she wondered if she had not spoken aloud, after
all; or whether her small voice had not penetrated his absorption.
‘Why, what would we make of each other married?’ he went on. ‘It
would be one long succession of agaçements. We’re both so self-conscious,
so fastidious, so civilized.... Oh, it would be appalling.’
‘Yes, it would.’
‘But, Judith, lovely delightful Judith,’ he pleaded, his voice deep and
beautiful, ‘for a season, for a season! A clean leap in, and out again the
minute it started to be a failure. Think what we could give each other!’
‘It would be very good for us I suppose....’ She held her head in her
hands, trying to think. What could he possibly give her that she would
want?
‘It would, it would. We’d live a bit instead of thinking. I’d make you
forget, I swear: and what things I’d give you to remember instead!—good
things that have been my secrets for years, that I’ve longed for years to
share, to offer to your lovely quick intelligence. No one else has had them,
Judith. They’ve been waiting for you: nobody else has ever come near you
in my mind. Judith, it wouldn’t be the irritating tiresome old bore you
know: that isn’t I! I’ve got secrets. Let me tell you them. So much beauty
I’d enrich you with, and then I’d let you go. Isn’t that fair? Isn’t that worth
having? Go and marry and breed afterwards if you must, but let me give
you this first. Try me, Judith, try me. You can’t refuse to try me. I want you
so much.’
She wanted to stop her ears: for she felt herself helplessly yielding to the
old syren of words.
‘Julian—I couldn’t give you—what you wanted. Oh, I couldn’t! It’s such
a step—you don’t realise—for a woman. She can’t ever get back—
afterwards, and be safe in the world. And she might want to.’
‘I’d see you got back if you wanted to. But I don’t think you will. You
won’t want to be safe. That’s not for you. Oh, Judith, I know you better than
you know yourself.’
‘No. No.’
She was locked away from him and he did not know it. What he mistook
for her living self was a mummy, with a heart of dry dust. He had not the
perspicacity to see it.
He was silent and then said:
‘I wouldn’t ask you for anything you—weren’t prepared to give me. I
hope—that might come. But for the present all I want is to help you live
again—in better, more enduring, ways. Will you let me? Will you allow me
to love you, Judith?’
‘Perhaps. Perhaps, Julian. I’ll try. I’ll try to love you too.’ The words
broke from her on top of a great sigh.
‘My dear!’ She felt his triumph. He put an arm round her and lightly
kissed her, and she thought: ‘Now I’ve been kissed by all three of them.’
‘But wait, Julian!’ she protested, near to nervous tears. ‘Don’t say any
more now. Take me home.’
‘Yes, yes. I’ll take you home now.’ His voice was soothing and tender.
He was letting her see that his patience was infinite. This time, she was
caught.
The car glided downwards from the hills into the plain, through the
lovely calm. Once she broke silence to say:
‘Nothing’s worth while, Julian? It doesn’t matter what one does? There’s
no point, really, in being alive?’
He laughed.
‘Poor Judy! Give it up! You’ll have to in time. Resign yourself, and the
compensations won’t seem so preposterously inadequate. There was a
time.... But that’s past. So long as there’s a balance of happiness I’m content
to be alive. That it’s all futile has ceased to trouble me. It’s not really
difficult to be happy, Judith.’
‘Well—you shall show me.’
But she felt crushed with melancholy to hear him; and his calm voice
echoed drearily in her heart.

She bade him good-night in the empty lounge, and went upstairs to the
bedroom’s rose and gilt harshness.
She was going to be Julian’s mistress.... He was sure of her: she had
noted his triumphant eyes and smiling mouth when he said good night....
Perhaps if she had offered to be Roddy’s mistress he would have agreed
with alacrity. He too was not made for matrimony.
She wished suddenly for Martin and sat down and started a letter to him;
gave up after a few sentences, too heavy-minded to think; and went to bed.

10
The next day was jour de fête: there were to be grand balls, carnivals and
exhibition-dancing in all the hotels.
‘We’ll make the round of them, Judy,’ said Julian. ‘And afterwards we’ll
take the car and go up into the hills—shall we?’
And she thanked him and agreed.
He was debonair, gay and gracious: the lines in his face seemed to have
been smoothed out, and the likeness to Charlie was strongly in evidence.
Dreaming ahead, she saw herself reluctantly, helplessly, plunging further
and further into relationship with him. He would not weary of her soon.
When once the thing started, the break with the past would inevitably be
complete. Together they would be reckless, free; together they would snatch
pleasure out of life’s worthlessness; for Julian had promised faithfully that
he was going to give her exactly what she wanted, that he had learnt
precisely how happiness was to be come by, and would teach her.... She had
given him leave to teach her.
Judiciously he absented himself for the day; and she spent the morning
with Mamma, watching all the internally-disordered people pass, cup in
hand up and down the Place from spring to spring; and the afternoon with
Mamma at the dressmaker’s; and the hours between tea and dinner with
Mamma in the hotel-lounge, drearily banishing and recurring to thoughts of
Roddy.
Mamma sent her out to buy a copy of the Continental Daily Mail, which
shrill-voiced women were excitedly advertising in the Place. Through her
lorgnette, Mamma scanned the announcement of recent arrivals, the
political outlook, the new French train smash, yawned, remarked that the
holiday season in England seemed marked as usual by murders and
drowning fatalities, yawned again and went upstairs to rest before her
bridge-party.
An hour yet till dinner and nothing to do but sit and think of things.
Idly she picked up the evilly printed sheets. Triple Boating Tragedy.
Why were they always triple? What must it be like to be relatives and
friends of a triple boating tragedy? But that was a class disaster, like a
charabanc death—not general.
Sailing Fatality off St. Catherine’s, Isle of Wight. That was where Martin
and Roddy were yachting. They might have witnessed it. Tragic End of
Well-known Young Yachtsman.
She had an impulse to put down the paper; but a name caught her eye
and she had to go on reading.
A dense fog in the Channel is presumed to be the cause of the death of
Mr. G. M. St. V. Fyfe, one of the best known of the younger Solent
yachtsmen.
According to information at present available, Mr. Fyfe, who was an
expert sailor and swimmer, had been out since early morning of the—th
sailing his small cutter “Sea Pink” single-handed. About noon a heavy sea-
fog drove up from the channel with great suddenness and in the evening his
friends became alarmed at his failure to return. Next morning a life-buoy
and some other wreckage identified as belonging to Mr. Fyfe’s boat was
found washed up on the shore near Brooke. It is thought that the boat must
have been run down by a liner or other large vessel off St. Catherine’s Head
during the fog of the previous afternoon. The body has not yet been
recovered.
Mr. G. M. St. V. Fyfe, who was twenty-four years of age, was the only son
of the late Sir John Fyfe, K.C.B., and of Lady Fyfe of the Manor House,
Fernwood, Hants. Educated at Eton and Trinity College, Cambridge, he
was among the most....
There followed a few more words, but the type was illegible.
It could not be Martin, because he was Mr. Martin Fyfe. Martin’s initials
were—O God!—forget you knew his initials. She could see them now
written in her own hand on an envelope: G. M. St. V. Fyfe, Esq. Such
dignified, satisfying initials.... It could not be Martin because an unfinished
letter to him was lying upstairs waiting to be sent. Martin was sailing safely
with Roddy and one or two others. He would not sail a cutter single-handed
in a fog, because that was so dangerous; and he never did dangerous things.
The body had not yet been recovered....
If she read the thing through again calmly she would realize it was
somebody else.
Perhaps better not.
Just the date though.... Two days old, this thing was now.... Mr. G. M. St.
V. Fyfe—Martin Fyfe—Martin had been nothing for two days....
She thought: If I pretend I never saw it, it will be just as if it hadn’t
happened. I won’t know it, and then it’ll stop being true.
She folded the newspaper carefully, took it and went upstairs; and
dressed for dinner with meticulous care. She was going to dine with Julian
at the hotel which promised the best exhibition dancing; and she had agreed
to wear his favourite frock to-night.

It was a very rich and expensive dinner that Julian had ordered; and a
bouquet of red carnations lay beside her plate. Lobster and champagne.
What a crowd of excited people! Bare flesh was very ugly, and all those
waved heads of women were intolerable. The monotony of faces in a
crowd!...
Julian was studying her covertly, with flickering glances, though his
attention was ostensibly for the company. He drank restlessly: the lines in
his face were very marked. She would say something to him about the
monotony of faces in a crowd; and then something about waved hair. After
that she said:
‘Julian, does anybody know you’re here?’
‘No, not a soul.’
‘You left no address?’
‘No. Paris is my headquarters. When I go off like this I prefer that the
great world should await my return, not follow me.’
‘Ah, you’re wise.’ She laughed. ‘It must make you feel so free.’
‘Why did you ask?’
‘Because it just occurred to me.’
Because they might have sent him a telegram: he was the eldest of the
family, and they might have wanted him for all sorts of reasons: for the
funeral.... But the body had not yet been recovered. Soon she must say to
him: ‘Julian, Martin has been drowned.’ He would not much mind: they had
never been very intimate: but of course they had shared that blood-intimacy
of the circle. She must really tell him soon.
They were dancing now. The room was full of smoke and light and
sickly scent; and the heat was choking. Everybody was rising to dance.
One of the American young men from her hotel was bowing and
murmuring in front of her.
‘Not just now, thank you so much.’ She flashed a smile at him. ‘Perhaps
later on....’
Oh, the queer marionettes bobbing up and down in their mechanical
motions! How could people look so serious and perform such imbecile
antics? But they were not real people.
‘Look, Julian, there’s the Spanish boy we played against in the
tournament. He’s good-looking, isn’t he? He’s simply enrapturing that girl.
Hasn’t he got a lazy smile?... You know, however ugly a Frenchwoman’s
body is at any rate it is a body and she’s not ashamed of it. Those English
people are just bundles of clothes. If you undressed them there’d be
nothing. That’s the whole difference.... Oh, look, they’re giving out favours.
Oh, I’d like a fan. Let’s dance.’
Threading her way through the crowded tables, she passed a party of fat
elderly Frenchmen and heard one say to another, loudly and with drunken
excitement:
‘Mais regardez donc un peu! En blanc—vois tu? Elle est bien, celle-là.
C’est tout à fait mon type.’
Their faces leered at her out of a dream.
Julian took her once round the room and then looked down at her and
said:
‘You can’t dance to-night. What’s the matter?’
She gazed at him in dread, dumb. There was a reason. Soon—soon she
would have to tell him; and then, when it had been spoken, imparted, it
would be true for ever and ever. Not yet.
After a little while Julian held her as if he had ceased to expect or desire
any response or rhythm from the lumpish wooden body he had to push. It
was no good trying to keep things going much longer.... All things were
coming waveringly to an end. The end would come with her own voice
saying: “Martin has been drowned.” After that there would be a breaking-
up and confusion, a going away to hide.... Not yet.
The dancing competition had started, amid loud laughter and applause.
The couples, gradually thinning out, circled self-consciously. The little soft-
eyed half-caste brother and sister—they were the ones. Their bodies were
lithe and flat and sinuous, their proudly-carried small heads shone like
black water, their eyes and lips were dreamy, sensual, sad, their limbs made
poetry and music as they moved. They agreed, as prize-winners, to dance an
exhibition dance.
Blushing, her teeth sparkling in a smile, she glided from the other end of
the room towards her brother. He gave her his hand, she paused with a swirl
of her long full yellow skirt,—and then they started swaying and circling
together. They whirled; stopped dead; whirled again. He lifted her in the air
and there she hung poised, laughing at him, pointing her tiny foot, then
dropped like a feather and went weaving on.
Oh, let them dance for ever! While they danced, people could die, gently,
easily, as a dancer sinks to earth, without pain to them or horror to others.
Let them dance for ever!... It was over. Hand in hand they curtsied and
bowed, and ran off the floor.
‘That was dancing,’ said Julian. ‘Nobody but each other to dance with,
you see, poor little devils. That’s the way to learn.’
Roddy would have danced with that soft-smiling side-long-glancing
little dancer: he would have made a point of it, not out of pity. Martin would
have left her alone with quiet distaste.

Then, in a flash, saw the sea try


With savage wrath and efforts wild
To smash its rocks with a dead child.

To smash its rocks with Martin.


Everybody was very gay now. Through the smoke, all the eyes and
mouths laughed, excited with wine and dancing. Balloons and favours
waved; the band blared. The musicians donned false noses and moustaches
and stood up, leaping and shouting.
Oh, this place is Hell!
Yes, Hell. Grimacing faces, obscene bodies, chattering parrot and
monkey voices; Hell’s musicians, with vicious tunes and features dark with
unmentionable evil....
The lights were dimmed, the floor cleared. A dancing girl leapt into the
middle of the space, throwing flowers. Her white ballet skirts spun mistily.
The lights were extinguished altogether, and you saw that the outline of her
bodice and her skirts, her shoe-buckles and the star on her forehead had
been painted with luminous paint; so that now she was three stars and some
circles and loops of light, wheeling fantastically in the dark.
Now was the time to slip out. Julian would not notice.
Half-way across the Place he caught her up.
‘Where are you going?’
‘There’s something I must show you. Come with me.’
He followed in silence, into the hotel, upstairs, into the sitting-room.
‘Wait there, then. I’ll come back.’
She saw that she was carrying a purple balloon. She dropped it and
watched it go bouncing like a great bubble across the room.
In the bedroom she found the letter in the folds of the blotter. ‘What a
silence, Martin! I have been missing you....’ Aghast, she tore it in shreds.
Now to go back to Julian.
He was standing in the middle of the room, waiting.
‘Julian, what are Martin’s initials?’
He thought.
‘Something St. V.—G. M. St. V.—George Martin St. Vincent.’
He raised his eyebrows—but grew pale.
‘Ah, yes.’
The paper lay on the window-seat; she went to get it. ‘Take it away and
read. There, where I’ve marked it.’ She made a cross with her thumbnail.
She went back to the bedroom and locked the door; and, after a few
minutes, heard him going downstairs again.
Then she flung herself upon the bed, weeping for Martin whom she
loved: whom she had left crying for her sake; who should have lived to be
loved by his children, and honoured and full of years; Martin who was kind
when all else was unkind—Martin who had been dead two days, rolling
about in the waves; Martin for whom poor Roddy had searched the sea in
vain; Martin who had been comely and now was destroyed utterly and
made horrible,—sea-water in his mouth and eyes and hair, sea-water
swelling his shapely body to a gross lump.
Whom had he thought of while he drowned? Had he fought and cursed?
Or had he welcomed death because of somebody’s unkindness and deceit?
‘Martin, I didn’t mean it.’
Martin was almost in the room—quite in the room—standing just behind
her, saying: “I’m all right.” He had come to comfort her.
Martin had entered into everlasting life. Yes!
No. No. No. Dead. Unconscious. Nothing. Beyond sight and touch for
ever.

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