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(Download PDF) Case Studies in Couple and Family Therapy Systemic and Cognitive Perspectives The Guilford Family Therapy Series Full Chapter PDF
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Contributors
vii
viii Contributors
International Society for Traumatic Stress Studies, where she gave presen-
tations on creating healing relationships for trauma survivors dealing with
marital distress. Her most recent publications include The Heart of the
Matter: Perspectives on Emotion in Marital Therapy (with coeditor L. S.
Greenberg, 1994} and The Practice of Emotionally Focused Marital Ther-
apy: Creating Connection (1996). She lives in Ottawa with her husband
and two children.
James Keim? MSW, LCSW-C, is director of training at the Family
Therapy Institute of Washington, D.C., in Rockville, Maryland. He is also
founder and director of the Community Health Project, which collaborates
with the National Institutes of Health to provide continuing education to
public health professionals. He has worked closely with Cloe JVladanes and
Jay Haley; he is coauthor (with Cloe Madanes and Dinah Smelser) of the
book The Violence of Men (1996), and has written or contributed to
numerous other publications on strategic family therapy.
David V. Keith, MD,, is an associate professor of psychiatry, family
medicine, and pediatrics, and the director of family therapy, at the State
University of New York Health Science Center in Syracuse. He was
formerly with the Family Therapy Center in St. Paul, Minnesota and the
University of Wisconsin Department of Psychiatry in Madison. Dr. Keith is
the author and coauthor (with Carl Whitaker) of numerous journal articles
and book chapters in the field of family therapy. Dr. Keith is one of the
leading figures of experiential family therapy and for years was a close
colleague and cotherapist with Carl Whitaker.
Luciano L3Abate, PhD, ABPP, was educated in his native Italy until
moving to the United States as an exchange student. He received his
doctorate in clinical psychology from Duke University. He has retired from
Georgia State University as professor emeritus, and has been consultant at
Cross Keys Counseling Center in Atlanta, Georgia, for the past 18 years,
and director of multicultural services at Cross Keys for the last 3 years. He
is a diplomate of the American Board of Professional Psychology and an
approved supervisor of the American Association for Marriage and Family
Therapy. In 1994, he received the "Family Psychologist of the Year" award
from Division 43 (Family Psychology) of the American Psychological
Association. He is widely published, and his many works have been
translated into several languages.
Thomas W. Lund, PsyD, has been a child and family psychologist for
23 years. For the past 11 years, he has been codirector of the Catskill
Family Institute (CFI), providing direct services to individuals, couples, and
families. During this time, he worked at developing CFPs narrative solu-
tions approach and has published numerous articles on its principles and
practices. Over the past 7 years, he has trained psychotherapists in the
United States and Canada in the CFI approach, and recently coauthored a
x Contributors
I owe much to my early mentors, Joseph Wolpe and Aaron T. Beck, who
have taught me most of what I know about cognitive-behavioral therapy.
I am also indebted to Thomas A. Seay, who taught me a great deal about
psychotherapy integration as well as couple and family therapy during my
early graduate school training. Additional thanks goes to Wallace E. Crider
for his supervision of my early work with couples and families. Along the
way in the development of my work, personal conversations with noted
figures such as Harry Aponte, Norman B. Epstein, Janies Framo, Cloe
Madanes, Donald Meichenbaum, John C. Norcross, Arnold A. Lazarus,
and Peggy Papp have also helped me tremendously in understanding the
potential role of cognitive-behavioral techniques in couple and family
therapy. I also thank the many couples and families who have served as the
pioneering samples for my early work in the refinement of the cognitive-
behavioral approach,
Compiling a major casebook such as this is not possible without the
aid of many talented contributors. The chapters in this book have been
written by some of the finest couple and family therapists in the world. In
addition, a tremendous debt of gratitude is owed to the series editor,
Michael P. Nichols, who has provided tireless effort and superb editorial
suggestions that helped to shape this text into what is (in my opinion) one
of the finest collection of case studies in the couple and family therapy
literature. Staff members at The Guilford Press who deserve acknowl-
edgment are Jodi Creditor and Anna Nelson for their outstanding work as
the production editors, and Seymour Weingarten, the editor-in-chief, who
has been extremely supportive and patient with rny ideas. It is because of
Seymour's open-mindedness and flexibility that this project has become a
reality.
I also profusely thank my personal secretary, Carol "Fingers" Jaskolka,
for her long hours of typing and her excellent computer skills. Her expertise
in coordinating all of the details with this book is appreciated more than
she will ever know. Her patience in enduring the stressful periods during
this project was remarkable and has also earned her the guarantee of a
lifetime supply of Prozac.
Finally, I owe the greatest acknowledgment to my children, Roseamie,
Tara, and Michael, as well as my wife, Maryann, who endured my many
absences during the preparation of this text. They have also taught me the
true meaning and beauty of being a father and husband.
xiv
Foreword
From its very inception a century ago, the field of psychotherapy has
resembled a dysfunctional family-—with covert and overt antagonism
among those representing different orientations, and few if any attempts
made to comprehend or value the points of view held by others. It has
operated on a win-lose basis, and the real losers have unfortunately been
our clients. However, there is nothing like an attack from the outside—tak-
ing the form of third-party payments, biological psychiatry, and pressures
for accountability—to facilitate cooperation within the system. This attack
may very well have helped facilitate the interest in integration among
therapists of different orientations and modalities. Other forces that have
caused the long-term latent interest in psychotherapy integration to evolve
into a more visible movement have been the proliferation of different
schools of therapy; the realization that no one approach is capable of
dealing with everything that therapists encounter clinically; and the forma-
tion in 1983 of the Society for the Exploration of Psychotherapy Integration
(SEPI), an interdisciplinary organization dedicated to the development of
clinically meaningful and empirically informed interventions that are not
necessarily constrained by theoretical schools.
Although most of the attention of the psychotherapy movement has
been paid to the integration of different schools of thought associated with
individual therapy, a small but energetic group of clinicians has been
interested in applying integrative thinking to family and couple therapy.
Contributions by Alan Gurrnan, Jay Lebow, and William Pinsof have dealt
with the integration of different theoretical approaches, and work by Larry
Feldman, Ellen Wachtel, and Paul Wachtel has focused on the conjoint use
of different modalities, such as individual along with couple/family inter-
ventions. The present casebook, edited by Frank M. Dattilio, is a very clear
illustration of how an integrative stance can be used when couple/family
work is approached from within a cognitive-behavioral orientation.
In commenting on the developmental status of behavior therapy in the
early 1980s, Philip Kendall observed that as a result of years of industry
and hard work, the behavioral approach—-including cognitive-behavior
therapy—had finally achieved its own personal identity. With this sense of
security, he went on to add, it was now ready to become more intimate
with other orientations. Even the very fact that Kendall, a behavior
therapist, used this Eriksonian metaphor in his formulation attested to the
readiness of behavior therapy for psychotherapy integration.
xv
xvl Foreword
xix
JO" Preface
also been the case with concepts and techniques of the psychodynamic
orientation (Norcross & Prochaska, 1988; Pitta, 1997), as well as those of
other schools of thought (Kirschner & Kirschner, 1993; Lazarus, 1992;
Christensen, Jacobson, & Babcock, 1995). Such hybrid forms of interven-
tion appear to be on the increase, as practitioners become more aware of
their potential effectiveness with individuals as well as with couples and
families. In fact, the modal orientation of family therapists is now eclecti-
cism/integration (Prochaska & Norcross, 1994). Within systemic therapy
alone, there has been a decided breakdown of schoolism and a movement
toward integration. In a survey of 900 family therapists, nearly one-third
described their theoretical orientation as eclectic (Rait, 1988).
One of the beauties of integrating theories is that the essential frame-
work of the primary theory need not be abandoned in order to integrate
other techniques or strategies. These techniques may be augmented in
various fashions and forms, depending on the vitality of the basic therapy
model. Cognitive-behavioral therapy has received increasing support in the
professional literature as a highly "integratable" theory in work with
couples and families (Beck, 1988; Dattilio & Padesky, 1990; Dattilio, 1989,
1990, 1994, 1997; Lombana & Frazier, 1994). In fact, two recent articles
addressed the question of whether or not all therapies are cognitive (Alford
& Norcross, 1991; Persons, 1995), particularly since cognitive components
appear to be part of the fabric of most modalities. Clinicians may selectively
choose various cognitive-behavioral techniques to incorporate into their
primary approach as the need arises. (This integration is particularly
important in short-term treatment, due to the effective results achieved with
cognitive-behavioral techniques,) Interestingly, this phenomenon was often
mentioned during the process of choosing contributors for this book. After
I explained to authors my idea for the work, many of them spontaneously
said, "Oh, I use cognitive-behavioral strategies in my work all the time."
In addition to the concept of integration, this book also provides detailed
case analysis from more than 16 different perspectives of couple and family
therapy, with elaborate commentary by both the authors and the editor.
Laurence Sterne, the 18th-century novelist, said that writing is just a
different name for conversation-—a conversation that takes place between the
author and the reader. The present book transcends this definition by provid-
ing a conversation among the authors, the editor, and (in a tacit sense) the
reader. In this text, the symbol " t" denotes rny comments as the editor, and these.
are highlighted in italics. The author or authors of each chapter were also invited
to submit a follow-up commentary after receiving a copy of my editorial com-
ments.1 The primary intention was to create a dialogue that would help
readers draw their own conclusions regarding the integration of cognitive-
behavioral strategies with other therapies as presented in this book.
FRANK M. DATTILIO
September 1997
xxii Preface
NOTE
1. The author or authors of each chapter were provided with a copy of Cognitive
Therapy ivith Couples (Dattilio & Padesky, 1990), which contains the basic
philosophy and theory of cognitive-behavioral therapy with couples and families.
They were also provided with a uniform list of questions to answer when composing
their "authors' reply to the editor's comments," along with a guideline for disguising
case material to ensure confidentiality.
REFERENCES
Index 480
Marriages and families
are not as they are made,
but as they turn out.
—Italian proverb
Chapter 1
An Introduction to
Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy
with Couples and Families
FRANK M. DATTILIO
NORMAN B. EPSTEIN
DONALD H. BAUCOM
1
2 CASE STUDIES IN COUPLE AND FAMILY THERAPY
Cognitive factors involved in couple and family distress have been concep-
tualized in varying ways by cognitive-behavioral theorists and therapists.
The central principle, however, is that family members' appraisals and
interpretations of one another's behavior influence the nature and extent
of their emotional and behavioral responses to one another.
Automatic Thoughts
"Automatic thoughts" are defined as stream-of-consciousness ideas, beliefs,
or images that individuals have from moment to moment, often elicited by
specific situations (e.g., "My wife is late again—she doesn't care about my
feelings," or "My parents are setting a curfew for me because they like
hassling me"). The word "automatic" indicates the spontaneous quality of
these cognitions, and cognitive therapists (e.g.. Beck et al., 1979) have noted
how individuals commonly accept them as plausible rather than questioning
their validity. A perfect example of this is portrayed by an incident that
occurred with a newly married couple. During working hours, a gentleman
had received a call from a distant relative who had arrived in town
unexpectedly. She asked if he and his wife were available for lunch. The
gentleman attempted to call his wife at home, but since it was short notice,
she was not available for lunch. However, he made plans to meet the
relative for lunch by himself. Ironically, the gentleman's wife had been out
shopping and saw him leaving a restaurant with his relative, who happened
to be an attractive young female. Upon seeing her husband with another
woman, the wife immediately flew into a rage. She began catastrophizing
that her husband was having an affair, and she became emotionally
distraught. After she confronted her husband, he informed her of the
situation and arranged for an opportunity to introduce his wife to his
relative later that same day. This is a clear example of a woman engaging
in the distortion of "jumping to conclusions," which led to the automatic
erroneous belief that her husband was being unfaithful.
wife arrives home 30 minutes late from work concludes, "She must be
having an affair/' or parents whose son or daughter was 15 minutes late
for curfew conclude that the child is engaging in inappropriate activities
with friends.
2. Selective abstraction. Information is perceived out of context;
certain details are noticed or highlighted, while other important informa-
tion is ignored. For example, an individual may focus on the negative
behavior of other family members., but fail to notice their positive actions.
In distressed families, it's common to hear the members whose positive acts
go unnoticed complaining, "You never notice the good things that I do!"
3. Over generalization. An isolated incident or two is allowed to serve
as a representation of similar situations, whether or not they are truly
related. For example, after her husband fails to complete one household
chore, a woman concludes, "He is totally unreliable."
4. Magnification and minimization. A case or circumstance is per-
ceived as having greater or lesser significance than is appropriate. For
example, an angry husband becomes enraged upon discovering that his wife
has overspent the weekly budget for groceries, and magnifies this event by
concluding, "We're doomed financially." In contrast, he may engage in
minimization when his wife spends less than the budgeted amount the next
time she does the grocery shopping, as he concludes, "That hardly saved
us any money/'
5. Personalization, This is a form of arbitrary inference, in which
external events are attributed to oneself when insufficient evidence exists
to render a conclusion. For example, a woman finds her husband remaking
the bed after she previously spent time making it herself and concludes,
"He is dissatisfied with the way I did it."
6. Dichotomous thinking. Experiences are classified as either all or
nothing—as complete successes or total failures. This is otherwise known
as "all-or-nothing" or "polarized thinking." For example, a mother who
states to her son who is cleaning his room, "There is still dust on your
bureau," elicits this reaction from her son: "She's never satisfied with
anything I do."
7. Labeling and mislabeling. Behaviors such as mistakes made in the
past are generalized as traits to define oneself or another family member.
For example, subsequent to making repeated errors in balancing the
checkbook, a partner states, "I'm really stupid," as opposed to recognizing
the errors as situational behavior (perhaps influenced by fatigue). Similarly,
a parent who observes a child dragging along in the morning as he or she
gets ready for school concludes, "This kid is really lazy."
8. Mind reading. This is another special case of arbitrary inference, in
which an individual believes that he or she is able to know what another
family member is thinking or will do in the near or distant future, without
the aid of direct verbal communication between the parties. Members of
distressed couples and families often make negative predictions about each
An Introduction to Cognitive-Behavioral Therapy 7
other. For example, a woman says to herself, "I know what Tom is going
to say when he hears that I'll be working late tomorrow." Although such
predictions may be accurate, based on past experiences with the other
person, mind reading involves going beyond the available data and risking
erroneous conclusions.
Schema®
Research on human cognition (Fiske & Taylor, 1991) supports the premise
that moment-to-moment automatic thoughts and the cognitive distortions
on which they are based tend to be shaped by the individual's "schemas,"
which are underlying core beliefs that the person has developed about
characteristics of the world and how it functions. Schemas are relatively
stable cognitive structures that may become inflexible and unconditional in
character. Many schemas about relationships and the nature of family
members' interactions are learned early in life from primary sources, such
as family of origin, cultural mores, the mass media, and early dating
experiences (Dattilio, 1993, 1994). These schemas or dysfunctional beliefs
about relationships are often not articulated clearly in an individual's mind,
but exist as vague concepts of what "should be" (Beck, 1988). For example,
some men believe that holding a door open for a woman is a way of being
polite or showing courtesy—-something that has been taught in many
American households. A woman who was brought up in a different
environment, however, may interpret this gesture as not respecting her
independence, particularly if it is overdone.
These kinds of schemas are the basis for coding, categorizing, and
evaluating experiences during the course of one's life. Central to Beck's
cognitive theory of depression is the concept of the "negative triad"—pes-
simistic schemas about the self, world, and future, Schemas that have been
previously developed influence how an individual subsequently processes
information in new situations. A basic tenet of cognitive-behavioral family
therapy is that each individual family member maintains schemas about
every member of the family unit (including himself or herself), in addition
to schemata about family interaction in general. These schemas are some-
times conscious and overtly expressed, but more often individuals aren't
fully aware of the basic beliefs that guide their responses to family
interactions.
When a couple forms a relationship, each partner brings some schemas
from his or her family of origin and other life experiences (e.g., schemas
about the characteristics that each individual assumes are typical of an
intimate relationship). Although these schemas influence each partner's
perceptions and inferences about events in the current relationship, events
in the current relationship can also modify preexisting schemas (Epstein &:
Rauconi, 1993). For example, even though an individual who grew up with
abusive parents may have developed a schema involving danger in family
8 CASE STUDIES IN COUPLE AND FAMILY THERAPY
interaction, and years later this schema may lead the individual to make
arbitrary inferences about malevolent intent by his or her adult partner,
current experiences with a safe and supportive partner may alter the
negative schema. However, preexisting schemas may be difficult to modify,
particularly if they are associated with strong feelings.
In addition to the schemas that partners or mates bring to their
relationship, each member of a couple develops schemas specific to the
current partner and relationship. Consistent with empirical findings con-
cerning schemas as templates according to which individuals process new
information. Beck (1988) describes how each partner develops a "frame"
or stable schema concerning the other's characteristics, and how subsequent
perceptions and interpretations of the other's behavior tend to be shaped
by the frame. For example, when a woman's observations of her partner
produce a schema in which he is viewed as "selfish," the woman is likely
to notice future partner behaviors that seem consistent with the schema, to
ignore actions that are inconsistent with the schema, and to attribute other
negative partner behavior to the trait of "selfishness."
Members of a couple are also likely to develop schemas about
themselves as a couple (e.g., "We share a lot of interests," "We're from two
different worlds," "Our goal is to raise children with high moral stan-
dards"). The couple dyad is modified with the birth of any offspring and
the development of a triad or larger family unit. Here the development of
"triangles" becomes important, because they contribute profoundly to the
development of family members' cognitions (Procter, 1985; Guerin, Fogarty,
Fay, & Kautto, 1996). For example, consistent with systems theory, when
family members form coalitions against other members, each individual
develops schemas concerning the conflict and power dynamics involved in
such coalitions. Moreover, cognitive-behavioral therapists are particularly
interested in helping individuals link such schemas to experiences in their
families of origin (Dattilio, 1997). As a result of years of integrated
interaction among family members, the individuals develop jointly held
beliefs, which constitute the "family schema" (Dattilio, 1994). To the extent
that the family schema involves cognitive distortions, it may result in
dysfunctional interaction (e.g., when all members of a family view a
particular child as irresponsible and therefore behave in ways that constrain
the child's development of autonomy). Figure 1.1 depicts the evolution of
a family schema from the schemas the partners bring from their families of
origin, and the blending of their life experiences and beliefs.
H. viii. 100.
The evident alarm and despair with which Xerxes
regarded the situation rendered Mardonius uneasy. An
adviser whose counsels had ended in disaster,—and he was mainly
responsible for persuading the king to undertake the great
expedition,—might well be anxious as to the consequences which
the failure might have for himself. Whether Herodotus had any real
authority for his account of the advice which he represents
Mardonius to have given Xerxes at this time, may perhaps be
suspected; but the main outlines of it are worth quoting, even if they
only reproduce what some contemporary Greek imagined that
advice to have been. He is represented, in the first place, as seeking
to minimize the disaster by arguing that it had only fallen upon one
branch of the service, and that the land-army was in no wise
impaired in efficiency by what had happened. If he did actually use
this argument, he can only have used it because he thought that it
was a sufficiently good one for the man to whom he was speaking.
He had himself commanded the expedition of 492; and though on a
much smaller scale, that venture had been brought to a premature
conclusion by the storm which wrecked his fleet off Mount Athos.
Mardonius was the last man who ought to have deceived himself as
to the significance of the disaster at Salamis. Two courses, he said,
were still open,—either to march with the whole army against the
Peloponnese, or for Xerxes to withdraw with the major part of the
land-forces, and leave him three hundred thousand men wherewith
to complete the conquest of Greece. Such is the advice as reported.
Whether a march on Peloponnese was possible at this time cannot
be said, since the state of the Persian supplies is not known. In any
case, Xerxes had no stomach for such a venture, and adopted the
alternative suggestion, which offered a greater chance of security to
H. viii 102.
his all-important self. Moreover, this was the view of
the matter which the astute Artemisia, whom he called
172
into counsel, put before him.
It must of necessity remain a matter for doubt whether Mardonius
ever gave such advice. The retirement of the fleet to the Asian coast
would give the Greeks the naval command of their side of the
Ægean, and, that being so, the real line of communications was lost,
and the alternative route by land along the North Ægean would be,
even if it could be regarded as effective, liable to be cut by an attack
from the sea. On the other hand, it is possible that he reckoned that
he might maintain himself for some months, even for a year, on the
food-resources of Thessaly and Bœotia; and in that space of time
much might happen to reverse the ill-fortune of the moment. Besides
all this, even if the conquest of Greece as a whole could not be
effected, there did remain the possibility of advancing the Persian
frontier south from Macedonia even as far as Kithæron, and of
robbing Greece of her richest lands. That the Greeks feared
something of this kind is shown by their subsequent advance to
Platæa. That move was so inconsistent with the whole plan on which
they had conducted the campaign on land, that it can only be
accounted for on the hypothesis that they were actuated by some
such fear.
But there were also political considerations
THEMISTOCLES
AFTER SALAMIS.
of the very highest importance which could not
but affect the decision of Xerxes and the
Persian authorities. The acknowledgment of complete failure such as
would have been apparent had the whole force withdrawn en masse
to Asia, must have shaken to its very foundations the great
composite empire which was held together by the strong hand and
the prestige of success. But could Xerxes on his return report that a
force had been left to complete the reduction of Greece, the
magnitude of the disaster which had fallen upon him might be
concealed, until, at any rate, he was himself in a position to take
measures to provide against any possible commotion which might be
caused when the varied population of the empire came to realize the
extent of the failure which had resulted in an expedition in which it
had put forth all its strength. Whatever the advice of Mardonius may
have been, these considerations must have been present with
Xerxes and his council when they met to discuss the course to be
adopted in view of what had happened at Salamis. Herodotus
shows, from the words he attributes to Artemisia, that he was not
173
oblivious to the wider possibilities of the situation.
His account of the events which immediately resulted from
Xerxes’ decision is complicated historically by the reappearance of
Themistocles on the stage of his history. The historian does not
attempt to conceal the prominence of that great man at Salamis; but
in the description of the actual fighting his name is only incidentally
mentioned, and personal details of him are conspicuous by their
absence. But the tradition of the events succeeding the battle
contained several ugly stories, some of them, indeed, capable of
diverse interpretation, but all of them capable of being interpreted to
Themistocles’ discredit. These the historian has inserted in his
narrative, with the result that he has introduced into it an element
which must excite suspicion, and which makes it very difficult to
disentangle that in it which is reliable from that which is not so.
H. viii. 107.
On the very night, it is said, after Xerxes’ decision
had been taken, the commanders of the Persian fleet
put out with all speed for the Hellespont, with orders to guard the
bridge across the strait for the king’s return. It is not, perhaps, easy
to see why so much store should be set by the bridge. The main
point, it might have been imagined, would be to defend the
Hellespont. Xerxes’ personal safety and his passage of the strait
would in that case have been equally well secured.
One incident of the voyage is described which is intended to
demonstrate the nervous state to which the Persian seamen had
been reduced by their defeat. Near a place called Zoster, which is
supposed to have been situated on the Attic coast the Persians
mistook certain rocks for enemies’ ships, and fled “a long distance”
before they discovered their mistake. The object of the story is
evidently to emphasize the dramatic contrast between the
confidence which preceded the battle and the depression which
succeeded it.
The next day was well advanced before the Greeks discovered
the flight. Seeing the land-army in its old position, they supposed the
Persian fleet to be still at Phaleron, which bay would be hidden from
their position in the strait by the high promontory of the Piræus; and,
under this impression, they prepared to meet a second attack. It is
remarkable, but quite evident, that the Greeks under-estimated alike
the moral and material damage they had inflicted on the enemy.
They show none of the jubilation which follows a decisive victory;
and it must be concluded that the fight was more fierce and more
stubborn on the part of the vanquished than any Greek historian has
described it to have been. Then, says Herodotus, when they
discovered that the fleet had sailed away, they started in pursuit, and
proceeded as far as Andros without catching sight of it. This is not
surprising, considering that it had, in all probability, twelve hours’
start. The statement that the fleet went as far as Andros, or even
ventured to leave Salamis at this time, has been regarded with
suspicion by some historians. It is argued that
QUESTIONS OF THE
with the land-army of the Persians still in
HELLESPONT
BRIDGE. Attica, the Greeks could not have ventured to
withdraw their fleet from the strait, and have
exposed the refugees on Salamis to attack.
But is it necessarily to be assumed that the Greeks did not leave
any vessels behind to provide against such a contingency? It may
even be doubted whether, after the withdrawal of the fleet, the
Persian army had any means whatever at its disposal for the
passage of the strait.
The short voyage to Andros was, no doubt, of the nature of a
reconnaissance. It was manifestly important to know whether the
enemy’s ships had definitely departed from Greek waters.
H. viii. 113.
The retreat of the Persian army began a few days
after the naval battle. Mardonius accompanied it
because, so Herodotus says, he wished to escort the king. The
campaigning season also was far advanced, and he thought it would
be better to winter in Thessaly. His real motive in retiring so far north,
—a motive Herodotus could hardly appreciate, even if he ever heard
it mentioned,—would be to shorten the line of communications,
especially for commissariat purposes. He had now no fleet upon
which to depend. Moreover, Thessaly was a rich country, whose
local supplies would go far towards satisfying the temporary wants of
his army. There he selected the men who were to remain with him
for the next year’s campaign. He seems to have chosen the best
troops in the huge and motley host, Persians, Medes, Sakæ,
Bactrians and Indians; and Xerxes made no objection. And then the
rest of the helpless throng departed on its long march round the
North Ægean, to carry to Asia a terrible tale of suffering of which but
few details have survived in the Greek historians. According to
Herodotus, three hundred thousand men remained with Mardonius.
It is commonly supposed that this number is largely exaggerated; but
unless there is a proportionate exaggeration in the numbers of the
Greek army present at Platæa, the force which the Persians
opposed to them there can hardly have been less than two hundred
and fifty thousand in number. Mardonius probably retained with him
nearly the whole of the really effective land-force of the original
expedition.
H. viii. 115.
That part of the army which continued its retreat
from Thessaly took forty-five days to reach the
Hellespont. The misery of that time must have been unspeakable,
and but few out of the many ever set foot again on Asian soil. The
realities of a six weeks’ march of four hundred miles, in the case of a
large force wholly unprovided with commissariat, must have been
horrible beyond description. Starving themselves, they spread
famine by their ravages wherever they went. In many places no food
was obtainable, and then they ate the very grass by the way and the
leaves of the trees. Dysentery was the inevitable result. The sick
who fell by the road were left to the care of the natives; and, knowing
the nature of those wild Thracian tribes of the North Ægean, it is not
difficult to imagine that their fate must have been pitiable in the
extreme. At last the survivors reached the Hellespont, to find that the
bridge had been carried away in a storm; but they were transported
to Abydos in boats. Not even then were their misfortunes over. Many
of the starving multitude perished from giving undue satisfaction to
their ravenous hunger.
H. viii. 119.
Herodotus, though he mentions two accounts of the
matter, is of opinion that Xerxes accompanied the
army all through its retreat. He rejects a tale to
AN INTERVAL IN
the effect that on arriving at Eion, at the mouth
THE WAR.
of the Strymon, the king went the rest of the
way by sea on a Phœnician ship, and was only saved from perishing
in a northern gale by the devotion of certain Persians who
accompanied him, and who sacrificed themselves in order to lighten
the ship. Apart from the tale of devotion, the rejected version is
manifestly the more probable. Not to speak of the horrors of the
land-march, the king’s personal safety may well have been imperilled
in the midst of an army which had undergone and was undergoing
the sufferings of his. To Hydarnes was committed the conduct of the
remainder of the retreat.
H. viii. 121.
The siege of Andros turned out a failure. Karystos
was attacked and its territory ravaged; and then a
return was made to Salamis. It is evident that the Greeks themselves
were at this time under the impression that the war in Europe was
over, in so far as they were concerned; and eagerness of the
Athenian section to carry the war into Asia, which Herodotus has
antedated, may be ascribed to this time. The news that Mardonius
had remained in Thessaly, with evident intent to renew the war next
year, can hardly have reached Athens until several weeks at earliest
from the time at which the retreat began.
Under this mistaken impression they began to wind up the skein
of past events, and after their patriotic victory to discuss who had
deserved best of their common fatherland. The gods had been very
good to them, much better, perhaps, than they themselves realized;
and it was to them that their remembrance first turned. To Delphi was
H. viii. 123.
dedicated a tenth of the spoils. After dividing the rest
of the plunder, the Greeks sailed to the Isthmus to
decide by vote who of all of them had rendered the greatest services
to his country in the recent war. The result was unfortunate. Each
general having two votes gave the first to himself, and the majority
gave the second to Themistocles. Under the circumstances they
thought it best to forego the decision; and the various contingents
departed home to their cities.
In spite of this the admiration of Themistocles burst forth, and that
in a most unexpected quarter. He went to Sparta, where such honour
was paid him as never had been previously paid to any foreigner,
and never was again paid up to Herodotus’ own day.
There are certain elements in the political situation at this time
which make it possible that party feeling ran high among the
Plat. Them.
Athenians during the period which now ensued. The
[Arist.] Athen. Areopagus, which still continued to represent all that
Pol. was exclusively aristocratic in Athens and Attica, had
played a considerable part in the measures which had
been taken for the public safety; and if the recently discovered Polity
of Athens, which is attributed to Aristotle, is to be believed, it had
gained considerable reputation thereby. On the other hand, the man
of the hour was Themistocles; and he led political interests directly
opposed to those which the venerable council represented. It may be
that Themistocles’ resignation of the Strategia was not wholly
unconnected with these struggles. He does not appear in history as
a man likely to under-estimate his own personal worth; and the
discovery that, in the turmoil of party strife, the world generally
seemed to set a lower value upon it, may have given bitter offence to
his pride. Herodotus gives no detail of these political events; though
H. viii. 125.
his introduction to a story which he evidently inserts
because it contained such a bon-mot as he dearly
loved, shows that an attack was made on Themistocles immediately
after his return from Sparta. Timodemos of Aphidnæ was the name
of the assailant. He reproached Themistocles with having taken to
himself an honour due to his country; and, apparently, thinking the
175
remark an effective one, repeated it on more than one occasion.
Herodotus, who never discovered a lack of ready wit to be one of
Themistocles’ defects, takes evident pleasure in recording the
crushing retort: “The thing stands thus,” said he; “had I been from
Belbina, I should not have been thus honoured by the Spartans, nor
would you have been, good sir, even had you been from Athens.”
This is the last of the series of events in
THE WAR IN SICILY.
Greece which can be attributed to the year
480, but before proceeding to recount the history of the following
year, it is necessary to recur briefly to what had meanwhile taken
place in Sicily. The brevity of the reference is not due to the
unimportance of the events themselves, but to the meagreness of
the surviving records of them. Herodotus dismisses the subject in a
few words; and the scheme of history which Diodorus had proposed
to himself rendered it impossible for him to devote much space to
them, despite the fact that this year was a most decisive one for the
history of his native land.
After the departure of the Spartan and Athenian ambassadors,
Gelo of Syracuse had been left alone to face that great storm which
Persia had stirred up in the West with the evident intention of
preventing the Sicilian and Italian Greek from taking part in the
defence of the mother country. It was more than fortunate for the
Sicilians that at this most critical moment of their history, such power
as they could put forward was under the control of one strong hand.
The tyrant, or tyrant city, was indeed at all times in Sicilian history
necessary to the salvation of the Greeks, face to face as they were
with the great Carthaginian power in the west of the island,
supported by a central base but a few miles distant across a narrow
sea.
There is no question that the Carthaginian preparations were on a
Diod. xi 20.
very large scale, though the numbers given by
Diodorus are certainly exaggerated. In her struggle
with Rome, more than two centuries later, Carthage, though in all
probability more powerful than she was in 480, could not muster
aught resembling the strength which the Sicilian historian attributes
to her on this occasion. He states the number of the land forces to
have been 300,000. The fleet, he says, consisted of 2000 warships,
together with 3000 transports. It is manifestly useless to attempt
what, in the absence of independent records, can be no more than a
guess as to the actual numbers. All that can be with safety assumed
is that they were very large. The name of the commander was
Hamilcar.
The gods of the winds were hardly less kind to the Greeks of
Sicily than they were to their fellow-countrymen at home. A storm
overtook the expedition in the Libyan sea, and the vessels conveying
the horses and chariots were lost. Hamilcar, however, conducted the
remainder in safety to Panormos. He had no anxiety as to the result
now that he had safely transported the bulk of his forces across the
sea. Doubtless he reckoned on having to deal with a Sicily such as
Sicily had been before the recent rise of Gelo’s power, in which the
great force at his disposal would have been able to crush the Greek
cities in detail.
From Panormos, after repairing, in so far as possible, the damage
suffered in the storm, he marched his army along the coast to
Himera, the fleet keeping in touch with it meanwhile. His method of
advance was consequently similar to that adopted by the Persians in
their march round the Ægean. Arrived at Himera, he formed two
camps, one for the army and one for the fleet. The arrangement of
these camps is interesting, as showing that in the west, as in the
east, the Greeks had to deal with a foe which, whatever his defects,
was both capable and experienced in the organization of large
expeditions over sea. The warships were drawn up on shore and
surrounded by a stockade and deep ditch. The other camp was
contiguous to the naval one, but ran inland to the summit of the
neighbouring heights, to the west of the city of Himera, and facing it.
Hamilcar thus secured his communications with his commissariat
base,—the fleet. The provisions which he had brought with him he
landed, and then despatched the empty transports to Libya and
Sardinia to fetch a further supply. His plan was evidently not to
attempt to assault the town on all sides. The loss of his cavalry
would make it difficult for him to advance far from his sea-base; and,
besides, he had to expect an attack from a relieving force. Having
completed the fortification of his position, he took some of the best of
his soldiers and advanced against the town, whose garrison came
out to meet him, afraid, no doubt, of his establishing siege works in
the immediate neighbourhood of their wall. It had, however, to retire
with severe loss, a disaster which brought the Himerans to a state of
despair. But even thus early in the campaign the town was not wholly
dependent on its own resources. Thero, tyrant of Akragas, who was
content to play a subordinate part to Gelo in
GELO MARCHES TO
RESCUE HIMERA.
Sicilian politics, was either present in it, or,—
for Diodorus’ language is capable of two
interpretations,—in its neighbourhood, with a force whose numbers
are not mentioned. Alarmed at the situation, and evidently not in
sufficient strength to take the offensive against the Carthaginians, he
sent an urgent message to Gelo to come with all speed. Gelo was
ready, and the fact of his being so suggests that the defence against
the invader was being conducted on a definite plan. Syracuse had
evidently been chosen as the base of operations. Its
communications with southern Sicily are both shorter and more easy
than with the north. If the attack took place on the south, which was
probably known to be unlikely, the central force at Syracuse would
be within striking distance. It would seem, therefore, that Thero’s
corps had been sent from the south to the north, where the attack
was more likely to be made, to act as an army of observation, and to
hold the enemy until Gelo could appear with the main army. The plan
was a sound one.