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PALGRAVE SERIES IN ASIA AND PACIFIC STUDIES

China, Russia
and Central Asian
Infrastructure
Fragmenting or
Reformatting the Region?
Peter Krasnopolsky
 Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies

Honorary Editor
May Tan-Mullins, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo,
China

Series Editor
Filippo Gilardi, University of Nottingham Ningbo China, Ningbo,
China

Editorial Board
Melissa Shani Brown, Ruhr University Bochum, Bochum, Germany
Adam Knee, LASALLE College of the Arts, Singapore, Singapore
Gianluigi Negro, University of Siena, Siena, Italy
Andrea Střelcová, MPIWG, Berlin, Germany
The Asia and Pacific regions, with a population of nearly three billion
people, are of critical importance to global observers, academics, and
citizenry due to their rising influence in the global political economy
as well as traditional and nontraditional security issues. Any changes to
the domestic and regional political, social, economic, and environmental
systems will inevitably have great impacts on global security and gover-
nance structures. At the same time, Asia and the Pacific have also emerged
as a globally influential, trend-setting force in a range of cultural arenas.
The remit of this book series is broadly defined, in terms of topics and
academic disciplines. We invite research monographs on a wide range
of topics focused on Asia and the Pacific. In addition, the series is also
interested in manuscripts pertaining to pedagogies and research methods,
for both undergraduate and postgraduate levels. Published by Palgrave
Macmillan, in collaboration with the Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies,
UNNC.
NOW INDEXED ON SCOPUS!
 Peter Krasnopolsky

China, Russia
and Central Asian
Infrastructure
Fragmenting or Reformatting the Region?
Peter Krasnopolsky
University of Nottingham
Institute of Asia and Pacific Studies
Ningbo, China

ISSN 2662-7922 ISSN 2662-7930 (electronic)

Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies
ISBN 978-981-19-4253-2 ISBN 978-981-19-4254-9 (eBook)
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 Acknowledgments

This project would not be possible without Ivaylo Gatev who recog-
nized the potential of the topic and provided professional guidance
through the initial years of research and friendly encouragement there-
after. May Tan-Mullins has been incredibly supportive at each stage of
the project, from research to publication submission. Kalyan Kemburi
offered valuable advice and motivation during my intellectual walka-
bout around the subject of the book. During the later stages of writing,
Gregory Moore offered skilled mentorship and moral support to ensure
the quality of the final manuscript. From distant Nottingham, Adam
Swain continuously provided valuable comments and positive reassur-
ance. In Ningbo a number of faculty members offered useful advice
throughout the research and writing process. Comments and motivation
came from Gernot Klantschnig, Hung Chieh, May Tan-Mullins, David
Kiwuwa, Grant Dawson and Mark Bailey. The travel grants from the
Graduate School and from the Institute of Asia Pacific Studies enabled
me to present my work at several conferences and conduct research in
Central Asia. The affiliation with the American University of Central Asia
in Bishkek was incredibly useful during field research. The thesis relies
heavily on data obtained from the interviews. I am thankful to all the
respondents in Beijing, Bishkek and Almaty.
I am incredibly grateful to my friends—Stephen Mcquat, Sam Seery,
Richard Webster and James Stewart-Wallace—who diligently proofread
chapters for style and clarity, commented on my work and used humor

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

to diminish the stress of the final writing stages. Back in New Jersey
my mother, Yelena, offered patient reassurance in the worthiness of the
project. At every stage of the process, my loving wife Hoffen provided
the strongest foundation from which I was able to launch this academic
endeavor. My kids, Muyang and Timmy, served as great motivators to
finish, and kindly sacrificed living room wall space designated for anime
and Ultraman posters for maps of railways, diagrams of energy flows and
other seemingly useless visuals. Finally, I am indebted to my father and my
brother, who managed to instill in me an interest in international affairs
and ignited my sense of general curiosity about the world.
 Praise for China, Russia and Central
Asian Infrastructure

“There is no overstating the outsized influence of the Chinese and the

Russians on regionalism in Central Asia. Peter Krasnopolsky has written
an outstanding work on the patterns of cooperation and competition
that define the region’s evolving infrastructure and connectivity, and the
respective contributions by China and Russia to that end. Krasnopol-
sky’s book is an absolute must read for anyone seeking to understand
contemporary Central Asia.”
—See Seng Tan, Research Advisor, S. Rajaratnam School of International
Studies, Singapore

“With all eyes on the significance of Sino-Russian relations for global

politics, Peter Krasnopolsky highlights the challenges their partnership
has posed for Central Asia’s regional economic development. His exten-
sive field work provides a granular exploration of the different impacts
Russia and China have had on the trajectory of Central Asian regionalism,
especially in building institutions, infrastructure, and connectivity.”
—Elizabeth Wishnick, Senior Research Scientist CNA, and Professor
of Political Science, Montclair State University, US

vii
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Building Organizations Not Cooperation 2
Railroad—Not Silk Road 4
China Looking Westward 6
Central Asia Through Various Lenses 9
Chapter Outline 12
Bibliography 16
2 Central Asia as a Region 21
Which Region? Central Asia vs. Central Eurasia 22
Implications from Security, Identity and Interdependence
on the Central Asian Region 26
Constraints to Regional Cooperation 29
Analyzing Central Asian Regionalism 31
Obdurate Infrastructure 33
Institution of Sovereignty 35
Reconstructing Interests 35
Voluntary Transformation of Identities 37
Conclusion 38
Bibliography 43

ix
x CONTENTS

3 Multilateral Organizations as a Questionable Reflection

of Regionalism 45
‘Home-Grown’ Regional Organizations 46
The CIS—The Initial Form of Post-Soviet Regionalism 48
Eurasian Integration: Narrowing Down the Region 51
The Eurasian Economic Community and the Eurasian
Economic Union—Toward ‘Harder’ Regionalism 51
Defined by Interests, But Not Always Serving Them 53
Shanghai Cooperation Organization: Serving Various Goals 57
‘Functionalism Upside Down’ 58
Chinese Style of Regionalism 60
Dynamics Defined by the Two Major Powers 61
The Challenge of Institutional Regionalism 63
Mutual Interests: Security and Regime Stability 63
Infrastructure Development 64
Trade and Economic Cooperation 66
Energy 67
Limitations of Institutions 68
Conclusion 68
Bibliography 75
4 No Loans—No Roads: Multilateral Financial
Institutions and Their Effect on Regionalism 79
Background 81
SCO-Based Initiatives 84
The SCO Interbank Association—Slow Steps
in the Cooperative Direction 84
The SCO Finance Banking Association—“SCO” Only
in Name 87
SCO Development Bank—A Failed Compromise 89
Intermediate Conclusion 91
New Institutions and ‘New Silk Road’ 93
Wide Scope and High Ambitions 95
Sino-Russian Dissonance 99
Conclusion 101
Bibliography 110
 CONTENTS xi

5 Not All Roads Lead to Moscow: Transportation Routes

and Their Twofold Effect on Regional Cooperation
in Central Asia 117
Reducing Non-physical Barriers Through Multilateral
Initiatives 121
The Economic Cooperation Organization—South
of the Pamir, West of the Caspian 121
From Europe to Asia Bypassing Russia 122
From Asia to Europe with Central Asia in the “Center” 127
The SCO and Non-physical Barriers 130
Intermediate Conclusion 133
Financing Physical Infrastructure: Varying
Engagement—Various Results 134
Russia’s Limited Role 134
Multiple Effects of China’s Engagement 136
China’s Engagement: Build the Road—Disconnect
the Neighbors 136
China’s Engagement: National Infrastructure
or Regional Infrastructure 138
China’s Engagement: New “Silk Road” Through
Kazakhstan Only 141
China’s Engagement and the “Russian Factor”: Crossing
Kyrgyzstan: South-North—Go; East-West—No Go 145
Conclusion 149
Bibliography 162
6 Trading Places in Central Asia: The “Shift”
in the Nature of Russian and Chinese Engagement
and Its Effects on Regional Cooperation in the Energy
Field 171
Water and Electricity 173
Regional Potential 173
Limited Impact of Regional Institutions: Eurasian
Development Bank as a Weak Instrument of Eurasian
Integration 175
Limited Impact of Regional Institutions: Sensitivity
of Energy Issues Weakens the Efforts of the CAREC
and the SCO 177
From Cooperation to Isolation 180
xii CONTENTS

Russia’s Engagement in the Power Sector 181

Chinese Engagement in the Power Sector: Power Lines
in Tajikistan 184
Chinese Engagement in the Power Sector: Substation
and Transmission Line in Kyrgyzstan 185
Chinese Engagement in the Power Sector: “Reformatting”
Regional Energy Flow 186
Hydrocarbons and the Pipelines that Carry Them 187
Gas Transporting Networks and Their Role in Regional
Connectivity 187
Russia’s “Situational” Engagement 188
The Effects of the Combined Major Powers’ Actions
and China’s Growing Role 191
Emerging Chinese Multilateralism and Changing Nature
of Engagement 193
Central Asian Oil as an Instrument of Chinese
Multilateralism 196
Conclusion 199
Bibliography 211
7 Laying Wires—Making Friends: Russia’s and China’s
Engagement in the Telecommunication Sector and Its
Effects on Regional Cooperation 219
Transcontinental Cables and Their Questionable Effects
on Regional Connectivity 222
Convergence of Sub-sectors, Geographical Constraints
and Technological Limitations 222
Sino-Russian Engagement and Transcontinental Cables
Bypassing Central Asia 224
Re-wiring Regional Lines of Communication 227
Lower Cost—More Players—Less Clear Vision of a Single
Region 230
Conclusion 234
Bibliography 239
 CONTENTS xiii

8 Whose Voice Gets the Ear? Soft Power, Language

and Regionalization in Central Asia 243
The Role of Russian Language 244
Russia’s Displacement and China’s Absence in the Media
Sector in Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan and Tajikistan 246
Russia’s Media Engagement in Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan 252
China’s “Public Relations” Approach in Central Asia 258
Conclusion 264
Bibliography 271
9 Conclusion 279
‘Ideology of Survival’: Central Asian States’ Reaction
to Major Powers’ Engagement 281
‘Survival’ and Infrastructure 283
Russia’s Situational Engagement 287
China’s Engagement: Toward Multilateralism and a New
‘Shape’ of the Region 288
Sino-Russian Relations and Central Asian Regionalism 292
Bibliography 296

Bibliography 299
Index 339
 Abbreviations

ADB Asia Development Bank

ASEAN Association of South East Asian Nations
BBSh Beineu-Bozoi-Shemkent pipeline
CA—China Central Asia—China pipeline
CACO Central Asia Cooperation Organization
CAREC Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation
CASA 1000 Central Asia South Asia power transmission initiative
CCTV China Central Television
CDB China Development Bank
CIS Commonwealth of Independent State
CNPC China National Petroleum Corporation
CPC Caspian Pipeline Consortium
CPEC China Pakistan Economic Corridor
CRBC China Road and Bridge Corporation
CSTO Collective Security Treaty Organization
EAEU Eurasian Economic Union
EBRD European Bank of Reconstruction and Development
ECO Economic Cooperation Organization
EDB Eurasian Development Bank
EFSD Eurasian Fund for Stabilization and Development
EMRC Europe-Russia-Mongolia-China (communication line)
EurasEC Eurasian Economic Community
GRES Gosudarstvennaya Rayonnaya Elektrostantsiya (Rus)
HEPP Hydro Electric Power Plant
IPS Integrated Power System
IRU International Road Union

xv
xvi ABBREVIATIONS

LNG Liquid Natural Gas

MAGAI Modern Activity Gap and Arch of Instability
MFA Ministry of Foreign Affairs
NELTI New Eurasian Land Transportation Initiative
NTV N Televidiniye (Brand name)
ORT Obshestvennoye Rossiyskoye Televidinie (Perviy Kanal)
RTR Rossiyskoye Televidiniye i Radio
SCO Shanghai Cooperation Organization
SRCIC Silk Road Chamber of International Commerce
TASIM Trans-Eurasian Information Super Highway
TBEA Tebian Electric Apparatus
TIR Transports Internationaux Routiers (French)
TRACECA Transportation Corridors Europe-Caucasus-Asia
TSCL Trans-Siberian Communication Line
ZTE Zhongxing Telecommunication Equipment
 List of Maps

Map 5.1 Angren-Pap Railway 138

Map 5.2 Dushanbe-Khudjand-Chanak and Dushanbe-Kulyab 140
Map 5.3 Kyrgyzstan North–South 146
Map 5.4 Proposed China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan
(Kashgar-Osh-Andijan) Rail 148
Map 5.5 China-Kyrgyzstan-Uzbekistan Rail in a wider context 150

xvii
 List of Tables

Table 3.1 Distribution of employment financing responsibilities

in the Eurasian Economic Commission 53
Table 5.1 NELTI estimated routes 124
Table 5.2 Potential connections under the SCO transport
agreement 133
Table 6.1 Distribution of energy resources in CA 174
Table 7.1 Lack of correlation between internet penetration, press
freedom, population income 224
Table 8.1 Perceptions of China and Russia in Kazakhstan
and Kyrgyzstan 261

xix
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

Central Asia is commonly associated with two popular concepts—the Silk

Road and the Great Game. The first one underlines Central Asia’s link
with China and the connecting role between the East and the West. The
second represents a great power rivalry, exemplified by competition for
the sphere of influence between Russian and British empires. Contem-
porary studies of Central Asia in various disciplines often rely on these
two concepts to draw analogies for modern regional dynamics. However,
neither accurately reflects the nature of Central Asia’s position in rela-
tion to external actors. The network of routes termed the “Silk Road”
withered and ceased to function as a trans-Eurasian link long before the
foundation of modern China. Any project labeled as a variation of the
“new” or “modern” Silk Road usually has little in common with the
nature or geography of the ancient caravan routes. Furthermore, present
interstate politics in Central Asia hardly provide a parallel for the “Great
Game” played out between British and Russian diplomats, officers and
explorers in the second half of the nineteenth century.

The nature of contemporary competition is conditioned by very different

rules […]; rather than a collection of city-states surrounded by frontier
lands over which imperial domains expand and contract, contempo-
rary Central Eurasia is composed of states pursuing modernist ideals of
territorial sovereignty1

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
P. Krasnopolsky, China, Russia and Central Asian Infrastructure,
Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4254-9_1
2 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

Moreover, if the competition between major powers in Central Asia can

be called a ‘game,’ it is far from ‘great’ because it largely excludes the
world’s superpower, the USA.
Yet, the two concepts do provide essential clues for analyzing modern
Central Asia. First, after decades of isolation from each other, China and
its western neighbors began interacting as independent entities after the
dissolution of the Soviet Union. Second, the nature of the relationship
between Russia and China, the two major powers and main external actors
in Central Asia, is incredibly complicated, which implies that regional
dynamics do resemble a ‘game’. As Alexander Cooley argues, the “rules
of the game” are often defined by the local actors.2 Nevertheless, Sino-
Russian relations play an inseparable role, and an inquiry into the nature
of the two major power’s engagement is essential for understanding
international relations in the post-Soviet Central Asia. The following
introduction highlights the institutional nature of regional cooperation
in Central Asia, provides the historical background of the dynamics and
motivating forces behind the major powers and their respective engage-
ment in the region, and identifies the gap in the existing literature in order
to justify the main research question: how does the nature of China’s and
Russia’s engagement affect Central Asian regionalism? The final section
presents a brief outline of the book.

Building Organizations Not Cooperation

After the dissolution of the USSR, five republics—Kazakhstan,
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan—emerged as sepa-
rate units in the international system and embarked on the new process
of nation-building. Their geographic proximity, close ethnicity and
languages, similar religion (moderate forms of Islam), shared history,
common resources, such as water, and Soviet-era infrastructure provided a
wide range of grounds for cooperation.3 Hence, post-Soviet Central Asia
could be viewed as a region according to one of the basic definitions of
the term, “a limited number of states linked together by a geographical
relationship and by a degree of mutual interdependence.”4
However, in the decades after independence, regional cooperation
among these young states frequently stagnated. In numerous instances,
pre-existing Soviet ties were severed. Economic interests of the five
countries developed outside their immediate neighborhood and trade
among Central Asia states did not reflect sharp growth in the trade
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

between neighboring China and Russia.5 The movement of people within

Central Asia became increasingly restricted. Coordination and informa-
tion exchange between Central Asian public organizations became very
limited resulting in fewer connections in culture, education, sports and
youth exchanges. The influence of common Soviet culture and Russian
language declined, yielding to new post-independence nation-building
rhetoric. Relations between Central Asian states became periodically
complicated by the issues of border security and management of shared
water resources. Consequently, the level of interdependence between the
former Soviet republics gradually declined.
Despite the relatively poor condition of interstate and transnational
cooperation, a number of multilateral initiatives emerged in Central Asia.
Some of the programs and initiatives were promoted by the existing
international bodies.6 Other institutions reflected a common Soviet past
or were initiated by Russia. Among these are the Commonwealth of
Independent States, the Collective Security Treaty Organization, and the
Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU).7 One distinct regional grouping
initiated by China is the Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO),
which in its original form included Russia and most of the Central Asian
states. The EAEU and the SCO are the two more encompassing orga-
nizations. Although the groupings are different, their functions are often
overlapping. Both emphasize the importance of regional cooperation. It
has been suggested that “whereas in other Asian areas there has been
discussion of “regions without regionalism,’ Central Asia had been closer
to ‘regionalism without a region.’”8 The assertion implies that region-
alism involves institutional cooperation; however, this is not necessarily
the case.
Regionalism, is a “purposive interaction, formal and informal, among
state and non-state actors of a given area in pursuit of shared external,
domestic and transnational goals.”9 In other words, regionalism involves
steps toward cooperation for the shared purpose. Regionalism does not
necessarily imply regional integration especially not at each stage of region
formation.10 Therefore, regionalism does not always revolve around
formal multilateral structures. Nevertheless, the disconnect between the
deterioration of regional cohesion and active development of interna-
tional institutions raises a general puzzle as to why, despite pre-existing
interdependence and geographic proximity, has regional cooperation in
Central Asia revolved around overlapping regional organizations rather
4 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

than bottom-up developments? In other words, why is regional cooper-

ation in Central Asia manifested through institution-building instead of
actual cooperation on the ground?

Railroad---Not Silk Road

In 1879, Russian engineering troops began laying rails outside of the
Krasnovodsk fort on the eastern coast of the Caspian Sea. The construc-
tion of the Trans-Caspian rail line was the initial step in the process that
eventually transformed the vast and diverse lands between Caspian Sea
and China’s western frontiers, into what is now commonly known as
Central Asia. The rail line was used by the Russian military to reach
the cities scattered throughout the geographic area nearly adjacent to
the British-controlled or claimed territories. By 1886, the Trans-Caspian
reached Ashkhabad and Merv, the ancient Silk Road hub, and in two
years the railway extended to the former powerful centers of Bukhara
and Samarkand. A decade later, the rail link reached two more important
ancient cities, Tashkent and Andijan. By that time, a permanent bridge
over Oxus (Amu Darya) was built connecting the desert populated by
Turcoman tribes with the more developed Bukhara oasis. By 1910, a
side branch connected Bukhara with Termez on Afghanistan border and
Dushanbe in the western foothills of Pamir.11
While serving the initial goals to allow military access to the new
Russian frontiers, the rail thereby connected relatively isolated, and often
hostile, commercial and cultural polities. The network of roadways which
connected these political units in the past and was used by caravans on
their ways between China and Europe and South Asia had long since
withered. The ancient Silk Road was no longer there after it had gone
through the peaks and troughs of use, over the course of nearly two thou-
sand years. In its heydays during China’s Han, Tang and Yuan dynasties,
the route system covering the geographic center of the Eurasian continent
was supported and secured by economic activities and the military power
of the Chinese empire and occasionally by strong regimes emanating from
central Eurasia itself. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries,
due to growing instability within political units, increased warfare, and
the changing nature of the world economy, sea routes between Asia and
Europe became more strategic than Central Asian overland routes and
the role of the Silk Road gradually deteriorated.12
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

Modern Central Asia, so commonly associated with the ancient

Silk Road, was actually defined by infrastructural projects initiated and
completed by the Russian Empire and the Soviet Union. By the end of the
nineteenth century, the Governorate-General of Turkestan included terri-
tories of modern-day Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Kyrgyzstan
and southern Kazakhstan.13 Between 1900 and 1906, almost concur-
rently with the construction of the Trans-Caspian Railway, another rail
link, Trans-Aral Railway connected the economic, cultural and political
center Tashkent with Orenburg in Urals—in the southern territory of the
Russian Empire. During the years of the First World War (1914–1918)
and the Russian Civil War (1918–1921) the development of a rail system
in Central Asia was temporarily postponed. However, in the early years
of the Soviet Union, between 1926 and 1931 another key rail link, the
Turkestan-Siberian Railway, was laid between Tashkent and urban centers
of Shemkent, Taraz and Almaty, with a spur heading out to Bishkek.14
From Almaty the rail extended north through the Kazakh steppe to
Novosibirsk in Western Siberia. Altogether, Trans-Caspian, Trans-Aral
and Turkestan-Siberian railways linked populated centers of Central Asia
and connected them to Russia’s established transportation network.
Originally designed to transport the Russian military southward and
locally produced cotton up to the north, this rail system became essential
for the development of cooperation and connectivity in Central Asia.15
The rail network led to the transformation of the vast area populated by
diverse peoples into several coherent administrative units. Between 1920
and 1936, five Central Asian republics emerged in the present territorial
forms, which were retained after the dissolution of the Soviet Union in
1991.16

The borders that emerged in Central Asia were not drawn at random,
even if at times they often seem to defy geographical logic. They were
a product of late-Tsarist and early-Soviet census data, ethnographic and
orientalist scholarship, and also in part of the process of rayonirovanie
[creation of rayons —administrative units]—identifying supposedly rational
and viable economic units, and ensuring that each new state met minimum
criteria for becoming a full-blown Soviet Socialist Republic: these included
a population of at least a million, and a capital city connected by rail.17

Visibly, rail links built at the beginning of the twentieth century played a
key role in defining the shape of modern Central Asia.18
6 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

Hard infrastructure laid by Russia provided the foundation not only for
the movement of people and products but also for the flow of ideas, which
continued to mold regional identities over the next century. Telegraph
wires were laid along rail routes connecting cities scattered throughout
the area. The central government from Saint Petersburg and later from
Moscow introduced printing, and publications produced in urban centers
were transported by rail throughout the area. Soviet policies insured that
published material was accessible to the masses. In the 1920s all local
languages adopted the Latin alphabet and by 1942 it was replaced by
Cyrillic script. This transition made it easier to learn the Russian language
which became a required subject in all schools at approximately the same
time.19 As a result of the Soviet policies, nationhood and statehood
emerged in Central Asian societies.

Marxism demanded that the culture there should develop or ‘be developed’
toward nationhood, and Soviet authorities devised national frameworks
into which they set the still nomadic cultures of the region, attempting
to name ‘the stans’ according to what they judged to be the dominant
national group.20

Before Russia’s active engagement in the late nineteenth century, only the
polities in the present-day Uzbekistan possessed a form of statehood.21 A
century later, after the dissolution of the USSR, five newly independent
states emerged with definite borders and, somewhat diluted, but clearly
visible state identities. The nationhood imposed by the soviet policies, did
not eliminate clan loyalties, which remained present and often affected
the internal politics of individual countries. Russia’s maintained various
degrees of presence and strong influence in several Central Asian states.
However, a new actor, China, previously isolated by the mountains and a
diverging ideology, gradually began to carve out its role in the region.

China Looking Westward

The western reach of the Chinese Empire during the last, Qing, dynasty
generally ended at the Pamir, Taishan and Altai mountain chains at
the western edges of the modern Xinjiang region. In the nineteenth
century, when Russia was consolidating its position in Western Turkestan
(present Central Asia), the Qing government periodically lost and
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

regained control of the western frontier regions. Active people’s move-

ments between Western Turkestan (Central Asia) and Eastern Turkestan
(Xinjiang)22 continued well into the early half of the twentieth century.23
In 1916, during the region-wide revolt in Western Turkestan against
the Russian imperial army conscription of local populations, thousands
of Kyrgyz, Kazakhs and Uzbeks migrated to Eastern Turkestan and
remained there. Population movements and other types of cross-border
interactions between Western and Eastern Turkestan continued during
the Russian Civil War and Basmachi anti-Soviet resistant movement in
1920s and early 1930s. Throughout the turbulent years of the Republic
of China and the Second World War, China and Russia maintained
various degrees of involvement and control in the two main parts of
Eastern Turkestan—Dzungaria (northern Xinjiang) and the Tarim Basin
(southern Xinjiang).24 After the People’s Republic of China (PRC) was
established in 1949, the new Beijing government consolidated control
over the whole of Xinjiang by the mid 1950s. Following 1956, during
the Sino-Soviet ideological rift, the border between the PRC and the
USSR was sealed and militarized, which effectively halted any exchanges
between the state of China and Soviet Central Asian republics. Sections
of the border re-opened in the late 1980s. Subsequently, following the
dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, after decades of isolation Chinese
engagement in Central Asia became possible once again.
China’s interest in Central Asia is often embodied in the popular quote
by General Liu Yazhou of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA): “Cen-
tral Asia is the thickest piece of cake given to the modern Chinese by the
heavens.”25 The “cake” was commonly viewed to represent Central Asian
hydrocarbons and other natural resources, and possibly a new emerging
market.26 However, in the three decades since the independence of the
Central Asian states, the character of Chinese engagement became much
more complicated than that defined by the extraction of natural resources
and sales of inexpensive consumer goods. China’s presence in the region is
visible through a wide range of activities, from Chinese restaurants multi-
plying in cities and Chinese language departments emerging in regional
universities, to major infrastructural projects financed by Chinese banks
and completed by Chinese companies. China’s impact on the develop-
ment of the physical infrastructure is comparable only to Russian/Soviet
efforts to create links between previously unconnected locations.
One critical factor clearly differentiates Chinese and Russian positions
in Central Asia. Security positions of the two are incomparable. First,
8 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

Russia leads the defense alliance Collective Security Treaty Organization

which includes three Central Asian states. Additionally, Russia maintains
bases and military contingent in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan. Above all,
Central Asian states are all, to varying degrees, reliant on Russian mili-
tary hardware to equip their armed forces. By contrast, China’s security
engagement in Central Asia had revolved around military exercises under
the auspices of the SCO and a single frontier outpost in a remote section
of Tajikistan.27 The exercises provided limited cooperation and experi-
ence sharing between China’s military and armed forces of the countries
in the region, but did not account for any long-term security presence
of China in Central Asia.28 Multilateral security mechanisms established
between China, Tajikistan, Afghanistan and Pakistan in 2016 remained
at nascent stages and had limited connection to the post-Soviet Central
Asia.29 China’s contemplations to build a military base in Afghanistan
near the border with Tajikistan remained in the discussion stage at the
end of 2020.30
Beijing officials insist that China’s engagement in Central Asia does
not carry any political interests and is based purely on economic consid-
erations.31 This rhetoric holds little ground because it is difficult to prove
or negate the absence of political interests in view of China’s substan-
tial economic position. At the same time, China’s engagement in Central
Asia is logical when considering Beijing’s economic interests and secu-
rity concerns in China’s western regions. According to Chinese political
theories, internal and external issues are not separable and need to be
approached in one context.32 This is not to say that western international
relations theories ignore internal factors.33 However, while Western theo-
rists tend to separate domestic and foreign considerations in foreign policy
decision-making, according to Chinese theorists, internal and external
factors are inseparable and are generally viewed in one context.34
Largely because of this perception, China’s engagement in Central
Asia is closely connected to Beijing’s considerations in Xinjiang which
is economically underdeveloped and, to a certain extent, unstable. Subse-
quently, both China’s policies in its western regions and its approaches
to Central Asia constitute components of the “March West” policy,
which implied the name-suggested direction for active engagement.35
However, outside of its borders, China’s economic considerations appar-
ently surpass security concerns.36 Subsequently, comparing the extent of
Russia and China’s security dimensions adds little to the understanding
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

of the dynamics of their respective engagement in Central Asia. Several

additional dimensions of Sino-Russian engagement deserve additional
attention.

Central Asia Through Various Lenses

A number of studies address Central Asian regional dynamics through
the prism of great power completion and energy geopolitics.37 Other
studies downplay material capabilities and analyze major powers’ perspec-
tives of the region and the role of norms in socializing Central Asian states
into cooperation.38 Several works connect Central Asia to Xinjiang and
largely exclude wider dynamics of China’s relations with its western neigh-
bors. 39 A number of more condensed studies focus explicitly on Russia’s
position in Central Asia.40 Similarly, a number of articles revolve specifi-
cally around Chinese engagement in the region.41 The analysis of major
powers’ interaction, in addition to Russia and China, generally includes
the American factor in Sino-Russian relations.42 A number of authors
place more emphasis on the domestic and intraregional security dimen-
sions of regional cooperation.43 Generally, studies focusing on major
powers’ relations and their interactions in Central Asia regard regional
institutions as foreign policy instruments of the major powers.
From a different perspective, several studies analyze Central Asian
regional cooperation through the prism of the SCO.44 Others focus on
Eurasian integration initiatives.45
To a certain extent these works may downplay the role of the material
interests in the decision-making process in the context of the SCO. Others
focus on legal mechanisms and economic aspects of the Eurasian integra-
tion initiatives. Very few revolved around the interplay between the SCO
and the Eurasian Economic Union.46 Several volumes view Central Asian
regionalism through the lens of economic activities.47 These, however,
tend to expand the discussion to wider regions of either former Soviet
Space of South Asia.
Overall, examining the intentions and activities of the major powers in
Central Asia in the context of multilateral initiatives offers a limited expla-
nation of how the former affects cooperation among the Central Asian
states. On one end of the spectrum, multilateral regional organizations
influence both internal and external economic activities in the region and
enable major powers to socialize regional states into compliance with the
former’s norms. From this perspective, economic activities may serve both
10 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

as a cause and an effect of regional cohesion. Furthermore, compliance

with the norms generated by external actors may have a twofold effect on
regional cooperation. On the other end of the spectrum of the assessment
of the effects of multilateral organization on regional cooperation is their
function of “protective integration.” According to Roy Allison,

A primary motivation for Central Asian leaders’ engagement in [multilat-

eral organizations] is the reinforcement of domestic regime security and
the resistance of ‘external’ agendas of good governance or democracy
promotion. These goals are concealed behind a discourse that denigrates
the imposition of external ‘values’ and continues to give pride of place to
national sovereignty. This offers little to overcome the underlying fractures
between states in Central Asia.48

From the first point of view, organizations initiated by the major powers
may have an unclear or a twofold effect on regional cohesion. From the
second, visibly more radical view, multilateral institutions do little for, or
even impede, regional cooperation.
Aside from security considerations, economic arrangements, and social-
ization by external actors, one additional factor plays a crucial role in
influencing regional cooperation in Central Asia. The development of a
hard infrastructure is essential for facilitating regional connectivity and
defining the ‘shape’ of the region. The initial step in the formation of the
Central Asian region was the construction of a railroad network during
the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries by Russia. Much of the
rail and automobile road network, power network, energy channels and
lines of communications laid during the Soviet period defined the direc-
tion of connectivity within Central Asia. In the post-independence years,
China’s engagement in Central Asia has been largely characterized by
financing and construction of infrastructure projects. This phenomenon
is commonly addressed in recent studies on Central Asia. However, there
is little understanding of how the contemporary engagement of the two
major powers in the infrastructural sector affects regional connectivity and
cooperation.
Evaluations of networked sectors in the infrastructure and the positions
of the main actors in the infrastructural development remain insuffi-
cient. Several of the works mentioned above address China and Russia’s
involvement in the networked sectors of the infrastructure. However,
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

their explanatory power in examining the impact of hard infrastruc-

ture on regional cooperation is limited for the following reasons. First,
the works which cover multiple sectors provide only a narrow investi-
gation of each sector and relatively constrained, if any, analysis of the
major powers’ interactions within each sector. Second, in-depth studies
of specific sectors, particularly energy do not provide an adequately
encompassing interpretation of China and Russia’s engagement in Central
Asia. Several multidisciplinary studies do examine regional connectivity
from a transnational infrastructure perspective.49 However, these works
only partially address post-Soviet Central Asia. Instead, the scope of
these studies revolves around border areas and inter-regional connections
spread through multiple parts of the Eurasian continent.
Considering these gaps in the literature base, particularly the absence of
a study examining the two major powers’ impact on Central Asian region-
alism, this book analyses networked sectors of the infrastructure. The
inquiry aims to answer how does the nature of China’s and Russia’s engage-
ment in the infrastructural sectors affect the degree of regional cooperation
among the Central Asian states?
Preliminary hypothesis suggest that Russia today is not a major facili-
tator of intraregional cooperation and in some instances actually impedes
cooperation among Central Asian states despite its role as a major engine
of regional integration during the imperial and Soviet eras. In fact, China
has emerged as the major engine of intraregional cooperation and altered
the direction of regional connectivity through increasingly focused devel-
opment of hard infrastructure and multilateral engagement with Central
Asian states.
The book intends to make three substantial contributions. First, it is
meant to enhance the overall understanding of Central Asian intraregional
politics, the role of the great powers therein, and the region’s position
within the international system. Second, the study is intended to add to
the understanding of Sino-Russian relations and the general direction of
Chinese and Russian foreign policies in the post-Cold War era. Third, the
book aims to make a contribution to the study of International Relations
by utilizing an original approach for studying regions formed by one pre-
existing major power and redefined by another, emerging, major power.
The final section of this introduction offers a brief outline of the
chapters.
12 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

Chapter Outline
Chapter 2 evaluates the capacity of key multilateral initiatives which
operate in Central Asia. The chapter aims to explore the capacity of the
regional institutions in fostering regional cooperation. The relative weak-
ness of formal regional structures highlights the key roles that China
and Russia play in terms of being facilitators or impediments to regional
cooperation. Based on the discussion of the institutions, the conclusion
suggests that Central Asian regionalism revolves around the engage-
ment of two major powers, Russia and China. The focus of the inquiry,
therefore, revolves around the regional engagement of the two major
powers.
Chapter 3 examines the regional capacity of Central Asia. It draws a
clear distinction between Central Asia and Central Eurasia. In addition
to geographic and cultural dimensions, the chapter evaluates implications
of security, identity and interdependence in Central Asian region. The
chapter continues with the analysis of constraints to regional cooperation
pertinent to Central Asia and outlines a visible declining trend in regional
cooperation. The closing section identifies the dominant role of infras-
tructure in facilitating regional cooperation, maintaining connectivity and
defining the format of the region.
Chapter 4 evaluates Sino-Russian interactions in the financial sphere.
Considering the key role of funds in the completion of large-scale infras-
tructure projects, the chapter examines China’s and Russia’s position
within the existing multilateral institutions and their attitudes toward
potential multilateral lenders.
Chapters 5, 6 and 7 analyze the nature of the two major powers’
engagement in the networked infrastructural sectors, which have a
capacity to influence regional cooperation and connectivity. The three
sectors are transportation, energy and telecommunications. The respec-
tive chapters examine Chinese and Russian activities in the regulatory
fields of each sector and their involvement in the completion of physical
infrastructure projects.
The Conclusion draws together the arguments of the empirical chap-
ters and explains how the nature of Chinese and Russian engagement in
the infrastructural sector in Central Asia affects the degree of regional
cooperation among the Central Asian states.
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

Notes
1. Diener, Alexander, C. “Parsing Mobilities in Central Eurasia: Border
Management and New Silk Roads”, Eurasian Geography and Economics,
2015, 56, 4, (2015), 376-404.
2. Cooley, Alexander, Great Games, Local Rules. The New Great Power
Contest in Central Asia, New York: Oxford University Press, 2012.
3. With the exception of Tajiks, all the titular nations are of Turkic origin.
4. Nye, Joseph, (ed), International Regionalism: Readings, Introduction,
Boston: Little, Brown and Company, 1968, vii.
5. Kassenova, Nargis, “Kazakhstan and Eurasian Economic Integra-
tion: Quick Start, Mixed Results and Uncertain Future,” Centre
Russie/Nei.Reports, No. 14, November 2012, 9.
Cooley, 2012, 150.
6. These include the Economic Cooperation Organization (ECO), United
Nations Social Economic Commission for Asia Pacific (UN-ESCAP),
the Special Program for the Economies of Central Asia (SPECA) and
the Central Asia Regional Economic Cooperation (CAREC) at Asian
Development Bank.
7. Eurasian Economic Community served as a base for the Eurasian Customs
Union, which in turn was transformed into Eurasian Economic Union.
8. Kerr, David, “Central Asian and Russian perspective on China’s strategic
emergence,” International Affairs, 86, 1, (2010), 127–152.
9. Acharya, Amitav, “Comparative Regionalgism: A Field Whose Time Has
Come?” The International Spectator, 47, 1, March 2012, 3.
10. Acharya, 2012.
11. Barisitz, Stephan, Central Asia and the Silk Road. Economic Rise and
Decline over Several Millennia (2017), Cham: Springer International
Publishing, 249.
12. Barisitz, 63.
13. Morrison, Alexander, “Russia Colonial Allergy”, Eurasianet, December
19, 2016, https://eurasianet.org/node/81726.
14. Barisitz, 249.
15. Newton, Francis, “Soviet Central Asia: Economic Progress and Problems”,
Middle Eastern Studies, 12, 3, 1976, 87–104.
16. Golden, Peter, Central Asia in World History, New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011, p. 132.
17. Morrison, Alexander, “Stalin’s Giant Pencil: Debunking a Myth About
Central Asia’s Borders”, Eurasianet, February 13, 2017, https://eurasi
anet.org/node/82376.
18. Fuller, Graham E., “The Emergence of Central Asia”, Foreign Policy, 78,
Spring 1990, 67.
14 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

19. Golden, Peter, Central Asia in World History, New York: Oxford Univer-
sity Press, 2011.
20. Gleason, Abbot, “Eurasia: What Is It? Is it?” Journal of Eurasian Studies,
1, (2010), 31.
21. Krausse, Alexis, Russia in Asia. A Record and a Study, 1558–1899, Leiden:
Global Oriental, 2012.
Author’s interview, Bishkek, February 15, 2016.
22. The terms “Eastern Turkestan”, “Chinese Turkestan” and “Xinjiang”
are used interchangeably without intention of any political connotation.
Different terms reflect their common usage during particular time periods
addressed in the text.
23. Barisitz, 258–264.
24. Clarke, Michael and Mackerras, Colin (Eds.), China, Xinjiang and
Central Asia: History, Transition and Crossborder Interaction into the
Twenty-First Century, New York: Routlege, 2009.
25. China in Central Asia Website (n.d.), http://chinaincentralasia.com/,
accessed March 2, 2018.
26. Pannier, Bruce, “What’s China’s Game in Central Asia?” Radio Free
Europe Radio Liberty, January 21, 2014, https://www.rferl.org/a/china-
game-central-asia/25237453.html.
Wong, Edward, “China Quietly Extends Footprints into Central Asia”,
The New York Times, January 2, 2011, https://www.nytimes.com/2011/
01/03/world/asia/03china.html.
27. Lemon, Edward J., “China, Russia and Security in Central Asia”, Rising
Powers in Global Governance project, February 26, 2018, http://risingpow
ersproject.com/china-russia-security-central-asia/
28. Haas, Marcel de, “War Games of the Shanghai Cooperation Organization
and the Collective Security Organization: Drill on Move!” The Journal of
Slavic Military Studies, 29, 3, 2016, 378–406.
29. “China Joins Afghanistan, Pakistan, Tajikistan in Security Alliance”,
Reuters, August 4, 2016, https://www.reuters.com/article/us-china-sec
urity-idUSKCN10F1A6.
30. Abbas, Haider, “China Making Military Bases in Afghanistan and Iran,”
Muslim Mirror, September 21, 2020, www.muslimmirror/eng/eng/
china-making-military-bases-in-afghanistan-and-iran/
31. Author’s Interview, Beijing, October 28, 2015.
32. Ye Zicheng, “The Cultural and Historical Origin of Chinese Diplomacy”,
Carnegie-Tsinghua Center Event: How traditional culture shapes Chinese
diplomacy, December 15, 2015, Beijing.
33. Putnam, Robert D., “Diplomacy and Domestic Politics: The Logic of
Two-Level Games”, International Organizations, 42, 3, Summer 1988,
427–460.
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

34. Ye Zicheg; Li, Lifang, “The SCO and How Chinese Foreign Policy Works.
The Global Influence of its Central Asia Policy”, in Michael Fredhold
(ed.) The Shanghai Cooperation Organization and Eurasian Geopolitics.
Direction, Perspectives, and Challenges. Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of
Asian Studies, 2013, 152-161.
35. Sun, Yun, “March West: China’s Response to the U.S. Rebalancing”,
Brookings, January 31, 2013, https://www.brookings.edu/blog/up-
front/2013/01/31/march-west-chinas-response-to-the-u-s-rebalanci
ng/.
36. Shea, Dennis C., “China’s Energy Engagement with Central Asia and
Implications for the United States” Hearing on the “Development
of Energy Resource in Central Asia”, United States Congress, May
21, 2015, https://docs.house.gov/meetings/FA/FA14/20140521/102
248/HHRG-113-FA14-Wstate-SheaD-20140521.pdf.
37. Cooley, 2012; Fingar, 2016; Marketos, 2009; Laruelle (et al.), 2011.
38. Godehardt, 2014; Kavalski, Emilian, 2010; Kavalski, 2012.
39. Karrar, 2009; Clarke and Mackerras, 2009.
40. Kerr, 2010; Lo Bobo, 2015; Spechler, M. and Spechler, D., 2010.
41. MacHaffie, 2010; Sheives, 2006; Zhao, Huasheng, May/June 2013.
42. Weitz, 2003; Wishnick, 2009; Ziegler, 2013; Xu, Zhengyuan, 2010);
Zabortseva, 2012.
43. Allison, Roy, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structure and Regime Secu-
rity in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, 27, 2, 2008, 185–202,
185.
Bohr, Annette, “Regionalism in Central Asia: New Geopolitics, Old
Regional Order”, International Affairs, 80, 3, May 2004, 485–502.
Bohr, Annette, “Central Asia: Responding to the Multi-vector Game,”
in R. Niblett (ed) America and a Changed World: A Question of
Leadership, Wiley-Blackwell/Chatham House, 2010, pp.109–24.
44. Aris, 2011; Fredhold, 2013; Akiner, 2010; Naarajarvi, 2012; Wang,
Jianwei, 2007; Ziegler, 2013.
45. Dragneva, Wolczuk, 2012; Dragneva and Wolczuk, 2017; Kassenova,
2012; Vinokurov and Libman, 2012; Libman and Vinokurov; 2012;
Shumylo-Tapiola, 2014; Wang Li Jiu, 2012.
46. Li, Xin, 2011; Wang, LiJiu, 2011; Gatev and Diesen, 2016.
47. Vinokurov and Libman, 2012; Libman and Vinokurov; 2012; Laruelle
and Peyrouse, 2013.
48. Allison, Roy, “Virtual Regionalism, Regional Structure and Regime Secu-
rity in Central Asia”, Central Asian Survey, 27, 2, 2008, 185-202,
185.
49. Walcott, Susan M. and Corey Johnson (Eds.), Eurasian Corridors of
Interconnection, New York: Routledge, 2014.
16 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

Overland, Indra, Heidi Kjaernet and Andrea Kendall-Taylor (Eds.),

Caspian Energy Politics: Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan, New
York: Routlege, 2010.

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Relations and SCO,” Contemporary International Relations, 22, 2 (2011),
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February 2009, http://www.StrategicStudiesInstitute.army.mil/
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world/asia/03china.html
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Various Approaches to Regionalism in Central Asia”, Connections, 9, 4, Fall
2010, 37–52
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20 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

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 CHAPTER 2

Central Asia as a Region

Regions may be viewed through the prisms of cooperation, security or

identity.1 According to Joseph Nye, a region is “a limited number of states
linked together by a geographical relationship and by a degree of mutual
interdependence.”2 For Buzan and Wever, a region can be viewed as the
“the level where states or other units link together sufficiently closely
that their securities cannot be considered separate from each other.”3
According to Fawcett, a region, similarly to a nation, can be seen as an
“imagined community” in which “people [are] held together by common
experience and identity, customs and practice.”4 Geographic proximity
among Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan
is evident with each bordering at least two other states. Mutual interde-
pendence may have decreased, but at the time of the dissolution of the
Soviet Union, in 1991, the five states were part of the same economic
system and had shared transportation and energy networks. Hence, at
least in the last decade of the twenties century, post-Soviet Central Asia
could be considered a region. Furthermore, the security dynamics among
the five states are tightly intertwined, considering that three of them, i.e.
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, belong to a Russia-led defense
alliance, and Uzbekistan, with the most powerful military, is practically
surrounded by the rest. Hence, even if the level of mutual interdepen-
dence among the five states has been decreasing, the security dimension

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 21

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2022
P. Krasnopolsky, China, Russia and Central Asian Infrastructure,
Palgrave Series in Asia and Pacific Studies,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-4254-9_2
22 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

alone grants post-Soviet Central Asia a status of a region. Furthermore,

based on the common identity definition, Central Asia will remain a
region until the generation that grew up before the dissolution of the
Soviet Union becomes insignificant.
The opening section of the chapter draws a distinction between Central
Asia and adjacent geographic spaces and is followed by the discussion
of the region’s characteristics from the perspective of security, identity,
and interdependence. The subsequent section identifies the constraints
to regional cooperation. The following part draws elements from various
schools of thought to identify the concepts utilized for the analytical
framework of the book. In this part, the first section identifies the Central
Asian region from the perspective of the new regionalism framework. The
second section explains the critical role of transnational infrastructure.
The final sections identify how key principles of the social constructivism
approach are used for understanding interactions between Central Asian
states and major powers.

Which Region? Central Asia vs. Central Eurasia

In this work Central Asian region is bound by the borders of the five
countries rather than a wider geographical space in the center of the
Eurasian landmass. The state-based definition of the region is more
suitable, compared with other social science frameworks which focus
on cultural, anthropological and ethnographic approaches, and allocate
less importance to state borders. Subsequently, five-state post-Central
Asia, consisting of Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan and
Uzbekistan, is distinct from other commonly used terms such as Greater
Central Asia or Central Eurasia. The distinction between the two terms
lies in the debate whether the subject constitutes the center or the
periphery of the continental international system. Greater Central Asia
highlights the key historical role played by the area where land empires
met and clashed.5 Central Eurasia suggests political centrality for the
geographical center of the Eurasian landmass.6 Eurasia is also a term
commonly used in the studies of the post-Soviet space.7 Nevertheless,
there is a clear distinction between the five-state region, which is the
subject of this book, and the more encompassing geographic area, regard-
less of whether it is called Central Eurasia or Greater Central Asia. The
first term is utilized for comparison.
 2 CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGION 23

The Central Eurasia, in addition to the five Central Asian states,

incorporates the territory encompassing Mongolia, northern Afghanistan,
the South Caucasus, parts of Iran, much of Turkey, parts of southern
Russia including Northern Caucasus and Volga regions, and parts of
Western China, including Tibet, but more so Xinjiang. However, the five-
state Post-Soviet Central Asian region, or Central Asia, is distinct from
the Central Eurasia. This distinction begins with geography, an essen-
tial element of any definition of a region. The boundaries of physical
geography, however, need to be viewed in juxtaposition with the polit-
ical boundaries which define the international system. It is common to
assign specific qualities to Central Eurasia based on geographic location.
However, “geographic regions are not naturally given… [They] rather
gain meaning through political action and political articulation, which
is why regions are regarded first and foremost, as political entities.”8
There are certain clear natural geographic barriers separating Central Asia
from the neighboring states and territories. In the west, the Caspian Sea
separates Central Asia from the Caucasus and Turkey. In the east Altai,
Taishan and Pamir mountain ranges separate Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and
Tajikistan from China. In particular, the mountain passes between China
and Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan are located at considerably high altitudes.
Admittedly, in the south, Tajikistan, Uzbekistan and Turkmenistan have
few natural barriers, other than the river Amudarya, to separate them
from Afghanistan. However, the Hindu Kush Mountain range in central
Afghanistan separates Central Asia from South Asia. Considering this,
northern Afghanistan, populated by ethnic Tajiks, Uzbeks and Turkmens,
can arguably be considered a part of Central Asia. However, Afghanistan
has been politically detached from the “Russian-Soviet” Central Asia for
over one hundred years, since the Anglo-Russian Entente of 1907. This
treaty marked the conclusion of the so-called Great Game, a term used to
define the rivalry for the sphere of influence between the Russian Empire
and the United Kingdom and the British Raj. The contemporary era
hostilities in Afghanistan never really crossed the Amudarya River to spill
into the Soviet Union or into the post-Soviet Central Asia. Near-absence
of transnational infrastructure to connect Post-Soviet Central Asia with its
southern neighbor Afghanistan highlights physical disconnection between
the region and Afghanistan.
In the north of Central Asia, vast empty arid areas of land provide a
natural barrier between southern Kazakhstan, which is commonly viewed
as “Central Asian,” from northern Kazakhstan, which has been more
24 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

closely connected with Russia from the times of the Russian Empire. Even
during the Soviet era, northern Kazakhstan had more significant interde-
pendence with Russia, while the infrastructure of southern Kazakhstan
was closely linked to its southern Central Asian neighbors. Neverthe-
less, considering the state-based analysis of regional cooperation, the
whole state of Kazakhstan must be included in the Central Asian region.
Furthermore, there are natural barriers within Central Asian states, such
as the above-mentioned steppes of Kazakhstan, deserts of Turkmenistan
and Uzbekistan and mountain ranges serving as strong internal divides in
Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan. However, the infrastructure built during the
Soviet era enabled states to overcome these natural internal barriers.
In addition to geography, the historic legacy of the continental empires
or trade route networks is also commonly used to assign Central Eurasia
a certain degree of unity.9 One view suggests that “divergences among
the natural, ethnic, cultural, and linguistic conditions and current reali-
ties of Central Asian countries are than balanced by their commonalities.
These are sufficiently strong to warrant our considering Greater Central
Asia a region with its own dynamic, needs, and possibilities.”10 However,
the notion that thousands of years of shared history provide grounds for
shared regional identity oversimplifies complex changes undergone by the
international system in modern history. Placing Mongolia and Uzbekistan
in one region simply because they were part of the Mongol Empire some
eight hundred years ago is similar to lumping together Tunis and Spain
because they both once belonged to the Roman Empire. The diversity
of Central Eurasia makes it challenging to clearly define its boundaries.
Diversity within also makes it challenging to pinpoint a common identity
among the alleged elements of Central Eurasia. However, this identity is
crucial for the definition of the region as an “imagined community” in
which “people [are] held together by common experience and identity,
customs and practice.”11
Geographic and political barriers translate into cultural dissonance.
These cultural differences are evident without needing detailed ethno-
graphic research. For instance, it is hardly possible to envision close rela-
tions between nomadic or city-dwelling Mongolians, whether Buddhist
or secular, to relate to Christian or secular Armenians or too conserva-
tive Muslims of Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Mongolian is not a Turkic
language; neither is Armenian, Georgian, Persian, Tajik or Pashtu. There
are no common borders between Mongolia and any of the Central Asian
states; subsequently, there is a very limited transnational movement of
 2 CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGION 25

people. In the case of Afghanistan, the borders with the three Central
Asian states do not imply significant cross-border interactions aside from
illicit activities, such as arms and drug trafficking.12 Moreover, while
connections along ethnic and linguistic lines are strong within Central
Asia, they are much laxer with related neighboring groups in adjacent
countries. Afghans’ national and ethnic identity, even if they are ethnic
Tajiks or Uzbeks, is distinct from that of their northern neighbors.
A similar situation exists in Iran which hosts sizeable ethnic minori-
ties related to several Central Asian nationalities. Furthermore, the main
Turkic peoples of Central Asia (i.e. Kazakhs, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Turk-
mens) are culturally distant from other large Turkic groups outside the
region, for instance, Turks in Turkey and Uighurs in China. Central
Asian ease of association with Azerbaijanis, who are Turkic, is an excep-
tion that occurs through shared Soviet identity. Moreover, even the
same ethnic groups who reside on different sides of the former Soviet
borders have developed divergent identities after years of isolation. For
example, Uighurs in Kyrgyzstan use Russian as a native language and are
viewed as a Russian-speaking minority; they know little about Chinese
Turkestan (Xinjiang). Concurrently, Uighur people in China are aware
of their Turkic neighbors, but have very limited connection with them
since much of the border between the USSR and China was sealed from
the 1940s until the early 1990s. As a result, shared ethnic ties between
Central Asian people and various peoples outside of the former Soviet
space do not easily translate into transnational activities along the ethnic
and religious lines. Solidarity of Turkic Muslims of Central Asia with
Xinjiang Uighur, or between Tajiks of Tajikistan and Tajiks of Afghanistan
is based on higher values but offers limited cultural and social cohesion.
In contrast, an over a century-long Russian-Soviet influence defined the
degree of connectivity among the five Central Asian republics by rein-
forcing external boundaries, overcoming internal physical barriers and
forging shared identity. Soviet influence enabled Central Asia to emerge
as a coherent region at the time of independence. The following section
evaluates this influence in the quest to determine the subsequent direction
of Central Asia’s development as a region.
26 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

Implications from Security, Identity

and Interdependence on the Central Asian Region
Aside from geography, the key regional dimensions of Central Asia
include security, interdependence and identity. Technically, Russia has
been directly responsible for security in the region.13 It was not until
the second decade of the millennium, that China’s security role in its
western neighborhood has become noticeable in the context of the SCO.
However, considering China’s sensitivity in recognizing Russia’s domi-
nant security position, Sino-Russian security dynamics with regard to
Central Asia are still a non-issue. In the highly unlikely scenario of China
asserting itself as the main security player in the post-Soviet Central Asia,
the implications may be grave, considering the history of Sino-Russian
conflict in the Far East. In the second decade of the millennia, as Sino-
Russia relations grew strongest since the foundation of the PRC, the
situation of open Sino-Russian rivalry in Central Asia is purely hypothet-
ical. Nevertheless, China’s potential security role in Central Asia cannot
be ignored.
The two major powers can be viewed as, so-called, intertwined actors,
embedded “in a complex web of relations.”14 In this regard, China and
Russia can be considered as not only parts of Central Asia, but also as
substantive parts of other regions with which they border. By acting
as intertwined actors, both China and Russia can alter the direction of
regional cooperation in Central Asia. Whether Central Asia is consid-
ered central or peripheral, the role of external forces on the shape of the
region cannot be underestimated. As regions emerge as a result of external
perceptions about them, the “multiplicity of international actors has been
involved in packaging and repacking the geographical and geopolitical
ramifications of Central Asia.”15
Arguably, despite a number of other external state actors present is
Central Asia, only Russia and China have the capacity to act as inter-
twined actors. The USA is too far away and it is intertwined in too
many other regions to leave an indelible mark. American policy in Central
Asia has also been inconsistent and ill-defined. Regional powers in the
proximity of Central Asia have also had a limited degree of engagement.
India’s participation in Central Asian affairs has been minimal and visibly
disproportional to India’s aspiration for the major (or great) power status,
and ambitions in the Indian Ocean rim and in South East Asia. India’s
attempts to project its influence in Central Asia have been very limited due
 2 CENTRAL ASIA AS A REGION 27

to the lack of clear vision and sound foreign policy for the region.16 Iran’s
involvement in Central Asia relies on ethnic and linguistic connectivity
with Tajikistan, which facilitates Iranian investments in the impoverished
country, and pragmatic cooperation with Turkmenistan, with which Iran
shares a lengthy border.17 Turkey’s engagement in Central Asia was
distracted by Turkey’s focus on gaining EU membership and by the
Central Asian state’s aversion to the Turkish model of democracy and the
emergence of a “new older brother” under the auspices of pan-Turkism.18
Subsequently, with the present state of the international system, only
China and Russia have the capacity to significantly alter the shape of the
Central Asian region. The two engage in the regions as more than just
outsiders possess the capacity to influence perceptions of the region and
the direction of the regional network.
Aside from security the other key dimensions of Central Asian region
are identity, interdependence and infrastructure. Before Russia’s impe-
rial expansion west of the Caspian, the concept of ‘statehood’ and of
‘nationhood’ was basically non-existent in Central Asia, arguably with the
exception of areas in the oasis cities of modern-day Uzbekistan.19 The
Russian Empire initiated nation-building in Central Asia, however, before
any coherent ‘Russian’ identity could be projected, the Communist Party
came to power. The Soviet Union was established and a ‘Soviet” identity
was promptly imposed on the people of Central Asia through media and
educational policies.20

No people or nation that passed through the crucible of the Soviet expe-
rience has escaped its powerful influence. […] The Muslim peoples of
Central Asia were sped through a peculiar and disruptive process of nation-
building under Russian-Soviet aegis, and their future trajectory will long
show its effects.21

After the dissolution of the Soviet Union, most the other former Soviet
republics took steps to return to their respected pre-Soviet national iden-
tities. However, for the Central Asian states, such a move was hardly
possible. Independence did not lead to “a return or revival of earlier forms
and symbols of independent statehood.”22 As a result, states attempted
to develop new forms of nationhood. The direction and characteris-
tics of these attempts varied substantially, although arguably the Soviet
or Russian-speaking identity remained the only form of identity shared
throughout the whole Central Asian region.
28 P. KRASNOPOLSKY

Another critical dimension of Central Asia as a region is interdepen-

dence, which was relatively strong at the time of the dissolution of the
USSR in 1991. Before their independence, the five republics had been
parts of one country where republican borders served purely adminis-
trative purposes. The units were all part of one economic system where
transportation, power, energy and telecommunication networks traversed
Central Asia unencumbered by administrative boundaries. Natural barriers
were overcome through the development of hard infrastructure. As such,
infrastructure served a key role to facilitate interdependence in Central
Asia. In addition to interdependence, infrastructure contributed to the
development of shared identity by connecting educational and cultural
urban centers and peripheral areas among the five states.
Education, culture, radio transmissions, print media and other carriers
of ideas require mediums, such as electricity, railways and telegraph cables
in order to function. The crucial role of hard infrastructure in Central Asia
is visible through a somewhat far-stretching, but relevant example from
across the Taishan mountain range. Visibly, the Russian Empire and the
Soviet Union achieved in Central Asia (Western Turkestan) the stability
that neither the Qing Court nor the Republic of China had managed
to achieve in Xinjiang (Eastern Turkestan). Granted, the turbulent years
of Dongguan revolt and two Eastern Turkestan republics in Xinjiang
were matched to a degree by the havoc of Basmachi period in Central
Asia, but at the end of the first half of the twentieth century Central
Asia emerged as stable and undisputed, even if a somewhat underdevel-
oped part of the Soviet Union. Meanwhile across the Taishan range, the
People’s Republic of China is still struggling with stability in Xinjiang.
Nation-building policies and economic development can only go as far
as hard infrastructure can take them.23 More than three decades after
the independence, infrastructure continues to play a key role in main-
taining interdependence among the Central Asian states, even while the
level of this interdependence gradually declined. Therefore, the focus of
this study, i.e. the evaluation of the effects of China’s and Russia’s engage-
ment on Central Asian regional cooperation, is conducted through the
examination of their involvement in networked sectors of hard infrastruc-
ture. The next section outlines general constraints which have prevented
cooperation among Central Asian states and subsequently decreased their
level of interdependence.
Another random document with
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William of Bauier duke of Holland, whiche was lawfull wife to
Ihon duke of Brabant then liuyng. Which mariage was not
onely woundered at of the common people but also detested
of the nobilitie, and abhorred of the clergie. But suerly the
swete tast, of this plasant mariage, brought after a sower
sauce, bothe to the amorous housbande and to the wanton
wife. Hall.
[723] Feends. N.
[724] So in editions 1578, 87, and Niccols, but appears a
misprint for convicted.
[725] With. N.
[726] Was. N.
[727] Could wake. N.
[728] Of my false foes. N.
[729] A parliament was somoned to be kept at Bery, whether
resorted all the peres of the realme, and emongest them the
duke of Gloucester, whiche on the second daie of the session
was by the lord Beamonde, then highe constable of Englande,
accompanied with the duke of Buckyngham, and other,
arrested, apprehended, and put in warde, and all his
seruauntes sequestred from hym, and xxxii. of the chiefe of
his retinue, were sente to diuerse prisons, to the greate
admiracion of the common people. The duke the night after
hys emprisonement, was found dedde in his bed, and his body
shewed to the lordes and commons, as thoughe he had died
of a palsey or empostome: but all indifferent persons well
knewe that he died of no natural death, but of some violent
force. Hall.
[730] The vnsure. 1578.
[731] They lyue in. 1578.
[732] G. Ferrers. N.
[733] Both the realmes. 1578.
[734] Were the chiefe workers. 1578.
[735] Whan thys was sayd: “Let kyng Jamy go,” quod mayster
Ferrers, “and retourn we to our owne story, and se what
broyles wer among the nobylyty in the kynge’s mynorytye.
How that cardinall Bewford malygneth the estate of good duke
Humfrey the kynge’s vncle and protector of the realme, and by
what driftes he first banisheth his wife from him. And lastly
howe the good duke is murderously made away through
conspiracy of queene Margaret and other: both whose
tragedyes I entend at leysure to declare, for they be notable.”
“Do so, I pray you,” quod another, “but take hede ye demurre
not vpon them. And I to be occupyed the meane tyme, wyll
shew what I haue noted in the duke of Suffolke’s doynges, one
of the chefest of duke Humfrey’s destroyers, who, &c.” 1563,
71. See p. 111, note 1.
[736] Notable death, which he may lament after thys maner.
1559, 63.
[737] And sayling. 1571, 75.
[738] Lord, omitted. 1578.
[739] And procuringe the death of Duke Humfrey of Glocester,
protector of England. 1578.
[740] Anno 1450. added 1571. Anno Dom. N.
[741] Banysht, headed so, and drowned. 1559, 63.
[742] Wherfore good Baldwin. 1578.
[743]

And therfore, Baldwyn, fro thy grave of gryefe

Reiect me not, of wretched prynces chief. 1559, 63.

[744] Or. 1559, 63.

[745] Good hap wyth vyces cannot long agree. 1559, 63.
[746] I am the prynce duke Wyllyam. 1559, 63.
[747] That was so famous in. 1559, 63.
[748] Whose vertuous paynes. 1559, 63.
[749] The. 1559.
[750] Luckly. N.
[751] Though Burgoyne duke had then the praise of all. N.
[752] Ere. N.
[753] Of. 1578.
[754] Help need to sue. N.
[755] And a princely. N.
[756] Heire. N.
[757] And of. 1578.
[758] Hated it. N.
[759] Gaine. N.
[760] Whom. 1559, 63, 71, 78.
[761] Should. 1578.
[762] Deeds. N.
[763] To have. 1559, 63, 71, 75, 78.
[764] The queene, whiche entierly loued the duke, fearynge
that some commocion and trouble might ryse, if he were let
goo vnpuneshed, caused hym to be committed to the towre,
where he was kepte with as muche pleasure as he that was at
large, and oute of all captiuitie. But after that a monethe was
expyred, she ymagenynge the people to bee pacifyed with this
open emprysonment, caused hym both to be deliuered, and
also to be restored to the kynge’s fauour and grace, as muche
as euer he was before that tyme. But this doynge incensed the
furye of the mutable commons, muche more then before:
openly demounsynge and saiyng, that it was a shame to all
the realme, to se such a persone, infected with so many
mysdedes, either to rule about a prince or be had in honor. Of
these wordes sprang dedes, and of this talkyng rose
displeasure, whiche had growen to greate mischiefe, if
politique prouision had not, with all celeritye, resisted the first
fury: for the commons in sundry places of the realme
assembled together, gathered great companies, and elected a
capytayn, whom they called blew berde: but or they had
attempted any enterprise, their headdes were apprehended
and so the members sodainly were dispersed, without any
hurte committed, or perpetrated. Hall.
[765] To adiourne. 1559, 63, 71, 75, 78.
[766]

As I was saylyng toward the coast of Fraunce,

The earle of Deuonshyre’s barke, of lytle pryce. 1559,
63.
[767] Whose captayne toke me by hys valyaunce. 1559, 63.
[768] But led me with hym into. 1559, 63.
[769] Where whan he had recounted me my. 1559, 63.
[770] In causyng. 1559, 63.
[771] On the edge wherof my. 1559, 63.
[772] Fortune wold not, that this flagitious person, shoulde so
escape, for when he shipped in Suffolke, entendynge to be
transported into Fraunce, he was encontered with a shippe of
warre appertaininge to the duke of Excester, the constable of
the towre of London, called the Nicholas of the Toure. The
capitaine of the same barke with small fighte, entered into the
duke’s shippe, and perceiuynge his person present, brought
hym to Douer rode, and there on the one syde of a cocke
bote, caused his heade to be striken of, and left hys body with
the heade vpon the sandes of Douer, whiche corse was there
founde by a chapelayne of his, and conuaied to Wyngfelde
colledge in Suffolke, and there buried. This ende had William
de la Pole, first duke of Suffolke, as men iudge, by God’s
punishment: for aboue all thynges he was noted to be the very
organ, engine, and deuiser of the destrucion of Humfrey the
good duke of Gloucester, and so the bloudde of the innocente
man was with his dolorous deathe, recompensed and
punished. Hall.
[773]

A pyteous ende, and therefore, Baldwyn, warne

All pyers and prynces, to abhorre vntroth,
For vycyous grayne must cum to fowl endes barne:
Who brueth breach of lawfull bond or oth,
God wyll ere long, cause all the world to loth:
Was neuer prynce that other dyd oppresse
Vnryghteously, but dyed in distresse. 1559, 63.

[774] Initials added in ed. 1571. W. Baldwine. N.

[775] Wycked man so maruaylously well punyshed. 1559, 63.
[776] Cade beinge but base borne, of no abylytye. 1559, 63.
[777] The passage in brackets added 1571.
[778] Naming himselfe Mortimer, added. 1571.
[779] In June Anno, 1450, added. 1571.
[780] Shall I it fortune call. N.
[781] Lifte. 1578. Rais’d. N.
[782] Vp, added. 1571.
[783] Or strength of stars, which make men high to growe?
1578.
[784] Ere. N.
[785] The will. N.
[786] Be stout. N.
[787] The grace. N.
[788] So. 1559, 63.
[789] Grace be giuen to some man. N.
[790] Yet fewe there be ’mongst men that vse it can. N.
[791] The spirit weake, and will strong. N.
[792] Comes. N.
[793] For fortune is the only foe of those. N.
[794]

Wherefore I thought to be my prince’s mate,

And by some meane his power to abate:
And for that ends Mortimer would be nam’de,
Heyre apparant of England once proclaym’de. 1578.

[795] Because the Kentishe-men be impatient in wronges,

disdainyng of to much oppression and euer desirous of new
chaung, and new fangelnes; the ouerture of this matter was
put furthe firste in Kent, and to the entente that it should not be
knowen that the duke of Yorke or his frendes were the cause
of the sodaine risyng: a certaine yong man of a goodely
stature, and pregnaunt wit, was entised to take vpon hym the
name of Ihon Mortimer allthoughe his name were Iohn Cade.
Hall.
[796] As our enemies. 1578.
[797] Trap. 1559. Tray. 1563. To tary sought. 1578. To stay
him. N.
[798] T’imprison. N.
[799] The, omitted. 1578.
[800] Thynges after my desyer. 1559, 63.
[801] Th’heape. N.
[802] Vpon the thyrde daye of Julii, he caused syr James
Fynes, lorde Say, and threasorer of England, to be broughte to
the Gylde-halle of London, and there to be arrayned: whiche
beyng before the kynge’s iustices put to answere, desyred to
be tryed by his peers, for the lengar delay of his life. The
capytaine perceiuynge hys dilatorie ple, by force took hym
from the officers, and brought him to the standard in Cheape,
and there before his confession ended, caused his head to be
cut of, and pitched it on a hyghe poole, which was openly
borne before him through the stretes. And this cruell tyraunt
not content with the murder of the lorde Say, wente to Myle
ende, and there apprehended syr James Cromer, then shreue
of Kent, and sonne in law to the said lorde Say, and him
without confession or excuse hearde, caused there like wise
to be hedded, and his heade to bee fixed on a poole, and with
these two heddes, this bloody butcher entered into the cytie
agayn, and in despite caused them in euery strete kysse
together, to the greate detestacion of all the beholders. Hall.
[803] And into Sussex rode, all hope was lost. N.
[804] Apprehend. corrected by ed. 1578, all the others read
apprend.
[805] Made men. 1559.
[806] But ere I fell I put. N.
[807] For two longe howres, our combat. 1578.
[808] A gentylman of Kent named Alexander Iden, awayted so
his tyme, that he toke hym in a gardyn in Sussex, where in the
takynge of hym the sayd Iak was slayne: and so beyng deed
was brought into Southwarke the —— day of the moneth of
September, and there lefte in the Kynge’s Benche for that
nyght. And vpon morowe the deed corps was drawen through
the hyghe stretes of the cytie vnto Newgate, and there hedyd
and quarteryd, whose hede was than sent to London brydge
and his iiii quarters were sent to iiii sondry townes of Kent.
Fabyan.
[809] Debities. 1559, 63, 71.
[810] Still, restored from ed. 1563. It is omitted in all those
subsequent.
[811] As, omitted. 1578.
[812] The lord. 1559, 63.
[813] And therefore. 1559, 63. Wherefore, O Baldwine. N.
[814] Must know his state, and. 1578.
[815]

Who lyst to stand at large,

Must folowe skyll, and flye all worldly charge. 1559, 63.

This legend is subscribed W. Baldwine, by Niccols.

[816] Q. for quoth. 1559, 63.
[817] Howe vpryghtly also and howe lyke. 1559, 63.
[818] Determined the office both of magistrates and subiects.
For in deede magistrates. 1578.
[819] Wycked ende. 1559, 63. Shal neuer see good end of hys
attempt. 1578.
[820] Q. 1559, 63.
[821] Nay rather let. 1559, 63.
[822] “Marched towarde London: but the kyng with his power
taried and met him at Saint Albone’s. Where whyle the kyng
and he wer about a treatye, therle of Warwyke set vpon the
king’s army and slew the duke of Somerset, the earle of
Northumberland, the lorde Clyfforde, and other, and in
conclusyon got the victorye, and the duke was made lorde
protector, which so greved the quene and her accomplices,
that pryuye grutches and open dissemblyng neuer ceased tyl
the duke, and his allyes were glad to flee the field and realme,
he in to Irelande, they to Calayes: whence they came agayne
with an army whereof the earle of Salysbury was leader, and
marched toward Coventry wher the king than was and had
gathered an armye to subdue them, and encountred them at
Northampton, and fought and lost the fyelde and was taken
hym selfe, the duke of Buckyngham, the erle of Shrewsbury,
the vycount Beaumont, the lord Egermount, and many other of
his retynue slayn yf no man haue any mind to any of these
noble personages because they were honourably slaine in
battayle, let sum man els take the booke, for I mynde to say
sum what of this duke of Somerset.”
☞ Whyle he was deuysyng thereon, and every man sekyng
farder notes, I loked on the cronicles, and fyndyng styll fyeld
vpon fyeld, and many noblemen slaine, I purposed to haue
ouerpassed all, for I was so wearye that I waxed drowsye and
began in dede to slumber: but my imaginacion styl
prosecutyng this tragical matter, brought me such a fantasye.
Me thought ther stode before vs, a tall man’s body full of
fresshe woundes, but lackyng a head, holdyng by the hande a
goodlye chylde, whose brest was so wounded that his hart
might be seen, his louely face and eyes disfigured with
dropping teares, his heare through horrour standing vpryght,
his mercy crauing handes all to be mangled, and al his body
enbrued with his own bloud. And whan through the gastfulnes
of this pyteous spectacle, I waxed afeard, and turned away my
face, me thought there came a shrekyng voyse out of the
wesand pype of the headles bodye, saying as foloweth. 1559,
63. See Induction to the legend of Plantagenet Duke of York,
p. 183.
[823] Was raysed by some sly drift of the duke of Yorke, who
shortly after, by open war, manifested his title to the crowne
and therefore gathered an army in Wales, and marched
towardes London: and preuentinge the kinge goinge
northward to prepare an army, in the waye at Sayncte
Albanes: who for want of a sufficient power to take the field,
was forced with sutch smal power as he had about him, to
defend the lanes and backsydes of the towne, and to send out
the duke of Buckingham for a treaty, whiche the duke of Yorke
beinge head of the contrary faction, woulde not allow without
fyrst hauinge the duke of Somerset and other at his will,
duringe which treaty Richard Neuill earle of Warwicke, the
stout maintayner of Yorcke’s title, entred the towne by force,
fought a battayle in the high streat, where of the kinge’s part
were slayne the sayd duke of Somerset called Edmond
Beauford, Henry Percy the second. 1578.
[824] Stafford, omitted. 1578.
[825] Besides a great number of knightes, esquiers,
gentlemen and yeomen of the kinge’s houshold and of other
lorde’s seruantes, on whom al the slaughter and bochery fell,
beinge all for the more part vnarmed. But, &c. 1578.
[826] In the edition of 1563, this legend succeeds that of Jane
Shore (see p. 460), and is followed by the Blacksmith (given p.
396), and has the following induction: “This was so well lyked,
that all together exhorted me instantly to procure Maister
Churchyarde to vndertake and to penne as manye moe of the
remaynder as myght by any meanes be attaynted at his
handes. And when I had promysed I wold do my diligence
therein, they asked me if I had any mo tragedyes yet vnred,
for the euenyng was nowe at hand and there were enow
already red to make a handsum volume. “In dede (quod I) I
purpose here to ende the second parte of this volume, for here
endeth the cruel reigne of kyng Rychard the thyrd: And in
another volume hereafter, to dyscourse the resydue from the
begynning of kyng Henry the seventh to the ende of this king
and Queene’s raigne (if God so long will graunte us lyfe) and I
beseche you all that you wyll dylygently performe such storyes
as you haue vndertaken, and procure your frendes such as be
learned, to help vs with the rest: for ther is in this part mater
enough to set al the poetes in England in wurke, and I wold
wishe that every fine apt wyt wold at the leest vndertake one:
For so wold it be a notable volume. For my parte I entende to
be so impudente and importunate a suiter to so manye as I
knowe or maye hereafter be acquaynted wyth, that no excuse
shall serve to shake me of: and I desyre you all to be as
earnest. And to occupye the tyme whyle we be nowe together,
I wyl reade vnto you Edmund the Duke of Somerset, which
must be placed in the fyrst parte: and than the blacke Smyth,
which must serve for thyrde volume, to thende I maye knowe
youre iudgement therein.” “Do so we pray you” (qd. they.)”
[827] Not so ill. 1578.
[828] That some attempts haue neuer happy speede. 1578.
[829] But. 1578.
[830] Out wrestle. 1563.
[831]

Or in skill,
Wynne what they will and wield the world at will. 1578.
[832] Of the first sorte myselfe I count for one. 1578.
[833] Fell despyte. 1563.
[834] Of my workes never could see. 1563.
[835] Sought. 1578.
[836] Bright, and shone like a starre. 1578.
[837] By malice of me. 1563.
[838] His fame. N.
[839]

Normandy yet nethelesse,

Alwayes I wrought that wit might well contriue,
But what bootes it against the streame to striue? 1578.

[840] Maligne and enemy to my trade. 1578.

[841] His, omitted. 1578.
[842] Swarued from Sol vnto. 1578.
[843] All, omitted. 1578.
[844] Well, wanting. 1563.
[845] A bryefe. 1563.
[846] Humfrey to damme that duke most innocent. 1578.
[847] Meane I. 1578.
[848] This worthy prince as a piller longe stood. 1578.
[849] Like to a proppe. 1563. A stronge prop. 1578.
[850]

O mad malice where with obeyeth will,

Was there euer any, whom folly did so nome:
Of all forecast, rigth, reason, wit and skill. 1578.

[851] My coosyn’s bloud, my refuge and my stay. 1578.

[852] Bare the sway. 1578.
[853] So long rebelles no quarelles. 1578.
[854] Once pulled. 1563.
[855]

The duke of Yorke, than stoutly hee stept in,

And chalenged the crowne by color. 1578.

[856] And in. 1563.

[857]

And spred great brutes in England up and downe,

That he of England was the heire true. 1578.

[858] Vsurped had. 1563.

[859] May rue. 1563. Right, by practise most vntrue. 1578.
[860] A chaunge. 1563.
[861] The land. 1563.
[862] Awles wanting one to dread. 1563.
[863] Lawles by weakenes of the heade. 1563.
[864] Where the prynce prest hath alway sword. 1563.
[865]

For dread of whom no man dare do amis,

Whose prince is prest alwayes and sword in hand.
1578.

[866] All enemies. 1578.

[867] In case the sonne had proued sutch a one. 1578.
[868]

Sure had he sitten in the royall throne,

Dreadlesse, and carelesse of common vpror;
But Henrie’s weakenesse appeered more and more.
1578.

[869] And that gave boldenes to the aduers bande. 1563.

Contrary band. 1578.
[870]
 To the gaye gallants of Yorke’s retinue;
Any lowe ground is highly ouerflowen. 1578.

[871] By bold traytours may bee soone remoued. 1578.

[872] That men durst. 1563.
[873] Head poste. 1563.
[874] Then wanting. 1563.
[875] I, omitted. 1563, 78.
[876] By whose malice this. 1578.
[877] To such a noble man. 1563.
[878] Afterward did ban. 1563.
[879] When our poste removed. 1563.
[880] The close traytour then. 1578.
[881] And he that lay hyd came. 1563. From the dark came.
1578.
[882] Whych thyng to compasse him. 1563.
[883] But this to achieue, first it him behoued. 1578.
[884] For, wanting. 1563.
[885] Who once perforce, or practice ill remoued. 1578.
[886] In hyghest authoritie about his grace. 1563.
Next to the prince and other to abase. 1578.
[887] I was the fyrst. 1571, 75, 78.
[888] Therefore he wrought strayght me to displace. 1563.
[889] For by. 1563.
[890] Would. 1563, 78.
[891] Subdue and haue them at his will. 1578.
[892] That geue. 1578.
[893] Loe, to a rebell what it is to geve place. 1563.
[894] So for the fishe when cast forth was the net. 1578.
[895] His plat. 1563.
[896] Common doltes to cause furiously to fret. 1563.
[897] He standing at. 1563.
[898] Graspe would the pray that he long dyd awayte. 1563.
[899] Practises. 1563.
[900] Which nought lesse meant then he. 1563. Who little
ment, that which hee. 1578.
[901] Lurkinge. 1578.
[902] But wanting. 1563.
[903] Then dyd he attempt the people. 1563.
[904] In, wanting. 1563.
[905] The troublous storme yet. N.
[906] How speedily. N.
[907] Like a Judas. 1563.
[908] Thynkinge time. 1578.
[909] Any wanting. 1563.
[910]

S. Albane’s towne, where both our hoastes did meete,

To trye a fielde, was not an equall place,
For we were forst to fight within a streete,
With fewe agaynst many, sutch was the case. 1578.

[911] But thought no whit. 1563. But little thought of. 1578.
[912] More foole hee that. 1578.
[913] The stout earle. N.
[914] Clifford couragious could not. N.
[915] Couragious Clifford could not eschewe the dart. 1578.
[916] Stafford although stout, free went not from this marte.
1563.
[917] Ralph Babthorpe sewer to the king, and Ralph his
sonne, the king’s attorney. Stowe.
[918] Was found very. 1563.
[919]

Babthorp th’attorney, with his skill in law,

In pleeding here appeared very raw. N.

So thus this poore kyng disarmed. 1563.

[920] So thus poore prince disarmed. 1578. King Henrie thus
disarmed. N.
[921] Friends all slayne, wantinge good. 1578.
[922] His friends and followers wanting assistence. N.
[923] Depriued. N.
[924] When all in poste it was by acte decreed. 1563.
[925] The duke of Yorke should haue the regally. 1578.
[926] Then came the duke of Somerset, and all the other
lordes with the kynge’s power, whiche fought a sore and a
cruel battail, in the whiche, many a tall man lost hys lyfe: but
the duke of Yorke sent euer freshe men, to succor the wery,
and put new men in the places of the hurt persones, by
whiche onely pollicie, the kynge’s army was profligat and
dispersed, and all the cheeftaines of the fielde almoste slaine
and brought to confusion. For there died vnder the signe of the
castel, Edmond duke of Somerset, who long before was
warned to eschew all castles, and besyde hym lay Henry the
second erle of Northumberlande, Humfrey erle of Stafford,
sonne to the duke of Buckyngham, Ihon lorde Clifford, &c.
Hall.
[927] A liege to. 1563.
[928] Titles should slepe. 1563.
[929] Realme for theyr tryall to wepe. 1563.
[930] From the heyre female came Yorke and his lede. 1563.
[931] And wee Lancastrians. 1578.
[932] I was in fault, or some about the queen. 1563.
[933] Some, omitted. 1578.
[934]

Thou lookest, Baldwyn, I should myselfe accuse,

Of some subtyle dryft or other lyke thing. 1563.

[935]

To the duke’s foes overmuch adhering,

Though some men’s practise did me thereto bryng.
1563.

[936] Forgeve it me for sore I dyd repent. 1563. To my foes

driftes, which I could not preuent. 1578.
[937] England had never felt. 1563.
[938] Second poynt. 1563.
[939] To any aduice agaynst. 1578.
[940] I and other mo abused. 1578.
[941] Therefore. N.
[942]

Forecast we lackt, which cannot be excused,

Of thinges to come, as soone. 1578.

[943] Cause of. 1578.

[944] Faultes I confesse, as no man liues without. 1578.
[945] I put thee, omitted. 1578.
[946] Thing to me is comfort. 1563.
[947] G. Ferrers. N.
[948] At S. Albane’s when he toke K. Henry prisoner, he was.
1578.
[949] Compare the remainder of this induction with the reading
of the editions of 1559, 63, at p. 166, n. 2.
[950] An. Dom. 1460 added. 1571. Earl of Rutland, an infant,
cruelly murdered, Anno 1460. 1578.
[951] Quoth. 1578.
[952] Trust not in chance, in whom. N.
[953] Of foolish men. N.
[954] O fooles most brute, that. 1578.
[955] How now? why dost thou, Baldwin, hide. 1578.
[956] See this poore boy, whom by the hand I lead. 1578.
[957] With bloud, and teares halinge his body staynd. 1578.
[958]

Rychard I am Plantagenet by name,

Whilom of Yorke the duke of worthy fame. 1573.

[959] Of duke Edmond, thirde. 1578.

[960] Engendred me of Anne, whose course. 1559, 63. This
reading is restored to supply sense to the text. The
subsequent editions have: Engendred mee, whereof the
course.
[961] For when Edmond her brother dyed warde. 1578.
[962]

From Lionel, the third begotten sonne

Of kingly Edward, by descent I came
From Philip hight, his heire we first begun
The crowne as due to vs by right to clame:
And in the end we did obtaine the same,
She was sole heire.——N.

[963] Troublous. 1559. N. Troubles. 1563, 71. Troubles and

daungers. 1578.
[964] And how by might, oft right. 1578.
[965] Duke Henry of Hereforde, called Bolenbrooke. 1578.
[966] Whan traytour like he. 1578.
[967] Kild him in prison, vsurped. 1578.
[968] The crowne by right came to Edmond Mortimer. 1578.
[969] And them of Lancaster. 1578.
[970] Houses. 1578.
[971]

And therefore thought good, to extirpe vs quight. 1578.

Against vs therefore he did all he might. N.

[972] To slay. N.
[973]

His cursed sonne ensued the father’s trade,

And kept my cosin guiltlesse in sure hold
For whom my father ful often did perswade,
With his allies and cousins, that they would
Their kinsman’s right mainteyn, and vphold,
And to depose by pollicy or power,
The heyre of him that was an vsurper. 1578.

[974] Whereof when Henry. 1578.

[975] Thys. 1559, 63, 71.
[976] Had heard, and knew of this conspiracye. 1578.
[977] Sayd that my father was the. 1578.
[978] French kyng hys ally. 1559, 63. French king Charles his
alley. N.
[979]

And hyred by him to worke this trecherye,

For which at Hampton, as it came to passe,
His lyfe he lost, and there beheaded was. 1578.

[980] This. 1559.

[981] To, added. 1571.
[982]
 Thus was the name of Mortimer extinct,
Whose right and title descended vnto me,
Being forst to lyue within a precinct,
For feare I would to other countries flee,
And so beeing at myne owne libertee,
Might haplye moue sedicion or strife,
For guilty hartes can leade no quiet lyfe. 1578.

[983] Whereby great frendes I had my part to take. 1578.

[984]

I by mariage,
Fowre fayre sonnes my yong wife to me bore,
Valiaunt. 1578.

[985] Brothers. 1578.

[986] As none of the kin had any time before. 1578.
[987] Were knights peerelesse. 1578.
[988]

—— Fortune’s frendly grace,

I first began to claime my lawful right,
And my chiefe foes with stoutnesse to deface. 1578.

[989] Al my hole force, I dayly did employ. 1578.

[990] The queene was wholy on hys syde. 1578.
[991] Stroke. 1559.
[992]

in Ireland I did byde,

Ful often driuen of force my head to hyde,
Yet through. 1578.

[993] This doutye duke most deare to king. 1578.

[994]

the queene her partie helde

 Farre in the north, where ouermatcht with power,
My life I lost, in an vnlucky howre. 1578.

[995] Led, omitted. 1578.

[996] And, omitted. 1578.
[997] Got the. 1559, 78.
[998] Next I with kinsfolke. N.
[999]

I at the next was present in persone,

With my chiefe kin, whereas by one and one,
Our souldiers false withdrew away by night,
Vnto our foes and wee put all to flight. 1578.

[1000] Not. The text corrected by editions 1559 and 63. The
others read: no.
[1001] Came I. 1559, 63.
[1002] My. 1559, 63. Make clayme. 1571. New claime to
make. 1578.
[1003] In the kinge’s seate I boldly. 1578.
[1004] Clayming the place, whereat. 1578.
[1005] At last to my demaund agreed. 1578.
[1006] But sith Henry had raigned than so long. 1578.
[1007] And to thend to make my title strong. 1578.
[1008] My, misprint. 1571. Apparant heire of England they me.
1578. In each place heire apparant they me. N.
[1009]

I sped me straight northward, whereas she lay,

Meaning by force to cause her to obay. 1578.

[1010] Bosworth. 1559.

[1011]

She thereof warned, prepared a strong power,

 And ere my men were altogether redye,
To Sandale came, where, in a dismal houre,
I like a beast, so rash was and so heddy
To trie fortune which alwaies is vnsteddy,
With thousands fiue of souldiers to assayle
The double number in campe to their auayle. 1578.

[1012] Th’infant. N.
[1013]

whyle my pore infant

Scarse twelue yere olde, sought way himselfe to saue,
That cruel Clifford, that fel bloudy tyrant,
While the pore chyld with tears did mercy craue,
With dagger sharp his hart a sunder claue. 1578.

[1014]

And set a crowne of paper theruppon,

Which for a sport he sent vnto the quene. 1578.
Which with a painted paper crowne thereon,
He for a present sent vnto the quene. N.

[1015] Might. 1559. To Yorke and set vp to be. 1578. To Yorke

fast by, where that it might. N.
[1016]

In some such place as theuis and traitors bene,

This mocke I had of fortune for rewarde,
After long hope that she wold me regard. 1578.

[1017]

Wherfore, Baldwin, see that thou set her forth

With her slipper pranks so as they may be known,
And warne all princes wel. 1578.

[1018] Sede. 1578

[1019] The gaine no surer but as of dice throwen. 1578.