Bangladesh in 1992: Dilemmas of Democratization Author(s): Zillur R. Khan Reviewed work(s): Source: Asian Survey, Vol. 33, No.

2, A Survey of Asia in 1992: Part II (Feb., 1993), pp. 150-156 Published by: University of California Press Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2645324 . Accessed: 26/11/2011 06:00
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BANGLADESH IN 1992
DilemmasofDemocratization
ZillurR. Khan
the Havingalmostcompleted cycleof electedgovernmentruleto populist authoritarian to electedauthoritarian rule rule,Bangladeshhas arrived a politicalcrossroad, thedirection choosesto at and it takewill determine future thenationpolitically, of and the economically, few socially. Ultimately, willbe thewill of thevocal and conscientious it bewhose commitment the nationalinterest to can make the difference scenariofor tweenKissinger's "basketcase" and a rapidly self-dependent one of the poorestcountries the world. AdvancingBangladesh'snaof tional interest about badly would involve, among otherthings, bringing needed reforms the country's in educational, economic,political,social, bureaucratic, military and systems. Most of the unsolvedproblems that Bangladeshhas been facingwith increasing difficulty rootedin the leadership's are inability understand to the role of educationand training perhapsthe mosteffective as agentof changefortheadvancement the society.Bangladesh's of recordin mainin taining and building educationalinfrastructure 1992 was less than the educasatisfactory. much-heralded Its policyto establish freeprimary a tion system withbuilt-in incentives girlsremainsto be implemented, for and the prefix as avoided "compulsory" appliedto educationis carefully use by policymakersforlack of sufficient resources and the prevalent of cheap child labor. The budgetedresources education, for whichinclude healthand populationprograms, rose to a modest 17.34% in the 1992 the inhibit budgetfrom14.91% in 1991, an increasethat will certainly level. extent reform of neededto bring to Bangladeshi youth a competitive Like their in stucounterparts mostunderdeveloped/developing countries, for dentsin Bangladeshhave been spearheading movement reforms, the
--M____ of ZillurR. Khan is Professor Chair,Department PoliticalSciand of ence,University Wisconsin-Oshkosh.

? 1993 by The Regentsof the University California of

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actionand have pushedthemto pursuedirect constraints and theresource of meansforredress grievances. bypassinstitutional

to Most Bangladeshipoliticalleaderslack adequate commitment quality as with the use of students leversin their educationand this,together has powerstruggles, led to campus violenceacross the country.Thirtydurwerereported five claiming dead and over200 injured, eight incidents viopartisan and factional of incidents student ing 1991,and comparable lence occurred during 1992. The Golam Azam issue in particular inpoliticsin 1992, makingthemmore unpredictable, polarizedstudent tense,and oftenviolent. Despite the factthat Prime MinisterKhaleda in Party(BNP) enjoysan absolutemajority Zia's BangladeshNationalist to appeal-largely attributable her inKhaleda's charismatic Parliament, deher leadership from husband-has been rapidly of heritance theparty pleted due to her hurrieddecision in 1991 to seek the supportof the Jamaat-i-Islami Party. Most Bengalis associate the Jamaat and party military. of leaderGolam Azam withthe 1971 collaborators thePakistani Althoughthe BNP could not have securedits 28 (out of 30) nominated an support, thusgaining absolutemathe women'sseatswithout Jamaat's the from ultraKhaleda's decisionto seeksupport jorityin thelegislature, partycame back to haunt her during1992 when Azam's conservative over a triggered seriouscontroversy theliberation as chief election Jamaat anew the searchfora nationalidentity. war,reviving this issue Khaleda's inabilityto address the concerns surrounding of memories atrocities perbitter and amongstudents thosewho stillcarry in by petrated the Pakistanimilitary 1971 damaged her popularimage, her distancing cocoon effect, and in turn,contributed an increasing to ego,coupledwiththefact politicalreality.Her own moreand morefrom advisthatshe was increasingly by surrounded a coterieof inexperienced of her quicklyto publicresentment hergovreacting ers,prevented from handlingof the Golam Azam case as well as the ernment's inefficient of communalviolenceof December 1992 that followedthe destruction Babri Masjid (mosque) in India by Hindu fanatics. The late President intoa politicalblunon Zia's strategic non-decision Golam Azam turned formal chargesagainst derwhenhis widow'sgovernment decidedto bring war,and 23 of her of of JahanaraImam,mother a martyr the liberation associatesforholdinga mock public trialof Azam in March 1992 and againsthumanity. for downthedeathsentence his allegedcrimes handing in becamemorepronounced theBanThe dilemmas democratization of but had gladeshcase whenan electedgovernment emerged failedto reinto forcedemocratic values. In its effort bringabout law and orderin a

Crisisof Identity

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has rapidly deteriorating society, civil Khaleda Zia's government managed of to make unnecessary compromises the civil liberties Bangladeshis. on program, administrathe On thepretext strengthening anti-terrorism of its tionhas givena new lease on lifeto the Special PowersAct, a black law to reminiscent the colonial era thatallows suspecteddissenters be arof have been lanrestedand held without trial. Around2,700 Bangladeshis of guishing prisonunderthe electedgovernment Khaleda Zia.' The in process dilemmaconfronting Bangladeshin 1992 in its democratization was this: ifKhaleda Zia increasingly takesrecourse extraconstitutional to lose legitimacy and, thus, measures protect government, might to her she undercut democratic the process;if,on the otherhand, she succumbsto the pressure of being generated the mass movements Novemberand by unrest arising arounddeearlyDecember,coinciding withthecommunal struction the mosque in India, and dissolvesParliament (more than of to threeyearsearlierthanrequired the Constitution) hold a midterm by would be comelectionas demanded the opposition, by constitutionalism process. promised, again undercutting democratic the In its 1992report Bangladesh, WorldBank placed majoremphasis on the on the need to restore and stability reshort-term economicand financial The focused versethe long-term declinein domestic investment.2 report on of particularly the need (1) to enhanceimplementation the publicin(2) vestment program accelerating pace of policyreforms; to imby the and domestic provethecountry's external competitiveness; (3) to increase growth strategy. The deproductivity a precondition an export-led as to cline in the annual GDP growthrate has been significant. market At declining from peak a prices, GDP standsat $22.5 billion, the withgrowth of 7.5% during FY 1975-80(Zia period)to 5.2% duringFY 1981-86, to to 4.0% duringFY 1987-89,further declining 3.6% in 1990-91. If the decline is not arrestedsoon, Bangladesh'sdependenceon externalresourceswill becomeeven moreacute,creating increasingly an untenable socioeconomic situation.Much as donorcountries wouldliketo helpBangladesh, theymight be able to do so owingto changedglobalpolitical not and economicrealities. The WorldBank report underscored Bangladesh'seconomicwoes,citto ingseveral specific efficiency-limiting factors.First, attainriceself-suffi1. The charge againstone of them was that he took part in an anti-state activity by presenting paperat the 1991 BengalStudiesConference the UnitedStates,whichtradia in tionally included has scholars from WestBengal,India,and Bangladesh.This author was coorganizer the conference. of 2. WorldBank Report,no. 10265-BD, 1992.

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ciency, distortions agricultural the in inputpricesmustbe minimized and farmers givenaccess to a widerangeofinputs they so willhave theneeded flexibility reactto changing to incentives. Second,forprivate sectordevelopment manufacturing,willbe necessary remove following in it to the impediments:(1) poor loan recovery, whichhas limited investors' access to credit;(2) inadequateaccess to raw materials, compounded import by restrictions and high tariffs; frequent (3) failures the power supplyand in other utilities; shortage increasing (4) and militancy skilled of labor;(5) the limited transport infrastructure; (6) government and failure implement to its industrial policy. Whether not the 1992 budgethas succeededas a decision-making or tool in addressing crucialproblems the emphasized the report in remains to be seen. The suggested import and tariff liberalization policyis facing stiff resistance fromcertainvestedinterests, particular in the domestic packaging industries poultry and farmers who have been hardhitby new competition from outside. Like thepoliticaldilemmaof democratization, the liberalization the economy subjectto the pulls of an open versus of is controlledsystem;like the politicians, the industrialists-including the agribased ones-are finding thattheycannothave their out cake and eat it too. The lack of commitment top leadersto settleconflicts by swiftly and their fairly, resignation bureaucratic dragging, widespread corto foot and ruption havemadetheBangladeshi economy evenless viablein 1992. This is in spiteofdonorpressure structural for adjustment, euphemism an a for ultimatum implement to badlyneededreforms. The 1992 budgetshowed a revenuesurplus,which added to foreign grantsand loans and extrabudgetary resources totaled93 billiontakas (Tk. 38.8 = US$1). Budget expenditures totaledTk. 97.55 billion,registering shortage Tk. 4.46 of a billion. The irony the 1992budget, unlikethosein previous of not is fiscal years, thatit showeda surplusin its expensescategory in and patheticdeficits capital development. top of that,the internal On decisionmakerswere unableto utilizetheexternal resources received from donorcountries specifically fillthe gapingholes in the capital budget. This anomalyof to nonutilization external of resources, estimated over $5 billion,came to at the surfacein Novemberwhen World Bank President Lewis T. Preston visited imBangladesh and reminded government theneedforswift the of plementation economicreforms. of Both India and Pakistanfaredbetter in Preston's assessment aid utilization of records.This was a clear signal fromaid giversthat beforeseekingnew and/oradditionalaid commitments, Bangladeshmustfirst attendto its bulging projectaid pipelineby

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prompt and effective decisions and actionsto improve significantly aid its absorptive and/orutilization performance. Anotheranomalyof the 1992 budgetwas the 17% slice for defense, whichwhenthehiddenexpenses werefactored increased morethan in, to 20% of the revenue budget. In the processof forcing the Ershad reout gime,the civilianleadership received support a number military the of of leadersand themassofsoldiery.This,together withthefactthattheBNP was createdby a military leader,led to Khaleda's decisionto expandthe military budget, contrary popularexpectations.But apartfromselecto tive employment increasing and GDP, the military expenditure will do very little raiseconsciousness to aboutsocietalneedsand how bestto meet them.

The clarity and vigorof a nation'sforeign policylargely dependson the stateofitsdomestic policiesin different areas. Havingcompleted electhe toral processwithconsiderable success in 1991, Bangladeshfound 1992 frought withextraordinarily difficult situations ethnic of insurgency, political uncertainty, seriouseconomicimbalance. All thesehave had a and very negative impacton theviability legitimacy Bangladesh's and of policy towardits giantneighbor, India, and its onlyotherneighbor, Myanmar, withwhichit sharesits southeastern boundary. The government's inabilityto meet the legitimate demands of the ChakmasoftheChittagong tracts, largest Hill the groupamongthecountry'stribal population,has had a numberof important consequences. First,ethnic have createda foreign insurgencies withNew policyproblem Delhi owingto the illegalmigration some Chakmasto India. Second, of the insurgents have used Indian territory a sanctuary as from whichthey reportedly have been launching guerrilla attacksagainstBangladeshborder security the personnel well as terrorizing civilianpopulationover as the last two decades. In its effort crushthe Chakma insurgency, the to Tk. 6.5 billion(ca. $150 million)a year. government been spending has Until recently, Dhaka has made littleor no seriousattempt negotiate to withthe insurgents overtheir aufourdemands, namely: (1) subregional of tonomy;(2) retention Regulation1900, whichaccorded themspecial statusas disadvantaged of of tribals; continuation theoffice chief;and (3) in on (4) a constitutionally mandatedrestriction Bengali settlement the Hill Tracts.3
in 3. Based on the author'sinterview 1970 withRaja TridipRoy, chiefof the Chakmas, and Rashed Khan Menon,one of theopposition party leaders,in August1992. Menon was in seriously injuredin an assassination attempt the same month.

ForeignPolicy

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Since India's cooperation vitalforthe resolution manyof Banglais of and desh's foreign policyproblems-including Chakma repatriations the fromthe the end of theirinsurgency, bordersettlements, water-sharing Ganges,and so on-it has becomethegeneral practice thehead ofany for Bangladeshigovernment/state pay official to visitsto New Delhi from timeto time. PrimeMinister Khaleda Zia's May 1992 visitwas perhaps to to designed seekDelhi's helpin pressuring Chakmainsurgents come the to a negotiated settlement theirformal on demands. Her joint communibut que withthe Indian primeminister seemedto open up the dormant, highly volatile illegalimmigration issue. Such a sensitive issue,whichhad once movedIndiraGandhito consider putting fence a aroundBangladesh, conshouldhave been addressedmuchmorecautiously after widespread sultation home. at to Instead of repatriating BangladeshiChakmas,Indian efforts return illegal immigrants to the rounding of over 100 Bengali-speaking led up the people from slumsof New Delhi and pushing themintoBangladesh. This createda bipartisan protest againstthe Indian decisionand almost the defeated purposeof Khaleda's goodwillvisit;it also cast a diplomatic gloomoverthe seventh SAARC summit scheduledto be held duringthe second week of Decemberin Dhaka. The summit was postponeduntil in January thenindefinitely and becauseofthedisturbances India overthe destruction theBabriMasjid. PrimeMinister of Khaleda Zia's diplomatic in withIndia proved be, fortunately her,a blessing disguise, setbacks to for degenerating renewed support homein dealingwiththe questionable at the signsof India. Scapegoating mayworksometimes, carrying bogey but of India too farwill certainly counterproductive Bangladesh. for be there effects, Whether notKhaleda's India visithad any far-reaching or borderprobwas a temporary hertripof a long-standing resolution after lem involving transfer a stripof Indian land to Bangladeshforacthe of cess to Bangladeshienclaves inside India; also the Chakma insurgents to made overtures cessationof hostility encourage through unilateral a timeseemed Dhaka to negotiate settlement. India forthefirst a Moreover, to agreeto multilateral negotiations, involving Bangladeshand Nepal, to the resolvethe rapidly deteriorating problem sharing of waterfrom Ganges. India has also reportedly agreedto negotiate proposalwithBanglaa for at desh and otherSouthAsian countries the SAARC summit a 10% of reduction tariffs bolster saggingintraregional to the trade. for newinitiatives Khaleda's Pakistanvisitin Augustsought generate to ofher increasing Pakistani investment Bangladesh.However, reported in ferto return fewmoney-losing the Bangladeshi jute millsto theirformer and did Pakistani ownersreceived littleor no encouragement, neither her for that be Banglasuggestion an equitablearrangement considered giving

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the from assetsdevelopedwithresources desh its due shareof identifiable those particularly former East Pakistan. However,manyin Bangladesh, saw of stilllamenting 1971fragmentation theIslamicstateofPakistan, the signthat by leadersas a positive Khaleda Zia's cordialreception Pakistani Muslargest between two of thethree relationship somedaythesymbiotic a and in lim countries theworldcould be restored perhapsgenerate counsuspected propensities against bothIndia and Myanmar's tervailing weight to take Bangladeshforgranted. decisionsoverthe yearsto and earlierBurmesegovernment Myanmar, regrowing of demandsforgreater out quell the Arakaneseinsurgency, of exodusto Bangladesh Arakan resulted theperiodic in gionalautonomy, (knownas Rohingya).In spiteof a repatriainhabitants Bengaliorigin of in 254,000refutionagreement April 1992,only5,981out ofan estimated food as gees had been repatriated of December. Lackingsufficient forits inhas government experienced own disadvantaged locals,theBangladesh groupcalledthe pressure theissue,and a local citizens on creasing internal that saying issuedan ultimatum ActionCommittee Rohingya Repatriation by was if the repatriation not completed December31, it would starta movement. noncooperation

in government Bangladeshoperatesin a society The new representative statusto its from and thatis stilltradition-oriented onlybeginning journey governmental poweris in and to contract, wherethetendency monopolize pluralization.The dangerof a rapidly withextreme continuous conflict can shrinking commongroundon whichconflicts be resolvedalwaysexhas out ists. The yearbrought in theopen whatBengalisociety been trythe ing to leave hidden. Having confronted problemof nationalidentity are issues,Bangladeshis being through Golam Azam and indemnity the problems forcedto face societalrealities.But to define mosturgent the on levelofrationality thepart confronting peoplewilldemanda higher the of bothpolicymakersand implementers. and It is not easy to findlegitimate meansto resolvethe conflicts, one to Khaleda Zia's representative wouldhesitate suggest thatPrimeMinister in itself successful transforming into has government beenevenmoderately on a democratic consensus nationalgoals government capable ofbuilding and how bestto attainthem.

Conclusion