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CHINA’S DIPLOMACY
AND ECONOMIC
ACTIVITIES
IN AFRICA
Relations on the Move

Anja Lahtinen
China’s Diplomacy and Economic
Activities in Africa
 Anja Lahtinen

China’s Diplomacy
and Economic
Activities in Africa
Relations on the Move
Anja Lahtinen
University of Helsinki
Helsinki, Finland

ISBN 978-3-319-69352-1    ISBN 978-3-319-69353-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69353-8

Library of Congress Control Number: 2017961869

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s) 2018

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To Karine and Mikko
 Acknowledgments

When I took my first trip to China in the mid-1980s, it was like arriving
on another planet. After a long and tiresome flight, I stepped into the
transit hall. Young officers in green uniform stood in front of the round
table in the middle of the room. Loud Chinese music was playing. It took
a long time to get my suitcases. The bicycles on the road from the airport
were reluctant to give way to our bus. Beijing was grey, damp and monot-
onous, with a lot of concrete administration buildings. The air was pol-
luted, smelling of charcoal. Mountains of Chinese cabbage were piled on
the kerbsides. The principal vehicle in use was the bicycle, and there
seemed to be millions of cyclists. All Chinese people appeared to be young.
They laughed at us in a kindly way while showing curiosity. China was
opening up, and it had invited us, a group of Finnish small and medium-­
sized enterprises, to learn about its economic and social plan to modernize
the country, and to invest in the country. Since my first visit, China has
experienced a remarkable transformation. In the space of 30 years it has
become an economic world power. In turn, I have become more familiar
with Chinese culture and people, politics, and society. My journey to
Africa, ten years later, followed a similar pattern, starting with an initial
visit to South Africa. The country was filled with hope as Mandela Nelson
had become president just a few months earlier.
China’s entrance into Africa began to pop up in international news
from mid-2000, at the same time as research on the latter country began
to evolve. At that point, although I was working on my dissertation,
“Governance Matters: China’s Developing with a Focus on Qinghai
Province,” this topic attracted my interest greatly. The idea of combining

vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

my previous ­knowledge of and encounters with Africa and China, and

learning more about both, became the plan for my next research topic.
Many books have been published about China in Africa. Most of them
deal with economic relations. This text, despite having a limited pagina-
tion, tries to paint a fairly relatively comprehensive picture that explores
the past, present, and future of the China–Africa collaboration. The book
would not have come into being without my seeing China as a world pow-
erhouse, including both good and bad aspects, and also acknowledging
Africa’s importance to the world, not least in its unlocked potential.
I am indebted to many Chinese and African scholars, officials, China-­
watchers, and all who have taken the time to discuss and debate ideas, and
to share their knowledge and views with me. I wish to thank the Chinese
Academy of Social Sciences, Peking University, Renmin University, Fudan
University, and the University of Hong Kong for welcoming me on my
trips to China as a visiting scholar and as a director of the Confucius
Institute. I warmly thank He Wenping, Director of African Studies at the
Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, and Professor Li Anshan at the Centre
for African Studies at Peking University, for fruitful discussions that pro-
vided the Chinese perspective for China’s presence in Africa. I am particu-
larly grateful to my friends at the China Centre at Stellenbosch University,
to Sven Grimm and Anthony Ross for hosting my visits and sharing their
knowledge. And my special thanks are reserved for Bronwyn Steyn Grobler
and Lydia du Plessis at Stellenbosch for their kind help with the practicali-
ties during my stays. I am most thankful to Professor Eric Mitema for
hosting my visits at the University of Nairobi, and to Professor Adam Oloo
for sharing his views and for his visit to the University of Helsinki to talk
about China–Africa relations at the Transforming China: New Leadership
and Foreign Relations conference on November 7, 2013. I also express my
sincere thanks to Dr Jenny Fatou Mbaye at the University of Cape Town,
and the Chinese directors and teachers at the Confucius institutes at the
universities of Nairobi, Kenyatta, Cape Town, and Stellenbosch.
Writing this book, China’s Diplomacy and Economic Activities in Africa:
Relations on the Move, has been influenced by my admiration and concern
for both China and Africa. The text has been written with the support of
friends and family in ways they may not even be aware of. I am most grateful
to the Jenny and Antti Wihuri Foundation’s grant for this book, as well to
the University of Helsinki for the research exchange visits which allowed me
also to work in situ. It has been a remarkable exercise of new learning that
has taken me down unforeseen paths and continued my academic journey.
 Contents

1 China–Africa Relations   1

2 China in Africa  17

3 Soft Power  33

4 Culture  53

5 Relations on the Move  67

6 Conclusion  83

Bibliography  89

Index 101

ix
 About the Author

Anja Lahtinen is an independent researcher. She has a PhD in East Asian

studies from the University of Helsinki, Finland, and an MBA from Henley
Business School, UK. She has experience of China spanning more than 30
years, first within business operations and then in academic research. Her
recent job as director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Helsinki
has offered valuable insights into the Chinese government. Her wide expe-
rience and in-depth knowledge of China provides a broad perspective from
which to understand its cultural, economic, and social life better. Witnessing
the country’s transformation and its opening up has allowed her to recog-
nize the links and consequences of tremendous change and thus to attain a
big-picture view of China’s aspirations in both Africa and the wider world.
Moving the research focus to Africa has been an energizing process, intel-
lectually and emotionally. It has given her a chance to see the world in dif-
ferent settings and different environments. It has also been a motivation to
write a book about China in Africa, to seek an understanding of the essence
and trajectories of development in the China–Africa relationship.

xi
 Introduction

Africa was long portrayed as “The Hopeless Continent,” as, for example,
on the front page of The Economist in an issue in 2000. For years, global-
ization had bypassed the continent because of its poor infrastructure, low
income, and political instability. Then came China, which needed resources
and oil for its expanding manufacturing capacity and to secure its growth
as a global manufacturing powerhouse. Chinese leaders headed business
delegations to every major African capital, landing infrastructure projects
and trade deals. The country’s state-owned enterprises, private corpora-
tions, and entrepreneurs all ventured to Africa.
In the decade since 2007, it seemed as China was building everything in
Africa. It constructed roads, schools, hotels, and conference centers. It
built a huge shopping mall in Zimbabwe’s capital, Harare, in Mozambique
it constructed a ring road around Maputo, and it invested billions in
Nigeria’s newly refurbished Lagos–Kano rail line. African leaders welcomed
China. Their country needed to improve its infrastructure deficit to accel-
erate growth. African governments were attracted by China’s pragmatic
approach and its “no strings attached” conditions to do business. This was
in stark contrast to the conditions imposed by Western countries, the
International Monetary Fund, and the World Bank, which demanded good
governance. China’s engagement helped African countries to accelerate
economic growth while Africa turned into China’s “second continent.”
McKinsey’s (2010) report predicted a growth trajectory for Africa’s econo-
mies, and by 2011 (within ten years of the aforementioned article), “Africa
is rising” was how the continent was depicted on the front page of The
Economist.

xiii
xiv Introduction

China and its rapidly growing presence in Africa soon raised concerns.
Its role and impact on the continent have continuously been questioned
and often criticized in the international arena as a result of the country’s
resources for infrastructure model and controversial trade practices. Since
the global financial crisis in 2008, China’s economic growth rate has
cooled off. And, when China devalued its currency, the renminbi, by 2%
in August 2015, this sent shockwaves through global markets. Now, China
seeks to rebalance its economy by shifting its activity from investment and
manufacturing toward consumption and services. The slowdown of the
world’s largest economy has affected markets across the world. It also hit
Africa hard. African states have already seen a faster than expected reduc-
tion in imports and exports. China’s economic growth has declined.
Because Africa has exposed its economic dependence on China, its gov-
ernments are challenged to find a path to more diversified economy pat-
terns. The key is to achieve sustainable development, with a focus on
inclusive growth and human development. In the meantime, the current
international environment is changing rapidly through globalization,
environmental change, migration, digitalization, and populism. The
effects of the UK’s decision to leave the European Union and Donald
Trump’s victory in presidential elections in the USA are far-reaching. The
relationships between global political forces and environmental concerns
change the economic and political landscape. These trajectories force
African governments to re-evaluate their economic and societal goals and
to decide how to unlock the potential of their countries for growth and
development to benefit their people. New economic and political activities
are on the horizon that will reshape and deepen the China–Africa coopera-
tion, but on what terms? It is high time that Africa decides.
This book is about China in Africa, with a focus on Sub-Saharan Africa.
It offers a comprehensive approach to China–Africa relations and is a
review of those relations on the move. It reveals the history of the relation-
ship to gain a better understanding of the present and to try to foresee the
future. The aim is to provide a deeper understanding of China in Africa,
China’s role and impact there, and how the relations have developed. It
examines how China’s soft power, comprising economic ties, aid, diplo-
macy, and culture, has served the goals of its government, and how
Africans have perceived its approach. Obviously, it has helped China’s
entrance into Africa, but whether it has won the “minds and hearts” is a
more nuanced issue. The book exposes the new reality for Africa that fol-
 Introduction 
   xv

lowed China’s economic slowdown. Undoubtedly, China remains in

Africa, but the central question is to what extent China’s soft power con-
tinues to play a part in Africa, and how the nature of the relationship may
be changing? Needless to say, China–Africa relations are on the move.
China has developed ambitious geopolitical goals, and its power is shifting
from soft to hard. This book also addresses the following questions. What
are lessons learned from the China–Africa partnership? What are the chal-
lenges and opportunities in changing the economic landscape, for Africa
and for China? How can the African developmental trajectory be redi-
rected to the benefit of Africans? What are the obstacles? And, finally, what
is the best way to unlock Africa’s potential? The central theme in this book
is soft power. This is driven by international relations theories concerning
power, national interests, security, strategy, hegemony, economic interde-
pendence, conflict, and cooperation. Writing this book in our fast-­
changing world, it can be a challenge to react and respond. New
information is increasingly made available via networks and interaction.
The role of the researcher is to organize and structure information in the
interplay between theory and observation, and to discern the most mean-
ingful and significant issues. The research data in this book comprises the
literature, reports, articles, blogs, interviews, discussions, and observa-
tions. There is plenty of scattered information available, so it requires a
critical lens to sort through it and refine it to the “knowledge” one needs.
This study was carried out using as a critical realist approach (Hammersley
1990; Silverman 2001), and practicing critical theory (Habermas 1978)
to interpret and explain the existing knowledge. The empirical data in this
study were gathered during fieldwork in Africa and China between 2011
and 2016. My visits to the Chinese and African universities were part of a
research exchange program and within my capacity as director of the
Confucius Institute. They allowed profound dialogue around my research
topic with some 100 researchers and academics at the following institu-
tions: Peking University, Renmin University, and the Chinese Academy of
Social Sciences in China; Hong Kong Chinese University, the University
of Hong Kong, and the City University of Hong Kong in Hong Kong; the
University of Cape Town and the University of Stellenbosch in South
Africa; the University of Nairobi and Kenyatta University in Kenya; the
University of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania; Cheikh Anta Diop University and
Gaston Berger University in Senegal; and the Centre for Chinese Studies
at Stellenbosch University in South Africa. I visited the latter three times
xvi Introduction

as a short-term visiting fellow. Methods of sampling, non-probability and

accidental, were adopted because of their relative ease of use in interviews
and discussions with people from academia, business, and government. All
these meetings within the context my topic China in Africa were manda-
tory, giving me the necessary opportunity to reflect and evaluate all prior
knowledge I had gathered and test my assumptions in situ. Encounters
with ordinary people from all walks of life in South Africa, Tanzania,
Kenya, Senegal, Namibia, Zimbabwe, and Botswana offered further per-
spectives on the complex reality. Free discussions and observations about
everyday engagements and non-engagements between Chinese and
Africans greatly helped to broaden my outlook and to reach a better
understanding of China–Africa relations.
This book offers a general picture, identifying the elements necessary to
provide a comprehensive appreciation of China–Africa relations, with
insights into and awareness of the issues that affect the relations and coop-
eration between the two. The chosen approach gives respect to the prin-
ciple for examining every African country in detail. In contrast, this book
was written to paint a more comprehensive picture. Thus this book
also allows newcomers to ease themselves into the subject of China in
Africa. It can also serve as a starting point for those interested in geopoli-
tics and how recent developments in international relations have mani-
fested themselves in Africa.
The rational of thinking and politics of China and Africa are worthy of
study, as are the relations between the two regions, with each being hugely
diversified and not homogenous. The chapters tackle issues such as ideol-
ogy, Confucianism, the Chinese Dream, soft power, culture, democracy,
human rights, and geopolitics. This introduction provides a perspective on
China’s entrance to Africa while also making clear the aims, questions, and
the nature of the study. Chapter 1 reviews China–Africa relations from
ancient times to the current period. To understand the present, one must
know something of the past. It highlights the historical trajectories to serve
as an introduction to contemporary period China–Africa relations. It also
describes the outlook of both regions. Chapter 2 addresses China’s search
for world power. It highlights the drivers of the Harmonious Society, the
Chinese Dream, and the New Silk Road. It also presents the framework of
China’s foreign policy, and African policy as part of it, to steer and super-
vise China–Africa relations. The Forum on China–Africa Cooperation is
also introduced, which is being used as a platform for dialogue and a show-
case for China–Africa ties. Chapter 3 examines the role and impact of
 Introduction 
   xvii

China’s soft power, comprising diplomacy, aid, economic relations, and

culture. Although this soft power has helped Africa to generate economic
growth, not everyone is comfortable with China’s involvement. Chapter 4
discusses the Chinese culture that has augmented the country’s soft power
to improve China’s image. It examines the role of Confucianism and
Confucian institutes in Africa, and it argues that Chinese culture with
politicized goals is not in competition with African values. Also, my find-
ings about China’s soft power are presented, together with how it has
been perceived in Africa. Chapter 5 is an account of China–Africa relations
on the move. It explores China’s economic downturn and the conse-
quences of this for Africa. It discusses African dependency on China and
what measures are to be taken to change Africa’s course. It examines
China’s New Silk Road initiative and its economic and political role in
building land and sea links connecting Asia, Europe, the Middle East, and
Africa. As already seen in the South China Sea, China seeks to increase its
role in geopolitics. Its military base in Djibouti shows that China’s soft
power is shifting from soft to hard and that the relations are changing.
Chapter 6 draws some conclusions. China has devoted substantial
resources to its soft power, which serves the political goals of “winning
friends and influencing people” in Africa. Its contributions to Africa are
made clear, and lessons from the China–Africa relationship are drawn.
China’s search for global leadership and pushing its initiatives in Africa
doesn’t mean that it could achieve this on its terms. For China to compete
globally it must rise to the challenges of corporate governance and
accountability, as practiced in the international economy, and not institu-
tionalized in Chinese state-owned companies operating in Africa or else-
where. This chapter also argues that the African developmental trajectory
can change to benefit the African people. Unlocking the opportunities of
African countries requires diversification of their economies, empowering
women, and providing wider access to education, and the choices to be
made are up to the African states and their governments.

References
Habermas, J. (1978/1968). Knowledge and Human Interest. London:
Heinemann.
Hammersley, M. (1990). Reading Ethnographic Research. New York:
Longman.
xviii Introduction

McKinsey. (2010). Lions on the Move: The Progress and Potential of

African Economies. Retrieved from http://www.mckinsey.com/
insights/africa/lions_on_the_move
Silverman, D. (2001). Interpreting Qualitative Data: Methods for
Analyzing Talk, Text, and Interaction (2nd ed.). Thousand Oaks: Sage
Publications.
 CHAPTER 1

China–Africa Relations

Abstract In ancient times, China regarded Africa as being the end of the
Western Zone, as from China to the rest of the world. After the founding
of the People’s Republic of China in 1949, the new ideology shaped its rela-
tions with the continent. China supported the liberation movements of
Africa as a part of the united international front against the superpowers and
the former Soviet Union. It established diplomatic relations with African
countries, seeking their political support. In the 1990s, this relationship
entered a new phase, which involved economic activities. China-Africa trade
increased rapidly. And in 2012, China surpassed the United and Europe, it
had become Africa’s largest trading partner. It received much international
attention in media, Policymakers and scholars were concerned. What are
China’s goals in Africa? Is China good or bad for Africa’s development?

Keywords Development of relations • Outlooks on China and Africa

China’s multifaceted relations with Africa are not new. In ancient times,
China regarded Africa as being the end of the Western Zone. From the
beginning of the Han Dynasty (207–220 CE), the Silk Road with its web
of roads connected the East and the West. It was a corridor to trade and
cultural exchange, vital to create interactions between the people of differ-
ent civilizations, reaching the height of its importance during the Tang
Dynasty (618–907 CE). The robe of Cleopatra VII (69 BCE–30 CE), the

© The Author(s) 2018 1

A. Lahtinen, China’s Diplomacy and Economic Activities in Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69353-8_1
2 A. LAHTINEN

Egyptian queen, is said to be made from Chinese silk. China’s celadon

chinaware and coins have been found in Egypt, Kenya, and Zanzibar. Du
Huan, an officer of the Tang Dynasty army, recorded his visit to Molin-­
guo, an African country located in desert lowland in the Sudan and Eritrea.
He wrote in Western Trip (jing xing ji): “Residents are black and tough,
have little rice or wheat, and grass or trees are almost unknown to them.
Their horses are fed on dried fish, and people use Persian dates as food. It
is a place with frequent cases of pestilence” (Smidt 2001, p. 18). During
the Song (960–1279) and Yuan (1279–1368) dynasties, the exchange
between goods and people increased and Chinese goods found their way
far inland, in Zimbabwe and South Africa. Wang Dayuan, a Chinese trav-
eler, made a trip to Zanzibar (c. 1311–1350) and met the Moroccan Ibn
Battuta (1303–1377), and visited Hangzhou and Guangzhou in southern
China. Zhu Siben (1273–1333) was the first to illustrate Africa on a map,
as a triangle extending southward (Wu 2006, p. 23).
During the early years of the Ming Dynasty (1368–1644), Chinese
emperors launched a series of maritime expeditions led by Admiral Zheng
He (1371–1434). In those days, China was a frontrunner in naval tech-
nology using magnetic compasses for navigation, two centuries before
Europe. Zheng was the son of a Muslim from Yunnan province who began
his career at the age of 12 as a court eunuch. Emperor Yongle (1403–24)
selected him to unite the countries of the south and southeast under
Chinese hegemony. Zheng headed seven different voyages between 1405
and 1433. They were truly huge in both scale and reach. The first expedi-
tion involved more than 60 ships, the largest 130 m long and carrying
27,000 men. His fourth expedition, from 1413 to 1415, was a round trip
of 12,000 km, stopping at Hormuz on the Persian Gulf. Part of the fleet
then sailed down the Arabian coast as far as Aden, going on to explore the
eastern shores of Africa, almost as far as Mozambique, some 80 years
ahead of the Portuguese.
When the fleet returned to China in 1415, it brought envoys from
more than 30 countries to pay homage to China’s rich cargo, which
included a giraffe. Zheng’s final expeditions all revisited the Persian Gulf
and the East African coastline, including ports in today’s Somalia and
Kenya. His voyages undoubtedly advanced China’s commercial interests.
His ships carried cargoes that included silks, porcelain, pearls, musk, gold,
rice, millet, and beans. He returned to China with ivory, rhinoceros horn,
amber, pigments, and exotic animals. Zheng died in 1434. The Ming
Dynasty fell as a result of internal rebellions and the attack of the Manchus.
 CHINA–AFRICA RELATIONS 3

China closed its door and it lost its status as a great sea power, but it con-
tinued to trade without official approval. Then Portuguese stepped into
Africa, travelling down the coast of West Africa and to Sierra Leone in
1460. Portugal dominated world trade for nearly 200 years (Tucker 2003,
pp. 365–367).

Contemporary Relations
The People’s Republic of China (PRC) was established on October 1,
1949. The foreign policy of New China as “Leaning to One Side” was
implemented by the formation of an alliance with the Soviet Union (Zhang
2013, p. 14). Newly established China connected with African countries
advocated shared historical experiences, both victims of “colonization by
the capitalists and imperialists.” This paved the way to seeking the political
support of African nations. Ideology was the central issue in Chinese for-
eign policy until the end of the Cultural Revolution in the 1970s. Mao
Zedong frequently received friends and organizations from Africa, pro-
claiming China’s “sincere sympathy and entire support for African peo-
ple’s fight against imperialism and colonialism.” China supported the
liberation movements of African countries as a part of the united interna-
tional front against the superpowers: the USA, and the former Soviet
Union. China saw similarities with Africa, seeing itself as standing “side by
side” with African countries under the banner of “South-South
solidarity.”
In 1955, with representatives from 29 newly independent nations, the
Afro-Asia Conference was held in Bandung, Indonesia. There, the Chinese
premier, Zhou Enlai, actively engaged with the leaders of African coun-
tries (Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Liberia, Libya, and Sudan) to discuss colo-
nialism, economic and cultural cooperation, and their role in a world that
was dominated by the superpowers. A year later, China established the first
diplomatic ties in the continent, with Egypt, which was also the first
African recipient of Chinese aid. Zhou Enlai made his first African tour in
1963–1964 in the context of the Cold War. He visited ten African coun-
tries to gain continent’s support in competition with the “imperialists”
(the USA) and the “revisionists” (the former Soviet Union).
Throughout the 1960s, China was “striking with both fists” toward
both the USA and the former Soviet Union. While its relations with the
latter deteriorated, China was lobbying to win the seat in the United
Nations (UN), and in 1966 Chinese scientists and scholars were able to
4 A. LAHTINEN

visit the USA. (Spence 1999, p. 596). By the early 1960s, China had
established diplomatic relations with ten African countries, and by the end
of 1970 with 44 of the 50 independent African states. It sent thousands of
engineers, technicians, and doctors to Africa to build stadiums, hospitals,
railroads, and other infrastructure. The TAZARA Railway cemented
China–Africa relations for decades to come. This 1860 km-long railway in
East Africa links the port of Dar es Salaam in Tanzania with the town of
Kapiri Moshi in Zambia’s central province. It was built between 1970 and
1975 as a turnkey project, financed and supported by China. Tanzania,
Zambia, and China built the railway in the spirit of pan-African socialism
as the “Great Uhuru Railway (Uhuru is the Swahili word for freedom).
The purpose was to eliminate the economic dependence of landlocked
Zambia on Rhodesia (now Zimbabwe) and South Africa, both ruled by
white-minority governments at that time. Even today, TAZARA remains
an enduring symbol of Chinese support for African independence and
development, as repeated in China’s official rhetoric and historical
narrative.

Taiwan and One-China Policy

The declaration of the PRC by Mao Zedong, the Chinese communist
leader, ended the full-scale civil war between the Communist Party of
China (CPC) and the Nationalist Party, or Kuomintang (KMT). Chiang
Kai-shek’s KMT and the army retreated to the island of Taiwan, just
90 miles off the coast of mainland China. The Republic of China (ROC),
as Taiwan formally calls itself, remains politically separate from the
PRC. Whereas, the latter regards Taiwan as a part of China and has refused
to renounce the use of force if Taiwan moves toward formal separation.
China remains firm in conducting its One China policy, resisting the rec-
ognition of Taiwan. Nevertheless, China and Taiwan have developed
extensive economic relations for doing business and visiting relatives. The
USA has committed to a “peaceful solution” regarding Taiwan and con-
tinues to sell military technology to the region so that it can defend itself.
Meanwhile China criticizes US policy toward Taiwan as being interference
in China’s internal affairs. The “fall” of mainland China to communism in
1949 led the USA to suspend diplomatic ties with the PRC until the
USA’s President Nixon visited in February 1972, ending two decades of
Cold War hostility. The political support of African countries for China
was crucial when the PRC was joining the UN in 1971 and thus taking
 CHINA–AFRICA RELATIONS 5

over the seat of the ROC. Since then, Taiwan has witnessed a sharp decline
in the number of African countries that recognize it. After Malawi switched
its allegiance from Taipei to Beijing in 2007, only four countries—Swazi-
land, Burkina Faso, Gambia, and São Tomé and Príncipe—recognize
Taiwan. Ten years later, Burkina Faso and Swasiland, are last two African
allies. They say that they have no plans to break ties with Taiwan. However,
it is hard to predict how long these two countries can resist China's eco-
nomic sphere of influence.
Deng Xiaoping initiated reforms in 1978 with a focus on domestic eco-
nomic development, shifting from a command economy to a market econ-
omy. His pragmatic “Socialism with Chinese Characteristics” opened
China up to foreign investment and the global market, developing China
into one of the fastest-growing economies in the world. Fundamentally,
his dilemma was the relationship between economic progress and political
freedom to secure power for the CPC. This same challenge for China
remains following the Tiananmen Square tragedy in 1989. It ended
China’s honeymoon relationship with Western countries for a couple of
years, with China being censured and isolated by the West. Thus it turned
to Africa to strengthen its old relations and initiate new projects. In the
1990s the China–Africa relationship finally shifted from ideology- to
economy-driven affairs. China–Africa trade increased rapidly, from $10.5
billion in 2000 to $40 billion in 2005 and $166 billion in 2011. In 2012,
China surpassed the USA and Europe to become Africa’s largest trading
partner (Africa Renewal 2013).
China’s entrance into Africa has received much attention from scholars,
policymakers, and the media. Its rapid engagement with economic activi-
ties in Africa has roused concerns. What are China’s goals in Africa and,
moreover, what is its impact on Africa’s development—is it good or bad?
The fairly extensive literature on the subject has described, examined and
commented on China’s multidimensional and multilayered interests in
Africa. In general there is agreement that the African economies have prof-
ited from China–Africa cooperation, but increasingly it is being ques-
tioned whether this relationship is as good for Africa as it has been for
China. Notable scholars have been critical. Chris Alden, in his China in
Africa (2005), pointed out how quickly China moved into Africa. He was
concerned about China’s unconditional trade, and the enthusiastic
response that African governments had to it. In his article “The Paradox
of China’s Policy in Africa” (2010), Seifudein Adem claimed that Africa’s
engagement with China would block its efforts to overcome dependency
6 A. LAHTINEN

and underdevelopment. China’s trade practices, and its infrastructure for

resources model, were largely criticized. Many criticized it for damaging
the continent’s natural resources and accused China of the “neocolonial-
ist” behavior. Taylor’s China’s Oil Diplomacy in Africa (2006) confirmed
that China was primarily seeking Africa’s oil and other natural resources.
Later, in his The International Relations of Sub-Saharan Africa (2010),
Taylor linked Africa to the global stage, as in the “new” scramble where
the new and old players are competing for Africa’s resources. Carmody
asserted that China’s involvement in Africa is like colonialism in The New
Scramble for Africa (2011). In contrast, Deborah Brautigam argued that
Africa gains from the partnership because China’s growth path is more
efficient than the paternalistic aid of the West. Her Dragon’s Gift (2009)
became a success and reference for those with a more moderate view of
China’s intentions in Africa. Spanish journalists Juan Pablo Cardenal and
Heriberto Araújo have rather opposing views on China and its goals, both
in Africa and globally. Their China’s Silent Army (2014) claims that China
is seeking leadership of the world. They expose the poor labor conditions
and mistreatment of workers, both local and Chinese, in Chinese compa-
nies operating in Africa. However, David Shambaugh attempts to calm
fears about China ruling the world. In his China Goes Global (2014), he
asserts that this notion is overstated and incorrect. In his view, China has
a long way to go to become a real global power, if it ever becomes one.
However, today, in light of the most recent incidents and unforeseen
events in world politics, a periodic reassessment is necessary.
Many Africans have expressed worries about China in Africa. Manji and
Marks have raised their voices as independent analysts and activists in
Perspectives on China in Africa (2007), a collection of articles. The con-
tributors to that volume have concerns for African people, but there is no
single “African view” about China in Africa. Rocha appraises African civil
society organizations as being crucial to ensure Africa’s economic develop-
ment toward being sustainable, and raises concerns about its natural
resources being exploited. Ndubisi Obiorah considers human rights and
democracy essential to Africa’s development. Kwesi Kwaa Prah brings up
the colonial past of the West in Africa while criticizing Western concerns
about China. In his view the West is simply “being jealous about Chinese
inroads to Africa.” In contrast, Anabela Lemos and Daniel Ribeiro charac-
terize Mozambique as “the Chinese takeaway,” worrying that the country
is at risk of being recolonized. Ali Askouri criticizes China’s non-­interference
policy and claims that economic ties between China and African govern-
 CHINA–AFRICA RELATIONS 7

ments are too close. The title of Muzi Kuzwayo’s (2012) book, Black
Man’s Medicine, comes from the African adage Setlhare sa Mosotho ke lek-
gowa (Black Man’s Medicine is the White Man). He emphasizes the ben-
efits of self-economic empowerment of Africans. Muzi is not alone in
arguing that blaming colonialism for Africa’s failings belongs to the past. In
his view, apartheid is an unfortunate history that must never be forgotten,
but now it is time to move on. Elley Twineyo-Kamugisha agrees. In her
Why Africa Fails (2012), she claims that Africa’s malaise is in large part the
result of its mistakes: greed, poor policies, and a lack of leadership.

China
China is a vast country with an enormous variety of land cover and diverse
climates. It has a population of more than 1.3 billion people, unevenly
distributed across its provinces. The country has the world’s longest con-
tinuously recorded history. The earliest Chinese writing, founded on so-
called oracle bones more than 4000 years ago, provides information about
the development of Chinese script. The oldest works of literature are from
the late Zhou Dynasty (1046–256 BCE), which was the longest lasting of
the Chinese dynasties. The most influential minds in the Chinese intel-
lectual tradition flourished under the Zhou Dynasty, particularly during
the Easter Zhou period (770–256 BCE). Many of the ideas developed by
Laozi, Confucius, Mencius, and Mozi inform Chinese civilization today.

Governance
China is a one-party state, with great power lying with the CPC. The party
refers to Marxism-Leninism, Mao Zedong’s Thought, Deng Xiaoping’s
Theory, Jiang Zemin’s Three Represents, Hu Jintao’s Harmonious
Society, and Xi Jinping’s Thought, which after the weeklong Communist
Party congress in October 2017 was incorporated into the Communis
Party’s constitution. Restoring China to greatness is a central message.
The authoritarian regime that tolerates a significant range of economic
freedoms is practiced within the governing system that includes
the Communist Party of China (CPC), The National People’s Congress
(NPC) and the Central People’s Government (also known as the State
Council). The CPC is the party in power.
The CPC has both central and local organizations. At the top is the
Central Committee. When it is not in session, the Political Bureau and its
8 A. LAHTINEN

Standing Committee exercise the power of the Central Committee. Both

the Political Bureau and its Standing Committee are elected by the plenary
session of the Central Committee. Party members nationwide hold almost
all of the top posts in the government, military, and internal security ser-
vices, and also in many financial and commercial entities, universities, aca-
demia, and social organizations. The CPC does not tolerate any form of
organized opposition or independent political parties. Despite relative
freedom in private discussion, China’s media remains extremely restrictive.
All Chinese television, radio, and print outlets are party mouthpieces.
Chinese laws formally guarantee equal treatment for all segments of soci-
ety but do not always achieve this in practice. Freedom House (2017)
reports a downward trend in freedom as a result of the chilling effect on
private and public discussion, particularly online, generated by cybersecu-
rity and foreign non-governmental organization (NGO) laws, increased
internet surveillance, and heavy sentences handed down to human rights
lawyers, microbloggers, grassroots activists, and religious believers.
The NPC of the PRC is the highest organ of state power. The term of
office of the NPC and its standing committee is five years. Its 3000 mem-
bers meet once a year. The NPC is effectively a symbolic body under the
leadership of the CPC. The only competitive elections are for village com-
mittees and urban residency councils, which have limited authority and are
subordinate to the local CPC committees. The nomination of candidates
remains tightly controlled, and many of the elections have been marred by
fraud, corruption, and attacks on independent candidates.
The central administrative organ is the Central People’s Government/State
Council. Local government agencies of the people’s governments are at
four levels: the provinces (autonomous regions and centrally administered
municipalities); cities and prefectures; counties; and townships. The gov-
ernment and military are subordinate to the CPC, which sets the national
policy agenda.
The presidency of the PRC, as the head of the state, is an independent
organ that as an office of state power does not itself decide on national affairs
but exercises its power according to decisions of the NPC and its standing
committee. At the 18th Party Congress in November 2012, the new Politburo
Standing Committee of seven members was announced. It is headed by Xi
Jinping, general secretary of the CPC’s Central Committee, Chinese presi-
dent and chairman of the Central Military Commission. He was named state
president in March 2013. Xi was re-elected to post of Secretary General of the
Central Committee of the CPC during the 19th Party Congress held in
October 2017. He was also elected head of the Military Council.
 CHINA–AFRICA RELATIONS 9

Economic Reforms
Deng Xiaoping inherited from Mao Zedong a stagnant economy and a
wounded state.1 China was still underdeveloped. Its gross domestic prod-
uct (GDP) per capita level was like that of Zambia, being less than half of
the Asian average and less than two-thirds of the African average. The
country’s industrial production and trade was controlled following cen-
trally planned output targets. Collectivized agriculture was the norm.
Following the reforms in 1978 and under Deng’s leadership, China shifted
from a centrally planned to a market-based economy. Major components
of the reform included agriculture with price and ownership incentives for
farmers. Trade and foreign direct investment (FDI) were at the core of
economic reform as part of the open-door policy. This encouraged the
opening up of China to foreign imports and the promotion of exports. In
the 1980s, foreign investors were invited to set up factories in special eco-
nomic zones along the coast, in the Shenzhen and Shanghai areas, inde-
pendently of or jointly with Chinese enterprises, to process imported or
locally produced materials for export. No import duties were levied on
materials prepared for export. A primary purpose of this was to absorb
Chinese labor while using the capital and technical knowledge of the for-
eign investors. Deng was instrumental in the development of the coastal
area, asserting that “some areas must get rich before others” and that the
wealth from coastal regions would eventually be transferred to aid eco-
nomic construction inland. Deng’s catchphrase “To get rich is glorious”
during his famous southern tour of China in 1992 encouraged entrepre-
neurship to drive China’s economy. In 1999, China launched the “Go
Out” or “Going Global Strategy” to encourage Chinese enterprises to
invest overseas. Then its entry into the World Trade Organization in 2001
integrated China into the global economy. Consequently, China has
grown, and this unforeseen growth was remarkable. China needed oil and
resources from Africa to keep its industries and construction companies
going, as well as new markets for its products. China had become the
manufacturing center of the world.
Indeed, China has benefited from these market reforms. In only a few
decades it has become the second-largest economy in the world, and a
manufacturing hub specialized in labor-intensive and export-led produc-
tion. China’s remarkable annual two-digit GDP lifted more than 800 hun-
dred million people out of poverty (World Bank, China 2017). Its Human
Development Index has risen steadily, and life expectancy, primary school
10 A. LAHTINEN

enrollment, and literacy are comparable to those of other middle-income

countries. Today, most Chinese citizens are better off than ever before.
Becoming rich is the reality for many.

Economic Growth
China has emerged as a major global economic power. It is now the
world’s second-largest economy.
Before the reforms in 1979, the average annual real GDP growth rate
in China was estimated at 5.3% (from 1960–1978) according to the
Congressional Research Service. China’s annual growth in 1990 was
3.9%. According to the World Bank, in 2000 annual growth was 8.5%,
and in 2007 it peaked at 14.2%. Since then, with the effects of the global
recession, there have been some steep inclines and drops in China’s GDP
growth rate. In August in 2008, when China hosted the Summer
Olympics, the skies were cleared of pollution, and the talks of political
reform haven’t disappeared. The country’s economy was in robust
growth. In September of that year, the fourth-largest US investment
bank, Lehman Brothers, collapsed. The global economy went into reces-
sion and the world economic crisis affected China’s economy. China’s
exports, imports, and FDI inflows declined, GDP growth slowed, and
millions of Chinese workers reportedly lost their jobs. The Chinese gov-
ernment responded by implementing a $586 billion economic stimulus
package and loosening monetary policies to increase bank lending. In
2008 the country’s annual GDP growth rate dropped by 4.6%, to 9.6%
compared with the previous year. In 2009, 2010, and 2011, China
reached its longstanding growth target of 8%. However, in 2012, its GDP
growth was 7.9%, so the government adopted a “new normal” with a
7.5% growth target. In 2015, China’s GDP reached its lowest figure for
25 years as growth was just 6.9%. This was a shock to the world’s markets.
The International Monetary Fund (IMF 2016a, b) forecast predicted the
country’s growth to slow to 6.3% in 2016 and 6.0% in 2017. However,
according to official data, China’s economy expanded to 6.7% in 2016,
although helped by a hefty dose of government stimulus. This was a slow-
down from the 6.9% in 2015, but stronger than predicted. Economists
say that such growth can’t continue indefinitely. They expect it to slow
further to 6.5% in 2017.
 CHINA–AFRICA RELATIONS 11

China’s problems in industry and real-estate markets have resulted

from manufacturing overcapacity and overlending to local governments.
This has led to an oversupply of houses, which has resulted in falling prices,
especially outside of the larger cities. Although China’s debt level is close
to some other indebted countries, the speed of growing debt is alarming.
Debt has quadrupled since 2007, and around 50% of loans are linked to
real-estate purchases, according to a report by McKinsey (2015). Global
markets fear a collapse in Chinese growth. The credibility of the data has
been problematic for a long time. Longstanding doubts about the accu-
racy of China’s economic data hit the news when the governor of Liaoning,
a major industrial region in northeast China, said that false statistics
boosted the province’s economic data from 2011 to 2014, according to
China’s official state news agency, Xinhua. The province admits falsifying
economic data for years (CNN 2017).
China’s economic development has also brought many problems.
These challenge the legitimacy of the government, which is largely depen-
dent on maintaining economic growth and how it succeeds in dealing
with emerging societal issues. Demonstrations by citizens have become
common all over the country. In truth, economic growth has been at the
expense of the environment. The environmental degradation is severe.
China’s mounting environmental crisis is one of the country’s most press-
ing challenges. The country is the world’s largest source of carbon emis-
sions, and in consequence the air quality of many of cities fails to meet
international health standards. For good reason, citizens are worried about
the consequent health threats. The fruits of growth have been distributed
unevenly. The income gap is increasing among the people while the dis-
parities are widening between the regions, and cities. At the same time,
China is facing demographic pressures related to gender imbalance, the
aging population, and the internal migration of labor. The rapidly aging
population means that the proportion making up the workforce is shrink-
ing and the number of dependents is rising. In response, China has recently
eased its one-child policy restrictions to allow all couples to have two chil-
dren. However, it may not alleviate the demographic strains on the econ-
omy because many couples say that they cannot afford another child. Also,
China is undergoing a rapid rural–urban transition and transformation.
The World Bank (2014) estimates that by 2030 up to 70% of the Chinese
population—around a billion—will be living in cities. Fast urbanization
increases the demand for the employment, urban infrastructure, and social
services. The government has relaxed its Urban Registration System
12 A. LAHTINEN

(hukou) to make rural–urban transition easier. Peasant migrants can move

to work in cities in low-end jobs, but they are not eligible for basic urban
social services. Their children are too often left in the countryside to be
taken care of by grandparents or relatives, and sometimes even by
themselves.
To change its economic course, China is now in the process of trans-
forming from a manufacturing-based economy to a service and high-­
technology economy, with a global reach that also has an impact on Africa
and its economies.

Africa
Africa is the world’s second-largest continent with 54 separate countries
and a rapidly growing population of roughly a billion. The regions are
North Africa, West Africa, East Africa, Central Africa, and Southern Africa.
Africa is a land of diversity with abundant natural resources; extraordinary
wildlife, landscapes and fascinating cultures; and the complexity of ethnic
divisions. It is a continent of contrasts, not only from the geographical,
historical, and cultural points of view but also sociopolitically and eco-
nomically. It is a site of spatial and cultural change, Janus-like, emulating
an African mask with opposite faces, looking both to the past and to the
future.
Africa stands at the very beginning of the origin of humanity, as proven
by many findings around the Great Rift Valley area. Its ancestor traditions
go back to the earliest times. African history comprises tradition and two
major invasions. Overlays of European Christian tradition and Arab-­
Islamic traditions have given Africa a complex array of ideas. Christian and
Islamic influences changed the structure of African behavior and created
new institutions, competing with or replacing ancient traditions. Africa’s
weak internal integration and underdevelopment have been linked to its
history, characterized by the slave trade and colonial rule. From the late
fifteenth century, Europeans and Arabs took slaves from West, Central,
and Southeast Africa. Beginning in the seventeenth century, the Dutch
began exploring and colonizing the continent. Britain as the master of the
seas became the largest slave-running country in the world. Between 1492
and 1885, Europe’s continental power was unchallenged. Millions of
Africans were sent across the ocean to the Americas and the Caribbean,
making Europeans who held plantations and businesses in those places
rich and powerful (Asante 2007, p. 216).
 CHINA–AFRICA RELATIONS 13

Colonial conquest leading to direct colonization began around 1870.

In 1878, at the Congress of Berlin hosted by German’s first chancellor,
Otto von Bismarck, Africa was divided by the European powers. It was
sliced up like a cake, straight geographical lines of latitude and longitude,
based on the principle of “effective occupation” (Carmody 2011, p. 2).
Africa, “un Magnifique gâteau African,” was swallowed by five rival
nations: Germany, Italy, Portugal, France and Britain (with Spain taking
some scraps) (Pakenham 2011, p. xxi). The continent was exploited and
controlled in the name of commerce, Christianity, “civilization,” and con-
quest. The most extreme exploitation occurred in the Belgian Congo
under Leopold II, the Belgian king. The presence of European powers in
Africa culminated in the Scramble for Africa, with a process of coloniza-
tion and annexation of African territory between 1881 and 1914. All these
events have had broad implications for the development of Africa.
Engagement between Africa and Europe for 150 years, from 1807 when
Britain banned the slave trade, to 1957, when the Gold Coast named
Ghana and became independent, was a bitter continental war. When it was
over, Africa had gained its political independence from the colonizing
powers, but it was still struggling in the mental and physical grip of its
former colonial masters (Asante 2007, p. 216).
Modern Africa emerged nevertheless. Decolonization took place, fol-
lowing independence and conflicts in many parts of the continent over the
next half-century. All the countries, which were formerly controlled by
Germany, England, Italy, and France, gained independence from their
colonial rulers, except for Liberia and Ethiopia, which were never colo-
nized. During the Cold War, from 1945 to 1980, between the USA and
the Soviet Union, Western powers did not impose democracy or free mar-
ket reforms on African states receiving aid. They supported “friendly”
anti-communist dictators such as Mobutu Sese Seko in Zaire, who came
to power in a coup backed by Belgium and the American Central
Intelligence Agency. After the Cold War, from the 1980s, economic and
political conditions from the Western-dominated financial institutions and
donors became the norm. The World Bank and the IMF launched struc-
tural adjustment policies encouraging the developing countries to l­ iberalize
their economies in exchange for loans. The fulfillment of these conditions
was a prerequisite to accessing these funds. Then in the 1990s the states
were urged to adopt multiparty democracy. Since 1994, when South
Africa, through democratic elections, replaced the internationally con-
demned apartheid system, there have been moves toward multiparty
14 A. LAHTINEN

democracy across the continent. In 2015 the elections in politically polar-

ized countries such as Nigeria, Tanzania, Guinea, and the Ivory Coast
concluded relatively peacefully. Whereas in Mauritius, Cape Verde,
Botswana, the Central African Republic, South Sudan, and Somalia, all
were broken by conflict.
Africa, the continent most exploited, was for a long time left in isolation
and economic marginalization. Then economic growth and development
took off, and China came to Africa. China invested in infrastructure, it
imported oil and raw materials, and it exported affordable goods to Africa.
In 2012, China was the single most dominant national trading partner for
sub-Saharan Africa (SSA). When the world markets fell into recession in
2008, China’s growth declined, and this had a severe impact on many African
economies. Africa needs economic growth to tackle poverty, climate change,
human development, and social inclusion, and to invest in health and educa-
tion. The progress and growth paths among Africa’s economies are complex,
but the World Bank (2016a, b) predicts a recovery in 2017–2018 for SSA
and gradual improvement in the region’s largest economies.

Notes
1. China was bruised and economically weak after the Cultural Revolution
(1966–76).

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 CHAPTER 2

China in Africa

Abstract China has reached the global scale as an economic power, assert-
ing its economic and diplomatic soft power to trade and invest in Africa.
Its Africa policy, as a part of its foreign policy, is the strategic framework
for bilateral ties between the countries. China’s quest for world power
stems from its economic strength. Inspiration rises from its 5000-year his-
tory and the sources of its traditions. Confucianism, the Chinese Dream,
and the New Silk Road serve the domestic and foreign policy goals of the
government. The country’s soft power shifted from soft to hard when
China established its first overseas military outpost in Djibouti in the
Horn of Africa.
The “peaceful rise with a low profile” has come to an end.

Keywords China’s policies and drivers

For more than 2000 years, the Chinese approach to foreign relations was
dominated by the distinction between the Chinese “us” and the non-­
Chinese “others.” China-centric universalism was based on the Chinese
emperor as the son of the heaven who had the Mandate of Heaven to rule
all-under-heaven (Tianxia). In imperial China, Confucianism and the
Mandate of Heaven were the foundations for the tributary system that
shaped foreign policy and trade. During the dynastic era, China was
invaded by Central Asian tribes during the dynastic era, by Western p
­ owers
and during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and by Japan in the

© The Author(s) 2018 17

A. Lahtinen, China’s Diplomacy and Economic Activities in Africa,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-69353-8_2
18 A. LAHTINEN

1930s. Since the founding of the PRC in 1949, the CPC has emphasized
the need for China to regain respect and dignity as a great nation after
being humiliated by foreign invaders for more than a century. Today,
China’s grand strategy (Swaine and Tellis 2000) has three objectives: first,
to secure domestic order by keeping up economic strength, and thus to
legitimize the CPC regime; second, to defend against external threats to
national sovereignty and territory; and, third, to attain and maintain geo-
political influence. In two decades, China became the second-largest
economy in the world. It has reached the global scale as an economic
power, asserting its economic and diplomatic clout to win allies to invest,
and to trade in Africa and all around the world. China’s interests in Africa
are political, economic, security, and ideological. It seeks Africa’s support
for its foreign policy agenda in multilateral forums.

Foreign Policy
China’s foreign policy is set by the CPC. With a membership of about 70
million, it is the only political party allowed to exercise power in China.
The CPC controls the People’s Liberation Army (PLA). The president
serves as head of the state, whereas the NPC, with 3000 members, repre-
sents the highest level of state power—in theory. The State Council is
headed by the premier, who leads the administration. The constitution
stipulates a hierarchy that divides China into provinces, cities, counties,
and townships. Each of these levels is involved in policy implementation.
China’s foreign policy is derived from the Five Principles of Peaceful
Coexistence. It consists of mutual respect for sovereignty and territorial
integrity, mutual non-aggression, non-interference (most notably with
Taiwan and Tibet), equality and mutual benefit, and peaceful coexistence.
These five were stated for the first time in an agreement between China and
India in 1954 and then incorporated, in a modified form, in the statement of
the Bandung Conference in 1955. Zhang (2013, p. 22) found that the Five
Principles of Peaceful Coexistence marked a change from the previous revo-
lutionary diplomacy (geming waijiao) to national diplomacy (guojia waijiao).
In the 1960s, the competition for Africa was heightened in China’s
foreign policy agenda. Between 1963 and 1964, Zhou Enlai visited ten
African countries and issued the Eight Principles of Foreign Economic
and Technological Assistance relating to foreign aid—to compete with the
“imperialists” (the USA) and the “revisionists” (the former Soviet
Union)—for Africa’s approval and support. During the Cultural
 CHINA IN AFRICA 19

Revolution, China continued to supply foreign aid to Africa, despite its

own domestic economic difficulties. This included the famous Tanzania–
Zambia Railway.
The Third Plenary Session of the 11th CPC Central Committee, held in
1978, decided to implement the policy of reform and opening up. The
focus shifted to economic development, and thus China’s foreign policy
was adjusted. Gradually, China’s diplomacy broke out of its ideological fet-
ters (Zhang 2013, p. 16). From the 1980s, the Chinese government pur-
sued an “independent foreign policy and peace,” according to which
China’s foreign policy goals were to preserve China’s independence, sover-
eignty, and territorial integrity, as well as to create a favorable international
environment for China’s reform, opening up and modernization. Deng
Xiaoping’s “hide its strength and bide its time” motto expressed the aim to
keep a distance from the troubles of the world. Hu Jintao’s Harmonious
Society and “scientific development” reflected the aim to secure China’s
economic growth while it begun to engage more in world affairs including
UN peacekeeping efforts. Xi Jinping conducts far more active foreign pol-
icy than his predecessors. Under his regime, China is expanding its role in
global politics. Xi-led foreign policy has become “proactive” (fenfa you
wei), while still emphasizing the development of good-neighborly relations
and partnership, and non-military aspects in economic integration and
multilateral cooperation. A fundamental principle of China’s foreign pol-
icy, a “peaceful rise with a low profile,” has come to an end.

African Policy
China’s Africa Policy (2006), as a part of its foreign policy, was issued in
January 2006. It stresses mutual benefit and shared prosperity as one of
China’s overall objectives. African policy forms the strategic framework for
the bilateral China–Africa ties and relationships. The CPC and its
International Department lays the foundation for political and commercial
cooperation. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs controls the implementation
of the African policy whereas the Ministry of Commerce plays a significant
role in trade, aid, and investments. China’s Export-Import Bank is under
the direct leadership of the State Council, which distributes official eco-
nomic assistance in the form of low-interest loans, export credits, and
guarantees. The African policy was also set to mark the 50th anniversary
of the establishment of diplomatic ties between China and Africa. The
updated African policy (2015) was released at the second summit of the
20 A. LAHTINEN

Forum on China–Africa Cooperation (FOCAC) in 2015. It promises to

help Africa to overcome the bottlenecks of infrastructure and human
resource development. China confirms its support to Africa and its desire
to reach “practical results,” in contrast to Western demands for demo-
cratic ideals and telling other nations how to run themselves. The policy
also highlights China’s commitment to friendly cooperation with all
African countries, according to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence,
and principles of mutual respect and win–win cooperation. The African
policy also sets the political precondition for China’s relations with African
countries: the One-China policy, supporting China’s reunification, but
refusing to have official relations and contacts with Taiwan. China’s search
for Africa’s support for its One-China policy and so-called “China model”
requires support for its political ideology. However, China’s policy of non-­
interference is ambiguous because the country sells weapons to rogue
states, such as Sudan and Zimbabwe (Taylor and Wu 2013).
The African Union (AU) adopted the New Partnership for Africa’s
Development (NEPAD) in Lusaka, Zambia, in 2001. NEPAD is an eco-
nomic development program that promotes sustainable development,
good governance, and democracy. The primary objectives are to eradicate
poverty, integrate Africa into the world economy, and accelerate the
empowerment of women. As China avoids dealing with transparency,
democracy, the free press, civil society, the independent judiciary, and the
rule of law—all structural elements of NEPAD—it says to support NEPAD
through FOCAC. FOCAC is China’s platform to demonstrate coopera-
tion with African countries. So, China can avoid discussing the values
attached with NEPAD referring to FOCAC, knowing that those are not
on the agenda at the China-driven FOCAC.
FOCAC was established as a platform to coordinate relations between
the two countries. It also serves as a showcase for China–Africa coopera-
tion. Since the first forum in Beijing in 2000, FOCAC has taken place in
Addis Ababa in Ethiopia (2003), Beijing (2006 and 2012), Sharm el-­
Sheikh in Egypt (2009), and Johannesburg in South Africa (2015).
The FOCAC 2006 and its first two-day China–Africa summit was held
in Beijing in November 2006. Images of African wildlife and African peo-
ple on giant billboards declaring “Amazing Africa” welcomed visitors to
the Beijing forum. Meanwhile, the Chinese media gave extensive coverage
of the summit within the theme of “Friendship, Peace, Development,
and Cooperation.” The outcome of the summit was the establishment
of a strategic partnership between China and Africa featuring political
equality and mutual trust, economic win-win cooperation and cultural
 CHINA IN AFRICA 21

exchanges. Meantime, China substantially increased its foreign aid to

Africa in political, economic, social, and cultural spheres.
Images of African wildlife and African people on giant billboards declar-
ing “Amazing Africa” welcomed visitors to the Beijing forum. Meanwhile,
the Chinese media gave extensive coverage of the summit within the
theme of “Friendship, Peace, Development and Cooperation.”
The 6th FOCAC summit in 2015 was hosted by South Africa. It was
held on November 4–5 in Johannesburg. The theme was “Africa–China
Progressing Together: Win–Win Cooperation for Common Development.”
China had consistently doubled its financing to Africa at earlier FOCAC
meetings, from $5 billion in 2006 to $10 billion in 2009 and $20 billion in
2012. On this occasion, China’s pledge was $60 billion, including $5 bil-
lion for grants and zero-interest loans, $35 billion for concessional loans
and buyer’s credit, and the rest for commercial financing. This was a signifi-
cant increase in comparison to previous commitments. The Chinese gov-
ernment announced that it would roll out ten cooperation plans with Africa
in the coming three years. These programs cover the areas of industrializa-
tion, agricultural modernization, infrastructure, financial services, green
development, trade and investment facilitation, poverty reduction and pub-
lic welfare, public health, people-to-people exchanges, and peace and secu-
rity (South African Government News Agency 2016). China’s undertaking
was applauded as a generous gesture at a time when its own economic
growth was weakening and because the “new normal” had no effect on
China’s plans in Africa. Xi reaffirmed China’s commitment to African devel-
opment. And, as usual, he talked about the collective historical experience
and struggles. He also reminded the audience that Chinese built the
Tanzara Railway and the Convention Center of the AU, and how China
helped Africa to fight Ebola. In reciprocation, Xi again thanked the African
countries’ selfless support of China’s return to the UN. However, as Sun
(2015) points out, this time he did not speak of the importance of natural
resources in China–Africa trade, perhaps because China’s demand for raw
materials was already on a downturn as a result of the economic slowdown.
It became clear that China’s intention was to transfer its production capac-
ity to Africa, and to build and upgrade the industrial parks there. Xi declared
that China was ready to take part in Africa’s future growth. It was to play
“a constructive role in promoting a political settlement of Africa’s hot-spot
issues” and in helping to unlock its “bottlenecks” in infrastructure, skilled
personnel, and access to funds. He assured the audience of China’s com-
mitment to help African growth through African solutions to African prob-
lems. In return, South Africa’s president, Jacob Zuma, praised President Xi
22 A. LAHTINEN

for taking China’s relationship with Africa “to its highest level ever.” He
thanked him for the country’s cooperation using the Chinese wording of
“sincerity, mutual trust, equality, and mutual benefit,” saying that China’s
support truly enhances the African development agenda as embodied in the
AU Agenda 2063 and its First Ten-Year Implementation Plan.
Also at Beijing’s FOCAC in 2012, President Zuma with many others
was worried about rapidly increasing trade with China and its unsustain-
able trade pattern. However, just three years later, he was ready to ensure
Africa’s full support for the partnership with China. Since then, his gov-
ernment has made political concessions to China. The 14th World Peace
Summit was scheduled to be held on October 13, 2014 in Cape Town.
It was supposed to be a gathering of former Nobel laureates honoring
Nelson Mandela, the late South African leader and a Nobel Peace Prize
recipient. But China’s pressure to shun the Dalai Lama resulted in South
Africa denying him a visa. As the Dalai Lama was unable to attend, nine
former peace prize winners and 11 affiliated organizations announced
that they would boycott the conference. South Africa was therefore
forced to cancel the even. The refusal to issue a visa to the Dalai Lama
was the third time in five years owing to the South African government’s
fear of upsetting China and thus endangering economic ties with the
country. It intensified public anger and outcry about selling South
Africa’s sovereignty to China. Archbishop Desmond Tutu accused Jacob
Zuma of kowtowing to China (Jacobs and Yu 2014).

Drivers of Global Power

China seeks a position as a global power. This quest stems from its eco-
nomic strength and is inspired by the country’s 5000-year history and its
traditions. Confucianism, the Chinese Dream, and the New Silk Road
serve the domestic and foreign policy goals of the government.
Confucianism and harmonious relationships are propagated by the gov-
ernment alongside a goal of stability and loyalty to legitimize the CPC.

The Chinese Dream

The Chinese Dream is to rejuvenate the country, and the New Silk Road is
an initiative ultimately to link the world to Zhongguo.1 The Chinese Dream
(Zhongguo meng) is a vision of the nation’s future. The goal is a strong
China—being strong economically and politically, harmonious, and beau-
tiful (including low levels of pollution) in the coming decades. The Chinese
 CHINA IN AFRICA 23

Dream is to restore the CPC’s ideological legitimacy by enhancing the

country’s self-confidence through the Two Centenaries, a set of goals
advanced by Xi Jinping. According to these goals, China was to be a mod-
erately affluent society by 2012 at the time of the 100th anniversary of the
CPC; and, second, China was to be a fully developed nation by 2049, the
date of the 100th anniversary of the founding of the PRC (Kuhn 2013).

The New Silk Road

The New Silk Road initiative is part of China’s forceful push to be a global
player. China has revived the historic Silk Road trade route that ran
between its borders and Europe. In 2013, during his visit to Central and
Southeast Asia, Xi Jinping announced the One Belt One Road project. It
is set to boost the country’s economic development through a network of
ports, pipelines, and railways, encompassing around 60 countries in Asia
and Europe, Oceania and Africa. Xi is encouraging Chinese enterprises to
invest in infrastructure and construction abroad. It is obvious that the aim
is that the new trade route will also serve as an outlet to absorb China’s
vast industrial overcapacity, mainly in steel manufacturing and heavy
equipment. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) and financial institutions
would be able to enter new markets and thus maintain the health of the
national economy. However, the initiative is not just about economics; it
also carries geopolitical intentions. The plan is that the One Belt One
Road will link China with the Persian Gulf and the Mediterranean Sea
through Central Asia and West Asia. Whereas the twenty-first-century
Maritime Silk Road is planned to go from China’s coast to Europe through
the South China Sea and the Indian Ocean in one route, and from China’s
coast through the South China Sea to the South Pacific in another. These
new corridors will link China to the rest of Asia, Africa, and Europe. The
New Silk Road will reach Africa. China, “as a good friend of Africa, is will-
ing to make efforts to help [its] African friends realize the dream,” said
China’s foreign minister, Wang Yi, after the bilateral talks with Kenya’s
foreign minister, Amina Mohamed, on January 10, 2015. China’s plan is
to build a $3.8 billion railroad linking Nairobi, Kenya’s capital, to
Mombasa, a port on the Indian Ocean. Nairobi, an inland city, is on the
Maritime Silk Road (Tiezzi 2014). The Kenya railroad project will eventu-
ally link Nairobi with the capitals of Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi, and
South Sudan. China is also involved in developing ports in Djibouti,
Tanzania, and Mozambique; it may also have plans to invest in ports in
Madagascar and the Seychelles. In Namibia, in Walvis Bay, a state-owned
24 A. LAHTINEN

Chinese company is building an artificial peninsula as part of a vast port

expansion (Larmer 2017). The rumors of a proposed naval base in Walvis
Bay are vehemently denied by Chinese officials, but it would allow access
to six African ports on the Maritime Silk Road, from the Indian Ocean
through the Red Sea.
The New Silk Road is Xi’s major undertaking, being a part of his more
active and distinctive foreign policy. “Vision and Actions on Jointly
Building Silk Road Economic Belt and 21st-Century Maritime Silk Road”
was issued by the National Development and Reform Commission, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and the Ministry of Commerce of the PRC
with State Council authorization in 28 March 2015 (Xinhua 2015). It
declares how the “Belt and Road” initiative as a win–win cooperation pro-
motes common development and prosperity, peace, and friendship by
enhancing mutual understanding and trust, and strengthening all-round
exchanges. Earlier, in October 2013, Xi had already paved the way for one
of the biggest initiatives in recent Chinese history. At a conference on the
diplomatic work in neighboring countries, he called on the delegates of
the State Council “to make our neighbors more friend [sic] in politics,
economically more closely tied to us, and we must have deeper security
cooperation and closer people-to-people ties” (Xinhua 2013).
The Asian Infrastructure Bank (AIIB) was established in 2015. It is a
Chinese-led international financial institution created to offer finance to
infrastructure projects as part of the New Silk Road initiative. It is a vital
component of Xi’s attempts to extend China’s geographical reach. The
AIIB has 57 members, but some major developed nations, including the
USA and Japan, have not joined. China supplied about 30% of the $100
billion initial operating capital. Major decisions require 75% agreement,
with China having veto power. The AIIB attracted dozens of Asian and
European member countries, many of them US allies that ignored
Washington’s concerns about the emergence of a Chinese rival to the
World Bank and the Asian Development Bank (ADB). The AIIB also met
resistance from Russia, which is promoting its integration project, the
Eurasian Economic Union. The AIIB offers sovereign and non-sovereign
finance for projects in energy and power, transportation and telecommu-
nications, rural infrastructure and agricultural development, water supply,
sanitation, environmental protection, urban development, and logistics.
In 2016 the investment target was $1.2 billion (see www.aiib.org/en/
about-aiib/who-we-are/our-work/index.html).
Criticisms and concerns have been expressed about whether the
­operation of the AIIB is transparent and up to international standards. Its
 CHINA IN AFRICA 25

establishment was regarded as an attempt by Beijing to rival the

US-dominated World Bank and the ADB, which is presided over by Japan.
Ikenberry (2017) claims that China’s creation of the AIIB could also be
considered as “counter-hegemonic” and an attempt to increase its influ-
ence and authority while reducing that of the USA. However, the AIIB
and the World Bank, originally seen as rivals, signed an agreement on April
14, 2016 to co-finance certain projects. The two banks have discussed
nearly a dozen jointly financed projects in sectors including transport,
water, and energy in Central Asia, South Asia, and East Asia (Wu 2016).
Clearly, China is directing its capital into overseas to seal its status as a
dominant player in world affairs.
The New Silk Road is not just a web of roads that starts in Urumqi, goes
to Kazakhstan and Russia, and ends up in Europe, or an economic project
to position China in the global economy. It is also a geopolitical project, a
strategic feature of China’s foreign policy. Shen (2016) believes that rather
than simply building economic partnerships with other countries, the aim
is that those countries will gradually become dependent on China.
China’s pledge of $124 billion for the New Silk Road is massive. There
are huge opportunities, but the challenges in making the plans a reality are
also enormous. It remains to be seen whether the New Silk Road project
will fulfill the aim of linking Asia, Africa, and Europe. Logistical roadblocks,
security risks, and political uncertainty are serious obstacles. Meanwhile,
other powers, such as India and Russia, have their own approaches to
building infrastructure and winning political influence in the same areas.
Thus there are doubts for many countries about undertaking joint projects
where territorial disputes might arise, and therefore connecting private-
sector investment and entrepreneurship is, to say the least, challenging.

China’s Multilateralism and Non-interference Policy in Africa

China’s foreign policy approach is one of multilateralism. Thus it seeks
cooperation with multilateral forums, such as the UN, the African Union
(AU), the World Bank, the IMF, and countries of the Organisation for
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD). China is playing a
growing role in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. Meanwhile, it has a
policy of no military bases there. China is a charter member of the UN and
one of the five permanent members of the UN Security Council. Its soft
power in military affairs also protects its economic and political ­interests in
Africa. Holding back from voting on decisions that mandate sanctions or
interventions on that continent, China has demonstrated the principle of its
26 A. LAHTINEN

non-interference policy. China’s negative vote is a veto, and it has allowed

several conflicts to continue by not voting (Nathan and Ross 1997).
The most frequently quoted examples in Africa are those of Darfur and
Zimbabwe.
Sudan and China established diplomatic relations in 1959. At the
beginning of the 1970s, China offered its first loan and began a series of
aid projects in the country. It supported Khartoum in its conflict with
southern Sudan, and it benefited politically in 1971 from a failed coup
attempt involving the Sudanese Communist Party. Sudan’s president,
Omar Al-Bashir, visited Beijing in 1990, which in the following year led to
Iranian-funded purchases of Chinese arms. Sudan experienced increasing
isolation from the West, especially the USA. At Sudan’s geographical
periphery, Darfur has continually been marginalized politically and eco-
nomically. Neglect of the region’s development and ethnic issues led to
the outbreak in 2003 of conflict in Darfur.
When Western powers put pressure on China to use its influence in
Sudan over the situation in Darfur, the decision by the UN Security
Council in March 2005 to refer the issue to the prosecutor of the
International Criminal Court (ICC) complicated China’s relations with
Sudan and the West. China abstained on the resolution and explained at
the time that it preferred justice take place in Sudanese courts. Neither
Sudan nor China is party to the Rome Statute, which established the
ICC. The ICC prosecutor subsequently determined that two northern
Sudanese, including Sudan’s minister of state for humanitarian affairs
Ahmad Muhammad Harun, were responsible for war crimes and crimes
against humanity committed in Darfur between 2003 and 2004. The ICC
judges issued international arrest warrants against the two in April 2007.
In September of that year, China’s ambassador to Sudan appeared with
Harun in Khartoum as China sent humanitarian assistance to Darfur. That
December, Human Rights First charged: “China has no intention of hold-
ing Sudan to account for evading its legal obligation to cooperate with the
ICC. And in fact, China will enable Khartoum’s continued evasion.”
China’s principle of non-interference has been practiced when holding
back from voting on decisions that mandate sanctions or interventions.
China’s negative vote constitutes a veto. It has allowed several interven-
tions to continue by not voting or casting an abstention. When the UN
demanded that pressure be applied to the government of Robert Mugabe
in Zimbabwe, China refused, stating that it would be counter-productive.
It then continued its dealings with Zimbabwe. This action was widely wel-
comed publicly by African leaders but it provoked criticism from the West.
 CHINA IN AFRICA 27

The non-interference policy has been tested in Sudan, a big oil exporter
to China. Chinese oil companies became a major stakeholder in the coun-
try, taking over the southern petroleum fields. Throughout the civil war,
Sudan continued to supply oil to China. Much of the oil revenue from
China was used to buy small arms and other military equipment from
Sudan’s ally: from 2003 to 2006, China sold more than $55 million worth
of small arms to Khartoum (China’s Arm Sales to Sudan n.d.).
After South Sudan gained independence, China quickly established
diplomatic relations with the new country because rich oil fields were
located there. When the South Sudanese Civil War erupted in December
2013, however, Chinese investments and the lives of Chinese citizens in
the country were put in jeopardy. China therefore took “a more proactive
role” in the crisis, actively participating in the peace negotiations with
Western diplomats and African mediators that began in January 2014.
This was in stark contrast to its usual approach in crises, calling for a peace-
ful resolution from afar. China took up a role as mediator. “We have huge
interests in South Sudan so we have to make a greater effort to persuade
the two sides to stop fighting and agree to a ceasefire,” Ma Qiang, the
Chinese ambassador to South Sudan, told Reuters.2 However, China’s
active role in the South Sudan negotiations does not mean that China
changed its foreign policy of non-interference as officially China continues
to claim its non-interference policy. Likely the policy will be challenged
again and again as China continues to invest and trade in unstable regions
in Africa and elsewhere. However, in several cases, China has sent peace-
keepers only after giving support to the actors who were causing the situ-
ation.3 Indeed, China has been focusing on economic relationships, to
allow it to trade and invest with no strings attached and also it has intro-
duced a non-interference policy in African governmental affairs.

UN Peacekeeping in Africa
Under President Xi Jinping, China has increased its direct involvement in
peace and security matters in Africa. Up to March 2017, more than 2500
Chinese troops, police, and military experts had been dispatched to six UN
peacekeeping missions in Africa, four of which are in Darfur, the Democratic
Republic of the Congo (DRC), Mali, and South Sudan. There are also
smaller contingents in the Ivory Coast and Western Sahara (Tumanjong
2014).4 The killing of Chinese peacekeepers in Mali and South Sudan,5
and the kidnapping of Chinese workers in Cameroon,6 illustrates China’s
vulnerabilities as it engages more both in Africa and internationally.
28 A. LAHTINEN

China’s role has increased in UN peacekeeping operations in Africa. No

doubt it wishes to protect its economic activities and political interests there.
Its first peacekeeping mission was in December 2015 when it sent 700 sol-
diers to the UN Mission in South Sudan. The Chinese ambassador to South
Sudan, Ma Qiang, gave assurance that China’s policy had not changed, insist-
ing that it had adhered to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence and that
its engagement in the peace process and UN p ­ eacekeeping was a contribution
to a multilateral initiative. China supports the African nations in its way and
does not push the so-called values of Western democracy, he said.7
Xi surprised the UN General Assembly on September 28, 2015, when
he pledged to set up a permanent Chinese peacekeeping force of 8000
troops. He also said that China would provide $100 million in military
assistance to the AU for the next five years to support the establishment of
an African standby force and to boost its capacity-building for crisis
response.8 As Li (2015) points out, despite Xi claims that Chinese efforts
to support peacekeeping operations and to train peacekeepers are part of
its soft power, the motivation is not simply to stabilize the continent.
Previously, China had limited its contributions in terms of military person-
nel to engineering, logistical and medical troops.9 Now Xi has changed
China’s involvement in Africa’s security affairs considerably. Two months
into his presidency, 170 combat troops from the PLA Special Force were
dispatched to the UN peacekeeping mission in Mali.10 This was the first
time that China sent “combat troops” to a foreign country.
China’s power shift, from soft to hard, become clear in 2016 when it
established its first overseas military outpost in Djibouti in the Horn of
Africa. A hot, dusty, and tiny city-state with fewer than a million people,
Djibouti has a strategic location at the Bab el-Mandeb Strait that connects
the Suez Canal and the Red Sea with the Gulf of Aden. With its proximity
to volatile areas in Africa and the Middle East, it plays a critical role in inter-
national efforts to fight piracy in the region while being a prime location for
the world’s military superpowers. China and Djibouti signed a security and
defense agreement in 2014. Two years later, China began to build a bricks-
and-mortar naval base in Djibouti, which is already home to US, French,
and Japanese military bases.11 It also has agreements to build a free trade
zone and to allow Chinese banks to operate there. China is downplaying
suspicions about the base’s role in its strategic military expansion. Thus it
refers the base as serving to “provide better logistics and safeguard Chinese
peacekeeping forces in the Gulf of Aden, offshore Somalia and other
humanitarian assistance tasks of the UN.”12 China contributes to a UN
peacekeeping standby force to show that it is a responsible international
 CHINA IN AFRICA 29

player amid concerns about its growing military might. Of the UN’s 16
missions, nine are in Africa, where China has significant investments.13
Peacekeeping gives China more clout in decision-making at the UN as
well as improving its international image and helping it to gather intelli-
gence. China also has other maritime plans for West Africa’s coastline
ports in Senegal, Gabon, and Ghana. China Harbor Engineering Company
Ltd (CHEC) started building a deep-water port in Cameroon’s port city
of Kribi in June 2011 and completed the project within three years (Huang
Yanan 2015. News.xinhuanet.com). New projects may well be extended
into Central African countries where China already has operations. Three
Chinese warships have joined the international naval flotilla battling piracy
in the Gulf of Aden. Certainly, China wants to have its say in world poli-
tics, so it is asserting itself as a global military power.
Despite the political rhetoric, the party doctrine of a “peaceful rise with
a low profile” has come to an end. China’s non-intervention approach is
no longer in effect.
Meanwhile, the core idea of the Five Principles of Peaceful Existence—
that no state has the right to interfere in the internal affairs of another—offi-
cially remains. This means that China is not giving up its core interests of
Taiwan, the South China Sea, Tibet, and Xinjiang. Taiwan’s independence
from China exists de facto, but not de jure, whereas Tibet and Xinjiang are
considered integral parts of the country. The Xinjiang a­ utonomous region in
China’s far west has caused tensions between the Chinese authorities and the
ethnic Uighur population. Ethnic tensions caused by economic and cultural
factors are the root cause of the unrest and violence in Xinjiang. While
Xinjiang has received considerable state investments in industrial and energy
projects to benefit the region, it has also brought Han Chinese workers from
the east, causing loss of jobs for the Uighurs. China has repeatedly made clear
that it will use force to protect its core interests. This has already been wit-
nessed in its territorial claims in the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands. China has
taken an assertive stance in this case, considering its territorial interests legiti-
mate for historical reasons. At the heart of dispute are eight uninhabited
islands in the East China Sea, known as the Senkaku Islands in Japan and the
Diaoyu Islands in China. They lie north-east of Taiwan, east of the Chinese
mainland, and south-west of Japan’s prefecture, Okinawa. The islands matter
because they are close to important shipping lanes and fishing areas and lie
near potential oil and gas reserves. They are also in a strategically significant
position, amid rising competition between the USA and China for military
primacy in the Asia-Pacific region. Japan inhabited the Senkaku Islands from
1895 until the start of World War II. When Okinawa prefecture was
30 A. LAHTINEN

provisionally placed under US administration in 1945, but returned to

Japan in 1972. Both China and Japan claimed that history was on their
side. China’s military has been building large-scale facilities on islands near
the Senkaku Islands. There has been a sharp rise of tension since 2012.
Chinese coastguard ships now regularly sail toward the islands, often
escorting fleets of fishing boats. In response, Japan has expanded its own
coastguard. China’s intentions to revise the status quo of the South China
Sea are also threatening the national interests of the Philippines, Indonesia,
Malaysia and Vietnam. China–US tensions have influenced the foreign
policy choices of the Southeast Asian leaders. Hence, the dispute goes to
the heart of concerns about China’s growing power ambition across a
region, once dominated by the USA.
At least where Africa is concerned, “good-neighborly” relations and a
“win–win partnership” remain; it is its economic activities and foreign
policy that are on the move. Alongside its position as a world economic
power, China wants to have its say in world politics.

Notes
1. Zhongguo as “middle kingdom” is a common name for China that has been
in use since the Western Zhou dynasty (c. 1046 BC to 771 BC). It reflects
a China-centric worldview, as for most of its history, China sees itself as the
cultural universe.
2. Tiezzi, S. (2014). In South Sudan Conflict, China Tests Its Mediation
Skills, Diplomat, June 6, 2014. http://thediplomat.com/2014/06/
in-south-sudan-conflict-china-tests-its-mediation-skills/
3. China’s Growing Role in UN Peacekeeping. Asia Report N°166 17 Apr
2009. pp. 1–48. International Crisis Group. See also http://www.crisis-
group.org/en/regions/asia/north-east-asia/china/166-chinas-grow
4. United Nations Peacekeeping. http://www.un.org/en/peacekeeping/
resources/statistics/contributors.shtml
5. Chin, J. (2016). Violence in South Sudan Kills Two Chinese U.N. Peacekeepers.
The Wall Street Journal, July 11, 2016. https://www.wsj.com/articles/
violence-in-south-sudan-kills-chinese-u-n-peacekeeper-1468224678
6. Tumanjong, E. (2014). Chinese Workers Kidnapped by Suspected Boko
Haram Militants in Cameroon. The Wall Street Journal, May 17, 2014.
https://www.wsj.com/articles/chinese-workers-kidnapped-by-suspected-
boko-haram-militants-in-cameroon
7. Su, A. (2016). China’s Business and Politics in South Sudan by Alice Su.
The Foreign Affairs, Letter from Juba, June 6, 2016. https://www.
foreignaffairs.com/articles/south-sudan/2016-06-06/chinas-business-
and-politics-south-sudan
 CHINA IN AFRICA 31

8. Martina, M. and Brunnstrom, D. (China’s Xi says to commit 8000 troops

for U.N. peacekeeping force. United Nations. http://www.reuters.com/
article/us-un-assembly-china-idUSKCN0RS1Z120150928
9. Li, G. (2015). Xi’s Blue Helmets: Chinese Peacekeeping in Context. China
Brief Volume: 15 Issue: 21, November 2, 2015. http://www.jamestown.
org/programs/chinabrief/single
10. Yun, S. (2014). Xi Jinping’s Africa Policy: The First Year by Sun Yun. The
Brookings Institute, April 14, 2014. http://www.brookings.edu/blogs/
africa-in-focus/posts/2014/04/10-jinping-africa-policy-sun
11. Mwiti, L. (2015). It’s hot, dusty, and tiny, but this city-state is on the way
to be one of Africa’s few real superpowers. http://mgafrica.com/
article/2015-05-12-scenarios-you-wouldnt-have-thought-it-but-this-city-
state-could-be-africas-only-actual-superpowerworlds-most-undderate-
dunknown-punching-above-its-weight
12. Felge, J. (2016). Why China’s Djibouti Presence Matters. Beijing’s growing
role there has broader strategic implications. The Diplomat, April 13, 2016.
http://thediplomat.com/2016/04/why-chinas-djibouti-presence-matters
13. Martina, M. and Brunnstom, D. (2015). China’s Xi says to commit 8000
troops for U.N. peacekeeping force, UN, http://www.reuters.com/arti-
cle/us-un-assembly-china-idUSKCN0RS1Z120150929

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is-china-the-worlds-new-colonial-power.html
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
 The killer’s habit of forcing open a whale’s mouth and eating the
tongue from the living animal, is an extraordinary method of attack
which has long been recorded by the whalemen who hunted the
Arctic bowhead. I must confess, however, that I had always been
skeptical as to the accuracy of this report until my own experiences
with the gray whales in Korea, where its truth was clearly
demonstrated.
Another story which is undoubtedly purely mythical, although it
has astonishingly wide credence, is that of “the swordfish and the
thresher.” It is said that a swordfish with a killer will attack a large
whale, prodding the animal from below with its “sword” and
preventing it from diving, while the killer tears out the tongue.

An anterior view of a killer. The heavy teeth and the white spot
just behind the eye are well shown.

I have personally interviewed a number of men who were reported

to have witnessed such a combat, but have never yet found one who
had seen a swordfish, or had any evidence of one being there,
although the killer could easily be seen. They usually defend their
story by saying that a swordfish must have been below, otherwise the
whale would have sounded. Undoubtedly what prevents the whale
from diving is the fact that it becomes paralyzed with fright and so
utterly confused that it is unable to escape.
An orca probably could not kill a large whale alone, but single
individuals undoubtedly cause all the fin whales great annoyance by
biting off the tips of their flukes and flippers; at least two-thirds of
the whales brought to the stations had the flukes or flippers injured. I
have a photograph of a young finback whale with the flipper torn and
mangled and plainly showing a killer’s teeth marks.
The sperm whale is probably the only marine animal which is
more than a match for a herd of killers. The enormous lower jaw of a
sperm whale presents an array of teeth even more formidable than
those of the orca, and I greatly doubt if the killer could succeed in
terrifying this whale; it is significant that the flukes and flippers of
sperms are practically always free from injuries.
Like other members of the dolphin family, the killer has twelve
teeth in both jaws and they may be readily distinguished from those
of the sperm whale by their smaller size and flatter basal portion.
 CHAPTER XIX
A STRANGE GIANT OF THE OCEAN

Of all the strange animals which live in the sea the sperm whale is
certainly one of the most extraordinary; whenever I look at one I feel
like saying with the country boy who had just seen his first camel:
“There ain’t no such thing, b’gosh.”

A sperm whale lying on the slip at Kyuquot, Vancouver Island.

Note the slender lower jaw and the small side fins.

Its head, which occupies one-third of the entire body, is

rectangular in shape, and contains an immense tank filled with liquid
oil known as “spermaceti.” It is only necessary to cut an opening in
the “case,” as this portion of the head is called, and with a bucket dip
out ten or fifteen barrels of oil.
Spermaceti congeals slightly when cooled and in appearance is
much like soft white paraffin. Beneath the oil-case is a great mass of
cellular tissue, called the “junk,” which also contains spermaceti
although not in a liquid condition. Spermaceti is used almost entirely
for lubricating fine pieces of machinery and its quality is very much
superior to the oil obtained from the blubber.
The use to the whale of the oil-case is largely a matter of
conjecture. My own belief is that it acts as a great reservoir and that
the animal draws upon it for nourishment during periods of food
scarcity. Bears, seals, and other animals store up on their bodies
great quantities of fat which enable them to live without food during
hibernation, or the breeding period, and the sperm whale is possibly
a similar case; some specimens are killed which are “dry,” and have
practically no oil in either the blubber or head.
Spermaceti should not be confused with “ambergris,” a substance
of great value in the manufacture of perfumes, which is obtained
only from the sperm whale. Ambergris is due to a pathological
condition of the intestines and is never found in healthy whales. It is
impossible to tell just how the substance is formed, but the fact that
it often contains cuttlefish beaks leads to the supposition that it is in
some way connected with the squid and cuttlefish upon which the
sperm whale feeds.
 Stripping the blubber from the head of a sperm whale.
Immediately beneath the blubber of this portion is the oil-case.
The blowhole may be seen at the end of the snout.

If but a small amount of ambergris is produced it will often pass

off with the excreta and, since it is very light, may be found floating
in the water, but the entire intestines of dead whales have been
known to be clogged with the substance. It is exceedingly valuable,
the black ambergris being worth at the present time $12.50 an ounce,
and the gray, which is of superior quality, $20. As much as $60,000
worth has been taken from the intestines of a single whale.
It is not itself used as an odor but as a fixative in perfumes; that is,
to make the fragrance last. Many substitutes for ambergris have been
adopted in commercial work, but as yet none has been found which
is as effective as the original substance.
For hundreds of years ambergris has been known and used in
various ways. It was formerly supposed to have wonderful medicinal
qualities (which, however, are largely mythical) and in Asia was
employed as a spice in cooking. The Turks have long considered it of
the greatest value, and pilgrims who traveled to Mecca used to bring
it as an offering. Ambergris has a peculiar and not disagreeable odor
which, when once identified, will not easily be forgotten; after
touching it traces of the smell will still remain even though the hands
have received several washings.
During the last eight years at least fifty persons have brought to my
office for identification almost as many different substances which
they have found floating or washed up on the seacoast, and which
they devoutly prayed might prove to be ambergris. One man brought
as a sample a large piece of tallow from a barrelful which he had
collected at considerable trouble and expense; another had a portion
of a jellyfish, and a third carefully treasured a mass of dirty soap. But
as yet no one has brought “the real thing.” Ambergris is soluble in
alcohol and this is a good first test for those to whom the substance is
unknown.
The sperm is by far the largest member of the toothed whale family
and has from eighteen to twenty-five massive teeth on each side of
the lower jaw; these fit into sockets in the upper jaw and assist in
holding the whale’s food. Upper teeth are also present but are in a
rudimentary condition and, except in rare cases, do not protrude into
the sockets; undoubtedly in ancient times the upper teeth were as
well developed as the lower but since they have not been needed they
have gradually atrophied and almost disappeared. Like the teeth of
other animals, those of the sperm whale are hollow in the basal half
of their length for the reception of nerves; in young whales this nerve
cavity is wide and deep but it almost closes with increasing age.
 “The sperm ... has from eighteen to twenty-five massive teeth on
each side of the lower jaw; these fit into sockets in the upper jaw
and assist in holding the whale’s food.”

Quite frequently the lower jaw of an immature animal will be

injured and as the whale grows its jaw becomes twisted like an
enormous corkscrew. The widespreading posterior part of the jaw is
called the “panbone” and from it the sailors make walking sticks, pie-
markers, hairpins, and carvings which are often beautifully executed.
“Scrimshawing,” or drawing upon whale’s teeth, also helps to while
away many weary hours when the ship lies still in a tropic calm.
 Cutting away the “junk” from the “case” of a sperm whale. The
junk is a mass of cellular tissue which also contains spermaceti.

The sperm whale is a lover of warm currents which favor the giant
squid and cuttlefish on which it lives, and although it has been taken
as far north as the Aleutian Islands, Alaska, even there it is in the
comparatively warm waters of the Japanese stream; it has also been
captured in the sub-Antarctic near the Falkland Islands.
The squid reach a length of twenty feet or more and the whale
sometimes has terrific battles with its huge prey, the tentacles of
which, armed with deadly suckers, tear long gashes in the skin of the
head and snout, leaving white scars crisscrossed in every direction.
In Japan I took several enormous spiny lobsters from the stomach of
a sperm whale, as well as the remains of a shark and seventy or
eighty yellow parrot-like beaks of the cuttlefish.
Unlike the whalebone whales, of which the opposite is true, the
male sperm is very much larger than the female, and an old bull will
sometimes reach a length of seventy feet and weigh eighty or ninety
tons. Such an animal is a truly colossal creature. The head of a sixty-
foot sperm, which was killed by Captain Fred Olsen in Japan
especially for the American Museum, was almost twenty feet in
length, and the skull, when crated, had a space measurement of
twenty-six tons; it was so large that it would barely pass through the
main hatch of the steamship which carried it to New York.
The sperm has only a single S-shaped blowhole situated almost at
the end of the snout on the left side, and its spout, which is like that
of no other whale, may be easily recognized even at a considerable
distance; the low, bushy, vapor column is directed diagonally
forward and upward, and the animal blows much oftener and more
regularly than other large cetaceans. A sperm may spout thirty or
forty times when not disturbed, generally lying still but occasionally
swimming slowly during the entire breathing period.

An anterior view of a young male sperm whale. The head occupies

one-third the entire length of the animal and the lower jaw is
much shorter than the upper.

When a bull is wallowing at the surface, the “hump”

(corresponding to the dorsal fin of the fin whales) is first seen, and at
regular intervals, as the spout is ejected, the nose appears some forty
feet ahead. The length of time he stays at the surface, the number of
spouts, and the interval between them are all very regular and thus
the hunters, after a particular whale has been observed for a few
minutes, know exactly when the animal will again appear and how
long it will remain visible.
After its blowing has been finished, the head gradually sinks, the
back and “small” are curved upward, the flukes are lifted slowly high
into the air, and the whale goes straight down.
During the “big dive” the animal remains below from fifteen to
forty minutes and when reappearing, if not disturbed, swims
tranquilly along just below the surface at a rate of about three or four
miles an hour. His body is then horizontal, with the hump projecting
above the water.
When frightened and speeding, a totally different attitude is
assumed and the great flukes are moved violently up and down; at
each downward stroke the head sinks eight or ten feet below the
surface but rises with the upward motion, presenting only the
cutwater-like lower portion. The upstroke of the tail appears to be
the more powerful of the two, and at the same time the broad upper
half of the head is lifted above the surface. A speed of ten or twelve
miles an hour can be reached in this way, which the whalers describe
as “going head out.”
The sperm is very playful and like the humpback frequently
“breaches,” or throws itself out of water, shooting into the air at an
angle of about 45 degrees and falling back upon its side. It
sometimes lobtails also, pounding the water into spray with its
flukes. When a sperm is harpooned with a hand iron it often rolls
over and over on the surface, winding the line about its body and
causing the hunters a deal of trouble.
 The tongue of a sperm whale; it is strikingly different from the
enormous flabby tongue of the whalebone whales.

Along the Japanese coast during July the sperm whales sometimes
appear in enormous herds of four hundred or more; the great
animals will lie at the surface spouting continually and the sea for
half a mile will be alive with whales.
When the steam whalers find a school of this sort, signals are set to
bring in all the ships which may be near, and there is excitement
enough for everyone. The guns bang as often as they can be loaded
and the whales made fast, and the number killed is merely a question
of how many harpoons each ship carries, or the hours of daylight left
when the herd is found.
 The head of the sixty-foot sperm whale, the skeleton of which was
sent to the American Museum of Natural History, from Japan.
The “case” yielded 20 barrels of spermaceti.

The school will usually move very slowly, blowing and wallowing
along at the surface, and the animals in the center are heedless of the
slaughter on the outskirts of the herd. At times, however, the whales
will stampede at the first gun, and it then becomes a stern chase,
which is often a long one, before a ship can get fast.
At Aikawa, one day, a whale ship with a Japanese gunner raised a
herd of sperms a long way from the village. The man allowed his
greed to get the better of his judgment and killed ten whales. He
made them all fast to the ship, which could barely move her load
through the water, and it was not until three days later that she
arrived at the station. The whales had all “blasted,” or decomposed,
and were not as valuable commercially as a single fresh one would
have been.
The meat of this species is so dark and full of oil that it is of but
little use as food. Nevertheless, during the summer it is sold to the
native coal miners of Japan who live in such extreme poverty that
they are glad to get even such meat at two or three sen per pound.
I shall not attempt to chronicle here the numerous authentic
instances of ships or boats which have been destroyed and sunk by
sperm whales, for they are the common property of every book on
deep-sea whaling. They leave no doubt that these animals often turn
the tables on their hunters and attack with savage ferocity and dire
results.
Apparently the sperm is the only whale which will deliberately turn
upon its pursuers when not in its death flurry. Not only is its tail
used with terrible effectiveness in sweeping the surface of the water
and delivering smashing blows, but boats are often crushed like
kindling wood between its horrible jaws.
It would be interesting to know how long sperm whales live. The
bull which was killed in Japan for the American Museum showed
unmistakable evidences of great age. Its head was covered with white
crisscrossed scars, bearing testimony of terrific battles with giant
squids in the ocean depths, and the teeth of its lower jaw were worn
almost flat, projecting only an inch or two above the gum. The bones
of its skeleton were hard and rough, being covered with tubercles
and bony growths.
 A posterior view of the head of the Museum’s sperm whale. The
thick covering of blubber which encircles the head is well shown.

All this indicated that the animal had lived for many years, but
how many it is impossible to tell. The condition of the skeleton shows
whether a whale is old or young, for in immature animals the bones
of the skull are separated (i. e., the sutures are open), the plates on
the end of the vertebræ (epiphyses) are free, and all the bones are
soft and spongy. Even though the whale may have reached adult size,
which it usually does in three or four years, the evidences of youth
are still present in the skeleton.
Reasoning by analogy (which is always unsafe), I have come to the
conclusion that a whale’s life is well within one hundred years, but I
must admit that my argument is mainly theory and that there are but
few facts with which it may be supported. Until recently, many
naturalists held the view that whales lived for hundreds of years and
that they did not reach adult size until long after birth. The latter
contention has been proved utterly wrong, but of the former we have
little new knowledge; neither do I see how we can ever estimate a
whale’s age with any degree of accuracy.
 CHAPTER XX
A DEEP-SEA SPERM WHALE HUNT

Every time I see a sperm whale shot with a bomb harpoon from the
bows of a steamship, I have more respect for the old-time hunters
who kill the huge brutes with a hand harpoon and lance. The vitality
of a sperm is enormous, and even when several bombs have exploded
in its body the animal will often fight for hours before it spouts blood
and dies.
When Captain Olsen secured the sixty-foot sperm, the skeleton of
which was sent to the Museum, he got fast with one iron but did not
kill the whale. After some time the vessel was near enough for a
second shot, and Olsen fired a harpoon which was bent slightly
upward at the point. The heavy iron, instead of penetrating the
blubber, rebounded, and when it was drawn back by the winch was
found to be actually bent double, the point of the bomb being within
a few inches of the opposite end. It required three harpoons, each
weighing one hundred and ten pounds, to finish the whale.
Yet with a magnificent courage which is only half appreciated by a
landsman, the fearless New Bedford whalers attack these colossal
animals with merely a slender hand lance. Is it to be wondered at
that our New England ancestors in such a training school made a
history of which every American may well be proud?
 A female sperm whale at Aikawa, Japan. The head of the female is
much more pointed than that of the male.

Although deep-sea whaling is practically ended, year after year two

or three ships drop away from the New Bedford wharves bound for
the Hatteras grounds for sperm whales. The cruises are short—only
six or seven months—and the whales are killed, cut in, and tried out
at sea in the old-time way. But even this lacks much of the glamour
and romance of the old days, when sons of New Bedford’s best
families manned the boats, for now the crews are usually “Brava”
negroes from the Kay Verde Islands, and the only white men in the
ship’s company are the Captain and perhaps one or two of the Mates.
The excitement of the hunt is still there, however, and it takes the
same nerve and the same cool head to fasten to and lance a sperm, as
it did fifty years ago. I have had no personal experience in this kind
of whaling, and therefore it does not fall within the scope of this
book, but by way of contrast I have quoted a few extracts from the
“Diary of a Whaling Cruise” by Victor Slocum, Harpooner.[14]
14. Forest and Stream, Vol. 67, 1907, pp. 928, 930, 968.
When a whale is cut in at sea the carcass is made fast to the lee
side of the ship, and a skeleton platform of heavy planks is rigged to
project beyond the whale, just above the surface. The mates take
their places there and, with long “whale spades,” make incisions
through the blubber, which is stripped off in long blanket pieces by
means of a block and tackle suspended from the mast. When the
blubber is all in, the head is cut away and hauled on board, where the
case is bailed, then the chains are slacked and the great carcass sinks
into the green depths below to furnish food for thousands of hungry
sharks.
Mr. Slocum tells of a sperm whale hunt in the following words:
At 4 A. M. all hands started to cut in, and just as we got through heaving, it was
whales again—just after dinner. I was glad of that, and so was everybody else, for
the work and exposure was beginning to pull on us, and a full stomach is none too
good to go down in a boat with. The whales were close by, and a large school of
them, too. There was just a breath of air stirring, so up went the sail and we
paddled as noiselessly as aborigines upon our quarry.
There seemed to be whales everywhere, as far as the eye could reach, and all
tame—just rolling and snorting in the water they lay in; once in a while one would
jump like a trout and make a splash like a waterfall, just to amuse himself.
At last we got close to one that suited us, and the boats went on head and head;
there was not wind enough to manage with the sail, and dipping with the paddle
was undesirable for it might result in a scare, so we lay perfectly still, right in his
course, and on he came.
 A posterior view of the Museum’s sperm whale. Longitudinal cuts
have been made through the blubber revealing the flesh beneath.

The harpooner stood up with his darting gun and iron, and just as the great
snout passed under our boat, he plunged it vertically right into the middle of the
back. There was the report of the gun, a heaving of the boat clear of the water, a
sensation like that of passing through a waterspout, and the dull explosion of the
shell all in the space of the next second—then the leviathan stretched out dead. The
bomb had killed him instantly, and it was well for us that it did, for in the case of
an ordinary iron being used, we would have been stove to pieces.
As we backed away, up came the black snout of another whale, and then two or
three more. They did not seem to know that there was any mischief, and they
rolled on top of the dead one as though nothing had happened. What an
opportunity to get another one! If there had been a chance to mark our “fish”
without getting stove by the others, and cutting loose as we did in a former case, we
could have killed another and another; but that was impossible, so a “waif” was set
for the second boat, and on they came under oars. And how the bully boys rowed,
for the cry had gone up that we were stove, and they pulled to save our lives.
 Cutting in a sperm whale at sea by the old-time method.

As they got close, we urged them with our cheers and cries to go in and show
what they were good for. Straight ahead they shot onto the “bunch,” and just as
they almost touched one that they had picked out, there was the curve of an iron
through the air; the next minute they were going like the wind with the whale’s
flukes just clearing the stern, throwing spray in every direction.
The second mate, as cool as a cucumber and with a happy smile on his face,
stood in the bow crouched down to keep as dry as possible, and with his bomb gun
under his arm was yelling, “Haul in on the line!” There was no slacking our speed
for him, with half a chance to get in a shot!
By night two whales were being worked on. That day’s excitement and sport was
worth a hundred dollars to me, for the whole thing was truly marvelous and it fully
compensates for all the discomfort and privation that I have felt....
The cutting in and trying out of the blubber is a prosy job, and nasty is no name
for it. All hands strip down to a shirt, a pair of overalls rolled up to the knees,
showing bare shins and sockless feet in large brogans, and in we go—grease from
head to foot—day and night until the whale is all cut safely on board. If we tarried,
bad weather would no doubt deprive us of our spoil.
It gives you a funny sensation at first to get into a deckful of blubber, with the
slimy stuff around your exposed cuticle, and oil squashing out of your shoes at
every step. But I am getting used to that now, and I feel like a veteran.... The try-
works are run day and night, while there is blubber to feed them, and the refuse
scrap is all the fuel they need, so it is very economical. They consist of two large
caldrons mounted in brick work, near the center of the ship, and the whole
structure is about six feet high. In the dark, with the flame roaring out of the short
chimneys and torches stuck on poles about the deck to give light, we must form an
interesting spectacle. The men, moving about the deck under the peculiar
illumination, look like conspirators in a comic opera.