Chinas Search For National Rejuvenation Domestic and Foreign Policies Under Xi Jinping 1St Ed Edition Jabin T Jacob Full Chapter PDF

China’s Search for ‘National
Rejuvenation’: Domestic and Foreign

Policies under Xi Jinping 1st ed. Edition
Jabin T. Jacob
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/chinas-search-for-national-rejuvenation-domestic-and
-foreign-policies-under-xi-jinping-1st-ed-edition-jabin-t-jacob/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
80+ Python Coding Challenges for Beginners: Python

Exercises to Make You a Better Programmer. No Prior
Experience Needed: 80+ Python Challenges to Launch ...
Journey. Katie Millie
https://ebookmass.com/product/80-python-coding-challenges-for-
beginners-python-exercises-to-make-you-a-better-programmer-no-
prior-experience-needed-80-python-challenges-to-launch-journey-
katie-millie/
Introduction to 80×86 Assembly Language and Computer

Architecture – Ebook PDF Version
https://ebookmass.com/product/introduction-to-8086-assembly-
language-and-computer-architecture-ebook-pdf-version/
Daring to Struggle: China's Global Ambitions Under Xi

Jinping Bates Gill
https://ebookmass.com/product/daring-to-struggle-chinas-global-
ambitions-under-xi-jinping-bates-gill/
Petit manuel de survie en médecine intensive-

réanimation : 80 procédures en poche Nicolas Lerolle
https://ebookmass.com/product/petit-manuel-de-survie-en-medecine-
intensive-reanimation-80-procedures-en-poche-nicolas-lerolle/
Biological Reaction Engineering: Dynamic Modeling
Fundamentals with 80 Interactive Simulation Examples
3rd Edition Elmar Heinzle
https://ebookmass.com/product/biological-reaction-engineering-
dynamic-modeling-fundamentals-with-80-interactive-simulation-
examples-3rd-edition-elmar-heinzle/
„■■■■ ■■■■ ■ ■■■■■■■■■...“ : ■■■■■■■ ■ ■■■■■ 80-■■■■

■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■■■■■ 2-■ ■■■■■■■, ■■■■■■■■■■■■ Edi
■■■■■■■■■ ■■■■■
https://ebookmass.com/product/%d0%b1%d1%8b%d1%82%d1%8c-
%d1%82%d0%b5%d0%b1%d0%b5-%d0%b2-
%d0%ba%d0%b0%d1%82%d0%b0%d0%bb%d0%be%d0%b6%d0%ba%d0%b5-
%d1%81%d0%b1%d0%be%d1%80%d0%bd%d0%b8%d0%ba-%d0%b2-%d1%87%d0
The Political Thought of Xi Jinping Tsang
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-political-thought-of-xi-
jinping-tsang/
Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and

Foreign Policy Dimensions Michael Clarke (Editor)
https://ebookmass.com/product/terrorism-and-counter-terrorism-in-
china-domestic-and-foreign-policy-dimensions-michael-clarke-
editor/
The Political Thought Of Xi Jinping Steve Tsang
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-political-thought-of-xi-
jinping-steve-tsang/
China’s Search
for ‘National
Rejuvenation’
Domestic and Foreign
Policies under Xi Jinping
Edited by Jabin T. Jacob · Hoang The Anh

China’s Search for ‘National Rejuvenation’
Jabin T. Jacob • Hoang The Anh
Editors
China’s Search for

‘National
Rejuvenation’
Domestic and Foreign Policies under Xi Jinping
Editors
Jabin T. Jacob Hoang The Anh
Department of International Relations Institute of Chinese Studies
and Governance Studies Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences
Shiv Nadar University Hanoi, Vietnam
Uttar Pradesh, India
National Maritime Foundation
New Delhi, India
ISBN 978-981-15-2795-1 ISBN 978-981-15-2796-8 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2796-8
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to
the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Dedicated to
Prof. Do Tien Sam (1953–2019)
Acknowledgements
Jabin T. Jacob would like to thank his former colleagues at the Institute of
Chinese Studies, Delhi, where this project was first conceived and thanks
especially, Rajesh Ghosh for his editorial and research assistance.
Hoang The Anh would like to thank his colleagues in the Vietnam
Academy of Social Sciences for their support and help in editing of the
Vietnamese papers.
vii
Contents
Part I Introduction 1
1 ‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea for China’s Domestic

and External Challenges 3
Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh
Part II Domestic Developments 21
2 Reform of Party and State Structures in China 23

Nguyen Xuan Cuong
3 Changes in China’s Economic Development Model After

the 19th CPC National Congress 37
Nguyen Quang Thuan and Tran Hong Viet
4 Xi Jinping’s Political and Economic Initiatives and the

‘Success Trap’ 49
Manoranjan Mohanty
5 Political Considerations in the Chinese Leadership’s

Economic Assessments 63
Jabin T. Jacob
ix
x Contents
6 China’s Military Reforms in the Wake of Recent CPC

National Congresses 77
Bui Thi Thu Hien
Part III Neighbourhood Policies 95
7 Key Markers and Trends in Chinese Foreign Policy in

South Asia 97
Prashant Kumar Singh
8 The BRI and the East Sea Disputes in China’s Ties with
Southeast Asia115
Hoang The Anh
9 Strategic Competition Between China and the United

States in the Indo-Pacific131
Cu Chi Loi
10 Competition and Caution in Chinese Foreign Policy

Towards Northeast Asia143
Nguyen Quang Thuan and Hoang The Anh
Part IV CPC Propaganda Abroad 155
11 The CPC’s International Department and China’s

Party-Based Diplomacy157
Ngeow Chow-Bing
12 China’s “Great Overseas Propaganda” Under the Belt and

Road Initiative169
Roger C. Liu
Contents xi
Part V Economic Development and Foreign Policy 185
13 China’s Quest for Global Leadership Through Scientific

and Technological Innovation187
Nguyen Binh Giang
14 Rural Vitalisation and Foreign Policy199

Prachi Aggarwal
15 China’s State-Owned Enterprises as Agents of Party and

State Power215
Aravind Yelery
Index231
Contributors
Prachi Aggarwal Sanchi University of Buddhist Indic Studies, Sanchi,

Madhya Pradesh, India
Bui Thi Thu Hien Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of
Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam
Cu Chi Loi Institute of American Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social
Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam
Hoang The Anh Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of
Jabin T. Jacob Department of International Relations and Governance
Studies, Shiv Nadar University, Uttar Pradesh, India
National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India
Roger C. Liu FLAME University, Pune, Maharashtra, India
Manoranjan Mohanty Council for Social Development, New Delhi, India
Institute of Chinese Studies, New Delhi, India
Ngeow Chow-Bing Institute of China Studies, University of Malaya,
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia
Nguyen Binh Giang Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi,
Vietnam
xiii
xiv CONTRIBUTORS
Nguyen Quang Thuan Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi,

Vietnam
Nguyen Xuan Cuong Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of
Prashant Kumar Singh Institute of Defence Studies and Analyses, New
Delhi, India
Tran Hong Viet Graduate Academy of Social Sciences, Vietnam Academy
of Social Sciences, Hanoi, Vietnam
Aravind Yelery Peking University HSBC Business School, Shenzhen,
China
List of Tables
Table 6.1 Timelines and contents of national defense and military

reforms after the 18th National Congress of the CPC 82
Table 14.1 Chinese provinces making foreign agriculture investments 208
Table 14.2 Amount of outward direct investment by China, 2003–2016 210
xv
PART I
Introduction
CHAPTER 1
‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea

for China’s Domestic and External
Challenges
Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh
The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)

in October 2017 is by all accounts a landmark event in the history of the
People’s Republic of China (PRC) and of the ruling CPC. The Congress
saw the solidification of CPC General Secretary and PRC President Xi
Jinping’s personal political authority within the Party as well as set the
direction for a series of domestic reforms that have long-term conse-
quences both internally and externally. The Congress is a culmination of
the recentralization of power under Xi in the sense that it gave an offi-
cial stamp to the process by enshrining ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ in the
Party constitution. At the same time, it is as much a beginning—hence,
J. T. Jacob (*)
Department of International Relations and Governance Studies, Shiv Nadar
University, Uttar Pradesh, India
National Maritime Foundation, New Delhi, India
e-mail: jabin.jacob@snu.edu.in
Hoang The Anh
Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences,
Hanoi, Vietnam
© The Author(s) 2020 3

J. T. Jacob, Hoang The Anh (eds.), China’s Search for ‘National
Rejuvenation’, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2796-8_1
4 J. T. JACOB AND HOANG THE ANH
also the reference in Xi’s Report to the Congress to a “new era” in

Chinese history—in the sense that the CPC will need fresh measures to
both continue and stabilize this process of recentralization of power.
Recentralization has been marketed by the CPC as being necessary for
the “great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi 2017) but “national
rejuvenation” is not possible without China tackling both domestic and
foreign challenges. In Xi’s words, this requires the CPC to:
… conscientiously safeguard the solidarity and unity of the Party, maintain

the Party’s deep bond with the people, and strengthen the great unity of the
Chinese people of all ethnic groups and the great unity of all the sons and
daughters of the Chinese nation at home and abroad. We must unite all the
forces that can be united and work as one to progress toward the brilliant
future of national rejuvenation. (Xi 2017)
In this statement to the 19th Party Congress, Xi also highlights what he

sees as the challenges—maintaining Party unity, the relationship of the
Party with the masses, social and ethnic rifts within the population and the
need to tap the resources and reach of ethnic Chinese beyond China’s
borders. Thus, the reasons and directions for this ‘national rejuvenation’
are derived from internal debilities and contradictions just as the means
and ability to sustain the rejuvenation are derived from strengths and com-
petencies built up by the CPC over the course of decades both within the
country and outside. What needs to be underlined is the intimate connec-
tion between Chinese domestic policies and its external policies and out-
reach. To underestimate the influence and importance of domestic politics
and considerations for the CPC in the formulation of the country’s for-
eign and security policies as well as the impact of external events on China’s
internal political dynamics would be a mistake. This volume attempts to
explain each of these aspects if not comprehensively at least substantially
across several themes and geographies.
The challenges outlined by Xi and the CPC are not new for China and
nor is the search for national rejuvenation in the country a new phenom-
enon. At least in the modern era, it traces its roots to the ‘self-strengthening
movement’ during the Qing dynasty in the middle of the nineteenth cen-
tury. As the CPC neared victory in the civil war on mainland China in
1949, Mao Zedong declared that the Chinese people had “stood up” and
that they had “friends all over the world” (Mao 1949), but, of course,
1 ‘NATIONAL REJUVENATION’ AS PANACEA FOR CHINA’S DOMESTIC… 5
there was much that remained to be done in order for China to find what
it considered its legitimate place in the world.
The reference to “national rejuvenation” in this work refers to this con-
tinuing effort by the Chinese Party-state with a focus on the renewed
attempts by Xi to carry this process forward. As he puts it, the ‘new era’
… will be an era for the Chinese people of all ethnic groups to work together
and work hard to create a better life for themselves and ultimately achieve
common prosperity for everyone. It will be an era for all of us, the sons and
daughters of the Chinese nation, to strive with one heart to realize the
Chinese Dream of national rejuvenation. (Xi 2017)
Thus, the CPC is once again talking about the need for the Chinese
people to make sacrifices at the national and individual levels to ensure
that China converts its domestic strengths to global standing and leverage.
And these sacrifices will be necessary because of the economic difficulties
that China faces on both the domestic and external fronts.
Continuing Economic Challenges

The global economic situation today is one in which countries appear to
be turning inwards and protectionist. This is the result of the global econ-
omy slowing and the experiences of a series of economic shocks over the
past decade starting with the global financial crisis of 2008 and including
such country- or region-specific events such as the anti-corruption cam-
paign in China and demonetization in India. Together with social stresses
created by issues such as the flow of migrants/refugees to Europe, for
instance, this has resulted in a series of conservative, right-leaning govern-
ments taking power or threatening established political consensus on free
trade and democratic rights in even many developed economies. A prime
case in point is the United States (US) where Donald Trump was elected
president with the slogan “Make America Great Again” and under which
the US is threatening to wall itself off against immigrants.
China has tried to take advantage of the moment by launching the BRI
and by attempting to fill the vacuum being created by American/Western
withdrawal from the provision of various global public goods.
Nevertheless, not only does the US remain a formidable economic,
military and political power in the world today but China’s attempts to
claim the mantle of No. 1 are limited against the backdrop of its own con-
siderable economic challenges, even if Xi (2017) claims that China is
“closer, more confident, and more capable than ever before of making the
goal of national rejuvenation a reality”.
Some of these challenges are old and persistent. Inequality is a major
challenge at multiple levels. There is the inequality between the different
regions of China—the coastal east, the interior provinces, the western
provinces and the northeastern industrial rustbelt—as well as within prov-
inces themselves. Then there is the inequality that exists between urban
and rural areas, as well as the huge gaps in income between individuals.
While extreme poverty is expected to be eliminated by 2020 (Xinhua
2019), in time for the centennial of the founding of the CPC in 2021, the
problem in China is now of relative poverty—of the sense of deprivation
that those without too many means feel while observing the lives of the
rich, the prosperous and the connected in China. Regional inequalities
even play into admissions to China’s top universities (Fu 2018).
Meanwhile, despite the Third Plenum Decision of the 18th CPC
Central Committee in 2013 which talked about giving a “decisive role in
resource allocation” to market forces (Xinhua 2013), Xi has subsequently
focused on strengthening state-owned enterprises (SOEs) instead and
both promoting them as “national champions” and calling on them to
become leaders internationally (Cai 2017). Currently, SOEs hold the
greatest amount of unproductive assets and debt and yet get most of the
credit from state-controlled banks (Wang and Leng 2018). What is more,
Xi has also strengthened the Party’s presence in Chinese private enter-
prises (Chen 2019; see also The Conversation 2019) as well as foreign ones
located in China (Martina 2017) calling into question the distinction
between private and public in the Chinese economy.
All of this has implications for the efficiency of the Chinese economy,
including the viability of the BRI—note that most Chinese companies
involved in BRI projects abroad are SOEs and if they carry forward the
same lack of environmental standards or business practices from China,
then there are reasons for host countries to beware of Chinese invest-
ments. Add to these, there are problems within of Chinese officials exhib-
iting a ‘go slow’ attitude to work, for instance, which has required ever
more exhortations from Xi to the CPC to reduce what is euphemistically
referred to as “bureaucratism” (Xi 2017).
On the positive side of the ledger is the Chinese leadership’s farsighted
focus on gaining leadership in both basic and frontier-edge technologies
from telecom hardware to mobile payment applications to social media

and artificial intelligence-based big data applications. This is a new ‘Great
Leap Forward’ in Chinese economic history and likely to be far more suc-
cessful than the first iteration in the late 1950s–early 1960s.
At the same time, the coercive economic measures and plain stealing
that China has practised in this technological race has invited strong reac-
tions with the US finally reacting to this mercantilist Chinese approach in
the form of the trade war and restrictions on technology transfers to China.
If the CPC under Xi appears to have some handle on the problems of
political unity and reform of governance structures and mechanisms within
the country and the Party, resolving the domestic economic situation is a
harder task given China’s close integration with the world economy. It
could be argued that while transforming the pattern of economic develop-
ment has been a strategic focus in China’s economic reform process since
the 18th CPC National Congress, success has eluded the Party primarily
for political reasons of control and incentives available to local leaderships.
It is at least partly to address these challenges that the anti-corruption
campaign, Xi’s recentralization of power and the renewed emphasis on
strengthening of state-owned enterprises as ‘national champions’ have
taken place.
Several chapters in this volume underline the centrality of the Chinese
economy to domestic developments as well as the importance of the econ-
omy to China’s larger global ambitions. The Chinese economy is today a
major player globally and any impact whether negative or positive on its
economy—brought out by political processes and considerations at home
and abroad—will have corresponding impact on the global economy.
The ‘China Model’

The grand CPC strategic vision melding the domestic political agenda of
unity and maintaining Party supremacy with the goal internationally of
increasing Chinese economic might and political influence is exemplified
by Xi’s statement at the 19th Party Congress where he defined “socialism
with Chinese characteristics for a new era”, as that which “offers a new
option for other countries and nations who want to speed up their devel-
opment while preserving their independence; and it offers Chinese wis-
dom and a Chinese approach to solving the problems facing mankind”
(Xi 2017).
What this also underlines, however, is that where once the CPC thought
it could learn from the outside world and control the consequences at the
same time or at least that the consequences would not fundamentally
threaten its own existence, today the measures undertaken by Xi suggest
that such confidence no longer exists. From the heavy-handed anti-
corruption campaign to the ever increasing number of directives and
instructions underlining limits to debates in universities to the constant
drumbeat of state-driven propaganda and adulation of Xi to the extreme
surveillance measures used against its own citizens, the Party looks less like
it is in charge and more like it is fire-fighting.
In fact, under Xi, the CPC has sharpened its battle against Western
norms and ideas and is taking this practically to the level of an existential
issue. To this end, the CPC is combining its Marxist-Leninist heritage
with supposed Chinese traditional values that favour hierarchy and order
in society and abroad to try and prevail against Western liberal ideals and
the international order dominated by the West. Hitherto, this conflict
with the West was evident usually only when reading between the lines of
Chinese statements and actions. At the 19th National Congress of the
CPC, even if a supposedly domestic affair, Xi appears to have more for-
mally and explicitly acknowledged this challenge to the West by, among
other things, “offer[ing] Chinese wisdom and a Chinese approach to solv-
ing the problems facing mankind” (Xi 2017).
Xi appears to believe the centennial goals of building “a moderately
prosperous society in all respects” and “a modern socialist country that is
prosperous, strong, democratic, culturally advanced and harmonious” by
2021 and 2049 respectively (Xinhua 2017) can be realized through eco-
nomic measures, anti-corruption struggles and ‘harmony’ among the peo-
ple—obedience, in other words, to the diktats of the Party. The dominant
narrative of the political centrality of the CPC to China’s future is accom-
panied by a reduction of space for dissent and pushing of strong and insen-
sitive efforts at homogenization and assimilation of minority ethnic groups.
The 2021 goal is of ensuring “that China’s development improves the
lives of all its people, particularly those who are below or near the coun-
try’s poverty line” (Xinhua 2017). But even China’s ethnic minorities are
today reasonably economically well off after four decades of reforms. If
there is still poverty in China, it is not entirely due to economic reasons
but because of the way economic development is promoted in an unequal
manner, and in the case of the minorities, also because it is promoted
without sensitivity to their identity or cultural concerns.
Similarly, the CPC also appears to believe that economic development

and the use of technology will ensure the 2049 target of a ‘culturally
advanced and harmonious country’. While ‘harmonious’ here is also
understood in terms of poverty alleviation, curbing pollution and ensuring
‘sustained and healthy economic and social development’ (Xinhua 2017),
it is not clear why a strongly centralized form of government or cultural
homogenization are essential to achieving these goals.
China’s economic growth is increasingly held up by the CPC and by
state organs of the PRC as a model for the rest of the world to emulate but
China’s economic growth has come at great cost in terms of the environ-
ment, civil liberties and human lives. Xi’s promotion abroad of a Chinese
model of economic development and growth should therefore be read as
an attempt to justify to his people that the costs incurred were worth it.
Without the ambition of trying to become a superpower and the global
presence and military might that comes with it, the CPC’s missteps would
be shown up to its own people.
China is unique in that it tries to portray its global expansion and espe-
cially its increasing political influence as something that is non-threatening
to the rest of the world. It has sold this as a case of China contributing to
regional and global peace and stability. A case in point is its presence in
anti-piracy operations in the Gulf of Aden, which however, also conve-
niently allows the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) Navy opportunities to
gain experience of a different ocean from the one that China physically
borders. It also allows the Chinese to engage in military diplomacy and
exercises with a host of Indian Ocean littoral nations subtly challenging the
position of dominant regional powers such as India. This narrative of the
‘global goods’ or ‘public goods’ is of a piece with China’s increasing par-
ticipation in UN Peacekeeping Operations, for example, where it is the
largest contributor among the permanent members of the UN Security
Council. However, while other nations seldom, if ever publicly, declare this
Chinese naval presence in the Indian Ocean as worrying or threatening, the
Chinese regularly accuse other nations exercising freedom of navigation in
the East Sea (South China Sea)1 as being inimical to Chinese interests.
What is more, China has increased militarization of the features it occu-
pies by putting missiles on them. In mid-2014, there was a major intrusion
1
While this chapter and others use the expression “East Sea”, the more commonly used
name internationally is the “South China Sea”. The “East Sea” is the preferred usage in
Vietnam.
into the Vietnamese exclusive economic zone by the Chinese oil platform
Haiyang Shiyou 981, which led to significant tensions in the Sino-
Vietnamese relationship. Beijing has been at it again since July 2019 with
the Chinese Geological Survey vessel group Haiyang Dizhi 8 repeatedly
violating Vietnam’s exclusive economic zone and continental shelf in the
south of the East Sea (Vu 2019). These Chinese actions raise the question
of whether China really seeks to develop peacefully as Xi stated in his
Report at the CPC’s 19th National Congress.
At the same time, the strong economic rationale for China’s expanded
political and military presence worldwide cannot be denied. China has
economic interests including the flow of its energy and other raw materials
supplies and trade across the globe that justify its security concerns and the
need to build up political and military capabilities to guard against poten-
tial threats from unstable polities as well as perceived threats such as the
US or India.
It is also a fact that that China’s extensive—and illegitimate—claims on
various features in the East Sea are the result of the narrative of the ‘cen-
tury of humiliation’ so heavily promoted by the CPC at home. While in
the past, China did not have the capability to enforce these claims, it never
actually ever let up on them. It also engaged in substantial diplomacy with
the countries of Southeast Asia and with Japan lulling these countries into
a false sense of security that somehow China had set aside or was not inter-
ested in enforcing these claims. But the ‘century of humiliation’ narrative
also has consequences in that the CPC itself cannot now not seek recom-
pense for the ‘humiliation’ or reclaim what is ‘rightfully’ China’s when it
actually has the capabilities to attempt to do so. Thus, it is that the Chinese
have—as part of the process of ‘national rejuvenation’—illegally occupied
and reclaimed and built up several features with the help of its commercial
and naval might and appear to have no intention of ever exiting these areas
no matter how many freedom of navigation operations the US or other
foreign navies might engage in.
It is important to note, however, that China does not seek to maintain
its claims by force alone. It also works assiduously to shape narratives and
histories in its neighbourhood and around the world subtly or otherwise
in its own favour. For instance, the great Ming dynasty admiral, Zheng
He’s voyages to the Indian Ocean are now recast as peaceful missions of
friendship aimed at bolstering trade and cultural ties than viewed as the
expeditionary voyages displaying Chinese power that they were in reality.
Indeed, for the CPC, all history is political. Historical narratives are con-
stantly modified and reshaped to achieve political ends of enforcing or

reinforcing Chinese claims on distant territories, of promoting the story of
China as a great civilization that influenced other kingdoms and peoples
and therefore, that China’s rise today is a normal and welcome development.
Institutional actors such as the PLA and China’s state-owned and pri-
vate enterprises too have a role in promoting the ‘Chinese dream’. In fact,
they also have strong sectoral interests and motivations in creating and
promoting the narrative of the ‘Chinese dream’ for this would also increase
their own profile and importance in the Chinese political system and
among the Chinese people. For the PLA, for instance, appearing a mod-
ern, powerful military force with the latest weapons as well as one that is
both engaged in supporting public goods and an efficient war-fighting
force is, therefore, an important consideration. China’s rulers see the
PLA’s growth and expansion as well as actual permanent physical presence
abroad in the form of bases in such locations as Djibouti in the Horn of
Africa as an important part of China’s progress to becoming a global
superpower.
Meanwhile, the close relationship between Chinese enterprises—
whether public or private—and the Chinese Party-state needs particular
attention, as Chinese state capital and influence are increasingly crossing
borders. It is Chinese law that all Chinese enterprises are beholden to the
Party-state (see Tanner 2017), and this means that laws of the counties
that host them are not as important to these entities as Chinese law itself.
In other words, if Chinese enterprises have substantial or controlling
stakes in tech and financial companies in other countries or manage for-
eign port terminals, then if host companies or countries are not careful or
are ignorant of China’s domestic political system and its priorities, then
everything from personal data to physical security of assets in those coun-
tries can become subject to Chinese state control or surveillance. It is for
this reason that this volume has placed such an emphasis on studying not
just the reforms in China’s governance structures but also its economic
reforms and their international implications. Such events as the interna-
tional contretemps around the global rollout of 5G technology by Chinese
private telecom major Huawei is also why this volume has delved deep
into issues like China’s scientific and technological innovation that is
widely understood as having security implications around the world but
also into the state of Chinese agriculture and its external ambitions in this
sector which do not receive equal attention.
Structure of the Book

This volume attempts to look at the policies and goals outlined by the
CPC in the quest for Chinese national rejuvenation from a distinctly Asian
perspective with scholars from across India and Southeast Asia examining
a range of issues from China’s governance structures and economic devel-
opment to its military and its foreign policies towards neighbours and the
wider world. It seeks to assess policies in these areas for their impact and
influence at home as well as on China’s external policies. At the same time,
the book also looks at specific themes like technology, agricultural devel-
opment, reform of state-owned enterprises and the use of Party bodies to
engage in foreign propaganda work among other things to offer examples
of the merging of Chinese domestic political and foreign policy interests.
In the process, this work offers its readers a better idea of China’s place in
the world as the Chinese themselves see it and the implications over time
for China, its neighbourhood and the rest of the world.
The first major section of the book discusses prominent domestic devel-
opments in China over the last several years since the 19th Party Congress
while contextualizing them against aims and achievements of the 18th
Party Congress. In Chap. 2, Nguyen Xuan Cuong addresses questions of
governance reforms in China noting that these have tended to fuse Party
and State structures ever more closely. ‘Xi Jinping Thought’ on ‘socialism
with Chinese characteristics in the new era’ adopted by the 19th Congress
has now been written into the Party constitution, while the 13th National
People’s Congress also passed an amendment to Constitution of the
Chinese state to this effect. These amendments to the Party and state con-
stitutions indicate the trends and approaches of the reform of Party and
state agencies, and the chapter explicates these in some detail with a focus
on the anti-corruption campaign.
Nguyen Quang Thuan and Tran Hong Viet in Chap. 3 focus on the
changes in China’s economic development patterns after the 19th National
Congress and the rationale offered for these by the Party. The planned
transition of the Chinese economy from a phase of rapid growth to a stage
of what is called high-quality development is a pivotal stage for transform-
ing China’s growth model, improving China economic structure and
fostering new drivers of growth. The chapter looks at the measures and
practices China has undertaken in the current period including for inte-
grating the Chinese economy into the world economy. The key change
they see is the increased involvement of the Party-state in China’s current
economic development policies both because of the need to fulfil the cen-
tennial goals and because China’s major foreign economic initiatives and
strategies require enormous resources and tools for implementation.
Manoranjan Mohanty, in Chap. 4, underlines what he calls the ‘success
trap’ afflicting China’s and Xi Jinping’s political and economic initiatives.
China’s economic successes have been accompanied by enormous social,
political and environmental problems, as well as increasing income inequal-
ity, regional disparity and corruption. These are systemic problems arising
from the economic reforms that started in 1978; but to their credit,
China’s leaders have recognized many of these issues over the past decades
and initiated some measures to address them. Despite their efforts, prob-
lems persist—increasing social and regional inequality, environmental deg-
radation, social alienation, declining freedoms and persistent corruption,
among others because China’s current reform path is ultimately incompat-
ible with the type of actions needed to tackle these problems.
In Chap. 5, Jabin T. Jacob examines the many political considerations
at the centre of the CPC’s economic reforms agenda. The world at large
has tended to focus on China’s economic prowess, its large domestic mar-
ket and of late, its rising international economic heft as expressed in such
outreach economic projects as the BRI. But for the CPC itself, the central
focus has always been to use its economic strength to ensure domestic
stability and the continuation in power of the Party. This chapter, there-
fore, looks at the Chinese leadership’s views of the Chinese economy as
gleaned from prominent reports and speeches and what these say of their
views, including apprehensions, about the state of affairs of the Chinese
economy and the implications for the position and legitimacy of the CPC.
The Chinese military is a key guarantor of the power of the CPC
given that the PLA is the Party’s army rather than that of the PRC. In
Chap. 6, Bui Thi Thu Hien looks at Chinese military reforms since the
18th CPC National Congress and the additional measures proclaimed
at the 19th Congress. She finds that China’s current round of military
reforms is dramatic in nature with ambitions of turning the Chinese
military into one of the strongest forces in the world, capable of multi-
terrain combat and of becoming the world’s most powerful naval force
in order to control distant waters. The chapter looks at the national and
international contexts before China as it carries out a series of policies
and measures to strongly promote military reform and also assesses the
relationship between the CPC and the PLA in the process. The attempt
is to clarify if since the 19th Party Congress, it is ‘the Party that controls
the gun’, or if the military has gained an edge in the relationship.
The next section of the book looks at China’s neighbourhood policies
with a specific focus on regions in China’s immediate neighbourhood.
The section opens with Chap. 7 in the book on trends in Chinese foreign
policy in South Asia by Prashant Kumar Singh. Looking at both the 19th
Party Congress in October 2017 and the 13th National People’s Congress
in March 2018 together, he argued there is a radical shift in Chinese for-
eign policy under Xi Jinping in terms of China’s national identity, grand
strategic vision and the nature of its international identification with the
world. China is finally shedding its old hesitation and staking its claim to a
leadership role in the international order. This chapter argues that although
it is East Asia that is receiving international attention, with reference to
China’s foreign policy assertion under Xi, South Asia has been equally
affected by this assertiveness, if not more so. China-South Asia relations
have generally been studied within the localized contexts of individual
bilateral relationships or India-China relations. However, wider South
Asia is also equally a testing ground for China’s grand-strategic vision and
ambitions under Xi especially through the BRI, and this in turn has impli-
cations for India-China bilateral relations.
Hoang The Anh in Chap. 8 argues that the focus of China’s foreign
policy actions in Southeast Asia is on implementing the BRI and ensuring
that the region is divided in its response to Chinese provocations in the
East Sea. Beijing is establishing a global network of partners, and building
a so-called ‘community of common destiny’ with Southeast Asia as a cen-
tral focus. China has continued its tough stance on disputes in the East Sea
even as it has used economic diplomacy and soft power to mollify or win
over the countries of the region. Given the strong economic dependencies
and other socio-cultural factors accompanying the greater economic inte-
gration of the region with China, Chinese policies are likely to have far-
reaching impact on Southeast Asia and the Indo-Pacific in general.
Without doubt, China’s relationship with the US is the world’s most
important bilateral relationship and Chap. 9 by Cu Chi Loi looks at
it in detail. He argues that with the rapid modernization of its naval
forces and the launch of the BRI, China has accelerated disputes with
countries in its near seas and unveiled its ambition to control the Indo-
Pacific region. The Donald Trump administration in the US has asserted
that China is a strategic competitor, challenging America’s power,
undermining American security and prosperity and seeking to replace

it in Asia. Washington has objected to China’s military strategy in the
East Sea of Vietnam, asserted its freedom of navigation in the region
and promoted an Indo-Pacific strategy with greater vigour to bring
regional states together into a new security network such as the
Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, comprising the US, Japan, India and
Australia, for example. In addition to security tensions, the US and
China have engaged in a trade war where the two sides have targeted
each other’s goods with punitive duties. It is this context against which
the chapter analyses the recent increase in strategic competition
between the US and China in the Indo-Pacific region and their reasons
thereof. The chapter also discusses the impact of Sino-US strategic
competition on cooperation and development in the wider region.
Chapter 10 by Nguyen Quang Thuan and Hoang The Anh examines
China’s relations with its neighbours Japan and the two Koreas which
form an important part of China’s neighbourhood considerations given
the tensions on the Korean peninsula arising out of North Korea’s
nuclear weapons and missiles testing and because Japan and South
Korea are military allies of the US. While China’s ties with each of these
countries have remained largely stable in recent years, Beijing has often
been willing to exacerbate tensions for sometimes short-term consider-
ations, especially with Japan. At the other end of the spectrum, how-
ever, with the arrival of the Donald Trump administration in the US,
that country’s relations with North Korea have undergone a major
transformation at least in terms of perceptions and imagery if not quite
in terms of substance and have profoundly also affected China’s equa-
tions with the countries of Northeast Asia, including North Korea itself.
This chapter looks at these dynamics particularly in the contexts of the
incipient Sino-US competition, including American military presence
on the Korean peninsula.
The third section in the volume is a short one but covers the important
dimension of the work of CPC itself in projecting Chinese power abroad
through propaganda efforts and outreach via the Chinese diaspora. It is a
fact that China, or more correctly, the CPC, has certain distinctive e lements
in its foreign policy work with overlap and close linkages between the for-
eign ministry on the one hand and propaganda units of the CPC such as
the International Liaison Department and the United Front Work

Department.
Chapter 11 by Ngeow Chow-Bing points out that besides its Foreign
Ministry, the International Department of the CPC is also an important
agency for the conduct of the country’s foreign affairs. The International
Department’s role is to interface with other political parties around the
world and this chapter discusses its role in the foreign policy process before
looking in greater detail at the activities and functions of the Department
in recent years. It finally examines how the 19th Party Congress has
changed or shaped the Department’s vision and future missions and func-
tions. The principal role of the CPC’s International Department appears
to be to promote China’s image and project the country’s soft power abroad.
Roger C. Liu in Chap. 12 picks a similar theme when he delineates and
traces the development of China’s ‘Great Overseas Propaganda’ strategy
in the context of the BRI. He suggests that the CPC’s propaganda cam-
paign has evolved and become more intricate and indirect with the Party
in the background. To increase China’s visibility and “to tell a good story”
about China, the CPC has used multi-pronged ways, including acquisition
of and collaboration with foreign media (especially media entities in BRI
countries), increasing appearance via internet-based media and reliance on
Chinese social media platforms to indirectly spread propaganda and create
positive images of China. The ‘Great Overseas Propaganda’ strategy and
BRI are mutually supporting: while infrastructure diplomacy creates the
demand for positive news of China either domestically or in the host coun-
tries, it also facilitates China’s infrastructure export to other countries.
In the final section, the book looks at the close links between China’s
economic development and foreign policy. Chapter 13 by Nguyen Binh
Giang looks at China’s quest for global leadership through scientific and
technological innovation. The country’s dream of becoming a global
leader and transforming the global governance system involves becoming
a superpower in three realms of the economy, the military and in science
and technology. This chapter therefore focuses on exploring China’s strat-
egy of promoting scientific and technological innovation as embodied in
the documents of the 19th Congress of the CPC as part of its desire to
gain global leadership and advantages. It examines in detail China’s ambi-
tion, the relationship between this ambition and the need to promote
innovation and the nature of China’s innovation strategy and concludes
with an evaluation of the implementation of the strategy so far.
Agriculture is seldom considered important in China’s foreign policy

outreach, but in Chap. 14, Prachi Aggarwal outlines exactly why the world
needs to pay greater attention to this aspect. She points out that rural
vitalization has been one of the major themes of the 19th CPC National
Congress and that, as China seeks to establish its ‘new normal’ in eco-
nomic growth, it has also established the revival of agriculture as one of its
top eight priorities. Food has been an important aspect of the Chinese
psyche, which is now being reflected in its political leadership as well. Xi
has been vocal in linking Chinese food with Chinese prestige. China has
begun to emerge as a major investor in agriculture in other countries, and
through the BRI China is attempting to achieve a level of security in food
and energy. It remains to be seen, however, if China can utilize its foreign
policy ambitions to support its domestic basic needs in the food and agri-
culture sector and how its overseas investments in agriculture will
contribute.
In Chap. 15, the final chapter of the volume, Aravind Yelery looks at
how reforms in China’s SOEs are being directed by the Party and how
these have implications externally. Despite several tribulations, SOEs have
remained a central pillar of the CPC ever since the founding of the People’s
Republic and provided an effective medium for political socialization and
mobilization. However, the role of SOEs had begun to wane over time as
the influence of private enterprises grew in the post-reforms era; the pri-
vate sector’s ability to introduce breakthrough technologies left China’s
SOEs looking obsolete. Nevertheless, over the period of the last decade or
so, the influence and role of SOEs have been on the rise again with the
CPC working at overcoming the shortcomings of SOEs and investing
energy in optimizing the distribution of state-owned capital around trans-
formation and upgrading of state-owned assets and improving their effi-
ciency. The CPC’s attempts to turn around SOEs in terms of improving
their management and R&D spends have several implications for how
China and Chinese companies will operate and be viewed abroad. The
goal is of political communication and consolidation of Party control not
just at home but also abroad.
Conclusion
China’s approach to securing political and security interests globally is
based on a whole-of-the-system approach in which the political, commer-
cial, security and diplomatic actors work together. This is not to say that
the Chinese get it right or things go smoothly for them every time. There
are mistakes that are frequently made and often huge financial losses are
incurred but there is also a great deal of learning from these mistakes and
the ability to quickly adapt as well as change course when the decision is
finally made. In any case, no great power ever reached its position or
remains in its position without taking risks and making mistakes. Thus,
China’s domestic politics and its external actions cannot be studied in
watertight compartments but need to be considered together as this vol-
ume has tried to do.
As China’s influence rises globally and its presence becomes more
entrenched across domains of politics, economic activity, traditional and
non-traditional security and science and technology, how it proceeds to
use this influence vis-à-vis other countries will also be based on the
CPC’s confidence and capacities. Given that both the basis of China’s rise
in recent decades and the strength of the narrative of the ‘century of
humiliation’ have their roots in China’s linkages with the rest of the world,
it is also natural to assume that the confidence of the CPC depends also on
how it views the international order and China’s place in it as much as on
its relations with the Chinese people. In effect, the CPC’s brand of politics
is one in which it seeks greater space and acceptance globally of what it
deems are Chinese interests on behalf of the Chinese people while at home
it increasingly seeks legitimacy on the basis of China’s ability to establish
and promote its rights and standing abroad. The problem is that this is an
ever-tightening circle in a situation of global economic downturn and ris-
ing protectionism that also affect the Chinese economy and where China’s
leaders continue to believe that their own political legitimacy vis-à-vis the
Chinese people is far from secure. The consequences of these develop-
ments and realities in China and the world and the perceptions that arise
from them for the Chinese people and their leaders and their responses
need to be understood better for they will also increasingly impact the rest
of the world.
References
Cai, Jane. 2017. “Forget privatisation, Xi has other big plans for bloated state
firms”, South China Morning Post. 6 September. https://www.scmp.com/
news/china/economy/article/2109943/how-china-making-its-state-firm-
dinosaurs-bigger-and-richer
Chen, Lulu Yilun. 2019. “China Boosts Government Presence at Alibaba, Private
Giants”, Bloomberg. 23 September. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/arti-
cles/2019-09-23/china-steps-up-government-presence-at-alibaba-
private-giants
Fu, Yiqin. 2018. “Data Analysis: Regional Inequalities in Chinese College
Admissions”, 7 June. https://yiqinfu.github.io/posts/china-college-admissions-
regional-inequalities-tsinghua/
Mao Zedong. 1949. “Selected Works of Mao Tse-tung: The Chinese People Have
Stood Up!”, Marxists.org. 21 September. https://www.marxists.org/refer-
ence/archive/mao/selected-works/volume-5/mswv5_01.htm
Martina, Michael. 2017. “In China, the Party’s push for influence inside foreign
firms stirs fears”, Reuters. 24 August. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-
china-congress-companies/exclusive-in-china-the-partys-push-
for-influence-inside-foreign-firms-stirs-fears-idUSKCN1B40JU
Tanner, Murray Scot. 2017. “Beijing’s New National Intelligence Law: From
Defense to Offense”, Lawfare. 20 July. https://www.lawfareblog.com/
beijings-new-national-intelligence-law-defense-offense
The Conversation. 2019. “Huawei founder’s protests mean nothing—independent
Chinese companies simply don’t exist”. 17 January. http://theconversation.
com/huawei-founders-protests-mean-nothing-independent-
chinese-companies-simply-dont-exist-109972
Vu, Khanh. 2019. “Vietnam demands Chinese ship leaves its exclusive economic
zone”, Reuters. 16 August. https://www.reuters.com/article/us-vietnam-
china-southchinasea/vietnam-demands-chinese-ship-
leaves-its-exclusive-economic-zone-idUSKCN1V61CO
Wang, Orange and Sidney Leng. 2018. “Chinese President Xi Jinping’s show of
support for state-owned firms ‘no surprise’, analysts say”, South China Morning
Post. 28 September. https://www.scmp.com/economy/china-economy/arti-
cle/2166261/chinese-president-xi-jinpings-show-support-state-owned-firms
Xi Jinping. 2017. “Secure a Decisive Victory in Building a Moderately Prosperous
Society in All Respects and Strive for the Great Success of Socialism with
Chinese Characteristics for a New Era”, 19th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China. Xinhua. 18 October. http://www.xinhuanet.
com/english/download/Xi_Jinping’s_report_at_19th_CPC_National_
Congress.pdf
Xinhua. 2013. “China Focus: 19th CPC Central Committee 3rd plenum
issues communique”, 1 March. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2018-
03/01/c_137006746.htm
Xinhua. 2017. “CPC Q&A: What are China’s two centennial goals and why do
they matter?”, 17 October, http://www.xinhuanet.com//english/2017-
10/17/c_136686770.htm
Xinhua. 2019. “China steps up policy support to areas of extreme poverty”, 26
June. http://www.xinhuanet.com/english/2019-06/26/c_138175467.htm
PART II
Domestic Developments
CHAPTER 2
Reform of Party and State Structures

in China
Nguyen Xuan Cuong
As the world moves into the third decade of the 21st century, the national
governance of China, especially after the 18th National Congress of the
Communist Party of China (CPC), has undergone numerous adjust-
ments with the emergence of new concepts such as “core leaders”, “stra-
tegic layout” and several new development strategies. “Xi Jinping thought
on socialism with Chinese characteristics in the new era” was affirmed in
the Party’s statute (at the 19th Congress) and inscribed in the National
Constitution after the 2018 session of the National Assembly. It provides
a basis for the coordination of major relationships between the Party, the
State and society; between economic, political and social factors; between
domestic and foreign affairs. It later became the guiding ideology of the
Party and the State of China. China’s national governance system has
been significantly transformed with the reform of Party and State agen-
cies, especially with the formation of the National Supervisory
Commission. China’s national governance also participates and works in
Nguyen Xuan Cuong (*)

Institute of Chinese Studies, Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences,
Hanoi, Vietnam
e-mail: xuancuong@vnics.org.vn
© The Author(s) 2020 23

J. T. Jacob, Hoang The Anh (eds.), China’s Search for ‘National
Rejuvenation’, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-2796-8_2
24 NGUYEN XUAN CUONG
coordination with global governance. National governance reflects the

operation of the Chinese political system working towards its goal of
becoming a powerful nation.
Governance in China After the 18th Congress

Governance comprises all facets from the guiding ideology, the political
decision–making mechanism, and the operation of the political system, to
the mobilization and allocation of resources. It deals with the relationships
between the State, the market and society; between the Party, the State
and society and between domestic and foreign affairs. National gover-
nance clearly demonstrates the functioning of the political and social sys-
tem. In China today, the fundamental and most important mechanism for
national governance is based on the leadership of the CPC. That is, the
governance of the State and the participation of society.
After the 18th Congress, the CPC, with “the core leadership” of Xi
Jinping as General Secretary, has changed its approach towards national
governance and leadership. Xi has promoted and raised the flag of the
“Chinese Dream”, while fine-tuning the relationships between the
Party, the State and society, and between economic, political and social
factors to strongly facilitate the process of China’s goal of becoming a
superpower.
After the CPC’s 18th Congress, there has been a push for a compre-
hensive reform programme. The Party considered the strategic adjust-
ment of the economic structure as the foremost and dominant method of
accelerating the transformation of the means to achieve economic devel-
opment. It also viewed advancement and creativity in science and technol-
ogy as key pillars, while improving people’s lives and the construction of
society with a resource-saving and environmentally-friendly model as
important efforts. And the reform and opening up process was seen as a
powerful engine to accelerate structural changes for economic growth
(China.com 2012).
The 3rd Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the
Communist Party of China proposed a comprehensive and extensive
reform policy for China in which “the modernization of China’s system
and the capacity for national governance” (Gov.cn 2013) was to be an
important solution. The 4th, 5th and 6th Plenary Sessions of the 18th
Central Committee established the strategic layout of “The Four
2 REFORM OF PARTY AND STATE STRUCTURES IN CHINA 25
Comprehensives” (People.com 2017a), or the Four-pronged Comprehensive

Strategy, to steer the country towards the goal of “the great renaissance of
the Chinese nation”. The fifth generation of leaders of the CPC has intro-
duced many new policies and views on national governance.
The decision-making mechanism was changed with the introduction of
the Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform and the “top-
level design” approach (Development Research Center of the State
Council (n.d.)), which is being implemented to guide and promote reform
for the new era in China. The political and social situation has been
remarkably transformed through the Party’s fierce fight against corrup-
tion, and the capacity for national governance significantly enhanced with
law enforcement being expected to be in full compliance with “the cage of
regulations” (Gov.cn 2016).
At the 6th plenum of the 18th Central Committee, Xi Jinping said that
“in order to solve all the problems of China the key lies in the Party. The
Party must be capable of managing itself. The management of the Party
must be disciplinary” (Sina.com 2016). The core strength of the Party is
the leadership and governance of the country, and the pioneering and
exemplary role models of party members as civil servants and public offi-
cers. “The key only lies in a few (officials and party members)” (Gov.cn
2015). “To forge iron one must be strong” and Party members and party
organizations must strictly abide by the “eight regulations” (ba xiang guid-
ing 八项规定) (Xinhua Wang 2012) and get rid of the “four undesirable
work styles” of formalism (xingshizhuyi 形式主义), bureaucratism (guan-
liaozhuyi 官僚主义), hedonism (xianglezhuyi 享乐主义) and extravagance
(shemi zhifeng 奢靡之风). Officials and party members must also comply
with the “norms of political life within the Party under current condi-
tions” and “the regulations on intra–party supervision” (Sina.com 2016).
Strengthening the execution of inspection and supervision practices
within the Party is considered as an important guideline and critical solu-
tion to preventing the degradation of political ideology and ethics of life,
as well as to combat corruption and the abuse of power, notably the super-
vision and inspection tours (xunshi 巡视) of the Central Committee of the
Party. By June 2017, the CPC had conducted 12 rounds of inspections.
The issue of “ensuring fair justice, enhancing the effectiveness of the judi-
ciary and the trust of the people in the judicial system” (Xinhua Wang
2016b) became the overall target of the judicial reform programme after
the 18th Congress.
China has promoted the development and implementation of a new

governance regime in which power is restricted to “the cage of regula-
tions”, aiming to further transform the government from an “infinitely
powerful and multi-functional” system into a model of authority with
strict limits on the arbitrary power of the State referred to as “constrain
power within the cage of the system” (ba quanli guan jin zhidu de longzi
li 把权力关进制度的笼子里) (Xinhua Wang 2016a). Authorities need to
closely follow the “cage of regulations” prescribed by the constitution and
the law. The establishment of a constitutional government in China cov-
ers: the comprehensive implementation of all government functions in
accordance with the law; the consolidation of the policy-making mecha-
nism in accordance with the law; and the strengthening of compliance and
supervision practices of administrative powers towards effectively deliver-
ing the nation’s development goals. China also focuses on pushing the
modernization of the governance system and enhancing the capacity for
national governance.
After the 18th Congress, anti-corruption campaigns such as “killing
tigers” (da hu 打虎), “hunting foxes” (lie hu 猎狐) and “swatting flies”
(pai ying 拍蝇) (Xinhua Wang 2016b) (against high, medium and low-
level corruption cases) were carried out very drastically with massive sup-
port from the public. The prevention of corruption, along with the
comprehensive and strict management of the Party, is a prerequisite and
an important basis for the development of the Party as well as national
governance.
National governance, besides the concept of “core leadership”, is basi-
cally a policy-making mechanism. It was significantly changed after the
formation of the Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform
and other central leading groups, and with the “top-level design” approach
that is being implemented to direct and promote reform for the new era
in China. The political and social landscape has been transformed through
the Party’s fierce anti-corruption campaign, aiming at interest groups that
were formed over 30 years of reform and opening up. From an economic
angle, China has focused on transforming the means to achieve economic
growth. It is now moving into a “new normal state” characterized by a
declining growth rate and increasing quality and efficiency of develop-
ment, while seeking new motivations for growth. The strategic idea of the
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI or the “one belt, one road”) is China’s new
test for the country’s domestic and foreign policies. The BRI is also a way
for China to participate in global governance.
Nevertheless, China has to deal with a series of complex and inter-

twined instabilities and challenges, especially the state of unbalanced and
unsustainable development. As far as foreign relations are concerned, the
difficulties lie in the growing competition among major countries and the
suspicions other countries have about China’s intentions.
National Governance in China After the 19th

CPC Congress
Xi Jinping Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for “a new
era” was affirmed in the Party’s constitution at the 19th National Congress
in October 2017 and at the 2018 session of the National People’s Congress
by being inscribed in the National Constitution. Xi Jinping Thought has
now become the guiding ideology of the Party and the State of China as
well as the main guideline for the reform, opening and modernization
process of achieving China’s goal of becoming a superpower.
Xi Jinping Thought
Xi Jinping’s thought on socialism with Chinese characteristics is acknowl-
edged by law and institutionalized to become the guiding ideology of the
reform and modernization process in China. The “Xi Jinping Thought” is
being thoroughly studied and interpreted and dramatically implemented
to achieve China’s goal of basically completing its modernization process
by 2035 and becoming a superpower by the middle of the 21st century.
The 19th Congress of the Chinese Communist Party advocated the
slogan “the Party leads everything” (dang lingdao yiqie 党领导一切)
(People.com 2017b). This idea of the Party’s comprehensive leadership
especially emphasizes the overall direction and coordination provided by
the CPC. The Central Leading Group for Deepening Overall Reform has
become a comprehensive and far-reaching reform committee, while con-
tinuing its role as an agency responsible for directing “top-level design”
reforms, issuing and coordinating major policy decisions of China.
Amendment of the Constitution

On 26 January 2018, the CPC Central Committee sent “A petition to
amend some contents of the Constitution” (Xinhua Wang 2018c) to the
National Assembly. At the first session of the National Assembly, the

“Draft amendment to the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China”
(Xinhua Wang 2018b) was discussed and approved.
It expressed some important changes as follows: In the Introduction of
the constitution, the paragraph “…under the direction of Marxist–
Leninism, Mao Zedong’s thought, Deng Xiaoping’s theory, the impor-
tant thought of Three Represents” was changed to “…under the direction
of Marxism–Leninism, Mao Zedong’s thought, Deng Xiaoping’s theory,
the important thought of Three Represents, the viewpoint on scientific
development, Xi Jinping’s thought on Socialism with Chinese characteris-
tics for a new era”. Thus, the thought of Xi Jinping was officially affirmed
in the Constitution and the historic position of Xi Jinping was placed on
par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping.
In Clause 2, Article 1, after the line “the socialist system is the basic
system of the People’s Republic of China” (Gov.cn 2018c), the line “the
leadership of the Communist Party of China is the most characteristic
feature of Socialism with Chinese characteristics” was added. Thus, the
leadership role of the CPC is embodied in the Constitution.
Chapter 3 of the Constitution (about the State apparatus) added
Section 7 and five articles (Articles 123–127) on the organization and
powers of the National Supervisory Commission. In particular, it says
“The National Supervisory Commission of the People’s Republic of China
is the supreme watchdog”. This oversight body was set up in addition to
other State agencies such as administrative agencies, courts and procura-
torates. It is responsible to the National People’s Congress, which also
appoints the director of this agency. Clause 3 of Article 79 of the 1982
Constitution, which stated “The President and Vice-President of the
People’s Republic of China cannot serve more than two consecutive
terms”, was also removed. This establishes the legal conditions for the cur-
rent President to continue to be elected as the President of the country for
a third term as well as subsequent terms after his second term of office
expires in 2023.
Reforming Party and State Apparatuses

In recent years, the supervision regime under the CPC has been strength-
ened with the establishment of a system of supervisory bodies from central
to local levels, which was implemented under the Supervision Law of the
People’s Republic of China. This Law was approved at the 13th National
People’s Congress of China in March 2018. The reform of the supervision
regime China shows the determination of the Chinese leadership in
national governance and the fight against corruption.
Regarding the reform of the apparatuses of the Party and State, over the
years China has conducted seven rounds of reform to renovate the govern-
ment apparatus and transform the functions of the government. Yet, the
results were not as desirable as expected and the level of efficiency was not
so high (Caixin 2018). Meanwhile, the current reform has been under-
taken in a more systematic, comprehensive and thorough manner, combin-
ing reforms of the apparatuses of the Party, government, National Assembly,
the Fatherland Front, the judiciary system, the national army, functional
departments, public groups and social organizations. It re-prescribed the
responsibilities, competencies and relationships between relevant depart-
ments in a clearer and more transparent way. The focus of this reform has
been on enhancing the overall leadership of the Party, integrating critical
focal points, improving efficiency and reinforcing rules of supervision. This
reform of the Party and the State organs demonstrates the comprehensive
leadership of the Chinese Communist Party, the improvement of the
national governance system and the enhancement of the people’s interests
that are beneficial for the long-term leadership and governance of the
Chinese Communist Party. At the first session of the 13th National People’s
Congress, Chinese Premier Li Keqiang submitted a plan to reorganize the
government structure with 26 ministries and an equal number of depart-
ments. This plan was later approved by the NPC (Gov.cn 2018a).
National Supervisory Commission and the System of Supervisory

Bodies in China
The Report of the 19th Congress of the Communist Party of China clearly
expressed a need “To establish a supervision system uniformly and consis-
tently coordinated by the Party with its comprehensive coverage, effective
powers and thorough connection between intra-party supervision and
government bodies for national supervision, democratic supervision, judi-
cial and public oversight, public opinion supervision, and enhancing over-
all capacity for supervision” (People.com 2017b). This essentially shows the
trend of structurally reforming the apparatus of supervisory organs, which
have been uniformly executed from central to local levels as an urgent
need of the institutional reform process in China.
In the past, China’s conduct of supervision practices focused on vari-

ous government bodies such as the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection of the CPC, the Ministry of Supervision (a Cabinet–level
department of the State Council) and the Supreme People’s Procuratorate
which is responsible for both prosecution and investigation. Furthermore,
the Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress also has the
function of supervising the performance of State agencies, such as the
State Council, the courts and the procuratorates. Hence, it can be con-
cluded that, in the past, China’s supervisory bodies were divided into
oversight organs of the Party, the State and the prosecution, investigation
and supervision system of the Chinese people, which was represented by
the People’s Congress.
The newly adopted constitution of China states that “The National
Supervisory Commission of the People’s Republic of China is the supreme
watchdog of the country. The National Supervisory Commission will lead
the performance of local supervisory commissions” (Article 125) (Gov.cn
2018c). As such, supervisory commissions will be organized from central
to local levels, appointed by and accountable to the corresponding People’s
Congress seat of each locality (Article 3, Clause 3) (Gov.cn 2018c).
The Supervisory Commission is defined as a specialized body that per-
forms the exclusive function of supervising State organs in cooperation
with the Central Commission for Discipline Inspection of the Chinese
Communist Party. This is intended to signify a high level of unity between
the Party and the people. Thus, the “Supervisory Commission is a political
structure that conducts the practice of self-monitoring of the Party and
the State, not as an administrative or judiciary organ, but based on law to
exercise the right of supervision” (Sina.com 2018). The Supervisory
Commission is placed under the direct leadership of the Party, represent-
ing the Party and the State to supervise all cadres and civil servants who
wield public power while investigating whether those personnel commit
any unlawful or criminal acts. The Supervisory Commission has distinctive
powers and functions compared with corresponding judiciary and law
enforcement agencies.
According to the provisions of the constitution and the Supervision
Law, all provinces, cities and districts across China will establish a supervi-
sion system at three levels: central, provincial (city), and communal (at
district-level cities) levels. At the central level, the name of the oversight
body will be the National Supervisory Commission, reflecting the shift
from “low-level supervision”, for example, administrative supervision, to
“high-level supervision”, such as State supervision and representing the

highest position of a state agency in the field of supervision (Sina.com
2018). Local supervisory commissions will be called by local a dministrative
names. For example, the oversight bodies of Guangdong and Guangxi will
be called the Supervision Commissions of Guangdong and Guangxi. The
Director of each Supervisory Commission will be appointed by the
People’s Congresses of the corresponding level.
In the past, in order to ensure a strong and consistent leadership of the
Party’s anti-corruption work, the Central Commission for Discipline
Inspection of the Chinese Communist Party had to perform two func-
tions: disciplinary inspection and supervision. However, now the supervi-
sion function will be carried out by a separate system of supervisory
commissions from central to local levels. In case of major and serious
cases, the decisions will be approved by the corresponding Party
Committees. The National Supervisory Commission leads the work of the
supervisory commissions at the local level. The subordinate supervisory
commission is accountable to the supervisory commission at the higher
level and the latter will oversee the work of the former.
In order to ensure the legitimation of the functions and duties of the
supervisory commissions, the amended constitution of the People’s
Republic of China clearly stipulates that the supervisory commissions
independently perform the functions of supervising, investigating and
handling of corruption cases on the basis of the legal framework. No
administrative bodies, social organizations or individuals have the right to
intervene. At the same time, relevant agencies and individuals need to
actively cooperate with the supervisory commissions for it to execute its
supervisory power. In the constitution, this relationship is institutional-
ized and legalized to ensure that the supervisory power is properly imple-
mented in accordance with the law and subject to the supervision of
related organs as described above.
National Governance in China in the Second Decade

of the 21st Century
Xi Jinping’s thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new

era was affirmed in the Constitution and became the guiding ideology of
the Party and the state of China. Moreover, Xi Jinping’s thought was also
confirmed by law and institutionalized to become the guiding ideology of
the reform and modernization process in China. The historic position of

Xi Jinping is now placed on par with Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping—
the 1954 Constitution marked the era of Mao Zedong; the 1982
Constitution marked the era of Deng Xiaoping; and the Constitution rati-
fied in 2018 now marks the era of Xi Jinping. “Xi Jinping thought” has
been thoroughly studied, interpreted and implemented to realize China’s
goal of completing its modernization process by 2035 and becoming a
superpower by the middle of the 21st century.
Supply-side reform is an idea developed from Chinese political-economy
theory. It has been adopted as the practical and theoretical basis for Xi
Jinping’s economic thought. Over time, the Chinese economy has been
struggling to shift from quantity to quality of growth while trying to sat-
isfy other urgent needs such as promoting upward movement in the indus-
trial value chain and economic structural adjustment to establish new
industries, develop a modern service sector to support different profes-
sions, and generate more innovation-based development achievements.
After the 19th Congress, China’s Central Economic Work Conference
in December 2017, for the first time, proposed the concept of “Xi Jinping
Thought on Socialism with Chinese characteristics for a new era”. In par-
ticular, Xi’s economic thought focuses on transforming the means to
achieve economic development, plus improving the quality and efficiency
of development. Xi’s economic thought is demonstrated more concretely
through the eight key tasks and the three critical battles.
The first of the eight key tasks is to focus the country’s economic work
on advancing supply-side structural reform. The second task is to activate
the powers of market participants. The third is to implement the strategy
of revitalizing rural areas, while the fourth focuses on promoting rational
strategies for “harmonious development” of the country. The fifth task is
to facilitate new prospects for comprehensive opening-up, the sixth, to
continuously guarantee and improve high-quality living standards and the
seventh, to accelerate the construction of a housing system that ensures
supply through multiple sources and multiple guaranteed channels, with
both rental housing and purchase. The eighth and final task is to promote
the construction of an “ecological civilization” (People.com 2017b).
The requirements set in 2018 for China’s economic performance will
face three major battles, which are the prevention and overcoming of
major risks, proper poverty reduction and the prevention of environmen-
tal pollution (People.com 2017c).
The Report on the government’s work in 2018, in the spirit of the

Resolution of the CPC’s 19th Congress and Xi Jinping’s economic
thought, has prioritized transforming the means to achieve economic
development, finding new motivations for growth, improving the quality
and efficiency of the economy, and moving from “a high growth rate” to
“high quality” through the main route called “supply-side reform” (Gov.
cn. 2018b).
Premier Li continued to emphasize the policy guidelines and solutions
for 2018 in the government’s report. It included: promoting supply-side
structural reform; speeding up the development of the national innovation
system; deepening reform in important areas; winning the three critical
battles; implementing the strategy of revitalizing rural areas and strategies
for regional cooperation and development; expanding the scale of con-
sumption and promoting effective investment; facilitating the new context
of comprehensive opening-up, especially the BRI. And setting an eco-
nomic growth target of 6.5 percent for 2018 (Gov.cn. 2018b).
The 18th National Congress of the Communist Party of China affirmed
the regime to be implemented in social governance, which “is led by the
Party, governed by the State and secured by law with strong social inclu-
sion and public participation” (dangwei lingdao, zhengfu fuze, shehui
xietong, gongzhong canyu 党委领导、政府负责、社会协同、公众参与)
(Renmin Chubanshe 2012). The 19th National Congress of the Chinese
Communist Party (CCP) stressed the “people-centered” philosophy to
carry out extensive and comprehensive reform. This can be considered as
a remarkable milestone in China’s reform. Social democracy is still a heavy
task and a major goal of China.
However, the biggest problem posed to China’s economy today is
probably the quality of China’s economic growth. The country’s eco-
nomic growth, while facing numerous challenges, has brought about
imbalanced and unsustainable outcomes. The issues arising from heavy
public debt and prolonged overcapacity remains unresolved. As the
country has experienced an abnormally high growth rate over a long
period of time, many consequences for the Chinese economy have not
been addressed thoroughly and adequately yet. For example, the deple-
tion of natural resources, environmental pollution, inequality between
the rich and the poor, unbalanced development, among others. Therefore,
though China’s political leaders want to overcome the “middle income
trap” and head towards a higher level of average income and high-quality
growth, the country’s economy is still facing big challenges. This is a
medium and long-term goal. China must deal well with major pairs of
relationships, such as between supply and demand; the state and the mar-
ket; input and output; domestic and foreign affairs; equality and effi-
ciency. In particular, it needs to eliminate potential risks of crises, in
which financial risk is ranked first. Fielding Chen and Tom Orlik have
estimated that China’s total debt would reach 327 percent of GDP by
2022. That would make China one of the biggest debtors in the world
(Bloomberg 2017).
Conclusion
China has long promoted drastic reforms in the context of a rapidly chang-
ing world and unstable regional conditions, especially with the emergence
of the opposite trends of supporting and opposing economic globaliza-
tion, plus the rise of trade protectionism, nationalism and populism.
Meanwhile, the geopolitical situation around China still creates several
obstacles for it. These include the nuclear crisis on the Korean Peninsula,
relations across the Taiwan Strait, maritime disputes with some East Asian
countries, and especially the competition among major countries in the
region and around the world, in which the competition between China
and the US is creating numerous uncertainties. With respect to its foreign
policy, China expresses great confidence and determination, while actively
participating in global governance and deploying diplomatic relations
with major countries based on “head-of-state diplomacy” to gain a more
active role in dealing with foreign affairs. However, the US-China trade
war is the biggest challenge for China since the 19th National Congress.
This requires China to adjust its domestic reforms while seeking solutions
in its foreign relations.
References
Bloomberg. 2017. “China’s Debt Surge May Increase Risk of Financial Crisis”.
November 21. https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2017-11-21/
china-s-debt-surge-may-increase-risk-of-financial-crisis
Caixin. 2018. “Gaige kaifang yilai qici Guowuyuan jigou gaige huigu” (改革开放
以来其次国务院机构改革回顾) [A Review of Institutional Reforms of the
State Council Since Reform and Opening Up]. March 13. http://topics.caixin.
com/2018-03-13/101220535.html
China.com. 2012. “Hu Jintao shibada baogao” (胡锦涛十八大报告) [Hu Jintao’s
Report to the 18th Party Congress]. November 20. http://news.china.com.
cn/politics/2012-11/20/content_27165856.htm
Development Research Center of the State Council. n.d. “Guanyu dingceng sheji
de sikao” (关于顶层设计的思考) [Thinking About Top-Level Design]. http://
www.dr cnet.com.cn/www/TrainInter view/TrainInter viewDetail.
aspx?interviewid=83
Gov.cn. 2013. “Zhonggong Zhongyang guanyu quanmian shenhua gaige
ruogan zhong da wenti de jueding” (中共中央关于全面深化改革若干重大问
题的决定) [Central Committee of the Communist Party of China’s Resolution
on Some Important Questions Regarding Comprehensive Deepening of
Reforms]. November 15. http://www.gov.cn/jrzg/2013-11/15/con-
tent_2528179.htm
Gov.cn. 2015. “Shengbuji zhuyao lingdao ganbu xuexi guanche shibajie si
Zhongquanhuijingshen” (省部级主要领导干部学习贯彻十八届四中全会精神)
[Leading Cadres at the Provincial Level Must Study and Carry Out the Spirit of
the Fourth Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist
Party of China]. February 7. http://www.gov.cn/xinwen/2015-02/07/con-
tent_2816078.htm
Gov.cn. 2016. “Guowuyuan wei gongting yinfa Guowuyuan bumen quanli he zeren
qingdan bianzhi shidian fang’an de tongzhi” (国务院为公厅关于印发国务院部门
权力和责任清单编制试点方案的通知) [Notice on Drawing Up a Pilot Program
Regarding State Council’s List of Rights and Responsibilities]. January 5. http://
www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-01/05/content_10554.htm
Gov.cn. 2018a. “Guowuyuan jigou gaige fang’an” (国务院机构改革方案) [Plan
For Institutional Reform of the State Council]. March 17. http://www.gov.
cn/guowuyuan/2018-03/17/content_5275116.htm
Gov.cn. 2018b. “Zhengfu gongzuo baogao” (政府工作报告) [Work Report of the
Government]. March 3. http://www.gov.cn/zhuanti/2018lh/2018zfgzbg/
zfgzbg.htm
Gov.cn. 2018c. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xianfa (中华人民共和国宪法)
[Constitution of the People’s Republic of China]. March 22. http://www.gov.
cn/guoqing/2018-03/22/content_5276318.htm
People.com. 2017a. “‘Si ge quanmian’ zhanlüe buju” (四个全面战略布局)
[Strategic Layout of ‘Four Comprehensives’]. September 6. http://theory.
people.com.cn/n1/2017/0906/c413700-29519344.html
People.com. 2017b. “Xi Jinping zai Zhongguo Gongchandang di shijiu ci quanguo
daibiao dahui shang de baogao” (习近平在中国共产党第十九次全国代表大会
上的报告) [Xi Jinping’s Report of the 19th Congress]. October 28. http://
cpc.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1028/c64094-29613660.html
People.com. 2017c. “Zhongyang jingji gongzuo huiyi beijing ju xing” (中央经济工
作会议在北京举行) [Central Economic Work Conference Organised in
Beijing]. December 21. http://politics.people.com.cn/n1/2017/1221/
c1001-29719813.html
Renmin Chubanshe. 2012. Zhongguo Gongchandang di shiba ci quanguo daibiao

dahui wenjian huiban (中国共产党第十八次全国代表大会文件汇编)
[Compilation of 18th Congress Documents]. Beijing.
Sina.com. 2016. “Zhongguo Gongchandang shiba jie liu zhong quanhui gong-
bao” (中国共产党十八届六中全会公报发布) [Communique of the Sixth
Plenary Session of the 18th Central Committee of the Communist Party of
China]. October 27. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2016-10-27/doc-ifxx-
fuff6960217.shtml
Sina.com. 2018. “Li Jianguo zuo guanyu jiancha fa caoan shuoming” (李建国
作关于监察法草案说明), [Li Jianguo’s Explanation of the Draft Supervision
Law]. March 13. http://news.sina.com.cn/c/nd/2018-03-13/doc-ifysc-
smv0856085.shtml
Xinhua Wang. 2012. “Zhonggong Zhongyang Zhengzhiju zhaokai huyi” (中共
中央政治局召开会议) [Political Bureau of the Central Committee of the
Chinese Communist Party Convenes a Meeting]. December 4. http://www.
xinhuanet.com/politics/2012-12/04/c_113906913.htm
Xinhua Wang. 2016a. “Guanyu xin xingshi xia dangnei zhengzhi shenghuo de
ruogan zhunze” (关于新形势下党内政治生活的若干准则) [Some Guidelines
on Political Life in the Party Under the New Situation]. November 27. http://
www.xinhuanet.com//politics/2016-11/02/c_1119838382.htm
Xinhua Wang. 2016b. “Shibada hou fanfu zouguo san nian: Yadaoxing taishi
zheng xingcheng” (十八大后反腐走过三年:压倒性态势正形成) [Combating
Corruption in the Three Years Following the 18th Congress: Overwhelming
Rectification of the Situation]. January 15. http://www.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2016-01/15/c_128630563.htm
Xinhua Wang. 2018a. “Shisan jie Quanguo Renda dici huiyi kaimu hui” (十三届
全国人大一次会议开幕会) [Opening Ceremony of the First Session of the
13th National People’s Congress]. March 5. http://www.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2018lh/zb/20180305b/wzsl.htm
Xinhua Wang. 2018b. “Zhongguo Gongchandang Zhongyang Weiyuanhui
guanyu xiugai xianfa bufen neirong de jianyi” (中国共产党中央委员会关于修
改宪法部分内容的建议) [Central Committee of the CCP’s Proposal on
Amending Parts of the Constitution]. February 25. http://www.net.com/
politics/2018-02/25/c_1122451187.htm
Xinhua Wang. 2018c. “Zhonghuo Renmin Gongheguo xianfa xiuzheng an” (
中华人民共和国宪法修正案) [Amendments to the Constitution of the
People’s Republic of China]. March 11. http://www.xinhuanet.com/
politics/2018lh/2018-03/11/c_1122521235.htm
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
historian, Rev. Alex. Macrae, is of opinion that the name has
an ecclesiastical origin as the ‘son of grace’ applied to a holy
man of old. Relying on tradition, he inclines to believe that the
Macraes were from Clunes in the Aird and were of common
origin with the Mackenzies and Macleans.
The Kintail Macraes were not out in ’45. There was,
however, a certain Captain MacRaw in Glengarry’s regiment;
he attended Prince Charles when in Lochaber during his
wanderings; also a Lieut. Alexander M‘Ra from Banff; and one
of the French officers taken prisoner at sea on the voyage to
Scotland, was Captain James Macraith of Berwick’s regiment.
Gilchrist Macgrath or M‘Kra entertained the Prince in Glen
Shiel in his wanderings. Murdoch M‘Raw, ‘nearest relation to
the chieftain of that name,’ was barbarously hanged as a spy
at Inverness protesting his innocence. (L. in M., i. 205, 342; iii.
378; ii. 205, 299.)
[265] See Dickson, The Jacobite Attempt of 1719 (Scot.
Hist. Soc., vol. xix.).
[266] The Long Island is the name given to the chain of the
outer Hebrides from the Butt of Lewis to Barra Head,
comprising Lewis and Harris, North Uist, Benbecula, South
Uist, Eriska, Barra and Mingulay.
[267] The story of the transference of the lands of the
ancient and powerful family of Macleod of Lewis to the
Mackenzies is one of the most pitiful in Highland history.
Towards the middle of the sixteenth century, Roderick (or
Ruari) Macleod, the last undisputed Macleod of Lewis,
married, as his first wife, a natural daughter of John Mackenzie
of Kintail. The wife eloped, the son, named Torquil Connanach,
was repudiated. Torquil was brought up at Strath Connan
(hence his ‘to-name’) by the Mackenzies, who embraced his
cause. From that moment the family of Lewis was doomed.
Partly by purchase, partly by marriage, but largely by intrigue
and violence the lands of Macleod were acquired by the
Mackenzies. Lewis was driven to anarchy; feuds of the worst
type ensued, father against sons, brothers murdering brothers.
Government interfered; Lewis was forfeited and parcelled out
among Lowland colonist-adventurers, who were thwarted by
the Mackenzies, and at last were glad to go, and in 1610 to
dispose of their rights to Mackenzie, who had become Lord
Kintail the previous year. Any rights that remained to his
cousin Torquil Macleod were made over to the Mackenzies.
Meantime, in 1605, Kintail’s brother Roderick had married the
daughter and heiress of Torquil, and became possessed of the
mainland property of Coigeach. As soon as the Mackenzies
obtained the island, they promptly restored order; the
remaining members of the old Macleod family were murdered
or driven out under a commission of fire and sword. Kintail’s
son became an earl in 1623, and took his title from Loch
Seaforth in Lewis, while his uncle Roderick, tutor of Kintail,
terrible and ruthless (of whom the Gaelic proverb says ‘there
are two things worse than the Tutor of Kintail, frost in spring
and mist in the dog-days’), built a castle in Strathpeffer, which
he called Castle Leod, and when his grandson obtained the
earldom of Cromarty in 1685, the second title then assumed
was that of ‘Lord Macleod,’ to show that the heritage of the old
family of Macleod of Lewis remained with him.
[268] Roderick Macneill of Barra was from home when
Prince Charles landed in the neighbouring island of Eriska,
July ’45. He took no active part in the rising but was arrested
on suspicion in July ’46, taken to London, released in ’47.
[269] For the Macdonald divisions and claims, see
Appendix,
[270] John Mackinnon of Mackinnon was the only one of
the three Skye chiefs who went out. He joined with his clan at
Edinburgh, and served throughout the campaign, but was
absent on duty in Sutherland when Culloden was fought. He
was attainted. Prince Charles went to him in his wanderings,
and the chief conducted him from Skye to the mainland, for
which service he was made prisoner, taken to London, but
released in July ’47. He died in Skye, in ’56, aged 75 years. He
was a son-in-law of Archbishop Sharpe of St. Andrews.
[271] This is a reference to the well-known story of the
conversion of the islanders. The laird, a man ‘much respected,’
an elder of the kirk, reproved by the General Assembly for
allowing his people to remain in popery, retrieved his character
by driving his tenants from the Catholic chapel to the
Protestant church with the vigorous application of a gold-
headed cane, called by the Highlanders a yellow stick: from
this the Presbyterian religion became known in the islands as
Creidimh a bhata bhui, the creed of the yellow stick. Cf.
Bellesheim’s Hist. Cath. Church Scot. (iv. 188).
[272] Called the Parish of the Small Isles.
[273] Modernly, Loch Hourn = Hell Loch.
[274] Scotus and Barisdale were brothers, both being
uncles of the chief of Glengarry. The elder, Angus Macdonell
of Scotus, was an old man in ’45, and died the following year.
He remained at home, but his eldest son Donald went out with
Glengarry. Donald fell wounded at Culloden, and was
supposed to have died on the field. The clan historians,
however, state that evidence has been found in the Stuart
Papers at Windsor that certain marauders landed from a ship
at night, carried off a number of wounded, among them Donald
of Scotus, who after various adventures was captured by
Turkish pirates, and held in bondage ever afterwards. (History
of Clan Donald, iii. 324.) Two of Scotus’s younger sons John
and Allan were captains in Glengarry’s regiment. Donald’s
eldest son Ranald fought on the Government side in ’45 in
Loudoun’s regiment. Ranald’s grandson succeeded in 1868 as
18th hereditary chief of Glengarry.
For Macdonell of Barisdale, see post, p. 96.
[275] The Morar family was really not a cadet, but the
senior branch of the Clanranald family, descended from the
eldest son of Dougall, 6th Clanranald, who was deposed by
the clan for cruelty and oppression, and his children excluded
for ever from the chiefship, which was conferred on his uncle.
Dougall was assassinated in 1520; his family, on whom the
lands of Morar were conferred, were known as the
‘MacDhughail Mhorair.’ In 1745 the laird of Morar was Allan,
whose mother was a Macdonald of Sleat. He must have been
an elderly man, as his wife was an aunt of Lochiel’s, the
youngest daughter of Sir Ewan Cameron by his third wife,
daughter of the Quaker David Barclay of Urie. Morar was one
of the first to meet the Prince on his reaching Lochnanuagh in
July ’45. He served as lieut-colonel of the Clanranald regiment.
Prince Charles in his wanderings came to him for hospitality in
July ’46, and Morar could only give him a cave to sleep in as
his house had been burned down. His reception of the Prince,
prompted it is said by young Clanranald, was very cold, and he
was the object of fierce invective by the chief of Mackinnon,
and of sorrowful reproach by Charles himself. (L. in M., iii.
187.) According to the clan historians, Morar had the
reputation of being ‘an unmanly, drunken creature all his life.’
(Hist. Cl. Donald, iii. 256.)
Mr. Andrew Lang says that Morar was the author of the
Journal and Memorial of P—— C—— Expedition into Scotland
(printed in the Lockhart Papers), which is a principal source of
knowledge of the early days of the adventure. Mr. Lang did not
remember his authority, but was certain of its authenticity. (I
had been assured in Moidart that the Journal was by young
Ranald of Kinloch-Moidart, but without proof.) Allan of Morar
died in 1756. His eldest son, John, was ‘out,’ but in what
capacity he served I have failed to trace. Morar’s step-brother,
John of Guidale, was a captain in the Clanranald regiment.
Another step-brother was Hugh Macdonald, who had been
educated for the Church in France. He was reported to Rome
as a ‘scion of one of the noblest branches of the
Macdonalds.... He himself is distinguished even more for his
zeal and piety than for his honourable birth, and is also a man
of singular prudence and modesty.’ (Bellesheim, iv. 386.) He
was consecrated Bishop of Diana in partibus in 1731, and
appointed vicar-apostolic of the Highlands. The Bishop visited
the Prince on board ship on his first arrival, and implored him
to return. When the Standard was raised in Glenfinnan it was
blessed by Bishop Hugh. What part he took during the
campaign I do not know, but after the debacle, he
accompanied Lord Lovat in his hiding in Morar. When the
fugitives were pounced upon by Ferguson’s party (see post,
pp. 90, 244) Lovat was captured, but the Bishop escaped and
went to France, in September, along with Prince Charles. He
returned to Scotland in 1749, when he had an interview with
Bishop Forbes, who veils his identity by calling him ‘Mr. Hugh.’
(L. in M., iii. 50.) He was betrayed in July 1755, and arrested,
released on bail, and obliged to reside at Duns until the
following February, when he was sentenced by the High Court
to perpetual banishment. (Scots. Mag., xvii. 358, xviii. 100.) By
connivance of the authorities, the sentence was not enforced,
and he remained in Scotland until his death, which occurred in
Glengarry in 1773.
The Kinlochmoidart family descends from the 9th
Clanranald (d. 1593). The laird in 1745 was Donald
Macdonald; his mother was Margaret Cameron, the only sister
of Lochiel of the ’45; his wife was a daughter of Stewart of
Appin. Donald, as a boy, had fought at Sheriffmuir. His brother
Æneas, a banker in Paris, came over from France with Prince
Charles. On arrival in Scotland Æneas was sent to summon
the laird. Kinlochmoidart, who was given a commission as
colonel and made aide-de-camp to the Prince, was at once
despatched to summon his uncle Lochiel, and other Jacobite
leaders. Prince Charles lived in his house from August 11th to
18th. When a captive the following year, Kinlochmoidart was
asked what made him embark in the adventure, ‘Lord, man’ he
replied, ‘what could I do when the young lad came to my
house.’ (Carlisle in 1745, p. 266.) It is interesting from the point
of view of Highland hospitality to compare this reply with the
advice given to Prince Charles by Clanranald’s brother,
Boisdale, who had an interview with the Prince at Eriska on his
first arrival, but refused to rise. When he found it impossible to
dissuade the Prince from his enterprise he ‘insisted that he
ought to land on the estate of Macdonald of Sleat or in that of
Macleod, for if he trusted himself to them in the beginning they
would certainly join him which otherwise they would not do.
The Prince would not follow this counsel, being influenced by
others.’ (Bishop Geddes’s MS.) Kinlochmoidart was made
prisoner at Lesmahagow in Lanarkshire, in November ’45,
while returning to the army from an unsuccessful mission to Sir
Alexander of Sleat and Macleod. The principal agent in his
capture was a divinity student, Thomas Lining, afterwards
rewarded with the living of Lesmahagow. The chieftain was
tried at Carlisle, and there hanged on 18th October ’46. His
head was fixed on the Scots Gate, where it remained for many
years. His house was burned down.
Kinlochmoidart’s family was deeply implicated in the Rising.
Four of his brothers served in Clanranald’s regiment: John, a
doctor of medicine, who was one of Ferguson’s victims in the
Furness; he afterwards returned to Moidart; Ranald, whose
chivalrous championship of the Prince’s cause, gave the first
note of enthusiasm to the adventure (Home, Hist. Reb., p. 39);
Allan, who fled to France and perished in the Revolution;
James, who was captured at Culloden, but escaped; he was
exempted from the general pardon, and is supposed to have
gone to America. A fifth brother, Æneas the Paris banker, was
captured, tried, and sentenced to death. He escaped from
Newgate by throwing snuff in the turnkey’s eyes, but being
shod with loose slippers he tripped when flying along Warwick
Lane and was retaken. He received a conditional pardon,
returned to France, and was killed in the Revolution.
[276] The property was acquired in 1726 by Sir David
Murray of Stanhope (Peeblesshire) 2nd bart., the father of
John Murray of Broughton. He died in 1729, but the work of
developing the lead mines and minerals was carried on by his
son, Sir James. In 1745 the proprietor was Sir David Murray,
4th bart., nephew of Sir James, He was ‘out,’ served as aide-
de-camp to the Prince, and fought at Falkirk and Culloden. He
was captured at Whitby endeavouring to escape; was tried at
York; sentenced to death; conditionally pardoned; and died an
exile in 1770. The forfeited estate in Ardnamurchan was sold
for £33,700.
[277] Of Torcastle, fourth son of Sir Ewan Cameron. He
was attainted. After Culloden he remained in Lochaber, and
was agent for distributing money to the Camerons. At the end
of ’47 he was still free, having evaded all attempts at capture
(Albemarle Papers); of his subsequent career I have no
knowledge.
[278] Sir Hector Maclean of Duart (Mull), 5th bart., who was
major of Lord John Drummond’s French regiment of Royal
Scots, had been sent from France to Edinburgh in May, and
was made prisoner there in June, and removed to London. He
was tried for his life, but on proving that he was born in Calais
he was treated as a prisoner of war. Charles Maclean of
Drimnin (Morvern) joined the Prince after the battle of Falkirk;
at Culloden, where Drimnin was killed, his Macleans were
formed into a regiment with the Maclachlans, commanded by
the chief of Maclachlan. Allan Maclean of Brolas, who
succeeded Sir Hector in 1750, as 6th bart., joined the
Government side. (Scots Mag., viii. 141.)
[279] Lachlan MacLachlan; was commissary general in the
Jacobite army; killed at Culloden.
[280] For the Maclean and Maclachlan gentlemen, see
Appendix.
[281] Rev. John Maclachlan of Kilchoan, ‘chaplain general
of the clans,’ friend and correspondent of Bishop Forbes.
Writing to the Bishop in 1748, he says, ‘I live for the most part
now like a hermite, because all my late charge almost were
kill’d in battle, scatter’d abroad or are cow’d at home. (L. in M.,
ii. 210.)
[282] Dugald Stewart, 8th chief of Appin and last of the
direct male line. Although a Jacobite, and created a peer, as
Lord Appin, by James, in 1743, he did not join Prince Charles.
His clan, one of the first to rise, was led out by his kinsman
Charles Stewart, 5th of Ardshiel. Dugald Stewart sold Appin in
1765, and died 1769.
[283] Alexander Macdonald of Glencoe was attainted; he
surrendered some time after Culloden; he was in prison as late
as 1750; date of release or of death not ascertained. Two
brothers, James and Donald, went out with him in ’45.
[284] Lochiel’s brother, Alexander Cameron, third son of
John of Lochiel, joined the Church of Rome, and became a
Jesuit. I have failed to trace what part he took during the
campaign; but in July 1746 he was arrested at Morar and put
on board the Furness, the ship of the notorious Captain
Ferguson. Father Cameron was carried to the Thames; he
suffered great hardships, and died at Gravesend on board
ship. (Albemarle Papers, p. 408; L. in M., i. 312.)
[285] The last clan battle of importance, known as the
Battle of Mulroy, fought in Glenroy, August 1688. The
Mackintoshes, who had obtained charters of Keppoch’s
country, were ever at feud with Keppoch, who legally owned
none of the land his clan occupied. It is said that on this
occasion Macdonell of Keppoch (‘Coll of the Cows’) treated his
prisoner Mackintosh so kindly that the latter in gratitude
offered him a charter of the lands in dispute. Keppoch
declined, saying, that he would never consent to hold by
sheepskin what he had won by the sword. (Hist. of Clan
Donald, ii. 645.) Murray of Broughton, however, states that as
the result of this battle Mackintosh granted Keppoch an
advantageous lease, which was still running in 1745.
(Memorials, p. 443.)
[286] In 1745 the chief of Keppoch, Alexander (son of Coll),
was a Protestant. When his clan joined the Prince he refused
to allow a favourite priest to accompany it, and in
consequence, a number of his people deserted when at
Aberchalder. Keppoch had been created a Jacobite baronet in
1743. His death at Culloden has been the theme of much
romance. For some late light on the subject, see Mr. Andrew
Lang’s Hist. of Scot., iv. 527.
[287] The Grants of Glenmoriston joined the Glengarry
regiment.
[288] Not the eldest son, but the third son, Allan Grant of
Innerwick. He was taken prisoner by the Jacobites at the
bloodless battle of Dornoch. Lord John Murray’s regiment is
the Highland Regiment (Black Watch).
[289] See post, p. 281 et seq.
[290] Contrary to what I find is a general impression, the
religion of Lord Lovat and his family, as well as his clan, was
Protestant. It is true that in his days of outlawry and exile in
France, about 1703, Lovat feigned conversion to Romanism,
yet from his return to Scotland in ’15, until his capture in ’46,
he conformed to the Presbyterian establishment; his bosom
friend and crony was the gloomy and dissolute fanatic, James
Erskine, Lord Grange. When in hiding after Culloden, along
with Bishop Hugh Macdonald, in Loch Morar (see ante, p. 82)
Lovat informed the Bishop that he had long been a Catholic in
his heart, and wished to be received into the Church. He was
preparing to make his confession, but before the rite could be
accomplished, the fugitives were dispersed by a party of
Campbells and seamen from Ferguson’s ship, and Lord Lovat
surrendered a few days later. Though he desired the services
of the chaplain of the Sardinian embassy while a prisoner in
the Tower, where on one occasion he pronounced himself a
Jansenist, and although he declared ‘Je meurs un fils indigne
de l’Église Romaine,’ there is no evidence, which I know of,
that he ever formally joined that communion.
[291] See post, p. 99.
[292] Robert Bruce, ordained minister at Edinburgh 1587;
Moderator of the Kirk 1588 and 1592, was the son of Bruce of
Airth, Stirlingshire, a rude and powerful baron of a family
collateral with the royal Bruces. At first Bruce was in high
favour with James vi., who placed him on the council of
regency when he went to Denmark to be married, 1589, and
appointed him to officiate at the coronation of Queen Anne the
following year. Subsequently he thwarted the king in his
ecclesiastical policy as well as in refusing to acknowledge the
guilt of the Earl of Gowrie, who had been his pupil. James had
him deposed from his parish, and banished from Edinburgh,
1600. Part of his exile was passed at Inverness (1605-9, and
again 1620-24), where he preached to crowded congregations
every Sunday. He died at Kinnaird, 1631.
[293] See post, p. 104.
[294] The valley of the Findhorn river, Inverness, Nairn, and
Moray shires.
[295] See post, pp. 100, 410.
[297] Now called Strathavon.
[298] Duncan Forbes of Culloden; b. 1685; M.P. Inverness-
shire 1722; Lord Advocate 1725; Lord President of the Court
of Session 1737; d. 1747.
[299] George (Mackenzie), 3rd earl; b. about 1702; known
as the Master of Macleod until his grandfather’s death, 1714;
as Lord Tarbat until his father’s death, 1731, when he
succeeded to the earldom. His father, although a friend and
cousin of Lord Mar, had not gone out in 1715. The Earl
married, 1724, Isabella, daughter of Sir Wm. Gordon of
Invergordon, head of a family ‘noted for their zeal for the
Protestant succession.’ He was captured at Dunrobin 1746;
condemned to death by the House of Lords; released with a
conditional pardon 1749; d. at London 1766.
[300] John (Mackenzie), Lord Macleod, eldest son of 3rd
Earl of Cromartie; b. 1727. Captured along with his father; pled
guilty; received a conditional pardon 1748; went abroad 1749;
entered the Swedish service when the Old Chevalier, at the
request of Lord George Murray, sent him the necessary funds
for his military outfit; became colonel, aide-de-camp to the
King of Sweden, and Count Cromartie; returned to England
1777; raised a regiment for King George, first known as
Macleod’s Highlanders, the 73rd, subsequently the 71st, and
to-day the Highland Light Infantry; M.P. for Ross-shire 1780;
family estates restored to him 1784; m. 1786, Margery, d. of
Lord Forbes; d. s.p. 1789.
[301] There were three Macdonells all bearing the
designation of Barisdale in the ’Forty-five, who are often
confused, and who for distinction’s sake may be termed here,
Old Barisdale, Young Barisdale, and Youngest Barisdale.
Old Barisdale was Archibald Macdonell, an uncle of
Glengarry and a brother of Scotus. He paid his respects to
Prince Charles at Glenfinnan, but took no active part in the
Rising, probably being too old to go out. In May 1746,
however, his house was burned down by Cumberland’s order,
and he was carried prisoner on board a ship of war, but was
soon released. He died in 1752.
Young Barisdale was Archibald’s eldest son, Coll
Macdonell, who is a prominent figure in the rising. He was
born in 1698. A man of commanding talent, he filled the rôle of
Highland cateran to perfection, and raised a following
absolutely devoted to him. He became captain of the watch
and guardian of the marches for western Inverness-shire, a
vocation (similar to that of his great prototype, Rob Roy) which
he exercised with rigour and occasional cruelty. He was able
to purchase several wadsets, which gave him territorial
importance in the western Highlands. He further strengthened
his influence in Ross-shire by his marriages, his first wife being
a daughter of George Mackenzie of Balmuchie, and his
second wife a sister of Alexander Mackenzie, then laird of
Fairburn. He joined Prince Charles at Aberchalder on 27th
August at the head of Glengarry’s Knoydart men, fought at
Prestonpans, and when the Prince went to England he and
Angus Macdonell, Glengarry’s second son, were sent back to
the Highlands to raise more men. Barisdale greatly disliked his
first cousin Lochgarry, who commanded the Glengarry
battalion, so he managed to raise a regiment of his own.
(Murray’s Mem., pp. 280, 441.) He fought at Falkirk, but was
not at Culloden, being absent on service in Ross-shire. In June
he was captured and taken prisoner along with his son to Fort
Augustus, and there he received a ten days’ protection on
condition of giving certain information to Government. For this
he was seized by the Jacobites, carried prisoner to France,
and confined at St. Malo and Saumur for two years and four
months; was not attainted in 1746, but was excluded from the
Act of Indemnity in 1747. He returned to Scotland in February
1749, but was again arrested by Government, taken to
Edinburgh Castle, and kept a close prisoner without trial until
his death, 1st June 1750. A friendly account of this remarkable
man will be found in the History of Clan Donald, iii. 337; and
an unfriendly one in Mr. Lang’s Companions of Pickle, p. 97.
Youngest Barisdale was Coll’s eldest son, Archibald, who
was not quite twenty years old at the beginning of the
adventure. He acted as major of the Glengarry regiment. His
name was included in the list of attainders in 1746, apparently
in mistake for his father. He was made prisoner along with his
father in 1746, first by Government and afterwards by the
Jacobites; he was carried to France, where he was held in
durance for a year. He returned to Scotland, and in 1749 was
again imprisoned by Government along with his father, but
was immediately released. Once more he was arrested in
1753, at the time when Dr. Archibald Cameron was taken and
executed. Barisdale was tried and sentenced to death in
March 1754, but reprieved. He was kept a prisoner until 1762,
when he was finally released. At his own request he at once
took the oath of fealty to Government, and accepted a
commission in the 105th Regiment (the Queen’s Own Royal
Highlanders), which was disbanded the following year. He died
at Barisdale in 1787.
[302] Captain in Cromartie’s regiment; was captured at
Dunrobin; tried at Southwark in 1746, pleaded guilty and was
condemned to death; he was not executed; I am ignorant of
his subsequent career.
[303] Simon Fraser, b. 1726: after Culloden gave himself
up to Government; attainted 1746, pardoned 1750; joined the
Scottish bar 1752; acted as Advocate-Depute in the Appin
murder trial, an episode immortalised in R. L. Stevenson’s
Catriona; raised a Highland regiment for the Government
1757, and served with it under Wolfe in Canada (regiment
disbanded 1763); M.P. Inverness 1761; family estates restored
to him 1774; raised a second regiment of two battalions 1775,
for the American War, which he did not accompany (regiment
disbanded 1783); died a lieut.-general 1782. Sir Walter Scott
calls the Master of Lovat the good son of a bad father. A very
different account is given by Mrs. Grant of Laggan—‘he
differed from his father only as a chain’d-up fox does from one
at liberty.’ (See Wariston’s Diary, etc., p. 275, Scot. Hist. Soc.,
vol. xxvi.)
[304] Charles Fraser the younger, b. 1725, nephew and
heir-presumptive of William Fraser of Inverallochy,
Aberdeenshire, the senior cadet of Lovat’s clan.
His father, Charles Fraser of Castle Fraser, younger
brother of the laird of Inverallochy, had inherited the property
of Muchall or Castle Fraser (Kemnay, Aberdeenshire), on the
death of his step-grandfather Charles, 4th and last Lord
Fraser, who lost his life near Banff by falling over a precipice
while in hiding to avoid capture after the ’15. In 1723 the elder
Charles Fraser was created ‘Lord Fraser of Mushall’ by the
Chevalier in recognition of his services, and particularly those
of his father, ‘who died bravely asserting our cause, and in
consideration of the earnest desire of the late Lord Fraser,
when we were last in Scotland, to resign his titles of honour in
favour of the said Charles’ father.’ I am not aware of what
these special services were, nor why the elder brother William
was passed over both for the Castle Fraser inheritance and
the Jacobite peerage. Charles Fraser eventually succeeded to
Inverallochy in 1749 on the death of his brother William. He
was probably too old to go out in 1745, and his son went out
as Lovat’s lieut.-colonel, ‘in accordance with the ancient
highland practice and the policy of Lord Lovat as being nearest
in blood to the chiefship.’ Young Inverallochy was killed at
Culloden, and the story of his death is very painful. It is first
told in a general way in The Lyon (ii. 305; iii. 56), and
afterwards with more detail by Sir Henry Seton Steuart of
Allanton in the Antijacobin Review of 1802 (p. 125) as follows:
—
‘When the celebrated General Wolfe (at this period a lieut.-
colonel in the army) was riding over the field of battle with the
D—— of C-m-b-l-d, they observed a Highlander, who, though
severely wounded, was yet able to sit up, and, leaning on his
arm, seemed to smile defiance of them.—“Wolfe,” said the D
——, “shoot me that Highland scoundrel, who thus dares to
look on us with such contempt and insolence!”—“My
commission,” replied the manly officer, “is at your R——l H
——s’s disposal, but I never can consent to become an
executioner.” The Highlander, it is probable, was soon
knocked on the head by some ruffian less scrupulous than the
future conqueror of Quebec. But it was remarked by those who
heard the story, that Colonel Wolfe, from that day, visibly
declined in the favour and confidence of the commander-in-
chief. We believe that some officers are still alive who are not
unacquainted with this anecdote.’
Mr. Beckles Willson, Wolfe’s latest biographer, accepts the
story as regards Wolfe but doubts its applicability to
Cumberland. Wolfe, it must be remembered, was on Hawley’s
staff, not Cumberland’s. These generals could easily have
been mistaken for each other. The action is very like Hawley,
who was hated by the soldiers, who nicknamed him the
Hangman, and who held his military talents in contempt, a
feeling shared by Wolfe. Moreover, it was a Jacobite cult to
vilify the Duke, and to impute all cruelties to him personally.
Seton Steuart was not an entirely unprejudiced writer; he had
been brought up in an atmosphere of uncompromising
Jacobitism. He was a cousin of Sir James Steuart of
Goodtrees and of Provost Stewart of Edinburgh, both of whom
suffered; while his wife was grand-daughter of Charles Smith
of Boulogne, the Jacobite agent frequently mentioned in
Murray’s Papers. (See ante, p. 11.)
[305] James Fraser, 9th of Foyers (Lochness), descended
from the 3rd Lord Lovat, was one of the most ruthless and
devoted henchmen of Lovat, who made him bailie of
Stratherrick. He received from Prince Charles a special
commission, dated 23rd September 1745, to seize President
Duncan Forbes and carry him prisoner to Edinburgh, an
enterprise which failed. His name was excluded from the act of
indemnity, but he was afterwards pardoned and his estates
restored. It was to his house that John Murray of Broughton
was carried the day before Culloden.
[306] N.B.—Most of the Chisholms are Papists.
[307] This does not quite accord with the clan history.
Roderick, the chief of Chisholm, was then forty-eight years old.
What part he took in the Rising is not on record, but he was
specially excluded from the act of indemnity. His eldest son
Alexander seems to have stayed at home; his second and
third sons were officers in the Government army, and fought
under Cumberland at Culloden; his fourth son, who was a
physician in Inverness, afterwards provost, seems to have
taken no part; his youngest son, Roderick Og, led out the clan;
he ‘headed about eighty of the Chisholms at the battle of
Culloden, himself and thirty thereof were killed upon the field.’
(Mackenzie, Hist. of the Chisholms.)
[308] The laird was then Alexander Mackenzie, 6th of
Fairburn. According to the Marquis d’Éguilles, French envoy to
Prince Charles, Fairburn’s wife was Barbara Gordon, of whom
he gives the following account in a despatch to his
government: ‘Une fort jolie personne ... celle-cy n’a pas banni
son mari; mais malgré luy, elle a vendu ses diamants et sa
vaisselle pour lever des hommes. Elle a ramassé cent
cinquante des plus braves du païs, qu’elle a joint à ceux de
miladi Seaforth, sous la conduite de son beau-frère.’ (Cottin,
Un Protégé de Bachaumont, p. 51.) The brother-in-law may be
Coll Macdonell of Barisdale, who married her husband’s sister;
or it may be Kenneth Mackenzie her husband’s brother who
although only a schoolboy was a captain in Barisdale’s
regiment. (Lord Rosebery’s List of Persons Concerned in the
Rebellion, p. 76.) This lady is not mentioned in the
genealogies of Alex. Mackenzie’s Hist. of the Mackenzies,
which are, however, manifestly incomplete.
[309] Alexander Macgillivray of Dunmaglas, the lieut.-
colonel of Lady Mackintosh’s regiment, and Gillise Macbain,
Dalmagarrie, the major, were both killed at Culloden.
[310] N.B.—The Laird of McIntosh got a Company in the
Highland Regiment. He raised a full company and they all
deserted except 8 or 9.
[311] Anne, daughter of James Farquharson, 9th of
Invercauld, and Margaret Murray, daughter of Lord James
Murray, an uncle of Lord George Murray; b. 1723; d. 1787; m.
Æneas Mackintosh 22nd of Mackintosh, who, though a
Jacobite peer, refused to join Prince Charles, preferring to
serve that monarch who was able to pay him ‘half-a-guinea the
day and half-a-guinea the morn.’ (Notes to Waverley, ch. xix.)
The chief raised a company for King George with the result
noted above, while his lady raised the clan for Prince Charles.
Of this lady we get the following enthusiastic account by the
Marquis d’Éguilles:—
‘Elle aimoit éperdûment son mari qu’elle espéra longtems
de gagner au Prince; mais, ayant appris qu’il s’étoit enfin
engagé, avec le Président, à servir la maison d’Hanovre, elle
ne voulut plus le voir.
‘Elle ne s’en tint pas là: elle souleva une partie de ses
vassaux, à la teste desquels elle mit un très-beau cousin qui,
jusques-là, l’avoit aimée inutilement. Mackintosh fut obligé de
quitter son lit, sa maison et ses terres. L’intrépide ladi, un
pistolet d’une main et de l’argent de l’autre, parcourt le païs,
menace, donne, promet, et, en moins de quinze jours,
ramasse 600 hommes. Elle en avoit envoyé moitié à Fakirk,
qui y arriva la veille de la bataille. Elle avoit retenu l’autre
moitié pour se garder de son mari et de Loudoun qui, à
Inverness, n’étoient qu’à trois lieues de son château. Le prince
logea chez elle, à son passage. Elle s’offrit à luy avec la grâce
et la noblesse d’une divinité, car rien n’est si beau que cette
femme. Elle luy présenta toute sa petite armée qu’elle avoit
rassemblée, et après avoir parlé aux soldats de ce qu’ils
devoient à la situation, aux droits et aux vertus de leur Prince,
elle jura très-catégoriquement de casser la tête au premier qui
s’en tourneroit, après avoir, à ses yeux, brûlé sa maison et
chassé sa famille.
‘Au reste, elle a toujours passé, jusques icy, pour être très-
modérée, très-sensée. C’est, icy, l’effet de la première
éducation. Son père, pris à la bataille de Preston en 1715,
avoit resté longtems prisonnier, et couru risque de la vie. Elle
n’a pas vingt-deux ans. C’est elle qui découvrit le projet
qu’avoit fait Macleod d’enlever le Prince, et, en vérité, c’est
elle seule qui l’a fait échouer.’ (Cottin, p. 49.)
The last sentence refers to the incident known as ‘the Rout
of Moy’ (post, p. 108), when Lady Mackintosh’s thoughtful
vigilance saved her Prince from imminent risk of capture. A
month later (March 20th) her husband was taken prisoner at
Dornoch by the Jacobites. Prince Charles sent the chief to his
wife at Moy, saying that ‘he could not be in better security or
more honourably treated.’ This may have been the occasion of
the story told by Bishop Mackintosh to Chambers: the lady
was jocularly known in the army as ‘Colonel Anne’; when her
husband was ushered into her presence she greeted him
laconically with, ‘Your servant, captain,’ to which he replied
with equal brevity, ‘Your servant, colonel!’ After Culloden Lady
Mackintosh was arrested at Moy and taken to Inverness; she
was released after six weeks’ confinement. In spite of her
martial reputation, and her undaunted resolution, there was
nothing masculine about her appearance; she was a slender,
rather delicate-looking girl: she took no part in the fighting but
remained at home during the campaign. In after years when in
London, family tradition says that she became a favourite in
certain royal circles, and there on one occasion she met the
Duke of Cumberland, and with him she exchanged some
piquant raillery (see narratives in A. M. Shaw’s Mackintoshes
and Clan Chattan, p. 464 seq.).
[312] Culcairn, now called Kincraig, in Rosskeen parish.
George Munro, b. 1685, brother of Sir Robert Munro of Foulis
(see post, p. 198). Culcairn was shot in Knoydart in August
1746 while wasting the country and carrying off cattle in
company with Captain Grant of Knockando, of Loudoun’s
Regiment. It is said he was shot by accident instead of Grant,
by the father of one Alexander Cameron, whom Grant had
shot a short time previously. (L. in M., i. 91, 312.)
[313] Cf. ante, p. 46 n.
[314] Kenneth (Mackenzie), eldest son of William, 5th Earl
of Seaforth, attainted 1716, d. 1740; but for the attainder he
would have been 6th earl. He was styled Lord Fortrose, which
was the second Jacobite title of his grandfather, created
Marquis of Seaforth by James vii. after his abdication. He was
born about 1718; M.P. for Inverness 1741-47; and for Ross-
shire from 1747 until his death, 1761. Lord Fortrose (who was
generally, though not officially, called Seaforth in Scotland)
adhered to Government in the ’45. Though his support was of
the paltriest description, his defection gave great pain to
Prince Charles. Fortrose’s wife was Lady Mary Stewart,
daughter of the 6th Earl of Galloway. This lady raised men for
Prince Charles, with the result narrated in these pages. Of her
the French envoy informs his Government: ‘On assure que
son zèle égale celuy des deux autres [Lady Mackintosh and
Mrs. Mackenzie of Fairburn], quoy qu’elle paroisse moins vive
et moins courageuse.’ It was their son who raised the 1st
Battalion Seaforth Highlanders (72nd), for which service he
was created Earl of Seaforth in the Peerage of Ireland.
[315] The Rosses of Ross-shire are rather mixed up here.
At this time there were two distinct races of Ross in the county,
which should not be confounded. The Celtic family of Ross, of
whom the ancient head was the Earl of Ross, was originally
known as the clan Ghille-andrais (servants of St. Andrew). The
earldom passed by marriage of heiresses in the fourteenth and
fifteenth centuries, first to the Leslies and afterwards to the
Macdonalds, Lords of the Isles. The chiefship of the clan,
however, went to the heir male, Ross of Balnagowan. In the
year 1711, David Ross, the last of the Celtic family of
Balnagowan, died. The natural heir was Ross of Pitcalnie, his
next of kin. Pitcalnie was a Roman Catholic or Episcopalian,
anyhow he was not a Presbyterian, and Balnagowan was
influenced by his wife, Lady Anne (daughter of the 4th Earl of
Moray), a bigoted Presbyterian, to disinherit the natural heir
and bequeath the property to General the Hon. Charles Ross,
a younger son of George, 11th Lord Ross of Halkhead, in
Ayrshire. (Fraser-Mackintosh, Antiq. Notes, p. 66.) The family
which thus became Ross of Balnagowan had no connection
with the Celtic clan of the same name, but was descended
from a Norman family named de Ros. In 1745 Balnagowan
with its great territorial influence had come to George, 13th
Lord Ross, and the Master of Ross his eldest son (afterwards
14th and last Lord Ross) received the command of one of the
independent companies raised in 1745. He was garrisoning
Inverness Castle (then called Fort George) when it was
captured by the Jacobites, 20th Feb. ’46; he remained a
prisoner on parole until the end of the campaign. He was one
of the very few officers who did not break his parole. (Cf. post,
pp. 207, 364.)
The Rosses of Inverchasley and Pitcalnie, who belonged to
the ancient Celtic clan Ghille-andrais, sided with the
Government, but ‘young Pitcalnie,’ Malcolm Ross, who was a
grand-nephew of President Duncan Forbes, went over to the
Jacobites. He had served as ensign in Loudoun’s regiment at
Prestonpans, where he was taken prisoner by the Jacobites
and released on parole. He seems to have been the only
Government officer who deserted to the Jacobites. His name
was included in the list of attainders.
[316] Macleod of Geanies was representative of the
Macleods of Assynt (see ante, p. 74). John, a brother of Neil
Macleod (tried for the betrayal of Montrose), left Assynt and
settled in Easter Ross where his son Donald, an officer in the
Scots Brigade in Holland, purchased the estate of Geanies.
Donald’s son Hugh was laird in 1745; his wife was a niece of
President Duncan Forbes of Culloden.
[318] This refers to the fiasco known as the ‘Rout of Moy’
(16th Feb. ’46), when by a stratagem, a blacksmith and a few
other retainers of Lady Mackintosh, made Loudoun believe
that the whole Jacobite army was upon him; he fled back to
Inverness, whence he retreated across the Kessock Ferry to
Ross-shire. The principal, perhaps the only, victim of the
expedition, was Donald Ban MacCrimmon, Macleod’s famous
piper, who was shot by the blacksmith. Cf. post, p. 145. (For
details, see Home, Hist. Reb., ch. ix.; L. in M., 149, etc.)
[319] George Grant of Culbin, brother of Sir James Grant of
Grant, major in the Highland Regiment (Black Watch). He
surrendered Inverness Castle (then called Fort George) to
Prince Charles, 20th February, for which he was subsequently
tried by court-martial, and dismissed the service.
[320] See ante, p. 75.
[321] Now called Strathavon (pronounced Stratha’an),
Banffshire. It is generally called Strathdawn or Strathdown in
documents of this date; perhaps from the local pronunciation,
plus the archaic ‘d’ which occasionally appears in place-
names, e.g. Strathdearn for the valley of the Earn or Findhorn.
There was an ancient church of Dounan in the valley perhaps
from the same root.
[322] George Forbes of Skeleter; m. Glenbucket’s daughter
Christiana Gordon. He escaped to France after Culloden,
joined Lord Ogilvie’s Scots regiment in the French service: he
never returned.
[323] William (Duff) of Braco and Dipple; b. 1697; d. 1763;
M.P. Banffshire 1727-34; created Baron Braco of Kilbride
1735; and in 1759 Viscount Macduff and Earl Fife—all these
titles being in the peerage of Ireland; m. (1) Janet, d. of 4th
Earl of Findlater; and (2) Jean, d. of Sir James Grant of Grant.
He, his father, and his grandfather made enormous purchases
of land in Aberdeen, Banff, and Moray shires, particularly on
the forfeitures after Mar’s rising in 1715. He joined
Cumberland in 1746.
[324] Among the Jacobite prisoners who pled guilty is
‘Robert Forbes, printer, son to New.’ (Scots Mag., viii. p. 438.)
At his trial it is stated that he was a farmer. His home was at
Corse in the parish of Coull, Deeside. He was captain in one of
Lord Lewis Gordon’s battalions, and was one of the officers left
at Carlisle and captured there. He was sentenced to death but
was not executed; of his subsequent career I have no
knowledge.
[325] Cope reached Aberdeen 11th Sept., and left it by sea
15th Sept. 1745.
[326] Johnshaven, a fishing port on the Kincardine coast,
about twenty-five miles south of Aberdeen; Torry and Foothy
(Footdee), fishing villages near the mouth of the Dee,
Aberdeen.
[327] James Moir of Stonywood, an estate on Donside
three miles above Aberdeen. He was very active in the
Jacobite cause, and while the Prince was in England raised a
battalion, of which Lord Lewis Gordon was titular colonel. After
Culloden he escaped to Sweden, where he resided until 1762,
when he was permitted to return to Stonywood. He died in
1782. His correspondence in 1745-46 is printed in the
Spalding Club Misc., vol. i.
[328] York Street cadys = messenger-porters of a low
street in Aberdeen.
[329] Francis Farquharson of Monaltrie, near Ballater on
the Dee, the ‘Baron ban’ of the ’45, raised a regiment from
Deeside and Braemar. He was made prisoner at Culloden,
tried at London, and condemned to death, but reprieved. He
was kept prisoner in England, latterly with considerable liberty
at Berkhampstead, Herts. He was liberated in 1766, and
returned to Monaltrie, where he devoted the rest of his life to
improving the social and material condition of his country. He
introduced into Aberdeenshire improved methods of farming,
which he had carefully studied while in exile in England. His
name is still cherished in the county as the man who did much
to make Aberdeen the great farming county it became. He
died in 1791.
[330] The Duke of Perth had twice to flee from Drummond
Castle; first in March 1744, immediately after the failure of the
projected French invasion. A party of 36 dragoons and 150
foot was sent from Stirling under Lieut.-Col. Whitney
(afterwards killed at Falkirk) to surround the castle, but the
Duke escaped (Chron. Atholl and Tullib., ii. 473). The second
time was in July 1745, referred to post, p. 271, n. 2. This
occasion was a treacherous attempt of his neighbour, Sir
Patrick Murray of Ochtertyre, and Campbell of Inverawe, both
officers of the Highland regiment (Black Watch), to capture him
while dining at Drummond Castle. The story is detailed in The
Lyon, i. 290.
[331] Now spelt Balmoral, the King’s home on Deeside.
The laird was badly wounded at Falkirk and took no further
part in the campaign.
[332] Hamilton’s home was Sanstoun, now called Huntly
Lodge, beside old Huntly Castle. He was left governor of
Carlisle when the Jacobite army left it on their way south (21st
Nov.), and on their return in December Hamilton was made
governor of the Castle, while Towneley, an Englishman, was
left governor of the town. Carlisle surrendered to Cumberland
30th December. Both Towneley and Hamilton were hanged on
Kennington Common. (See also post, p. 173.)
[333] His home was Dunbennan, close to Huntly; the whole
‘toun’ was burnt down in 1746.
[334] James Petrie, advocate in Aberdeen; joined the local
bar 1743; appointed sheriff-depute 8th May 1744. The last
deed ascertained to have been lodged before him is dated

Chinas Search For National Rejuvenation Domestic and Foreign Policies Under Xi Jinping 1St Ed Edition Jabin T Jacob Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

You might also like

Chinas Search For National Rejuvenation Domestic and Foreign Policies Under Xi Jinping 1St Ed Edition Jabin T Jacob Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Chinas Search For National Rejuvenation Domestic and Foreign Policies Under Xi Jinping 1St Ed Edition Jabin T Jacob Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

China’s Search for ‘National

Rejuvenation’: Domestic and Foreign

80+ Python Coding Challenges for Beginners: Python

Introduction to 80×86 Assembly Language and Computer

Daring to Struggle: China's Global Ambitions Under Xi

Petit manuel de survie en médecine intensive-

„■■■■ ■■■■ ■ ■■■■■■■■■...“ : ■■■■■■■ ■ ■■■■■ 80-■■■■

The Political Thought of Xi Jinping Tsang

Terrorism and Counter-Terrorism in China: Domestic and

The Political Thought Of Xi Jinping Steve Tsang

Edited by Jabin T. Jacob · Hoang The Anh

China’s Search for

ISBN 978-981-15-2795-1 ISBN 978-981-15-2796-8 (eBook)

1 ‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea for China’s Domestic

Part II Domestic Developments 21

2 Reform of Party and State Structures in China 23

3 Changes in China’s Economic Development Model After

4 Xi Jinping’s Political and Economic Initiatives and the

5 Political Considerations in the Chinese Leadership’s

6 China’s Military Reforms in the Wake of Recent CPC

Part III Neighbourhood Policies 95

7 Key Markers and Trends in Chinese Foreign Policy in

9 Strategic Competition Between China and the United

10 Competition and Caution in Chinese Foreign Policy

Part IV CPC Propaganda Abroad 155

11 The CPC’s International Department and China’s

12 China’s “Great Overseas Propaganda” Under the Belt and

Part V Economic Development and Foreign Policy 185

13 China’s Quest for Global Leadership Through Scientific

14 Rural Vitalisation and Foreign Policy199

15 China’s State-Owned Enterprises as Agents of Party and

Prachi Aggarwal Sanchi University of Buddhist Indic Studies, Sanchi,

Nguyen Quang Thuan Vietnam Academy of Social Sciences, Hanoi,

Table 6.1 Timelines and contents of national defense and military

‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea

Jabin T. Jacob and Hoang The Anh

The 19th National Congress of the Communist Party of China (CPC)

© The Author(s) 2020 3

also the reference in Xi’s Report to the Congress to a “new era” in

… conscientiously safeguard the solidarity and unity of the Party, maintain

In this statement to the 19th Party Congress, Xi also highlights what he

Continuing Economic Challenges

from telecom hardware to mobile payment applications to social media

The ‘China Model’

Similarly, the CPC also appears to believe that economic development

stantly modified and reshaped to achieve political ends of enforcing or

Structure of the Book

undermining American security and prosperity and seeking to replace

the International Liaison Department and the United Front Work

Agriculture is seldom considered important in China’s foreign policy

Reform of Party and State Structures

Nguyen Xuan Cuong

Nguyen Xuan Cuong (*)

© The Author(s) 2020 23

coordination with global governance. National governance reflects the

Governance in China After the 18th Congress

Comprehensives” (People.com 2017a), or the Four-pronged Comprehensive

China has promoted the development and implementation of a new

1 ‘National Rejuvenation’ as Panacea for China’s Domestic

Part II Domestic Developments 21

2 Reform of Party and State Structures in China 23

3 Changes in China’s Economic Development Model After

4 Xi Jinping’s Political and Economic Initiatives and the

5 Political Considerations in the Chinese Leadership’s

6 China’s Military Reforms in the Wake of Recent CPC

Part III Neighbourhood Policies 95

7 Key Markers and Trends in Chinese Foreign Policy in

9 Strategic Competition Between China and the United

10 Competition and Caution in Chinese Foreign Policy

Part IV CPC Propaganda Abroad 155

11 The CPC’s International Department and China’s

12 China’s “Great Overseas Propaganda” Under the Belt and

Part V Economic Development and Foreign Policy 185

13 China’s Quest for Global Leadership Through Scientific

14 Rural Vitalisation and Foreign Policy199

15 China’s State-Owned Enterprises as Agents of Party and