Civilization and the Making of the State

in Lebanon and Syria Dr. Andrew

Delatolla
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/civilization-and-the-making-of-the-state-in-lebanon-an
d-syria-dr-andrew-delatolla/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...

Syria: The Making and Unmaking of a Refuge State Dawn

Chatty

https://ebookmass.com/product/syria-the-making-and-unmaking-of-a-
refuge-state-dawn-chatty/

Trade, Commerce, and the State in the Roman World

Andrew Wilson

https://ebookmass.com/product/trade-commerce-and-the-state-in-
the-roman-world-andrew-wilson/

Syria: Borders, Boundaries, and the State 1st ed.

Edition Matthieu Cimino

https://ebookmass.com/product/syria-borders-boundaries-and-the-
state-1st-ed-edition-matthieu-cimino/

Adaptive Mediation and Conflict Resolution: Peace-

making in Columbia, Mozambique, the Philippines, and
Syria Cedric De Coning

https://ebookmass.com/product/adaptive-mediation-and-conflict-
resolution-peace-making-in-columbia-mozambique-the-philippines-
and-syria-cedric-de-coning/
The Making of the Modern Muslim State: Islam and
Governance in the Middle East and North Africa Malika
Zeghal

https://ebookmass.com/product/the-making-of-the-modern-muslim-
state-islam-and-governance-in-the-middle-east-and-north-africa-
malika-zeghal/

All Is Well: Catastrophe and the Making of the Normal

State Saptarishi Bandopadhyay

https://ebookmass.com/product/all-is-well-catastrophe-and-the-
making-of-the-normal-state-saptarishi-bandopadhyay/

Syria: The Tragedy of a Pivotal State 1st ed. Edition

Rajendra M. Abhyankar

https://ebookmass.com/product/syria-the-tragedy-of-a-pivotal-
state-1st-ed-edition-rajendra-m-abhyankar/

Administering Colonialism and War: The Political Life

of Sir Andrew Clow of the Indian Civil Service Dr Colin
R. Alexander

https://ebookmass.com/product/administering-colonialism-and-war-
the-political-life-of-sir-andrew-clow-of-the-indian-civil-
service-dr-colin-r-alexander/

State of Disorder: Privatised Violence and the State in

Indonesia Abdil Mughis Mudhoffir

https://ebookmass.com/product/state-of-disorder-privatised-
violence-and-the-state-in-indonesia-abdil-mughis-mudhoffir/
MIDDLE EAST TODAY

Civilization and the

Making of the State in
Lebanon and Syria

Andrew Delatolla
 Middle East Today

Series Editors
Fawaz A. Gerges
Department of International Relations
London School of Economics
London, UK

Nader Hashemi
Josef Korbel School of International Studies
Center for Middle East Studies
University of Denver
Denver, CO, USA
The Iranian Revolution of 1979, the Iran-Iraq War, the Gulf War, and the
US invasion and occupation of Iraq have dramatically altered the geopo-
litical landscape of the contemporary Middle East. The Arab Spring upris-
ings have complicated this picture. This series puts forward a critical body
of first-rate scholarship that reflects the current political and social reali-
ties of the region, focusing on original research about contentious poli-
tics and social movements; political institutions; the role played by non-
governmental organizations such as Hamas, Hezbollah, and the Muslim
Brotherhood; and the Israeli-Palestine conflict. Other themes of interest
include Iran and Turkey as emerging pre-eminent powers in the region,
the former an ‘Islamic Republic’ and the latter an emerging democracy
currently governed by a party with Islamic roots; the Gulf monarchies,
their petrol economies and regional ambitions; potential problems of
nuclear proliferation in the region; and the challenges confronting the
United States, Europe, and the United Nations in the greater Middle
East. The focus of the series is on general topics such as social turmoil, war
and revolution, international relations, occupation, radicalism, democracy,
human rights, and Islam as a political force in the context of the modern
Middle East.

More information about this series at

http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14803
 Andrew Delatolla

Civilization
and the Making
of the State
in Lebanon and Syria
Andrew Delatolla
Lecturer in Middle Eastern Studies
School of Languages, Cultures, and Societies
University of Leeds
Leeds, UK

Middle East Today

ISBN 978-3-030-57689-9 ISBN 978-3-030-57690-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57690-5

© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2021
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.

Cover credit: Mikadun/shutterstock.com

This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
 Acknowledgements

This book developed from a specific interest in the politics of Lebanon and
Syria within a global context, and is the result of continuous discussion
and debate with friends and colleagues on issues of statehood, imperi-
alism, colonialism, Orientalism, and race. The extensive group of remark-
able friends and colleagues that have thoughtfully engaged with me in
these discussions include, but are by no means limited to Katerina Dala-
coura, Fawaz Gerges, George Lawson, for their constant mentorship,
as well as Daniel Neep, Charles Tripp, Christine Cheng, Joanne Yao,
Hadi Makarem, Omar al-Ghazzi, Sophie Haspeslagh, Dima Krayem, Till
Spanke, Martin Hearson, Julia Himmrich, Kiran Phull, Annissa Haddadi,
Simone Datzberger, Margaret Ainley, Ida Danewid, Evelyn Pauls, Nicola
Degli Esposti, Shourideh Molavi, Maria Fotou, Terri Ginsberg, Iman
Hamam, Rabab el-Mahdi, and Marco Pinfari for having such great influ-
ence on my scholarship. I am indebted to these scholars, who have directly
and indirectly influenced the direction of the book and arguments, having
been generous in providing me with their insights and critiques. I am also
grateful to have presented various parts of this book at conferences and
workshops, having received terrific feedback at ISA, BISA, BRISMES, and
Millennium.
The project would not have been possible without the institutional
and financial support of the Middle East Centre and Department of
International Relations at the London School of Economics and Political
Science, the Department of Political Science at the American University in

v
vi ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Cairo, the RJ Vincent Memorial Scholarship, and the Middle East Centre
Emirates Ph.D. Scholarship.
The arguments made throughout this book were inspired by extensive
engagement with the Lebanese National Archives, the French Diplomatic
Archives, the French National Archives, the British National Archives, the
UK Parliamentary Archives, and the archives at l’Université Saint-Joseph
in Beirut. Without the generosity and patience of the staff at the archives,
this book would not have been possible.
In addition to the academic and professional support that I have
received over the years, making this endeavour a reality, none of it
would have been possible without the support of friends and family.
Lauren Sexton, Hayat Chedid, Karim Chedid, my parents Darlene and
George Delatolla, my sisters Andrea and Victoria, my brother-in-law,
Harry Williams, my grandparents Wadia and Romeo Shoiry and Catherine
and John Delatolla, for all the love, encouragement, and instilling in me
the importance of history and politics.
 Contents

1 Introduction 1
Contemporary State-Building and Development: The
(Re)production of a Civilizational Standard 4
Civilization and the State: Tying Development
and State-Building to Imperialism and Colonialism 15
The Argument: The Modern State as a Standard
of Civilization 19
Chapter Breakdown 22
Works Cited 26

2 The Standards of Civilization and the Production

of Statehood 33
Theories and Histories of State Formation in the Middle East 34
European State Formation: Historicizing the Conceptual
Foundations Modern Statehood 41
Post-colonial Statehood: The Result of a Standard
of Civilization 49
The Civilizing Project and European Colonialism
in the Middle East 56
Conclusion 59
Works Cited 61

vii
viii CONTENTS

3 Equality as a Standard of Civilization: The Opposition

Towards Ottoman Tolerance 69
Equality and Tolerance: Foundations of Governance
in Europe and the Ottoman Empire 71
Equality as a Standard of Civilization 77
The Tanzimat Reforms: The Failure of Equality 82
Conclusion 89
Works Cited 91

4 Race, Religion, and Civilization in Programs

of Governance and Modernization 95
Historic Intersections of Civilization, Race, and Religion 96
The Hatt-ı Şerif: Eradicating Inferior Government 106
Mount Lebanon: Racializing Religion 110
Continuing Civilizational Reform: The Hatt-I
Humayun 1856 115
Racialized Religion and National Consciousness 119
Conclusion 121
Works Cited 124

5 Territory, Identity, and Governance: Creating Order

from Disorder 129
Creating Civilized Boundaries: Territory, Identity,
and Governance 131
Split Authority in Mount Lebanon: Territorialization
and the Division of Greater Syria 136
The Land Code of 1858 144
Settling the Desert 148
Conclusion 151
Works Cited 153

6 Violent Resistance: Interactions with Modernity

and European Interference 155
Violence as Resistance: European Interference and Revolt 156
European Modernization, Modernity, and the Emergence
of Violent Resistance 161
The Aleppo Uprising, 1850 162
The Damascus Massacre, 1860 165
 CONTENTS ix

The Mandate System and Faisal’s Revolt 172

French Colonial Pacification: The Druze Revolt 1925 178
Conclusion 181
Works Cited 182

7 Nationalism as Resistance: Acquiescing to European

Identifiers 185
Nationalism, Resistance, and Response 187
The Young Ottomans 188
The Young Turks, Arab, and Syrian Nationalists 195
Conclusion 210
Works Cited 211

8 Preventing Autonomy: European Interests

and the Application of a Standard of Civilization 215
European Interests in the Ottoman Empire at the Beginning
of the Reform Period 217
Applying the Standard of Civilization: Methods to Attain
Political Interests 223
The Tanzimat: Hatt-ı Şerif (1839) and the Hatt-ı
Hümayun (1856) 223
The French Mandate and Lebanon and Syria 230
French Governance and Political Representation
in Lebanon and Syria 235
Conclusion 242
Works Cited 244

9 Conclusion: Taking Histories of Post-colonial

Statehood Seriously 247
The Standard of Civilization and the Production of the State
in Lebanon and Syria 248
(Re)Thinking Statehood 253
The Standard Lives On 256

Bibliography 257

Index 279
 CHAPTER 1

Introduction

The modern state in international relations and political science is often

described by a set of generalizable and, at times, abstract criteria. This
is inclusive of qualifications such as territory, government, population,
and international and domestic recognition. The conceptualization of the
state in an abstract manner, however, produces a significant problem for
social scientific research, specifically when attempting to engage in analysis
of modern statehood in the non-West. While some social scientists may
argue that it is necessary to simplify or abstract states as units of study to
develop generalizable theories from which we are better able to under-
stand domestic and global politics, the practice of simplification in the
social sciences can distort reality. Here, simplification and abstraction can
make important differences invisible while highlighting conclusions that
are problematic.1

1 This is most evident in realism, neorealism, liberalism, and, at times, in feminist and
post-colonial literature. Realism, neorealism, and liberalism treat states as units with similar
or the same goals and interests, with the same functions, or functioning in relation to
an accepted set of universal norms (Morgenthau 2005; Waltz 1979; van de Haar 2009;
Doyle 1996). Feminist and post-colonial scholarship, can, treat sources of oppression
and repression as singular objects (Hooper 2001), or constructs the ‘third world’ or
‘developing world’ as a singular actor (Mohanty 1984; Said 1978).

© The Author(s), under exclusive license 1

to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
A. Delatolla, Civilization and the Making of the State
in Lebanon and Syria, Middle East Today,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57690-5_1
2 A. DELATOLLA

Abstraction is a particular problem that occurs in political science and

international relations with regard to the modern state. By engaging
in abstraction, differences between states are often dismissed or simpli-
fied, reduced to regime type, institutions, and culture. The dismissive
or reductive approach towards difference follows from arguments that
the structure of the international state system and the characteristics of
statehood create enough similarity to warrant the development of gener-
alizable theories regarding state interests, relations, and organization.
Based on this notion, political science, international relations, and devel-
opment studies produce the assumption, often implicitly, that states exist
on a linear scale, from strong to weak and failing; hegemonic to passive
and submissive (Morgenthau 2005; Waltz 1979; Bellamy 2008; Clapham
1998; Grant 1999).
Although the state can be viewed as a political system, one that is
now present in every society, Shmuel Eisenstadt argued that ‘different
types of political systems develop and function under specific social condi-
tions, and the continuity of any political system is also related to such
specific conditions’ (1993, p. 3). As such, abstracting and simplifying the
state becomes problematic. While the modern state can be, justifiably,
seen as a global system of social, political, and economic organization,
following from Eisenstadt, it cannot be generalized due to variation in
the historical social and political context from which it emerged. Herein,
a fundamental problem becomes evident: variations in historical social and
political contexts produce difference, yet an abstracted concept of modern
statehood has become a benchmark, or a standard, to be attained.
Investigating the application of this abstracted conceptualization of
modern statehood, this book draws attention to the emergence of the
post-colonial state in Lebanon and Syria and argues that the modern state
in Lebanon and Syria was the result of a standard of civilization. Here, the
standard of civilization is discussed as a political tool of the nineteenth
century to distinguish ‘civilized’ from ‘barbarian’ societies, ‘to gate-keep
membership of international society, and to justify colonialism’ (Buzan
2014, p. 576; Linklater 2016a). Although it can be argued that state-
hood has existed throughout history, not located in a single temporality
or geography, the concept and conceptual framing of the modern state
did not (de Carvalho et al. 2011).
The state, as a concept that frames the legal-political organization
of a society or a country through government and demarcated bound-
aries, began to take form in the fourteenth century, developing from the
 1 INTRODUCTION 3

thirteenth-century Old French ‘estat ’ or ‘estate’ and Latin word ‘status ’.

‘Estat ’ and ‘status ’ were used to describe the position, condition, status,
order, or arrangement of an entity. In a figurative sense, these terms
referred to public order or community organization, sometimes within
a legal context. In the fourteenth century, the term ‘state’ was used in
relation to status rei plublicae or the status or condition or the republic
(Lazzeri 1995). It is this foundation from which the knowledges and
practices of the modern state began to emerge and later, in the late eigh-
teenth century, was deployed as a standard of civilization. By making this
argument, it is possible to consider how the modern state, as a standard
of civilization, was embedded in histories of nineteenth-century global
transformations, altering the social, political, and economic conditions
and contexts of society in Lebanon and Syria. The book focuses empir-
ically on rational state-building, the civilizing project, in Lebanon and
Syria, tracing the developments and immediate consequences of rational
state-building into independence.
The following section of this chapter considers some of the arguments
and discussions concerning contemporary state-building and develop-
ment. It engages in these discussions to make an argument about histor-
ically constituted and embedded knowledges and practices of modern
statehood. Here, the arguments produced in the contemporary scholar-
ship highlight particular aspects of modern statehood as a standard of
civilization which can then be historicized. This includes how the state
or polity is abstracted from its social and political context and measured
against a set of criteria produced in relation to an ideal type. Addition-
ally, what becomes apparent in making this connection is the continuity
of the modern state as a standard of civilization in state-building and
development, which reproduces a practical and intellectual coloniality
regarding statehood. From this engagement, it is possible to historicize
these contemporary deliberations to the global transformations of the
nineteenth century. This follows from Aníbal Quijano, who argued that

the intellectual conceptualization of the process of modernity produced

a perspective of knowledge and a mode of producing knowledge […] it
is […] a specific rationality or perspective of knowledge that was made
globally hegemonic, colonizing and overcoming other previous or different
conceptual formations and their respective concrete knowledges. (Quijano
2000, pp. 549–550)
4 A. DELATOLLA

Emergent from intertwined processes related to colonialism and capi-

talism, the coloniality of knowledge/power, or Eurocentrism, functions
by establishing ‘binary, hierarchical relations between categories of object
and reflects a particular secular, instrumental, and technocratic rational-
ity’ (Tucker 2018, p. 219). Secularity, instrumentality, and rationality
are, as Quijano argues, ‘exclusively European products’, from which
‘intersubjective and cultural relations between Western Europe and the
rest of the world were codified’ in binary and hierarchical relations,
such as ‘East-West, primitive-civilized, magic/mythic-scientific, irrational-
rational, traditional-modern – Europe and not Europe’ (Quijano 2000,
p. 542). Building on this scholarship, Karen Tucker notes how this
coloniality of knowledge ‘refers to historically rooted, racially inflected
practices that routinely elevate the knowledge forms and knowledge-
generating principles of colonizing cultures’ (2018, p. 220). What is
produced from these binaries and hierarchies are benchmarks to be
attained by those exogenous to ‘exclusively European products’. Due to
the racial inflections of these binaries and hierarchies, and in relation to
the modern state, what emerges is a standard of civilization, discussed in
further detail in Chapter 2.
Specifically, and explored below, are discussions on contemporary state-
building and development as practices that are engaged in the abstraction
and simplification of modern statehood based on a European- or Western-
centric conceptualization.2 This, as argued below, produces typologies
and hierarchical measurements that are ‘racially inflected’ and reproduce
the state as a standard of civilization.

Contemporary State-Building and Development:

The (Re)production of a Civilizational Standard
The state is often depicted as being a standard and universal object,
framed by the idea of centralized authority with a particular set of

2 The use of the terms European and Western are used to discuss the real consequences
regarding international power dynamics, material flows, and exclusions that produce and
reproduce global hierarchies that ascertain a group of ‘European’ or ‘Western’ civilized
states, norms, and ideals in contrast to the ‘other’ (Said 1978; Fanon 2001). While Europe
and the West are constructed, as is its ‘other’, this book does not aim to deconstruct the
binary, but explore how its construction has had real effects, highlighting the normative
and cultural transnational links that are made evident by the discussions of the standards
of civilization (Gong 1984; Donnelly 1998; Fidler 2001).
 1 INTRODUCTION 5

government institutions. The central purpose of the state is argued to

be the successful and legitimate governance of a delineated territory and
population (Weber 1946, p. 77). From this definition, an ideal type3 is
produced. This ideal type facilitates the measurement of the state through
an analysis of capability and capacity, where the capability and capacity to
govern a population and territory without fault, external intervention,
or internal challenges exogenous to governing institutions is perceived as
strength. As such, the strongest states in the international state system are
often considered to be those that are the closest to the ideal type.
Measuring the state in this manner, however, creates a linear scale of
incapability to capability, from failure and weakness to strength. In this
regard, incapability, state weakness, and failure requires determined devel-
opment and state-building projects to re-establish domestic order and
legitimate governance. By engaging in such practices, the assumption of
what a strong state is and is not is reproduced, simplifying statehood to
the core institutions of governance. As such, the primary engagement of
state-building and development projects are to rebuild or fix deficiencies
in institutions. The strategies employed in state-building and develop-
ment are based on the notion that states, as objects, can be improved,
and that there is a single logic and practice of statehood that must be
followed to facilitate progress. This gives little-to-no attention to the
negative social, political, and economic consequences of external inter-
vention; or the impact of pre-existing logics and prejudices by individuals
and parties engaged in development and state-building.
To determine which states require interventions, in the form of
state-building or development, assessments of capacity and strength
are developed. The indicators that measure strength for contemporary
state-building and development projects are used to label states with
a typology: strong, weak, failing, failed. Robert Rotberg and Stewart
Patrick describe state failure and weakness as the inability or unwilling-
ness of governing bodies to provide the elements that are required for
statehood such as, legitimate political institutions that provide a frame-
work for economic management, social welfare, and physical security

3 The ideal-type is an abstract and hypothetical framing that establishes a generalized

conceptual benchmark. In this case, the ideal type with regards to the concept of the
state is a focus on its associated institutional characteristics and functions, which do not
correspond to any single case, but that are reproduced in scholarship and measurements
of statehood (Weber 1997, p. 90).
6 A. DELATOLLA

(Rotberg 2004; Patrick 2006, p. 29). Rotberg argues that indicators

of state failure include: enduring violence, victimization of citizens by
the state, loss of control over peripheral territory, growth of criminal
violence, flawed institutions, deteriorating infrastructure, lacking provi-
sions of basic services, uneven economic opportunity, and widespread
corruption (Rotberg 2004). Susan Rice and Stewart Patrick have devel-
oped a similar set of indicators as Rotberg to employ when examining
state capacity. In addition to the chosen indicators of state failure or
weakness, Rice and Patrick also propose a set of practical policies that
focus on the development of institutions with the aim to limit damage
and steer the state away from collapse.4 Regardless of whether measuring
states against an abstract set of criteria is unintentional, this practice places
the state on hierarchy, or scale, of effectiveness and efficiency that support
assumptions regarding the ability to ‘fix’ perceived deficiencies. Although
this may seem justified, developed with good intentions, the indicators
exclude further qualitative analysis that would often point to sociological
issues including customary political, economic, and social hierarchies that
can be in contention with official state institutions.
Despite the often overlooked sociological factors that either contra-
dict or become intertwined—in unpredictable and sometimes problematic
ways—with institutions of statehood, the concern of development and
state-building is focused on the end goal of such projects. The aim,
according to Amartya Sen, is to provide populations with new freedoms.
This references the Hegelian notion that the state is an environment that
provides freedoms which would otherwise not be enjoyed (Patten 1999).
Specifically, Sen argues that

Development requires the removal of major sources of unfreedom: poverty

as well as tyranny, poor economic opportunities as well as systematic social
deprivation, neglect of public facilities as well as intolerance or over activity
of repressive states. (Sen 1999, p. 3)

4 Rice and Patrick (2008) provide indicators that place states on a scale depending
on their capacity to fulfil necessary criteria. This includes GNI per capita, GDP growth,
income inequality, inflation, regulatory quality, government effectiveness, rule of law, voice
and accountability, control of corruption, freedom ratings, conflict intensity, political inten-
sity, political stability and absence of violence, incidence of coups, gross human rights
abuses, territory affected by conflict, child mortality, primary school completion, under-
nourishment, percent population with access to improved water sources and with access
to improved sanitation facilities, life expectancy.
 1 INTRODUCTION 7

Similarly, Rotberg asserts that, notwithstanding the elements that may be

inducing failure and weakness, states can be revived through the devel-
opment of a stabilized environment by driving forward notions of law
and order. Once a relative peace has been established, three goals should
be pursued concurrently: economic development, rejuvenation of civil
society, and the reintroduction of rule of law (Rotberg 2004). The goals
outlined by Rotberg are commensurate with establishing effective control,
from which new freedoms are derived. However, the legitimate economic
development, rejuvenation of civil society, and the reintroduction of rule
of law are narrowly understood by those pursuing these goals. They do
not reflect the political, economic, and social customs of the society where
the projects are being developed, but those of the modern state as an ideal
type (Muppidi 2004).
By conceiving the modern state as an entity that is universal and objec-
tive, it gives credence to understanding rights and freedoms as being
universal standards that reflect global human progress (Sen 1999, p. 229).
Although poverty, tyranny, social deprivation, social neglect, and socio-
political intolerance are problems that require engagement, the methods
of engagement to alleviate these problems should be carefully considered.
By placing emphasis on state capacity and institutional reform to alleviate
sources of ‘unfreedom’, an international reproduction of paternalistic rela-
tions between the global north and the global south,5 the west and the
east, is (re)developed. It assumes that human progress is linear, ongoing,
and direct; that it follows a particular and unique experience of devel-
opment located in Western society and civilization. Here, divergence is
akin to moving backwards, reasserting binary and hierarchical relations
(Quijano 2000; Tucker 2018).
By engaging in state-building and development as a way to fix deficien-
cies, emphasis is placed on establishing political rituals that mimic those
present in the strongest states, specifically Western states. The goal of
intervention in state-building and development, whether such projects
include, or are limited to, institution building, capacity building, or

5 The global south as a concept can be critiqued due to its reproduction of an ordered
world that divides the ‘developed’ north from the ‘underdeveloped’ south, as had been
done with such conceptual framings of the ‘third world’. However, the global south is
a useful concept that reflects the core-periphery ordering of the world that developed in
the nineteenth century and that persists into the twenty-first century (see Levander and
Mignolo 2011; Dryzek 2006; Wallerstein 2007; Rosenberg 2010).
8 A. DELATOLLA

economic aid, is to pacify populations and governments that are deemed

subversive, unstable, and which pose an implicit or explicit threat domes-
tically or internationally. The aim, as with colonial endeavours, has been
to ‘fight war in the “social milieu”’ by engaging in practices to ensure
the ‘rise of social forms of governance [that are] distinctly modern and
capitalist variant on the science and practice of household rule’ (Owens
2015, p. 279). By encouraging the development of new political rituals
to replace those that are viewed as illegitimate, regressive, and uncivilized,
a set of supposed universal moral and ethical codes are also deployed.
State-building and development projects are, then, sustained strategies
to replace knowledges and practices that are perceived as backward, or
unruly, in an effort to reorder society within a rational design that is ‘com-
mensurate with the scientific understanding of natural laws’ (Scott 1998,
pp. 4–5). By pacifying and stabilizing states that are considered under-
developed, underperforming, failed, or weak, economic growth can be
encouraged and the threat of violence is decreased, facilitating the estab-
lishment of new practices that are considered legitimate by the strongest
states in the international state system.
The assumption that engagement in state-building and development
can produce effective change to the benefit of the targeted state and
society is based on good intentions but, as argued by Raja Menon, it
‘can never become an ethically driven pursuit disentangled from power
and interests’ (2016, p. 11). Highlighted by Menon, the decision to
engage in state-building and development, targeting specific states, is
always, explicitly or implicitly, driven by power and interests. In making
the argument that state-building and development practices are entan-
gled in the pursuit of power and interests, Menon highlights the case
of the Kurdish population in Iraq. He argues that the U.S. had only
developed an interest in the Kurdish population following the Iran–Iraq
War (1980–1988), having ignored their plight throughout the period of
conflict with Iran (Menon 2016, pp. 11–12). Following the war, however,
and after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait (1990–1991), the U.S. began to
further engage with the Kurds. U.S. policy in Iraq became concerned
with ensuring the safety of the Kurds, but also provided further justi-
fication for the isolation of Saddam Hussein as part of the policy of
containment (Zanger 2002). The U.S. decision to intervene and provide
support for autonomous and democratic development was not a decision
of moral or ethical selflessness. Rather, it produced favourable outcomes
for U.S. strategy and interests in the Middle East. Although state-building
 1 INTRODUCTION 9

and development are often framed by narratives of good intentions, self-

lessness, and moral impetus, intervening states make gains by nurturing
alliances with domestic partners, gaining access to new economic markets
and resources, and by ensuring beneficial regional stability and influence;
as discussed in Chapter 8 in relation to histories of European intervention
and interference.
Discussed thus far are two aspects of state-building and development
that follow from a single assumption about human social and political
development and progress. This single assumption holds that human
social and political development and progress occur on a linear trajec-
tory with the most powerful states in the international state system being
at the forefront of development and progress. From this assumption, two
arguments are developed. First, that state-building and development are
practices that are constructed on good intentions aimed at ‘helping’ back-
wards, weaker states and societies. Second, that these assumptions lead
to opportunities that allow the most powerful states in the international
system to pursue interests and power; shaping the targeted states to their
benefit.
Regardless of intent, whether it is to help other societies progress and
develop, or if state-building and development are tools in the pursuit of
power and interests, the focus on the modern state is an heir to historic
practices of imperial and colonial governance. The practices of state-
building and development, as well as imperial governance and colonialism,
are formed by the interactions between state-building and development
practitioners or imperial and colonial administrators and the populations
that are being engaged in programs of social re-engineering. In these
interactions, and related to differences in power, emerges a coloniality
of knowledge, as discussed above. While Quijano (2000) outlined these
dynamics in reference to the seventeenth to the nineteenth centuries,
state-building and development represent its continuation, albeit under
new—seemingly benign—categories that appear detached from imperi-
alism and colonialism.
The practices of social re-engineering based on coloniality of knowl-
edge has continuously (re)produced a civilizing project, one that facili-
tates an ongoing link between Western or European imperialism, colo-
nialism and state-building and development. The civilizing project, or
mission, can be described as being conceived of as ‘a “benign” vision
of imperialism’, a liberal project, shrouded in moral reasoning, inflected
with—implicit and explicit—racist hierarchies. This project, or mission,
10 A. DELATOLLA

developed with the view that ‘Western rational institutions and norms’
were—and continue to be—the pinnacle of development, and sought to
insure a cultural conversion or assimilation of non-European societies into
these institutions and norms (Hobson 2012, p. 122). In other words,
the civilizing project was centred on a particular set of knowledges and
practices that were mobilized to ensure the expansion and replication
of European progress, modernity, and civilization. Unlike the logics of
imperialism and colonialism, which were justified based on a ‘moral voca-
tion’ that attempted to save brown and black men from the state of
nature, a ‘backward hereditary condition’ (Hobson 2012, p. 123), state-
building, and development forego the use of a direct and explicit racist
logic. Instead, state-building and development, in the production of a
civilizing mission, engage in an implicit racism, one that ‘locates “dif-
ference” through cultural, institutional and environmental criteria rather
than genetic properties’ (Hobson 2004, p. 220). This is not to say that
explicit and implicit racisms are separate, rather they often overlap and
function together; as is evident in the context of European imperialism
and colonialism of the nineteenth century.
Reflecting imperial and colonial justifications, as well as the moral voca-
tion of the nineteenth-century civilizing project, contemporary practices
of state-building and development, maintains that there is a cultural,
institutional, or environmental inability to engage with the structures,
norms, and institutions of the modern state. This is particularly evident
with regard to the typologies of states, with weak, failing, or failed states
requiring strategies to alleviate societies from their conditions of under-
development (Scott 1998, pp. 4–5). K. Adalbert Hampel critiques the
contemporary measurement of state capacity and the production of state
typologies as being ahistorical, reproducing narratives that the modern
state is analogous to the organic polity, reinforced by global hegemony.
Hampel correctly points to the modern state, in terms of its conceptual
formulation as well its practical development, being the unique conse-
quences of European political history. Despite its particular origin, it has,
nevertheless, been used to measure and test the development, progress,
and civilization of other societies and polities (2015, pp. 1632–1638).
In a similar vein, Branwen Gruffydd Jones argues that the language of
state weakness and failure in the post-colonial world conjures notions of
‘a general lack of capacity to develop, to rule or to be peaceful’ (2013,
p. 49). By categorizing states into typologies, a hierarchy is created that
reproduces the language of colonial and imperial governance, echoing
 1 INTRODUCTION 11

historic discourses and divisions that ascertained regions in the global

south as backwards, uncivilized, and fanatical.
The language of state weakness and failure resonates with the colonial
civilizing missions that attempted large-scale assimilation of the global
peripheries within the dominant norms of governance in the European
state system. The categories employed throughout the nineteenth century
in the global south were not justified by the quantification and scientific
measurement of the social world, but were still organized into a hier-
archy that used the West as the benchmark of development, progress, and
civilization. Furthermore, the categories, labels, and characterizations that
are used in state-building, development, imperialism, and colonialism are,
and were, deployed to justify various kinds of interventions. Although the
language of colonial and imperial engagements of the civilizing project
were not as sophisticated as the language used in contemporary state-
building and development practices, the binaries, hierarchies, and logics
have been similar.
In addition to similar logical foundations, the practicality of imperial
and colonial civilizing projects, despite temporal and categorical differ-
ence from development and state-building projects were also quite similar.
Here, imperial and colonial civilizing projects as well as development
and state-building can be viewed through instrumentalist and strategic
purposes. Of particular concern has been external recognition, legitimacy,
and the facilitation of economic and geopolitical access. The aim, then,
has been to create environments amenable to the rational and civilized
societies, politics, and the economies of the West (Saouli 2012, p. 13;
Wallerstein et al. 1987; Sunar 1987, pp. 63–87).
To create environments amenable to the West, institutional engi-
neering was emphasized following interventions in states categorized as
weak, failing, or failed, or in polities that were considered uncivilized,
unmodern, or fanatical. The focus on institutional engineering during
imperial and colonial modernization, although developed to achieve
particular interests of the imperial and colonial powers, was justified based
on early scientific ideas of human progress. The aim in undertaking these
projects, as with state-building and development, was to reorder society
into organized formations that mirrored the ordering and organization of
societies in the imperial and colonial states, providing future ease of access
and engagement. Although the method of measurement in developing
the categories employed to engage in state-building and development
differ from those used throughout colonial and imperial governance, the
12 A. DELATOLLA

desire to help states achieve modernity and progress, whether this was
done with good intentions or to pursue interests and power, created a
set of paternalistic international relations (Scott 1998, pp. 4–5; Hefner
1998).
The assumption that state-building and development are practices
that help states and societies, primarily in the global south, to become
developed is based on good intentions, however, it is a worldview that
privileges Western forms of development as being empirically better.
Furthermore, such strategies fail to account for exploitive political and
economic relations that have facilitated, if not created, the conditions
for sustained underdevelopment (Gunder-Frank 1966; DeGannes Scott
1995). In taking these histories into serious consideration, it is possible
to trace political and economic exploitation into discussions of sustained
underdevelopment, state weakness, and failure and critique the inherent
assumption of universalism across social and political formations (Call-
inicos and Rosenberg 2008; Ashman 2009). Here, Eisenstadt’s basic
premise that ‘different types of political systems develop and function
under specific social conditions, and the continuity of any political system
is also related to such specific conditions’ (1993, p. 3) can be further
interrogated in relation to state-building and development.
Sen defends the point of universality by arguing that while differ-
ence may be paramount between the West and the East, the North
and the South, parallels exist. In providing examples, he notes similari-
ties between Western political ideas and Asian political thought, such as
Confucianism (Sen 1999, pp. 233–234). Although parallels between the
West and non-West can be emphasized to transcend disparate temporali-
ties and geographies, there is a problem with conflating Western concepts
with Eastern philosophy to assume universality. As argued by Muhammad
Asad,

One should always remember that when the European or American

speaks of “democracy,” “liberalism,” “socialism,” “theocracy,” “parliamen-
tary government,” and so forth, he uses these terms within the context of
Western historical experience.

It is this historical experience which gives these terms their particular

and unique meanings and usage in Western and Eastern contexts (Asad
1980, pp. 18, 19–23). Not only does drawing parallels threaten the
erasure of the contextual reality in which these non-Western texts were
 1 INTRODUCTION 13

written, but it further assumes that Western philosophy and political

concepts are unsurpassed by other philosophical traditions (Germond-
Duret 2016). By holding Western philosophy and political concepts as
the standard, the development of parallels between Western and non-
Western concepts requires intellectual acrobatics that ignore contextual
and linguistic meaning and connotation.
The assumption of universality of modern statehood, where univer-
sality is produced in relation to concepts and definitions, practices, and
logics of order and organization follows from the arguments made by
Sen. This logic of universalism, as argued by Brett Bowden (2004), trans-
lates into practices that attempt to produce uniformity. As such, there is
a disregard for social and political difference in the name of development
and progress. This is not only a critique of contemporary state-building
and development, but also the modernization and civilizing projects of
nineteenth-century imperialism and colonialism. With regard to the latter,
as a means to accede to modernity, modernization was perceived as linear
and path-dependent, a condition that could be replicated by the civi-
lizing project. Modernization therefore offered a ‘comprehensive solution
– applicable worldwide, based on universal agreement’. Although it could
be applied worldwide, Menon argued that this comprehensive solution
was not universally applied. Instead, only societies and polities that were
of particular strategic interest were engaged in the modernizing project
(Menon 2016, p. 171).
The modernizing, or civilizing, projects, were attempts to reorder,
reconstitute, and civilize the other, creating harm in two areas (Linklater
2002, p. 15). The modernizing, or civilizing, projects, as well as state-
building and development attempt to engage states that are deemed
unmodern by reconstituting those processes through modernization
reforms (Fortna 2013, p. 1). First, harm is produced in the form of
social, political, and economic alienation that develops from swift insti-
tutional and structural transitions. By altering the social, political, and
economic political institutions and structures individuals are unable to
access customary structures and institutions, and become alienated and
disenfranchised. Although the intent is often noble, the projects are
primarily concerned with Western conceptions of progress; emphasizing
institutional capacity and the prevalent categories used at any given period
of time (Rotberg 2004; Rice and Patrick 2008; Menon 2016, p. 10).
Ashraf Ghani and Clare Lockhart demonstrate this problem with the case
of Nepal:
14 A. DELATOLLA

A civil society leader in Nepal recounted how the aid system reinvents
itself with new methods and languages, and the Nepali leaders spend their
time learning those languages to meet the criteria of the moment. But
as soon as they have mastered them and rewritten their documents, the
approach changes, and the cycle begins all over again: poverty reduction,
sustainable development, millennium development goals, capacity building.
(Ghani and Lockhart 2009, pp. 107–108)

The effort put into learning these new categories, redeveloping goals,
altering the raison d’être of the organization, changes the language of
development and the end goals of modernization, creating systemic alien-
ation until the language is learned, developed, mobilized. This constrains
the total amount of resources as well as creating institutional and struc-
tural outputs that are unnavigable for individuals and communities that
have not learned the language, creating social and political dislocation,
dissatisfaction, and alienation.
Second, harm is produced in the process of state-building, which
necessitates the use of force. Force, in this context, exists as threat and
use, resulting in coercion (Foucault 1995; Kertzer 1988, pp. 1–3; Belge
2013, p. 17). Even in cases where state-building and development are
primarily focused on economic capacity, economic aid, or local develop-
ment projects, the prescription of solutions often requires the presence of
a security apparatus that seek the pacification of individuals and commu-
nities. Paul Miller describes the use of force to facilitate state-building as
indispensable, having a great amount of impact on the potential success
of the project. The threat and use of force in state-building is to defend
civilian personnel responsible for institution and capacity building and
to limit the actions of domestic spoilers (Miller 2013, pp. 4, 117–174).
Describing instances of counterinsurgency interventions and occupations
with the aim to facilitate the ‘right’ kind of politics, Patricia Owens argues
that those involved in the deployment of force seek to control popula-
tions. By asserting power over populations, intervening states attempt to
re-engineer society through practices of domestic governance and institu-
tion building. She continues that such practices are a distinctive type of
governance, deployed through armed social work (Owens 2015, pp. 9–
10; Galula 1964, pp. 62–63; Sitaraman 2012, pp. 36–37). Here, armed
social work requires new social logics of engagement, bearing similarity to
colonial governance in its use of force as a tool to re-order (Owens 2015,
pp. 9–10; Galula 1964, pp. 62–63).
 1 INTRODUCTION 15

Civilization and the State: Tying Development

and State-Building to Imperialism and Colonialism
The similarities between the logics and practices of colonial and impe-
rial governance with state-building and development reveal important
dynamics of statehood in the global south. These dynamics include the
paternalistic relationship that the West has maintained with the global
south; the assertion that there is a singular way to be modern or to
engage with modernity; the belief that institutions and structures of
centralized government will help in the development of order and ratio-
nality of society; the employment of the threat and use of force to
pacify populations and assert dominance; and the belief that engage-
ment, intervention, and capacity building is a moral vocation. Noting
these similarities, William Easterly (2006) argues that state-building and
development are constitutive of a form of postmodern imperialism, and
characterizes it as the continuation of the previous colonial era.
The continuity between colonialism and contemporary interventions
was a result of, according to Easterly, practices of colonialism that
impaired economic and political development; breeding conditions that
motivated the ‘new White Man’s Burden to clean up the mess left behind
by the old White Man’s Burden’ (Easterly 2006, p. 239). Noting the
relationship between state-building and development and imperialism and
colonialism, there is evidence that the post-colonial state in the global
south is subject to a similar set of conditions in the international state
system as it had been during periods of nineteenth-century imperial and
colonial governance. Where state-building and development have had
a substantial impact on the contemporary function of the post-colonial
state, the knowledges and practices of imperialism and colonialism have
had a substantial impact on the making of the modern state in the global
south. With regard to imperialism and colonialism, however, the conse-
quence of imperial and colonial knowledges and practices in the global
south have been a different set of attributes and characteristics from the
modern state in the West. This difference has required further interven-
tion and interference by engaging in contemporary state-building and
development practices. Rather than argue that this difference represents
incapacity or deficiency, the post-colonial state requires examination as
the result of a standard of civilization.
16 A. DELATOLLA

The post-colonial state, as a result of and continuously subjected to a

standard of civilization, is the outcome of a general and universal concep-
tual understanding of modern statehood that is measured on a linear
scale. This linear scale, a measurement of progress and development, as
discussed above, did not conclude with imperial and colonial engage-
ments of the nineteenth century. Instead, the standard of civilization, the
linear scales of progress and development were maintained and repack-
aged into a new language of state-building and development based on
social scientific measurements. Specifically, these measurements focus on
institutional capacity and sovereignty, resulting in discussions of strong
states, weak states, and failed states (Jones 2008, 2013). What emerges
in typifying states in this manner, is the maintenance of a standard or
benchmark that emphasizes the need to engage in a global reproduction
of ‘strong’ and ‘developed’ states. By holding the ‘strong state’, typi-
cally the state in the West, as the pinnacle of development, it becomes
the set benchmark or standard for ‘weaker’, ‘underdeveloped’—and often
post-colonial states. By placing emphasis on the state in the West as the
model to be copied elsewhere, the characteristics and the knowledges and
practices of statehood are assumed to be applicable globally. This allows
for, not only typologies of statehood to emerge, but an abstracted social
scientific measurement and classification of the state to be produced. This
abstraction, although discussed as being universal, imposes uniformity.
By measuring statehood and placing states in hierarchies, a number
of problems emerge regarding the manner in which states and—by
extension—societies are categorized and characterized. The hierarchiza-
tion of states lends itself to assumptions about which states require
development—being underdeveloped, or which states are incapable of
development—being considered undevelopable. These hierarchies also
inform knowledge concerning which states, polities, societies, and geogra-
phies are considered safe and law-abiding, in opposition to those that
are deemed violent, corrupt, and unruly. These ascribed characteristics,
whether they are concerned with politics or the economy, position states
and societies in relation to an ‘ideal type’ that relies on assumptions of
universality and the belief that there is a right way and a wrong way
to govern; that capacity and institutions can be measured in a quantifi-
able manner without concern for social, political, and economic histories;
and that states can be fixed by engaging in state-building (inclusive of
institution building) and development, without much concern for the
consequences of socio-political reorganization by external force.
 1 INTRODUCTION 17

As Owens (2015) notes, by positioning the state as an object that can

be ‘fixed’, state-building and development creates an abstraction based
on an assumed universalism. In agreement with Owens, this abstraction
is problematic, as it emerges from a notion that progress occurs in a
linear fashion with a singular outcome. This foregrounds a universalist
objectivity with regard to the state, premised on the notion that social,
political, and economic progress occurs in stages, with the most advanced,
often Western states, being at the pinnacle of development. However, this
universalism disregards difference in social and political knowledges and
practices by placing those differences into hierarchies where the moral
imperative to ‘civilize’, to lead the hierarchically ‘underdeveloped’ or
‘uncivilized’ society into advanced stages of ‘development’ or ‘civilization’
is an attempt to produce uniformity.
This assumption of universalism and its consequences are rooted in
the global transformations of the nineteenth century (Buzan and Lawson
2015; Stearns 2007, pp. 21–27). The global transformation of the nine-
teenth century, according to Barry Buzan and George Lawson, ‘generated
four basic, but linked, types of changes’, including: ‘industrialization
and the extension of market to a global scale’, ‘processes of rational
state-formation’, the prominence of new ideologies (liberalism, nation-
alism, socialism, and ‘scientific’ racism), and a core-periphery global order
(2015, pp. 3–4). These four transformations were contained within and
directed by the development of European modern states. Because of
the importance of the modern state in relation to these global trans-
formations, modern statehood in the nineteenth century was the central
evidence of development and progress. It was associated with rationality,6
order, governance, and allowed for centralized economic productivity.
Indeed, the modern state in Europe in the nineteenth century facili-
tated global European expansion and domination. Subsequently, in the
twentieth and twenty-first centuries, modern statehood continued to be
benchmarked—although by more ‘scientific’ means. This allowed govern-
ments, international organizations, and non-governmental organizations
determine capacity and capability, development and progress; building
on previously held assumptions, albeit by employing new conceptual
frameworks.

6 Rationality refers to the ability to make decisions based on scientific reason, to suffi-
ciently disentangle the mind from wider obstacles created by barriers such as religion,
kinship, or political favouritism (MacFarlane 1992, p. 123).
18 A. DELATOLLA

By historicizing modern statehood in the context of the nineteenth-

century global transformations, the modern state, as it is discussed in
political science and international relations, owes its conceptual origins
to the unique history of European state formation. Consequently, while
these disciplines often disassociate the modern state from its historical,
geographic, and temporal origins, it is nevertheless important to consider
how histories of modern state formation have influenced ideas of state-
hood going forward. Whether the origin of the modern state is discussed
through the histories of conflict and war, elite politics, religion, or tech-
nological and intellectual progress, the modern state conceived of in the
Weberian framework is a social enterprise rooted in pre-modern European
history. By understanding the relationship between history and concep-
tual development, it is possible to understand how the modern state
became increasingly central to the organization and governance of society,
and its central role regarding ideas of development and progress.
Notably, attempts to measure development and progress by assessing,
measuring, and testing states, is not a contemporary development of inter-
national politics. Benchmarking progress and development by examining
statehood and political organization emerged in the nineteenth century,
justifying the establishment of the core-periphery global order (Broome
and Quirk 2015; Buzan and Lawson 2015). Although these dynamics
are not novel, by considering their historical emergence, it is possible to
examine the emergence of the modern state in the global south as a result
of a standard of civilization, one that has continued into the twentieth and
twenty-first centuries.
The classical standard of civilization, discussed in relation to the global
transformations of the nineteenth century, was a comparative measure-
ment of progress and development, a tool that was deployed to discipline
uncivilized bodies, societies, and polities. This standard emerged from a
comparison of development and progress, one which assumed a linear
scale, using the most progressed and developed states as benchmarks. By
deploying a standard of civilization, interference, oppression, and violence
was justified as a necessary practice of the civilizing project. The stan-
dard of civilization that was mobilized in the nineteenth century was
framed by the discourse of the ‘white man’s burden’, and while this
discourse is no longer considered legitimate, contemporary categories of
progress and development are maintained by the language of develop-
ment studies (Fidler 2001; Gong 1984). Still, however, it is of importance
that the context of this history is understood, not only to critically engage
 1 INTRODUCTION 19

and discuss how state-building and development represent its unfinished

project, but to contextualize histories of imperial and colonial led state
formation, and critique the categories and concepts used with the aim of
using more accurate categories and concepts.

The Argument: The Modern State

as a Standard of Civilization
This book explores how the modern state, as a standard of civilization,
was historically produced in the global south, and specifically in Lebanon
and Syria. In doing so, it considers how the exogenously produced
knowledges and practices regarding statehood were layered, or assembled,
onto pre-existing knowledges and practices, with the aim to replicate the
former and eradicate the latter. Here, the modern state, symbolic of civi-
lized engagement, was central to the ‘civilizing project’. This book further
argues that the concept of civilization and the benchmarking of civiliza-
tion was embedded in the discourses, structures, and practices of explicit
and implicit racism (Hobson 2004, pp. 219–242). By understanding the
racist starting point of the civilizing project, tied to modern statehood,
what becomes evident is how practices of modernization, state-making,
and the emergence of the post-colonial state and subsequent global
relations continue to be embedded in racist structures of civilizational
hierarchies.
Racial hierarchies were mobilized in the explanations for why polities in
the global south had not progressed or reached civilizational development
in comparison to European societies and states. This helped European
states, and of particular focus throughout this book—France and Britain,
determine the kind of civilizing program that was to be applied and the
kinds of knowledges and practices that were to be transferred to the unciv-
ilized societies, in this case the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces, and
Lebanon and Syria. Because the Ottoman Empire had not been classified
as a final-tier civilization in the civilizational league tables (Hobson 2004,
pp. 225; Anghie 2002), it was believed that the kind of civilizing project
required was not of direct colonial control and governance. As such, the
Ottoman Empire was autonomous, but not recognized as an independent
state with access to international law. In this subordinated position, the
Ottoman Empire was advised—often under coercive or economic pres-
sure—on the terms of modernity and modernization. Only by acceding
to these terms, or benchmarks that were exogenously created, could
20 A. DELATOLLA

the Empire be recognized as a full and equal member to the group of

‘civilized nations’, with recourse to international law.
This book explores the multifaceted application and consequences of
modern statehood as a standard of civilization. Although the European
powers—Britain, France, and Russia in the case of this book—are exam-
ined as the arbiters of civilization in relation to the Ottoman Empire,
their programs of modernization were assembled onto existing social,
political, and economic dynamics, having unexpected and ongoing conse-
quences (Sassen and Ong 2014). Argued in this book, the process
of early-to-mid nineteenth-century modernization programs, particularly
with regard to institutional and structural transformations, evoked senti-
ments of dissatisfaction and alienation from local populations in the Syrian
provinces. Feelings of alienation were exploited by the European powers
and justified by moral duty of protecting civilizational kin. Here, and
explored throughout the book, racial hierarchies were redeployed at a
local level, where religion became a racial signifier of development and
civilization. As such, it was often argued that certain religious groups were
inherently more civilized than others, leading to a process of racializa-
tion that attributed civilizational characteristics, assumed to be biological,
to the different religious groups. Following from these developments, it
is argued that race became an embedded characteristic of the modern
state—not only in the hierarchization of states globally, but in the struc-
tures of the states; evident, for example, in the development of modern
nationalisms.
That is not to say that the Ottoman Empire and the populations of the
Syrian provinces did not exhibit agency, but that agency became confined
to the creeping structures established by foreign powers. Indeed, where
agency and resistance were exhibited, they were exogenously perceived
as the result of a civilizational failure that required further ‘fixing’. Here,
failure was either caused by resistance or the consequence of assembled
knowledges and practices that blended the ‘pre-modern’ and ‘modern’,
‘non-European’ and ‘European’ (Tibi 1971; Jones 2013; Lamarck 1914),
producing ‘scars’, ‘imperfections’, or ‘defects’, written on the body-politic
of the Lebanese and Syrian states. Following from this argument, Sandra
Halperin and Ronen Palan state that the institutions and logics of past
polities do not entirely disappear, instead, their mark is left on the ‘struc-
tures and processes and on the institutions, cultures, politics and legal
systems of the peoples who inhabit [these] territories’ (2015, p. 1).
 1 INTRODUCTION 21

In relation to Halperin and Palan’s argument, by revisiting and empha-

sizing the histories of imperial and colonial engagements, exploring the
knowledges and practices of these engagements, it is possible to historicize
the ‘scars’, ‘imperfections’, or ‘defects’ that continue to be of concern for
contemporary state typologies. Furthermore, by historicizing the modern
state in the post-colonial world as a product of a standard of civilization,
it is possible to conceptualize and define the post-colonial state as a sepa-
rate entity from European, or Western, modern states. This allows for a
better understanding of how coloniality has impacted the development of
the modern state in the post-colonial world.
Of primary focus in this book, is the examination of the displace-
ment and erasure of important social and political organizing principles
including ideas and practices of tolerance; the transformations regarding
the relationship between territory, identity, and governance; the changing
nature of resistance through imperial and colonial modernization; and
the impact of global governance. The book interrogates the histories of
the modern state and considers how the Lebanese and Syrian states were
assembled in relation to nineteenth-century international transforma-
tions,7 European expansion into the global south, imperial modernization
projects directed by the Sultan and the Sublime Porte of the Ottoman
Empire, and French colonial governance. By exploring the histories and
interactions between the international and the local, the legacies of which
have impacted post-colonial statehood and created difference in concep-
tualization and practice, the book argues that the post-colonial state in
the global south was a product of a standard of civilization, a project of
state-building that led to an assemblage, which ultimately impacted the
knowledge and practice of the post-colonial modern state, domestically
and internationally.
Influenced by debates in international historical sociological, post-
colonial, anti-colonial, and decolonial scholarship, the arguments made in
this book emerge from a re-engagement of the global political and soci-
ological histories of statehood. The book draws from secondary source
histories on the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon, and Syria. It also makes
extensive use of archival documents, including government dispatches,
newspapers, and recorded first-hand accounts from the British National

7 Jennifer Mitzen (2013), Barry Buzan and George Lawson (2015), John Hobson
(2004), and Andrew Linklater (2016b) note that the nineteenth century was a period of
global transformation that gave way to contemporary international relations and politics.
22 A. DELATOLLA

Archives, the French Diplomatic Archives, the French National Archives,

the Lebanese National Archives, and the archives at the Université Saint-
Joseph in Beirut. It triangulates these histories, by engaging in historical
analysis, to develop a better understanding of French and British percep-
tions of the Ottoman Empire, the Syrian provinces and the communities
therein, as well as the responses from these communities. By triangu-
lating these accounts and histories, the notion of historical ‘facts’ is
carefully rejected by understanding history as being the product of a story
which represents the situated knowledge and action of the individual or
group who is narrating. For this reason, the research attempts to accord
historical accounts to interests, power relationships, and goals (Rowlinson
2004; Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003). In doing so, it uses content
analysis, and discourse analysis. Content analysis is used to reveal under-
lying meanings and ideas in the narration of historical accounts in the
primary source documents (Krippendorff 2004, pp. 11–12). At times,
this research employs a discourse analysis, particularly when meanings
and ideas require contextualization with regard to power. Using discourse
analysis, this research also draws on language as source of power that influ-
ences, reinforces, and legitimates the worldviews, actions, and positions of
the actors involved (Bryman 2004, pp. 528–540).

Chapter Breakdown
Building on the discussion of statehood as a the standard of civiliza-
tion, the following chapters explore the various ways that the state in
Lebanon and Syria were developed from a civilizing project that empha-
sized the replication of the modern state in Europe; first by means of
Ottoman reforms and modernization and, second, in relation to the
French Mandate of Lebanon and Syria. These chapters also explore how
the application of the standard of civilization, its associated knowledges
and practices, became institutionalized within the structures of the state
and state–society relations.
Chapter 2 frames the argument that is presented here. It first discusses
some of the existing scholarship on state formation and statehood in the
Middle East and North Africa. It then considers the relationship between
the history of state formation in Europe and the conceptualization of
modern statehood in political science, international relations, and devel-
opment studies. Chapter 2 argues that the state, as it is defined, framed,
and conceptualized in universal terms, exists as a standard of civilization.
 1 INTRODUCTION 23

It further contends that this conceptualization emerges from a partic-

ular European history, a history that provides the reference point for the
nineteenth-century standard of civilization and contemporary practices of
development and state-building. By considering the conceptual develop-
ment of the state as being historically unique, it is possible to question the
application of a supposed universal framework of modern statehood to the
global south, and specifically, the post-colonial state in the Middle East.
Chapter 3 explores the application of the principle of equality in lieu of
the customary principle of tolerance. Where equality was seen as necessary
in relation to the modern state, particularly with regard to state–society
relations and the development of citizenship; tolerance was perceived,
by the European powers, as a customary foundation of governance that
inhibited the central authority of the state. The inability to apply reforms
concerning the principle of equality in a manner that was considered
acceptable was perceived as a marker of difference and evidence of the
Ottoman Empire’s ‘self-incurred immaturity’. This evidence was further
supported by the failure of sectarian communities to adjust to their altered
social–political relations and, ultimately, with each other. This chapter
further notes the domestic consequences of the relevant reforms, partic-
ularly in relation to the application of equality and its effect on religious
communal relations.
Chapter 4 examines how the standard of civilization and, specifically,
the failure of the Ottoman Empire to produce the appropriate outcomes
from the civilizing process facilitated and justified the racialization of
religious groups. The European powers, mainly France, argued that
the underdevelopment of the Ottoman Empire was a result of Muslim
barbarism and fanaticism, an inherent trait that suppressed the devel-
opment and natural civilized status of Christian communities. Through
this process of racialization that attached social characteristics as a biolog-
ical, or inherent, condition related to creed, Muslims were characterized
as barbaric, fanatical, and underdeveloped, while Christian communities
were considered the ‘civilizational cousins’ to the European powers; justi-
fying European interference and interventions on their behalf. In this
context, France justified their close political and economic relations with
Christian, and particularly Catholic, communities. Similarly, Russia had
formed relations and alliances with the Christian Orthodox communities.
The development of racial hierarchies based on assumptions of ethno-
sectarianism contributed to the development of political contestation
related to European alliances with, primarily, Christian communities. The
24 A. DELATOLLA

notion of racial difference further became embedded in the development

of a distinct Lebanese national conscience, particularly with the notion
of Phoenician history; facilitating justifications of separateness based on a
historical civilizational difference.
With the process of racialization placing emphasis on identity markers
and the pressure placed on the Ottoman Empire to engage in modern-
ization reforms in the nineteenth century, there was a changing dynamic
between territory, identity, and governance. In the first instance, discussed
in Chapter 5, the territorialization of Mount Lebanon split authority
and governance between the Maronite and Druze communities. This
altered intercommunal relations by dividing the populations and systems
of governance erasing practices of shared governance in Mount Lebanon.
In addition to the transforming relations between territory, identity,
and governance in Mount Lebanon, having particular consequences for
the development of a national conception of Greater Lebanon, more
explicit reforms were also developed; including the Land Code of 1858.
This reform was an attempt to modernize land tenure throughout the
Ottoman Empire, bringing the Empire into closer alignment with Euro-
pean states, and facilitating the development of governance through
territorial organization. Although this reform was developed to facilitate
order and governance, to territorialize the population through formal
ownership, it also skewed domestic relations by providing political and
economic elites the opportunity to extend their influence into new
geographies. Pressure from European states also necessitated Ottoman
imperial expansion by formalizing control over the sedentary and nomadic
tribes. This was done to ensure that control over these territories would
be maintained by the Sublime Porte, and that resource extraction from
these territories and populations could be secured.
Increased European interference and intervention in the Ottoman
Empire led to growing sentiments of alienation and dissatisfaction among
the populations in the Syrian provinces. This was particularly due to
the enforcement of the principle of equality, the process of racializa-
tion, sectarian alliance formation, and the application of modernization
reforms (Makdisi 2002, p. 771; Ayubi 1995, pp. 21–23). Discussed in
Chapter 6 is how this discontent led to violent forms of resistance; partic-
ularly among the Muslim communities in the nineteenth century, and
later with regard to the French mandate. While violence as a form of
resistance was used in various contexts to resist European encroachments
and the transforming political and economic realities between religious
 1 INTRODUCTION 25

communities, it failed to procure the desired ends of those engaged in

violence. Covered in this chapter are the dynamics and the results of
the Aleppo Uprising of 1850, the Damascus Massacre of 1860, Faisal’s
Revolt, and the Druze Revolt of 1925. The failures of violent engagement
to dislodge European interference led to further European, and in partic-
ular, French interventions, resulting in increased dissatisfaction. Further
interventions in the Syrian provinces were justified by violent engage-
ment, which was considered to be the evidence of a Muslim inability to
engage in civilization.
Resistance, however, is complex, and was not solely observable in rela-
tion to violence. Discussed in Chapter 7, nationalism, as part of the
nineteenth-century global transformations, became increasingly promi-
nent in the Ottoman Empire as a form of resistance. In the first instance,
the Young Ottomans were engaged in a political strategy that sought to
merge customary identity markers with aspects of modernity, including
the establishment of state institutions. Constructing their movement in
relation to European norms of civilized engagement and statehood, they
mobilized Islamic identity markers as a point of difference. By engaging
with, and acquiescing to, European standards or benchmarks, the Young
Ottomans attempted to resist continued European interference and inter-
ventions by engaging in the discourses, norms, and structures of moder-
nity. Although the Young Ottomans failed to successfully resist continued
European interference and intervention, they managed to make social and
political inroads. In particular, they were foundational for the develop-
ment of the Young Turk movement and the Syrian and Arab nationalists.
However, while the Young Turks, and Syrian and Arab nationalists were
attempting to resist European interference, they were also positioned
against each other, often relying on the racial characterizations to resist
each other’s demands. These nationalist movements were not only mobi-
lizing political programs, but also ethnic identity markers with the aim
of making legitimate claims to statehood. Despite attempts to engage in
what was perceived as civilized progress, the national movements were
continuously denied autonomy.
The standard of civilization, as it was applied to the Ottoman Empire
and, subsequently, to the French mandates of Lebanon and Syria,
produced a set of material and immaterial benchmarks. As such, the popu-
lations were required to accede to a set of socio-political norms as well
as apply modernization reforms that replicated the institutions and struc-
tures of statehood in Europe. However, and as discussed in Chapter 8, the
26 A. DELATOLLA

standard of civilization became intertwined with the interests of Euro-

pean states. Because the civilizing project and modernization reforms,
being the products of a standard of civilization, could not be divorced
from political and economic interests, the standard that was required of
the Ottoman Empire, Lebanon, and Syria continued to shift. The result
was the continued subordination of the Ottoman Empire and the Syrian
provinces, the continuation of the civilizing project, and—as such—the
continued application of imperial interference and intervention. This is
evident throughout the Tanzimat period as well as the French mandate
period.
By arguing that the state in Lebanon and Syria, and—more broadly—
the post-colonial state, is the result of a standard of civilization, it
begin a critical reassessment and reconceptualization of statehood. The
concluding chapter of this book, Chapter 9, provides an engaged discus-
sion on the importance of taking history seriously in political science and
international relations. In doing so, and as argued in the conclusion, it is
possible to understand how global structures resulting in the production
of the state and classifications of statehood were developed as a result
of the global transformations of the nineteenth century. By tethering
contemporary global dynamics concerning statehood to these histories,
it becomes evident that, despite intentions, coloniality is reproduced.

Works Cited
Anghie, Antony. 2002. Colonialism and the Birth of International Institutions:
Sovereignty, Economy, and the Mandate System of the League of Nations.
New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 34: 513–633.
Asad, Muhammad. 1980. The Principles of State and Government in Islam. Kuala
Lumpur: Islamic Book Trust.
Ashman, Sam. 2009. Capitalism, Uneven and Combined Development and the
Transhistoric. Cambridge Review of International Affairs 22 (1): 29–46.
Ayubi, Nazih N. 1995. Overstating the Arab State: Politics and Society in the
Middle East. London: I.B. Tauris.
Belge, Ceren. 2013. Seeing the State: Kinship Networks and Kurdish Resistance
in Early Republican Turkey. In The Everyday Life of the State: A State in Society
Approach, ed. Adam White, 14–29. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
Bellamy, Alex J. 2008. The Responsibility to Protect and the Problem of Military
Intervention. International Affairs 84 (4): 615–639.
 1 INTRODUCTION 27

Bowden, Brett. 2004. In the Name of Progress and Peace: The ‘Standard of Civi-
lization’ and the Universalizing Project. Alternatives: Global, Local, Political
49 (1): 43–68.
Broome, André, and Joel Quirk. 2015. Governing the World at a Distance: The
Practice of Global Benchmarking. Review of International Studies 41 (5):
819–841.
Bryman, Alan. 2004. Social Research Methods. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Buzan, Barry. 2014. The ‘Standard of Civilization’ as an English School Concept.
Millennium: Journal of International Studies 42 (3): 576–594.
Buzan, Barry, and George Lawson. 2015. The Global Transformation: History,
Modernity and the Making of International Relations. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press.
Callinicos, Alex, and Justin Rosenberg. 2008. Uneven and Combined Develop-
ment: The Social-Relational Substratum of ‘the International’? An Exchange
of Letters, Review of International Affairs 21 (1): 77–112.
Clapham, Christopher. 1998. Degrees of Statehood. Review of International
Studies 24 (2): 143–157.
de Carvalho, Benjamin, Halvard Leira, and John M. Hobson. 2011. The Big
Bangs of IR: The Myths That Your Teachers Still Tell You About 1648 and
1919. Millennium Journal of International Studies 39 (3): 735–758.
DeGannes Scott, Bernice. 1995. Arrested Development: The Economic Legacy
of European Expansion and Colonialism in the Caribbean. The Western
Journal of Black Studies 19 (3): 196–201.
Donnelly, Jack. 1998. Human Rights: A New Standard of Civilization? Interna-
tional Affairs 74 (1): 1–24.
Doyle, Michael. 1996. Kant, Liberal Legacies and Foreign Affairs. In Debating
the Democratic Peace, ed. Michael E. Brown, Sean M. Lynn-Jones, and Steven
E. Miller. Cambridge: MIT Press.
Dryzek, John S. 2006. Deliberative Global Politics: Discourse and Democracy in
a Divided World. Cambridge: Polity.
Easterly, William. 2006. The White Man’s Burden. Oxford: Oxford University
Press.
Eisenstadt, S.N. 1993. The Political Systems of Empires. London: Transaction
Publishers.
Fanon, Frantz. 2001. The Wretched of the Earth, trans. Constance Farrington.
London: Penguin Classics.
Fidler, David P. 2001. The Return of the Standard of Civilization. Chicago
Journal of International Law 2 (1): 137–157.
Fortna, Benjamin. 2013. The Ottoman Empire and After: From a State of
‘Nations’ to ‘Nation States’. In State-Nationalisms in the Ottoman Empire,
Greece and Turkey: Orthodox and Muslims, 1830–1945, ed. Benjamin Fortna,
28 A. DELATOLLA

Stefanos Katsikas, Dimitris Kamouzis, and Paraskevas Konortas, 1–13. New

York: Routledge.
Foucault, Michel. 1995. Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison. New
York: Vintage Books.
Galula, David. 1964. Counter-Insurgency Warfare: Theory and Practice. London:
Praeger.
Germond-Duret, Celine. 2016. Tradition and Modernity: An Obsolete
Dichotomy? Binary Thinking, Indigenous Peoples and Normalisation, Third
World Quarterly 37 (9): 1537–1558.
Ghani, Ashraf, and Clare Lockhart. 2009. Fixing Failed States: A Framework for
Rebuilding a Fractured World. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Gong, Gerrit W. 1984. The Standard of Civilization in International Society.
Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Grant, Thomas D. 1999. Defining Statehood: The Montevideo Convention and
Its Discontents. Columbia Journal of International Law 37 (2): 403–458.
Gunder-Frank, Andre. 1966. The Development of Underdevelopment. Monthly
Review 18 (4): 17–31.
Halperin, Sandra, and Ronen Palan. 2015. Introduction: Legacies of Empire.
In Legacies of Empire: Imperial Roots of the Global Contemporary Order, ed.
Sandra Halperin and Ronen Palan, 1–25. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
Hampel, Karl Adalbert. 2015. The Dark(er) Side of ‘State Failure’: State
Formation and Socio-Political Variation. Third World Quarterly 36 (9):
1629–1648.
Hefner, Robert. 1998. Multiple Modernities: Christianity, Islam, and Hinduism
in a Globalizing Age. Annual Review of Anthropology 27 (1): 83–104.
Hobson, John M. 2004. The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Hobson, John M. 2012. The Eurocentric Conception of World Politics.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Hooper, Charlotte. 2001. Manly states: Masculinities, International Relations,
and Gender Politics. New York: Columbia University Press.
Jones, Branwen Gruffydd. 2008. Introduction: International Relations, Eurocen-
trism, and Imperialism. In Decolonizing International Relations, ed. Branwen
Gruffydd Jones, 1–22. Plymouth: Rowman & Littlefield.
Jones, Branwen Gruffydd. 2013. ‘Good Governance’ and ‘State Failure’:
Genealogies of Imperial Discourse. Cambridge Review of International Affairs
26 (1): 49–70.
Kertzer, David I. 1988. Ritual, Politics, and Power. New Haven: Yale University
Press.
Krippendorff, Klaus. 2004. Content Analysis: An Introduction to its Methodology.
London: Sage Publications.
 1 INTRODUCTION 29

Lamarck, Jean Baptiste. 1914. Zoological Philosophy: An Exposition with Regard

to the Natural History of Animals, trans. Hugh Elliot. London: Macmillan.
Lazzeri, Christian. 1995. Introduction. In L’intérêt des princes et des États de la
chrétienté, ed. Henri de Rohan. Paris: Presses Universitaires de France.
Levander, Caroline, and Walter Mignolo. 2011. Introduction: The Global South
and World Dis/order. The Global South 5 (1): 1–11.
Linklater, Andrew. 2002. Towards a Critical Historical Sociology of Transnational
Harm. In Historical Sociology of International Relations, ed. Stephen Hobden
and John Hobson, 162–180. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Linklater, Andrew. 2016a. The ‘Standard of Civilisation’ in World Politics. Social
Character, Historical Processes 5 (2).
Linklater, Andrew. 2016b. Violence and Civilization in the Western States-Systems.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
MacFarlane, Alan. 1992. Ernest Gellner and the Escape to Modernity. In Tran-
sition to Modernity, ed. John A. Hall and I.C. Jarvie, 121–136. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Mahoney, James, and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. Comparative Historical
Analysis in the Social Sciences. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Makdisi, Ussama. 2002. Ottoman Orientalism. The American Historical Review
107 (3): 768–796.
Menon, Rajan. 2016. The Conceit of Humanitarian Intervention. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Miller, Paul D. 2013. Armed State Building: Confronting State Failure, 1898–
2012. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Mitzen, Jennifer. 2013. Power in Concert: The Nineteenth-Century Origins of
Global Governance. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mohanty, Chandra Talpade. 1984. Under Western Eyes: Feminist Scholarship
and Colonial Discourses. Boundary 2 12 (3): 333–358.
Morgenthau, Hans J. 2005. Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and
Peace. Boston: McGraw Hill.
Muppidi, Himadeep. 2004. Colonial and Postcolonial Global Governance. In
Power in Global Governance, ed. Michael Barnett and Raymond Duvall, 273–
293. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Owens, Patricia. 2015. Economy of Force: Counterinsurgency and the Historic Rise
of the Social. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Patrick, Stewart. 2006. Weak States and Global Threats: Fact or Fiction? The
Washington Quarterly 29 (2): 27–53.
Patten, Alan. 1999. Hegel’s Idea of Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Quijano, Aníbal. 2000. Coloniality of Power: Eurocentrism and Latin America.
Nepantla: Views from South 1 (3): 533–580.
Rice, Susan E., and Stewart Patrick. 2008. Index of State Weakness in the
Developing World. Washington: Brookings Institution.
30 A. DELATOLLA

Rosenberg, Justin. 2010. Basic Problems in the Theory of Uneven and

Combined Development: Part II—Unevenness and Political Multiplicity.
Cambridge Review of International Affairs 23 (1): 165–189.
Rotberg, Robert I. 2004. The Failure and Collapse of Nation States: Breakdown,
Prevention, and Repair. In When States Fail: Causes and Consequences, ed.
Robert I. Rotberg, 1–50. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
Rowlinson, Michael. 2004. Historical Analysis of Company Documents. In Essen-
tial Guide to Qualitative Methods in Organizational Research, ed. Catherine
Cassell and Gilian Symon, 301–312. London: Sage Publications.
Said, Edward. 1978. Orientalism: Western Conceptions of the Orient. New York:
Pantheon.
Saouli, Adham. 2012. The Arab State: Dilemmas of Late Formation. New York:
Routledge.
Sassen, Saskia, and Aihwa Ong. 2014. Assemblage Thinking and International
Relations. In Reassembling International Theory: Assemblage Thinking and
International Relations, ed. Michelle Acuto and Simon Curtis, 17–24. New
York: Palgrave.
Scott, James C. 1998. Seeing Like a State: How Certain Schemes to Improve the
Human Condition Have Failed. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Sen, Amartya. 1999. Development as Freedom. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Sitaraman, Ganesh. 2012. The Counterinsurgent’s Constitution: Law in the Age
of Small Wars. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Stearns, Peter. 2007. The Industrial Revolution in World History. Boulder:
Westview Press.
Sunar, İlkay. 1987. State and Economy in the Ottoman Empire. In The Ottoman
Empire and the World-Economy, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, 63–87. Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press.
Tibi, Bassam. 1971. Arab Nationalism: A Critical Enquiry, ed. and trans. by
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglet. London: Macmillan Press.
Tucker, Karen. 2018. Unraveling Coloniality in International Relations: Knowl-
edge, Relationality, and Strategies for Engagement. International Political
Sociology 12 (3): 215–232.
van de Haar, Edwin. 2009. Liberalism and International Relations Theory. In
Classical Liberalism and International Relations Theory, ed. Edwin van de
Haar. New York: Palgrave Macmillan.
Wallerstein, Immanuel. 2007. World-Systems Analysis: An Introduction. Durham,
NC: Duke University Press.
Wallerstein, Immanuel, Hale Decdeli, and Resat Kasaba. 1987. The Incor-
poration of the Ottoman Empire into the World-Economy. In The
Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy, ed. Huri İslamoğlu-İnan, 88–100.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
 1 INTRODUCTION 31

Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. New York: Addison-

Wesley.
Weber, Max. 1946. Essays in Sociology, trans. H.H. Gerth and C. Wright Mills.
New York: Oxford University Press.
Weber, Max. 1997. Max Weber on the Methodology of the Social Sciences, trans.
Edward A. Shils and Henry A. Finch. New York: Free Press.
Zanger, Maggy. 2002. The US and the Kurds of Iraq: A Bitter History. Middle
East Research and Information Project, Note 104.
 CHAPTER 2

The Standards of Civilization

and the Production of Statehood

The global transformations of the nineteenth century, a result of the

Enlightenment and industrialization, led to an expansion of European
influence and hegemony. Central to this expansion was the formation of
the modern state (Vu 2010), facilitated by central governmental organi-
zation, allowing for better control of the economy and military, enabling
European global influence. Based on these developments and the related
immaterial and material advances of statehood, the European modern
state became the evidence of human social and political progress. This
provided justifications for practices of domination over polities consid-
ered less progressed, customary, traditional, or backwards. The modern
state, as a standard of civilization, became the rational ordering principle,
replacing forms of household governance that were considered traditional
(Owens 2015; Engels 2010; Thomas 2001; Mansel 2010). Its production
in the global south was viewed as necessary in order to be considered a
recognized actor, able to engage in the frameworks of international law.
Although the modern state in Europe has provided order and orga-
nization, transforming global politics from the late eighteenth century
onwards, it was not a result of conscious efforts. Yet, its conceptualiza-
tion, despite developing from happenstance histories, is often discussed
as ordinary and prevailing; a normative framing of politics that exists de
facto, and a natural or organic means to organize society. By situating the

© The Author(s), under exclusive license 33

to Springer Nature Switzerland AG 2021
A. Delatolla, Civilization and the Making of the State
in Lebanon and Syria, Middle East Today,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-57690-5_2
34 A. DELATOLLA

modern state, and its specific conceptualization emergent from European

histories of state formation, as a fact of nature or an organic development
of civilization, statehood has become a constant standard applied globally
throughout history.
This chapter discusses some of the scholarship on state formation in the
Middle East before historicizing the European modern state by exploring
discussions concerning state formation. By exploring the dynamics of
state formation in Europe, it is possible to draw connections between
these histories and the conceptualization of statehood. This chapter then
considers how these conceptualizations, tied to specific and unique histo-
ries, form the basis for the production and deployment of benchmarks
associated with statehood. From this discussion, it is then possible to
engage in the overarching critique of statehood, in its dominant framing,
as universal. The assumptions that the modern state, as it is conceptual-
ized in political science and international relations, is universal, provides
the foundation to apply it as a standard of civilization. Here, the notion
that failure to engage in knowledges and practices of statehood that mimic
the state in Europe is a result of socio-political, civilizational, and cultural
deficiencies, requiring interference and intervention, institution building,
and continued development is further explored. Referencing the discus-
sion in the introduction, this chapter continues to build the argument that
the state is produced as a standard of civilization, noting the relationship
this standard has with the post-colonial state.

Theories and Histories of State

Formation in the Middle East
The histories of state formation in the Middle East and North Africa tend
to refer to the emergence of independent and sovereign states in rela-
tion to the collapse of the Ottoman Empire and the developments of the
First World War (Halliday 2005, pp. 76, 87). For example, Adham Saouli
(2012, pp. 36–39) considers how the relative weakness of the Ottoman
Empire in relation to the European modern state system contributed
to the state formation process. Similarly, Fred Halliday (2005, p. 86)
points to the period of 1918–1939 as being crucial to internal devel-
opments of the state in the region. While these histories are important,
they need to be critically contextualized. First, by beginning the story of
state formation in the Middle East during this period, we become trapped
by a Eurocentric timeline that coincides with an international liberal
 2 THE STANDARDS OF CIVILIZATION … 35

politic that is assumed to be universal. Second, by locating the intel-

lectual starting point of state formation in relation to Ottoman decline
and European strength, assumptions of comparative weakness on a linear
scale of development and progress are reproduced.1 By questioning the
temporal process of modern state formation, tracing it to the global trans-
formations of the early nineteenth century and in the context of these
comparisons—particularly with regard to assumptions of ‘weakness’, it is
possible to reframe the Ottoman modernization period as structurally and
institutionally important for the development of modern states as being
embedded in coloniality. Whereby the Mandate project of the early twen-
tieth century can be framed as a continuation colonialism that reapplied
the civilizing project (Anghie 2002, 2006).
That is not to say that Halliday (2005), Saouli (2012), Mohammed
Ayoob (1996), and Raymond Hinnebusch (2003, 2010), have not dealt
with the historical dynamics of the Ottoman Empire and consequences of
empire and colonialism, but that their temporal and contextual focus and
engagement with the ‘state’, as a concept, is different from the framing
of this book. While Halliday (2005, pp. 86–90) focused on a gener-
alist account of state formation that placed national and institutional
developments in the interwar years as essential, Saouli (2012, pp. 9–
23) examined the state as a process that emerged from the social field.
Specifically, Saouli examines cycles of conflict, resistance, and domination
that have foregrounded the social constitution of the state as it relates to
material structure, cultural structure, political structure, and institutions.
Ayoob (1996, pp. 67–86), on the other hand, discusses the process of
state formation as developing, in parallel to modernization, in stages, and
being encumbered by contemporary political and technological contexts.
Similarly, and in reference to the scholarship on democratization, Hinneb-
usch (2010, pp. 201–214) has examined the historical sociological process
of state formation in relation to regime type, tracing the political histo-
ries of authority structures and contextualizing them within the context
of existing social structures and international positions. This builds on his
previous scholarship, where Hinnebusch (2003, pp. 73–91) considers the
consequences of imperial state-building efforts, but discusses this history
in relation to four identifiable stages, beginning in 1920 and ending in
the early 2000s.

1 Karen Barkey (2008) discusses the scholarship on the Ottoman Empire’s demise,
refuting the ‘decline narrative’ as Eurocentric.
36 A. DELATOLLA

Divergent from the above-mentioned studies, the starting point of this

book challenges the notion that the position that the Ottoman Empire
was of ‘weakness’. It critiques this position as one that emerges from
a European position that engaged in comparison under the assumption
that development and progress is linear and path-dependent. Here, weak-
ness was a characteristic that only existed in comparison to European
‘strength’. By engaging in such comparisons, civilizational hierarchies
have been reproduced, continuing to privilege a framing of European
exceptionalism and Ottoman barbarism and fanaticism. Indeed, ‘weak-
ness’ was not inherent to the Ottoman Empire, but was a constructed
comparative feature that had practical ramifications, where the Ottoman
Empire was viewed as ‘less civilized’ and unable to engage with European
states in an equal manner. As such, the Ottoman Empire was increasingly
becoming subject to an expansive European state system, one that it had
not been granted full membership to as a sovereign entity. With regard to
this system, the Ottoman Empire was not free from interference and inter-
vention and was treated as a subordinate power (Barkey 2008). Notably,
this position was upheld by coercive practices and racist ideological order-
ings of the world (Linklater 2016; Buzan and Lawson 2015; Hobson
2004; 2012; Vitalis 2015; Mitzen 2013). The subordinate position of the
Ottoman Empire in relation to European states reflected the dynamic of
nineteenth-century modern expansion: to bring societies out of the dark-
ness through the development of a rational ordering of society, by the
governance of public affairs, and the ‘exit from self-incurred immaturity’
(Immanuel Kant quoted in Deligiorgi 2002, p. 154).
While considerations of the relational position of the Ottoman
Empire are made central in this book, another point of diversion from
the argument presented here is Halliday’s focus on the acceleration of
internal state-making from 1918 to 1939. Although Halliday (2005,
p. 90) discusses the impact of colonialism and its embedded effects on the
Middle East, what Saouli (2012, pp. 36–39) examines as path-dependent
‘historical structuralism’, there is little discussion of how specific colonial
practices translated into statehood, impacting the state formation process.
For example, although Saouli remarks that ‘the Middle Eastern state was
born in an international structure not of its own choosing’ (2012, p. 37),
he further states that ‘in Lebanon, the state was established on the basis
of power distribution among the country’s sectarian communities’ and
‘became socially ingrained structures that determined and shaped the
politics of that country’. While neither of these statements are false, the
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
antecedents, know the present, and foretell the future—must
meditate these things, and have two special objects in view with
regard to diseases, namely, to do good or to do no harm. The art
consists in three things—the disease, the patient, and the physician.
The physician is the servant of the art, and the patient must combat
the disease along with the physician.[636]
6. Pains about the head and neck, and heaviness of the same
along with pain, occur either without fevers or in fevers. Convulsions
occurring in persons attacked with frenzy, and having vomitings of
verdigris-green bile, in some cases quickly prove fatal. In ardent
fevers, and in those other fevers in which there is pain of the neck,
heaviness of the temples, mistiness about the eyes, and distention
about the hypochondriac region, not unattended with pain,
hemorrhage from the nose takes place,[637] but those who have
heaviness of the whole head, cardialgia and nausea, vomit bilious
and pituitous matters; children, in such affections, are generally
attacked with convulsions, and women have these and also pains of
the uterus; whereas, in elder persons, and those in whom the heat is
already more subdued, these cases end in paralysis, mania, and
loss of sight.
Third Constitution.

7. In Thasus, a little before and during the season of Arcturus,

[638] there were frequent and great rains, with northerly winds. About
the equinox, and till the setting of the Pleiades, there were a few
southerly rains: the winter northerly and parched, cold, with great
winds and snow. Great storms about the equinox, the spring
northerly, dryness, rains few and cold. About the summer solstice,
scanty rains, and great cold until near the season of the Dog-star.
[639] After the Dog-days, until the season of Arcturus, the summer
hot, great droughts, not in intervals, but continued and severe: no
rain; the Etesian winds blew; about the season of Arcturus southerly
rains until the equinox.
8. In this state of things, during winter, paraplegia set in, and
attacked many, and some died speedily; and otherwise the disease
prevailed much in an epidemical form, but persons remained free
from all other diseases.[640] Early in the spring, ardent fevers
commenced and continued through the summer until the equinox.
Those then that were attacked immediately after the commencement
of the spring and summer, for the most part recovered, and but few
of them died. But when the autumn and the rains had set in, they
were of a fatal character, and the greater part then died.[641] When in
these attacks of ardent fevers there was a proper and copious
hemorrhage from the nose, they were generally saved by it, and I do
not know a single person who had a proper hemorrhage who died in
this constitution. Philiscus, Epaminon, and Silenus, indeed, who had
a trifling epistaxis on the fourth and fifth day, died.[642] The most of
those seized with the disease had a rigor about the time of the crisis,
and especially those who had no hemorrhage; these had also the
rigor associated. Some were attacked with jaundice on the sixth day,
[643] but these were benefited either by an urinary purgation, or a
disorder of the bowels, or a copious hemorrhage, as in the case of
Heraclides, who was lodged with Aristocydes: this person, though he
had the hemorrhage from the nose, the purgation by the bladder,
and disorder of the bowels, experienced a favorable crisis on the
twentieth day, not like the servant of Phanagoras, who had none of
these symptoms, and died. The hemorrhages attacked most
persons, but especially young persons and those in the prime of life,
and the greater part of those who had not the hemorrhage died:[644]
elderly persons had jaundice or disorder of the bowels, such as Bion,
who was lodged with Silenus. Dysenteries were epidemical during
the summer, and some of those cases in which the hemorrhage
occurred, terminated in dysentery, as happened to the slave of
Eraton, and to Mullus, who had a copious hemorrhage, which settled
down into dysentery, and they recovered. This humor was redundant
in many cases, since in those who had not the hemorrhage about
the crisis, but the risings about the ears disappeared, after their
disappearance there was a sense of weight in the left flank
extending to the extremity of the hip, and pain setting in after the
crisis, with a discharge of thin urine; they began to have small
hemorrhages about the twenty-fourth day, and the swelling was
converted into the hemorrhage. In the case of Antiphon, the son of
Critobulus, the fever ceased and came to a crisis about the fortieth
day. Many women were attacked, but fewer than of the men, and
there were fewer deaths among them. But most of them had difficult
parturition, and after labor they were taken ill, and these most
especially died, as, for example, the daughter of Telebolus died on
the sixth day after delivery.[645] Most females had the menstrual
discharge during the fever, and many girls had it then for the first
time: in certain individuals both the hemorrhage from the nose and
the menses appeared; thus, in the case of the virgin daughter of
Dætharses, the menses then took place for the first time, and she
had also a copious hemorrhage from the nose, and I knew no
instance of any one dying when one or other of these took place
properly. But all those in the pregnant state that were attacked had
abortions, as far as I observed. The urine in most cases was of the
proper color, but thin, and having scanty sediments:[646] in most the
bowels were disordered with thin and bilious dejections; and many,
after passing through the other crises, terminated in dysenteries, as
happened to Xenophanes and Critias. The urine was watery,
copious, clear, and thin; and even after the crises, when the
sediment was natural, and all the other critical symptoms were
favorable, as I recollect having happened to Bion, who was lodged in
the house of Silenus, and Critias, who lived with Xenophanes, the
slave of Areton, and the wife of Mnesistratus. But afterwards all
these were attacked with dysentery. It would be worth while to
inquire whether the watery urine was the cause of this.[647] About the
season of Arcturus many had the crisis on the eleventh day, and in
them the regular relapses did not take place, but they became
comatose about this time, especially children; but there were fewest
deaths of all among them.
9. About the equinox, and until the season of the Pleiades, and at
the approach of winter, many ardent fevers set in; but great numbers
at that season were seized with phrenitis, and many died;[648] a few
cases also occurred during the summer. These then made their
attack at the commencement of ardent fevers, which were attended
with fatal symptoms; for immediately upon their setting in, there were
acute fever and small rigors, insomnolency, aberration, thirst,
nausea, insignificant sweats about the forehead and clavicles, but no
general perspiration; they had much delirious talking, fears,
despondency, great coldness of the extremities, in the feet, but more
especially in their hands: the paroxysms were on the even days; and
in most cases, on the fourth day, the most violent pains set in, with
sweats, generally coldish, and the extremities could not be warmed,
but were livid and rather cold, and they had then no thirst; in them
the urine was black, scanty, thin, and the bowels were constipated;
there was an hemorrhage from the nose in no case in which these
symptoms occurred, but merely a trifling epistaxis; and none of them
had a relapse, but they died on the sixth day with sweats.[649] In the
phrenitic cases, all the symptoms which have been described did not
occur, but in them the disease mostly came to a crisis on the
eleventh day, and in some on the twentieth. In those cases in which
the phrenitis did not begin immediately, but about the third or fourth
day, the disease was moderate at the commencement, but assumed
a violent character about the seventh day. There was a great number
of diseases, and of those affected, they who died were principally
infants, young persons, adults having smooth bodies, white skins,
straight and black hair, dark eyes, those living recklessly and
luxuriously; persons with shrill, or rough voices, who stammered and
were passionate, and women more especially died from this form. In
this constitution, four symptoms in particular proved salutary; either a
hemorrhage from the nose, or a copious discharge by the bladder of
urine, having an abundant and proper sediment, or a bilious disorder
of the bowels at the proper time, or an attack of dysentery.[650] And
in many cases it happened, that the crisis did not take place by any
one of the symptoms which have been mentioned, but the patient
passed through most of them, and appeared to be in an
uncomfortable way, and yet all who were attacked with these
symptoms recovered. All the symptoms which I have described
occurred also to women and girls; and whoever of them had any of
these symptoms in a favorable manner, or the menses appeared
abundantly, were saved thereby, and had a crisis, so that I do not
know a single female who had any of these favorably that died. But
the daughter of Philo, who had a copious hemorrhage from the nose,
and took supper unseasonably on the seventh day, died. In those
cases of acute, and more especially of ardent fevers, in which there
is an involuntary discharge of tears, you may expect a hemorrhage
from the nose, unless the other symptoms be of a fatal character, for
in those of a bad description, they do not indicate a hemorrhage, but
death. Swellings about the ears, with pain in fevers, sometimes
when the fever went off critically, neither subsided nor were
converted into pus; in these cases a bilious diarrhœa, or dysentery,
or thick urine having a sediment, carried off the disease, as
happened to Hermippus of Clazomenæ. The circumstances relating
to crises, as far as we can recognize them, were so far similar and
so far dissimilar. Thus two brothers became ill at the same hour (they
were brothers of Epigenes, and lodged near the theatre), of these
the elder had a crisis on the sixth day, and the younger on the
seventh, and both had a relapse at the same hour; it then left them
for five days, and from the return of the fever both had a crisis
together on the seventeenth day. Most had a crisis on the sixth day;
it then left them for six days, and from the relapse there was a crisis
on the fifth day.[651] But those who had a crisis on the seventh day,
had an intermission for seven days; and the crisis took place on the
third day after the relapse. Those who had a crisis on the sixth day,
after an interval of six days were seized again on the third, and
having left them for one day, the fever attacked them again on the
next and came to a crisis, as happened to Evagon the son of
Dætharses. Those in whom the crisis happened on the sixth day,
had an intermission of seven days, and from the relapse there was a
crisis on the fourth, as happened to the daughter of Aglaïdas. The
greater part of those who were taken ill under this constitution of
things, were affected in this manner, and I did not know a single case
of recovery, in which there was not a relapse agreeably to the stated
order of relapses; and all those recovered in which the relapses took
place according to this form: nor did I know a single instance of
those who then passed through the disease in this manner who had
another relapse. In these diseases death generally happened on the
sixth day, as happened to Epaminondas, Silenus, and Philiscus the
son of Antagoras. Those who had parotid swellings experienced a
crisis on the twentieth day, but in all these cases the disease went off
without coming to a suppuration, and was turned upon the bladder.
But in Cratistonax, who lived by the temple of Hercules, and in the
maid servant of Scymnus the fuller, it turned to a suppuration, and
they died. Those who had a crisis on the seventh day, had an
intermission of nine days, and a relapse which came to a crisis on
the fourth day from the return of the fever, as was the case with
Pantacles, who resided close by the temple of Bacchus. Those who
had a crisis on the seventh day, after an interval of six days had a
relapse, from which they had a crisis on the seventh day, as
happened to Phanocritus, who was lodged with Gnathon the painter.
During the winter, about the winter solstices, and until the equinox,
the ardent fevers and frenzies prevailed, and many died. The crisis,
however, changed, and happened to the greater number on the fifth
day from the commencement, left them for four days and relapsed;
and after the return, there was a crisis on the fifth day, making in all
fourteen days. The crisis took place thus in the case of most
children, also in elder persons. Some had a crisis on the eleventh
day, a relapse on the fourteenth, a complete crisis on the twentieth;
but certain persons, who had a rigor about the twentieth, had a crisis
on the fortieth. The greater part had a rigor along with the original
crisis, and these had also a rigor about the crisis in the relapse.
There were fewest cases of rigor in the spring, more in summer, still
more in autumn, but by far the most in winter; then hemorrhages
ceased.
Sec. III.

10. With regard to diseases, the circumstances from which we

form a judgment of them are,—by attending to the general nature of
all, and the peculiar nature of each individual,—to the disease, the
patient, and the applications,—to the person who applies them, as
that makes a difference for better or for worse,—to the whole
constitution of the season, and particularly to the state of the
heavens, and the nature of each country;—to the patient’s habits,
regimen, and pursuits;—to his conversation, manners, taciturnity,
thoughts, sleep, or absence of sleep, and sometimes his dreams,
what and when they occur;—to his picking and scratching;[652]—to
his tears;—to the alvine discharges, urine, sputa, and vomitings; and
to the changes of diseases from the one into the other;—to the
deposits, whether of a deadly or critical character;—to the sweat,
coldness, rigor, cough, sneezing, hiccup, respiration, eructation,
flatulence, whether passed silently or with a noise;—to hemorrhages
and hemorrhoids;—from these, and their consequences, we must
form our judgment.[653]
11. Fevers are,—the continual, some of which hold during the
day and have a remission at night, and others hold during the night
and have a remission during the day;[654] semitertians, tertians,
quartans, quintans, septans, nonans. The most acute, strongest,
most dangerous, and fatal diseases, occur in the continual fever. The
least dangerous of all, and the mildest and most protracted, is the
quartan, for it is not only such from itself, but it also carries off other
great diseases.[655] In what is called the semitertian, other acute
diseases are apt to occur, and it is the most fatal of all others, and
moreover phthisical persons, and those laboring under other
protracted diseases, are apt to be attacked by it.[656] The nocturnal
fever is not very fatal, but protracted; the diurnal is still more
protracted, and in some cases passes into phthisis. The septan is
protracted, but not fatal; the nonan more protracted, and not fatal.
The true tertian comes quickly to a crisis, and is not fatal; but the
quintan is the worst of all, for it proves fatal when it precedes an
attack of phthisis, and when it supervenes on persons who are
already consumptive.[657] There are peculiar modes, and
constitutions, and paroxysms, in every one of these fevers; for
example,—the continual, in some cases at the very commencement,
grows, as it were, and attains its full strength, and rises to its most
dangerous pitch, but is diminished about and at the crisis; in others it
begins gentle and suppressed, but gains ground and is exacerbated
every day, and bursts forth with all its heat about and at the crisis;
while in others, again, it commences mildly, increases, and is
exacerbated until it reaches its acmé, and then remits until at and
about the crisis.[658] These varieties occur in every fever, and in
every disease. From these observations one must regulate the
regimen accordingly. There are many other important symptoms
allied to these, part of which have been already noticed, and part will
be described afterwards, from a consideration of which one may
judge, and decide in each case, whether the disease be acute, and
whether it will end in death or recovery; or whether it will be
protracted, and will end in death or recovery; and in what cases food
is to be given, and in what not; and when and to what amount, and
what particular kind of food is to be administered.
12. Those diseases which have their paroxysms on even days
have their crises on even days; and those which have their
paroxysms on uneven days have their crises on uneven days. The
first period of those which have the crisis on even days, is the 4th,
6th, 8th, 10th, 14th, 20th, 30th, 40th, 60th, 80th, 100th; and the first
period of those which have their crises on uneven days, is the let,
3d, 5th, 7th, 9th, 11th, 17th, 21st, 27th, 31st. It should be known, that
if the crisis take place on any other day than on those described, it
indicates that there will be a relapse, which may prove fatal. But one
ought to pay attention, and know in these seasons what crises will
lead to recovery and what to death, or to changes for the better or
the worse. Irregular fevers, quartans, quintans, septans, and nonans
should be studied, in order to find out in what periods their crises
take place.

13. Fourteen Cases of Disease.[659]

Case I.—Philiscus, who lived by the Wall, took to bed on the first
day of acute fever; he sweated; towards night was uneasy. On the
second day all the symptoms were exacerbated; late in the evening
had a proper stool from a small clyster; the night quiet. On the third
day, early in the morning and until noon, he appeared to be free from
fever; towards evening, acute fever, with sweating, thirst, tongue
parched; passed black urine; night uncomfortable, no sleep; he was
delirious on all subjects. On the fourth, all the symptoms
exacerbated, urine black; night more comfortable, urine of a better
color. On the fifth, about mid-day, had a slight trickling of pure blood
from the nose; urine varied in character, having floating in it round
bodies, resembling semen, and scattered, but which did not fall to
the bottom; a suppository having been applied, some scanty flatulent
matters were passed; night uncomfortable, little sleep, talking
incoherently; extremities altogether cold, and could not be warmed;
urine black; slept a little towards day; loss of speech, cold sweats;
extremities livid; about the middle of the sixth day he died. The
respiration throughout, like that of a person recollecting himself, was
rare, and large, and spleen was swelled upon in a round tumor, the
sweats cold throughout, the paroxysms on the even days.[660]
Case II.—Silenus lived on the Broad-way, near the house of
Evalcidas. From fatigue, drinking, and unseasonable exercises, he
was seized with fever. He began with having pain in the loins; he had
heaviness of the head, and there was stiffness of the neck. On the
first day the alvine discharges were bilious, unmixed, frothy, high
colored, and copious; urine black, having a black sediment; he was
thirsty, tongue dry; no sleep at night. On the second, acute fever,
stools more copious, thinner, frothy; urine black, an uncomfortable
night, slight delirium. On the third, all the symptoms exacerbated; an
oblong distention, of a softish nature, from both sides of the
hypochondrium to the navel; stools thin, and darkish; urine muddy,
and darkish; no sleep at night; much talking, laughter, singing, he
could not restrain himself. On the fourth, in the same state. On the
fifth, stools bilious, unmixed, smooth, greasy; urine thin, and
transparent; slight absence of delirium. On the sixth, slight
perspiration about the head; extremities cold and livid; much tossing
about; no passage from the bowels, urine suppressed, acute fever.
On the seventh, loss of speech; extremities could no longer be kept
warm; no discharge of urine. On the eighth, a cold sweat all over; red
rashes with sweat, of a round figure, small, like vari, persistent, not
subsiding; by means of a slight stimulus, a copious discharge from
the bowels, of a thin and undigested character, with pain; urine acrid,
and passed with pain; extremities slightly heated; sleep slight, and
comatose; speechless; urine thin, and transparent. On the ninth, in
the same state. On the tenth, no drink taken; comatose, sleep slight;
alvine discharges the same; urine abundant, and thickish; when
allowed to stand, the sediment farinaceous and white; extremities
again cold. On the eleventh, he died. At the commencement, and
throughout, the respiration was slow and large; there was a constant
throbbing in the hypochondrium; his age was about twenty.[661]
Case III.—Herophon was seized with an acute fever; alvine
discharges at first were scanty, and attended with tenesmus; but
afterwards they were passed of a thin, bilious character, and
frequent; there was no sleep; urine black, and thin. On the fifth, in
the morning, deafness; all the symptoms exacerbated; spleen
swollen; distention of the hypochondrium; alvine discharges scanty,
and black; he became delirious. On the sixth, delirious; at night,
sweating, coldness; the delirium continued. On the seventh, he
became cold, thirsty, was disordered in mind; at night recovered his
senses; slept. On the eighth, was feverish; the spleen diminished in
size; quite collected; had pain at first about the groin, on the same
side as the spleen; had pains in both legs; night comfortable; urine
better colored, had a scanty sediment. On the ninth, sweated; the
crisis took place; fever remitted. On the fifth day afterwards, fever
relapsed, spleen immediately became swollen; acute fever; deafness
again. On the third day after the relapse, the spleen diminished;
deafness less; legs painful; sweated during the night; crisis took
place on the seventeenth day; had no disorder of the senses during
the relapse.[662]
Case IV.—In Thasus, the wife of Philinus, having been delivered
of a daughter, the lochial discharge being natural, and other matters
going on mildly, on the fourteenth day after delivery was seized with
fever, attended with rigor; was pained at first in the cardiac region of
the stomach and right hypochondrium; pain in the genital organs;
lochial discharge ceased. Upon the application of a pessary all these
symptoms were alleviated; pains of the head, neck, and loins
remained; no sleep; extremities cold; thirst; bowels in a hot state;
stools scanty; urine thin, and colorless at first. On the sixth, towards
night, senses much disordered, but again were restored. On the
seventh, thirsty; the evacuations bilious, and high colored. On the
eighth, had a rigor; acute fever; much spasm, with pain; talked much,
incoherently; upon the application of a suppository, rose to stool, and
passed copious dejections, with a bilious flux; no sleep. On the ninth,
spasms. On the tenth, slightly recollected. On the eleventh, slept;
had perfect recollection, but again immediately wandered; passed a
large quantity of urine with spasms, (the attendants seldom putting
her in mind,) it was thick, white, like urine which has been shaken
after it has stood for a considerable time until it has subsided, but it
had no sediment; in color and consistence, the urine resembled that
of cattle, as far as I observed. About the fourteenth day, startings
over the whole body; talked much; slightly collected, but presently
became again delirious. About the seventeenth day became
speechless, on the twentieth died.[663]
Case V.—The wife of Epicrates, who was lodged at the house of
Archigetes, being near the term of delivery, was seized with a violent
rigor, and, as was said, she did not become heated;[664] next day the
same. On the third, she was delivered of a daughter, and everything
went on properly. On the day following her delivery, she was seized
with acute fever, pain in the cardiac region of the stomach, and in the
genital parts. Having had a suppository, was in so far relieved; pain
in the head, neck, and loins; no sleep; alvine discharges scanty,
bilious, thin, and unmixed; urine thin, and blackish. Towards the night
of the sixth day from the time she was seized with the fever, became
delirious. On the seventh, all the symptoms exacerbated;
insomnolency, delirium, thirst; stools bilious, and high colored. On
the eighth, had a rigor; slept more. On the ninth, the same. On the
tenth, her limbs painfully affected; pain again of the cardiac region of
the stomach; heaviness of the head; no delirium; slept more; bowels
constipated. On the eleventh, passed urine of a better color, and
having an abundant sediment; felt lighter. On the fourteenth had a
rigor; acute fever. On the fifteenth, had a copious vomiting of bilious
and yellow matters; sweated; fever gone; at night acute fever; urine
thick, sediment white.[665] On the seventeenth, an exacerbation;
night uncomfortable; no sleep; delirium. On the eighteenth, thirsty;
tongue parched; no sleep; much delirium; legs painfully affected.
About the twentieth, in the morning, had a slight rigor; was
comatose; slept tranquilly; had slight vomiting of bilious and black
matters; towards night deafness. About the twenty-first, weight
generally in the left side, with pain; slight cough; urine thick, muddy,
and reddish; when allowed to stand, had no sediment; in other
respects felt lighter; fever not gone; fauces painful from the
commencement, and red; uvula retracted; defluxion remained acrid,
pungent, and saltish throughout. About the twenty-seventh, free of
fever; sediment in the urine; pain in the side. About the thirty-first,
was attacked with fever, bilious diarrhœa; slight bilious vomiting on
the fortieth. Had a complete crisis, and was freed from the fever on
the eightieth day.[666]
Case VI.—Cleonactides, who was lodged above the Temple of
Hercules, was seized with a fever in an irregular form; was pained in
the head and left side from the commencement, and had other pains
resembling those produced by fatigue: paroxysms of the fevers
inconstant and irregular; occasional sweats; the paroxysms generally
attacked on the critical days. About the twenty-fourth was cold in the
extremities of the hands, vomitings bilious, yellow, and frequent,
soon turning to a verdigris-green color; general relief. About the
thirtieth, began to have hemorrhage from both nostrils, and this
continued in an irregular manner until near the crisis; did not loathe
food, and had no thirst throughout, nor was troubled with
insomnolency; urine thin, and not devoid of color. When about the
thirtieth day, passed reddish urine, having a copious red sediment;
was relieved, but afterwards the characters of the urine varied,
sometimes having sediment, and sometimes not. On the sixtieth, the
sediment in the urine copious, white, and smooth; all the symptoms
ameliorated; intermission of the fever; urine thin, and well colored.
On the seventieth, fever gone for ten days. On the eightieth had a
rigor, was seized with acute fever, sweated much; a red, smooth
sediment in the urine; and a perfect crisis.[667]
Case VII.—Meton was seized with fever; there was a painful
weight in the loins. Next day, after drinking water pretty copiously,
had proper evacuations from the bowels. On the third, heaviness of
the head, stools thin, bilious, and reddish. On the fourth, all the
symptoms exacerbated; had twice a scanty trickling of blood from
the right nostril; passed an uncomfortable night; alvine discharges
like those on the third day; urine darkish, had a darkish cloud floating
in it, of a scattered form, which did not subside. On the fifth, a
copious hemorrhage of pure blood from the left nostril; he sweated,
and had a crisis. After the fever restless, and had some delirium;
urine thin, and darkish; had an affusion of warm water on the head;
slept and recovered his senses. In this case there was no relapse,
but there were frequent hemorrhages after the crisis.[668]
Case VIII.—Erasinus, who lived near the Canal of Bootes, was
seized with fever after supper; passed the night in an agitated state.
During the first day quiet, but in pain at night. On the second,
symptoms all exacerbated; at night delirious. On the third, was in a
painful condition; great incoherence. On the fourth, in a most
uncomfortable state; had no sound sleep at night, but dreaming and
talking; then all the appearances worse, of a formidable and
alarming character; fear, impatience. On the morning of the fifth, was
composed, and quite coherent, but long before noon was furiously
mad, so that he could not constrain himself; extremities cold, and
somewhat livid; urine without sediment; died about sunset. The fever
in this case was accompanied by sweats throughout; the
hypochondria were in a state of meteorism, with distention and pain;
the urine was black, had round substances floating in it, which did
not subside; the alvine evacuations were not stopped; thirst
throughout not great; much spasms with sweats about the time of
death.[669]
Case IX.—Criton, in Thasus, while still on foot, and going about,
was seized with a violent pain in the great toe; he took to bed the
same day, had rigors and nausea, recovered his heat slightly, at
night was delirious. On the second, swelling of the whole foot, and
about the ankle erythema, with distention, and small bullæ
(phlyctænæ); acute fever; he became furiously deranged; alvine
discharges bilious, unmixed, and rather frequent. He died on the
second day from the commencement.[670]
Case X.—The Clazomenian who was lodged by the Well of
Phrynichides was seized with fever. He had pain in the head, neck,
and loins from the beginning, and immediately afterwards deafness;
no sleep, acute fever, hypochondria elevated with a swelling, but not
much distention; tongue dry. On the fourth, towards night, he
became delirious. On the fifth, in an uneasy state. On the sixth, all
the symptoms exacerbated. About the eleventh a slight remission;
from the commencement to the fourteenth day the alvine discharges
thin, copious, and of the color of water, but were well supported; the
bowels then became constipated. Urine throughout thin, and well
colored, and had many substances scattered through it, but no
sediment. About the sixteenth, urine somewhat thicker, which had a
slight sediment; somewhat better, and more collected. On the
seventeenth, urine again thin; swellings about both his ears, with
pain; no sleep, some incoherence; legs painfully affected. On the
twentieth, free of fever, had a crisis, no sweat, perfectly collected.
About the twenty-seventh, violent pain of the right hip; it speedily
went off. The swellings about the ears subsided, and did not
suppurate, but were painful. About the thirty-first, a diarrhœa,
attended with a copious discharge of watery matter, and symptoms
of dysentery; passed thick urine; swellings about the ears gone.
About the fortieth day, had pain in the right eye, sight dull. It went
away.[671]
Case XI.—The wife of Dromeades having been delivered of a
female child, and all other matters going on properly, on the second
day after was seized with rigor and acute fever. Began to have pain
about the hypochondrium on the first day; had nausea and
incoherence, and for some hours afterwards had no sleep;
respiration rare, large, and suddenly interrupted. On the day
following that on which she had the rigor, alvine discharges proper;
urine thick, white, muddy, like urine which has been shaken after
standing for some time, until the sediment had fallen to the bottom; it
had no sediment; she did not sleep during the night. On the third
day, about noon, had a rigor, acute fever; urine the same; pain of the
hypochondria, nausea, an uncomfortable night, no sleep; a coldish
sweat all over, but heat quickly restored. On the fourth, slight
allevation of the symptoms about the hypochondria; heaviness of the
head, with pain; somewhat comatose; slight epistaxis, tongue dry,
thirst, urine thin and oily; slept a little, upon awaking was somewhat
comatose; slight coldness, slept during the night, was delirious. On
the morning of the sixth had a rigor, but soon recovered her heat,
sweated all over; extremities cold, was delirious, respiration rare and
large. Shortly afterwards spasms from the head began, and she
immediately expired.[672]
Case XII.—A man, in a heated state, took supper, and drank
more than enough; he vomited the whole during the night; acute
fever, pain of the right hypochondrium, a softish inflammation from
the inner part; passed an uncomfortable night; urine at the
commencement thick, red, but when allowed to stand, had no
sediment, tongue dry, and not very thirsty. On the fourth, acute fever,
pains all over. On the fifth, urine smooth, oily, and copious; acute
fever. On the sixth, in the evening, very incoherent, no sleep during
the night. On the seventh, all the symptoms exacerbated; urine of
the same characters; much talking, and he could not contain himself;
the bowels being stimulated, passed a watery discharge with
lumbrici: night equally painful. In the morning had a rigor; acute
fever, hot sweat, appeared to be free of fever; did not sleep long;
after the sleep a chill, ptyalism; in the evening, great incoherence;
after a little, vomited a small quantity of dark bilious matters. On the
ninth, coldness, much delirium, did not sleep. On the tenth, pains in
the limbs, all the symptoms exacerbated; he was delirious. On the
eleventh, he died.[673]
Case XIII.—A woman, who lodged on the Quay, being three
months gone with child, was seized with fever, and immediately
began to have pains in the loins. On the third day, pain of the head
and neck, extending to the clavicle, and right hand; she immediately
lost the power of speech; was paralyzed in the right hand, with
spasms, after the manner of paraplegia; was quite incoherent;
passed an uncomfortable night; did not sleep; disorder of the bowels,
attended with bilious, unmixed, and scanty stools. On the fourth,
recovered the use of her tongue; spasms of the same parts, and
general pains remained; swelling in the hypochondrium,
accompanied with pain; did not sleep, was quite incoherent; bowels
disordered, urine thin, and not of a good color. On the fifth, acute
fever; pain of the hypochondrium, quite incoherent; alvine
evacuations bilious; towards night had a sweat, and was freed from
the fever. On the sixth, recovered her reason; was every way
relieved; the pain remained about the left clavicle; was thirsty, urine
thin, had no sleep. On the seventh trembling, slight coma, some
incoherence, pains about the clavicle and left arm remained; in all
other respects was alleviated; quite coherent. For three days
remained free from fever. On the eleventh, had a relapse, with rigor
and fever. About the fourteenth day, vomited pretty abundantly
bilious and yellow matters, had a sweat, the fever went off, by
coming to a crisis.[674]
Case XIV.—Melidia, who lodged near the Temple of Juno, began
to feel a violent pain of the head, neck, and chest. She was
straightway seized with acute fever; a slight appearance of the
menses; continued pains of all these parts. On the sixth, was
affected with coma, nausea, and rigor; redness about the cheeks;
slight delirium. On the seventh, had a sweat; the fever intermitted,
the pains remained. A relapse; little sleep; urine throughout of a good
color, but thin; the alvine evacuations were thin, bilious, acrid, very
scanty, black, and fetid; a white, smooth sediment in the urine; had a
sweat, and experienced a perfect crisis on the eleventh day.[675]
 BOOK III.—OF THE EPIDEMICS.

THE ARGUMENT.

Though in the Argument prefixed to the First Book of the

Epidemics I have given a pretty full summary of the contents both of
that book and the third, I have still a few observations to make on
some important points, which were not sufficiently considered on that
occasion; and this I do the more readily, as it will afford me an
opportunity of noticing a subject on which M. Littré has bestowed
very extensive research. I allude to the origin of the Glandular
Plague. As I make it a rule, in giving these my annotations, not to
enter into any lengthy details, I shall now state, in a very succinct
manner, the result of my inquiries. The reader is referred, for a fuller
discussion of the subject, to the more ample disquisitions of M. Littré.
[676]

The opinion has been pretty generally maintained by modern

authorities, that the first description which we have of the glandular
plague of the East is that given by the historian Procopius, in the
sixth century; and the inference drawn therefrom is that the disease
was unknown until his time. This opinion is still held, to a certain
extent, by Hecker, Rosenbaum, Pariset, Nauman, and others of the
most distinguished scholars of the day, but it appears to be
untenable after the discovery of the “Fragment” of Ruffus, published
by Mai, Rome, 1831. As the passage is very important, I shall give a
translation of it in this place. It is as follows: “The buboes called
pestilential are most fatal and acute, especially those which are seen
occurring about Libya, Egypt, and Syria, and which are mentioned by
Dionysius Curtus. Dioscorides and Posidonius make much mention
of them in the plague which occurred in their time in Libya; they say
it was accompanied by acute fever, pain, and prostration of the
whole body, delirium, and the appearance of large and hard buboes,
which did not suppurate, not only in the accustomed parts, but also
in the groins and armpits.” The only thing which detracts from the
value of this paragraph is the difficulty of determining exactly who the
authorities are which are referred to in it. Of Dionysius Curtus
nothing is known; indeed it is more than probable, that there is some
mistake in this name. There are several medical authors of the name
of Dioscorides and Posidonius, and it is difficult to determine to
which of them reference is here made. Still, however, there seems to
be no reason for questioning the authenticity of the passage. Ruffus,
I may add, is generally admitted to have flourished in the reign of
Trajan.[677]
To this important document let me join an interesting extract from
Galen’s work “On Fevers.” Galen, treating professedly of Pestilential
Fevers, which he maintains are all connected with a tendency to
putridity, expresses himself as follows: “Moreover, as Hippocrates
says, all fevers from buboes are bad, with the exception of
ephemerals; although the bubo is also of the class of phlegmons.
And I agree in so far with what is said of putrefaction, for this is the
cause of the fever in inflammations, and not as Erasistratus
supposed.[678] But yet there are certain fevers from buboes of the
class of ephemerals, as certain others proclaim them to be; diseases
difficult to cure, which derive their origin from an inflammation, an
ulcer, an abscess, or some other such affection in a viscus. But the
ephemeral fevers from buboes differ from those connected with
putrefactions, either in a certain viscus, or in the hollow and very
large vessels, that in those from buboes, which always impart their
heat to the surrounding parts, the heat is communicated to the heart,
and the putrefactive fume does not reach it, but remains
circumscribed in the seat of the bubo, and the heat reaching the
heart solely by a change in the connecting parts, in like manner as in
those exposed to excessive heat and fatigue, the diffusion of the
heat takes place from the parts first warmed to the source of vitality;
but in a putrefaction about the viscera and large vessels, a fume, as
it were, from the putrefying humors reaches the cavities of the heart,
etc.”[679] From these two passages alone, without taking into
account several others of less importance, which might be gathered
from other medical authorities,[680] it must be quite obvious that the
glandular plague was known, at all events, in the second century of
the Christian era. Moreover it is equally clear, that Galen did not look
upon it as a new disease, but considered that it was noticed in the
works of Hippocrates. To my mind, then, there can be no doubt that
the pestilence which prevailed during the Peloponnesian war partook
of the nature of the glandular plague. What has tended to create
doubts on this subject, in the minds of many learned men, is the
omission of any distinct mention of buboes in the graphic description
of it given by Thucydides. But it should always be taken into account
that Thucydides was not a professional man, and therefore there is a
strong presumption that his acquaintance with the disease, even
although, as he states, he himself had experienced an attack of it,
must have been altogether of a general nature. Indeed Galen, both
in the treatise from which I have quoted above and in many other
parts of his works, does not hesitate to declare, that the historian
describes the disease as a common, that is to say, a non-
professional man, whereas Hippocrates gives its characters as a
physician. It is also to be borne in mind, that the description of it
given by Thucydides applies to it only at its outbreak in the city of
Athens, and it is a well-known characteristic of pestilential epidemics
that they change very much during their progress. This character of
them was well illustrated in the Plague of Aleppo, so admirably
described by Dr. Russel; for although the glandular form of the
disease prevailed in a large number of cases, a considerable
proportion of them were unaffected with buboes. Indeed it appears to
me to be too much the practice for the profession, as well as the
public, to imagine to themselves a certain type or ideal of every
disease, and when they do not recognize the exact characters which
they fancy it should present, they immediately set down such cases
as constituting an entirely different disease. This is an error that is
constantly committed, and one which I believe to be at the bottom of
the discordant opinions which prevail among professional men, on
the subject of the glandular plague. It would be well for the physician
to bear in mind how many varieties of symptoms the fever
designated as Typhus puts on,—some with the rash reckoned
peculiar to this fever, and some without it,—some with petechiæ, and
miliary eruptions, and others without them; and many other
complications of symptoms, which are sometimes present and
sometimes not.
 With regard to the hypothesis lately advanced by Mr. Theod.
Krause,[681] and in so far countenanced by M. Littré, that the plague
of Athens was an epidemical variola, I must say that I can see no
probability in this supposition; for that a disease so strongly marked
as smallpox should have prevailed in ancient times, and yet not be
distinctly noticed by the Greek and Roman writers on medicine, I
cannot conceive, more especially when we call to recollection the
very accurate descriptions which they have left us of other
cutaneous diseases, by no means attended with symptoms of so
obvious a nature. Indeed it appears to me most wonderful, that such
an opinion should have been entertained by any person at all
acquainted with the Arabic writers on medicine, who described most
distinctly both the plague and the smallpox. Not to lose ourselves
amidst a host of authorities, I would refer the reader, in particular, to
Avicenna, iv., 1, 4, where the two diseases are treated of most
distinctly, so that I cannot entertain a doubt that the Arabian
physicians considered them to be essentially different.
In a considerable number of the cases reported in this book,
there are affixed to them in the original certain characters, the
interpretation of which the reader will find given in the translation. It
will be necessary, then, to give the reader some account of the origin
of these characters, regarding which our sole authority is Galen,
who, in his Commentaries on this book, enters on the question in his
usual elegant and attractive style. He admits that he derived his
information principally from Zeuxis, one of his predecessors in the
office of commenting upon the works of Hippocrates. (See § 2, of the
Preliminary Discourse.) It appears that Ptolemy Philadelphus was so
zealous in his search for books to adorn his library, in Alexandria,
that he gave instructions to the masters of ships going on distant
voyages to collect all the books they could procure, and bring them
back with them; that he ordered copies to be taken of books brought
to him in this way, and kept the originals, but returned the copies,
along with large sums of money, in certain cases, to those who had
lent them to him; and that the works so obtained were preserved in a
separate department of the library, with the inscription, “The Books of
the Ships.” Among these was found a copy of the Third Book of the