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COMPANION TO FEMINIST STUDIES
Companion
to Feminist
Studies
EDITED BY
NANCY A. NAPLES
This edition first published 2021
© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd

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Library of Congress Cataloging‐in‐Publication Data

Name: Naples, Nancy A., editor.

Title: Companion to feminist studies / edited by Nancy A. Naples.
Description: Hoboken, NJ: Wiley‐Blackwell, 2021. | Includes index.
Identifiers: LCCN 2020026504 (print) | LCCN 2020026505 (ebook) | ISBN
9781119314943 (cloth) | ISBN 9781119314950 (adobe pdf) | ISBN
9781119314929 (epub)
Subjects: LCSH: Women’s studies.
Classification: LCC HQ1180.C656 2021 (print) | LCC HQ1180 (ebook) | DDC
305.4–dc23
LC record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020026504
LC ebook record available at https://lccn.loc.gov/2020026505

Cover Design: Wiley

Cover Image: © Liyao Xie/Getty Images

Set in 10/12.5pt Sabon by SPi Global, Pondicherry, India

10 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1
 Contents

About the Editors vii

Notes on Contributors ix
Acknowledgments xvii

PART I INTRODUCTION 1
1 Feminist Studies as a Site of Critical Knowledge
Production and Praxis 3
Nancy A. Naples

PART II FEMINIST EPISTEMOLOGY AND

ITS DISCONTENTS 13
2 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 15
Sheila Greene
3 Marxist and Socialist Feminisms 35
Elisabeth Armstrong
4 Radical and Cultural Feminisms 53
Lauren Rosewarne
5 Materialist Feminisms 73
Bronwyn Winter
6 Black Feminism and Womanism 91
Rose M. Brewer
7 Intersectionality as Critical Inquiry 105
Patricia Hill Collins
8 Queer, Trans, and Transfeminist Theories 129
Ute Bettray
9 Postcolonial Feminism 155
Umme Al‐wazedi
vi Contents
10 Feminisms in Comparative Perspective 175
Anne Sisson Runyan, Rina Verma Williams,
Anwar Mhajne and Crystal Whetstone
11 Transnational Feminisms 193
Gul Aldikacti Marshall

PART III METHODOLOGICAL DIVERSITY 211

12 Feminist Methodologies 213
Cynthia Deitch
13 Feminist Empiricism 231
Gina Marie Longo
14 Feminist Science Studies 247
Samantha M. Archer and A.E. Kohler
15 Feminist Economics 265
Valeria Esquivel
16 Feminist Ethnography 281
Dána‐Ain Davis and Christa Craven
17 Feminist Historiography 301
Ariella Rotramel
18 Feminism, Gender, and, Popular Culture 321
Diane Grossman

PART IV FEMINIST PRAXIS 339

19 Feminist Pedagogy 341
Danielle M. Currier
20 Feminist Praxis and Globalization 357
Manisha Desai and Koyel Khan
21 Feminism and Somatic Praxis 373
Gill Wright Miller
22 Feminist Health Movements 393
Meredeth Turshen and Marci Berger
23 Feminist Praxis and Gender Violence 411
Claire M. Renzetti and Margaret Campe
24 Feminist Political Ecologies in Latin American Context 427
Astrid Ulloa
25 Feminism and Social Justice Movements 447
Molli Spalter

Index 469
 About the Editors

Editor

Nancy A. Naples is Board of Trustees Distinguished Professor of Sociology and

Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies. She served as president of the Society for
the Study of Social Problems, Sociologists for Women in Society, and the Eastern
Sociological Society. Her publications include over fifty book chapters and journal
articles in a wide array of interdisciplinary and sociological journals. She is author
of Grassroots Warriors: Community Work, Activist Mothering and the War on
Poverty and Feminism and Method: Ethnography, Discourse Analysis, and Activist
Research. She is editor of Community Activism and Feminist Politics: Organizing
Across Race, Class, and Gender; and co‐editor of Border Politics: Social Movements,
Collective Identities, and Globalization; Teaching Feminist Praxis; Women’s Activism
and Globalization: Linking Local Struggles and Transnational Politics; and The
Sexuality of Migration: Border Crossings and Mexican Immigrant Men by Lionel
Cantú. She is series editor for Praxis: Theory in Action published by SUNY Press and
Editor‐in‐Chief of the five‐volume Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender and
Sexuality Studies. Her awards include the 2015 Jessie Bernard Award for distin-
guished contributions to women and gender studies from the American Sociological
Association and the 2014 Lee Founders Award from the Society for the Study of
Social Problems. She also received the 2010 Distinguished Feminist Lecturer Award
and the 2011 Feminist Mentor Award from Sociologists for Women in Society, and
the University of Connecticut’s College of Liberal Arts and Sciences’ 2011 Excellence
in Research for the Social Sciences and Alumni Association’s 2008 Faculty Excellence
Award in Research. She is currently working on a book on sexual citizenship.

Managing Editor

Cristina Khan is a lecturer in the Department of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality

Studies at Stony Brook University. She received her PhD from the Department of
Sociology at the University of Connecticut in 2019 with a certificate in Feminist
viii About the Editors
Studies. Her specializations include race, ethnicity, embodiment, sexualities, and
qualitative research methods. Her dissertation, “Undoing Borders: A Feminist
Exploration of Erotic Performance by Lesbian Women of Color,” draws on two
years of ethnographic fieldwork and 40 in‐depth interviews with a collective of les-
bian exotic dancers, uncovering how race and sexuality, together, shape women’s
potential to enact agency over the conditions of their participation in exotic dance.
Her research on “Constructing Eroticized Latinidad: Negotiating Profitability in the
Stripping Industry” has been published in Gender & Society. She is also co‐author of
Race and Sexuality (Polity Press, 2018). Her research experience includes serving as
a consultant on diversity and equity initiatives at the New York City Department of
Education, and as a research assistant on cochlear implant usage and experience
amongst families, under the supervision of Dr. Laura Mauldin.
 Notes on Contributors

Umme Al‐wazedi is Associate Professor of Postcolonial Literature in the Department

of English and Division Chair of Language and Literature at Augustana College,
Rock Island, Illinois. Her research interest encompasses women writers of South
Asia and the South Asian Diaspora, postcolonial and Muslim feminism, and postco-
lonial disability studies. She has published in South Asian Review and South Asian
History and Culture and has also written several book chapters. She coedited a spe-
cial issue of South Asian Review titled “Nation and Its Discontents” and a book
titled Postcolonial Urban Outcasts: City Margins in South Asian Literature
(Routledge, 2017) with Madhurima Chakraborty of Columbia College Chicago,
Illinois.
Samantha M. Archer received her BA and MA from The University of Texas at
Austin and is currently a PhD student in the Department of Anthropology at the
University of Connecticut. She is a biocultural anthropologist and anthropological
geneticist whose work merges the study of contemporary and ancient human DNA
with critical queer, feminist, indigenous, and Black science studies. Her article,
“Bisexual Science,” cowritten with lab mate and colleague Dr. Rick W.A. Smith, was
published in American Anthropologist (2019).
Elisabeth Armstrong is a Professor in the Program for the Study of Women and
Gender at Smith College. She has published two books, Gender and Neoliberalism:
The All India Democratic Women’s Association and Globalization Politics
(Routledge, 2013) and The Retreat from Organization: US Feminism Reconceptualized
(SUNY Press, 2002).
Marci Berger, PhD, is an Assistant Professor at the Edward J. Bloustein School of
Planning and Public Policy, Rutgers, the State University of New Jersey. Her areas of
interest include public health, health policy, public policy and sexual and reproduc-
tive health policy.
Ute Bettray currently teaches (trans)feminisms and (trans)gender studies at Humboldt
University in Berlin, Germany where is preparing to write her Habilitation titled
Literary Female Sexology, 1849–1899. She is also currently preparing an article
x Notes on Contributors
titled “A Transfeminist Reading of Hannah Arendt’s The Life of the Mind (1978) via
Newest German Literature.” Prior to teaching at Humboldt University, Dr. Bettray
held an appointment as Visiting Assistant Professor of German at Lafayette College
where she also taught courses such as Introduction to Women’s and Gender Studies
and Transfeminisms in the Women’s and Gender Studies Program. Before coming to
Lafayette College, Dr. Bettray had worked as a Visiting Assistant Professor of German
and Gender Studies at Swarthmore College. She is in the process of publishing two
book manuscripts located at the intersections of transfeminism and transnational
transfeminism and German Studies. These manuscripts are entitled When Black
Feminist Thought Meets Transfeminism: The Works of Angela Y. Davis and Audre
Lorde, and Toward a Transnational Transfeminism via Germanic Sexology and
Psychoanalysis. Among her latest publications is a book chapter titled “Making the
Case for Transfeminism: The Activist Philosophies of CeCe McDonald and Angela
Davis” included in an anthology on Embodied Difference (Jamie A. Thomas and
Christina Jackson [eds.], Lexington Books, 2018).
Rose M. Brewer, PhD, is an activist scholar and The Morse Alumni Distinguished
Teaching Professor and past chairperson of the Department of African American &
African Studies, University of Minnesota‐Twin Cities. Brewer publishes extensively
on Black feminism, political economy, social movements, race, class, gender, and
social change. Her current book project examines the impact of late capitalism on
Black life in the US. Brewer has held the Sociologist for Women in Society Feminist
Lectureship in Social Change, a Wiepking Distinguished Visiting Professorship at
Miami University of Ohio, and was a 2013 Visiting Scholar in the Social Justice
Initiative, University of Illinois‐Chicago.
Margaret Campe, PhD, is the Director of the Jean Nidetch Women’s Center at the
University of Nevada, Las Vegas. Her research focuses on college campus sexual
assault and the experiences of marginalized populations, domestic violence pro-
gramming, and research methods. Margaret published an article in the Journal of
Interpersonal Violence, entitled, “College Campus Sexual Assault and Students with
Disabilities” (2019) and is editing a forthcoming textbook, Substance Use and
Family Violence, with coeditors Dr. Carrie Oser, and Dr. Kathi Harp (Cognella, antic-
ipated 2021). She is also coauthoring a chapter examining mixed methods and
quasi‐experimental designs, for The Routledge Handbook of Domestic Violence and
Abuse, with Dr. Diane Follingstad and Dr. Claire M. Renzetti.
Patricia Hill Collins is a social theorist whose research and scholarship have exam-
ined issues of race, gender, social class, sexuality and/or nation. Her first book, Black
Feminist Thought: Knowledge, Consciousness, and the Politics of Empowerment
(Routledge), published in 1990, with a revised tenth anniversary edition published in
2000, won the Jessie Bernard Award of the American Sociological Association (ASA)
for significant scholarship in gender, and the C. Wright Mills Award of the Society
for the Study of Social Problems. Her second book, Race, Class, and Gender 10th ed.
(2019), edited with Margaret Andersen, is widely used in undergraduate classrooms
in over 200 colleges and universities. Black Sexual Politics: African Americans,
Gender, and the New Racism (Routledge, 2004) received ASA’s 2007 Distinguished
Publication Award. Her other books include Fighting Words: Black Women and the
Search for Justice (University of Minnesota Press, 1998); From Black Power to Hip
 Notes on Contributors xi
Hop: Racism, Nationalism, and Feminism (Temple University Press, 2005); Another
Kind of Public Education: Race, Schools, the Media and Democratic Possibilities
(Beacon Press, 2009); the Handbook of Race and Ethnic Studies, edited with John
Solomos (Sage, 2010); and On Intellectual Activism (Temple University Press, 2012).
In 2008, she became the 100th President of the American Sociological Association,
the first African‐American woman elected to this position in the organization’s
104‐year history. Professor Collins also holds an appointment as the Charles Phelps
Taft Emeritus Professor of Sociology within the Department of African American
Studies at the University of Cincinnati.
Christa Craven is the Dean for Faculty Development and a Professor of Anthropology
and Women’s, Gender & Sexuality Studies (Chair from 2012 to 2017) at the College
of Wooster. Her research interests include reproductive health and reproductive
justice, lesbian/gay/bi/trans/queer reproduction, midwifery activism, feminist eth-
nography and activist scholarship, and feminist pedagogy. She is the author of
Reproductive Losses: Challenges to LGBTQ Family‐Making (Routledge, 2019),
Pushing for Midwives: Homebirth Mothers and the Reproductive Rights Movement
(Temple University Press, 2010) and a textbook with Dána‐Ain Davis, Feminist
Ethnography: Thinking Through Methodologies, Challenges and Possibilities
(Rowman & Littlefield, 2016). Her professional website is: http://discover.wooster.
edu/ccraven.
Danielle M. Currier is an Associate Professor and Chair of Sociology, Coordinator
of Gender Studies, and Director of the Summer Research Program at Randolph
College. Her teaching foci are gender, sexuality, family, qualitative methods, and
social theory. Her research foci are hookups among college students, violence against
women, and gender and sport. She is coauthor of “The Social Construction of
Women’s Interests in the 2014 and 2010 Midterms” in Political Communication &
Strategy: Consequences of the 2014 Midterm Elections (2017). She is author of
“Strategic Ambiguity: How the Vagueness of the Term ‘Hookup’ Protects and
Perpetuates Hegemonic Masculinity and Emphasized Femininity” in Gender &
Society (2013) and “Creating Attitudinal Change Through Teaching: How a Course
on ‘Women and Violence’ Changes Students’ Attitudes About Violence Against
Women” in Journal of Interpersonal Violence (2009).
Dána‐Ain Davis is Director of the Center for the Study of Women and Society and is
on the faculty in the PhD program in anthropology and critical psychology at the
Graduate Center, City University of New York. She is also Professor of Urban Studies
at Queens College. Her work is concerned with how people live policy, inequality,
and racism. Her research topics include neoliberalism, poverty, reproduction, domes-
tic violence, and HIV/AIDS. She is the author of Reproductive Injustice: Racism,
Pregnancy, and Premature Birth (NYU Press, 2019); coauthor, with Christa Craven,
of Feminist Ethnography: Thinking Through Methodologies, Challenges and
Possibilities (Rowman & Littlefield, 2016); coeditor, with Shaka McGlotten, of
Black Genders and Sexualities (Palgrave Macmillan, 2012); contributing author to
Beyond Reproduction: Women’s Health, Activism, and Public Policy by Karen Baird
with Kimberly Christensen (Fairleigh Dickinson University Press, 2009); and the
author of Battered Black Women and Welfare Reform: Between a Rock and a Hard
Place (SUNY Press, 2006).
xii Notes on Contributors
Cynthia Deitch is an Associate Professor of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality
Studies; of Sociology; and of Public Policy & Public Administration at the George
Washington University. She received a PhD in Sociology from the University of
Massachusetts at Amherst. She has been teaching a graduate seminar in feminist
methodologies for several decades. She has published research on gender and vari-
ous public policies, on gender and race in the labor market, and on workplace
sexual harassment.
Manisha Desai is Head of the Sociology Department and Professor of Sociology and
Asian and Asian American Studies at the University of Connecticut. Her research
and teaching areas include gender and globalization, transnational feminisms, and
contemporary Indian society. Among her recent publications are Subaltern
Movements in India: The Gendered Geography of Struggles Against Neoliberal
Development in India (Routledge, 2016) and, with Rachel Rinaldo, guest editor of
the special issue of Qualitative Sociology on “Gender and Globalization.”
Valeria Esquivel is Senior Employment Policies and Gender Officer at the International
Labour Office, based in Geneva. Before joining the United Nations in 2014, Valeria
developed a long academic career as feminist economist, publishing extensively on
labor, and macroeconomic and social policies. She coedited Gender & Development’s
issue devoted to the Sustainable Development Goals (Vol. 24, No. 1, 2016) and is the
editor of the collective volume La Economía Feminista desde América Latina: Una
hoja de ruta sobre los debates actuales en la región (ONU Mujeres, Santo Domingo,
2012). Her latest publications have focused primarily on care policies and care‐
workers. She coauthored the reports Innovations in Care: New Concepts, New
Actors, New Policies (Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2017) and Care work and care jobs
for the future of decent work (ILO, 2018). Her current research focuses on the inter-
sections of gender, employment, and macroeconomics.
Sheila Greene is a Fellow Emerita at Trinity College Dublin (TCD), Ireland, and
former AIB Professor of Childhood Research. She is a cofounder of the TCD Centre
for Gender and Women’s Studies and cofounder and former Director of the Children’s
Research Centre. Currently she is a Pro‐Chancellor of the University of Dublin. Her
primary interest is in developmental psychology and her publications include The
Psychological Development of Girls and Women (Routledge, 2003/2015),
Researching Children’s Experience (Greene and Hogan, Sage, 2005), Key Thinkers in
Childhood Studies (Smith and Greene, Policy Press, 2015), and Children as Agents
in Their Worlds (Greene and Nixon, Routledge, 2020).
Diane Grossman received her BA from Vassar College and her PhD in Philosophy
from New York University, where she was an Ida Parker Bowne Scholar. She is
Professor of Women’s and Gender Studies and Philosophy at Simmons University
and Director of the Honors Program. Dr. Grossman has served Simmons as Chair of
both departments, as Director of Academic Advising, and as Associate Dean and
Dean of the College of Arts and Sciences. She is the author of Existentialism and the
Philosophical Tradition, Looking at Gay and Lesbian Life, and numerous articles
and essays on ethics, feminist theory, and cultural studies. In addition, she is part
of a cross‐disciplinary research team that studies girls’ and women’s perceived
 Notes on Contributors xiii
confidence; the team has published several articles on that subject. Her areas of spe-
cialization are continental philosophy, feminist theory, and applied ethics.
Koyel Khan received her doctorate from the Department of Sociology at the
University of Connecticut. She is Assistant Professor of Sociology at Tennessee
Wesleyan University. Her research areas are neoliberal globalization, nationalism,
gender, and culture.
A. E. Kohler is a medical anthropologist and critical disability studies scholar who
focuses on the phenomenological dimensions of intellectual disability as they inter-
sect with systems of health and social inequities.
Gina Marie Longo is an Assistant Professor at Virginia Commonwealth University
in the Sociology Department. She specializes in the sociology of gender, race and
ethnicity, immigration, and digital sociology. Her research focuses on how U.S. citi-
zens negotiate immigration official’s demands that they prove their marriages are
authentic to obtain their foreign-national spouses’ green card.
Gul Aldikacti Marshall is the Chairperson and a Professor in the Department of
Sociology at the University of Louisville. Her research interests are in the areas of
gender, social movements, politics, and the media. She is the author of the book,
Shaping Gender Policy in Turkey: Grassroots Women Activists, and the European
Union. Her work has been published in edited volumes and numerous scholarly
journals, such as Gender & Society and Social Politics.
Anwar Mhajne is an Assistant Professor at Stonehill College. She is a political scien-
tist specializing in international relations and comparative politics with a focus on
gender and politics. Her current research is at the intersection of gender, religion, and
Middle Eastern politics. Dr. Mhajne focuses on how Islamic beliefs and institutions
in the Middle East structure Muslim women’s political understandings, agencies, and
opportunities at local, national, and international levels. Due to her political science
and interdisciplinary training in gender politics, international relations, and com-
parative politics, Dr. Mhajne’s research strengths lie in the following areas: feminist
international relations and security studies; democratization; governance and insti-
tutions; civil society and activism; political Islam; Middle East; gender politics; social
movements; and regime change.
Gill Wright Miller, Professor of Dance and Women’s Studies, Denison University,
researches the connection between somatic awareness and meaning‐making through
both large‐scale embodied events and individual somatic explorations. Her embod-
ied work involves opportunities to practice new patterns to shift mere “physical
experiences” to full‐bodied “somatic activism.” She is the author/editor of many
articles on somatics and academia and the text Exploring Body–Mind Centering: An
Anthology of Experience and Method (North Atlantic Books, 2011). More recently,
she was invited to speak about practice‐based research for Cultivating Equity &
Access Across Difference: Dance Education for All in 2017; invited to speak and
conduct workshops on the intersection of Body–Mind CenteringTM, Somatics, and
Women’s and Gender Studies for Encontro International de Prácticas Somáticas e
Dança: Campus Brasília of Instituto Federal de Brasília in Brasilia, Brasil in 2018;
xiv Notes on Contributors
and was a featured presenter for “Be(Com)ing the Change We Seek” at Somatische
Akademie in Berlin, Germany in 2019.
Nancy A. Naples
See “About the Editors.”
Claire M. Renzetti, PhD, is the Judi Conway Patton Endowed Chair for Studies of
Violence Against Women, and Professor and Chair of Sociology, at the University of
Kentucky. For more than 30 years, her work has focused on the violent victimization
experiences of socially and economically marginalized women and girls. In addition
to editing the “Gender and Justice” book series for University of California Press, she
is editor of the international and interdisciplinary journal Violence Against Women,
and coeditor of the “Interpersonal Violence” book series for Oxford University Press.
She has written or edited 26 books as well as numerous book chapters and journal
articles based on her own research, which currently includes an evaluation of a thera-
peutic horticulture program at a battered women’s shelter and studies that explore
religiosity and religious self‐regulation as protective and risk factors for intimate part-
ner violence perpetration. Her scholarship and activism on behalf of abused and
exploited women and girls has received national recognition with various awards
from professional organizations, service agencies, and community groups.
Lauren Rosewarne is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Social and Political
Sciences at the University of Melbourne, Australia. Lauren is a political scientist
specializing in gender, sexuality, and the media. She is the author of 11 books as
well as many articles, chapters, and commentary pieces. For more information:
www.laurenrosewarne.com.
Ariella Rotramel is the Vandana Shiva Assistant Professor of Gender, Sexuality, and
Intersectionality Studies at Connecticut College, and received a PhD in Women’s and
Gender Studies from Rutgers University. Rotramel’s research encompasses social
movements, labor organizing, and queer and sexuality studies. Rotramel’s book,
Pushing Back: Women of Color–Led Grassroots Activism in New York City, exam-
ines women of color‐led organizing in contemporary New York City around issues
of housing, the environment, and labor.
Anne Sisson Runyan, PhD in International Relations, Professor of Political Science,
and Affiliate Faculty and former Head of Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies at
the University of Cincinnati, is among the progenitors of and eminent scholars in the
field of feminist world politics. Her authored, coauthored, and coedited books
include Global Gender Politics (Routledge), Global Gender Issues (Westview Press),
Gender and Global Restructuring (Routledge; third edition in progress), and Feminist
(Im)Mobilities in Fortress(ing) North America (Ashgate, 2013). She is currently writ-
ing a book on gendered nuclear colonialism and recently guest edited and contrib-
uted an article on this subject to a special issue of the International Feminist Journal
of Politics, for which she served as an associate editor, on “Decolonizing Knowledges
in Feminist World Politics.” Other recent publications have appeared in Critical
Studies on Security, Critical Studies on Terrorism, Review of International Studies,
and handbooks on gender and security and gender and international relations. She
coordinates the Political Science doctoral concentration in Feminist Comparative
 Notes on Contributors xv
and International Politics at the University of Cincinnati and is Vice President and on
the Executive Board of the Committee on the Status of Women of the International
Studies Association.

Molli Spalter is a PhD candidate in Literary and Cultural Studies at Wayne State
University where she serves as the managing editor for Criticism: A Quarterly for
Literature and the Arts. Her research interests include contemporary women’s litera-
ture, affect theory, and feminist social movements.

Meredeth Turshen is a Professor Emerita in the Edward J. Bloustein School of

Planning and Public Policy at Rutgers University. Her research interests include
international health and she specializes in public health policy. She has written four
books: The Political Ecology of Disease in Tanzania (1984), The Politics of Public
Health (1989), and Privatizing Health Services in Africa (1999), all published by
Rutgers University Press, and Women’s Health Movements: A Global Force for
Change (2007; second edition 2019) published by Palgrave Macmillan. She has
edited six other books: Women and Health in Africa (Africa World Press, 1991),
Women’s Lives and Public Policy: The International Experience (Greenwood, 1993),
What Women Do in Wartime: Gender and Conflict in Africa (Zed Books, 1998),
which was translated into French (L’Harmattan, 2001), African Women’s Health
(Africa World Press, 2000), The Aftermath: Women in Postconflict Transformation
(Zed Books, 2002), and African Women: A Political Economy (Palgrave Macmillan,
2010). She has served on the boards of the Association of Concerned Africa Scholars,
the Committee for Health in Southern Africa, and the Review of African Political
Economy, and is on the editorial board of the Journal of Public Health Policy.

Astrid Ulloa, PhD in Anthropology, Full Professor of Geography at the Universidad

Nacional de Colombia. Her main research interests include indigenous movements,
indigenous autonomy, indigenous feminisms, gender, climate change, territoriality,
extractivisms, and feminist political ecology. She is the author of The Ecological
Native: Indigenous Peoples’ Movements and Eco‐Governmentality in Colombia
(2005–2013). Her recent book chapters include: “Indigenous Knowledge Regarding
Climate in Colombia: Articulations and Complementarities Among Different
Knowledges” (2020), “Reconfiguring Climate Change Adaptation Policy: Indigenous
Peoples’ Strategies and Policies for Managing Environmental Transformations in
Colombia” (2018), “Feminisms, Genders and Indigenous Women in Latin America”
(2018), “La confrontation d’un citoyen zero carbone déterritorialisé au sein d’une
nature carbonée locale‐mondiale” (2018). Her recent articles include. “The Rights
Of The Wayúu People And Water In The Context Of Mining In La Guajira, Colombia:
Demands Of Relational Water Justice” (2020), “Gender and Feminist Geography in
Colombia” (2019), “Perspectives of Environmental Justice from Indigenous Peoples
of Latin America: A Relational Indigenous Environmental Justice” (2017),
“Geopolitics of Carbonized Nature and the Zero Carbon Citizen” (2017). Her cur-
rent research is about gender and mining, and territorial feminisms in Latin America.

Crystal Whetstone, PhD, is an Assistant Professor of Political Science at Sam Houston

State University. Her dissertation examined the role political motherhood plays
in Global South women’s peace movements and women’s postconflict political
xvi Notes on Contributors
representation. Her work has been published in the International Feminist Journal
of Politics (IFJP), Third World Quarterly, and The Conversation.
Rina Verma Williams (PhD Harvard; BA and BS University of California at Irvine) is
Associate Professor of Political Science at the University of Cincinnati, where she is
also Affiliate Faculty in Asian Studies and Women’s, Gender and Sexuality Studies.
Her research and teaching interests include comparative Indian and South Asian
politics; religion, law and nationalism; and gender and identity politics. She is the
author of Postcolonial Politics and Personal Laws: Colonial Legal Legacies and the
Indian State (Oxford University Press, 2006). Her current research focuses on wom-
en’s participation in religious nationalist political parties in Indian democracy.
Bronwyn Winter is Professor of Transnational Studies at the University of Sydney.
Her publications include September 11, 2001: Feminist Perspectives (coedited with
Susan Hawthorne, Spinifex Press, 2002); Hijab and the Republic: Uncovering the
French Headscarf Debate (Syracuse University Press, 2008); and Women, Insecurity
and Violence in a Post‐9/11 World (Syracuse University Press, 2017). Her most recent
publications include the coedited Global Perspectives on Same‐Sex Marriage (with
Maxime Forest and Réjane Sénac, Palgrave, 2018), and Reform, Revolution and
Crisis in Europe (with Cat Moir, Routledge, 2019), and she is a contributing advi-
sory editor of the Wiley Blackwell Encyclopedia of Gender and Sexuality Studies
(2016).
 Acknowledgments

I am grateful to all the authors, reviewers, and editors who have made this ambitious
interdisciplinary volume possible. The authors bring a wide range of expertise from
different academic training and activist backgrounds to their chapters with a com-
mitment to sharing their visions and knowledge of the diverse topics and themes that
shape the Companion to Feminist Studies. Many of my colleagues in Women’s,
Gender, and Sexuality Studies at the University of Connecticut and other academic
sites around the world have generously supported the project in the important role
of anonymous reviewer, often providing a quick turnaround to facilitate the demand-
ing production deadlines. I am grateful for their extremely insightful reviews and
their understanding of the international and interdisciplinary goals of the Companion.
Special thanks to Shweta M. Adur, Françoise Dussart, Michele Eggers Barison,
Vrshali Patil, and Barbara Sutton for sharing their expertise on various chapters. J.
Michael Ryan also graciously offered his editorial and academic knowledge when-
ever asked and without hesitation. I would also like to thank the Wiley Blackwell
editorial and production team Navami Rajunath, Umme Al-Wazedi, Charlie Hamlyn,
and Justin Vaughan – for their commitment and dedication to this project. Thanks
also go to copy-editor Katherine Carr. My appreciation to M.J. Taylor who assisted
at the very early and crucial stage of identification and outreach to authors and
organization of manuscripts. Managing Editor Cristina Khan was an extremely val-
uable collaborator who has assisted in reviewing and editing all the chapters as well
as co‐authoring a chapter in this volume to advance the coverage of important topics
in the Companion. Cristina signed on as Managing Editor at the early stages, not
expecting, I suspect, all that this would entail. She was able to see it through to com-
pletion even as she started a new position in Women’s, Gender, and Sexuality Studies
at Stoney Brook University in New York. I could not have done this massive editorial
project without her.
 Part I
Introduction
 1
Feminist Studies as a Site of Critical
Knowledge Production and Praxis
Nancy A. Naples

Introduction

Feminist Studies is an expression of the theoretical and interdisciplinary underpin-

nings of women’s and gender studies. It is a diverse and ever‐changing field that is
contoured by the intersecting goals of understanding and theorizing the ways that
social life is organized by complex “relations of ruling” that shape social institutions
and “everyday life” (Smith 1989), and how individuals and communities organize for
social justice and social change. These are manifest within social, political, cultural,
and economic institutions, social media, and everyday interactions. The presence and
expression of Feminist Studies varies within disciplines and interdisciplines and across
regions, as demonstrated by the authors of the 24 chapters in this Companion.
While feminist studies has a long history, it became institutionalized in academia
beginning in the 1970s, through courses offered in different disciplines like English,
History, Sociology, or Anthropology. These efforts contributed to cross‐disciplinary
advocacy for the establishment of Women’s Studies programs where faculty designed
interdisciplinary courses in response to the deepening intellectual project. In the US,
Feminist Studies has found an institutional foothold in some universities as a stand‐
alone program or department. The Feminist Studies Program at the University of
California, Santa Cruz was founded in 2013. They describe their mission as “challeng-
ing existing disciplinary boundaries and fostering a reconsideration of the relation-
ships between knowledge, power, and expertise” (https://feministstudies.ucsc.edu/
graduate). It is now a department that trains students for academic careers as well as
for public policy and human rights advocacy and research. In describing its graduate
education in Feminist Studies, it notes that:

The roots of Feminist Studies lie in the study of women’s experiences and a critique of
their neglect in knowledge production. But the name “Feminist Studies” reflects the fact
that the subject matter includes more than women: research and teaching focus on the

Companion to Feminist Studies, First Edition. Edited by Nancy A. Naples.

© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2021 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
4 Nancy A. Naples
ways that relations of gender, intersecting with race, class, ethnicity, sexuality, nationality,
age, religion, ability, and other categories of difference, are embedded in social, political,
and cultural formations. Feminist Studies encompasses teaching and research interests
in men and masculinities and sexualities, as well as women.
(Feminist Studies n.d., UCSB)

Graduate training in Feminist Studies draws on diverse critical epistemologies and

interdisciplinary approaches. For example, the University of Washington’s Graduate
Program in Feminist Studies centers “Intersectional, Decolonial, Indigenous, Queer
and Transnational feminisms” and encourages “research informed by Black Studies,
Latina/o Studies, Asian American Studies, Latin America, East Asia and South Asia
Studies and the disciplines including Anthropology, Cultural Studies, History,
Political Science, Psychology and Sociology” (https://gwss.washington.edu/feminist‐
studies‐doctoral‐program).
The US has a strong emphasis on undergraduate training, while in other coun-
tries, the focus has been primarily on graduate education (see Tambe and Montague
in Companion to Women’s and Gender Studies, 2020). Furthermore, as Tambe and
Montague note, feminists in other countries have had different relationships with the
state. For example, feminist perspectives have been more effectively integrated in
state governance structures than in the US. For example, in Australia, feminist activ-
ists were able to incorporate their activism into the state as “femocrats” where they
engaged with policy construction and implementation across different arenas,
including applying a feminist framework to review of the general state budget
(Eisenstein 1989; Mazur 2001; Watson 1990). While their influence has waned over
the years (Outshoorn and Kantola 2007), feminist activists have found footholds in
other countries where, for example, they have succeeded in passing statutes for
greater representation of women in both elected and other governmental positions
in France, Pacific Islands, the UK, Scandinavia, and countries in Latin America and
Africa, among others (see, for example, Arendt 2018; Baker 2019; Barnes and
Córdova 2016; Dahlerup and Freidenvall 2005; Hughes et al. 2017; Johnson Ross
2019; Opello 2006).
Since the field of Feminist Studies draws insights from feminist scholars and activ-
ists from many different disciplinary and interdisciplinary sites and diverse local,
national, and regional contexts, it is challenging, to say the least, to ensure all voices,
perspectives, and contributions are represented. Our solution is to focus attention on
many of these contributions by organizing the Companion to Feminist Studies
around three different dimensions that are key components of the field and tran-
scend these differences: Feminist Epistemologies and Its Discontents, Methodological
Diversity, and Feminist Praxis.

The Diversity of Epistemologies, Methodologies, and Feminist Praxis

Part II, entitled “Feminist Epistemologies and Its Discontents,” presents 10 different
theoretical frameworks that have diverse historical and political origin stories and
investments. It opens with an examination of gender essentialism, one of the most
persistent approaches to the analysis of gender and sexual differences (Chapter 2).
 FEMINIST STUDIES AS A SITE OF CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND PRAXIS 5
Author Sheila Greene begins with a discussion of Graeco‐Roman arguments about
essential differences between women and men that positions men as superior by
nature to women. Women’s reproductive capacity has often been the basis for her
construction as closer to “nature,” while men’s presume greater intellectual capacity
positions them as creators of culture and academic advancement. Greene traces the
continuity of this framing over time and how it continues to be “deeply embedded in
Western scholarship.” For example, contemporary biologically determinist
approaches center the significance of genes, hormones, and brain differences in con-
tributing to essentialist gender differences. Feminists have challenged these reductive
approaches and point out the interaction of biological and other social, cultural, and
environmental factors in shaping human diversity (see, e.g. Davis 2015; Fausto‐
Sterling 2000; Keller and Longino 1996; Udry 2001).
In Chapter 3, Elisabeth Armstrong examines the development and divergence
between Marxist and Socialist Feminism. Marxist feminism was articulated in the
late 1960s and early 1970s by feminists who adapted Karl Marx’s analysis of capi-
talism to incorporate the significance of women’s unpaid labor in the home for sup-
porting the economic exploitation of workers. Socialist feminism quickly followed
as feminists engaged with analysis of patriarchy as a separate system of exploitation.
Chapter 4 provides a fascinating discussion of the origins and debates in “Radical
and Cultural Feminisms.” Lauren Rosewarne examines the activism of radical femi-
nists and radical feminist theoretical analyses from the late 1960s. She notes that one
major tenet of radical feminism is that “women are subordinated … [as] an oppressed
class; a sex‐class … caused by patriarchy.” She explains that “radical feminism aimed
to dismantle not only patriarchy but each of the social, cultural, political, and eco-
nomic structures that benefited from – and supported – male authority.” As noted
above, feminists informed by both radical analyses of patriarchy and Marxist cri-
tiques of capitalism were in the forefront of developing socialist feminism.
Rosewarne outlines key tenets and critiques of radical feminism, then moves to
discuss the difference between radical and cultural feminism. She defines cultural
feminism as:

a theory which describes that there are fundamental personality differences between
men and women, and that women’s differences are special … Underlying this cultural
feminist theory was a matriarchal vision – the idea of a society of strong women guided
by essential female concerns and values. These included, most importantly, pacifism,
co‐operation, non‐violent settlement of differences, and a harmonious regulation of
public life.
(Tandon 2008, p. 52)

While radical feminism orients toward separatism and the elimination of the sex‐class
system, “cultural feminism was a countercultural movement aimed at reversing the
cultural valuation of the male and the devaluation of the female” (Echols 1989, p. 6,
quoted in Rosenwarne in this volume). Alice Echols argues that “radical feminists were
typically social constructionists who wanted to render gender irrelevant, while cultural
feminists were generally essentialists who sought to celebrate femaleness” (ibid).
In Chapter 5, Bronwyn Winter describes three different approaches to materialist
feminism, which builds on Marxist feminism in different ways. They are each
6 Nancy A. Naples
associated with different geographic constellations of academic knowledge: French
materialist feminism, British materialist feminism, and US materialist feminism. As
she explains, “Gender, and the relationship of male domination that underpins it, are
historically constructed and grounded in social relations, and are thus not fixed, but
open to interrogation and change.” They all center “the material (social, economic),
structural and ideological rather than (only) discursive or cultural underpinnings of
these social relations.”
In Chapter 6, Rose M. Brewer highlights the significant theoretical and activist
insights of Black feminist and Womanist epistemologies. She notes that these inter-
related formulations have a long history that, in the US context, dates back to at least
the nineteenth century. Both approaches center Black women’s experiences and
social justice. Womanist thought foregrounds and features Black culture and spiritu-
ality. Black feminist thought marks the significance of the positionality of the social
actor in reflecting on how the social and political world shapes individual and social
experiences.
In Chapter 7, Patricia Hill Collins expands on the contributions of Black feminist
thought and critical race theory in her discussion of intersectional theory which
emphasizes the ways in which gender, class, and race intersect to shape different
women’s experiences and the social structures that them. Collins is one of the key
theorists whose analysis of Black feminist thought (1990) was foundational for
articulating intersectional theory and analysis. In Chapter 7, she presents the theo-
retical perceptions and social activism that informs intersectionality including a clear
explication of legal scholar Kimberlé Crenshaw’s founding formulation of the con-
cept by offering “a shortcut that built on existing sensibilities in order to see inter-
connections” between gender and race. It also offers a framework for deepening
analysis to incorporate sexuality, class, and other dimensions of difference and power
inequality. Collins (2019) argues that given the importance of intersectional episte-
mology, it should become a central framing within contemporary “critical social
theory that keeps critical analysis and social action in play” (p. 3).
Chapter 8 explores the significance of the contributions to feminist epistemolo-
gies of “Queer, Trans and Transfeminist Theories.” Author Ute Bettray discusses the
diverse origins and key premises of these interrelated approaches that theorize the
fluidity of gender and sexuality, and challenge the binary and heteronormative
approaches of other feminist frameworks. She concludes by discussing the ways in
which transfeminism decouples feminine gender and female sex. She also emphasizes
the significance of notions of queer space and time and deconstructive modes of
queering “as a critical mode of the deconstruction of patriarchal, heteronormative,
neoliberal late capitalism.” Bettray also examines transing as a process that “reveal[s]
the socially constructed nature of categories and histories that can be reconceptual-
ized in radically different ways.”
The final three chapters in Part II attend to the important insights drawn from
the positionality of postcolonial, comparative, and transnational feminists. In
Chapter 9, Umme Al‐wazedi explains that postcolonial feminism developed in reac-
tion to the lack of attention to the dynamics of colonialism and empire in shaping
postcolonial gender relations and global dimensions of inequalities, including “the
hegemonic power established by indigenous men after the Empire.” Al‐wazedi
argues that postcolonial feminism attends to the significance of caste, religion, and
 FEMINIST STUDIES AS A SITE OF CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND PRAXIS 7
other dimensions of social, political, and cultural differences that shape the lives of
non‐Western women.
In Chapter 10, Anne Sisson Runyan and coauthors compare approaches to femi-
nism across different regions, which arose along with the expansion of regional gov-
ernance and international non‐governmental organizations. Sisson et al. identify the
resistance of activists and analyses of local conflicts, migrations, and economic shifts,
as well as the diverse challenges and common themes in feminisms that are evident
across regions. The authors highlight the importance of neoliberalism and the influ-
ence and resistance to Western feminism in shaping local feminisms that contribute
to the “complex terrain of feminisms beyond binaries and borders.”
In the final chapter in this part (Chapter 11), Gul Aldikacti Marshall defines
transnational feminism “as a theory developed against white Western feminism’s
notion of global sisterhood, which assumes a common patriarchal oppression faced
by all women.” Transnational feminism is a powerful framework that attends to
both local expressions of feminism and resistance, as discussed in the previous chap-
ter, and incorporates understandings developed in postcolonial feminist theory. It
includes critique of neoliberal globalization, colonialism and imperialism as well as
Western‐centric expressions of feminism. Marshall notes that transnational femi-
nism allows for the possibility of “dialog and coalition building,” and solidarity
among women in their contextual particularities that are based on the intersection
of social locations, such as gender, race, ethnicity, class, and nationality.
In Part III, we focus on the diversity of methodologies developed by feminist
scholars in response to the limits of approaches that rely on traditional positivist or
androcentric scientific methods (see Chapter 12 by Cynthia Deitch). Despite these
critiques, feminist empiricist scholars continue to draw on positivist methods in the
fields of demography, geography, economics and sociology to document the ways in
which gender and other systems of difference and inequality are expressed in aggre-
gate data. In Chapter 13, Gina Marie Longo details the premises and research strat-
egies adopted by feminist empiricists who apply positivist approaches but also
acknowledge the role of values in scientific research practices in order to minimize
their negative effects. However, she also notes that feminist empiricism has been
criticized for “lacking a radical approach to deconstructing the power hierarchies
and systems of oppressions that exist within and are upheld by science.” Longo then
presents two different feminist modes of knowledge generation: standpoint episte-
mology and postmodern feminism. Feminist standpoint analysis begins in the lived
experience of socially located actors. They are especially attentive to the perspectives
of marginalized knowers who experientially understand the “relations of power”
(Chapter 13) or “relations of ruling” (Smith 1989) that contour social life. In con-
trast, feminist empiricists focus on the diverse interests and values that are con-
structed as rational products of deliberative discourse, rather than an expression or
reflection of lived experiences.
In addition to debates about what counts as knowledge and how to conduct
research, contemporary interdisciplinary scholars (Chapter 14) discuss the signifi-
cance of the lack of women and women‐identified people working as scientists in
academia and other research positions. They also consider more recent critical
approaches which incorporate methodological strategies informed by postcolonial,
critical race disability, and queer theories. Drawing on two contemporary case
8 Nancy A. Naples
s­tudies, Samantha M. Archer and A.E. Kohler demonstrate the power of feminist
science studies to challenge some of the taken‐for‐granted findings of archeological
and genetic research on gender to address “controversial bioethical dilemmas regard-
ing intellectual disability and clinical practice.” In Chapter 15, Valeria Esquivel dis-
cusses how feminist economists contest “the gender‐blindness of economic thinking
and have developed new analytical frameworks and methodologies to examine
­gender relations in economic institutions and economic functioning.”
In their overview of feminist approaches to ethnography in anthropology, Dána‐
Ain Davis and Christa Craven (Chapter 16) emphasize the diversity of feminist eth-
nographic innovations. Despite these differences, Davis and Craven find that there
are overlapping “commitment[s] to paying attention to marginality and power dif-
ferentials, attending to a feminist intellectual history, seeking justice, and producing
scholarship in various creative forms that can contribute to movement building and/
or be in the service of the people, communities, organizations, and issues we study.”
Ariella Rotramel examines “Feminist Historiography” in Chapter 17. Rotramel
explains that this methodological approach can best be understood as a form of
feminist praxis, namely, one that is shaped by the dialectical relationship between
theory and practice. For example, knowledge generated by social activism is then
used to inform the development or reformulation of social theory, which, in turn,
informs future activist strategies and engagement. Feminist historians who adopt this
approach have been at the forefront of revealing the relations of power embedded in
the archives that are used to generate knowledge about the past. Rotramel also notes
that feminist historians have expanded their approach by drawing on literary studies
and digital humanities to alter how scholars approach analysis of historical texts.
Feminist scholars debate both the subjects for analysis and the methods utilized
within the social sciences, the arts, and the humanities. Culture and media are topics
that are approached in a variety of ways in different disciplines. In Chapter 18, the
final chapter in Part III, Diane Grossman explains how feminist scholars effectively
shifted cultural analysis to center gender and alter how scholars approach cultural
texts and study cultural artifacts in the area of popular culture. Grossman demon-
strates how disciplinary as well as epistemological framing influence research ques-
tions as well as methodological approaches.
The last part of the volume is constructed around the theme of “Feminist Praxis.”
Many of the authors in this volume writing about both feminist epistemologies and
methodologies acknowledge how activism and the goals of social justice have con-
tributed to the innovations and reformulations of feminist approaches since the
1970s. This last part focuses on topics that explicitly engage with social change and
social justice. In this regard, it is fitting to start with the chapter on “Feminist
Pedagogies,” as it is a form of feminist praxis designed to train students in critical
reading, writing, and community‐building skills to enhance their ability to contrib-
ute to social change efforts in their everyday lives. While those who teach courses in
Feminist Studies may or may not view their teaching through the lens of feminist
pedagogy, many do see their role in the classroom as an extension of their commit-
ment to educating for social justice. In Chapter 19, “Feminist Pedagogy,” Danielle
M. Currier reviews the history of this form of feminist praxis and focuses on the
importance of intersectionality, reflexivity, experiential learning, and critical skill
building.
 FEMINIST STUDIES AS A SITE OF CRITICAL KNOWLEDGE PRODUCTION AND PRAXIS 9
In Chapter 20, Manisha Desai and Koyel Khan examine feminist praxis in the con-
text of globalization. In particular, they interrogate decolonial postcolonial feminism
as it developed through a recognition of the ways in which colonialism, modernity, and
capitalism contoured constructions of gender. It “is informed by social imaginaries of
gender justice beyond the modern” liberal or socialist framing. Desai and Khan con-
clude that “decolonial feminist praxis in a globalizing world needs to rethink women’s
empowerment and gender justice beyond the modernist emancipatory logic and locate
it within anti‐racist, anti‐capitalist, and anti‐settler colonial struggles that seek alterna-
tive relations among humans, with other species, and with nature.”
In Chapter 21, Gill Wright Miller focuses on “somatic praxis” and argues for the
importance of “the material body” for feminist praxis. Experiences of “menstrua-
tion, pregnancy, childbirth, lactation, menopause … lay the groundwork for a body‐
centered approach to corporeality.” Miller provides a methodological framework for
assessing pedagogies of the body. Miller explains that in order to integrate
­feminism and somatic praxis requires asking “ourselves questions about our own
preferences and expectations, to notice and take responsibility for the delivery of our
expression, and to aim to shape multidimensionally with the other participants.”
Meredeth Turshen and Marci Berger explore the praxis of “Feminist Health
Movements” in Chapter 22. They start with defining key terms in understanding
feminist social activism and political claims, and how feminists challenge practices
of forced sterilization and eugenics. Both authors illustrate the contemporary
challenges posed by different aspects of “hashtag activism.” For example,
­
#BringBackOurGirls was developed to publicize the kidnapping of schoolgirls from
the Nigerian Chibok Government Secondary School by Boko Haram terrorists and
#SayHerName draws attention to the experiences of Black women who were targets
of police violence.
In Chapter 23 on “Feminist Praxis and Gender Violence,” Margaret Campe and
Claire Renzetti provide an overview of different theories that explain interpersonal
and structural violence, including liberal and radical feminisms. They also discuss
the significance of intersectional analysis for revealing the complex inequalities and
differential risk faced by different women. They close with an analysis of feminist
political economic explanations that explicate the mutually reinforcing dynamics of
interpersonal and structural dimensions of gender‐based violence.
In Chapter 24, Astrid Ulloa discusses the history and contributions of feminists to
the interdisciplinary field of Political Ecology. She describes different strands, one
originating within an Anglo‐Saxon context and the other in Latin America. While
there are common themes across these two approaches, they each have different
histories, socio‐political contexts and physical environments. Ulloa describes “the
diverse contributions from feminisms, gender studies and gender and development
discussions, and the approaches of ecofeminism.” She then focuses specifically on
Latin American Feminist Political Ecology to emphasize the significance of “diverse
feminisms, feminist spatialities, feminist movements, and indigenous women’s move-
ments.” She draws on her own experience and scholarship and concludes by consid-
ering contemporary debates and trends in the field.
In Chapter 25, the final chapter, Molli Spalter considers the importance of sus-
tainability and solidarity in “Feminism and Social Justice Movements.” She opens
with an overview of the history of feminist movements and surveys the key trends in
10 Nancy A. Naples
the scholarship on feminist social movements, including an understanding of inter-
sectional identities and the importance of global perspectives. Spalter notes the
growing influence of feminist praxis in social justice movements, broadly defined,
and illustrates with a discussion of Palestinian Working Woman Society for
Development and Black Lives Matter.

Conclusion

It is an exciting and challenging time for the field of Feminist Studies. While Feminist
Studies and feminism, more generally, have been the target of backlash and ridicule
by right‐wing critics (Leach 2020; Kano 2011; Oakley and Mitchell 1997; Silva and
Mendes 2015), feminism has also broadened its influence from women’s movement
activism and scholarship to broader social justice movements and has entered main-
stream celebrity culture and everyday discourse (Kemp 2017). Feminist Studies
­faculty are training a new generation of scholars and activists who are committed to
intersectional and transnational praxis. Feminist pedagogues in all academic settings
are transforming educational contexts for students around the world. This edited
collection provides historical perspectives, cutting edge scholarship, and contempo-
rary debates in the field for those engaged in this important educational and activist
role. Our hope is that this volume becomes a resource for students, faculty, and activ-
ists who are dedicated to social justice and critical engagements which challenge
inequalities and oppression in everyday life and help build toward a just and peace-
ful future. It is also important to acknowledge the gaps in what we are able to cover
in this volume and encourage greater dialogue and more sustained attention to the
work produced in sites farther removed from the hegemonic Western and Northern
social and geographic context that, despite our efforts in the chapters to follow, is
still ­underrepresented.

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Watson, S. (1990). Playing the State: Australian Feminist Interventions. London; New York:
Verso.
 Part II
Feminist Epistemology and Its
Discontents
 2
Biological Determinism
and Essentialism
Sheila Greene

Introduction: Historical Perspectives on Woman’s Nature

Dating from the classical era in the West, men have made pronouncements about the
nature of woman and the differences between the sexes. The Greek philosopher
Aristotle said, “As regards the sexes the male is by nature superior and the female
inferior, the male ruler and the female subject.” The thirteenth‐century theologian
St. Thomas Aquinas endorsed Aristotle’s viewpoint and stated that, “As regards
­individual nature, woman is defective and misbegotten.” Biological reasons for pur­
ported sex differences were offered, such as women’s smaller brains and lack of
heat (Aristotle); their half‐formed genitals (Galen), or their physical weakness and
passivity (Aquinas).
Confining this glance backwards to women in the West, it is clear that, for centu­
ries, woman’s nature was seen as dictated by her bodily structures and her reproduc­
tive capacity (Tuana 1993). These views, rooted in Graeco‐Roman thought, were
propagated by the Christian Church, which had, and still has, a central role in life in
Europe and the Americas. Despite the rise of scientific thinking in and after the
Enlightenment, the Church continued to have a major role in framing how women
were seen and scientists rarely challenged this traditional perspective but rather fed
into it. It was taken for granted that men and women were different and that these
differences resided in their biology, which generated their distinctive functions and
social positions. Women were thought to be not only different from men but more in
thrall to their biological natures. Fausto‐Sterling (1992[1985]) quotes a Victorian
physician, who wrote that “Woman is a pair of ovaries with a human being attached,
whereas man is a human being furnished with a pair of testes” (Rudolf Virchow,
MD, 1821–1902, cited by Fausto‐Sterling, 1992[1985], p. 90).
Early psychologists were equally convinced that women were in the grip of their
biology. G. Stanley Hall said,

Companion to Feminist Studies, First Edition. Edited by Nancy A. Naples.

© 2021 John Wiley & Sons Ltd. Published 2021 by John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
16 Sheila Greene
Her sympathetic and ganglionic system is, relative to the cerebro‐spinal, more domi­
nant. Her whole soul, conscious and unconscious, is best conceived as a magnificent
organ of heredity (i.e. reproduction) and to its laws all psychic activities, if unperverted,
are true. (1904, p. 561)

These educated men saw themselves as scientists but appeared to accept unquestion­
ingly that the form of the daily life and behavior of the women around them was
ordained by their anatomy (and God). To questions these (apparent) realities was
both astonishing and presumptuous.
To conclude, in any examination of the long history of explanations of differences
between the sexes, biological explanations are to the forefront. Although the focus
of such explanations has changed over time, the preoccupation with biology has not.
The idea that biology shapes the essential nature of women (and men) has remained
strong, if expressed these days in a somewhat more sophisticated or nuanced fashion
(Pinker 2002; Baron‐Cohen 2004) This chapter presents a critical approach to recent
and contemporary forms of biological determinism and essentialism as applied to
sex and gender differences and sexuality.

Biological Determinism and Essentialism

Defining Biological Determinism and Essentialism

Biological determinism refers to the idea that human behavior originates in and is
dictated by biological entities or processes, either innate or constitutional (Rose
1982). Most frequently, in recent years, the causal mechanism is seen to reside in the
individual’s genetic make‐up, which acts on behavior through the brain or the hor­
mones (Fine 2010). Hormones have receptors in the brain so they can act on the
brain, as the brain can in turn affect the production of hormones. Theories colored
by biological determinism are used to explain species‐specific behaviors, group dif­
ferences or differences between individuals. As a philosophical or scientific view­
point it has been applied throughout history to many different human characteristics
and behaviors and has been used, often contentiously, to explain differences between
people, such as those associated with race (Smedley 2016).
Biological determinism has always had strong currency in the explanation of
observed differences in behavior and capacities between men and women, in defin­
ing women’s “nature” and accounting for differences between people in their sexual
orientations and behaviors. In her review of biological theories about sex and gender,
Sayers defined biological essentialism as the view that “biology has endowed women
with an essential femininity” (1982, p. 147). Maracek offers the following definition
of essentialism as it relates to sex and gender, saying:

This view of gender holds that the categories “man” and “woman” are natural, self‐evi­
dent and unequivocal. It regards sex‐linked behaviours and traits as fixed and stable
properties of separate and autonomous individuals. (1995, p. 162)

Essentialism is a broader concept than biological determinism. It refers to theories

or viewpoints that account for differences between categories by ascribing to them
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 17
enduring, fixed, and prototypical characteristics. In other words: their essence.
Haslam and Whelan. define essentialism as “The claim that there are natural kinds
whose members share a common essence” (2008, p. 1297). As a theoretical perspec­
tive, essentialist thinking is often found when the focus is on identifying differences
between the sexes or specifying the nature of womankind. One of the main justifica­
tions for essentialist views of sex differences is a commitment to biological determin­
ism but essentialist theories can be based on differences that are seen to have
sociocultural origins, usually taking effect in infancy or early childhood.

Defining Sex, Gender, and Sexuality

In discussing theories of causation in relation to sex and gender it is important to note
the use of terminology since the terms, sex and gender, are often used interchangeably,
especially in daily discourse and in the popular media. For example it is common on
official forms to be asked to specify one’s gender when it might be more precise to ask
about one’s sex, which is probably the information that is being sought. The American
Psychological Association (APA) defines sex and gender as follows, “Sex usually refers
to the biological aspects of maleness or femaleness, whereas gender implies the psycho­
logical, behavioral, social and cultural aspects of being male or female, (i.e. masculinity
or femininity).” (http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality‐definitions.pdf).
However, having said that, these distinctions can readily break down, and not
only in popular usage. The designation of sex is made on the basis of the presence of
a complex of structures and processes, including the sex chromosomes, gonads, hor­
mones, external genitalia, and secondary sexual characteristics, and all of these ele­
ments can be present in different degrees at birth causing ambiguity about the
assignation of sex, or they can be altered by later accidental or deliberate interven­
tions. Thus, even at a biological level, sex is a complex cluster of characteristics, not
one simple characteristic. Butler adds to this picture the view of sex as permeated
with social meanings such that the distinction between sex as biological and gender
as social breaks down (1990). This problem in distinguishing sex and gender has
been taken on board by some contemporary theorists. For example, in a more recent
paper on “Neurofeminism and feminist neurosciences” Schmitz and Höppner have
decided to use the term “sex/gender” (2014). Increasingly then, there is recognition
of the difficulties that arise in adopting the traditional definition of sex, which
implies that sex is always dimorphic, that there are only two sexes, male and female,
and that they do not change over the life course. The use of the terms sex and gender
thus remains problematic.
The definition of sexuality or sexual orientation is also a matter for debate. Sexual
identity and sexual desires, and behaviors are complex and can also be unstable
across the life course. The APA offers a definition of sexual orientation stating that
it is, “A component of identity that includes a person’s sexual and emotional attrac­
tion to another person and the behavior and/or social affiliation that may result
from this attraction” (http://www.apa.org/pi/lgbt/resources/sexuality‐definitions.
pdf). This definition can be seen as essentialist and certainly the term “sexual orien­
tation” is often used as though an individual’s sexuality is fixed and unchanging.
Social constructionists will often use the term “sexual preference” indicating a degree
of choice and openness (Rosenblum and Travis 2016).
18 Sheila Greene
Biologically deterministic theories about sex, gender, and sexual orientation typi­
cally see all three as intrinsically linked and mapping neatly onto each other, with
common biological origins. Thus, from this perspective, being female implies being
feminine and attracted to males. This assumption forms the basis of what Adrienne
Rich terms “compulsory heterosexuality,” the view that heterosexuality and attrac­
tion to the opposite sex is natural to the female sex and that any deviation from this
is therefore unnatural and open to a wide range of hostile responses on the part of
heteronormative societies (1980). Transgender people who reject the sex to which
they were assigned at birth are an example of the uncoupling of biological sex and
gender identity (Chrisler and McCreary 2010). Although it is the case that for centu­
ries, sex, gender, and sexuality have been seen as different facets of the unified bio­
logical essence of men and women, increasingly these three elements are seen as
separable and as potentially fluid (Diamond 2009), as discussed in a later section of
this chapter.

Biological Theories about Sex and Gender

For some decades the majority of natural and social scientists have come to view
extreme biological determinism as an untenable position because of the incontro­
vertible evidence that human behavior is strongly influenced by social and cultural
factors. Thus very few of them would identify as hardline biological determinists and
what becomes a matter of dispute is the extent to which scientists emphasize the
social or the biological. However recent developments in neuroscience, evolutionary
psychology and the “new genetics” have bolstered biologically based explanations of
male–female differences (e.g. Buss 1995; Baron‐Cohen 2004; Brizendine 2007), pro­
voking a second wave of feminist critiques of what they see as sexist and determin­
istic theories and assertions.
As discussed earlier, the aspect of biology seen as central to male–female differ­
ence or women’s character has shifted over the centuries. Scientists no longer hold
that important consequences arise because female bodies are moist whereas those of
males are dry, as Galen asserted, or that female moodiness is because the womb has
come adrift and is causing havoc, as Plato suggested. There is a number of theories
that are actively discussed in recent and current literature and they focus on genes
and evolution, hormones, and brains. The links between genes, evolution, hormones,
and brains are strong. For example, biological differences between the sexes in brain
function are seen by writers such as Herbert (2015) as due to sex‐linked hormones
activated in utero and in the first months of life that shape the brain of males and
females in different ways. In the following sections some recent theories will be
elaborated, along with critical reactions to them.

Evolution and Genes

Sociobiological explanations of sex differences were particularly popular in the
1970s and 1980s with the publication of books like “Sociobiology: The New
Synthesis” by Wilson in 1975 and “The Selfish Gene” by Dawkins in 1976. Wilson
defined sociobiology as “the systematic study of the biological basis of all social
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 19
behavior” (1975, p. 4) and argues that human nature is largely dictated by a set of
evolved traits. He and other sociobiologists such as Barash (1977) see sexual differ­
ence as rooted in our early evolution, at a time, they argue, when the fundamental
structure and function of our brains were set down. Given the demands of the prim­
itive life, brains of males and females diverged to suit males to hunting and com­
petitive behavior and women to child‐rearing and nurturing behavior. Such
behavioral dimorphism was adaptively advantageous and secured the survival and
reproductive success of the species. Barash recommends acquiescing to our biologi­
cal natures, saying, “there should be a sweetness in life when it accords with the
adaptive wisdom of evolution” (1977, p. 25).To sociobiologists, much of both male
and female behavior is seen to be explicable in terms of reproductive strategies
designed to optimize both sexes’ chances of having many healthy offspring, and
perpetuating their genes. A small number of theorists claimed to be feminist and
advocates of biological determinism. Sayers records the views of “feminist sociobiol­
ogists” like Rossi (1977) who consider that,

It is the task of feminism to enable women to get back in touch with their biologically
given essence by, among other things, persuading society to construe and value feminin­
ity and female biology equally with masculinity and male biology.
(Sayers 1982, p. 147)

Evolutionary theories about human behavior are still strong although the term
sociobiology has largely fallen out of use and has been replaced by a number of off­
shoots such as evolutionary anthropology and evolutionary psychology. Although it
is hard to find any proof for hypotheses about sex differences having their origins in
cave life, the idea that our basic human propensities are laid down in our genes is still
current, typified in this century by the popularity of the work of psychologists like
Pinker (2002) and philosophers like Dennett (2003). Commitment to evolutionary
and genetic determinism is still strong though challenged by the rise of areas such as
epigenetics which examine the ways in which the environment can alter the expres­
sion of genes, once thought to be entirely impervious to external influences.

Hormones
Hormones have been a longstanding preoccupation of sex difference theorists. As
with other strands of biological determinism, hormones have been resurrected in the
twenty‐first century and are now a focus for contemporary brain scientists. Since the
discovery of hormones and the fact that hormones act differently in males and
females, hormones have been seen as an explanation for observed sex differences
and indeed for the particular nature and psychology of women. Fausto‐Sterling was
one of the first scientists to offer a resounding critique of theories purporting to
show how women were in the grip of their hormones in her book Myths of Gender:
Biological Theories about Women and Men, which was first published in 1985 and
revised in 1992. She notes that,

some modern psychologists and biologists suggest that women perform more poorly
than do men on mathematics test because hormonal sex differences alter male and
20 Sheila Greene
female brain structures; and many people believe women to be unfit for certain profes­
sions because they menstruate. (1992[1985], p. 93)

Fausto‐Sterling examines the literature on the effects of menstruation and meno­

pause on female behavior and finds evidence for significant negative effects resound­
ingly lacking. She comments on “the morass of poorly done studies on menstruation
and menopause” (1992[1985], p. 121) but is heartened by the new research that
rejects a traditional misogynistic medical model perspective, which positions wom­
en’s hormones as toxic and abnormal, and instead situates the experience of men­
struation and the menopause in their social contexts (e.g. Beyene 1992). Fausto‐Sterling
also examines the evidence for sex differences in aggression. She points out that there
is “no clear cut evidence to show that different testosterone levels in adult men and
women result in differences in aggression” (1992[1985], p. 141). In fact there is very
little evidence for a relationship between circulating hormones such as estrogen and
testosterone and any human behavior. Given this reality, researchers often resort to
arguments based on the action of fetal androgens on the brain, since the fact that
fetal androgens are involved in the establishment of biological sex is incontroverti­
ble. Some neuroscientists and endrocrinologists argue that sex hormones continue to
act on the brain throughout life (McEwen and Milner 2017). However, the evidence
that fetal hormones shape the human brain for life in a sex‐differentiated manner or
that circulating sex hormones have a direct impact on the behavior of adult males
and females is weak (Fine 2017).

Brains
Differences in male and female brains have been the focus of attention since the
absolute difference in brain size was noted. At first the preoccupation was with the
fact that female brains are smaller and therefore, it seemed safe to conclude, less
competent (Tuana 1993). But the autopsies of the brains of famous men revealed
that they might well have had a brain smaller than that of the average women and it
also became clear that there was no correlation between intelligence and the size of
the brain (Russett 1989). In general the focus moved to the way brains function
rather than their size, although recently neuroscientists have shown an interest in
examining and theorizing sex differences in the size of brain structures and in abso­
lute size. For example, Grabowska speculates that there are “compensatory mecha­
nisms in females that enable their smaller brains to work as effectively as male
brains” (2017, p. 211).
The history of the study of the brain and the nervous system is a very long one but
the rise of contemporary neuroscience is seen as a feature of the early 1980s, pro­
pelled by recent advances in molecular biology and brain imaging (such as Positron
Emission Tomography (PET) scanning and Functional Magnetic Resonance Imaging
(fMRI)). Neuroscience has become one of the most feted and well‐funded scientific
disciplines, given considerable power and credibility within academia and in the
public imagination. President George Bush declared the 1990s the Decade of the
Brain in order to “enhance public awareness of the benefits to be derived from brain
research.” Leaning on both evolutionary theory and research on hormones, as well
as developments in the brain sciences, numerous publications since the 1980s, from
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 21
both social and natural scientists, have promoted the view that the brains of men and
women are different. One of the first books to gain prominence was Brain Sex by
Moir and Jessel, published in 1989. They assert that,

Six or seven weeks after conception … the unborn baby “makes up its mind” and the
brain begins to take on a male or female pattern. What happens at that critical stage in
the darkness of the womb, will determine the structure and the organisation of the brain
and that in turn will decide the very nature of the mind. (1989, p. 21)

Other books in this vein included Baron‐Cohen’s The Essential Difference: Men,
Women and the Extreme Male Brain (2003) and The Female Brain by Brizendine
(2007). Baron‐Cohen’s main focus is on the idea that evolution has shaped male and
female brains to think differently, so that men are sytematizers and women empa­
thizers. Brizendine claims that “scientists have documented an astonishing array of
structural, chemical, genetic, hormonal and functional brain differences between
men and women” (2007, p. 27). It is this confident assertion of the scientific basis of
the idea of sexed brains that has elicited criticism from feminist scientists (Fine 2010;
Jordan‐Young 2010).
Currently some of the most powerful criticism comes from feminist scholars
linked to the group, the Neurogenderings Network (www.neurogenderings.
wordpress.org). Like Fausto‐Sterling, the members of this group are biologists and
neuroscientists so they are speaking from within the fold. Their aim is to counter
examples of “neurosexism” (Fine 2010) by examining the scientific claims that are
being made by those promoting the idea of the sexed brain. Neurosexism can be
defined as the viewpoint that there are hardwired differences in the brains of men
and women that account for the gender status quo, to paraphrase Fine (2010 p. xxv).
The scholars in this group want to replace neurosexism with “neurofeminism.” As
it sets out on the website:

The NeuroGenderings Network is a transdisciplinary network of “neurofeminist”

scholars who aim to critically examine neuroscientific knowledge production and to
develop differentiated approaches for a more gender adequate neuroscientific research.
Feminist neuroscientists generally seek to elaborate the relation between gender and the
brain beyond biological determinism but still engaging with the materiality of the brain.

Notably these scientists are not against brain research into sex and gender. Instead,
they are asking for a better quality of research. For example, they point out that
images of the brain can only reflect current brain activity and not what causes it.
When a close analysis of claims about brain sex is conducted it is striking how often
they are made on the basis of animal studies, studies of humans using very small
samples and so called “snap‐shot studies.” Fine et al. suggest that,

Focusing only on similarities or differences is misleading. We need to develop a new

framework for thinking of the relation between sex, brain and gender that better fits
current knowledge and takes into account changes, overlap, variance and most of
all, context.
(Fine et al. 2014, p. 1)
22 Sheila Greene
The work of feminist critics seems to be having some impact on the field of neu­
roscience. In 2017, Fine and Jordan‐Young, two early critics of what they saw as
unjustified claims about male–female differences in the brain, commented in an arti­
cle in The Guardian that there are “welcome signs that neuroscience is showing new
openness to critiques of research into sex differences.” It remains to be seen whether
the work of these critics percolates through to the media and the public.

Essentialism and Feminist Theory

Much of the work of liberal feminist researchers in the twentieth century focused on
demonstrating the minimal difference between the sexes and the considerable over­
lap in their capacities (Maccoby and Jacklin 1974). This early work seemed to be a
quest for the “real” sex differences’ and thus was still essentialist in character.
However the work of Maccoby and Jacklin, and the later work in this vein, such as
that reviewed by Eagly et al. in 2012, was important since it demolished many myths
and stereotypes about actual differences between the sexes (in North America at
least). After conducting a meta‐analysis of such studies Hyde developed what she
called “The Gender Similarities Hypothesis” (2005). Research showing the extent of
overlap and the small size of the differences that were to be found led to the crucial
conclusion that knowing the sex of any individual could not reliably inform you
about their likely dispositions and traits. It should be noted that research of this kind
usually addresses issues to do with the psychological attributes and competences of
males and females. It does not survey such matters as mode of dress, social roles, etc.
In examining some of the differences in conduct and status between men and women
it might be easy to side with Lippa who counters Hyde by proposing a “Gender
Reality Hypothesis,” pointing out the many ways in which the actual lives of men
and women differ (2006). Adjusting the focus of any comparison and examining dif­
ferent samples of men and women, or boys and girls, coming from different classes
or cultures may well lead to different conclusions. This kind of comparative research
has its uses if not overgeneralized, but it is descriptive and leaves open the question
of the origins and meaning of any differences that are detectable.
In the late 1970s some influential theorists argued that the way forward was
through a revaluation of the so‐called feminine traits and dispositions. For example,
Gilligan attacked existing theories about personality development as being male‐
centered, saying that “Implicitly adopting the male life as the norm they have tried
to fashion women out of a masculine cloth” (1979, p. 6). In her explorations of girls’
and women’s moral thinking she concluded that women have “a different voice” and
that they work with an ethic of care rather than an ethic of justice (1982). Around
the same time Chodorow wrote about the way girl children’s early experience of
being mothered shaped their capacity for forming relationships and a maternal
­orientation (1978). Both theories were widely lauded at the time but have fallen out
of favor, largely because of their essentialist viewpoint. Neither theory was based on
biological difference but saw male–female differences as psychically rooted in early
experience and carried forward into the rest of the person’s life. More recently
Chodorow has admitted that her early views have changed and she disassociates
herself from theories that are “universalising and essentialising” (2012, p. 7).
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 23
As far back as 1949, Simone de Beauvoir in The Second Sex, said that “One is not
born a woman but becomes one.” This maxim was positioned in direct opposition to
Freud’s assertion that “anatomy is destiny.” It became representative of the radical
feminist stance, which, unlike the still hegemonic biological determinist viewpoint,
held the door open to change and provided a platform for feminist activism. Spurred
on by the second wave of feminism in the late 1960s many feminist researchers
argued that the patriarchal sociopolitical context and rampant sex‐typing that were
so disadvantageous to women were the main reasons for women’s subordinate posi­
tion and achievements. In the latter part of the twentieth century most feminist theo­
rists advanced social explanations for differences between men and women in
behavior and status, seeing differences as socially constructed, not given. As
Rosenblum and Travis note,

From the constructionist perspective, difference is created rather than intrinsic to a

phenomenon. Social processes … create differences, determine that some differences
are more important than others and assign particular meanings to those differences.
(2016, p. 3)

One social process that was given central importance in the last decades of the
twentieth century was language, a focus that was influenced by postmodern thinking
and “the turn to language.” Alerted by Foucault to the role discourse plays in power
relations throughout all aspects of society, feminist theorists examined discourses on
the body, on male–female relations and society’s discursive representations of the
female and the feminine (Butler 1990; Nicholson 1990). Postmodernists also resisted
the longstanding focus on male–female differences, seeking to disrupt traditional
binaries and oppositions like male–female and nature–nurture (Gergen 2001).
Despite the clear rejection of essentialist theories by most feminist theorists, essen­
tialist thinking is, as I will discuss further in the concluding section of this chapter,
still very evident in both popular writing on male–female difference and in those
theories that promote biological explanations, which tend in recent decades to pro­
mote the “different but equal perspective” rather than the view that women are in
any way inferior. The most well‐known book that trumpets this new form of essen­
tialism is probably Gray’s Men are from Mars, Women are from Venus, which was
published in 1992 and has sold over a million copies, according to its Wikipedia
entry. Gray focuses on what the differences are – or what he asserts they are – and
does not dwell on origins, though he does say “men and women are supposed to be
different” (p. 10). Essentialist theories, like those of Gray, however seemingly benign
and celebratory of women’s “special” qualities are quickly translated into evidence
of female deficiency and used as a reason for prejudice and exclusion. Thus Carol
Gilligan’s (1982) theory that women favored a morality based on valuing relation­
ship and men based their morality on the consideration of rights could potentially be
used to deny a woman a traditional high‐status post like Chief Justice. As Mednick
notes,

Arguments for women’s intrinsic difference (from men), whether innate or deeply
socialized, support conservative policies, that in fact could do little else but maintain the
status quo vis a vis gender politics. (1989, p. 1122)
24 Sheila Greene
Rejecting all forms of essentialism may be seen to present feminists with a dilemma
because if women do not share a common essence or identity how can they have a
common political cause? One solution may be to adopt the “strategic essentialism”
advocated by Spivak (1988). Spivak argues for “a strategic use of positivist essential­
ism in a scrupulously political interest” (1988, p. 15). This would result in women
(temporarily) setting aside their diversity and their differences in race, class, ethnic­
ity, etc. and adopting the shared identity “woman” but for political purposes only.
Stone considers the concept of strategic essentialism problematic, proposing instead
that feminists continue to reject essentialism as “descriptively false” (2004, p. 1) but
find unity between women in their shared history of oppression and in shared aspects
of their current social positioning.

Sexuality and Biological Determinism

In relation to sexuality a number of different positions on the social–biological con­

tinuum have been proffered. Explanations that favor biological determinants have
been seen as both negative and positive by gay, lesbian, and trans activists. In 1991,
LeVay claimed to have found evidence of a difference in the hypothalamus of homo­
sexual and heterosexual men. This finding and the claim by Hamer et al. in 1993 to
have identified the “gay gene” were embraced by some activists as evidence that
homosexuality was innate and therefore should not be the target of discrimination
any more than the color of a person’s skin or hair. However, there have been difficul­
ties in replicating both findings and they have been subject to numerous critiques,
centering on their scientific standing and their harmful implications. For example,
Hegarty (1997), in a feminist interrogation of Le Vay’s work, points out that Le Vay’s
dichotomous view of sexuality excludes those with “bisexual or queer” sexual iden­
tities. A view that homosexuality is fixed in structures of the brain reinforces the
view that it is a constitutional deficiency that is universal in all homosexual men, and
ignores the variety and mutability in the expression of human sexuality. As Hegarty
notes, lesbian and gay people “differentiate their sexualities in complex and different
ways across the life span” (1997, p. 356). Hegarty sees LeVay’s work as a typical
example of biological essentialism, “part of a longer ongoing attempt to inscribe
sexual desire within the discipline of biology” (1997, p. 355).
Many different biological and social explanations of sexual orientation have been
put forward, ranging from genetic differences to atypical early attachments with
parents, but the general consensus is that while biological factors, operating via the
genes or postnatally, may have a role and social factors may also have a role, sexual
orientation is multiply determined and may have very different causal origins across
the population (APA 2008).
An essentialist position on sexual orientation sees it as a fixed and unchanging
trait of the individual. In his historical review of sexuality studies, Plummer com­
ments that the Kinsey Institute and others in the 1970s “moved sexuality from being
seen as essentially biological and reproductive to the challenge of taking seriously its
socially grounded multiple meanings” (2012, p. 245). Plummer continues, “sexuali­
ties are never fixed or stable, they do not harbour one grand truth and they do not
reveal our essential nature” (p. 253). He notes that by the 1990s and the publication
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 25
of books such as Simon’s Postmodern Sexualities (1996) scholars increasingly
adopted a social constructionist perspective on sexuality, As Plummer notes sexual­
ity was “destabilized, decentered, and de‐essentialized” (2012, p. 247).
However studies show that although scholarly thinking on sexuality may reject
an essentialist perspective, essentialist thinking may still be a part of how many lay
people conceptualize their own sexual orientation. Fausto‐Sterling (2012b) gives the
example of a study by Stork which showed that women who have entered lesbian
relationships in middle age – after having been married and having had chil­
dren – tend to conclude that they must always have been a lesbian but just didn’t
know it (1998).
Diamond introduced the term “sexual fluidity,” which she claims is more com­
mon in women than in men (2009). One of her studies, which study tracked young
women who identified as having a same‐sex orientation into middle age and older
found considerable fluctuation in their sexual preferences and behavior over time,
often prompted by changes in context and opportunity (Diamond 2009). Diamond
argues for a de‐essentialized, social constructionist perspective on sexual orienta­
tion which is against both biological determination and the idea that a person’s
sexual preference is necessarily fixed across the life course. Despite the increased
discussion of sexual fluidity in academia and in the media, accompanying the
higher profile for gender fluidity, empirical research indicates that the majority of
people retain the same sexual orientation/preference across the life course (Savin‐
Williams et al. 2012).

A Place for Biology but not for Determinism or Essentialism?

Reclaiming the Body

For many years there was a widespread rejection within feminism, across all its
manifestations, of any form of theory that included biological elements. To see any
female characteristic as biological in its origins or mode of functioning was seen as
tantamount to accepting that it was fixed and immutable. Biology and essentialism
were thus seen to go hand‐in‐hand. In the late twentieth century, with the rise of
social constructivist theory and the accompanying “linguistic turn,” the body and its
functions were seen as texts where discourses about the body – often positioned as
oppressive and unhelpful discourses – dictate what is experienced by the individual.
Thus “the thought body” became a theoretical preoccupation for many feminist
scholars and the material body remained problematic (Greene 2015). Although the
shift to seeing social and discursive factors as the causes of difference and therefore
the target for change was understandable and productive, one consequence was the
exclusion of the physical from consideration and the perpetuation of culture‐nature,
mind–body binaries. Also, as Grosz comments, social constructivist perspectives
reduced “materiality to representation” (Grosz 2005, p. 172). In relation to sexual­
ity, Plummer comments that the predominantly social constructivist view of sexual­
ity has served to take attention away from the body and bodily acts but he notes a
recent increase in interest in research into the embodiment of sexuality and forms of
sexual expression (2012).
26 Sheila Greene
Ussher was among a number of feminist theorists who felt uncomfortable with
this preoccupation with the discursive alone and argued accordingly for the need for
a material‐discursive perspective (2006). In this century a number of feminist schol­
ars have reembraced the material and the biological and there has been a return to
some form of acceptance of the material reality of the body, with material‐discursive
approaches and “the new materialism” becoming more popular (Barad 2003; Hird
2004). Such work resonates with the work of critics of mechanistic and reductionist
perspectives within biology who are associated with the emergence of “the new biol­
ogy” (e.g. Woese 2004). Importantly, the “new materialists” and cognate theorists
have found ways to resist any form of biological determinism.
Currently, biological determinism is under attack from feminist scientists, from
those who favor sociocultural determinants but also, even more importantly, from
those who oppose the very idea that all human behavior is determined, either by
biological or by social factors.

Explaining the Role of Biology

There are some contemporary theorists who attempt to take account of the biologi­
cal in their approach to understanding what shapes sex and gender‐linked behavior.
The basic premise behind these theories is that human life is complex and should be
seen from a biopsychosocial perspective. One hypothesis is centered on the fact there
are some physical and physiological differences between the sexes that are both evi­
dent at or shortly after birth and more or less universal (Eliot 2009). These relatively
small but consistent differences are mostly to do with size (males are larger and
heavier), activity level (males are more active), maturity (females are more mature
physiologically), and vulnerability (males are more likely to die in utero and after
birth and are more prone to suffering from a range of childhood disorders). Eliot
argues that “each of these traits is massively amplified by the different sorts of prac­
tice, role models and reinforcement that boys and girls are exposed to from birth
onward” (2009, p. 6).
Although Eliot does not mention the work of researchers in the dynamic systems
and relational developmental systems fields, her hypothesis sits quite comfortably
with these very active areas of research (see, for example, Overton and Lerner 2012).
Fausto‐Sterling (2012a,b) and Martin and Ruble (2009) see dynamic systemic devel­
opmental models as offering a more adequate theoretical framework for explaining
how gender‐typed traits develop and change over time. This stable of theories works
at the intersection of biology and the psychosocial sciences and recognizes the ongo­
ing interconnectedness of biological, social, and psychological processes, adopting a
developmental and longitudinal approach to research. Fausto‐Sterling discusses the
process of “gender fortification,” which is set in motion as soon as it is known
whether the new baby (or baby in the womb) is a girl or a boy. As she says, “the
social response to the genitalia of the newborn is intense” (2012b, p. 7). This chimes
with Eliot’s view that originally small differences are amplified by our social response
to them.
Once factors external to the body enter into the picture, i.e. as soon as conception
takes place, there is a fundamental inseparability between the biological and the
environmental, between nature and nurture. Fausto‐Sterling talks about the ways
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 27
that external influences become embodied (2012b). This implies that when scientists
assess what they claim to be “the biological,” whether it be hormones, brain struc­
tures, or brain function, they cannot excise the effects of previous experience on
those material substances or processes. Thus, when the brains of men and women or
boys and girls are compared, what is found in the brain is as likely to be the result of
gendered experience as it is innate biology. Experience changes biology.
In countering the fatalism of deterministic and essentialist theories in relation to
human behavior, it is necessary to take full account of the biological, the social, the
psychological, and the environmental. It is critical to do this in a way that is scien­
tifically robust. Scientists from both the natural and the social sciences have embarked
on this project, in different ways but with a common recognition that the old either/
or polarities – opposing the biological and the psychosocial – are a theoretical dead‐
end. Biology is in itself dynamic, evolving, and totally interdependent with the envi­
ronment (Rose 1997; Woese 2004). In this sense, strong biological determinism with
its connotation of a fixed biology impervious to environmental influence is not ten­
able. As long ago as 1978 Lambert commented,

The notion that “innate” factors, such as genes or hormones, influence human behavior
is often called (usually pejoratively) “biological determinism.” To equate biological with
intrinsic, inflexible, or pre‐programed is an unfortunate misuse of the term biological.
Behavior is itself a biological phenomenon, an interaction between organism and envi­
ronment.
(Lambert 1978, p. 104)

Feminist biologists such as Anne Fausto‐Sterling (2012a) regret the neglect of

biology that has been a consequence of the rejection of biological determinism. She
says, “Everybody breathe a sigh of relief: We do not have to fight biology anymore.
But, take a deep breath: If we invite biology back into our theoretical lives, we have
to do it right” (2012a, p. 411). She argues that any complete and adequate view of
human behavior, including gender and sexual identity, must incorporate biology.
A counterdeterministic or nondeterministic view of human behavior emphasizes
human agency and intentionality. This viewpoint foregrounds the capacity of human
persons to act on the world and respond to it in ways that are novel, creative, and
essentially unpredictable (Martin et al. 2010). Thus an important consideration in
any approach to understanding gender or sexuality is the self‐making capacity of the
human. Theories need to take on board the emergent, novel, and autopoietic quality
of human thought and action (Greene 2015). Self‐construals and self‐constructions
are inevitably influenced by ambient societal discourses but each person is capable
of selecting from the discourses around her and arriving at her own relationship with
her sex, gender, and sexuality, if permitted.
Another cognate strand of work, promoted by social scientists and philosophers
rather than natural scientists, is found in the rise of “the new materialism.” Braidotti
was one of the feminist forerunners of the new materialism. In 2000, she criticized
feminist writers for their “denial of the materiality of the bodily self” (2000, p. 160).
However she was adamantly opposed to biological determinism and argued for a
perspective that was as she termed it “post‐humanist.” Humanist thinking, she
argued, tends to essentialize and reify the attributes thought to define the human.
28 Sheila Greene
This tendency has been seen in both biological and social essentialist thought. A
number of feminist writers has explored the potential of the new materialism (see
Alaimo and Hekman 2008) and they do so in a variety of different ways. However,
there is broad agreement on the need to move beyond the discursive and social con­
structionist theories to embrace the material but not within the old rigid framework
of biological determinism. The new materialists eschew dualisms between mind and
matter, nature and nurture, and in some cases, human and nonhuman. They see the
mind and body in constant fluid interaction, fundamentally inseparable from each
other and from their context.
One might conclude that, as with the nurture versus nature debate, old ideas
about the fixed and predetermined essence of human beings can now be assigned to
the dustbin of history. However, they persist.

The Enduring Appeal of Essentialist and Biological Explanations

Persistence of Essentialist Thinking

Essentialist thinking is a common and understandable human pattern of thought.
Studies have shown that lay people frequently use essentialist modes of thought in
­relation to both objects and people (Medin and Ortony 1989). The developmental
psychologist, Gelman, has researched the development of essentialist thinking in chil­
dren and adults and concludes that “Essentialism is a reasoning heuristic that is readily
available to both children and adults” (2004). To Phillips it is “a psychologically inev­
itable feature of the way humans think” (2010). In order to make sense of the complex
and diverse world around us we seek to group things and people into categories on the
basis of some – actual or presumed – underlying common qualities or essences. If one
accepts this viewpoint it is clear that essentialist thinking will always be with us and
the tendency to ascribe essences to the categories man and women, male and female,
will continue. Research by Bastain and Haslam showed that essentialist thinking was
related to the endorsement of stereotypes, including those related to gender (2006).
This implies a need to redouble efforts to encourage evidence‐based critique of essen­
tialist thinking whenever it moves beyond being a handy shorthand to fostering restric­
tive stereotyping and prejudice. Given this proclivity for humans to look for
essentialist explanations, vigilance is required to identify and counter examples of
unfounded or oppressive essentialist thinking, wherever it raises its Hydra‐like head.

Persistence of Biological Determinism

Although biological determinism in its various forms has been subjected to sustained
and cogent criticism, such theories continue to emerge and are given attention in the
media as well as in academic circles, as is readily seen in the current popularity of
brain‐based accounts of a wide range of behaviors and human differences Since
these theories are often based on weak evidence and flawed arguments it is clearly
important from the scientific perspective that they are critiqued and that more ade­
quate scientific explanations are advanced such as those studies critiquing neuro­
sexism mentioned earlier. However, since such alternative viewpoints and
disconfirming studies do exist, the question then becomes, why do they not take hold
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 29
in the imagination of the public, in the thinking of a wide range of practitioners, and
among policymakers? For example, current research on the brain is widely cited in
the media and by policymakers but they favor the kind of brain research that pro­
motes a simple Brains R Us view of human functioning (Tallis 2014). Undoubtedly
this information about brains and the biology of sex and gender also influences the
thinking and practice of parents who listen to or read popularized versions of the
views of biological determinists in the media. This public uptake of the latest bio­
logical fad – however flawed – was recognized as far back as 1978 by Lowe in her
paper on “Sociobiology and sex differences.” She says, “We do not have to treat
sociobiology seriously as a scientific theory of human behavior. Unfortunately we do
have to take it seriously as a political theory” (1978, p. 123).
In 1993, the psychologist, Lerner, wrote a paper arguing against biological deter­
minism and reductionism, in which he stated, “These questions are not merely aca­
demic. Science and public policy are at this writing being influenced by biologically
reductionistic ideology” (p. 124). One quarter of a century later, biologically reduc­
tionistic and deterministic theories are, if anything, more pervasive. Tallis comments
on the dangers of the widespread influence of what he calls “neuromania” and
“Darwinitis” for our perception of what it means to be human. He sees such theories
as promoting a view of humans as mere animals, thus failing to recognize what it is
that makes us different from animals. While not dismissing our biological reality he
calls for more attention to the moral and self‐regulatory capacities of humans, both
undermined by excessive “science‐based naturalism,” as he terms it (2014, p. xi). In
a 2005 article called “fMRI in the public eye,” Raeme et al. report the results of their
analysis of 13 years of media coverage of brain research using fMRI imagery. They
concluded that the media present the research as though the brain images allow us
to “capture visual proof of brain activity, despite the enormous complexities of data
acquisition and image processing” (p. 160). They appear to be the first to coin the
term neuroessentialism by which they mean how fMRI research locates subjectivity
and personal identity in the brain. They say, “In this sense the brain is used as a
shortcut for the more global concepts such as the person, the individual or the self”
(p. 160). It is not hard to find articles in the press with titles such as “How provoca­
tive clothes affect the brain” (The Guardian 2018) or books with titles like The
Brain: The Story of You (Eagleman 2016). Raeme et al. also comment on how com­
mon it is for scientists and science writers to “provide the audience with the news
that is easiest to assimilate.” Studies have shown that if reports of new scientific
studies are accompanied by colored images of the inner workings of the brain they
are found to be more credible than when accompanied by graphs or tables, especially
if readers do not see themselves as experts in the topic (McCabe and Castel 2008).
According to O’Connor and Joffe (2014) the general public has, for the most part,
a tendency to assimilate scientific data to fit their existing conceptions of how soci­
ety works. They say,

Research shows that humans have a deep‐seated motivation to justify the social system
in which they live, and their cognition is moulded by the desire to construe that system
as good, just and legitimate. This orientation shapes public reception of scientific infor­
mation, which is often absorbed into efforts to preserve existing group hierarchies
(2014, p. 2).
30 Sheila Greene
These authors have a somewhat pessimistic and maybe patronizing view of the
ability of the general public to understand scientific information. However, the
­persistence of sexual dimorphism in society and the perpetual emergence of new
theories about its biological justification – for the most part happily received by the
media and the populace – lend weight to their point of view.
We can see the evidence of the resurgence of biological determinism, sexism,
and sex‐role differentiation all around us, in the shops and on the media and in
daily practices, public and private. Even in this age when gender fluidity is a topic
of interest and discussion and despite the pleas of second‐wave feminists for a less
gendered treatment of boys and girls, the market continues to brand their clothes
and toys as pink or blue. As England notes, the gender revolution is uneven and,
in some regards, stalled (2010). Men earn more and occupy more positions with
power. Women are demeaned and abused across the globe. The OECD’s 2014
report on the position of girls and women in 160 states concludes that “across the
globe every day women and girls experience some form of discrimination solely
because they were born female” (Social Institutions and Gender Index [SIGI]
2014, p. 6).
The fact that people cling to the status quo and prefer simple theories to complex
ones is part of reality. It is also part of current reality that we live in society where
old forms of patriarchy are being threatened and where a defensive reassertion of the
inevitability and fixity of sex and gender roles serves the agenda of the white, male
ruling class and its favored political ideologies.
In the 1980s, Lewontin wrote a paper called “Biological determinism.” Among
other things he said,

If we want to understand where these biological determinist theories of human life

come from and what gives them their perpetual appeal, we must look not in the annals
of biological science, but in the social and political realities that surround us, and in the
social and political myths that constitute the ideology of our society. (1982, p. 152)

His warning is as relevant today as when it was written.

Conclusion

Biological determinism has a long history and is deeply embedded in Western schol­
arship. Both biological determinism and essentialism have taken many different
forms over the centuries. While extreme biological determinism is rarely advocated
by scholars today, theories that promote biology as offering the strongest explana­
tion for sex and gender differences and differences in sexuality are still popular and
widely accepted in academia and in the media. Current theories centering on genes,
hormones, and brains have been critiqued by feminist scholars and others, who ques­
tion the quality of the science behind the assertions that are made. Questions arise,
also, about the narrow conception of humanity and human life that a theory focused
primarily on genes, hormones, or brains can offer. Such theories fail to capture the
reality that humans are not only biological but also social and psychological beings,
enmeshed in complex and ongoing exchanges with their human and nonhuman
 Biological Determinism and Essentialism 31
c­ ontexts. It is thus unhelpful to ignore the social nature of human biology as much
as it is to ignore the biological nature of all humans.
Essentialism is often found hand in hand with biological determinism although
the perceived roots of difference may be social as well as biological. Seeing males and
females, homosexuals and heterosexuals as different “types,” with fixed and endur­
ing essences is questionable given the evidence of a degree of life‐course fluidity
within individuals and the varied and overlapping nature of sex, gender, and sexual
expression across individuals.
Combating essentialism and biological determinism and reductionism may be a
difficult and ongoing struggle. However, it is high time to leave the old and fallacious
certainties of essentialism and biological determinism behind and embrace the chal­
lenge of a nonessentialist, nondualist future, one that fully embraces the dynamic
complexity, potentialities, and constraints of human life. Theories such as develop­
mental dynamic systems theories are attempting to capture this complexity. In femi­
nist theory we need to take account of the material and the biological. The “new
materialism” and the “new biology” converge on similar visions and together pro­
vide a more adequate base for theorizing human ontology and potential and – criti­
cally – they provide a better foundation for feminist theory and action.

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Fundy, Bay of, 83.
Fur trade, 104, 109, 118, 127, 137, 173, 177, 212, 220, 270.

Garay, Francis, 35.

Gates, Sir Thomas, 78.
Georgia, 158, 159, 173.
Gilbert, Sir Humphrey, 64, 65.
Gillam, Captain Zachariah, 208.
Gold, Search for, 37, 59, 141, 142, 149;
Discovered, 256;
Mica taken for gold, 76.
Golden Gate, the, 151.
Gorges, Sir Ferdinand, 87, 88;
Robert, 88.
Gosnold, Bartholomew, 71.
Gourgues, Dominique de, 61, 62.
Gray, Captain, 188.
Grand Manan, Island of, 84, 85.
Great Bear Lake, 214.
Great Bend, Missouri River, 186, 226.
Great Plains, the, 274.
Great Slave Lake, 214, 247, 254.
Greenland, 8, 11.
Grenville, Sir Richard, 67, 68.
Griffin, the, 133.
Grijalva, Captain, 140.
Grosseliez, 207, 208.
Gunnbiorn, 8.

Half Moon, 105–107.

Harrisburg founded, 162.
Hartford, 104.
Hatteras, Cape, 65.
Hawkins, Sir John, 59.
Hearne, Mr., 210, 213–217.
Hennepin, 133, 134.
Hercules, Pillars of, 7.
Herjulfson, Bjarni, 8.
Hochelaga, 53, 54.
Holmes, William, 103.
Hontan, Baron La, 138, 247.
Hudson, Henry, 105–108.
Hudson River, 50, 106.
Hudson’s Bay, 108, 137, 206–208, 210–213, 269, 270.
Hudson’s Bay Company, 138, 206, 208–217.
Hudson’s Straits, 210.
Huguenot colonists, 57–62, 165.
Hunt, William, 225‒232.
Huron, Lake, 115.
Huron Indians, 115, 126.

Illinois River, 132.

Independence, War of, 162.
Indians, conflicts with, 105, 110, 126, 153–156, 158, 167, 222,
226.
Indian princess, 42;
King, 54;
War challenge, 96;
Ceremony in honor of the dead, 122;
Concert, 263;
Scalp dance, 264.
Indians:—174, 179, 214, 219, 229, 244.
Algonquins, 110, 112, 115–117.
Apache, 149, 150, 184, 258, 260–264, 267, 268.
Arapaho, 242.
 Blackfeet, 228.
Cherokees, 159, 168–172.
Cheyennes, 228, 242.
Chickasaw, 43, 168.
Chippeway, 122, 129, 179–181, 238.
Comanche, 136, 184.
Creek, 158.
Crow, 228, 229.
Flathead, 98.
Huron, 115, 116.
Illinois, 130.
Iroquois, 113, 116, 123, 124, 127, 134.
Mohawk, 116, 123, 126, 127.
Navajoe, 184, 264, 266, 268.
Nez Percés, 197.
♦Onguiaharas, 122.

♦ ‘Onquilaharas’ replaced with ‘Onguiaharas’

Osage, 181.
Ottoe, 184.
Pawnee, 181, 234.
Pequod, 153–156.
Root, 247.
Seneca, 116, 127, 133.
Shoshone, 187, 229, 247, 254, 256.
Sioux, 128, 134, 177, 185, 225, 238.
Snake, 195, 196.
Zuni, 265.
Indians enslaved, 156, 158.
Indians, Penn’s treaty with the, 160.
Indiana, 173.
Iroquois Indians, 113, 116, 123, 124, 127, 134.
Isabella of Castile, 19.
Itasca Lake, 239.
James, Captain, 207.
James, Captain, 234–236.
Jamestown, 73, 76, 78–81, 110.
Jarvis, E. W., 272.
Jesuit Missionaries, 84, 119, 120, 126, 148, 149, 167.
Jesuits, Loss of power, 150.
Jesuit, a heroic, 124.
♦Jogues, Isaac, Jesuit Missionary, 123–125.

♦ ‘Joques’ replaced with ‘Jogues’

John II. of Portugal, 14.

Kansas, 241, 246.
Karsefue, 10.
Kennebec River, 88.
Kentucky, 168–172.
Kino, Eusebius Francis, 148.
Kirk, Mr., 118.
Knight, John, 209, 210.

La Paz, 146.
Lake of the Woods, 238.
Lane, Ralph, 68.
Latter-Day Saints, 255.
Laudonnière, René de, 58, 61.
Law, John, 166.
Laws, Mr., 258.
League of the Colonies, 157.
Le Gran Quivera, 259.
Leech Lake, 180, 233.
Leif the Lucky, 9.
Le Moyne, Father, 126.
Leon, Juan Ponce de, 33–35.
Lewis, Captain, 184–198.
Lion Caldron, 230.
Long, Major, 234–238.
Long Island, 9.
Long Island Sound, 87, 109.
Louisiana, 135, 166, 167, 168;
Ceded to United States, 173.
Louisville founded, 172.
Lost colony, the, 69, 70.
Luna, Don Tristan de, 47.

M’Dougal, Mr., 220–224.

Mackenzie, Alexander, 213, 217–219.
Mackenzie River, 214, 217.
Mackinaw, 225.
Mad River, 230.
Madoc, 11.
Magellan, 32, 49.
Magnus Colorado, Indian chief, 262.
Maine, 82, 85, 86.
Mandan Indians, 186, 227.
Manhattan Island, 106, 110.
Marco Polo, 12.
Marquette, James, 129–133.
Martha’s Vineyard, 71.
Maryland founded, 80.
Mason, Captain John, 156.
Massachusetts, 71.
Massasoit, 95, 102.
Matagorda, Bay of, 135.
Maurepas Lake, 164.
Mavilla, Indian village, 42.
Mayflower, the, 93.
Meares, Captain John, 202–204.
Mendoza, 140, 145.
Menendez, Pedro, 60–63.
Merrimac River, 99.
Mesnard, René, 128.
Mexico, 140, 144.
Mexico, Gulf of, 30, 135.
Michigan, 236.
Michigan, Lake, 120, 133, 237.
Middleton, Captain, 210.
Minnesota River, 237.
Missionaries, 119, 120.
Missionary colonists, 115, 150–152.
Missionary settlements, 119, 120.
Mississippi River, 35, 43, 44, 129, 132, 138, 164–166, 170,
176, 178, 180, 233, 234, 239.
Mississippi Scheme, 166.
Missouri River, 131, 184–194.
Great Bend, 186, 226.
Source of, 194.
Mitchigamea, Indian village, 132.
Mobile Bay, 164.
Mohawk Indians, 116, 123, 126, 127.
Monterey Bay, 146.
Montreal, 53, 114, 120.
Monts, De, 83.
Moore, Captain, 210, 211.
Mormons, 255, 256.
Mount Desert, 84.

Narvaez, Pamphilo de, 37, 38.

Natchez founded, 165.
Navajoe Indians, 184, 264–266, 268.
Nebraska River, 234, 236, 241, 246.
New Amsterdam, 110.
New England, 92–104.
Newfoundland, 9, 52, 64.
New Hampshire, 86, 88.
New Haven, 157.
New Jersey, 109.
New Mexico, 136, 174, 258.
New Netherland, 109, 128.
New Orleans, 166.
Newport, Captain, 72, 76, 77.
New York, 110.
New York, Harbor of, 50, 106.
Nez Percés, 197.
Niagara River, 122, 133.
Niagara Falls, 122.
Nipissing Lake, 115.
Nizza, Fra Marco da, 141–144.
Nootka Sound, 201.
Northmen, the, 11.
North-west Company, 212, 213, 217.
Nova Scotia, 9, 88, 269.
Nunez, Alvaro, 141.

Oglethorpe, General, 159.

Ohio River, 170;
State, 171, 172.
Ohio Company, 167, 172.
Oldham, John, 89, 153.
Omaha, 226.
Ontario, Lake, 119, 127.
♦Onguiaharas Indians, 122.
♦ ‘Onquiaharas’ replaced with ‘Onguiaharas’

Opechancanough, Indian Chief, 73.

Ortiz, Juan, 40.
Oswego River, 127.
Osage Indians, 181.
Ottawa River, 114.
Ottoe Indians, 184.

Pacific Ocean, Balboa discovers the, 32.

Palliser, Captain, 271.
Parker, Dr., 259.
Pawnee Indians, 181, 234.
Pearl fisheries, 150.
Penn, William, 159–161.
Pennsylvania, 160.
Penobscot River, 82.
Pensacola Harbor, discovery of, 41.
Pensacola River, 164.
Peoria Lake, 134.
Pequod Indians, 153–156.
Perez, 16, 17, 18, 23.
Philadelphia, 161.
Pictured Rocks, 123.
Pigart, Claude, Jesuit missionary, 122, 123.
Pike, Major, 176–183.
Pike’s Peak, 235, 242.
Pipe of Peace, 130, 131, 178, 227.
Pittsburg, 162.
Plymouth Company, 87, 88.
Pocahontas, 75, 79.
Pontchartrain, Lake, 164.
Port Royal, 58.
Portsmouth founded, 88.
Potomac River, 75.
Potawatomie Indians, 236.
Powhatan, 75, 77.
Providence founded, 102.
Puritans, the, 89–91;
Embarkation of, 92;
First landing, 93;
Land at Plymouth, 94;
Threatened by Indians, 96;
Settlements by, 99, 105.

Quebec, 53, 112, 116.

Quakers, 161.
Railroads, 268, 271–275.
Raleigh, Sir Walter, 64, 65, 67, 70.
Red Cedar Lake, 180.
Red River, 166, 169, 182.
Red River of the North, 238.
Rhode Island, 9.
Ribault, John, 57–62.
Rio Bravo de Norte, 183.
Rio Grande River, 260.
Roanoake Colony, 67–69.
Rocky Mountains, 190, 193, 194, 234, 242–247, 256.
Root Indians, 247.
Rose’s Edward, conspiracy against Hunt, 228.
Rupert, Prince, 208.
Russian Exploration, 200.

Sacramento, 256.
Sacramento River, 253.
Salle, Robert Cavalier de la, 133–136.
Salmon, 219.
Salt Lake, 236.
Salt Lake City, 248, 256.
San Diego, 146, 150.
San Domingo, 22.
San Francisco, 151, 240.
San Xavier del Bac, ruins of, 149.
Santa Fé, 184.
Saskatchewan River, 137, 272.
Savannah River, 158.
Saybrook, 104, 156.
Scalp dance, 264.
Schoolcraft, Mr., 238, 239.
Scotch colonists, 88.
Seneca Indians, 116, 127, 133.
Shawmut Point, 99.
Ship Island, 164.
Shoshone Indians, 187, 229, 247, 254, 256.
Sierra Nevada Mountains, 251.
Sioux Indians, 128, 134, 177, 185, 225, 238.
Skraellings, 9.
Slaves first landed at Jamestown, 79.
Slave Lake, 217.
Slave River, 217.
Smith, Captain John, 72–78, 85.
Smith, Captain, 210, 211.
Smith, Joe, 255.
Snake River, 230, 248.
Snake Indians, 195, 196.
Sothel, Seth, 158.
Soto, Hernando de, 39, 46.
South Pass, 245, 254.
Southern Pacific Railway, 268.
Spanish Explorations and Settlements, 30–48, 60–63,
140–146.
Spanish power in Mexico, Overthrow of, 152.
Standish, Captain Miles, 93, 97, 98.
Stansbury, Captain, 256.
Steck, Dr., 258.
Stewart family, Murder of, 268.
Stone, Captain, murder of, 152.
St. Anthony’s Falls, 134.
St. Augustine, 62.
St. John’s River, 57.
St. Lawrence, Gulf of, 29, 52.
St. Lawrence River, 52, 112–118, 178, 237, 238.
St. Louis, 131, 135, 225.
St. Mary’s, 81.
Superior, Lake, 123.
Sutter’s Fort, 240, 253.
Swedish colonists, 110.

Tampa Bay, 37.

Tennessee, 172.
Texas, 135, 136;
ceded to the United States, 174.
Thinkleet Indians, 219.
Thorstein, 10.
Thorvald, 9.
Tonti, 165.
Tonquin, the, 220;
loss of, 221, 224.

Ulloa, Francisco de, 141.

United States,
Beginning of, 157;
Extension of, 173;
Northern boundary, 270.

Vaca, Cabeca de, 38, 39.

Vancouver, 204.
Verrazano of Florence, 37.
Verrazano, Giovanni, 49–51.
Vespucci, Amerigo, 25.
Vines, Richard, 87, 89.
Virginia, first settlement, 68.
Viscaino, Sebastian, 146, 188.
Voyage up the Missouri, Hunt’s, 225–228.
Voyage down the Snake and Columbia, Hunt’s, 230–232.

Walloons, 109.
Welsh, 12.
West India Company, 109.
White, John, 69.
White Mountains, 87.
Wilkes, Captain, 240.
Williams, Roger, 101–103, 155.
Wisconsin River, 130, 132, 138, 177.
Windsor, 104.
Winnipeg, Lake, 233, 238, 272.
Winthrop, John, 99, 101.

Yellowstone River, 187, 246.

Yellow Fever in Louisiana, 166.
Yerba Buena, 239, 251.
Young, Brigham, 255.

Zeni, the Brothers, 12.

Zuni, Ruins of, 265.
Zunis Indians, 265.
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