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Climate of Conquest War Environment and Empire in Mughal North India Pratyay Nath Full Chapter PDF
Climate of Conquest War Environment and Empire in Mughal North India Pratyay Nath Full Chapter PDF
Climate of Conquest War Environment and Empire in Mughal North India Pratyay Nath Full Chapter PDF
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Climate of Conquest
Climate of Conquest
War, Environment, and Empire
in Mughal North India
Pratyay Nath
1
1
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
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Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries.
Published in India by
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2/11 Ground Floor, Ansari Road, Daryaganj, New Delhi 110 002, India
I have transliterated the Persian and Arabic words used in this book
according to F. Steingass, A Comprehensive Persian–English Dictionary
(New Delhi: Manohar, [1892] 2007). I have transliterated Bengali words
according to the romanization guidelines of the American Library
Association, Library of Congress, USA. I have not used diacritical
marks in the names of people and places for the ease of reading.
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS
To those who seek an empire, the best dress is a coat of mail, and the best
crown is a helmet, the most pleasant lodging is the battlefield, the tasti-
est wine is the enemies’ blood, and the charming beloved is the sword.
A prince, therefore, must not have any other object nor any other
thought, nor must he adopt anything as his art but war, its institutions,
its discipline; because that is the only art befitting one who commands …
The most important reason why you lose it [the throne] is by neglecting
this art, while the way to acquire it is to be well-versed in this art.
Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince2
1 These lines are followed up by a couplet: ‘Only that person who kisses
the lip of the sword/Can embrace in a leap the bride of dominion (‘arūs-i
mulk kasī dar kinār gīrad chust/kasī bos bar lab-i shamshīr āb-dār zanad).’ (MJ,
48,151.)
2 Niccolo Machiavelli, The Prince, trans. Peter Bondanella (New York:
Climate of Conquest: War, Environment, and Empire in Mughal North India. Pratyay
Nath, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199495559.001.0001
xxii Introduction
the Early Modern World (Berkeley, Los Angeles, and London: University of
California Press, 2003), 26.
5 Irfan Habib’s analysis of the administrative and bureaucratic processes
production of most of this class was to fight for the empire, much of
the financial resources ended up being spent on the upkeep of troops
and the making of wars. M. Athar Ali, Satish Chandra, and others
have highlighted how these imperial aristocrats increasingly vied with
each other to capture for themselves as much of this agrarian resource
as possible.6 Collectively, these historians argue that this increasing
financial appetite of the military aristocracy ultimately wrecked the
empire from within in two ways. First, it led to the over-exploitation
of the peasantry, pushing them to the point of large-scale rebellions.7
Second, it facilitated the destruction of the financial structure of the
empire and the degeneration of the imperial officialdom into ram-
pant factionalism.8
The regular bouts of war also meant that beyond actual military
performance at the front and the overall military priorities of the
administrative structure, the empire was perpetually busy attending
to the unending organizational minutiae of making war. At all times,
it had to manage the maintenance, repair, and construction of for-
tifications; the procurement, training, and deployment of diverse
types of war-animals; the production, storage, and shipping of vari-
ous kinds of weaponry; the recruitment and payment of enormous
numbers of soldiers as well as their transportation from the centres
of mobilization to the theatres of war; and so on. Consequently, war
was not something alien—some abnormality that happened away
from the regular dynamics of the empire’s daily life. It was in fact, a
social, cultural, and economic reality that comprised a fundamental
part of the quotidian life of the state. It not only moulded the behav-
iour of the empire in times of open conflict—which in any case were
extremely frequent—but also fundamentally shaped its very nature,
University Press, [1966] 2001); Satish Chandra, Parties and Politics at the
Mughal Court, 1707–1740 (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, [1959] 2003).
7 Habib, Agrarian System, 364–405.
8 Ali, The Mughal Nobility under Aurangzeb; Chandra, Parties and Politics;
Satish Chandra, Medieval India: Society, Jagirdari Crisis and the Village (Delhi:
Macmillan, 1982).
xxiv Introduction
Prakashan, 1977); Kaushik Roy, India's Historic Battles: From Alexander the
Great to Kargil (New Delhi: Permanent Black, 2004), 54–79; Jadunath Sarkar,
Military History of India (Delhi: Orient Longmans, 1970).
11 The most important contributions in this area have come from Iqtidar
Alam Khan. See Iqtidar Alam Khan, ‘Early Use of Cannon and Musket in
India, A.D. 1442–1526,’ Journal of Economic and Social History of the Orient 24,
no. 2 (1984), 146–64; Iqtidar Alam Khan, ‘Firearms in Central Asia and Iran
during the Fifteenth Century and the Origins and Nature of Firearms brought
by Babur,’ Proceedings of the Indian History Congress (Calcutta, 1995), 435–446;
Iqtidar Alam Khan, ‘Origin and Development of Gunpowder Technology in
India, A.D. 1250–1500,’ The Indian Historical Review 4, no. 1 (1977), 20–9;
Iqtidar Alam Khan, Gunpowder and Firearms: Warfare in Medieval India (New
Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2004). Also see Irfan Habib, ‘Akbar and
Technology,’ Social Scientist 20, no. 9–10 (1992), 3–15; Iqbal Ghani Khan,
‘Metallurgy in Medieval India—The Case of Iron Cannons,’ Proceedings of the
Indian History Congress (Annamalainagar, 1984); G.N. Pant, Mughal Weapons
in the Baburnama (Delhi: Agam Kala Prakashan, 1989); Murray B. Emeneau,
‘The Composite Bow in India,’ Proceedings of the American Philosophical
Society 97, no. 1 (1953), 77–87.
12 Works on Mughal army organization include Abdul Aziz, The
Mansabdari System and the Mughal Army (Delhi: Idarah-i Adabiyat-i Delli,
[1945] 1972); William Irvine, The Army of the Indian Moghuls (Delhi: Low
Price Publications, [1903] 2004); Kaushik Roy, ‘From the Mamluks to the
Mansabdars: A Social History of Military Service in South Asia, c. 1500 to
c. 1650,’ in Fighting for a Living: A Comparative History of Military Labour
1500–2000, ed. Erik-Jan Zürcher (Amsterdam: Amsterdam University Press,
2013), 81–114. For a comprehensive analysis of Mughal military techniques
Introduction xxv
and Tactics in the Early Empire, 1500–1605,’ The Journal of Military History
78, no. 3 (2014), 927–60; Andrew de la Garza, The Mughal Empire at War:
Babur, Akbar and the Indian Military Revolution, 1500–1605 (London and New
York: Routledge, 2016).
15 For an emphasis on the role of firearms, see especially Marshall G.S.
System’ of Mughal India,’ Indian Economic and Social History Review 23,
no. 3 (1988), 319–40.
19 Richard M. Eaton, The Rise of Islam and the Bengal Frontier, 1204–1760
Mughal, Safavid, and Ottoman Empires, Streusand has developed this idea
further. (Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires, 254–64.)
25 Streusand, Islamic Gunpowder Empires.
xxx Introduction
Biran, eds., Mongols, Turks, and Others: Eurasian Nomads and the Sedentary
World (Leiden: Brill, 2005); Thomas J. Barfield, The Perilous Frontier: Nomadic
Empires and China (Massachusetts and Oxford: Basil Blackwell, 1989); Anatoly
M. Khazanov and Andre Wink, eds., Nomads in the Sedentary World (Surrey:
Curzon Press, 2001).
29 The triad of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals was originally
War in the Early Modern World, 1450–1815, ed. Jeremy Black (London and
New York: Routledge, 1999), 105–28, see 109.
xxxii Introduction
33 Peter Lorge, The Asian Military Revolution: From Gunpowder to the Bomb
(Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), 112–32;
Kaushik Roy, Military Transition in Early Modern Asia, 1400–1750: Cavalry,
Guns, Government and Ships (London and New York: Bloomsbury Academic,
2014). Jos Gommans has also contributed to this debate and argued that
South Asia experienced a Military Revolution only in the eighteenth century
comprising a Europeanization of the armies of the various states that rose
following the decline of the Mughal Empire. See Gommans, ‘Warhorse and
Gunpowder in India.’
34 Michael Roberts, The Military Revolution, 1560–1660 (Belfast: Marjory
Boyd, 1956).
35 Christopher Duffy, Siege Warfare: The Fortress in the Early Modern
‘Military Revolution in Early Modern Japan,’ Japanese Studies 33, no. 3 (2013),
243–61.
38 John A. Lynn, ‘The Trace Italienne and the Growth of Armies: The
French Case,’ Journal of Military History 55, no. 3 (1991), 297–330; David
A. Parrott, ‘Strategy and Tactics in the Thirty Years’ War: The “Military
Revolution”’, Militiirgeschichtliche Mitteilungen 2 (1985), 7–25; Clifford J.
Rogers, ‘The Military Revolutions of the Hundred Years’ War,’ Journal of
Military History 57, no. 2 (1993), 241–78. Also see Jeremy Black, A Military
Revolution? Military Change and European Society, 1550–1800 (Basingstoke:
Macmillan, 1991).
39 Jeremy Black, Beyond the Military Revolution: War in the Seventeenth
Century World (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011), 199.
40 Jeremy Black, War and the Cultural Turn (Cambridge: Polity Press,
2011), 45.
xxxiv Introduction
point about the flexible, adaptive, and inclusive nature of the Mughal state in
his study of the fashioning of Timurid imperial ideology, especially between
Timur and Akbar. He shows that this political ideology developed through
constant interaction with and borrowing from myths, beliefs, traditions,
and lived experiences of the various subject populations. (A. Azfar Moin,
The Millennial Sovereign: Sacred Kingship and Sainthood in Islam [New York:
Columbia University Press, 2012.])
47 In part, the title is inspired by that of Sam White’s fascinating recent
study of the impact of the Little Ice Age on the society and economy of the
Ottoman Empire. In this book, I draw upon White’s analysis in focusing on
the relationship between the natural environment and the building of the
Mughal Empire in early modern North India. White, Climate of Rebellion.
xxxvi Introduction
of different factors and I have pointed out repeatedly that climate was
one of the most important among them. Climatic factors, including
rainfall, snowfall, low temperatures, and heavy showers, profoundly
shaped the conduct of warfare in regions as diverse as Assam, Bengal,
Sindh, Kashmir, Qandahar, and Balkh. The title of the book refers to
this very important role played by climate in moulding the processes
of Mughal war-making. However, even more than this specific use,
the term signifies the wide range of environmental factors in general.
Apart from climate, several other forces played very important roles
in influencing the course of military expansion. They included terrain,
ecology, and so on. In this second instance, the reference to climate
is meant to remind the reader about this enduring and intricate
relationship between environmental factors, in general, and Mughal
territorial conquest. Finally, I have used the word figuratively as well,
to refer to the ideological paradigm of war at the Mughal court. This
encompasses the realm of military culture, legitimization of war,
narratives of military conflict, military ethics, and so on.48
Next, it is important to understand the meaning of the term
‘early modern’, that I use throughout this book. The great amount
of scholarly output in the last few years has firmly established the
usefulness of this new periodization.49 John Richards, Sanjay
Subrahmanyam, Rosalind O’Hanlon, and Sheldon Pollock have
discussed from various perspectives the merits of using this fresh
category for writing South Asian history from the sixteenth through the
eighteenth centuries.50 In this collective imagination, early modernity
48 The inspiration for this figurative use of the term ‘climate’ comes from
W.H. Auden’s description of Sigmund Freud in the following words: ‘to us
he is no more a person/now but a whole climate of opinion/under whom we
conduct our different lives’. I am thankful to Ritajyoti Bandyopadhyay for
attracting my attention to this poem. (Source: https://www.poets.org/poet-
sorg/poem/memory-sigmund-freud, accessed on 3 March 2018. Emphasis
mine.)
49 For an example of a voice of dissent, see Jack Gladstone, ‘The Problem
of the “Early Modern” World,’ Journal of the Economic and Social History of the
Orient 41, no. 3 (1998), 249–84.
50 John F. Richards, ‘Early Modern India and World History,’ Journal of
The Mughals conquered North India twice. The first time, Zahiruddin
Muhammad Babur (r. 1526–1530), a young Turkish prince, marched
in from Kabul against the Afghan sultanate of the Lodis. He was
a Timurid prince dispossessed of his paternal inheritances in
Transoxiana by bitter fraternal rivalry and an ascendant Uzbeg
Khanate. Based in his modest domain in Kabul and its surround-
ings to the south of Transoxiana, he tried his luck to get hold of
Hindustan—the fabled land of riches—several times since 1519. It
was in 1525–6 that fortune finally smiled upon him. Spectacular vic-
tories in two battles fought in quick succession near Delhi and Agra
gave him the control over these two imperial cities and an opportunity
to establish his dynastic power in this new land. However, as it turned
Climate of Conquest: War, Environment, and Empire in Mughal North India. Pratyay
Nath, Oxford University Press (2019). © Oxford University Press.
DOI: 10.1093/oso/9780199495559.003.0001
4 Climate of Conquest
out, Babur could enjoy the fruits of his long-drawn efforts only for
four more years.1
Upon his death, his eldest son Nasiruddin Muhammad Humayun
(r. 1530–1540, 1555–1556) inherited his father’s North Indian pos-
sessions in 1530. His rule started well with rapid military advances
towards the west and the east. However, his fortune quickly reversed
with successive defeats against a brilliant Afghan military general
from Bihar—Sher Khan Sur.2 As the latter styled himself as Sher
Shah to celebrate his victories over Humayun and proclaim him-
self an independent ruler, the first Mughal attempt at building
an empire in South Asia came to a sudden halt in 1540.3 It took
Humayun a decade and a half, which included a brief sojourn at his
rival Shah Tahmasp Safavi’s court in Iran and a bitter war against his
own brothers, to re-enter North India. When he did manage to lead a
Mughal army to retake the city of Delhi, he met with an accident and
died an untimely death soon after.4 It was under his son and succes-
sor Jalaluddin Muhammad Akbar (r. 1556–1605) that the Mughals
defeated yet another Afghan army on the fields of Panipat in 1556
1977).
3 For a recent analysis of this Mughal–Afghan face-off and the rise of Sher
Shah Sur, see Raziuddin Aquil, Sufism, Culture and Politics: Afghans and Islam
in Medieval North India (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 2012).
4 For a study of Humayun’s political career with an emphasis on his king-
ship, see Moin, The Millennial Sovereign, 94–129. Also see Faruqui, Princes of
the Mughal Empire, 46–65.
Environment and the Heterogeneous Conquest of North India 5
and thereby sealed their control over Delhi and Agra once again.
This began the second chapter of Mughal history in early modern
South Asia.5
Over the next decade and a half, armies of the young emperor
expanded their territory and consolidated Mughal territorial power
in North India.6 By 1569, they established control over much of the
land that would eventually constitute the heartland of their empire.
This area mainly comprised the modern Indian federal states of
Punjab, Haryana, Uttar Pradesh, Madhya Pradesh, and Rajasthan
as well as eastern parts of Pakistan. It was based on their hold over
this area that Mughal armies invaded more distant lands, including
Sind and Gujarat in the west and Bihar and Bengal in the east—all
in the early 1570s. The story of this second wave of expansion is
something I will discuss in the next chapter. The dynamics of the
initial campaigns that created the Mughal heartland under Akbar
is what the present chapter unravels. Douglas Streusand studied
this process around three decades back.7 I build on his arguments
and take the inquiry forward. More specifically, I probe the kind of
negotiations with the natural environment these initial campaigns
under Akbar entailed. In the process, I also revisit the formula-
tions of two different groups of historians, who argue that Mughal
military conquests were spearheaded by the imperial cavalry and
firearms respectively. I will argue that while both of these made
valuable contributions to the overall process of military expansion,
environmental diversity of the region under study prevented either
of them from actually driving imperial conquests single-handedly
everywhere.
5 Andre Wink and Douglas Streusand have carried out the most recent
and critical analysis of this early phase of the second chapter of Mughal
expansion. (Streusand, Formation; Andre Wink, Makers of the Muslim World:
Akbar [Oxford: Oneworld, 2009].)
6 Akbar was only fourteen years old when he succeeded his father to the
evant for my work. I will refer to them from time to time in the relevant
sections.
6 Climate of Conquest