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Different Histories,
Shared Futures
Dialogues on
Australia-China
Edited by
Mobo Gao · Justin O’Connor · Baohui Xie ·
Jack Butcher
Different Histories, Shared Futures
“A timely, wide ranging and well informed contribution to the currently vexed
and turbulent relationship between Australia and China. This collection presents
the balanced but forcefully argued views of some of the best qualified scholars
on this issue at a moment when such a book is crucial. An essential primer.”
—Kerry Brown, Professor, King’s College
“If you just want fast food off the China threat production assembly line,
this is not the book for you. What this book delivers is that extremely rare
commodity: a patient, dispassionate, cool-headed analysis drawing on insights
from the authors’ life-long, dedicated research on China. If you want to see
Australia-China relations improve, and if Australia’s public debate is to have
any hope of going beyond media headlines and think-tank reports, this book is
essential reading.”
—Wanning Sun, Professor, University of Technology Sydney
“As the world seems to be spiralling toward a new Cold War with China, this
edited volume offers a useful corrective to what has been, at times, a hysterical
over-reaction to the growth of Chinese global power. Featuring a number of
Australia’s leading China specialists discussing the two country’s relations, this
volume could not be more timely or more necessary.”
—Michael Dutton, Professor, University of London
“This book is a timely stocktake of the spectacular collapse of Australia-China

relations, and a strong riposte to the narrative that this was all China’s doing.
With informed perspectives on questions of Australian security and identity, and
the nature of today’s PRC, the authors pick apart simplistic depictions of an
ideological stand-off and offer more compelling explanations for today’s rivalries
and antagonisms. Anyone looking for an alternative to rising tensions and the
reckless contemplation of war will find much to draw on in this volume.”
—David Brophy, Senior Lecturer, University of Sydney
Mobo Gao · Justin O’Connor · Baohui Xie ·
Jack Butcher
Editors
Different Histories,
Shared Futures
Dialogues on Australia-China
Editors
Mobo Gao Justin O’Connor
Department of Asian Studies Creative Industries
University of Adelaide University of South Australia
Adelaide, SA, Australia Magill, SA, Australia
Baohui Xie Jack Butcher

Department of Asian Studies Department of Politics
University of Adelaide and International Relations
Adelaide, SA, Australia University of Adelaide
Adelaide, SA, Australia
ISBN 978-981-19-9190-5 ISBN 978-981-19-9191-2 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9191-2
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights
of translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and
retrieval, electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology
now known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc.
in this publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such
names are exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for
general use.
The publisher, the authors, and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and informa-
tion in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither
the publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with
respect to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been
made. The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps
and institutional affiliations.
Cover credit: kenkuza_shutterstock.com
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
Acknowledgements
Much of the discussion in this book is based on an online conference in

which we collaborated the resultant joint findings with colleagues across
three continents—Australia, Asia and Europe. We would like to thank
all the conference participants, even though some of the papers initially
presented have not been included here. We would like to acknowledge
the support of the School of Social Sciences under then Head Professor
Melissa Jane Nursey-Bray at the University of Adelaide and the Univer-
sity of South Australia Creative for the support provided in getting this
book to publication. We are also grateful for the valuable input of each
of the international team members towards this project, which has taken
much of their time, effort and patience, especially Jacob Dreyer and Arun
Kumar Anbalagan, with whom we have been in frequent communication.
v
Contents
1 Different Pasts: The Panda and the Kangaroo 1

Mobo Gao, Baohui Xie, Justin O’Connor, and Jack Butcher
2 China Threat, Australian Challenge: Recognising
Differences, Building Futures 15
David S. G. Goodman
3 The Role of National Security in Australia–China
Relations 31
Colin Mackerras
4 Australia’s China Discourse: Equivalential Identities
and Bilateral Relations 49
Yingjie Guo
5 Australia’s Narrative on Beijing’s Economic Coercion:
Context and Critique 65
James Laurenceson
6 Geopolitical Contest in the South Pacific: Are
Australia and China Destined to Compete? 89
David Morris
7 The Securitisation of Australia’s China Policy and Its
Reasons 109
Rujie Chen and Yujia Shen
vii
viii CONTENTS
8 The Strange “Bed-Fellows” with Different Dreams:

The System-Unit Dynamics in China–Australia
Strategic Partnership 121
Lei Yu and Sophia Sui
9 Australia’s China Literacy and China’s Australia
Literacy: Misassumptions and Implications
for Bilateral Relations 137
Dan Hu and Ying Li
10 Grassroots Perceptions of Australia in China During
Diplomatic Tensions: A Lens Through “We-Media”
Framing 159
Jack Butcher
11 Minzhu in the People’s Congress: Understanding
the Chinese Way of Understanding Representative
Democracy 179
Baohui Xie
12 Australia’s Higher Education and the Future
of the Common Good 203
Greg McCarthy and Xianlin Song
13 Cultural Diplomacy and Foreign Interference: Some
Reflections on Australia–China Relations 223
Jocelyn Chey
14 Is Common Destiny with Australia Possible When
the CCP Still Rules China: From the Perspective
of Values and Ways of Life 241
Mobo Gao
15 Shared Futures? 269
Justin O’Connor
Index 287
Notes on Contributors
Jack Butcher is a Ph.D. student at the University of Adelaide. He has

extensive experience working, living and studying in China. He speaks
highly fluent Mandarin among five other languages. He received both
the Westpac and New Colombo Plan scholarships in 2017. His research
interests include security studies and strategic culture in the Asia Pacific.
Rujie Chen is a Master’s student at the School of International Studies
at Sichuan University. His research focuses on Asia-Pacific politics.
Dr. Jocelyn Chey is Adjunct Professor at Western Sydney University
and UTS and Visiting Professor at the University of Sydney. She was
a career diplomat, her last posting being as Consul General to Hong
Kong and Macau. She was awarded the Australia-China Council Medal
in 2008 and the Medal of Australia (AM) in 2009. She is a Fellow of the
Australian Institute of International Affairs. Her current research fields
include Australia-China and Australia-Hong Kong relations and Chinese
humour.
Dr. Mobo Gao is Professor and Chair of Chinese Studies at the Depart-
ment of Asian Studies at the University of Adelaide. He was the founding
Director of the Confucius Institute at the University of Adelaide from
2008 to 2018, and he has working experience at various universities
in China, UK and Australia. He is known as a prolific author and for
his insight into Chinese politics, culture as well as Chinese migration to
Australia and the mass media.
ix
x NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS
Dr. David S. G. Goodman is Director, China Studies Centre, Univer-

sity of Sydney, where he is also Professor of Chinese Politics in the
Department of Government and International Relations. A Fellow of the
Academy of Social Sciences in Australia, he is also an emeritus professor
in the Department of China Studies at Xi’an Jiaotong-Liverpool Univer-
sity in Suzhou, China; and the Australia-China Relations Institute at
University of Technology, Sydney.
Dr. Yingjie Guo is Professor in Chinese Studies at the Faculty of Arts
and Social Sciences, the University of Sydney. His research is related
to discourses of nation and class in contemporary China with a focus
on China’s cultural nationalism and Chinese cultural identities, and the
discourse of class in post-Mao China.
Dr. Dan Hu is Assistant Professor and Deputy Director at the Australian
Studies Centre of Beijing Foreign Studies University, and Research
Fellow at the Centre for Contemporary Chinese Studies, University of
Melbourne.
Dr. James Laurenceson is Professor and Director of the Australia-China
Relations Institute (ACRI) at UTS.
His research has been published in leading scholarly journals. He also
provides regular commentary on contemporary developments in China
economy and the Australia-China relationship.
Ying Li is a Master’s student at the Australian Studies Center of Beijing
Foreign Studies University.
Dr. Colin Mackerras is a Professor Emeritus from Griffith University,
where he worked from 1974 to 2004. He is a Fellow of the Australian
Academy of the Humanities and an Officer in the Order of Australia.
He has published widely on (1) Chinese traditional theatre and drama;
(2) Chinese history; (3) China’s ethnic minorities; (4) Western images of
China; and (5) Australia-China relations.
Dr. Greg McCarthy is Professor Emeritus of Political Science at the
University of Western Australia. He was the BHP Chair of Australian
Studies at Peking University from 2016 to 2018. He has published widely
on both China and Australia relations and higher education.
David Morris is former Australian and multilateral diplomat. He is Vice
Chair of the United Nations Economic and Social Commission for Asia
NOTES ON CONTRIBUTORS xi
and the Pacific Sustainable Business Network. He represented the Pacific

Islands Forum Secretariat as Pacific Trade and Investment Commissioner
in China, 2015–2018. He is currently completing a Ph.D. in international
relations at Corvinus University of Budapest.
Dr. Justin O’Connor is Professor of Cultural Economy at the Univer-
sity of South Australia. He’s been involved as researcher, teacher and
policy-advocate in the cultural/creative industries in the UK and East
Asian regions since 1989. He has also been involved, as a member of
UNESCO’s international ‘Expert Facility’, in missions developing cultural
industries strategy in various countries as well as convening a Global
Cultural Economy Network.
Dr. Yujia Shen is Associate Professor at the School of International
Studies at Sichuan University. Her research interest is on Asia Pacific
region with a special focus on China and South Pacific relations and
China-Australia relations.
Dr. Xianlin Song is Adjunct Research Fellow at the School of Social
Sciences at the University of Western Australia. She is active in quite
a number of related but cross-disciplinary areas in arts and humanities
including Chinese women’s literature and international higher education
mobility.
Dr. Sophia Sui is a Research Fellow at the Deakin University, Australia.
Dr. Baohui Xie is Scholarly Teaching Fellow at the Department of Asian
Studies at the University of Adelaide. He is an advanced level interpreter
and NAATI certified translator of Chinese and English in both directions.
Apart from his expertise in translation studies, he researches into Chinese
politics, media and religion.
Dr. Lei Yu is Professor at the Center for Pacific Studies, Liaocheng
University and Guest Professor at Beijing University of Foreign Studies.
List of Tables
Table 4.1 Opposed camps in the International Arena 51

Table 4.2 The Antagonistic poles 52
Table 4.3 Equivalential identities within self and other 53
Table 9.1 Primary enrolments, by language and year level, 2020 144
Table 9.2 Secondary enrolments, by language and year level, 2020 144
Table 9.3 Number of students who completed a VCE Unit 4
language course, by year level undertaken, and eligible
to graduate in 2020 145
Table 9.4 Number of Schools Offering Chinese Courses
in Australian States of New South Wales, Victoria,
Queensland, South Australia and Western Australia 147
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Different Pasts: The Panda

and the Kangaroo
Mobo Gao, Baohui Xie , Justin O’Connor ,

and Jack Butcher
Different Histories
This book is the direct outcome of an online conference held jointly
by the University of Adelaide and the University of South Australia in
M. Gao (B) · B. Xie

Department of Asian Studies, University of Adelaide, Adelaide, SA, Australia
e-mail: mobo.gao@adelaide.edu.au
B. Xie
e-mail: baohui.xie@adelaide.edu.au
J. O’Connor
Creative Industries, University of South Australia, Magill, SA, Australia
e-mail: Justin.oconnor@unisa.edu.au
J. Butcher
Department of Politics and International Relations, University of Adelaide,
Adelaide, SA, Australia
e-mail: jack.butcher@adelaide.edu.au
© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

Singapore Pte Ltd. 2023
M. Gao et al. (eds.), Different Histories, Shared Futures,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9191-2_1
2 M. GAO ET AL.
September 2021. Amid the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2021

was the year when the diplomatic relationship between Australia and
China was at its worst since 1972. We, Mobo Gao, Justin O’Connor,
Baohui Xie and Jack Butcher from the two universities mentioned above,
thought that we should perhaps do something to lift our spirits during
the gloomiest of times. We wanted to examine whether there was a possi-
bility of a way forward in which Australia and China could have a shared
future, even if the histories between the two countries were profoundly
different.
Australia and China could not be any more different. Australia is a
country of a little more than 25 million people, a continent scarcely popu-
lated in its middle and northwest but with abundant natural resources. It
has developed excellent health care, education, agriculture, mining and
service industries but hardly any industrial capacity. On the other end
of the spectrum, China is a country of 1.4 billion people with minimal
natural resources, a country that is nicknamed the “world’s factory” due
to its extensive manufacturing capabilities. The population of Shanghai,
or any one of the half a dozen megacities in China, is more than all the
people in Australia combined. Just imagine if all of Australia’s residents,
from Darwin to Perth, across the outback and towards the eastern states,
moved to Tasmania to live. That is what an average Chinese province is
like in terms of land size but double or even triple the number of people
living there.
But these are only the visible physical and material differences between
the two countries. There are many more. Politically, Australia is a multi-
party, one-person, one-vote democracy. China is a one-party state ruled
by the Communist Party of China (CCP), which has been there not
because of the ballot, but due to what is more broadly known as
a communist revolution. Although both countries are geographically
located in the Asia–Pacific, Australia’s cultural values and ways of life are
largely shaped by European traditions that were planted by white settlers
at the expense of the first nations peoples. On the other hand, Chinese
cultural values and ways of life, whatever they are, a matter discussed in
this book, have been shaped by the indigenous peoples themselves.
Geopolitically, Australia and China have one commonality: that is inse-
curity. Although Australia is a continental country at ease with itself in
terms of territorial integrity, it feels insecure as a European outpost in
the Asia–Pacific region and, therefore, canonically seeks alliances with
“great and powerful” Western powers for protection, formerly the United
1 DIFFERENT PASTS: THE PANDA AND THE KANGAROO 3
Kingdom (UK) and now the United States (US). On the other hand,
China has had territorial disputes with most of its neighbours. Although
settling land disputes with 13 of its 14 neighbours, except for India,
China still has maritime disputes with several countries. Furthermore, the
Taiwan issue, in particular, unsettles China.
Traditionally, China was not a nation-state in the sense that originated
in the West. The China that was between and around the Yellow River
and Yangtze River basins has been fluid in size, bigger or smaller both
in population and land, depending on outcomes of brutal and constant
tribal warfare, with different ethnic groups intermingling while fighting
against each other. While the Confucian-influenced Chinese were later
called the Han Chinese (because of the name of the Han Dynasty), Han
was never meant to be ethnic or national. The two biggest empires in
Chinese history were the so-called Yuan Dynasty and Qing Dynasty, the
former established by the Mongolians from the north and the latter by
the Manchus from the northeast, who invaded and conquered China
proper. Whether those two empires can be categorised as Chinese dynas-
ties might be debatable, but the fact that they became Chinese, even
though the Mongolians were not as thoroughly as the Manchus, is less
under dispute. When the Qing Dynasty collapsed in 1911, the Republic of
China, established in 1912, inherited its territories. And when the Kuom-
intang (KMT), headed by Chiang Kai-shek, took the Republic of China
government to Taiwan after his defeat at the hands of the communists
led by Mao Zedong, the CCP established the People’s Republic of China
(PRC) and took over the Republic of China’s territories, without much
of an internationally recognised and legalised demarcation of its borders.
After years of give-and-take negotiations, the PRC has settled its disputes
with most of its land-based neighbours and has accepted a territorial size
smaller than what the Republic of China in Taiwan would entertain.
Nevertheless, China does not feel secure. Memories of colonial occu-
pation by Western powers and Japanese invasions and occupations linger
vividly, particularly images of war-time atrocities, such as the Nanking
Massacre and the Japanese 731 Unit Chemical warfare experiment.
Furthermore, looking at the map to locate how many US military bases
surround China in its periphery, it is not hard to imagine that a Chinese
leader would always have sleepless nights. It may surprise many Australians
that the Chinese, like them, do not feel secure. China’s fear is even worse
because China does not have anyone to fall back on for protection.
4 M. GAO ET AL.
It is not just the fear of war and violence but there is also the fear
of hunger and starvation. Although China has improved greatly in terms
of feeding its people, the food/land and water resources versus people
ratio is still precarious, even after such brutal and inhumane population
control imposed by the Chinese on themselves for a couple of decades.
The two most recent famines occurred in 1942 under the Republic of
China regime during the Japanese occupation and 1958 upon the after-
math of the Great Leap Forward. On the other hand, though much of
the land in Australia is barren desert, there is enough arable land to feed
not only a smaller population in Australia but with surplus to export, to
China for instance.
So far, we have only presented an outline of some of the differences
and one commonality between China and Australia. There are more,
of course, stereotypical differences, perhaps as a result of their different
histories. Australians are laid back and fun-loving, keen and good at
sports, who would like to indulge in the myths of larrikinism and mate-
ship, while the Chinese are much more reserved and serious in worldly
pursuit, perhaps precisely because of the scarcity of it. Let us repeat the
scenario of all the Australians multiplied by two or three living on the
small island of Tasmania: it would be hard to imagine then that if you
took your children to a park, there would be a swing available for them
to jump on. It would also be hard to imagine there would be ovals here
and there with large expanses of green grass for sports.
Australians love animals and probably have more pet animals per capita
than anywhere else in the world. Some would like to proudly claim that
it is because we Australians are humane and civilised towards animals,
unlike the cruel Chinese. But imagine how difficult it would be even to
walk your dog if you had to live in a flat on the fiftieth floor among what
seems like a forest of high-rise apartment blocks.
Common Interests
Despite all the differences, Australians and Chinese have been living
together quite nicely since 1972 and until recently, let’s say before the
US elected Donald Trump as its president in 2016. In fact, the very
differences between the two countries meant that one could complement
the other. For example, China could supply Australia with manufactured
goods at throwaway prices while Australia could supply China with its
excellent agricultural goods such as fruit, wheat, barley, beef, wine and,
of course, mineral dirt, plus world-class education. It is a proven fact that

since the 1990s, whatever China supplies, the prices tend to decrease, and
whatever China demands from Australia, the prices most likely increase.
China, for decades, has imported pollution by producing commodities at
the lower end of the value chain and exports deflation by depressing the
prices in the market. In the process, China has made a leap in its GDP
and wealth among its people, albeit at the cost of the environment and the
welfare of the millions and millions of migrant workers. It was a win–win
relationship, as the Chinese would like to say.
What is the Problem?

Spectacularly and apparently suddenly, the bilateral relationship between
the two countries started to deteriorate until 2022, when Australians
voted out the Liberal-National Coalition government led by Scott
Morrison. The newly installed labour government seems to have put a
brake on any further slide. However, it may not be totally fair to blame
the Morrison-led government for the deterioration. To start with, it is not
just Australia that has problems with China. So have Japan, South Korea,
and many European countries, not to speak of the US under Trump or
not. Secondly, surveys in these countries seem to suggest that negative
opinions of China form a popular majority.
So, the fault must be with China. In the words of the newly elected
Australian Prime Minister Anthony Albanese: “Australia has not changed,
but China has”. There had been tit-for-tat exchanges between Australia
and China on trade issues, official rhetoric and media reporting. The
details of these exchanges have been dealt with in this book. But the broad
issue to be noted in this introduction is this: What has China under Xi
Jinping done to arouse such hostility from the US and its allies? The ban
of the Chinese telecommunication giant Huawei and, the arrest of one
of Huawei’s top executives Meng Wanzhou, the imposition of tariffs on
Chinese imports valued at billions and billions of dollars by the Trump
administration, just to name a couple of examples, are the West’s reaction
to China’s aggression and its behaviour of not observing “the rules-based
international order”, as the consistent and frequent news headlines in the
mainstream media claim in Anglo-Saxon societies. So what exactly is it
that Xi has done?
6 M. GAO ET AL.
China Prior Xi as a Comparison

First, let us take a step back to look at China before Xi actually came
to power in 2013. The two events that should have assaulted the sense
of justice and keenly felt values seemingly held by Western countries
happened in China under the firm grip of Deng Xiaoping. The first was
the army crackdown with tanks in the streets of Beijing in 1989. The
second was the brief invasion of Vietnam in 1979 to, in the words of
Deng Xiaoping, “teach the Vietnamese a lesson”. Both of those would
not have taken place without the explicit instruction of Deng Xiaoping.
Deng was one of the most ruthless and autocratic leaders, if not the most,
of the CCP. Deng dismissed almost single-handedly two General Secre-
taries of the CCP, Hu Yaobang and Zhao Ziyang, the two most “liberal”
CCP leaders, still worshipped by the liberal Chinese intelligentsia. The
General Secretary of the CCP in post-Mao China was and still is officially
and formally supposed to be the number one boss in the Chinese polit-
ical and bureaucratic hierarchy, but Deng could lecture the two General
Secretaries as if they were his children.
Nevertheless, Deng has not been feared or demonised as much as Xi
Jinping as a dictator. When Hong Kong was in the middle of turmoil in
2019, many predicted, and some actually anticipated, that China would
send tanks into the street, like in 1989. But Xi did not order such a crack-
down and the Chinese PLA troops remained in their barracks, except
when they came out to clean up the rubbish left behind in the street by
the protesters and rioters.
Regarding the South China Sea issue, Xi Jinping did not do anything
out of the ordinary of what China had been doing under his predecessors.
The first armed exchange between China and Vietnam over the South
China Sea dispute took place in 1974 and then the second in 1988. The
first Chinese armed exchange with the Philippine naval forces in the South
China Sea took place in 1995 and the last one in 2012 before Xi came
to power one year later. It is possible to attribute the artificial build-up of
islands by dredging sand to Xi as his initiative since these projects began in
2013. But quite possibly, these projects were planned some years ahead of
Xi assuming the leadership. It has to be pointed out, though, that China
under Xi did push through the National Security Law in Hong Kong and
that China under Xi has built up a military presence in the South China
Sea after some rocks were expanded into island-like existences.
The three most prominent programmes or policies that are more or less
definitely pushed by Xi Jinping are the stronger and more thorough anti-
corruption campaign within the CCP and the Chinese government, the
Made in China initiative to upgrade China’s value chain of production and
the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI). However, if one examines carefully,
none of them were really Xi Jinping’s original ideas. Anti-corruption was a
consistent issue within the CCP for years on end. The difference, if there
is any, is that Xi has had the guts to tackle corrupted officials at the very
top partly because of his princeling credentials.
Upgrading the value chain of production is almost as natural as
day turning into night. With the increased development of technology,
coupled with heightened demand for higher salaries against the back-
ground of decreased labour supply, industries of lower technological value
in China have started to move to countries that have been lately catching
up, just like those industries that moved from Hong Kong, Taiwan and
the West to China during the 1980s and 1990s. China has moved towards
a direction of development with or without Xi Jinping, just as Japan,
South Korea and Taiwan have.
The BRI looks like a signature programme by Xi Jinping to project
China’s power and influence. But, again, this may not be what it appears.
The geographical differences and developmental gaps between the south-
east coasts and inland provinces have always been an issue for modern
Chinese governments, not just since the PRC was established in 1949.
For the description of this regional disparity, there is a standard refer-
ence of the first-tier cities of Beijing, Shanghai, and provinces of Jiangsu
and Zhejiang, Fujian, second-tier cities like Xi’an, Taiyuan, Zhengzhou,
Nanchang or Chengdu and provinces like Anhui and Jiangxi and Sichuan
and third tier provinces further to the west, and northwest of China.
During the era of Mao, when China felt threatened by the US/Taiwan
from the south and the former USSR from the north, Mao designed a
strategy called the “Third Front”, in which a massive amount of invest-
ment and human resources were mobilised to set up industries in the
second and third tier areas to avoid military attacks.
By the beginning of the twenty-first century, regional gaps were even
more keenly felt. As a result of this perception and necessity, there
emerged a programme of developing the “west” before Xi came to power.
For the Chinese leadership under Hu Jintao, there was already a focus on
Tibet and Xinjiang. China could not leave the “west” underdeveloped
for geopolitical reasons. Moreover, Chinese policymakers felt increasingly
8 M. GAO ET AL.
more intensely that ethnic or political unrest in conjunction with reli-

gious extremism could be dealt with more effectively if and when there is
economic development in these areas. Finally, Chinese policymakers also
believed that China relies too much on maritime routes for imports and
exports, a risk to be anticipated given the unsettled South China Sea and
Taiwan issues and encirclement by the increasingly less friendly US and
its allies. Therefore, a road network for trade and development inspired
by the Ancient Silk Road was on the agenda before Xi came to power.
Regarding the Taiwan issue, again, Xi Jinping has not so far said
anything that has not been repeated many times before: that Taiwan is
a province of China, that the current split between the two sides of the
Taiwan Strait was a result of a civil war between the KMT and the CCP
that has not finished, that China will try every means possible to unite
Taiwan peacefully, but will resort to military force if the red line of inde-
pendence is about to be crossed. Just as we are writing now, the army,
the navy and air forces of the PLA have been carrying out what they call
“military drills” surrounding Taiwan in reaction to US House Speaker
Nancy Pelosi’s visit to Taiwan. This can easily be seen as evidence of the
aggressive nature of Xi Jinping. However, again, it is not that simple.
China, under Xi’s predecessor Jiang Zemin, also ordered missile drills
over Taiwan in 1995. The only difference is that China’s willingness to
take risks has increased, and its willingness to deal with provocations has
gone down.
The Problem with China Under Xi

Basically, Xi Jinping’s sin is that he is leading a China that is wealthier,
more confident and more assertive in defending what it considers its
interests. In a nutshell, the issue is this: The Western-dominated world
has to deal with a rising China that is not only racially different but also
politically different from the West headed by the US. The US wants to
maintain its dominance, and China seems not only able to but also aims
to challenge this dominance.
In today’s “progressive” world, we cannot openly articulate racist senti-
ments that occasionally occur when the rise of China is a topic along the
lines of “the first non-Caucasian rising power”. It is better to talk down
to China regarding values and ways of life because it is politically correct
and we can hold the moral high ground. The most popular and often
cited argument is that it is not the Chinese people we are up against but
the Chinese government that is ruled by a communist party.
What is referred to as Chinese in what is called China consists of 20% of
humanity. The Chinese might argue that they have the right to develop,
including cutting-edge technology and the right to have a higher standard
of living. The Chinese might also argue that based on their own experi-
ence, the development of infrastructure through the BRI would lead to
economic growth that is good for everyone, even though the BRI is not
without China’s self-interest in supplying manufactured commodities and
demanding raw materials. At least China provides a suitable alternative
for the formerly colonised countries. Surely, if Fox News, the BBC, the
VOA, the Murdoch press, Reuters and all the dominating Western media
could spread the soft power of the West, China can also do some of its
own, the Chinese would think.
Yes, but no. To start with the media, Western media cannot get into
China because it blocks them. There is no freedom of speech in China.
There is no level field for competition with China regarding tech devel-
opment because the Chinese state directs its big companies. There is
no transparency in how Chinese enterprises operate, and they are not
rule-based commercial operations. The US could vote Trump out by an
election, and so did Australians with Scott Morrison, but you could not
do that in China. What is worst of all, China practices forced labour and
even “genocide” against the Uighurs in Xinjiang. So the story goes.
It was hoped, as often touted, that with the opening up of China to
Western values and ways of life, which are universally accepted as the best
in any possible world, China would change. But China has not. Worse
still, Xi came along who completely ruined any hope for change in China
because Xi is less hesitant, more assertive, more articulate and more in
control. To the outrage of those who wished for China to change, Xi
even abolished limitations on presidential terms, meaning that Xi wants
to rule for life.
Is a Shared Future Possible?

This book aims to tackle these issues to see whether there can be a shared
future between Australia and China, and by extension a shared future
between China and the West. To explore this possibility, we will ask the
following questions:
10 M. GAO ET AL.
• Is China a national security threat to Australia?

• Are the Chinese different from Australians in terms of values and
ways of life?
• How do the Chinese see democracy?
• Does people-to-people exchange in cultural activities make a differ-
ence?
• How do the Chinese perceive Australia on social media?
• How does the literacy of each country measure up?
• Are Australia and China destined to compete in the South Pacific?
• Is a pattern of economic partnership but geopolitical rivalry sustain-
able?
• Is Australia securitising Australia–China relationship?
• Is there a common good in education across the two countries?
• Is good-will between China and Australia possible?
• Is it possible to understand China?
• Is Australia’s narrative on Beijing’s economic coercion too simplistic?
• What are the domestic dynamics for the West’s hostility towards
China?
Contents of the Chapters

To answer these questions, this book is divided
into two parts—Chapters 1–8 examine the Australia–
China relationship in general, while Chapters
9–15 focus on more specific topics. The first and foremost question
following the introductory chapter, of course, is whether China poses
any threat to Australia given that the dominance of the China Threat
discourse in Australia’s public affairs suggests poor prospects for any
continued Australia–China relations, let alone positive interactions of
mutual benefit. To address this question, David Goodman explores,
in Chapter 2, alternative ways to approach Australia’s relationship with
China and argues that the recognition of differences and the development
of ways to mediate differences through building on complementarities
can be beneficial for both Australia and China, not just through economic
but also through social interactions. He believes that the development
of mutual understanding of other peoples, their cultures, and their social
and economic systems is a precursor not simply to respect and the
avoidance of unwarranted prejudice but to cooperation for a wider public
good.
Colin Mackerras, in Chapter 3, examines the role of national security

in Australia–China relations, arguing it as particularly being a factor in
the decline of the relationship after 2015. Focusing non-exclusively on
the prime ministership of Scott Morrison (2018–2022), Mackerras anal-
yses national security concerns and responses of both the Australian and
Chinese sides and points out that neither side has shown any sympathy for
the national security concerns of the other. While criticising the Morrison
government for making China an enemy by treating it as such, the author
also discusses the potential impact of a more diplomatic approach on
Australia–China relations in the post-Morrison years.
In Chapter 4, Yingjie Guo debunks the logic of equivalence in the
China discourse of the so-called China threat industry, which gives rise
to three notable consequences. One is the discursive dichotomisation of
the international community and the resultant erosion of global socia-
bility. Another is the hardening of the Australian Self vis-à-vis the Chinese
Other. The third is the simplification and homogenisation of China. Each
of these has a ripple effect that combines to perpetuate and escalate
negative perceptions of and hawkish reactions to China. The logic of
difference, however, provides an alternative perspective on Australia and
China and is likely to lead to a better understanding and improvement of
bilateral relations.
In Chapter 5, James Laurenceson provides a detailed analysis on
an emerging narrative of economic coercion surrounding the Australia-
China trade tensions in the early 2020s. The narrative attributes China’s
campaign of disruption targeting Australian exports to China’s authori-
tarian political system and presents the local predicament as unsurprising
given past attempts by Beijing at economic coercion affecting other coun-
tries. This fiction of economic coercion also suggests that Australia should
join its allies to seek economic decoupling from China. Laurenceson
contends that this narrative is substantially incomplete, misses relevant
context and fails to acknowledge evidence that challenges its key claims.
To substantiate his argument, the author provides a more comprehen-
sive account of context and evidence for an assessment of Australia’s
predicament.
In light of the deterioration of China–Australia relations in recent
years, with distrust and threat narratives concerning the South Pacific
region contributing to Western discourse on the risks of the Belt and
Road Initiative, David Morris analyses the geopolitical narratives in
Chapter 6, to comprehend whether Australia and China are destined
12 M. GAO ET AL.
to compete for power, or whether the geopolitical imperatives of both

could be satisfied—as well as risks reduced and opportunities for regional
sustainable development realised—through mutually beneficial coopera-
tion.
Yujia Shen and Rujie Chen discuss Australia’s securitisation of China
in Chapter 7. They have observed that the “national security” framing
of economic investment from China in Australia has increasingly perme-
ated the fields of economy, politics, science, technology, and even cultural
exchanges and shaped Australia’s foreign policy towards China since the
mid-2010s. The change of government, the interest-interaction game of
its actors, massive mobilisation of the media as well as regional geopolit-
ical influences have all contributed to Australia’s increasing securitisation
of China.
In Chapter 8, Lei Yu and Sophia Sui provide an empirical review of the
Australia-China strategic partnership and identify an ambivalent pattern
of economic interdependence and political and security mistrust. The
authors argue that some factors at the systemic and unit levels advance
their economic interdependence whereas others alienate the two states
and lead to an ambivalent pattern of relations. The authors hold that this
ambivalent pattern can remain in the foreseeable future given the growing
clash of interests driven by systemic and unit-level constraints.
Part II of this book moves from discussion of challenges to opportuni-
ties in more specific terms, looking at how Australia and China can better
understand, communicate and work with each other for a better future.
In Chapter 9, Diane Hu and Ying Li highlight misconceptions on the
part of both Australia and China when formulating and implementing
their foreign policy regarding each other: both assume that they know
perfectly well about the other. The authors examine key indicators of
literacy and further illustrate the low level with a case study of Turn-
bull’s “stand up” speech. The authors argue that misconceptions on both
sides could drive and keep the current low of bilateral relations since the
mid-2010s and need to be corrected if the two countries are to navigate
through major power rivalry and ideological differences.
In Chapter 10, Jack Butcher presents a frame analysis of Chinese
language “we-media” contents through four media frames to explore
how Australia has been portrayed and perceived at the grassroots level
in China. He finds that we-media users generally depict Australia as
lacking an independent foreign policy, strategically anxious and increas-
ingly xenophobic in the conflict frame, a laid-back immigrant society
with wide-open spaces, good quality of life and unique flora and fauna
in the human-interest frame, highly dependent on China and resource-
rich in the economic consequences frame and co-opted by the US to
contain China in the responsibility frame. This chapter aims to inform a
non-Chinese speaking audience regarding the diversity of views communi-
cated about Australia in China at the grassroots level and promote mutual
understanding for a shared future.
To debunk value narratives that have led to increasingly polarised
and oversimplified perceptions about China, Baohui Xie explains, in
Chapter 11, how democracy is understood and practised in China
through its parliamentary system. He argues that democracy is more
often taken as a conceptual aspiration for realisation of such ideas
as minquan (sovereignty of the people), minyi (public opinion) and
minsheng (people’s livelihood) rather than a particular form of govern-
ment. All these ideas are pre-fixed by min—the people, demanding much
space allowing for dynamics of democracy at local levels, which in turn
feeds into democratic satisfaction and popular support. While simplistic
democracy-autocracy dichotomies lend space to suspicion and fear and
shut down dialogues and interactions, the author believes that a healthy
Australia–China relationship can benefit from mutual understanding and
engagement and calls for wisdom and creativity in negotiating differences.
Greg McCarthy and Xianlin Song are particularly concerned with
Australia’s higher education and the future of the common good and,
in Chapter 12, examine the issue of common good through the historical
lens of Australian higher education, from colonial outposts of Western
modernity to post-World War II nation building and then to the contem-
porary shift to commercialisation and national security. This chapter
contests that the future of Australian higher education lies in addressing
the issue of global common good by building its international engage-
ment to global concerns facing humanity. The authors also point to the
barriers to an educational common good caused by geopolitical tensions
between Australia and China, which have compromised Australian univer-
sity autonomy in the name of national security.
In Chapter 13, Jocelyn Chey shares her first-hand experiences to illus-
trate how the Australian government has sought to introduce Australian
culture to China through cultural diplomacy, and how China has also
engaged in similar activities in Australia over the past 40 years. As both
countries’ trade and political relations matured, people-to-people cultural
exchanges gathered pace. The author uses particular cultural events and
14 M. GAO ET AL.
programmes to shed some light on the aims and results of this half century
of cultural diplomacy.
In Chapter 14, Mobo Gao asks the question whether a common
destiny with Australia is possible even when the CCP still rules China. The
answer is positive. Refuting assumptions that Australia and China cannot
get along due to fundamental differences in values and ways of life, Gao
demonstrates, by fact-checking values and ways of life in analytical cate-
gories, such as democracy, market capitalism, individualism, law and order
and governance with evidence-based reality, that the differences between
China and Australia as well as between the Chinese and the Australians
are far from fundamental. He argues that the tension between the two
countries is actually rooted in the geopolitics dictated by the US.
Lastly, Justin O’Connor presents a conclusion in Chapter 15. He
further addresses the China Threat rhetoric and presents a discussion that
draws out the underlying geometry of such claims as economic coercion
and ideological orthodoxy beyond pure economic issues, “national inter-
ests”, value narratives, and Australia’s new defence stance. He argues that
there is a connection between Australia’s hollowed-out democracy and
the lurch into a China war, with the hawks combining a deep identifica-
tion with the US with a distrust of domestic democracy. He warns that a
sudden suspension of constructive conversation and a swerve into mutual
antagonism can come at great cost to us all.
This book, therefore, broadens the discussion on Australia–China rela-
tions and presents a core argument that the Panda and the Kangaroo
can share a common future despite the differences and challenges they
have to confront, understand and negotiate. Australia and China have
never been enemies in history, and there are no substantial reasons why
they should become adversaries now because enmity, the bad fruit of a
cold war mindset, is not in the interest of either party by any means.
For the bilateral relationship to move ahead so that both Australia and
China can benefit from engaging each other on the basis of mutual respect
and understanding, dialogues and exchanges at multiple levels are needed.
This is exactly why we put our thoughts together in this book, exploring
the possibility of a shared future.
CHAPTER 2
China Threat, Australian Challenge:

Recognising Differences, Building Futures
David S. G. Goodman
Oceania was at war with Eastasia: Oceania had always been at war with
Eastasia. A large part of the political literature of five years was now
completely obsolete. Reports and records of all kinds, newspapers, books,
pamphlets, films, sound−tracks, photographs all had to be rectified at
lightning speed. (Orwell, 1949, p. 87)
George Orwell’s pointed satire about totalitarian regimes seems surpris-

ingly somewhat apposite to the contemporary Australian public discourse
about China. Since 2017, there has been not just a sudden about-face in
Australian attitudes towards China but the development of an increasingly
hostile attitude in public discourse, driven not just by government and
politicians but also by opinion leaders of all kinds, including Think Tanks
and journalists. The causes of this change are attributed to the China
D. S. G. Goodman (B)
China Studies Centre, University of Sydney, Camperdown, NSW, Australia
e-mail: david.goodman@sydney.edu.au

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9191-2_2
16 D. S. G. GOODMAN
Threat: an existential threat to Australia from the People’s Republic of

China (PRC) and the Communist Party of China (CCP).
Clearly, there are paradoxes and tensions in the changes in the
Australian public discourse of the last few years, as well as generally
the more longer term in Australia’s relationship with the PRC. Simply
put, the PRC and Australia have complementary economies but very
different and largely opposed political systems. The PRC is essentially a
one-party state with great power aspirations; it has been and remains to a
large extent a developing economy, which introduced a major economic
reform programme in 1978. Even now, after forty years of economic
growth, China is still just about the world average for GDP per capita,
and even in terms of Purchasing Power Parity calculations [PPP] only at
a level 27.2% that of the USA (World Bank, 2021). Nonetheless, since
the late 1970s, the PRC’s changed economic development strategy has
led it to reach an overall GDP greater than 60% of that of the USA and
become the second largest economy in the world with all that implies for
governmental capacity domestically and internationally. Part and parcel of
that process has been China’s economic integration with the rest of the
world, eventually becoming the world centre of manufacturing through
technology transfer, trade and investment.
In contrast, Australia is a medium-sized developed economy, with a
relatively high GDP per capita—82.7% of the level of the United States
of America (USA) in terms of PPP (World Bank, 2021). Australia prides
itself on its liberal democratic values and political system, and has come
in the era of globalisation to see itself as especially open in trade and
investment. As a result of economic openness, while it now has compar-
atively little manufacturing, it is a great supplier of primary products and
services, especially to China. From the Australian standpoint, it is not just
that China rapidly became this country’s main trade partner, as has now
become the case for the majority of the countries in the world, but that
Australia is by any measure heavily dependent on its economic relationship
with the PRC. By value, 27% of Australia’s imports come from China; and
32.6% of Australian exports go to China: Australia’s most substantial trade
partner in both categories by a long way (Australian Bureau of Statistics,
2020).
Managing the ambiguities inherent in Australia’s relationship with
China is never likely to be easy (Goodman, 2017). Declaring a China
Threat would though seem to be misguidedly foreclosing on that rela-
tionship rather than building towards a sustainable future. At the same
2 CHINA THREAT, AUSTRALIAN CHALLENGE: RECOGNISING … 17
time, there are always options way short of constant and regular appease-
ment. The idea of a China Threat suggests that it is primarily the result of
a conflict between the USA and the PRC in terms of their aspirations and
own particular views of the world, and their respective roles in it. As Zhao
Suisheng (2021) has recently pointed out, this is a conflict moreover that
the USA cannot win if it wishes to maintain its position as the sole domi-
nant political economy. He also highlights that neither the USA nor the
PRC are going to back down from their stated (if somewhat different)
positions of leadership and great power aspirations, and in the latter’s
case this would be so regardless of CCP leadership and presumably by
extension of whether China was a liberal democracy.
The language of existential threat is more likely to lead to war and open
hostility rather than conflict resolution. This would seem not to be in
Australia’s interests not simply economically but given the PRC’s contin-
uing role in the Asia Pacific Region in which, needs must, this country
operates. Better perhaps to recognise the challenge that the PRC poses
to Australia, particularly the differences in social and world views, where
these exist, and to develop ways to mediate those differences. It may then
be possible to build on the complementarities for the benefit of both, not
just economically, but also socially, difficult though that may be.
Understanding the PRC

The idea of a China Threat has the potential to be a self-fulfilling
prophecy and highly destructive. Armed conflict and economic disrup-
tion are only the most obvious consequences. Polarised approaches to
social and political problems may sell well in the political marketplace
and on social media. At the same time, they require individuals to adopt
extreme positions, as indeed was often the case during the Cold War,
where anti-establishment figures in Europe and the UK had far more
comfortable views of the then Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR)
than was realistic. When as in the case of Australia, the object of enmity
(China) may be equated with a substantial portion of the country’s popu-
lation (Chinese-Australians) regardless of the attitudes the latter may hold
such polarisation not only has the potential to be socially divisive (and
worse) but actually to push the latter towards the former. The Australian
opposition spokesperson on foreign affairs, Penny Wong, has forcefully
18 D. S. G. GOODMAN
emphasised that domestic fear-mongering is not just socially and econom-

ically irresponsible, it is also politically counterproductive, internationally
always and domestically in the long term (Wong, 2021).
Polarisation also results in even more increased misunderstandings
about China in Australia, particularly as evidenced in the recent discussion
of the contemporary China Threat (Goodman, 2021). Only if Australia
starts to put some of those misunderstandings aside can a more sustain-
able framework for interaction with China develop. In particular, there
have been three major misunderstandings: about the role of Communism
in the contemporary PRC; about the social and political consequences of
economic development; and about the totalitarian nature of the state.
Given that the PRC is a Communist Party-state, it would be conve-
nient for those who wish to pursue the theme of China representing an
existential threat if the major difference between China and Australia (or
for that matter the liberal democracies elsewhere in the world) could be
expressed in terms of the contrasting ideologies of international commu-
nism and liberal democracy, and their battle for world supremacy. This
was what provided the Cold War with its cutting edge (in both directions)
and justified hostility beyond a “you can’t tell me what to do attitude to
international politics”. There were then different visions (however flawed)
of present and future societies. Liberal democracy and capitalism versus
the Communist Party-states, world revolution and socialism. There clearly
are differences in the approach to politics of Australia and China, not
least since Australia remains a Liberal Democracy with competing polit-
ical parties and independent social and legal institutions while the PRC
still has an institutionalised ruling party. The CCP, though, has come a
long way since its embrace of proletarian world revolution, both before
and for the decades immediately after 1949. This shows not only in its
international stance but also in its domestic approach. These days, the
membership of the CCP is very different to its Mao-era days. Half of the
members are now college-educated, and a greater percentage are officials,
professionals, technicians and managers than are workers and peasants
(Xinhua, 2019; Zhang, 2021). Xi Jinping, General Secretary of the CCP,
spoke at length on the 100th Anniversary of the Foundation of the Party.
In his celebratory speech, there was no mention at all of the proletariat,
workers were only mentioned twice, and peasants once. Not surprisingly,
members of the CCP were mentioned eleven times, and there were many
and frequent references to “the people” and “the nation” (Xi, 2021). The
CCP certainly has an international strategy, but this is to remove the USA
as the hegemon and replace it with a greater plurality of states in which

it plays a leading role. These views were clearly expressed at a conference
of world political parties shortly after the 100th Anniversary (Liu, 2021).
There are those who have argued that the CCP has embraced capi-
talism through its programme of economic reform (Nee & Opper, 2012),
and even those who have suggested that the PRC has become more capi-
talist than the USA (Halper, 2010). Certainly, the introduction of the
market into a state socialist economic system has had a profound impact
on both economic development and social change. There may now be
businesspeople and industrialists who operate within the PRC in many
ways that seem similar to capitalist practices, and they may be very rich
indeed by world standards, let alone by comparison to their compatriots
(Goodman, 2018). Nonetheless, the PRC is not a capitalist system in the
sense that politics and economics overall operate for the benefit of the
capitalist class. On the contrary, the capitalists are subservient to the ruling
CCP under almost all circumstances, which has led some sociologists to
identify capitalists as part of the middle class (Li, 2013). In addition,
though there is much talk about the emergence of a private sector in the
PRC in reform China, this is not like for the most part the development
of private enterprises in a liberal democracy (Krug, 2004). Enterprises and
entrepreneurs have often emerged from within the Party-state, and where
they have not, they have been subsequently incorporated, especially with
success and growth (Dickson, 2007). The development of the former
state sector of the economy and its state-owned enterprises alongside
new kinds of enterprises, has resulted in an economy where almost every
enterprise is a hybrid state-private establishment. Private entrepreneurs
can own shares in state-owned enterprises (some though not all), and
state-owned enterprises own enterprises in the private sector. Ownership
is less important for the dynamics of the economy than management and
control (Chen & Naughton, 2016; Naughton, 2010).
One of the greatest expectations outside the PRC in the last few
decades appears to have been that with economic growth and the devel-
opment of a middle class the PRC would liberalise politically. These ideas
were clearly born out of the triumphalism attendant on the collapse of
Communist Party-states in Russia and Eastern Europe at the end of the
1980s and beginnings of the 1990s, and reflected in Francis Fukuyama’s
well-known essay on “The End of History?” (Fukuyama, 1989). In the
case of China, the theory seems to have been that since the emergence
of a middle class in Northwest Europe in the nineteenth century led to
20 D. S. G. GOODMAN
the establishment of liberal democracy, the same would happen in the

PRC (Glassman, 1991). Indeed, it also seems to be likely that the failure
of economic growth to lead to liberal politics in the PRC by the second
decade of the twenty-first century may be at least one reason for disap-
pointment then crystallising in the expression of a China Threat, especially
in the USA (Medeiros & Blanchette, 2021). If decision-makers in the
liberal democracies really believed that economic growth and the emer-
gence of a middle class in China would lead to political change, they were
not listening to or reading a substantial body of academic research since
the early 1990s (Goodman, 1992). That research has argued that while
the middle class has grown with economic reform to include more profes-
sionals, technicians, businesspeople and managers, it remains considerably
more limited than some of the hype from marketing companies (Chinese
and others) might suggest, at probably around 12% of the population
(Goodman, 2014). More importantly, it has long been clear that the
middle class has emerged from within the structures of the Party-state
(Rocca, 2016) and not independently of the state as is often assumed
to be the case in the European model. Under such conditions, it would
be reasonable to assume that the interests of the middle classes remain in
maintaining the Party-state’s status quo, and indeed surveys of their views
and ideas bear that out (Chen, 2013).
These comments about the consequences and drivers of economic
growth in the PRC highlight how crucial it is to understand the dynamics
of the Party-state. Often in describing the Party-state, even non-hostile
commentators will see the PRC as totalitarian. Certainly, the CCP prefers
the management of certainty to political pluralism. At the same time, the
equation of the PRC and its Party-state with the model of totalitarianism
as applied to describe the USSR under Stalin builds on the commonality
of ruling Communist Parties but otherwise pushes analysis out of perspec-
tive. The CCP does not attempt to manage certainty as it once did, before
the start of the Reform Era, through wholesale direct intervention. Obvi-
ously not only in economic matters but also in politics and society. The
instruments of rule are authoritarian: education (political as well as more
general); supervision; and were judged necessary intervention after the
event, sometimes including punitive action. These are justified by the
CCP’s claim to be the best authority to interpret the interests of the
Chinese people. This approach to political rule and the management of
society may be anathema to those who believe that in a democracy the
interests of people are immanent in the people themselves, but at the
same time, they are not necessary indicators of the total subservience of
society to the state, which is the starting point for the identification of
totalitarianism (Schapiro, 1972).
In the PRC today, society is subject to the state but is not subsumed by
it, and there is space for individual and collective expression. Necessarily,
that is more limited than in a liberal democracy. To regard PRC citi-
zens as completely controlled totalitarian subjects in all their thoughts and
deeds is extremely misleading. One instructive example occurred around
the Tokyo Olympics in early August 2021 when two PRC cyclists won
gold and chose to wear pin badges of Mao Zedong, as might have been
seen during the decade of the Cultural Revolution and remain popular
(Al Jazeera News Service, 2021). Their reasons for the actions are not
recorded, and it most probably was not as much a political as an assumed
patriotic or cultural act. The international media picked up on the fact
though and the International Olympic Committee censored the PRC
Olympic Committee, which it and other PRC agencies accepted. There
was then quite a furious outpouring of criticism, largely from a nation-
alist viewpoint, through Chinese social media (Song, 2021). The use of
social media is a normal feature of life in the PRC. Some is Party-state
controlled, some is not. Some is within politically acceptable boundaries,
and some is on the edge or beyond, towards more extreme positions of
nationalism, of conservative pro-Mao positions, or towards recognisably
more liberal views. Party-state agencies may and do intervene with censor-
ship but by no means always. The Tencent-operated WeChat is often
characterised as providing a framework for CCP influence (Joske et al.,
2020) but it is also in larger measure a channel for social expressions
of all kinds, and the circulation of information and views outside of the
Party-state.
The PRC has become highly decentralised and deregulated in many
respects since 1978. Decision-making on policy implementation is consid-
erably more experimental than would be permitted under a central
plan. Local officials and local governments have considerable room for
manoeuvre in carrying out their duties and indeed for that reason the
PRC has been described as “decentralized authoritarianism” (Landry,
2008). Some have seen this decentralisation as resulting from the CCP’s
guerrilla heritage, that certainly carried over into the 1950s, where cadres
and local governments were exhorted to “do the best according to local
conditions” in implementing national policies. The national level would
set out the general directions of policy, provincial and local governments
22 D. S. G. GOODMAN
would react through attempts to implement, and in the process provide

a feedback loop that revised national policy settings (Heilmann, 2008).
Decentralised authoritarianism may in part have the same origins, but
it also results from the operation of the market, introduced as an allo-
cator of resources and particularly public goods in meeting social needs
(Chen, 2016). In the PRC today—in contrast to past (for the most
part) state-controlled provision in urban China and rural sector collective
self-reliance—housing, education and medical care are largely provided
through the market. The size, scale and diversity of China’s social and
economic geography necessarily mean that there will be variation in socio-
economic conditions and even to some extent politics. Moreover, state
regulation of market operations remains variable and often lax.
Negotiating China
There is no point in Australia adopting a Pollyanna-type approach to
interactions with China, not least because intergovernmental relations are
in dire straits. It will take some time and effort, and political will in
Australia, to restore a working relationship with the PRC. It is though
necessary to do so. Arguing that Australian Federal Ministers have not
been able to communicate directly with their PRC counterparts is a very
weak excuse: announcing in public that this is the case is the equivalent
of saying that no closer contact is required (Hurst et al., 2020). It is
not only in China that sensitive and sometimes not-so-sensitive matters
are better or first achieved by going through “the back door”: using
informal and often personal connections and channels. Australia is a rela-
tively small country in world impact, albeit with a developed economy
and high levels of education and invention. It sits as it has done for some
decades uneasily between two global powers, who in addition to their
economic and political clout, and military strengths in East Asia, also
claim a moral superiority for themselves alone, in which Australia cannot
share. Despite the prevalence of the China Threat discourse, there are also
many who suspect that the PRC is unlikely to have the capacity to grow
to a point where it can challenge the USA fully (Magnus, 2021; Rosen,
2021). While the PRC may not surpass the USA economically or match
it militarily, it is certain that the PRC is an essential part of Australia’s
economic and security environment.
The critique of the China Threat offered here is not to say that
Australia may not face challenges from PRC policies and activities, nor
that it should necessarily approve of actions the latter takes of which it

does not approve. It is, though, important to distinguish between acts
and activities that Australia (whether its governments or some or all of its
people) do not approve of, on the one hand, and threats to the Australian
way of life, on the other. In that context it is good, for example, that
foreign influence in Australian public life and businesses be as transparent
as possible, as should be the case for the influence campaigns and activities
of all countries. Lobbying and building networks of influence are part and
parcel of open social and political systems and Australians can and should
have confidence in our institutions and liberal politics.
To move forward in suggesting how Australia should approach China,
it is important to distinguish between challenges to Australia, on the one
hand, and on the other, not only things some or all Australians do not
like or approve of but also that not all interactions between the two
countries (especially those in science and technology) are about security,
and that there is inevitably a changing world order as a consequence of
the PRC’s greater economic strength and political presence. This last of
course is where politicians in the USA have generally been reluctant to
go. Australia, though, has a different and lesser standing in global politics
and international relations. Its strength lies in its international relations,
for scientific and technological development, no less than for the open-
ness of its economy. Restricting science and technology cooperation with
the PRC would seem short-sighted, particularly given the development
of both in China in some fields, especially alternative energy, electric
vehicles and the internet of things where there is substantial compara-
tive advantage (Yergin, 2020). Again, that is not to say Australia should
ignore security concerns but should act where and when national secu-
rity is actually challenged rather than running a fear campaign based on
possible uses.
When discussing interactions between two states, international rela-
tions experts and commentators of all kinds beyond academia, are fond
of referring to “the three Cs”—competition, collaboration and conflict—
recognising that these are not mutually exclusive (Cordesman, 2019).
Competition between Australia and China is surely not as significant
as complementarity, and not just in economic activities. There can and
have been significant synergies in scientific research and technolog-
ical development which have continued even under current conditions
(Laurenceson & Zhou, 2020; Science in Public, 2010). Conflict between
Australia and China may currently be metaphorical but is hardly likely to
24 D. S. G. GOODMAN
involve the use of military force, not least because of the PRC’s capa-
bility and geography, not to mention the states and their militaries based
in-between (Williams, 2021). So in addition to complementarity and
collaboration, it may be worth proposing three further “Cs”—commu-
nication, caution and critical engagement—to guide both Australian
government interactions and the personal involvement of Australians with
the PRC.
Communication is crucial to other activities. The consequences of
megaphone diplomacy would be difficult enough to manage with any
other state. Towards the PRC, as was demonstrated in April 2020, it
merely escalated tensions. It seems unbelievable that communication
channels between the Federal Government and the PRC have been closed
so irretrievably. Even now, it should be possible for bridges to be built and
conversations to be had. Australia and China are different countries with
different standard operating procedures, at the individual level as much
as in terms of state interactions. Bridging the gap, though, requires not
just the re-establishment of trust but probably of even greater importance
at this stage in the poor relationship between the two the development
of a simple respect. Australia does not have to approve of things that go
on in, or actions that are taken by, the PRC to appreciate the position of
the Party-state. Communication is even more important at the individual
level. Australia needs people both in government and in society who have
contacts in the PRC, and Australians need to be able to welcome contacts
from the PRC. Trust is difficult to maintain without personal contacts,
and respect is all too readily trashed.
Caution is necessary because Australia and China are not just two
different types of state, though that is clearly not unimportant. Politi-
cally blundering about in the PRC without thought to the consequences
is clearly short-sighted. Australia and China are different countries with
different backgrounds and histories. Activities and ideas that are accept-
able in either Australia or China may not be acceptable in the other
country, either politically or socially. As already noted, politics and govern-
ment work differently in China and Australia. Moreover, the difference
between the public and the private and what may be articulated in private
or in public vary greatly. Both from the Australian and the Chinese side,
governments and individuals should never work from the assumption
that their way of doing things or managing situations can apply with
or to governments or individuals from the other. To take an obvious
example, in better times (in terms of the Australia–China relationship) it
was common for visiting Australians to be offered a gift by their Chinese

host, and for Chinese visitors to have been offended when no gift was
forthcoming in Australia. Australians active in the PRC often forget the
importance of personal relationships to decisions and activities even when
in their view they are offering an excellent opportunity to their Chinese
counterpart.
Critical engagement is also important. For Australia and Australians,
critical engagement entails being able to reflect on involvement in China
and knowing when and how to talk about things that take place that are
cause for concern without giving offence. There will be occasions when
self-reflection leads to exit for a range of reasons, depending on ethical
positions and the strength of feelings and possibly economic interests. The
PRC is after all someone else’s country. Expressing concerns is necessarily
a fine line to walk, not least since relations of reciprocal trust have had to
be established. Nonetheless, giving and taking criticism is part of a healthy
and mature relationship.
Bringing these principles to bear on Australia–China relations will
obviously require different kinds of activities for government(s) and indi-
viduals. In all cases, though, there needs to be both knowledge of and
about China. At a time when higher education in Australia is generally
under threat from the dual challenge of less Federal Government funding
and the COVID-19 Virus Pandemic’s impact on international student
numbers and their tuition fees, it may seem foolhardy to argue for greater
investment in China Studies and Chinese language programmes. Yet these
are going to be needed even more in the future than they have been in
the past. This is not a suggestion for universities to graduate substan-
tially more PhD students than at present but rather that people should
generally be encouraged to learn Chinese and about China regardless of
their specialisation and industry so that they can be involved in future
interactions with some greater hope of both understanding and success in
their careers. Remarkably, the proportion of employees in the Australian
public service who are Chinese speakers (Cantonese or Modern Standard
Chinese) is substantially less than the proportion in Australian society.
This is not an ambit claim for greater representation but an observation
highlighting dysfunctionality (Jiang, 2021).
Obviously, language skills assist communication, but still there also
need to be channels of communication. Government needs to ensure
that it restores such interactions as quickly as possible, informally, first
of necessity given recent events. At the same time, an open-minded
26 D. S. G. GOODMAN
approach will also be necessary. This is, of course, unlikely to occur with
the current Federal Government’s defence and foreign policy settings.
As Hugh White has advocated for some time, these need to change to
recognise the consequences of the PRC’s role in East Asia (White, 2020).
There may be more immediate successful opportunities for devel-
oping channels of communication in non-governmental interactions with
China, particularly once international travel restrictions are lifted as the
COVID-19 Virus Pandemic comes under greater control. Second Track
Diplomacy proved very effective in Western Europe after the Second
World War in re-establishing good working relations between popula-
tions in countries—particularly Germany and France, and Germany and
the United Kingdom—heavily impacted by the previous conflict. In those
days and with then contemporary technology and transport, the interac-
tions were much more limited than might be possible now. Nonetheless,
they too focussed on the need to bring people together to interact
and begin to understand each other, to respect difference and to build
sustainable relationships. While this was government-inspired action, it
depended on the motivation and commitment of individuals outside
government. Local governments twinned, and possibly of even greater
importance, young people in those pairs of countries came together
for state-sponsored events of familiarisation, notably through educational
exchanges.
Australia already has a system of states and large city-based twinning
with the PRC. The excellence of the European example, though, was
that the local-level was at a much lower level of the politico-administrative
hierarchy. Bringing local leaders together in Australia and the PRC may
be constructive. The idea of student and young people exchanges is
also a useful, long-term solution to hostility, but there is more that
can be done more immediately. Australia can establish Australia-China
Dialogues where people from each country with shared interests come
together to exchange ideas and interpretations not so much of Australia–
China relations, as life in general. In the immediate future such meetings
could be web-based, given the world’s recent forced development of
such infrastructure, and while those practices might continue regard-
less of pandemics for some time, there could be future opportunities
for exchanges and joint meetings in person in both countries. Those
participating in such dialogues could be people with shared interests not
just in study or research, though one suspects universities would be an
easy starting point for such a development, but also in a wide range of
activities, careers and industries.
Australia and China

The idea of China Threat is an example of the logical fallacy of radical
dichotomisation. As Hugh White has pointed out in his Quarterly Essay
over a decade ago and since, this is a necessarily false position: Australian
interests are best served by not choosing sides in someone else’s fight,
especially when the two sides are on an apparent collision course (White,
2010, 2017, 2021). While Australia may clearly jeopardise its political
and economic interests through engaging in the discourse of the China
Threat, it also manifestly devalues its own liberal and humanist values.
China may pose challenges to Australia in politics and economics but
these are not resolved by demonising China and Chinese people, or by
failing to engage with or attempting understand that country, even when
Australia may not like its goals, methods or practices.
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CHAPTER 3
The Role of National Security

in Australia–China Relations
Colin Mackerras
Introduction
This chapter addresses how national security affects the Australia–China
bilateral relationship. It argues that this issue has played a significant role
in the decline of the relationship over the years, and damaged the relation-
ship in a toxic and unnecessary way. But is China really a security threat
to Australia? Contrary to the mainstream view, this writer does not see
China as a threat to Australia (Mackerras, 2020). Looking at the history
of the world in the last half-century to the time of writing in June 2022,
I see only one time when China specifically attacked another country,
Vietnam, in 1979. The war lasted only about a month, with China making
no attempt to seize the Vietnamese capital or territory. It did not change
Vietnam’s government, and the conflict ended with a Chinese withdrawal.
This contrasts with the United States (US), which has launched multiple
C. Mackerras (B)
Griffith University, Nathan, QLD, Australia
e-mail: c.mackerras@griffith.edu.au

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-19-9191-2_3
32 C. MACKERRAS
wars since World War II. China has shown no signs of desiring to attack
Australia militarily.
From a security point of view, it was, ironically, under the government
of ultra-conservative Tony Abbott, which lasted from September 2013
to September 2015, that Australia–China relations reached an apex. In
November 2014, President Xi Jinping visited Australia and addressed a
joint sitting of the two houses of the Commonwealth Parliament. He
and Abbott agreed that their bilateral relationship was a “comprehen-
sive strategic partnership”. At least symbolically, this was important and
“helped facilitate a sprawling program of engagement” (Storey, 2021),
with leaders on both sides appealing to this partnership as a sign of
good relations. In addition, it was the Abbott government that forged
the Australia–China Free-Trade Agreement (ChAFTA, June 2015).
Australia–China relations have declined rapidly to a dangerously low
ebb since then, with both the comprehensive strategic partnership and
ChAFTA falling into disrepair. There are numerous issues that have
caused this downturn, and they appear to multiply with the passage of
time. The main strategic issues will form the nub of this article.
Abbott’s successor as Australian Prime Minister was Malcolm Turnbull,
who was himself overthrown in August 2018 by a third representative of
the Liberal Party, Scott Morrison. The focus of this article will be on
Morrison’s period in Australia’s top job. Nearly nine years of government
under the conservative Liberal-National Party Coalition came to an end
with the election of a government led by the Australian Labor Party’s
(ALP) Anthony Albanese in May 2022.
Australian National Security Concerns

This chapter aims to isolate and evaluate the most important of the
national security issues, beginning with the Australian side.
The China Threat

The first issue to consider is the “China threat” theory. Once so preva-
lent in Australia’s foreign policy during the Cold War, this diminished
and more or less disappeared during the 1970s, only to return with a
vengeance, especially after 2018.
As background, we may note that the US has adopted a very hostile
policy towards China in recent years. It was the administration of Donald
3 THE ROLE OF NATIONAL SECURITY IN AUSTRALIA–CHINA … 33
Trump that definitively changed US policy towards China from engage-

ment to rivalry. On 7 July 2020, in a speech to the Hudson Institute in
Washington, Federal Bureau of Investigation Director Christopher Wray
said, “The greatest long-term threat to our nation’s information and
intellectual property, and to our economic vitality, is the counterintelli-
gence and economic espionage threat from China. It’s a threat to our
economic security—and by extension, to our national security” (Wray,
2020). Although China has also issued negative statements of its own,
the important point is that the active partner has been the US, with China
doing no more than responding to its provocations.
The Democrat Administration of Joe Biden has shown no willingness
to adopt a softer line on China. On 25 March 2021, Biden said, “China
has an overall goal … to become the leading country in the world, the
wealthiest country in the world, and the most powerful country in the
world…. That’s not going to happen on my watch because the United
States is going to continue to grow” (see Renshaw et al., 2021). He
appears to be clear that he is determined to prevent China from over-
taking the US in any meaningful way. The policy has been reinforced on
several occasions, most notably in a speech by Secretary of State Antony
Blinken on 26 May 2022.
Earlier, Blinken said during a visit to Australia in February 2022,
“there’s little doubt that China’s ambition over time is to be the leading
military, economic, diplomatic and political power not just in the region
but in the world”. What he meant in essence was that China was officially
an enemy, to be countered as far as possible, and not even as an equal
partner, with which it was possible to engage. Therefore, the US–China
relationship had moved from engagement to hostility.
As for Australia, one of the main signposts of the direction the
Morrison government took was the AUKUS agreement announced on
15 September 2021 between Australia, the United Kingdom (UK)
and the US. Aimed against the threat supposedly posed by China, it
allowed Australia to purchase nuclear-powered submarines, cancelling an
arrangement reached with France some years before. The French Presi-
dent Emmanuel Macron made no attempt to disguise his fury, publicly
describing Morrison as a liar. But even though it had not been consulted
before AUKUS was reached, the ALP backed the deal. Not surprisingly,
China reacted angrily, criticising the “Cold War mentality” of Western
34 C. MACKERRAS
leaders. To this writer, it symbolised an Australian return to the Anglo-

sphere, undermining what had been fruitful and beneficial engagement
with China.
Meanwhile, Australian popular opinion has also swung against China
in terms of whether it is seen as a friend or partner on one side or threat
and an enemy on the other. The Lowy Institute Polls are the best guide
in this regard. The difference between the years 2020 and 2021 was very
dramatic.
The majority of Australians (63%) now see China as ‘more of a security

threat to Australia’, a substantial 22-point increase from 2020. Only 34%
say China is ‘more of an economic partner to Australia’, 21 points lower
than in 2020. More than half (56%) say ‘China is more to blame’ than
Australia for the tensions in the Australia–China relationship. However,
57% said ‘Australia should remain neutral’ in the event of a military conflict
between the U.S. and China, with 41% saying Australia should support the
U.S. and only 1% China. (Kassam, 2021)
The reasons for this rapid change are various. The Lowy Institute
Poll comments in “Views of China” that the change was due in part to
“economic and political disputes between Australia and China” (Kassam,
2021), among which a dispute over an investigation into the origins and
spread of COVID was probably paramount. The relentlessly hostile views
of China put forward in the mainstream press also contributed to the
change in attitudes towards China.
Scott Morrison made his antagonism towards China very clear on
numerous occasions, while Peter Dutton, his Minister for Defence from
March 2021 until the defeat of the Morrison Government in May 2022,
emphasised that China is an aggressive and dangerous power and the
cause of a more dangerous situation in the Pacific region than any seen
since the 1930s, which led to World War II. Shortly before the May 2022
election, in an attempt to politicise foreign policy for domestic purposes,
he described the voyage of a single Chinese surveillance ship far down
coast of West Australia as an act of aggression, despite the fact that it was
well outside Australian territorial waters.
McKinley (2022) interprets Dutton’s attitude as saying that “China’s
increasing assertiveness is comparable to the rise of Nazi Germany. The
1930s are upon us. The Munich Syndrome lives”. These are insensitive
and intemperate postures that seem geared towards making relations as
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
The Project Gutenberg eBook of A time to die
This ebook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United States
and most other parts of the world at no cost and with almost no
restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it away or re-use it
under the terms of the Project Gutenberg License included with this
ebook or online at www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the
United States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
Title: A time to die
Author: Harold Calin
Illustrator: Virgil Finlay
Release date: January 8, 2024 [eBook #72662]
Language: English
Original publication: New York, NY: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company,

1961
Credits: Greg Weeks, Mary Meehan and the Online Distributed

Proofreading Team at http://www.pgdp.net
*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A TIME TO

DIE ***
A TIME TO DIE
By HAROLD CALIN
Illustrated by FINLAY
Capt. Kingsford cleaved the depths of space in a

monomaniacal search for his personal devil. The
tale of what happens when he finds it is reminiscent,
on a cosmic scale, of Moby Dick. For every
man like Kingsford, is there a white whale?
[Transcriber's Note: This etext was produced from

Amazing Stories June 1961.
Extensive research did not uncover any evidence that
the U.S. copyright on this publication was renewed.]
Heroes are not brave men; they are the fortunate victims of
circumstance. They perform an act in life for which one usually pays
with that life. But they do it with an unusual outcome. They do not die.
So they are heroes. Captain Robert Kingsford returned alive from the
first expedition to Aldebaran IX. He returned alone. He also
commanded the second expedition. I was, or perhaps I should say,
still am executive officer on this second expedition. If there is ever a
third expedition here, Kingsford will not be the commander. This time
he did not become a hero. He became a very stupid, very dead man.
I finished my fourth tour of duty in S Force about nine years ago. The
third and fourth tours, as you know if you are familiar with S Force,
were voluntary. Two is the limit they figure a man should spend in
deep space on assigned duty. By the third, if he has not achieved a
command, or rank at the least, he might be somewhat loathe to
spend three years on a cruise not of his own choosing. After my
fourth tour I sat for exams and got my captain's papers, so I signed
on for a two-tour contract with an outfit operating Star Class Scouts
out of Alpha Centauri X. By the end of this contract, I'd had it with
space, and I settled down to a nice life of ease. You know, fishing and
a house by the sea in the tropics, and a boat. That, of course, is
where I made my mistake. You don't break the habits of over twenty
years merely by putting some idle wishes into fulfillment. I reflect on it
now because that idiotic notion about retirement is probably why I am
here. That, and the determination of Captain Robert Kingsford to be a
hero again, with remaining witnesses to bear him out.
I spend so much talk on myself at this point, incidentally, because I
have lots of time in which to do this. Time to do anything I please, as
if there was anything to do beside this. Except for the periods of
hiding, of course. The hiding isn't bad, either. One gets used to it.
I've done this thing, this writing it all down, though it is on slates with a
sharp stone as a stylus, about fifteen times. I've never found traces of
the other times I've written it, and somehow I feel it should all be
down. In the beginning, just to express one's thoughts, even in
writing, was enough. After a while, however, you sort of want to talk
with someone, even if there is no one to talk with. I guess I've told
myself this thing about a hundred times, in addition to the writings. It's
changed a bit with the tellings. Also, I've never quite finished it. So
actually, I'm creating the epic saga of a race. A race of which I am the
sole member, and with no heirs apparent.
Well, it makes the time pass.
I, Philip Rogers, known as "Buck" to my less imaginative and non-
spacemen acquaintances, decided to have done with retirement on
Barbados after three years of the kind of living toward which all men
strive. I had resided and dined in opulence, I had fished, I had
traveled within the confines of atmospheric craft and I had seen the
whole world. But living for itself, just as survival for itself, can be
pretty well the same as death, and believe me, I can deliver virtuosic
discourses on both subjects. Both tend to instill a certain cessation of
all feeling. For that reason, incidentally, I've actually grown to look
forward to the periods of hiding here. It's the only time I truly feel
anything. But to get on, I got pretty well fed up with Barbados and the
boat and the house. I had never married, principally because I'd
never been fond of the idea of a woman standing on some "widow's
walk" waiting for me. Three year cruises in deep space were hardly
the short business trips of a commercial traveler. I had also, I
imagine, never met the right woman. When I realized that this tropic
paradise was becoming little more than a sort of waiting room for the
voyage to hell or wherever I'll go, I began to cast feelers into the only
other world I knew. I made certain inquiries among commercial space
outfits for the possibility of a berth. I had let my papers lapse and
learned that I was no longer eligible for a command. This was no
great loss to me, since doing something was the primary objective. I
could still gain an Exec's berth on any non-atmospheric craft. I
reactivated my status, got my First Officer's papers, and was about to
sign on for a mining expedition in the third asteroid belt of Alpha
Centauri, when Kingsford completed his solo return from Aldebaran
IX.
Basing speculations on the future profits to be had from Aldebaran IX,
according to Kingsford's report, Anglo-Galactic Mining began almost
immediately to outfit a new ship for a second expedition. I heard a bit
of Kingsford's story, the landing, the surveys, the planet being almost
a total ore deposit, and then the tragedy of the crew. One of Anglo-
Galactic's geologists told me Kingsford's tale of how all of his crew
was killed by being drawn up in the feeding action of some gigantic
flying animal, how he alone had managed to avoid this horror, and his
agonizing fourteen month voyage back all alone.
I thought I was well able to imagine the feeling of being a sole
survivor on an alien world, let alone the almost superhuman task of
activating a ship's drive, even with delayed action timing, and plotting
a course and manning a craft through fourteen months in space
alone.
They were recruiting a complete crew for Kingsford's new ship, the
Algonquin. She was new throughout, the drive and astrogating
equipment being of a design with which I was unfamiliar. I began to
understand why I was no longer eligible for command. A short three
year absence and space technology had passed me by. I had read
about the Shaller drive system in a technical journal during my
retirement, but all through those three years I had made a rather
strenuous effort to stay away from anything to do with my former
calling. Actually, the Shaller system had outstripped all former star
drives and was now in almost exclusive use in all ships geared for
long range space penetration. It had conquered inertial resistance to
the point where there existed absolutely no problems or stresses to
either craft or personnel during acceleration and deceleration. If
Kingsford's report about Aldebaran IX were true, and assays of the
ore he'd brought back seemed to promise even more than he did, a
berth on the Algonquin would be quite a prize. I flew to London and
arranged a preliminary interview with an Anglo-Galactic vice president
whom I had known for years. This would take some politics. From
what I could figure, an Executive Officer's berth on the Algonquin, if
she should make the strike that seemed imminent, would be worth
millions, at the one-twentieth share normally apportioned to Execs on
exploratory mining expeditions.
"Naturally, Kingsford will command," I was told. "But if you've a rated
Exec's papers, Rogers, I think we may swing it." It would mean ten
percent of my share, but the requisite of portions of officers' shares is
one of the fringe benefits enjoyed by executives of corporations like
Anglo-Galactic. There were two others with Executive tickets being
touted by other politics within Anglo-Galactic, but my past record, my
S Force dossier and my age were tremendous determinants. Or,
perhaps, my politics were stronger. I was chosen and signed on for
the expedition. I had still not met Kingsford. This was a bit odd. After
all, I was to be his executive officer, his immediate subordinate, and I
had not even been requested to present myself for his appraisal
before selection.
After signing the contract, I was given a manifest of the ship, a

complete set of drawings, and a small library of technical data for
brushing up as well as familiarizing myself with the Shaller system
theory and everything else that had rendered me somewhat obsolete
during my retirement.
I came aboard ship three days before departure, still not having met
any of the crew, let alone Kingsford. I was greeted by a junior Officer
of the Day.
"Rogers," I said. "Philip Rogers. I'm the new Exec."
"I'm Williams," he said. "Welcome aboard the Algonquin, sir."
"This is quite a ship. A bit more than I'm familiar with."
"She's a bit more than most of us are familiar with," Williams said.
"Isn't she a beauty?"
"I hope she shakes down without too many kicks."
"Yes, sir. Captain Kingsford is expecting you."
"Is he aboard?" I asked.
"Yes, sir."
I rapped on the hatch, and as I entered his cabin the captain rose to
greet me. The first thing I noticed was the eye patch. I had seen
photographs of him taken since his return, but he had worn no patch
then.
"Mr. Rogers," he said and extended his hand. "Welcome aboard."
He held his face slightly to one side, as if to give his one seeing eye
as full a field of vision as possible. He noticed my preoccupation with
the eye patch.
"I traveled fourteen months with a big hole here, Mr. Rogers," he said,
motioning toward the patch. "I left my right eye where we are going."
Then he closed his good eye and was silent for a time. I grew to
accept these silences during conversations with him. "They fitted me
with a false one when I returned, but advised against my wearing it in
space. It's just as well. It gave me bad headaches. The patch is the
same, but I don't feel a solid object lodged in my head. This is much
better. Well, Mr. Rogers, what do you think of the Algonquin?"
"She's quite a ship, the little I've seen, sir."
"Yes. Mr. Rogers, I am a man disinclined to consorting with my crews.
Your main duty aboard will be to convey my orders and requests to
the crew. For all intensive purposes, you will appear to be in
command. I suppose you have been well briefed on the purpose of
this venture. If we succeed, and we shall, you will return a very rich
man."
"I already am pretty well off," I said.
"I did not say pretty well off, Mr. Rogers. I said very rich. But, be that
as it may, you have the look of a good officer about you. We'll get on,
I'm sure."
"I hope so, sir," I said.
"You've had your own commands, Mr. Rogers. It's one of the reasons
I'm glad you're with me. You are familiar with the problems of
command. How is it that you were so lax as to let your papers lapse?
Your command record is excellent."
"I was retired," I said. "I didn't think I'd ever need them."
"But the old habits do not die, do they?"
"I guess you can put it that way."
He looked at me and was quiet for a time. Then he looked up. "Have
you ever felt, Mr. Rogers, that the whole of the universe was put
together wrong? That perhaps man was placed here to undo some of
God's bad work? Have you? Have you ever wished that all your life
could be different? Have you ever seen evil? True evil, or its absolute
personification?"
"I may have," I said. "But I've done well not to let my imagination run
too rampant at times like that."
"Mr. Rogers, do you know how I lost my crew on the Essex?" The
Essex had been Kingsford's command on the first expedition to
Aldebaran IX.
"I've heard bits of it," I said.
"Aldebaran IX is a very strange planet. The atmosphere is extremely
dense, entirely breatheable, you understand, but dense almost to the
point where you could compare it to water. The atmosphere is a true
ocean of air. The surface of the planet has barren areas, trenches,
shelves, sections of almost jungle-like undergrowth, and a very
hazardously deceptive feeling of warmth. It has no intelligent life. But
it does have life. I can assure you of that. It has life. I experienced
some of its life." Here, he paused again. When he resumed, his
thoughts had gone beyond the life of Aldebaran IX. "Every ounce of
matter on that planet contains the highest percentage of ore my
counters have ever recorded. Ore, Mr. Rogers, the Ultimate Ore. The
ore for which forty-two men under my command died. I intend that the
dependents of those men will reap the benefits of that ore. I have
instructed that my entire share be distributed among these heirs. This
bit of information is to go no further than yourself, you understand."
"I understand," I said.
"Mr. Rogers," he then said, "were any of your past commands of a
military nature?"
"How do you mean, sir?"
"Well, on an alien world, for example, have you ever organized a
tactical reconnaissance program? Or perhaps planned a system of
self covering defense positions?"
"Naturally," I said. "Military sciences are a large part of S Force
operation."
"This I know, Mr. Rogers. But have you ever put these sciences into
practice?"
"Yes, sir," I said. "May I ask why you wanted to know?"
"No, Mr. Rogers. But it is very good to have you aboard. Thank you,
Mr. Rogers." He turned his attention suddenly to a manual on his
desk. The interview seemed to be over. I left.
We spent the next few weeks at the Lunar base undergoing extensive
testing. Finally the ship was ready for commissioning. Kingsford
appeared to accept command and we lifted from orbit, locked into the
pre-taped course and set about the business of a crushingly inactive
fourteen months of transit.
In all that I have written of the Algonquin incident, I have tried to
portray Kingsford correctly. I don't know yet as I have succeeded. He
was almost a complete recluse aboard ship. I virtually commanded,
as he had predicted during our first conversation. When I did see him,
it was to deliver routine reports on the ship and crew, but I began to
observe that even these reports did not particularly interest him. He
had stopped shaving and had grown a long, very full dark beard.
That, together with the eye patch, gave him the look of a very ancient
mystic. He was always reading when I entered his cabin. His
readings were restricted to the writings of St. Augustine, The City Of
God I believe the volume was, and one or another of the first books of
the Old Testament. After about nine months of my routine
monologues, I stopped reporting altogether, and didn't see him for
about three weeks. Nor did I receive any summons from him.
Then, during one of my periods of watch in the control room, I
received a signal to report to the Captain's cabin. I entered, observed
that despite his solitude the cabin and every accessory was in perfect
order, nothing out of place. I knew that he allowed no orderly to enter
the cabin, and yet there was no evidence that here was a man who
was virtually a prisoner of his own choosing. We spoke for many
hours that time. He asked about my past, my period of retirement, my
reading habits, what I had read and what I thought of these readings.
The conversation was limited almost entirely to myself, but Kingsford
as an entity began to emerge for the first time since I had met him.
He was altogether friendly. He wanted to know whether I was familiar
with the Bible. When I said I was, he asked which section interested
me most. I told him Ecclesiastes.
"Why Ecclesiastes, Mr. Rogers?"
"Well, because it seems to pretty well sum up all of life."
"There is far more to all of life than just vanity," he said.
"There is also far more to Ecclesiastes than just vanity," I said. "But I
do imagine one could speak of purposes in life, and all of that. But
aren't these in themselves a sort of vanity? Actually, we're not put
here for any real reason. I don't think so, anyway. I've always felt that
man is quite the master of his own destiny."
"And yet, Mr. Rogers, here you are," he said, smiling now, "aboard
the Algonquin, after having quite conclusively decided that a life of
grace and leisure was your true destiny. Do you not believe that
perhaps your whole life was destined for that of a space officer?
Perhaps molded from the very moment you were born to serve as my
Executive Officer during this expedition?"
"I prefer to believe that I had stronger politics with Anglo-Galactic than
the others who were after this berth."
"Do you really? Well, that's interesting enough. And tell me, Mr.
Rogers, what of the crew? Do they still hold your faith to the last
man?"
"I've seen enough men in enough situations to know that one cannot
vouch for every man, even for himself, Captain. I still believe they are
a good enough crew, yes."
"Good enough for what?"
I looked at him, smiling. "I believe that was actually a question for me
to ask you."
"You think so? Perhaps. But, nonetheless, have any of them lost faith
in Aldebaran IX?"
"I think it would be wise for you to address them and judge that for
yourself," I said. "At this point, Captain, it's no more than any man
aboard deserves."
"Nobody deserves anything, Mr. Rogers," he said firmly. "Don't you
forget that. Keep them busy, Mr. Rogers. They shall have their wealth.
Their speculations on that wealth is all that need concern them. And I
shall have mine."
"Do you intend to address the crew at any time before we reach
Aldebaran IX?"
"In good time, Mr. Rogers," he said. "In good time."
That was very much the way it went, Kingsford sticking to his cabin,
reading his Bible, and the men occupying the monotony of space
penetration with conjectures on their futures and on Aldebaran IX.
It took four more months to raise Aldebaran. When we ran onto the
range of Aldebaran, things grew a bit tricky. There were no truly
accurate charts, no perfectly matched coordinates for absolute
bearings, only the tape of the Essex's astro-officer to trail in on. We
set the tape and locked the controls in on them and turned all the
scanners up full. We proceeded at ten percent power, gradually
drawing in on the solar system of the red star, setting a solar orbit and
drawing in toward the nebula of its system. Here, the Essex's tape
became useless. They had made eight approaches before striking a
parallel orbit, had not recorded the orbital timing of the various outer
planets of the system, and had sort of felt their way into the ninth
planet. We would be obliged to do the same thing. Throne, the
astrogation officer, took over control and eased the Algonquin down,
decelerating gradually over a period of seven hours. He then brought
us to a complete halt and looked up at me.
"We'll have to go back out and start over, sir," he said. "I have
insufficient data to bring us through correctly. It might take weeks. I
don't understand how the Essex made it. Probably a big piece of
luck."
We lifted out of the solar plane and set the computers to coordinating
positional data on Aldebaran's system. This time, the Essex's tapes
were unnecessary. Throne plotted an exact course, determined to
strike the ninth planet at the apogee of its orbit. None of Aldebaran's
planets, incidentally, hold anywhere near a circular orbit. There are
six belts of what can be classed as asteroids. These were very likely
planets, or pairs of planets, at one time, but before the multi-rhythmed
cycle of Aldebaran's system established itself, these planets ceased
to exist, through what cataclysmic collisions I could not even begin to
imagine.
We struck an orbit about Aldebaran IX without fault, and Throne
returned command to me. There was a general announcement made
throughout the ship that we were in orbit about the objective planet
and shortly thereafter, the voice of Captain Kingsford, for the first time
during the voyage, came over the communications system.
"Attention. This is Captain Kingsford speaking. Mr. Rogers will
supervise the locking of all controls into this orbit about our objective,
and members of the crew will assemble on the main deck. I wish to
address you. My compliments to Mr. Throne on a fine piece of ship
handling in this rudimentarily charted area. Thank you, Mr. Throne. In
ten minutes, then, gentlemen." The men all looked up, as if suddenly
reawakened to the fact that there was an officer aboard who was my
superior.
"Well," I said, "I guess you'll now meet Capt. Kingsford."
We secured into orbit and made our way to the main deck. It was the
first time in well over a year that all the men were there together, the
first time since the commissioning ceremony. I remember now that I
thought for a brief instant of how few of the men I had actually spoken
more than several words with, how taut and almost mechanical this
entire trip had been, how the crew held a common bond as in other
ships, but not of friendship as on other ships on which I had served.
Here it was an alliance against the unknown. The unknown,
represented not so much by Aldebaran IX, but by Captain Kingsford.
He entered the main deck through the hatch from the officers'
quarters and all motion and sound among the crew stopped. He
walked silently to the center of the deck, nodded briefly at me, and
turned to face the men.
"Here are the facts on Aldebaran IX as I know them. The assays
performed on the ore I brought back display a potential yield of
almost ninety percent pure uranium. Ninety percent, gentlemen. You
are, I am sure, aware of what this can mean for every last one of us.
The extraction of this ore amounts to little more than erecting loaders
on almost any site, and automatic conveyors to the refinery we will
assemble for reducing the ore to a pure state. Our reaction engineers
will then convey the element through the reaction process by which
we will return to Earth with a hold filled with true plutonium. This is
almost an automatic procedure and can be accomplished with an
absolute minimum of operational difficulty. You will ask, then, why I
requisitioned a manifest of so large a crew. The answer to this is
precaution.
"There is a manner of animal life on Aldebaran IX which it is
necessary that we subdue. It is a form of flying animal, quite large,
which feeds through a suction action, ingesting matter with
tremendous force, as it flies. This action not only nourishes the beast,
it also forms the fuel for the ejection of waste gases that are its power
for flight, jet propulsion, in essence. The animal is omnivorous, quite
fast in flight, and leaves an area barren in its trail. It also defies all
manner of remote observation. It came upon us in the Essex
completely by surprise, though all our scanners and force beams
were activated. It was the cause of the death of the entire crew. I
alone was inside the Essex at the time. I escaped with the mere loss
of an eye. How I managed to be the one to survive I cannot say.
Perhaps it was fated that way. But, gentlemen, had we been
prepared, had we been firmly entrenched and adequately armed, this
beast would have presented no threat at all. We were not prepared
then. Now we are. You are probably all familiar with the arsenal
manifest. It was for this reason that I ordered the arms we now have
on board.
"There has never been a reward without a hazard for men to face.
This, then, is our hazard. And I assure you, no man has ever been
within reach of so vast a reward. Is there anything else I can tell you?
Mr. Rogers will establish a manner of arms distribution and a system
of defense positions once we make landfall. We will bring the
Algonquin down on a site I have already determined. The site where
the Essex met her fate."
Here, Kingsford stopped speaking. Several of the men shifted slightly.
There was some clearing of throats, but no voices.
"Are there no questions, then?" Kingsford asked. Again, no one
spoke. Perhaps they were awed by the sight Kingsford presented. He
had been seen by no one on board since the commissioning but
myself and a junior officer who piloted the shuttle at Alpha Centauri X.
They knew him without the eye patch or the beard. He seemed to
have aged twenty years since the departure. He had worn the false
eye during the commissioning ceremony, and now, with the eyepatch
and the beard, his face was darker, his expression pained.
Perhaps the men chose to accept Kingsford's optimism in the face of

the fate of the Essex, considering that they were now in orbit about
Aldebaran IX, and little more could be done but effect a landing.
Anything else could constitute mutiny, and the alternative was the
fortune Kingsford promised each man.
"Good," Kingsford said. He smiled. "Now, as you might imagine, I
have a personal interest in this animal we will hunt." He motioned to
the eye patch. "I left this behind me last time. Not to mention a crew
of forty-two men." Here he paused in the way I had grown to know.
His eye again focused on no particular object. After a time, he
continued. He drew a paper from his tunic. "This, Mr. Rogers, is to be
posted where all crew members can read it. I believe it will explain
itself. Post it after we land." He handed me the sealed paper.
"Gentlemen," Kingsford said, "I thank you for your service. Are you
with me in this business of Aldebaran IX and its flying animal?"
He smiled broadly. The men looked at one another, then slowly
began to smile. Pierce, the armorer, made his way to Kingsford, his
hand extended.
"Sir," he said, as Kingsford grasped his hand and shook it, "it's been
too long since I've been on a good hunt. I'm with you all the way."
"Good," Kingsford said. "You are Pierce, am I right?"
"Yes, sir."
"Thank you, Mr. Pierce."
That started it. The crew moved in on Kingsford, all shook his hand
and pledged to do their share. After a long while, the camaraderie
quieted down, and Kingsford excused himself, requesting Throne and
me to join him in his cabin.
Kingsford sat down behind his desk and drew a chart from a file. He
slid it across the desk so that Throne and I could see it.
"This is a photographic chart of one hemisphere of Aldebaran IX,
gentlemen. I have marked the area in which the Essex was operating.
There are many landmarks which you can use for triangular bearing
to establish the exact position of the site. These are also marked, as
you will note. Prior to the Essex landing, we dropped shuttles at many
random points about the planet and drew cores and meter readings.
This area proved to possess the greatest density of high percentage
ore. It seems natural that we light here again. Do you have sufficient
data here, Mr. Throne?"
Throne moved the chart closer to himself and studied it quietly for a
moment. "I should think so, sir," he said. "This red marking, here.
Would that indicate a mountainous area?"
Kingsford leaned over the chart. "Yes," he said.
"Good," Throne said. "Then I understand the markings."
"Is there anything else I can tell you?"
"No, sir. This chart seems complete enough. I'll have the ship
dropped from orbit and scan the surface. We should be able to pick
up check points to match the chart all right."
"Or you can activate the counters, Mr. Throne. This ship is equipped
with long range equipment. The point of highest incidence of count
will be your mark."
"Yes, sir. Will you be at the controls?"
"For the landing, yes. Mr. Rogers and I will be in the control room
shortly."
"I'll get to this immediately, then," Throne said.
He left the cabin and Kingsford shifted his gaze to me. "You seem
disapproving of my methods, Mr. Rogers."
"Not really, sir. Just your timing. You can hardly call it fair to have kept
to yourself during all these months."
"Perhaps, but remember one thing, Mr. Rogers. You have been my
buffer during all these months. You are a conspirator to the silence. I
think that my address to the crew brought them very much over to my
side, don't you?"
"They haven't had time to think," I said. "Or maybe they don't know
how to, or prefer not to. They might wonder why you waited until now
to tell them about your hunting plans. They might begin to feel, much
as I do now, that this whole trip should never have taken place."
"No, Mr. Rogers. It had to take place. It had to."
"Why?"
Kingsford didn't answer right away. He looked at me quietly for a time.
Then a slow smile spread across his face.
"For the betterment of mankind, Mr. Rogers," he said. "You see, I
believe that the crew of the Essex met a fate that was destined long
before preliminary surveys of Aldebaran IX were even projected.
Before, even, men developed the power to travel into space. It was a
warning. That is my belief, and my faith."

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Different Histories, Shared Futures:

Dialogues on Australia-China Mobo

Contingency in International Law: On the Possibility of

The Silk Road: Connecting Histories and Futures Tim

Queer Epistemologies in Education: Luso-Hispanic

The Political Economy of the China-Pakistan Economic

Social Welfare in India and China: A Comparative

Personalized Law: Different Rules for Different People

Growing Up Shared Stacey Steinberg

Africa-China Cooperation: Towards an African Policy on

“This book is a timely stocktake of the spectacular collapse of Australia-China

Baohui Xie Jack Butcher

ISBN 978-981-19-9190-5 ISBN 978-981-19-9191-2 (eBook)

Cover credit: kenkuza_shutterstock.com

Much of the discussion in this book is based on an online conference in

1 Different Pasts: The Panda and the Kangaroo 1

8 The Strange “Bed-Fellows” with Different Dreams:

Jack Butcher is a Ph.D. student at the University of Adelaide. He has

Dr. David S. G. Goodman is Director, China Studies Centre, Univer-

and the Pacific Sustainable Business Network. He represented the Pacific

Table 4.1 Opposed camps in the International Arena 51

Different Pasts: The Panda

Mobo Gao, Baohui Xie , Justin O’Connor ,

M. Gao (B) · B. Xie

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 1

September 2021. Amid the depths of the COVID-19 pandemic, 2021

of course, mineral dirt, plus world-class education. It is a proven fact that

What is the Problem?

China Prior Xi as a Comparison

more intensely that ethnic or political unrest in conjunction with reli-

The Problem with China Under Xi

Is a Shared Future Possible?

• Is China a national security threat to Australia?

Contents of the Chapters

Colin Mackerras, in Chapter 3, examines the role of national security

to compete for power, or whether the geopolitical imperatives of both

China Threat, Australian Challenge:

George Orwell’s pointed satire about totalitarian regimes seems surpris-

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 15

Threat: an existential threat to Australia from the People’s Republic of

Understanding the PRC

emphasised that domestic fear-mongering is not just socially and econom-

as the hegemon and replace it with a greater plurality of states in which

the establishment of liberal democracy, the same would happen in the

would react through attempts to implement, and in the process provide

that it should necessarily approve of actions the latter takes of which it

was common for visiting Australians to be offered a gift by their Chinese

Australia and China

Magnus, G. (2021, June 22). China must pivot to consumption-led growth or

The Role of National Security

© The Author(s), under exclusive license to Springer Nature 31

Australian National Security Concerns

The China Threat

Trump that definitively changed US policy towards China from engage-

leaders. To this writer, it symbolised an Australian return to the Anglo-

The majority of Australians (63%) now see China as ‘more of a security

Title: A time to die

Author: Harold Calin

Illustrator: Virgil Finlay

Release date: January 8, 2024 [eBook #72662]

Original publication: New York, NY: Ziff-Davis Publishing Company,

Credits: Greg Weeks, Mary Meehan and the Online Distributed

*** START OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK A TIME TO

Capt. Kingsford cleaved the depths of space in a