Democratization and Democracy in South Korea 1960 Present 1St Ed Edition Hyug Baeg Im Full Chapter PDF

Democratization and Democracy in
South Korea, 1960–Present 1st ed.

Edition Hyug Baeg Im
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/democratization-and-democracy-in-south-korea-1960
-present-1st-ed-edition-hyug-baeg-im/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
Human Resource Development in South Korea: Theory and

Cases 1st ed. Edition Doo Hun Lim
https://ebookmass.com/product/human-resource-development-in-
south-korea-theory-and-cases-1st-ed-edition-doo-hun-lim/
Contention and Regime Change in Asia: Contrasting

Dynamics in Indonesia, South Korea, and Thailand 1st
ed. Edition Linda Maduz
https://ebookmass.com/product/contention-and-regime-change-in-
asia-contrasting-dynamics-in-indonesia-south-korea-and-
thailand-1st-ed-edition-linda-maduz/
Urban Food Democracy and Governance in North and South

1st ed. 2020 Edition Alec Thornton
https://ebookmass.com/product/urban-food-democracy-and-
governance-in-north-and-south-1st-ed-2020-edition-alec-thornton/
Global Sports Fandom in South Korea : American Major

League Baseball and Its Fans in the Online Community
1st ed. Edition Younghan Cho
https://ebookmass.com/product/global-sports-fandom-in-south-
korea-american-major-league-baseball-and-its-fans-in-the-online-
community-1st-ed-edition-younghan-cho/
Developmental Universities in Inclusive Innovation
Systems: Alternatives for Knowledge Democratization in
the Global South 1st Edition Rodrigo Arocena
https://ebookmass.com/product/developmental-universities-in-
inclusive-innovation-systems-alternatives-for-knowledge-
democratization-in-the-global-south-1st-edition-rodrigo-arocena/
White Drug Cultures and Regulation in London, 1916–1960

1st ed. Edition Christopher Hallam
https://ebookmass.com/product/white-drug-cultures-and-regulation-
in-london-1916-1960-1st-ed-edition-christopher-hallam/
Child Protection in England, 1960–2000: Expertise,

Experience, and Emotion 1st ed. Edition Jennifer Crane
https://ebookmass.com/product/child-protection-in-
england-1960-2000-expertise-experience-and-emotion-1st-ed-
edition-jennifer-crane/
Gender and HIV in South Africa 1st ed. Edition

Courtenay Sprague
https://ebookmass.com/product/gender-and-hiv-in-south-africa-1st-
ed-edition-courtenay-sprague/
Inter and Post-war Tourism in Western Europe, 1916–1960

1st ed. Edition Carmelo Pellejero Martínez
https://ebookmass.com/product/inter-and-post-war-tourism-in-
western-europe-1916-1960-1st-ed-edition-carmelo-pellejero-
martinez/
Democratization
and Democracy
in South Korea,
1960–Present
h y ug b a eg i m
Democratization and Democracy in South Korea,
1960–Present
Hyug Baeg Im
Democratization
and Democracy
in South Korea,
1960–Present
Hyug Baeg Im
Gwangju Institute of Science and Technology (GIST)
Gwangju, South Korea
Korea University
Seoul, South Korea
ISBN 978-981-15-3702-8 ISBN 978-981-15-3703-5 (eBook)

https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Singapore Pte Ltd. 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
microfilms or in any other physical way, and transmission or information storage and retrieval,
electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
known or hereafter developed.
The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the
publisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect
to the material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made.
The publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and
institutional affiliations.
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Singapore Pte Ltd.
The registered company address is: 152 Beach Road, #21-01/04 Gateway East, Singapore
189721, Singapore
For Eun Hee, Michael, and Cindy, My Beloved Family
Acknowledgments
This book would not have been published without the support, encour-
agement, and helping hands of many scholars, students, and research insti-
tutions. First of all, I would like to give a million thanks to my teacher and
friend, Professor Adam Przeworski at New York University. Professor
Przeworski was the chairman of both my MA thesis committee and
Ph.D. Dissertation committee at the University of Chicago. He has always
kindly taught me how to study the right methods and theories of democ-
racy and democratization in the 1980s. He guided me meticulously in
writing Chap. 2, “The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South
Korea,” and Chap. 4, “Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian
Rule in South Korea.” In other chapters, too, I am deeply indebted to him
for guiding me in writing analytically and critically about democracy and
democratization in South Korea.
I thank Professor Tun-jen Cheng and Professor Deborah A. Brown
for inviting me to write a book chapter on the democratization move-
ment of churches in South Korea. I remember that Professor Cheng
praised my paper as the most analytical among 11 papers in the edited
book. I learned a lot from Professor Larry Diamond at Stanford
University in writing Chap. 6, “Opportunities and Constraints to
Democratic Consolidation in South Korea.” Professor Diamond’s advice
was very informative, thoughtful, and hypothesis-testing. I would like to
give special thanks to Professor McNamara at Georgetown University
who invited me to teach at the Sociology Department at Georgetown
University, and gave me the opportunity to make a presentation on
vii
viii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Korean industrial relations in the post-democratic transition period. I

had one more chance to present a similar topic on industrial relations at
the Korea Institute at Harvard University in 1996. Chapter 8, “Faltering
Democratic Consolidation in South Korea,” was the result of four years’
research on interregional comparison of democratization organized by
the European Consortium for Political Research (ECPR) and the
Japanese Political Science Association (JPSA). I thank participating
members of ECPR and JPSA, especially Professor Aurel Croissant and
Professor Wolfgang Merkel at Heidelberg University, Professor Leonardo
Morlino at the University of Florence, Professor Antoaneta Dimitrova at
Leiden University, and Professor Geoffrey Pridham at the University of
Bristol. Chapter 9, “The Development and Change of Korean Democracy
since the Democratic Transition in 1987,” was based on a paper pre-
sented at the international conference entitled “The Experiments with
Democracy in East and Southeast Asia” organized by the Centre of Asian
Studies at the University of Hong Kong in May 2008. I give special
thanks to Professor Yin-Wah Chu at Hong Kong Baptist University.
Chapter 10, “Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development
Compared: South Korea,” was written for the book East Asian
Development Model (Routledge, 2015), edited by Professors Shiping
Hua and Ruihua Hu. I give special thanks to Professor Shiping Hua,
who invited me to contribute to the book. Chapter 11, “Better
Democracy, Better Economic Growth? South Korea,” was my contribu-
tion to IPSR (International Political Science Review), Vol. 32(5), 2011,
the year when I served as an Executive Member (EC) of International
Political Science Association (IPSA).
Finally, I would like to give special thanks to my colleagues, Ph.D. and
graduate students. Professor Youngmi Kim at Edinburgh University sug-
gested me to submit a proposal for publishing a book at Palgrave Macmillan
and advised me on how to write the proposal. Professor Sung Eun Kim at
Korea University helped me to get permission of copyright to use papers,
book chapters, figures, and tables. Research Fellow Eunmi Choi
(Ph.D. Korea University) at The Asan Institute for Policy Studies reorga-
nized the whole manuscript in accordance with Palgrave Macmillan’s
book format. Dr. Hyobin Lee (Ph.D. Korea University) at the Korean
University proofread the whole manuscript several times. Nicejudy Ju Hee
Lee (Ph.D. Student, Korea University) completed the index of this book.
I also thank Ms. Hye Kyung Kim, a graduate student of Korea University,
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS ix
for helping me to proofread the first draft of the manuscript. Lastly, I

would like to thank my daughter Cindy Im, a graduate of Stanford
University and senior at University of California Hastings Law School for
meticulously proofreading the whole manuscript. Except the persons and
institutes that I mentioned as the key helpers, angels, and supporters,
many people officially and unofficially encouraged and empowered me to
publish articles in a book form. I sincerely thank everyone who enabled
me to publish this book on democracy in South Korea.
Contents
1 Introduction: My Democratization Studies in Retrospect 1

References 15
Part I Authoritarianism and Democratic Transition 17
2 The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea 19

Toward an Analytical Framework for Industrialization
and Regime Change 19
The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model and Its Critics 20
An Alternative Analytical Framework 22
How, Then, Are Changes in the Economic System Related
to Regime Change? 23
Authoritarian Transition in Dependent Capitalism 24
Transition to Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in Korea 26
The Organization of the Economy (1961–1972) 28
Changes in the Configuration of Classes of International
Capital 31
Local Bourgeoisie 32
Peasants 33
Working Class and Social Marginals 34
The State and Classes 34
The Restricted Democracy (1963–1971) 35
xi
xii Contents
Crisis in the Restricted Democracy 37

Organic Crisis 37
The Institutional Crisis of 1971 39
Conclusion 41
3 Recasting Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism: Myths,

Reality and Legacies 49
The Legacy of Park Chung Hee—Still Alive and Well 49
Types of Modern Authoritarianism: Bureaucratic
Authoritarianism, Neo-Patrimonialism, Developmental Soft
Authoritarianism, Bureaucratic Feudalism 50
The Myth of Park Chung Hee’s Developmental Authoritarianism
1: How Developmental Was Park Chung Hee’s
Authoritarianism? 55
Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism in the 1960s (the Third
Republic) 55
Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism in the 1970s (the
Yushin Regime) 58
The Myths in Park Chung Hee’s Developmental
Authoritarianism 2: Endogenous and Exogenous Factors in
Development in the Park Chung Hee Period 60
Theory of Endogenous Growth: Strategic Choice of Park
Chung Hee 60
The Theory of Exogenous Growth: Colonial Legacies,
Benevolent American Hegemony, Land Reform and
Confucian Capitalism 62
The Legacies of Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism 64
How Has Park Chung Hee Been Treated at Different Times? 64
Debates on Historical Necessity ofPark Chung Hee in
Post-Democratic Transition: “Was Park Chung Hee
Historically Necessary?” 67
Was Park Chung Hee the Solution or the Problem of the 1997
Financial Crisis and the Current Economic Crisis? 68
Conclusion 70
References 73
Contents xiii
4 Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian

Rule in South Korea 75
Lessons from the Korean Transition 75
Contending Perspectives on Democratic Transition 76
Alternative Proposition 77
The Politics of Korean Democratization 79
Aborted Transition: 1979–1980 80
Decompression: 1984–1985 81
The Election of February 12, 1985 82
Standoff: 1986–1987 84
Politics of Constitution Making 87
Transition Elections: December 1987 and April 1988 88
Conclusion 90
5 Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea 95

The Role of Christian Churches and Catholics in Korean
Democratization 95
Korean Christian Churches Join the Democratic Opposition
Movement 96
The Push Factor: Doctrinal Change and the Pursuit of
Legitimacy 99
The Pull Factor: The Invitation from Social Movements 101
Competition for the Religious Market 102
The Contribution of Korean Churches to Democratic Transition 104
The Church as Incubator and Shelter for Democratic Activists 104
Mobilization by Networking 107
Who Participated and How Did Democratic Activists Acquire
Hegemony? 108
Part II Democratic Consolidation and After 117
6 Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Opportunities

and Constraints119
The Enabling and Confining Conditions for Democratic
Consolidation 119
Democratic Consolidation: Conceptual Review 120
The Modality of Democratic Transition 123
Facilitators 126
xiv Contents
Economic Affluence 126
Ethnic Homogeneity 129
Religious Tolerance 130
Effective State 133
Civilian Control over the Military 134
Obstacles 135
Low Institutionalization of Political Society 135
Weak Constitutionalism: “Constitutions Without
Constitutionalism” 138
Underdevelopment of Civil Society 139
Economic Globalization 145
External Security Vulnerability 147
Conclusion: Overcoming Obstacles for Korean Democratic
Consolidations 148
7 From Affiliation to Association: The Challenge of

Democratic Consolidation in Korean Industrial Relations159
Beyond Democratic Consolidation 159
Associative Model of Social Order and Industrial Relations:
Profile and Promise 161
Interests Without Institutions: Korean Industrial Relations—
Past and Present 165
Prospects for an Associative Mode of Industrial Relations in
Korea 169
A Korean Solution: Association in a Confederal Welfare State 172
Conclusion: Theoretical Significance of the Korean Experience 175
8 Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea:

Democracy at the End of the Three Kims Era183
Korean Democracy at a Crossroads 183
Assessing New Democracies: Negative Consolidation and Positive
Consolidation 184
The Achievements of the First Generation of Democracy 187
Reinstituting Civilian Control Over the Military 187
Institutionalization of Elections 188
A Peaceful Transfer of Government 189
Enhancing Accountability 190
Persistent Bad Legacies of the Three Kims’ Politics 192
Contents xv
Divisive Regionalism 192
An Underdeveloped Party System 194
An Imperial but Weak Presidency with a Single-Term Limit 195
Political Corruption 196
Declining Trust in Democracy 197
The Presidential Election of 2002 and Its Implication for
Democratic Consolidation 198
Party Reforms and the “People’s Primary” 199
Implications for Removing Obstacles to Democratic
Consolidation 200
Conclusion: The New Era 201
9 Development and Change of Korean Democracy Since the

Democratic Transition of 1987: The Three Kims’ Politics
and After205
Development and Underdevelopment of Democracy in Korea 205
Coexistence of Different Historical Times: Simultaneity of
Premodernity, Modernity, and Postmodernity 206
Modalities of Transition and Path Dependence 208
Korean Democracy in the Three Kims Era 210
Modernity: Development of Liberal Democracy 210
Civilianization 210
Institutionalization of Democratic Competition 211
Alternation in Power 212
Premodernity: Legacies of Confucian Patrimonialism 213
Confucian Patrimonialism Under the Chosun Dynasty 214
Confucian Patrimonialism in Post-Transition Democracy 215
Resilient Regionalism 216
Delegative Presidency 217
Personal Political Parties and Party Bossism 218
Ideological Orthodoxy 219
Change of Democracy in the Post–Three Kims Era 220
The Rise of Neo-Nomadic Society 220
Receding Premodernity: “Confucius Leaving Korea” 222
Advancing Modernity: Political Reforms for Modern Liberal
Democracy 223
Party Reform 223
Political Finance Reform 224
The Advent of Postmodernity: Internet Democracy 225
Conclusion: Gear Toward Conservatism 226
xvi Contents
Part III Toward a Quality Democracy in South Korea 233
10 Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development

Compared235
Korea as a Showcase for Testing Theses on Democracy and
Economic Development 235
Theoretical Overview: Five Possible Causal Relations between
Democracy and Economic Development 238
Modernization Theory: “Development First, Democracy
Later” 239
Praetorianism: “Economic Development, Under
institutionalization, Hyper-democracy, and Praetorian
Dictatorship” 240
Bureaucratic Authoritarianism: “Development Does not
Lead to Democracy” 241
Democratic Development Theory: “Democracy First,
Development Later” 243
Exogenous Modernization: “Democracy Does not Matter in
Development” 245
The Democratic Interlude and the Collapse of the Second
Republic (1960–1961) 247
Authoritarian Development under Park Chung Hee 247
Exogenous Growth under Park Chung Hee’s
Authoritarianism 249
Democracy and Development since the Democratic Transition in
1987 251
The Record of Democratic Governments’ Economic Management 252
Roh Tae Woo Government 252
Kim Young Sam’s Presidency 253
Kim Dae Jung’s Presidency: Parallel Development of
Democracy and Market Economy 253
Roh Moo Hyun’s Presidency: Neo-Nomadic Democracy and
Digital Economy 254
Performances of Democratic Governments in Comparative
Perspective: Managing Sustainable Economic Growth 255
Authoritarian Capitalism Refuted in Development since the
Democratic Transition 256
Exogenous Factors of Growth under Democratic Governments 261
Endogenous Factors of Growth under Democratic Governments 263
References 268
Contents xvii
11 Better Democracy, Better Economic Growth? South Korea273

Introduction 273
The Empirical Findings 274
Rule of Law 275
Electoral and Interinstitutional Accountability 277
Participation 282
Competition 285
Freedom 286
Equality 290
Responsiveness 294
Conclusion 296
References 297
References299
Index309
List of Figures
Fig. 4.1 Dynamics of transition from authoritarian rule Authoritarian

Power Bloc 78
Fig. 4.2 Aborted transition in 1979–1980 81
Fig. 4.3 “Standoff”: 1985–June 1987 moderate opposition 84
Fig. 4.4 Democratic transition: June 1987 87
Fig. 5.1 Christians’ attitude toward authoritarian regimes. Note: See
Jong Chul Choi, “Hankook Kidoggyo Gyohoedeuleui
Jungchijuk Taedo” [The political attitudes of Korean
Christian churches, 1972–1990] Kyungjewa Sahoe [Economy
and Society] 15 (Autumn 1992): 215. Here, the abbreviation
CFA stands for the Christian Farmers’ Association; KCCC for
the Korean Council of Christian Churches; and KCAAC for
the Korean Christian Association for Anti-Communism 109
Fig. 10.1 Modernization theory and neo-modernization theory.
(Source: Chen 2007) 238
Fig. 10.2 Praetorianism. (Source: Chen 2007) 240
Fig. 10.3 Bureaucratic authoritarianism. (Source: Chen 2007) 241
Fig. 10.4 Democratic development theory. (Source: Chen 2007) 243
Fig. 10.5 Exogenous modernization. (Source: Chen 2007) 245
Fig. 10.6 Domestic investment rate (%). (Source: Korean Statistical
Information Service http://kosis.kr) 258
Fig. 10.7 Gross fixed capital formation (% of GDP). (Source: World
Databank http://databank.worldbank.org) 258
Fig. 10.8 GDP growth (annual %). (Source: World Databank http://
databank.worldbank.org)259
xix
xx List of Figures
Fig. 10.9 International trade balance (US dollars). (Source: The Bank of
Korea http://www.sbok.or.kr) 260
Fig. 10.10 Inflation, consumer prices (annual %). (Source: World
Fig. 10.11 Unemployment total (% of total labor force). (Source: World
Fig. 11.1 Rule of law. (Source: Governance Matters 2009, “Worldwide
Governance Indicators (WGI)”) 276
Fig. 11.2 Individual security and civil order. (Source: Cingranelli’s
PHYSINT (physical integrity variable). The Quality of
Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) 277
Fig. 11.3 Institutional and administrative capacity. (Source: Governance
Matters 2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”.
The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country Report: South
Korea 2010) 278
Fig. 11.4 Control of corruption. (Source: Governance Matters 2009,
“Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”) 278
Fig. 11.5 Electoral accountability. (Source: Reporters Without Borders,
Worldwide Press Freedom Index) 279
Fig. 11.6 Interinstitutional accountability. (Source: Governance Matters
2009, “Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”) 280
Fig. 11.7 Voter turnout in presidential elections. (Source: International
Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(International IDEA)) 283
Fig. 11.8 Voter turnout in parliamentary elections. (Source:
International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance
(International IDEA)) 283
Fig. 11.9 Number of parties. (Source: The Quality of Democracy
Workshop, Country Report: South Korea 2010) 285
Fig. 11.10 Difference in the strength of the first and second largest party.
(Source: The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country
Report: South Korea 2010) 286
Fig. 11.11 Political rights. (Source: Freedom House, Freedom in the
World (FRW)) 287
Fig. 11.12 Civil rights. (Source: CIRI’s Civil Rights/Empowerment
Rights Index. The Quality of Democracy Workshop, Country
Report: South Korea 2010) 288
Fig. 11.13 Gini coefficient. (Source: Office of Statistics, Republic of
Korea, Statistics Korea 2006 (www.kostat.go.kr)) 291
List of Figures xxi
Fig. 11.14 Polarization in education. (Source: Choi, Tae-uk. 2005.

“Sahoetonghaphyung Segyehwachujineul wihan Jungchijedo
Jogeun (Political Institutional Conditions for Promoting an
Inclusive Globalization),” Shinjinbo Report (New Progressive
Report) (January) 82–83.) 293
Fig. 11.15 Responsiveness. (Source: Governance Matters 2009,
“Worldwide Governance Indicators (WGI)”) 294
List of Tables
Table 2.1 Foreign capital inflow (millions of dollars) 31

Table 2.2 Indexes of real wages and labor productivities (1965 = 100) 38
Table 3.1 Types of modern authoritarianism 52
Table 10.1 IT Index in Roh Moo Hyun Presidency (2007) 256
Table 10.2 Political rights and economic freedom indicators 264
Table 10.3 Worldwide governance indicators 266
Table 11.1 Responsiveness: percentage of positive evaluation 295
xxiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction: My Democratization Studies

in Retrospect
On August 11, 1979, as I was boarding my plane to go and study com-

parative regime transformation and consolidation at the University of
Chicago, major newspapers were running front-page photos of hand-
cuffed Korean women workers crying and shouting through the window
of an armored police bus. The photos showed the YH Corp. female work-
ers’ strike ending with state union-busting by police arrest, torture and
other brutalities toward striking workers. One woman jumped to her
death from the fourth floor of the opposition New Democratic Party
headquarters. In August 1979, Korea was in the middle of the Yushin
dictatorship, ruled by the strongman Park Chung Hee. The country was
under Emergency Decree No. 9, authorizing police to arrest, torture and
put in jail every striking worker and every demonstrating and protesting
college student.
The purpose of the research proposal I submitted to the University of
Chicago was, I remember, to research why authoritarianism had survived
despite continuing protests, strikes and demonstrations in South Korea.
At that time I did not even imagine the demise of Park Chung Hee’s
authoritarianism, to say nothing of the regicide of Park Chung Hee. In
mid-1979, the Yushin dictatorship was regarded as impregnable by many
political scientists, both at home and abroad, who assumed it would last
for Park Chung Hee’s lifetime. I shared this view and wanted to study why
this was so, and why crafting a democratic transition had hitherto been
impossible in this repressive, bureaucratic, technocratic dictatorship.
© The Author(s) 2020 1

H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea,
1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_1
2 H. B. IM
However, when I started studying at Chicago, I was surprised to dis-

cover that authoritarian regimes had recently been collapsing in Southern
Europe and Latin America. I was shocked by Philippe C. Schmitter’s
course entitled “The Demise of Authoritarianism and the Prospects of
Democracy in Latin America” and Adam Przeworski’s unpublished paper
in the reading list, “Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to
Democracy.”1 In Chicago, comparative political scientists had already
studied the demise of authoritarianism and the transition to democracy. At
that time dictatorships in East Asia and Eastern Europe were not included
among countries for researching the possibility of democratic transition.
Even the forerunners of transitology perceived the possibility of demo-
cratic transition in South Korea under Park Chung Hee’s iron-fist rule to
be slight indeed. I agreed that East Asian developmental dictatorships
were very difficult to democratize because of their good economic perfor-
mance and because the South Korean authoritarianism under Park Chung
Hee was the typical case of developmental dictatorship.
Within a month of my starting to study at Chicago, on October 26,
1979, Chung Hee was assassinated by his close friend and protégé, KCIA
chief Kim Jae Kyu. The authoritarian dictator turned out not to be invin-
cible and the Yushin authoritarian system was not impregnable. After
Park’s death, the Yushin system crumbled: without him, the system was
unsustainable, and Koreans enjoyed a “sweet and sad”2 time in the Seoul
Spring, late 1979–early 1980: “sweet” because they regained some degree
of political freedom and civil liberties after the dictator’s death. Yet also
“sad” because during the interregnum the politicized military officer
group called the New Military officers under General Chun Doo Hwan
staged an internal military coup, arresting Martial Law Commander
General Chung Seung Hwa, and seizing control. Chun Doo Hwan and
the New Military then usurped power, repressing mass protests and mas-
sacring more than 300 citizens and student protestors in Kwang Ju city.
The Seoul Spring was too short to bring back democracy in South Korea,
and another military dictatorship filled the power vacuum created by
Park’s death. The Seoul Spring confirms the “Stern Principle” that the
logic of the fall of the Weimar Republic did not explain the advent of
National Socialism in Germany.3
Witnessing the survival of the military authoritarian regime even after
the death of founding military dictator Park, I tried to explain why the
Korean case had proved an exception with regard to democratic transition
from authoritarianism. I tried to understand why its authoritarian regime
1 INTRODUCTION: MY DEMOCRATIZATION STUDIES IN RETROSPECT 3
was exceptionally immune to the Third Wave of democratization despite

its rapid and spectacular economic growth.4 I researched how Park Chung
Hee staged the Yushin palace coup and established Yushin authoritarian-
ism as a system that enabled the military authoritarianism regime to sur-
vive the death of its founder. At that time I was still a probabilist, a fatalist,
unable to believe in the prospect of democratic transition in South Korea.
I searched for structural prerequisites and minimum probability for bring-
ing democratic transition. Observing that the country had crossed the
minimum threshold for democratic transition in terms of per capita
income, a strong and broad educated middle class and high accessibility to
mass communication but no democratic transition even after the death of
the dictator Park Chung Hee, I held out little hope for democracy.5
I was then very fortunate to meet two great theorists of democratic
transition and consolidation, Adam Przeworski and Philippe C. Schmitter,
at the University of Chicago. Adam was the chairman of my MA thesis and
PhD dissertation. I learned from Adam to analyze, not describe, political
phenomena with mathematical, deductive logic. Philippe was the profes-
sor of comparative politics whose colorful but very enlightening lectures I
loved to listen to. I learned from him the use of inductive reasoning to
explain political phenomena. Both great scholars shared with me powerful
methods for studying democratization. Adam taught me a game-
theoretical model for democratic transition: that it is not structure and
culture that determined the path to democracy, but the strategic choices
of relevant political actors that bring democratic transition or non-
transition. Philippe taught us that transitologists could overcome probabi-
lism, structural determinism, fatalism and impossibilism by what Albert
O. Hirschmann called “possibilism.” Possibilism stresses agency and con-
tingency, “structured contingency” (Terry Karl),6 uncertainty and
Machiavelli’s “virtu,” the capacity of an individual political actor to see
the opportunities for creative responses and to come up with a set of rules
and practices for democratic transition.7 With possibilism, transitologists
can find solutions from impossible conditions.
My escape from impossibilism started with the regime transition from
restricted democracy to a repressive, military and bureaucratic authoritari-
anism in late 1972 by then-president Park Chung Hee. Chapter 2 explains
why Park had installed bureaucratic authoritarianism in South Korea differ-
ently from Latin American military dictators, yet similarly to highly techno-
cratic and developmental “bureaucratic authoritarian” regimes. Chapter 2
was written as a PhD preliminary paper at the Department of Political
4 H. B. IM
Science at Chicago in 1985 and published in World Politics in 1987. In this

chapter, I argue that even though Yushin authoritarianism shared similar
regime characteristics of Latin American bureaucratic authoritarianism,
such as the exclusion of popular sectors politically as well as economically,
the repression of protestors, the violation of human rights and the installa-
tion of modern technocratic rational authoritarianism in economically
advanced third world countries, nevertheless, the process of regime instal-
lation in South Korea was different. First, Park Chung Hee did not justify
Yushin in order to overcome an economic crisis. On the contrary, he justi-
fied it to preserve the economic development that he had already accom-
plished in the 1960s and to maintain the high rate of economic growth in
the 1970s under his leadership. Second, unlike Latin America, the Korean
“deepening” in the form of heavy and chemical industrialization (HCI)
was the consequence rather than the cause of regime transition to bureau-
cratic authoritarianism. Third, popular sectors were not seriously politically
activated to threaten the developmental authoritarian state, and on the eve
of Yushin, unlike Latin America, no bureaucratic authoritarian coup coali-
tion was formed between the state, the domestic and the transnational
bourgeoisie. Finally, strong state apparatuses had been already established
in the 1950s and 1960s, before the inauguration of Yushin.
I argue in Chap. 2 that authoritarian regime transition in the early
1970s was not predetermined by the structural change from a labor-
intensive export platform to industrial deepening toward heavy and chem-
ical industrialization. Rather, it was a strategic choice by Park Chung Hee
to sustain his dictatorial rule given that a labor-intensive export platform
had become incompatible with restricted democracy. This required him to
appeal to the rapidly growing working class vote, as urban-based industri-
alization quickly absorbed the reserve army of Bonapartist small peasants
in the countryside which had previously been his electoral stronghold. It
was a strategic choice for Park because he sought to sustain a restricted
democracy while simultaneously developing a domestic market-based
economy and export platform based on both labor-intensive and high-
technology-intensive products. Such an approach was prone to class com-
promise and was to work positively for Park and his party’s electoral
politics. He chose to establish bureaucratic authoritarianism to avoid the
constraints of electoral politics under the restricted democracy and con-
tinue his state-led export-platform developmental strategy.
Chapter 3 demystifies the Park Chung Hee model of economic devel-
opment, often praised as an ideal developmental state model, as it achieved
high economic growth with equity. Park Chung Hee’s reign had two
stages: first, a soft authoritarian developmental state under a restricted
democracy; and, second, a repressive bureaucratic authoritarian state
under the Yushin system. In both stages, the economy grew “miracu-
lously” from one of the poorest in the region to an economic powerhouse.
Many have praised Park Chung Hee for his wise and timely choice of
optimal developmental strategy based on state-led economic platform.
However, the Korean “miracle” was not simply that: it was a combina-
tion of both endogenous and exogenous factors. Park Chung Hee deserves
credit for generating endogenous development through the timely adop-
tion of optimal strategies at every stage. Nonetheless, the miraculous
development in Korea is also due to many exogenous factors, such as
Japanese colonial legacies, benevolent American hegemony, the comple-
tion of land reform before launching urban-centered industrialization, the
elimination of a landed class that could have strongly resisted industrializa-
tion and the emergence of Confucian capitalism.
Korea’s development into a modern industrialized country shows us
the relationship between macro and micro factors, and between structures
and actors. Because of Park’s achievement in transforming the Korean
economy into a modern industrialized one, his admirers have even justi-
fied his dictatorship. They have argued that his Yushin system was histori-
cally necessary in the 1970s, going on to argue that authoritarian
development in the 1970s was a necessary pre-stage to the democratic
transition in the mid-1980s. The historical necessity argument is severely
weakened, however, if we take into account the exogenous factors that
contributed to Korea’s miraculous economic growth during his reign.
Park Chung Hee and his choices of development strategies may have been
historically necessary for a spectacular economic growth in the 1960s and
1970s, but they were not sufficient on their own. In addition, there is no
clear causal relationship between authoritarian development in the 1970s
and the democratic transition in 1987, nor any substantial evidence that
the developmental dictatorship was a precondition and stepping stone to
that transition.
Of course, Park Chung Hee contributed a great deal to Korea’s miracu-
lous development in the 1960s and 1970s and deserves to be called “the
great modernizer” of his country. At the same time, he accomplished all
this thanks to good fortune and beneficial exogenous factors of historical
path dependence, and fclass structure and culture that were beyond his
control. Karl Marx succinctly described the relationship between actors
6 H. B. IM
and structures, actors and historical path dependence, and Machiavelli’s

fortuna and virtu in his Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte.
Men make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do
not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances
existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all
dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. (Marx
1852, p. 78. Eighteenth Brumaire of Louis Bonaparte)
Park Chung Hee made a great historical step with the first industrializa-
tion of Korea. Nevertheless, he did not do it alone, but with the good
fortune transmitted from the past in the form of the Japanese colonial
legacy, benevolent American hegemony, land reform, a class structure that
eliminated the landed class who would have resisted urban-centered indus-
trialization and the capitalism embedded with Confucian culture. All of
these exogenous factors that were beyond the control of dictator Park
Chung Hee worked favorably for his industrial revolution in South Korea.
Chapter 4 is a game-theoretical analysis of the aborted transition to
democracy in 1979–1981 and the successful democratic transition in the
mid-1980s. I start with a critique of the precondition or prerequisite theo-
ries of democratic transition. These theories fall short in explaining the
causal path from an authoritarian regime to democracy because in many
cases factors such as economic prosperity and civic culture are not a pre-
condition to democratic transition, but rather the outcomes of the transi-
tion or the products of consolidated stable democracies. A more serious
problem of precondition theories is that they are politically impotent in
explaining democratic transitions because they afford no active role to
individuals in the transition process, assuming that they await passively the
maturity of economic and cultural preconditions favoring democracy. In a
nutshell, the precondition theory of democratic transition can be seen as
an impossibilist theory that does not search for the possibility or hope for
democracy; it is thus prone to be fatalistic about the prospect of democ-
racy, assuming the population to be unable to satisfy such preconditions.
South Korea is an exceptionally poor case for the precondition theory
of democratic transition. Even though at the time of Park’s assassination
the country did satisfy preconditions for democratic transition, such as an
industrialized economy, a strong and well-educated middle class, the for-
mation of workers with class consciousness and the existence of a rebel-
lious opposition party with strong leaders, the death of the dictator did
not lead to a democratic transition, but to another military authoritarian

regime after the brief Seoul Spring. The aborted transition from October
26, 1979, to May 18, 1980, taught me that precondition theories could
not explain democratic transition or non-transition in South Korea because
the country proved to be a typical case where democratic transition did
not take place despite satisfying the preconditions for democratic transition.
Democratic transition does not autonomously arise when a country
under authoritarianism satisfies the necessary economic and cultural pre-
conditions. Rather, it depends on the outcome of strategic interplays
among relevant political actors. With regard to the major actors in the
transition from authoritarianism to democracy four can be identified:
moderates and maximalists in the opposition, and hard-liners and soft-
liners (the latter transforming themselves into reformers) in the authori-
tarian regime. I do not distinguish authoritarians from moderate
authoritarians, or moderate and reformist democrats from radical and
revolutionary oppositioners. Rather, I classify major actors along the lines
of their strategic stances toward democratic opposition and the authoritar-
ian regime. Hard-liners in the regime and maximalists in the opposition
are non-strategic actors who have only one uncompromising, intransigent
strategy: the repression of opposition regardless of the opposition’s change
of strategy toward compromise and the unending struggle against the
authoritarian regime until they overthrow it.
The game of transition starts with the organization of viable democratic
alternatives with leaders, and the split within authoritarian power bloc
between hard-liners and soft-liners. If viable democratic alternatives are
organized without the split in the authoritarian regime, the outcome of
strategic interplays will likely be an inconclusive tug-of-war. To break out
of this game-theoretical impasse, a split in the authoritarian power bloc
between hard-liners and soft-liners is necessary. The emergence of a split
does not automatically bring a transition to democracy, however. A demo-
cratic transition takes place as one of four outcomes of the game of transi-
tion: (1) a coup by hard-liners and popular revolution by maximalists as
the outcome of confrontation in the street; (2) authoritarianism with con-
cessions but without transition; (3) protracted and inconclusive struggle,
standoff and non-transition; (4) democratic transition through compro-
mise between “reformers” within the regime and moderate opposition.
In the aborted transition between October 26, 1979, while the hard-
line New Military controlled and suppressed the voice of soft-liners after
seizing power, the moderate and institutional oppositional forces led by
8 H. B. IM
the opposition New Democratic Party could not control the actions and
voices of the extra-institutional opposition and students. Under this game-
theoretical condition the New Military took an uncompromising strategy
to repress all opposition regardless of their position. They provoked vio-
lence on campuses, in the streets and in workplaces. Finally, they drew
opposition forces into the streets, crushed them and took over the power
to rule over the whole country. The Kwangju People’s uprising and mas-
sacre by Green Beret troopers in May 1980 was the finishing blow by the
New Military, and the Seoul Spring ended in less than six months after
it began.
The successful democratic transition process began in 1984 when Chun
Doo Hwan relaxed and decompressed authoritarian control. With the so-
called Korean abertura, civil society was resurrected and many autono-
mous student, labor and religious organizations mushroomed from the
underground to the foreground of democratic agora. This plethora of
social movements for democracy contributed considerably to the electoral
success of the New Korea Democratic Party (NKDP), led by two key lead-
ers for the restoration of democracy, Kim Young Sam and Kim Dae Jung,
in the National Assembly election on February 15, 2015. The NKDP was
organized just two weeks before the election and rapidly became the larg-
est opposition party. After the election, Koreans had an organized political
alternative, the single dominant opposition party NKDP, with two strong
leaders, the Two Kims. The combined strength of the institutional opposi-
tion in the form of the NKDP together with social movement forces
demanding democracy in “street parliaments” made a “catastrophic bal-
ance” to the authoritarian regime. The inconclusive and protracted tug-
of-war that had continued since 1986, between democratic forces
demanding the restoration of democracy and the authoritarian regime led
by hard-liners who rejected outright the demands and instead repressed
them with clubs and tear gas, was finally resolved.
The protracted standoff was broken when President Chun Doo Hwan
announced on April 14, 1987, to stop negotiations with the democratic
opposition over the constitutional revision to allow democratic competi-
tion and to continue the current system of authoritarian rule. Chun’s ter-
mination of the negotiations triggered the unification of the institutional
opposition and social movement forces. In May 1987, the revelation that
the regime had tortured a student, Park Jong Chul, to death, and the
ensuing cover-up attempt revealed by a Catholic priest, shifted the balance
of forces in the street confrontation as religious movements, white-collar
workers, intellectuals, artists and other moral opposition forces joined the
democratic coalition. On June 10, 1987, the democratic coalition orga-
nized a united front, the National Coalition for Constitutional Reform
(NCCR), and occupied the hill of Myungdong Cathedral. Various factions
within the democratic coalition set aside their differences and made a con-
certed collective action for democracy. The NCCR postponed the debates
on the ideology of the new democracy by controlling the voice of intran-
sigent maximalist oppositions; instead, they focused their efforts on the
directly elected presidential system. As the democratic coalition grew and
overwhelmed the police in the street, the hard-liners became isolated, and
reformers within the regime seized their chance to take the lead in resolv-
ing the crisis. The confrontation in the street ended with the ruling
Democratic Justice party’s presidential candidate Roh Tae Woo’s
announcement to concede to restoring democratic competition including
a directly elected presidential system, and that Roh’s concession should be
accepted by two leaders of the opposition party, Kim Young Sam and Kim
Dae Jung.
The mode of democratic transition in 1987 was one of compromise
between reformers within the regime and moderate opposition. They
reached a second-best compromise in which the moderated opposition
guaranteed that the reformers would remain a strong political force that
could win in the democratic competition by assuring their incumbency as
well as their “safe return home” in return for conceding to the reformers’
demand to restore democratic competition. It was a mode of democratic
transition of what Przeworski calls “democracy with guarantees.”
Chapter 5 deals with the role of Korean Christian churches in the
democratization of South Korea. The late Samuel P. Huntington noted in
his The Third Wave that “the Christian churches, their leaders and com-
municants, were a major force bringing about the transition to democracy
in 1987 and 1988.”8 Korean churches participated in the democratization
movement, first by setting up a new legitimacy formula in a time of rapid
socioeconomic change, second by responding to demands from other
social movements in providing shelter to antigovernment dissidents and
finally by creating a new niche market for religious organizations.
In South Korea, both Protestant and Catholic churches participated
actively in the democratization movements and contributed a great deal to
the democratic transition of 1987. However, even though Protestant
churches suffered more imprisonment of their members and martyrs than
the Catholic Church did, the latter gained the upper hand in making
10 H. B. IM
society believe they had played a more progressive role in democratization

despite being a minority. While Protestant activists struggled with conser-
vatives in responding to popular demands for democracy, Catholics over-
came the existing division within their community, and were able to
present a united front to society and the state. Catholic activists gained the
upper hand over Protestants in religious democratization movements by
cooperating with their conservative fellow Catholics, and by making them
share the agony and recognize the authoritarian state’s repression. After
the transition to democracy in 1987, most people in Korea thought that
Catholic churches had contributed more to democratic transition than
Protestant churches did, even though Protestant activists voiced opinions
of democracy, provided shelter to dissidents, appealed to international
communities to help Korea to be democratized and produced prisoners
and martyrs for democracy.
Part II deals with the democratic consolidation in South Korea. In my
graduate school years at Chicago, I studied the rise and fall of authoritari-
anism in South Korea from 1961 to 1979 and analyzed the democratic
transition process in South Korea from 1980 to 1987 with a strategic
choice-approach for my PhD dissertation. After receiving my PhD, I
returned home and found South Korean democracy entering into a con-
solidation process. Since then I have written, presented and published
many articles and books on this subject. In retrospect, I can say that South
Korea completed the democratic consolidation process in a relatively short
period of time. Since 1987, South Koreans have institutionalized and reg-
ularized competitive and fair elections, and the electoral space has expanded
from the national to the local level and broadened to societal areas. Now
university presidents, superintendents of education and even chairs of
women’s associations in apartment complexes are directly elected by pro-
fessors, citizens of cities and provinces, and residents of the apartment
complexes, respectively. The military that ruled the country for 26 years
has returned to the barracks and remained under firm civilian control. The
finishing touch to the consolidation process was the first peaceful transfer
of power to long-time opposition leader, Kim Dae Jung, in the presiden-
tial election of December 1997, in the middle of the financial crisis, just
ten years after the democratic transition. With the peaceful handing over
of government to the leader of the opposition by means of fair and com-
petitive election, Korean democracy can be considered consolidated and
democracy is “the only game in town.”
Nevertheless, democracy under the Three Kims (Kim Young Sam, Kim
Dae Jung and Kim Jong Pil) era was not without defects. The era is also
known as the democracy of the “1987 system,” a period characterized by
the simultaneity of non-simultaneous historical times of modernity, pre-
modernity and post-modernity. The Three Kims era has many characteris-
tics of modernity of liberal democracy, including political and civil liberties,
regular and competitive elections, civilian control over the military, the
rule of law, transparency and accountability, and responsiveness of elected
representatives and government. However, during this period, pre-
modernity coexisted with modern liberal democracy, and Confucian patri-
monialism persisted among political leaders and the masses. Regionalism
in the form of expanded Confucian familism usually decided the outcome
of elections; delegative presidents acted like the Confucian patriarchal
father of the nation; and political parties were the personal parties of Three
Kims, which they ran like feudal lords. In the latter half of the Three Kims
era, globalization, the neoliberalization of the economy and the advent of
a neo-nomadic society driven by the IT revolution brought post-modernity
into Korean politics. The IT revolution revolutionized multi-directional
on- and offline communications and networking in ways that have changed
Korean democracy, making it smaller in size, faster in responding to peo-
ple’s demands, more interconnected, accountable and inclusive. At the
end of the Three Kims era, the modernity of liberal democracy, the pre-
modernity of Confucian patrimonialism and the post-modernity of inter-
net democracy existed simultaneously.9
Part III includes the two concluding chapters of this book. Chapter 10
deals with the superiority of democracy over authoritarianism even in
terms of economic performance. Many Koreans have felt nostalgia for the
economic miracle of Park Chung Hee whenever they meet economic dif-
ficulties, arguing that democratic government performs worse than
authoritarian government. By comparing the statistics on the economic
performance of democratic governments from 1987 to 2008 and those of
authoritarian governments from 1961 to 1987, I show that democratic
governments have, in fact, performed better, regardless of their economic
policy regimes in all categories of economic performance, except the GDP
growth rate. The average domestic investment rate in the democratic
period is 32.5%, while in the authoritarian period it was 31.1%. The gross
fixed capital formation (% of GDP) under democracy is 32.2%, while in the
authoritarian period it was 24.4%. The GDP growth rate in the democratic
period is 6.7%, while under authoritarianism it was 7.8%. One explanation
12 H. B. IM
for the 1.1% lower growth rate is the two regional and global economic
crises in 1997 and 2008; if the sharp decline in GDP growth during those
crises is taken into account, the GDP growth rate in both periods would
be almost the same. The international balance of trade shifted from peren-
nial deficits in the authoritarian period to continuing trade surpluses in the
democratic period. The inflation rate in democratic period is 4.7% while in
the previous period it was 12.7%. Lastly, the unemployment rate under
democracy is 3.4%, compared to an earlier figure of 4.3%.
All these statistics show the superiority of democracy over authoritari-
anism in terms of economic performance. Just as exogenous factors con-
tributed to spectacular economic growth during the Park Chun Hee era,
exogenous factors such as the “three lows” (low inflation, low currency
rate, low dollar value), the end of the Cold War and globalization also
contributed to the higher economic performance of democratic govern-
ments. However, such factors contributed much less to economic growth
during the democratic period of the Park Chung Hee era. Therefore, we
must look at the endogenous factors of economic growth in the post-
authoritarian democratic period. This means that democracy does func-
tion well endogenously for economic growth with its superior regime
properties, such as political rights, economic freedom, rule of law, account-
ability, transparency, political stability, government effectiveness and regu-
latory quality. During the democratic period, all these superior regime
properties contributed to the better economic performance of democratic
governments.
The lesson we learn from the Korean experience under two different
political regimes is that democracy matters for sustaining a high-growth
economy with equity. Without democratization in the mid-1980s, South
Korea could not have adjusted to the changed international political and
economic environments brought about by the end of the Cold War, the
spread of neoliberal globalization and the IT revolution. The country was
able to weather the East Asian financial crisis because, at that time, it was
a democracy in which the accountability mechanism worked to replace the
leaders and party responsible for causing the financial crisis with the lead-
ers of the opposition party, who were not tied to the establishment in poli-
tics, finance, business and public sectors. They thus dared to introduce
drastic reforms to overcome the crisis and resume a sustainably high eco-
nomic growth in a very short period of time. The performance of demo-
cratic governments in Korea since 1987 supports the democratic
development thesis, that is, “democracy first, economic development
later,” because economic development follows from good governance

practiced by good democracies.
Finally, as I describe in Chap. 11, Korean democracy is now at the stage
of improving the quality of democracy. Looking back, Koreans have had a
long and painful but valuable journey from repressive authoritarianism to
a consolidated democracy. They are on the path toward an advanced
democracy in terms of the rule of law, political freedom and civil liberties,
electoral and inter-institutional accountability, responsiveness of represen-
tatives, human security, effective administration, transparency and control
of corruption, active political participation of citizens and equality.
Recently, many have talked about the retreat of democracy in South
Korea since the inauguration of the conservative Lee Myung Bak presi-
dency in 2008, particularly as regards political freedom and civil liberties.
Among these, freedom of speech and expression have been seriously com-
promised by the two consecutive conservative governments of Lee Myung
Bak and Park Geun Hye. In this regard, South Korea has been classified as
a “partly free” country by international freedom of speech NGOs such as
Freedom House and Reporters Without Borders.
However, I remain optimistic because Koreans, I believe, have shown
their mettle, in holding elections during the Korean War, in toppling the
authoritarian dictator Rhee Syng Man in the April 19 Student Revolution
in 1960, in successfully crafting a democratic transition by mobilizing on
the streets in the most militarized country in the world. I believe that
Koreans’ path toward a more advanced quality democracy is irreversible,
even though obstacles hinder their smooth passage. They have the self-
correcting power to remove historical obstacles, whether they are Hegel’s
“yokes” or Mencius’ “holes” that obstruct the path to advanced democ-
racy. They have the will to remove barriers to a quality democracy. I end
the introduction of this book by quoting the great scholar-bureaucrat of
the late Chosun dynasty, Jung Yak Yong’s interpretation of Confucius’
“sighing at the river” (Analects, Book 9).
Our life is a long journey advancing straight forward step by step without
looking to the side. It is similar with the situation that when we ride on a
cart that is descending down a hill, we cannot stop that slowly descending
cart. (Jung Yak Yong, Analects with Interpretation Notes)
Jung Yak Yong taught us that history will move forward progressively,
even though it is a long journey. Like Jung Yak Yong, I believe that Korean
14 H. B. IM
democracy will move forward, and that the Korean people have the will
and capacity to prevent democracy from retreating or being sidetracked,
so that they will move forward toward a more sustainable quality
democracy.
Notes
1. Przeworski’s paper was published as the key theoretical chapter in the third
volume of Transition from Authoritarian Rule. Adam Przeworski, 1986.
“Some Problems in the Study of the Transition to Democracy” in Guillermo
O’Donnell, Philippe C. Schmitter and Laurence Whitehead (Eds.),
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Comparative Perspectives. Vol. III
(Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press).
2. Walt Whitman, 1865. “The Wound Dresser.”
3. Fritz Stern, 1966. The Path to Dictatorship: 1918–1933 (New York: Anchor),
p. xvii, quoted from Guillermo O’Donnell and Philippe C. Schmitter, 1986.
Transitions from Authoritarian Rule: Tentative Conclusions About Uncertain
Democracies (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press), p. 78.
4. Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: The Democratization in the
Late Twentieth Century (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press). At that
time South Korea was a typical counterexample of the thesis of moderniza-
tion theory that predict “the more well-to-do a nation, the greater the
chances that it will sustain democracy.” Lipset, Seymour Martin, 1959.
“Some Social Requisites of Democracy: Economic Development and
Political Legitimacy,” American Political Science Review 53 (March).
5. For possibilism and impossibilism, see Hirschman (1971).
6. Philippe C. Schmitter, 2012. “Two Pieces of Unfinished Business,”
European University Institute and Central European University
(February–March).
7. Philippe C. Schmitter, 2012. “The Ambidextrous Process of Democratization:
Its Implications for Middle East and North Africa,” European University
Institute (September).
8. Samuel P. Huntington (1991).
9. In the “long twentieth century of Korea” (1876–present) the simultaneity
of non-simultaneous historical times has existed as a defining characteristic
of modern politics since the opening of Korea in 1876. Therefore, the
“simultaneity of non-simultaneous” (Bloch 1935; Bloch and Mark Ritter
1977) in the Three Kims era was not an exceptional phenomenon of mod-
ern politics of the “long twentieth century.” I received the Best Academic
Award from Korean Academy of Science for the book Simultaneity of Non-
Simultaneous: Multiple Temporalities of Modern Politics in Korea (Korea
University Press, 2014).
References
Bloch, Ernst. 1935. Erbschaft dieser Zeit (Heritage of Our Times). Frankfurt am
Mein: Suhrkamp Verlag.
Bloch, Ernst and Mark Ritter. 1977. Nonsynchronism and the Obligation to its
Dialectics. New German Critique 11: 22–38.
Hirschman, Albert O. 1971. Bias for Hope: Essays on Development in Latin
America. New Haven: Yale University Press.
Huntington, Samuel P. 1991. The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late
Twentieth Century. Norman and London: University of Oklahoma Press.
PART I
Authoritarianism and Democratic

Transition
CHAPTER 2
The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

in South Korea
Toward an Analytical Framework

for Industrialization and Regime Change
The process of the rise of a bureaucratic-authoritarian (BA) regime occur-
ring in the 1970s is rather interesting in South Korea. The regime transi-
tion was the outcome of conflict among key political actors who were
constrained, although not in a deterministic way, by the change in the
Korean economic structure. It can be understood as the outcome of stra-
tegic choices made by key political actors among alternatives that satisfied
structural constraints.
The case of regime transition in Korea is useful not only to elucidate the
dynamic relation between economic structure and political regime change.
It also allows us to reformulate the bureaucratic-authoritarian model that
was initially developed from the analyses of Latin American countries such
as Brazil, Argentina and Chile. In disputing the thesis of the original
model—which viewed political crises leading to authoritarian regimes as
the reflection of a structural transformation from the stage of import-
substitution industrialization (ISI) to that of the “deepening” of the pro-
ductive structure—I argue that structurally created constraints lead to
political crises of democratic regimes only if contending political actors
cannot compromise on an alternative feasible development strategy to
resolve distributional conflicts. Thus, authoritarian regime transition is not
© The Author(s) 2020 19

H. B. Im, Democratization and Democracy in South Korea,
1960–Present, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-981-15-3703-5_2
20 H. B. IM
structurally determined, but contingent upon the outcome of class

conflicts.
In this chapter, I investigate why a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime
emerged by analyzing conflict among key political actors along with
changes of the economic structure. To do so, I discuss the theoretical limi-
tations of the model first, and then I explore an analytical framework based
on class conflict in distributional struggle and shall apply it to the Korean
experience of regime transition.
The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model and Its Critics

In the late 1950s and early 1960s, modernization theorists expressed opti-
mism about the prospects for democracy in economically advanced third
world countries. Industrialization and economic growth were expected to
generate the preconditions for democracy automatically.1 Contrary to this
theory, however, extraordinary economic growth and industrialization in
some countries of Latin America and East Asia in the late 1960s and 1970s
did not lead to the development of democratic institutions.
In the wake of this experience, different theories about the relation
between economic development and political change emerged. Guillermo
O’Donnell, in particular, argued that large-scale heavy industrialization
and economic development are associated with military takeovers and the
rise of bureaucratic authoritarianism.2
According to O’Donnell, the rise of bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes
has been closely related to structural changes in dependent capitalism.
Developmental bottlenecks at the late stage of import-substitution indus-
trialization led to the appearance of many symptoms of crisis, such as an
adverse balance of payments, inflation and negative redistribution of
income. In this stage, the “deepening” of productive structure ( i.e., “ver-
tical integration and property concentration in industry and the produc-
tive structure in general, basically benefiting large organizations, both
public and private, national and foreign”)3 emerged as a viable solution to
the economic crisis. Because this deepening requires increased capital,
technology and organization, only the state and international capital can
undertake this new project.
Social order and economic stability are necessary to provide guarantees.
Thus, a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime emerges as a functional require-
ment for the change in productive structures in the dependent capitalist
economy because the basic requirements for the deepening could hardly
2 THE RISE OF BUREAUCRATIC AUTHORITARIANISM IN SOUTH KOREA 21
be met within the political and social order of populism. Popular political
activation and economic demands generated by the exhaustion of import-
substitution industrialization must be tightly controlled in order to “guar-
antee the social peace necessary for these faltering capitalisms to obtain
new transfusions of international capital.”4
The regime is a system of exclusion of the popular sector, based on the
reaction of dominant sectors and classes to the political and economic
crises to which populism and its developmentalist successors led. In turn,
such exclusion is necessary to achieve and guarantee “social order” and
economic stability; these constitute necessary conditions to attract domes-
tic investments and international capital, and thus to provide continuity
for a new impulse toward the deepening of the productive structures.5
O’Donnell’s thesis has contributed to the demystification of modern-
ization theory with regard to the political economy of regime change. It
has stimulated many research projects concerning dependent develop-
ment, corporatism, populism and the peripheral capitalist state.
Nevertheless, the thesis has its critics.6
First of all, O’Donnell is criticized for his economic determinist view of
regime change.7 Just as populism was associated with the stage of import-
substitution industrialization in his model, bureaucratic authoritarianism
has an “elective affinity” with the advance of internationalization of the
internal economy. Thus, O’Donnell presupposes that a political regime is
determined by the structural changes in the economic system. But not
every structural change in an economic system determines the political
outcome. In Colombia and Venezuela, for example, democratic regimes
have implemented policies of economic restructuring that, according to
O’Donnell’s thesis, could only be carried out by bureaucratic-authoritarian
regimes.8 Even though Colombia and Venezuela suffered from economic
problems similar to those of Argentina and Brazil, they escaped bureau-
cratic authoritarianism because the ruling power bloc found a compromise
solution with subordinate classes.9
Another disputed point is the functionalist assumption in O’Donnell’s
thesis that deepening requires the strong intervention of the state in civil
society in order to induce the transfer of international capital which has
the necessary financial capacity and technological expertise. To this end,
the state must guarantee stability and predictability, which may be sought
through repression of the political and economic demands of the masses.
In many cases, however, such functional requirements are a consequence
rather than a cause of bureaucratic authoritarianism.10
22 H. B. IM
The flaw in this functionalist argument is that it leads us to regard

bureaucratic authoritarianism as the most rational and efficient political
regime that satisfies a necessary condition for guaranteeing the consolida-
tion and reproduction of dependent capitalist accumulation. But Jose
Serra finds that a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime need not be the most
rational and efficient political regime in order to deal with economic
growth, balance of payments, inflation and resource allocation.11 Moreover,
the functionalist formula has its own pitfalls in explaining the collapse of
such a regime. If the functional needs are no longer necessary, the regime
ought to collapse. But, because such regimes endure even in the absence
of functional requirements, O’Donnell’s thesis is questionable.12
An Alternative Analytical Framework

An alternative framework of analysis for regime transition can overcome
the theoretical problems in the bureaucratic-authoritarian model of
explanation.
First, the concepts of “political regime” and “political regime change”
must be defined. Cardoso usefully defines “political regimes” as the formal
rules that link the ruling power bloc and the popular masses within the
principal political institutions.13 If we accept this definition, political
regime change is the change in the procedural rules and institutions that
results from the conflict among classes and groups about defining, making
and revising those rules. This kind of definition distinguishes a democratic
regime from an authoritarian one by formal, procedural and institutional
rules. The main difference between democratic and authoritarian regimes
is that the former guarantee the right to participate in political conflict and
competition, and the latter deny it. Democratic procedures and institu-
tions do not guarantee the substantive realization of the interests of any-
one, but only provide rules to decide distributional and other conflicts;
bureaucratic authoritarian regimes exclude the popular masses from par-
ticipating in the distributional conflict. The economic exclusion of the
popular masses from sharing the new wealth generated by industrializa-
tion may be the consequence of political exclusion; but in itself, it is not a
determinant that distinguishes a bureaucratic-authoritarian regime from a
democratic one. We cannot say that a regime is bureaucratic authoritarian
simply because the economic interests of the masses are not realized.
How, Then, Are Changes in the Economic System Related

to Regime Change?
Regime change is likely when a change in the balance of power of class
forces leads to the intensification of distributional conflict. Each party tries
to organize the economy in its own favor. If the ruling power bloc and the
masses cannot reach a compromise on the organization of the economy,
the resulting conflict provides an opportunity for regime change. When
the regime changes, the economic system is maintained, completely
changed or partly reorganized. Thus, the organization of the economy is
not predetermined, but is itself an object of conflict among groups or
classes. The economic system does not evolve in accordance with purely
economic laws of the capitalist mode of production, and political regime
change is not merely an adaptation to the evolution of the economy.
Political regime change occurs not because a new political regime is func-
tional to resolving the incompatibility between politics and economics,
but because political actors (e.g., the working class, the capitalist class, the
state, etc.) cannot or do not want to compromise. Therefore, political
regime change is contingent upon the result of class conflict in an eco-
nomic crisis.
But economic and political conflict cannot be converted to class reduc-
tionist terms. In many third world countries—even those that are fairly
industrialized—class politics is less salient than in advanced capitalist coun-
tries. Compared to the advanced industrial countries, the organization of
classes remains very low. National politics is not based on the support of
class constituencies: regional, ethnic or sectoral cleavages have a much
greater influence on national politics. The fact that class politics is mar-
ginal, however, does not mean that class compromise is absent. In fact,
class compromise does not occur in class reductionist terms but, in many
cases, in people/power bloc terms.14 Under conditions of weak class orga-
nization, subordinate classes try to organize the “people” as a political
force against the “power bloc” and to coordinate class interests with pop-
ular interests. Conversely, the power bloc tries to disorganize popular
forces or to organize the people under its own leadership.15 Democratic
institutions (elections, parliaments, judicial systems, and so forth) provide
the framework within which distributional conflicts between people and
the power bloc are managed. Thus, although the workers are not orga-
nized as a class, they can participate in distributional conflicts not as mem-
bers of a class but as citizens or voters through democratic institutions and
processes.
24 H. B. IM
Authoritarian Transition in Dependent Capitalism

How do bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes arise in advanced dependent
capitalist countries? The main characteristic of capitalism in such countries
is the internationalization of the local economy. The local economy
becomes dependent upon the finance and technology of international
capital. Non-traditional goods are manufactured for export. An interna-
tionalized oligopolistic bourgeoisie emerges. It is plausible, as suggested
by the bureaucratic authoritarian thesis, that policy requirements derived
from the structural constraints of the internationalist model, such as stabi-
lization and securing the confidence of international capital, impose a
funnel-like narrowing of the coalitional choices and institutional alterna-
tives available to the power bloc.16 However, the constraints of the inter-
nationalist model do not necessarily require a bureaucratic authoritarian
regime. Transnational firms do not always favor authoritarianism and are
not always hostile to democratic regimes unless the policies of the host
country overtly threaten their basic interests in profiting from investment.
Because the interests of transnational firms are predominantly economic,
the democratic regime is also acceptable to such firms when mutually ben-
eficial relations with the host countries can be established.17 For example,
when a transnational firm is involved in the production of consumer goods
for middle- and lower-income groups, it favors a redistributive income
policy that will expand the local market. The investment of the transna-
tional firm thus increases the favorable conditions for class compromise
and so strengthens the potential for democracy. Aside from the specific
case, international capital is generally indifferent, not antagonistic, to
democracy. Because international capital is mobile and not bound by the
territorial sovereignty of the host country, transnational firms can disinvest
and leave the host country whenever the costs of staying outweigh those
of leaving. Thus, even in an internationalized economy, the state and local
bourgeoisie, not international capital, are left with the responsibility for
the reproduction of consent of the popular masses to the political regime.18
The local bourgeoisie in dependent capitalist countries does not have a
natural tendency to favor authoritarianism. Because authoritarian regimes
have difficulties in acquiring legitimacy, the industrial bourgeoisie favors
democracy over authoritarianism if its interests can be satisfied within the
framework of democratic institutions.19
Democracy is possible under an internationalized economy when the
state, the local bourgeoisie and the working masses can compromise.
Compromise is possible if the fundamental interest of the bourgeoisie—

that is, the maintenance of capitalist accumulation—is compatible with a
moderate redistribution of income-benefiting workers.20 Thus, democratic
institutions can be maintained conditionally. A material base must exist so
that class compromise or people/power bloc compromise can be attained.
Under dependent capitalism, capitalists and the state must guarantee the
minimal material well-being of the masses without fatally sacrificing prof-
its, despite the constraints imposed by the internationalization of the
economy. In an economic crisis, the material base of compromise is
reduced, and consequently compromise becomes more difficult. When
the outcome of distributional conflict is unacceptable to either capitalists
or the working masses, a political crisis may result.
Nevertheless, an economic crisis does not necessarily result in a political
one, because the emergence of a political crisis is contingent upon the
outcome of class conflict. Here are two examples of contingent outcomes
of class conflict that can generate pressure to change a democracy into an
authoritarian regime: (1) demands by workers for wages higher than
dependent capitalism is willing to provide, demands that may encourage
the ruling power bloc to opt for authoritarianism over democracy and to
sacrifice legitimation for the sake of saving capitalism; and (2) an attempt
by the ruling power bloc to get out of an economic crisis by reducing
wages and/or the work force, actions that are unlikely to please the work-
ing class. The ruling power bloc may try to secure capitalism by closing
democratic institutions and suspending procedures in the face of the ensu-
ing increase in working-class militancy.21 Democracy is rare in dependent
capitalist countries. Because the expansion of the state has preceded the
dominance of industrial capitalism, the industrial bourgeoisie has been
created by state economic policies and is, as a result, politically weak. In
addition, the industrial working class has been under state corporatist con-
trol and manipulation. Thus, in many cases neither the industrial bour-
geoisie nor the industrial working class has fought for a democratic legal
order. It has been imposed by state elites as an instrument of clientelistic
or populist control of the popular masses.22 As a consequence, many coun-
tries have a restricted democracy, that is, “a regime which has competitive,
formally democratic institutions, but in which the power apparatus retains
the capacity to intervene to correct an undesirable state of affairs.”23 Under
restricted democracy, the popular masses are, in most cases, excluded eco-
nomically but not politically, because the ruling power bloc does not
believe the political inclusion of the masses in formal competitive elections
26 H. B. IM
is a serious threat to its domination. In the worst case, the ruling bloc has
the power to reverse the outcome of democratic competition.
When the authoritarian power bloc invalidates the outcome of formal
democratic competition, however, restricted democracy becomes unsta-
ble. The authoritarian power bloc opts for formal democracy over authori-
tarianism to provide legitimacy to its rule. When the legitimation function
of formal democracy is eroded by the invalidation of an election, the rul-
ing power bloc has little incentive to maintain democracy even in a
restricted form. It eventually opts for more naked and repressive authori-
tarianism. Thus, stable, restricted democracy requires a compromise that
does not exclude the interests of the popular masses completely. In other
words, if profits and wages are in a perfect zero-sum game and if the popu-
lar masses are activated politically, the probability of the invalidation of the
outcome of the electoral competition increases; thus, restricted democracy
loses support in the authoritarian power bloc. To sum up, in a restricted
democracy, the power bloc has the political power to impose an authori-
tarian solution and the popular masses lack the power to reverse it.
Whenever there is a conflict between the popular sector’s demands for
greater distribution of income and the necessity of maintaining accumula-
tion in a dependent capitalist economy, the power bloc may impose an
authoritarian solution. Even in this situation, however, transition to a
naked, repressive authoritarian regime can be avoided if the power bloc
reorganizes the economy to accommodate the material interests of the
masses within the confinement of dependent capitalist accumulation or if
it manipulates the popular masses to remain politically passive.
Transition to Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

in Korea
In South Korea, the emergence of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime that

began in late 1971 was completed with the imposition of a new constitu-
tion (the Yushin Constitution) in late 1972. The Korean regime, named
the Yushin regime, had some traits similar to those found in Brazil,
Argentina and Chile.24 First, the popular sector was politically excluded:
competitive elections were abolished, strikes were prohibited, the organi-
zation of labor unions was severely restricted and basic human rights were
violated arbitrarily. Second, the popular sector was economically excluded.
The primary focus of economic policy was on overall economic growth,
but not on the improvement in the standard of living of the middle and
lower classes.
Korean labor was not allowed to share equitably in the distribution of
earnings from economic growth. Instead, the big bourgeoisie and the
high-ranking state bureaucrats monopolized most of the benefits from
economic growth.25 Finally, the regime tried to “depoliticize” social issues
in terms of technological rationality. Efficiency, rationality and social sta-
bility replaced democracy as the basis on which the regime laid claim to
legitimacy.26 Although the BA regime in South Korea exhibited traits simi-
lar to those found in Latin America, it developed differently.27 First, in
South Korea, the regime was not justified by an economic crisis. Park justi-
fied Yushin on the pretext of preserving the accomplishments of economic
development and maintaining a high rate of economic growth.28
Second, at the time of the inauguration of Yushin, the Korean economy
was not at the transitional stage from import-substitution industrialization
to deepening. The internationalization of the economy began in 1964
when the state launched an export-platform project. In 1972, there was
no change in economic policy from that of the pre-bureaucratic authori-
tarian democratic regime. The deepening of the Korean economy began
only in the mid-1970s and was the consequence rather than the cause of
bureaucratic authoritarianism. The “deepening” hypothesis is thus inap-
propriate in the Korean case.
Third, pre-bureaucratic authoritarian popular political activation was
not serious enough to threaten the ruling power bloc. Popular political
activation was higher in 1971 than before. Nevertheless, there were no
serious anti-union or anti-leftist fears among the military, the upper and
middle classes and state bureaucrats. Labor and other popular protests
increased, but labor and the popular sector did not have the strength to
pose any serious threat to the ruling power bloc. Fourth, a strong state
apparatus had already been established long before the authoritarian
regime emerged. Thus, the thesis that bureaucratic authoritarianism is
needed to establish a strong state is not supported by the Korean case.29
Finally, no bureaucratic authoritarian coup coalition existed on the eve
of bureaucratic authoritarianism that was comparable to the Latin
American cases. Neither the politically weak national bourgeoisie nor the
politically indifferent international bourgeoisie pressed for a regime
change. No evidence has been found to hold them responsible for launch-
ing a bureaucratic authoritarian regime in South Korea. Why, then, did
such a regime emerge in South Korea under circumstances so different
28 H. B. IM
from those presupposed by O’Donnell? In South Korea the restricted

form of democracy had been maintained in the 1960s despite the state’s
pro-business economic policies because rapid industrialization improved,
to some extent, the material conditions of the masses. By the end of the
1960s, changes in the class structure made class compromise difficult
because the unlimited supply of labor had ended. As a consequence, the
distributional conflict intensified and the organization of the economy
(the developmental strategy) became the object of class conflict. The
authoritarian power bloc rejected alternative developmental strategies that
would accommodate the interests of the popular masses, and maintained
the existing developmental strategy (the export platform). Fearing the
uncertainty of the outcome of democratic competition, it closed the
already limited democratic institutions and procedures. The power bloc
launched bureaucratic authoritarianism preemptively to exclude the popu-
lar masses from participating in the distributional struggle. This explana-
tion can be substantiated by (1) describing the organization of the
economy in the pre-bureaucratic authoritarian period; (2) tracing the
changes in the configuration of classes; and (3) relating these changes to
the distributional conflict. The result was a regime change.
The Organization of the Economy (1961–1972)

In South Korea, a high rate of economic growth began when the military
junta (1961–1963) tried to replace democracy with economic develop-
ment as the main legitimation of its rule. For the first time in Korean his-
tory, a series of five-year economic development plans was launched. The
first five-year plan (1962–1966) initially put the emphasis on rural devel-
opment, heavy capital goods industry and import-substitution industries.
Exports were merely a means of raising foreign currency to pay for imports.
In the first two years (1962–1963) of the first five-year plan, the results in
the priority areas fell far short of the planned targets, but exports increased
far above expectations (34% in 1962, 58% in 1963). The military-turned-
civilian Park regime revised the plan by the end of 1963 and changed the
development policy from one based on ISI and heavy capital goods to one
based on labor-intensive, export-oriented industrialization30 (i.e., the
export platform).31 Since 1964, the developmental strategy based on the
export platform has achieved spectacular success. Between 1961 and
1972, total exports expanded more than 40 times, manufactured exports
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
– És más ruhát nem vesz fel; mert tán nem fog konyhaszaggal az
ebédlőbe jönni.
– Konyhaszaggal? de hiszen, méltóságos uram, nincs annál
finomabb illat az egész világon. Hanem annyit mégis láttam, hogy
ebből a kisasszonyból nem neveltek jó gazdasszonyt.
– És miért nem?
– Nem ért az asszonyok mesterségéhez annyit sem, mint én a
versiráshoz. Úgy megbámulta a kolbásztöltőt, mint én a vasutat meg
a gőzkocsit. Alig tudták neki megmagyarázni, mint kell avval bánni.
– De aztán mégis megértette.
– Meg valahogy; de még sem kivánnék abból a kolbászból enni,
a mit disznóöléskor ez a kisasszony csinálna. Hej pedig mindent
elkövettem az uton, hogy jó hirét csináljam a leány előtt az én
méltóságos uramnak.
– Nagyon lekötelez Varjas Andoriás uram, de máskor ne
avatkozzék az én dolgomba.
– Nem avatkoztam, báró ur; de mivel én az asszonyságok
kocsiján a bakon ültem: a hol csak szép tanyát, gazdag földet és
kövér legelőt láttam, mindenre azt mondtam, ez is a gencsi uraságé.
– Hogy mert hazudni?
– Igy szokták ezt, uram, különben az ily gazdag kisasszonyt soha
el nem szédítjük.
– És aztán hitték?
– Mindig nevettek; tehát tetszett nekik. A Szultán bácsi pedig
még tódította. Mikor Parajdon túl a nagy kapaszkodó tetejére értünk
s megláttuk napkelet felől a Tar csucsát, felkiáltott az öreg úr: addig
a kopasz hegyig tart a gencsi urodalom! a szikla tetején pedig
fekszik a báró urnak vára márványkőből, a honnan ha kinéz valaki
az ablakból, meglátja egész Havasalföldet s azon túl a Fekete-
tengert mindent hajójával, a mi rajta jár.
Pál báró nevetett és szokott mondókáját ismétlé:
– Bolond kend Varjas Andoriás uram, de mégis jobb lesz, ha
máskor a hazudozás helyett a maga dolgához lát.
Nézzünk másfelé.
Kiderült, hogy a konyhaszag illatának megbirálásában Varjas
Andoriás uram és a kastély hölgyei között, mint a magasb irmodorú
vezérczikkben mondják, «lényeges eltérések valának észlelhetők».
Mert félórával az ebédre hivó csengetyű megszólalása előtt Zsuzsi
néni a műkedvelő szakácsné hadat, ujabb öltözködés végett, saját
szobáiba küldte.
Természetesen, hogy a főparancsnoknő volt leghamarabb
készen s aztán átjött Esztike szobájába, leült a pamlagra, onnan
gyönyörködve nézte, mily fürgén működik a Pestről hozott komorna,
a ki mint varázsütésre egészen ujra alakította át úrnője külsejét.
Zsuzsi néni szótlanul éldelgett a lányka bájain s nem tagadhatta
többé, hogy ez szíve szerinti gyermek, a kiben régi eszményképét
találja fel. Azon lányt, a kit ő érdemesnek tartott azon kitüntetésre,
hogy Pál fiát egész életére boldogíthassa.
Tudjuk azonban, hogy az asszonyi faj, ide értve Zsuzsi nénit,
soha sem szeret meg valakit másként, mint egy harmadiknak
rovására. Mentől mélyebben ad helyet szívében egy új arcznak,
annál inkább gyűlöli, vagy legalább közönyös lesz az iránt, a ki
helyet adni kényszerült utódának. A mily mértékben vonzódék
Zsuzsi néni Esztikéhez s egymásután fedezte fel benne a
tökéletességeket, épen így kereste s fel is találta nemcsak a testi
fogyatkozásokat, de még a lelki rútságot is korábbi kedvenczében,
Marialaky Zsuzsikában, a ki azonban e perczben boldog volt és
képtelennek tartotta, hogy a gencsi kastélyban rosszul vélekedjenek
felőle.
Hiába az asszonyi kebelben csak egy kegyelt fér el. A férfi
örvendhet, ha e kitüntetés őt illeti, de senki sem tehet róla, ha néha
érdemetlenül és ártatlanul egy nőnek kell megfizetni a más nő által
elfoglalt szállásnak bérét.
Még 15 percz volt hátra ebédig s ekkor Zsuzsi néni karon fogta a
szép leányt s bevitte oda, hova kevés halandónak volt megengedve
a belépés, saját szobájának szentélyébe.
Ez pedig a rideg aggszűzi jellemnek mintaszerű tanyája volt.
Sehol semmi kényelem, mindenütt aggodalmat keltő rend, és a
végletekig vitt tisztaság.
Női szoba pamlag nélkül! ki hallott, ki látott ilyen csodát
napjainkban! Két tölgyfakarszék állott az asztal előtt, melyen
közönséges ivópohárban frissen szedett virágcsokor tarkállott,
mellette fekete bőrbe kötött ezüst csattos biblia, mint egyedüli
olvasmány, időtöltés és vallásos magábaszállás.
Itt ültette maga mellé vendégét azon titkos czélból, hogy miután
az igézőn szép arczot ismeré, bepillanthasson a lélek mélyébe is.
Mindjárt látni fogjuk, mily egyszerűen és természetesen ment végbe
ezen nagy előkészületek után megkisérlett lélektani műtét.
Zsuzsi néni ezen elhatározó pillanatban, melyre régen várt és
elméjében egészen késznek tartotta magát, késett s kereste a
bevezetést, miként fogjon feladata megoldásához. Esztike azonban
csak természeti hajlamának engedett, a midőn szó nélkül egyszerre
a néni keblére borúlt és ezer csókkal halmozá el őt, kezdve
öltözékén, később a nyakán, homlokán, végre az ajkakon.
– Oh kedves Zsuzsi néni, mint vágytam e pillanatra, hogy karjai
közé vessem magamat, mert mamámon kívül nincs nő, kit úgy
tiszteljek és szeressek, mint önt.
– Ön szeret engem, kedves gyermekem?
– Végtelenűl. Nem ma először, hogy látom, de azóta, hogy
leveleiből ismerem. És épen ilyennek találom, mint képzeltem, mint a
kit mindig szerettem és szeretni fogok. Angyali lélek lakik abban, a ki
így tudott írni. Pál báró minden sorát felolvasta, édesdeden
elmerengett anyai beszéde fölött, nekem pedig könyek hulltak
szememből.
– Leányom! mit mondasz? leveleim egy falusi vén néninek
mende-mondái voltak.
– Igen, de az elolthatlan szeretet gyöngyei csillámlottak ki a
betűkből. Úgy-e szeretni fog engem is, ha jobban megismer? mert
én nem vagyok rossz vagy hiú leány, a kit a város fénye, a nagy
világ pompája elcsábított. Én csak ott akarok élni, a hol engem
mindenki szeret és én mindenkit szerethetek.
– Leányom! – felelt Zsuzsi néni és könyei patak módjára folytak.
– Te szeretsz minket? Te boldog és megelégedett szívvel jöttél ezen
egyszerű falusi tanyára? Hiszen ha szeretsz minket s mi mindnyájan
szeretünk téged, akkor minden elmondva van és boldogságunkhoz
semmi sem hiányozhatik.
Ezzel megakadt a társalgás fonala. Ha ki volt mondva a mindent
magában foglaló szó, a mi utána következett, feleslegessé vált.
Bármely későbbi magyarázat vagy bővítés csak ronthatott, csak
lealkudhatott valamit az eredeti kijelentésből. Zsuzsi néni tehát karjai
közé zárá a teljes odaengedéssel keblére hullott leánykát és hiába
erőlködött szavakat keresni, mert folyvást csak édes leányának,
legkedvesebb Esztikéjének nevezte a könyeiben úszó gyermeket.
E pillanatban szólt az ebédre hívó csengettyű éles hangja s a
néni karjára fűzve a leánykát, megindúlt az ebédlő felé, a nélkül,
hogy egyikejöknek is eszébe jutna az arczukon csillámló könyek
áruló nyomait letörölni.
Nem lehet szándékunkban egy erdélyi nemes embernek hosszú
ebédjét részletesen leírni, főkép ha idősb Pál bárót és Bogárdy
Zoltánt kivéve, a többi csak szemmel evett. A legnagyobb gonddal
készült étkeket jobbára illetetlenül hordták vissza s a két házi
kisasszonynak meg kellett elégedni azon vigasztalással, hogy
ozsonna alkalmával, mely egyszersmind vacsora leendett, majd
bővebben látnak Isten áldásához.
Este hat órát is elverte, míg a férfiak a fekete kávéval, az
egymásután töltött pipákkal és a politikával készen lettek.
A három leány ezalatt a kertben sétálgatott, a mi futkosásnak is
beillett, különösen miután Pál báró is közbe vegyült, vége-hossza se
látszott a szaladgálásoknak. Zsuzsi néni és Dorozsmayné a veranda
kétes hűséből nézték a játékot, a mennyiben a gyermekek szemök
előtt maradtak, mert a játék hevében sokszor messze elkalandoztak
a gyümölcsfák sátora alá, különösen pedig igen szivesen pihentek
meg a nagy diófák alatt, a hol nehány fehérre festett pad és élénk
zöld pázsit enyhelyül szolgált.
Még később a két házi kisasszonyt a készülő vacsora fölötti
felvigyázat gondjai szólíták el és ekkor Pál báró Esztike
kisasszonynyal az idősbek társaságát keresé fel; azonban nem oly
könnyen találák fel azokat, kik szintén a hűvös árnyék alá
menekültek, s igy Pál és Esztike gyakrabban válthattak nehány szót
tanúk jelen nem létében.
Egy ily kedvező «véletlen» pillanatában Pál báró karjával kinálá a
szép leányt és így sétálgattak a gyümölcskert pázsitján. Ez volt első
eset (a tánczbavivés vagy más hivatalos s azért minden jelentőség
nélküli szertartásokon kívül), hogy e két rokonszenves teremtés
karonfogvást lejtett.
– Kisasszony, – szólt Pál báró, – tudja-e, melyik szavából
származott azon boldogságom, hogy engem bizalmára
érdemesített?
– Mindenre jól emlékezem. Önt bemutatták nálunk. Ön lovagias
modorban társalogni kezdett velem, én pedig csacska kis leányok
szokása szerint félbeszakítottam s azt kérdtem: ön erdélyi? Erre
aztán nagy érdekeltséggel hallgattam, míg elbeszélte családi
viszonyait, s mindig Zsuzsi néni volt a főszemély, a kire visszatért.
– És ime, még nem múlt el esztendeje, s a mit legmerészebb
álmomban sem remélhettem, csodálatosan beteljesült. Esztike
kisasszony és édes anyja itt vannak, mint legkedvesebb vendégek
Gencsen!
– Az idő rövid volt, de sok történt alatta. A világot nem ismerő
gyermek vezetőt, tanácsadót, professzort nyert, a ki nélkül most én
volnék az emberi nem legboldogtalanabb teremtménye.
Arthur grófhoz kötött viszonyát értette, de Pál báró gyöngédebb
volt, mintsem ezen úton vigye tovább a beszéd folyamát. De azért jól
megjegyezte, mily édes felbátorítás rejlett az észrevételben, s aztán
rögtön, kettőjök régi szokása szerint, derültebb tárgyat ragadott elé.
Különböző út volt ez ugyan s más pontból indúlt ki, de a végczél,
mely felé törekedtek, változatlanul maradt.
És kérdé, igen tréfás hangon:
– Egyszer már elindultunk az egyenlítő vonala felé, Fiumében
tartván a legelső állomást. A gondos, elővigyázatos és mindig
szolgálatra kész professzor úgy vélekedett, hogy azon irány nincs
helyesen választva. Tehát dél helyett keletnek fordultunk s meg is
érkeztünk szerencsésen Gencsre! Menjünk tovább. Azokon a
sötéten kéklő kopár sziklákon túl fekszik új Románia, azután
Oroszországnak egy kis ide tévedt szalagján áthatolva, jövünk a
Fekete-tengerre. Azt is áthajózzuk és vasuton át érünk a Kaspi-
tenger partjára. Innen már csak a képzelet szárnyain röpülhetünk át
Középázsia barbár pusztáin, míg China vagy Japán virányait
megpillanthatjuk. Tegyük fel, hogy most épen Nangasaki híres
kikötőjében ülünk; előttünk a Csendes-oczeán végtelen sivataga s
már füstöl a gőzhajó, mely Borneo szigetére készül, a hol
megtaláljuk az egyenlítőt, s ott nem messze valahol az igéret földét.
– Professzor, ez nagyon fáradságos út volt egyszerre. És én a
nagy meleget, mely Borneo szigetén uralkodik, csakugyan érzem.
Régebben azonban azzal hitegetett engem az én mesterem, hogy
minden közbeneső főállomásnak megvan a maga saját titka, és én
úgy mint eddig, tudományos rendszer szerint kivánnék haladni, s
mindennel, a mi tudni való, részletesen megismerkedni.
Míg ezt mondta, összes leányi erejét összeszedte, hogy komoly
képet csináljon hozzá. De mihelyt akarata ellen is mosoly lopódzék
el ajkáról, mindketten víg nevetésre fakadtak.
– Kisasszony, – felelé a tanár, – igaza van. Ez volt eredetileg a
professzornak is «tanterve,» mint a cultusministeriumban nevezik.
Időközben azonban napvilágra jött, hogy a tanítvány elsőrendű
ragyogó talentummal bir és képes egy év alatt három iskolai osztályt
is sikeresen bevégezni, még pedig «kitünő» érdemsorozattal. A
professzor tehát nem pazarolhatja tovább a drága időt az alsóbb
iskolákba való elemi oktatásokra, melyeken növendéke már régen
túl van, hanem megy vele egyenesen a «fensőbb mathesis» titkaira,
azon biztos öntudattal, hogy rendkívüli tehetséggel megáldott
tanítványa ezen legelvontabb tudományban is egyetlenegy leczke
után otthon lesz.
– Meglátjuk, mert csalódhatik felfogási képességemben. Tehát
állapodjunk meg itt Nangasaki néplepte kikötőjében. Ime a kastély
teteje fölött látok valamit füstölögni, ez tán az előttünk horgonyozó
gőzhajó kéménye, s van is az elindulásig egy óránk, melyben kész
vagyok ismét leczkét venni.
– Úgy van, kisasszony, épen egy óránk van az elindulásig, a
midőn pontban kilencz órakor elhivat bennünket Zsuzsi néni
vacsorára. Miután pedig nem vagyunk peripatetikus filosofusok, a kik
sétálva hallgatták a nagy mestert, ott látok a legnagyobb diófa alatt
egy szépen fehérre festett támláspadot, melyen nagyobb kényelem
hiányában helyet foglalhatunk.
Ezzel a legárnyasabb lombok hűse alá vitte a kis leányt, a ki
sokkal inkább mutatni akarta, mennyire érti a tréfát, mintsem
ellenkezett vagy huzakodott volna.
Midőn aztán leültek, Pál gróf utánozva a leghíresebb egyetemi
tanárt, úgy játszott kezével, mintha szemüvegét törlené, azután
szivartárczáját vette elő, nagyot pattantott rá, mintha burnótos
szelenczéjéből akarna szippantani, még köhécselt is, míg végre
szenvelgett, hamis pedagóg hangon kezdé:
– Esztike kisasszony, a szerelem végtelen utjában oly pontra
jutottunk, hogy a kellő megértés végett kénytelen vagyok
tantételeimet (mi tudósok doctrinának nevezzük) tapasztalati
kisérlettel is támogatni, különben bizonyítékaim hiányosaknak
mutatkozhatnak.
– Halljuk. (Hozzá mondhatta volna: lássuk.)
Ezen édes beleegyezés után folytatá:
– Diximus, egy korábbi alkalommal, hogy ha hosszas kétely után
széket foglal a kebelben az elméleti vágy, az «ő karjaiba röpülni», ez
már reményt igérő kórjel a szerelem felébredésére, s azután a
tudomány hátralevő adományait képesítve lettünk befogadni. Most
tehát figyeljen. A ki szeret, annak első szabálya, hogy szeretettjének
kezét megfogja. Például: így. Most a második kérdés, valjon a
szeretet tárgya nyugodtan, békével és ellenkedés nélkül engedi
végbemenni ezen mellőzhetlen műtétet? Mert ha bizalmatlanul, vagy
épen borzadályt érezve visszarántja, akkor rögtön mindennek vége
szakad.
– Láthatja, hogy bizom önben és nyugodt vagyok.
– Százezer köszönet érte. Ezentúl azonban úgy képzelje, hogy
nem a fanyar professzor, nem a szenvedhetlen rideg tudós, hanem
azon végtelenül boldog halandó beszél belőlem, a kinek nincs
megtiltva, hogy önt szeresse. Tehát megfogom e kezet,
gyönyörködöm hófehérségében és soha eddig nem érzett varázslat
fog el e puhaság illetésével. Ekkor még mindig rettegve a legelső
visszautasítás mozdulatától, csendesen és óvakodva felemelem e
kezet szomjazó ajkamig, s ekkor először egy, aztán rögtön rá a
csókoknak megszámlálhatlan ezerét hintem. Kérdés: kegygyel és
örömmel fogadja a leányka e hódolatot, ezen elragadtatást? Mit érez
ezalatt ő maga is? Kedvteléssel és megelégedéssel látja, hogy csak
egyik kezével is ily leírhatlan boldogságot képes ajándékozni?
– Báró, ön ma nagyon élénk előadást tart.
– Ez azon első kisérlet, melynek sikere tudományos
búvárlatainkban minket tovább vezethet. A férfi úgy tartja meg a
szép kezet, mintha sajátja volna, mintha többé soha elbocsátani sem
szándékoznék. Egyszerre csak a birtokba ragadott kéz, mintha saját
súlyára volna hagyva, alább hull, de mégis mindig gyöngéden
vezettetve, a férfi ajkáról oda esik, a hol az imádónak szíve dobog.
Valjon megolvassa a leányka, hányat ver a felzaklatott szív
másodpercz alatt? Talán az övé sem lüktet észrevehető
lassúbbsággal ugyanennyi idő alatt? Lesüti hát szemét s fel nem
nézne a fél világért, nehogy a szemébe lopózott örömköny elárulja
bensejét. A férfinak azonban, mint tudjuk, két keze van. Eddig
imádottjának balját tartotta rabságban, most hirtelen bal kezébe
játsza át szerzett birtokát, a mi által jobbja felszabadul, vagy mint az
iskola nyelvén beszélnek, «teljesen szabad rendelkezése alá esik».
Igen természetes, hogy a kéz, mely a boldogság első gyönyöreit
élvezé, többé háladatlan tétlenségben nem maradhat, tehát
meghajlik, szeliden simuló félívet képez, átkarolja a reszkető
leánykát s ha tudná is, hogy a következő pillanatban meg kell halnia,
szerelme tárgyát saját kebléhez szorítja. Tüzes ajkai most akadály
nélkül csókolhatják a hajba fűzött rózsabimbót, majd a selyempuha
fürtöket, aztán a felhőtlen homlokot, végre egymás után a boldogság
tengerében fürdő két szemet.
Úgy látszik, hogy Pál báró mindazt, a mit mondott, azon
sorrendben meg is cselekedte a nélkül, hogy elháríthatlan akadályra
találna.
De ezzel egyszersmind vége volt a tanári ékesszólásnak s
beszédének fonala ketté szakadt. Innen túl csak rebegé: kedves
szép kisasszony, drága édes Esztikém, a mi nagyon szívrehatólag
hangzott, de már sok hozzá hasonló szerelmes férfitól is kitelt.
Szerencséjére értelmes, rokonszenves és olvadozó tanítványra
talált, a ki a hiányos és töredékes vallomásnak értelmét felfogni és
szívében átérezni képes volt. S míg Pál báró a hajat, homlokot és a
két szemet csókolá, az ő virágzó szép arcza lángba borulva
nyugodott a férfi keblén és csak azt érzette, hogy az egész világon
ez azon egyedüli hely, a hol pihenni és otthon lenni óhajt.
Mikor pedig megszólalt a ház csengetyüje, mindketten mintegy
varázsálomból felveretve, rémülve ugrottak fel a padról, sehogy sem
értvén, miként mulhalhatik el ily hallatlan gyorsasággal egy teljes
egész óra.
A kert középső utjára érkezve, Zsuzsi néni s a két házi
kisasszony a vendégek elé jöttek, hogy a társaság együtt menjen a
kastély éttermébe. Esztike kisasszony alig tudta, mit cselekszik?
Boldog volt, de hogy soha nem tapasztalt felindultságát leplezze,
Zsuzsi néni nyakába borult, s aztán oly hévvel csókolá összevissza
a két leányt, mintha testvérei volnának, kiket régen nem látott
valamely szörnyű veszedelemből való menekülés után. Pál báró is
hiába igyekezett egykedvűséget színlelni; pödörgethette bajuszát
gépies egyformasággal, de azért minden jelenlevő eltalálta, hogy a
párocska között a legmelegebb nyilatkozatok mentek végbe.
Az özvegy, mint mindig, a hányszor leányára pillantott, anyai
érzéstől ellágyulva mosolygott, s ha legtöbbet sejtett is, ő igyekezett
legjobban azt mutatni, mintha semmit sem venne észre. Bogárdy
Zoltán sem kerülheté ki a megzavarodást, mert azon égbekiáltó
vádat, melyet épen most szórt a Tisza-kabinet szemébe,
egyátalában nem tudta kellőleg bebizonyítani.
A vacsora azonban vígan folyt le, sőt épen a kik bűnösöknek
érzék magukat, úgy mutatták, mintha fönséges étvágyuk volna.
Úgy volt elhatározva, hogy a Dorozsmay család másnap reggel
továbbutazik a borszéki fürdőbe. Épen a csemegét hordták fel, a
midőn Esztike kisasszonynak eszébe jutott valami és kérdé a kastély
lakóitól:
– Hány ló kell, hogy elbírja a mi kocsinkat?
– Hány? – felelé idősb Gencsy Pál báró. – Kettő szépen elég; de
parádéból négyet fogunk be.
– Igen, de a borzasztó felhőszakadás egész a kőszikla alapokig
elhordta az országutat.
A gencsiek bámulva néztek a kis leánykára, mert valóban
legalább négy hete mult, hogy egy csepp eső sem hullott az égből. A
papok mindennap az ég csatornáinak megnyílásáért imádkoztak.
– Én nem hallottam semmi felhőszakadásról, – mondá Zsuzsi
néni ártatlanul.
– Édes néni, – felelt Esztike, – mielőtt ide értünk, valamelyik
állomáson egy ember kocsit keresett, mert az övének eltört a kereke.
Zoltán bácsi mondta neki: minő pusztulás van az országuton, s
tizenkét ökörrel kell a szekereket vontatni.
Bogárdy elpirult, de aztán az öreg báróhoz fordulva mondá:
– Bocsánat, ez egy kis tréfa volt a régi jó világból, a midőn Jósa
Gyuri, meg Keglevich Miklós gróf uralkodtak Hevesmegyében.
Hallottam, hogy valami pesti zsidó gavallér utazik Borszék felé, s én
valóban nem hittem, hogy a fuvaros komolyan veheti mesémet.
– És mért ne mehetne a gazdag zsidó Borszékre? – kérdé idősb
Pál báró, a ki a szomszéd fürdőhelynek divatba jövését nagyon
óhajtotta.
– Báró úr, – felelt a szélső baloldali képviselő, – miattam mehet
oda akár az egész Jeruzsálem, hanem erre az egyre nagyon
megharagudtam, mert útközben mindenütt grófnak adta ki magát.
– Az már teljesen más, – felelt a kastély ura egészen kibékülve.
Dorozsmayné azonban nagyon gyanus pillantásokat vetett Zoltán
bácsira, a kiről tudta, hogy eljár ugyan a szája bizalmas körökben,
de azért valami izléstelen tréfára soha sem vetemedhetik. Inkább
valószinűnek mutatkozott, hogy azon utazó valósággal bizonyos
ismert gróf volt s nem csak annak adta ki magát.
Másnap a korán felhozott reggeli után sok sírás és
nyakbaborulás kiséretében útra keltek a pesti vendégek.
Az utolsó pillanatban, a midőn ifjabb Pál báró kezet csókolt az
özvegynek és leányának, Dorozsmayné igen kegyesen mosolygott
és mondá:
– Báró úr, én augusztus és szeptember havát Harasztoson
szándékozom tölteni. Ha kedve lesz hozzá és meglátogat
bennünket, igen szívesen fogadom.
Ezen szertartásos és igen világos meghívással pedig ismét egy
új lépés lett megnyerve a legédesebb remény felé vezető ösvényen!
XII.
(Egy üres hang, mely az emberi nyelvben értelemmel sem bir.)
Forró júliusi nap, melyben por, aszály és eltikkadtság uralkodik,

de a sárgult kalász ettől érik s lehajtja fejét.
Rév állomáson az Erdélyből jövő gyorsvonaton, éjnek idején,
szürke szakállas, bozontos bajuszú s a középéletkort meghaladó
utas száll le, bemegy az indóház várótermébe, lefekszik egy padra,
jóízűt alszik világos virradtig, s azután békés türelemmel unatkozik,
sőt koplal egész délig.
Ekkor azonban, ugyanazon irány felől a személyvonat is berobog
az állomásra, s egy bajusztalan öreg úr lép le, könnyű nyári
porköpenybe burkolva, csekély utipodgyászszal.
Mindjárt kitünt, hogy e két idegen találkozót adott itt egymásnak,
mert barátságos üdvözlet után kezet fogtak, s legkevésbbé sem
mutattak meglepetést. Mindketten visszamentek a váróterembe,
asztal mellé ültek és háborítlanul ugyan, de száraz torokkal kezdtek
titkos beszélgetésbe.
Így találkoztak össze levélbeli meghívás folytán Bogárdy Zoltán
és kanonok bácsi. Már leirtuk e két nevet, a midőn jó keresztyéni
lelkiismeretünk szemünkre veti, hogy első helyen mindenesetre az
egyház érdemes tagját kell vala megemlítenünk.
– Drága papom, nagy szükségünk van rád; bocsáss meg, ha ide
hivtalak.
– Drága papom.
– Mi baj? Mondhatom nem szivesen jöttem e pogány

forróságban, s közbevetőleg legyen mondva, a gyulafehérvári
káptalan sem rosszul ebédel, a rózsamáli bor pedig megérdemli régi
jó hirét. Mit akarsz? Mi dolgom itt az oláhság között, kiket még szent
Pál is odahagyott?
– Semmi. Azaz: oly csekélység, hogy első grammatista korodban
is elvégezhetted volna.
– Dorozsmaynét illeti?
– Természetesen, hogy őt. Honnan lett volna bátorságom, más
akármely ügy miatt, téged oly messziről ide czitálni?
– Mindenre kész vagyok, a miben e nemeslelkű özvegy nő
szolgálatára lehetek. Kivévén…
– Hogyan? kivévén…
– Igen, kivévén, ha megint valami hazugság elmondására akarsz
felhasználni. Ezt kereken megtagadom, mert a multkori most is
nyomja lelkiismeretemet. Sőt még álmomat is háborgatja,
étvágyamat elrontja. Mindenek előtt kérdem, mért kellett nekünk
épen ezen Istentől elfeledett zúgban találkoznunk, a hol vagy éhen
hal az ember, vagy olyan ételt kap, a mit az én elgyengült gyomrom
nem emészthet.
– E miatt ne búsulj. Legfelebb másfél óra mulva olyan terített
asztal mellé ülsz, hogy káptalanod nagy prépostja is megirigyelheti
sorsodat.
– Itt e rongyfészekben?
– Nem épen itt, de félórányi távolra innen. Már szereztem
számodra kocsit; itt vár rád a pályaudvar külső oldalán. Ha
beszéltünk, ha végeztünk, felülsz, elhajtasz és épen ebéd idejére
érkezel a gróf kastélyába.
– A gróf kastélyába?
– Bendeffy Arthur gróf kastélyába. Mihelyt kiérsz az országútra,
meglátod a falunak hegyes fatornyát, s onnan balra, az erdő szélén
a gróf vadászkastélyát.
– S mi dolgom lesz ott?
– Ne félj, Arthur gróf úgy fogad, mint legszívesebben látott
vendégét. Te lészsz üdvözítője, szabadítója, és minden szívbeli
gyötrelmeinek orvosa és enyhítője.
– Kérlek, igérj kissé kevesebbet, mert soha sincs lelked inkább
telve gonoszsággal, mint midőn ájtatos képet mutatsz hozzá.
– Ezúttal tiszta őszinteség beszél belőlem. Halld tehát:
Dorozsmayné rád bízza, hogy látogasd meg a grófot, beszélj vele,
add tudomására, hogy ha nincs különös kifogása, az esküvő
augusztus 21.-én végbe mehet.
– Ah, ez már más. Így aztán nem sajnálom a fáradságot.
Megyek, rohanok. Hol a kocsim? Jó lovakat kaptál? mert röpülni
volna kedvem.
– Lassan járj, tovább érsz.
– Zoltán! Egészen boldoggá tetted bús atyai szívemet. Tehát
végre is Arthur gróf viszi haza Esztike hugunkat? Végtelenül
örvendek. Bendeffy gróf! ex tam bona catholica familia! Megvallom,
a mikor tegnap délben kaptam leveledet, nem hittem, hogy ily jó
napom lesz. Mintha ujjá születném, elenyészett vén csontomból
minden fáradság.
– Vedd köszönetemet e buzgóságodért, Dorozsmayné hugom
nevében. Különben pedig tartoztál vele, kedves barátom. Te, mint
tiszteletbeli kanonok semmi jövedelemmel sem birsz. Püspököd
azon czím alatt bocsátott el a megyéből, hogy velem együtt
gondnoka légy az árvának, és kezelője az özvegy vagyonának. Meg
van igérve, hogy Esztike esküvője után is megtartod fizetésedet
egész életedre. Pompás sine cura ez, barátom, többet ér némely
valóságos kanonokságnál is, s a mellett oly teljes szabadságot
élvezesz, mint a fekete rigó az erdő közepén. Menj tehát a grófhoz
és hozz ott rendbe minden részletet, minden aprólékos felvételt, a mi
hátra maradt.
– Nem értem. Úgy tudom, hogy a házassági szerződés régen
készen van.
– Igen, de ezen okmány csak a pénzügyi kérdésekre vonatkozik.
– Mi lehet még függőben?
– Semmi; még annál is kevesebb. Emlékezel azon utolsó éjre,
melyet Tihamér barátunk halálos ágya mellett töltöttünk?
– Mindenre igen jól emlékezem.
– Félek, hogy nem; mert akkor előre tudnád, a mit mondani
akarok. Sokat beszélt a szegény beteg, de te minduntalan elaludtál
karszékeden.
– Ezt már kereken tagadom.
– Mindig tagadja az, a ki mások jelenlétében elszundikál. Ha
felébresztik, azt hiszi, csak nehány másodperczig bólintgatott; pedig
órahosszat szuszogott legédesdedebben.
– Mi történt hát akkor?
– Semmi fontos, különben felráztunk volna álmodból, hogy
szükség esetén tanu lehess. Haldokló barátunk akkor végső
óhajtásait mondta el, s az özvegy mindent szigorúan megtartani fog.
– Soha sem hallottam valamit ily végső óhajtásokról. A
végrendelet régen készen volt, s mi ketten mindent hűségesen
teljesítettünk.
– Ha egyebet nem tudsz, akkor csakugyan kiderül, hogy úgy
aludtál, mint a hörcsök.
– Nem aludtam! de meglehet, hogy valamit még is elfeledtem.
– Elfeledted, mert a dolognak fontosságot nem tulajdonítottál. Én
sem tulajdonítottam. Mert nemde mindegy az: ha valaki az én
vizslámat ebnek, vagy kutyának nevezi?
– Már micsoda pokróczos hasonlítás ez?
– Csak olyan, mint a többi; kissé sántikál, a mi minden
hasonlításnak természetében fekszik. Most épen valami
semmiségről van szó, melyre példám vonatkozott. Lásd, barátom, az
egész nem több mint üres emberi hang, melynek a nyelvben semmi
értelme sincs. Például: tudjuk, ki a püspök, ki a káplán? Kérdem,
volna abban különbség, ha véletlenül a püspököt neveznők
káplánnak, és megfordítva, ha másként ugyanazt értenők mindkét
név alatt, a mit ma?
– A példát jól megértettem. Máskor azonban beszélj inkább a
viczispánról meg az esküdtről, a szent hivataloknak pedig hagyj
békét.
– Fő dolog, ha megértettél.
– Zoltán! én neked nem hiszek. Mindig ravasz róka voltál. Ha bal
kezed bársony keztyűvel símogat valakit, jobbodban a köpeny alatt
fejszét rejtegetsz, hogy azzal vágj embertársad fejéhez.
– Bolondság. Ismersz, s hallod, hogy komolyan beszélek.
– Előre látom, hogy darázs-fészekbe küldesz; mert máskor is
mindig akkor rántottál elé, ha parázsból kellett a gesztenyét
kikaparni.
– Szereped könnyű, egyszerű és ártatlan lesz.
– Mért nem mégysz hát magad?
– Azért, mert ily szertartásos ügyhöz tisztes ősz haj, szép fekete
reverenda és vörös öv kell. Ha én mennék, annyi volna, mintha
hordárt küldenének.
– Hiszen a mi a czerimoniát illeti, azt elvállalom, csak hogy meg
is legyen augusztus végére az esküvő.
– Ahhoz kétség sem fér. Legyen csak kezünkben a két
keresztlevél meg a püspöki dispensatio, Pest és az egyetemi
templom még olyan fényes lakodalmát soha sem látott.
– Nem ér ez a fecsegés semmit; lássuk a medvét. Hallani
akarom végre, mi az az üres hang, mely az emberi nyelvben
értelemmel sem bir. Míg ezt nem értem, addig rettegnem kell, hogy
most szövöd a legundokabb galibát.
– Jer, vezetlek kocsidhoz, s tíz másodpercz alatt míg odaérünk,
mindent megmagyaráztam. Magad legjobban neveted majd, hogy ily
semmiségnek oly széles feneket kerítettél.
A tíz másodperczből tisztességes félóra lett, míg kanonok bácsi
csak féligmeddig nyugton érezheté magát s akkor régi hű barátjának
ezer szerencsekivánatával elhalmozva útnak indulhatott. Meg volt
győződve, hogy küldetését óhajtott sikerrel végezheti, mert a mit
még feltételkép követelnie kellett a gróftól, a jólelkű pap előtt
valósággal oly csekélységnek látszott, mely szóra is alig lehetett
érdemes.
De már az equipage, melyen a főtisztelendő úr helyet foglalt,
sehogy sem felelt meg a várakozásnak. Ily díszes követséghez
bizonyára más szebb fogat alkalmasabb leendett. Közönséges oláh
fakó szekér volt ez, melyre szénából raktak ülést. Azonban a két kis
mokány ló gyorsan szedegette fel patkolatlan lábát s a mondott időre
a kastély kapuja elé szállítá a nagytekintélyű vendéget.
Kanonok bácsi a porköpenyt levetve vállairól, fekete szinben,
egész méltósággal lépett a kastély külső csarnokába, s maga a
szakácsné, a ki legelőször pillantá meg az érkezőt, vezeté őt az
étterembe, a hol Arthur gróf ebédelni szokott.
Előre is jó «omen» mutatkozott. A gróf ugyan már asztalnál ült,
de még a pirossárga ráklevest sem kanalazá fel, a midőn a
belépőben a régi ismerős arczot megismerte.
– Ah, drága főtisztelendő úr, minő végtelenül kellemes
meglepetés! Legmerészebb álmomban sem remélhetém, hogy még
ma ily szerencsére virradjak. Kérem, tessék leülni s ne vesse meg
az én szerény falusi ebédemet.
Az inas ezalatt második terítéket rakott az asztalra, szemközt a
gróffal s mindjárt megindult a zajos társalgás, melyben mindenki
elmondá, hol s merre járt azóta, hogy utoljára látták egymást.
Kanonok bácsi, természetesen, az ebéd végére hagyá követsége
eléterjesztését. Addig mint két elismert műértő a felhozott ételek
birálgatására szorítkoztak. Azonban a friss erdei szamócza és
cseresznye után a felszolgáló legény eltávozván, a «rendkívüli nagy
követ» így kezdé meg beszédét:
– Gróf úr, én egyenesen Dorozsmayné ő nagysága nevében
jövök.
– Ah? nagy megtiszteltetés.
Igy felelt meglehetősen szárazon a gróf, a ki az özvegynek
Gencsen tett látogatása és Spuller Jeannette megjelenése óta
kezdett a vőlegényi eszmékről mindinkább leszokni.
– Méltóztatik tudni, gróf úr, hogy Esztike kisasszony épen Szent
István királyunk napján lesz 18 éves s Dorozsmayné ő nagysága
azon izenettel küld engem ide, hogy ha gróf úrnak is úgy tetszenék,
s a határnap iránt ellenvetése sem volna, az esküvőt mindjárt
másnap, augusztus 21.-én megtarthatjuk.
Arthur gróf majd elejtette a kezében tartott pohárkát e csodálatos
módon, váratlanul érkezett nyilatkozat hallatára. Mindamellett
bizalmatlanul, sőt mérgesen és gyanakvólag nézett a pap szemébe:
eszébe jutván, hogy egy ízben épen ezen semmi befolyással sem
biró egyéniség által akarták vele elhitetni a mesét, hogy Bogárdy
Zoltán és az özvegy nő között is egybekelési terv forog kérdésben.
– Úgy van, gróf úr, – folytatá a kanonok bácsi igaz hivő lélekkel
és tökéletes benső meggyőződésből. – Augusztus 21.-ke lehet azon
szerencsés nap, mely mindnyájunknak legszentebb óhajtását
teljesedésbe hozhatja. Részünkről többé kétkedés, nehézség,
akadály vagy halogatás nem foroghat szóban. Minden tökéletesen
rendben van, vőlegény és menyasszony csak a boldog óra
bekövetkezésére vágynak. Dorozsmayné és családja útban vannak
Pest felé; tegnap mondtak végbúcsut a hires savanyúviznek. Esztike
hugom szebb, frissebb és egészségesebb, mint valaha. Az esküvő
után pedig, ha gróf urnak más jobb terve nincs; ha a forró nyár
európai nagy útra alkalmatlan időszak, a jövendőbeli anyós nagyon
megtisztelve érezné magát, ha az új házaspár, addig, mig tetszeni
fog, a harasztosi kastélyban vesz szállást.
Arthur gróf mintha mély, fagyos dermedtségből ráznák fel, oly
bámulva nézett a papra. Mintha minden, a mi a tél óta történt,
gonosz álom volna, s most ébredne fel a legboldogabb valóságra.
Úgy szerette volna lelkét a feléje mosolygó örömöknek
átengedni, mert mint Esztike férje egy rá nézve elvesztettnek vélt
világ dicsőségei újra felnyiltak. Azonban sokkal váratlanabban
érkezett e változás, mint sem lelkében a hit, e leggyöngédebb
növény, rögtön megfogamozhatott volna és elűzheti onnan azon
sötét képeket, melyek ott nehány hónap óta állandó tanyát vertek.
– Gróf úr, – folytatá papos oktatásait oly hangon, melyből a pápai
csalhatatlanság bizonyos árnyalatának öntudata nem hiányozhatott.
– Minden nagy dolog e világon nehézséggel jár. Ne csodáljuk tehát,
ha a leányok utolsó perczig ragaszkodnak rövid ideig tartó
szabadságukhoz. A természet által beléjök öntött önállósági vágyból
történhetett az esküvőnek elhalasztása. A nőnem függetlenségének
eszméje a természettel ellenkezik s maguk az asszonyok nevetik
azon különczködőket, kik a női emancipatióról éretlen és unalmas
szónoklatokat tartanak. A leány anyjának korlátlan hatalma alatt áll,
ha férjhez megy, urat változtat. A bölcs férfi mindezt tudva, tűri a
menyasszony szeszélyeit, mint úgyis nem sokáig tartó
viczkándozást. Olvassuk az evangeliumot, vagy az apostolok
fejedelmeinek iratait, s láthatjuk, hogy a nő mindig engedelmességre
volt utasítva. Szent Pál mondja: a nő férjének akar tetszeni, a férj
Istennek. Azért adott a természet a férfinak erős, a nőnek gyenge
testalkatot, hogy ha két különböző akarat áll szemközt, válság
esetében a férj még erőszakkal is érvényesíthesse fensőbbségét. A
nők ellenkezése csak boszantás és aprólékos fondorlatokból áll,
mely addig tart, mig a férfi érczes mély hangjával a «quos ego»-t ki
nem mondta.
– Főtisztelendő úr! ez felséges prédikáczió volt. Nagy kár, hogy a
kiket leginkább érdekelt volna a leczke, épen most senki közülök
jelen nem lehetett. Szabad kérdeznem, mi lesz ebből, rám,
érdemetlen férfira a tanulság?
– Mindjárt szolgálok vele. Nézetem szerint a házasulandó mindig
bölcsen cselekszik, ha az esküvő előtt az engedékenynek szerepét
játszsza. Szüksége lehet gróf úrnak ezen elhatározásra most, midőn
minden tisztába van hozva, egyetlenegy feltételen kívül.

Democratization and Democracy in South Korea 1960 Present 1St Ed Edition Hyug Baeg Im Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Democratization and Democracy in South Korea 1960 Present 1St Ed Edition Hyug Baeg Im Full Chapter PDF

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Democratization and Democracy in

South Korea, 1960–Present 1st ed.

Human Resource Development in South Korea: Theory and

Contention and Regime Change in Asia: Contrasting

Urban Food Democracy and Governance in North and South

Global Sports Fandom in South Korea : American Major

White Drug Cultures and Regulation in London, 1916–1960

Child Protection in England, 1960–2000: Expertise,

Gender and HIV in South Africa 1st ed. Edition

Inter and Post-war Tourism in Western Europe, 1916–1960

ISBN 978-981-15-3702-8 ISBN 978-981-15-3703-5 (eBook)

Korean industrial relations in the post-­democratic transition period. I

for helping me to proofread the first draft of the manuscript. Lastly, I

1 Introduction: My Democratization Studies in Retrospect 1

Part I Authoritarianism and Democratic Transition 17

2 The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea 19

Crisis in the Restricted Democracy 37

3 Recasting Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism: Myths,

4 Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian

5 Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea 95

Part II Democratic Consolidation and After 117

6 Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Opportunities

7 From Affiliation to Association: The Challenge of

8 Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea:

9 Development and Change of Korean Democracy Since the

Part III Toward a Quality Democracy in South Korea 233

10 Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development

11 Better Democracy, Better Economic Growth? South Korea273

Fig. 4.1 Dynamics of transition from authoritarian rule Authoritarian

Fig. 11.14 Polarization in education. (Source: Choi, Tae-uk. 2005.

Table 2.1 Foreign capital inflow (millions of dollars) 31

Introduction: My Democratization Studies

On August 11, 1979, as I was boarding my plane to go and study com-

© The Author(s) 2020 1

However, when I started studying at Chicago, I was surprised to dis-

was exceptionally immune to the Third Wave of democratization despite

Science at Chicago in 1985 and published in World Politics in 1987. In this

and structures, actors and historical path dependence, and Machiavelli’s

not lead to a democratic transition, but to another military authoritarian

society believe they had played a more progressive role in democratization

later,” because economic development follows from good governance

Authoritarianism and Democratic

The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

Toward an Analytical Framework

© The Author(s) 2020 19

structurally determined, but contingent upon the outcome of class

The Bureaucratic Authoritarian Model and Its Critics

The flaw in this functionalist argument is that it leads us to regard

An Alternative Analytical Framework

How, Then, Are Changes in the Economic System Related

Authoritarian Transition in Dependent Capitalism

Compromise is possible if the fundamental interest of the bourgeoisie—

Transition to Bureaucratic Authoritarianism

In South Korea, the emergence of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime that

from those presupposed by O’Donnell? In South Korea the restricted

The Organization of the Economy (1961–1972)

(Egy üres hang, mely az emberi nyelvben értelemmel sem bir.)

Forró júliusi nap, melyben por, aszály és eltikkadtság uralkodik,

– Mi baj? Mondhatom nem szivesen jöttem e pogány

You might also like

Korean industrial relations in the post-democratic transition period. I

1 Introduction: My Democratization Studies in Retrospect 1

Part I Authoritarianism and Democratic Transition 17

2 The Rise of Bureaucratic Authoritarianism in South Korea 19

Crisis in the Restricted Democracy 37

3 Recasting Park Chung Hee’s Authoritarianism: Myths,

4 Politics of Democratic Transition from Authoritarian

5 Christian Churches and Democratization in South Korea 95

Part II Democratic Consolidation and After 117

6 Democratic Consolidation in South Korea: Opportunities

7 From Affiliation to Association: The Challenge of

8 Faltering Democratic Consolidation in South Korea:

9 Development and Change of Korean Democracy Since the

Part III Toward a Quality Democracy in South Korea 233

10 Democratic Development and Authoritarian Development

11 Better Democracy, Better Economic Growth? South Korea273

Table 2.1 Foreign capital inflow (millions of dollars) 31