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STUDIES IN DIPLOMACY AND
INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS
Diffusion in
Franco-German Relations
A Different Perspective on a
History of Cooperation and Conflict
Eric Sangar
Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations
Series Editors
Donna Lee
Manchester Metropolitan University
Manchester, UK
Paul Sharp
College of Liberal Arts
University of Minnesota
Duluth, USA
Marcus Holmes
College of William & Mary
Williamsburg, USA
More information about this series at
http://www.palgrave.com/gp/series/14471
Eric Sangar
Diffusion in Franco-
German Relations
A Different Perspective on a History
of Cooperation and Conflict
Eric Sangar
Sciences Po Lille & CERAPS
University of Lille
Lille, France
Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations

ISBN 978-3-030-36039-9 ISBN 978-3-030-36040-5 (eBook)
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36040-5
© The Editor(s) (if applicable) and The Author(s), under exclusive licence to Springer
Nature Switzerland AG 2020
This work is subject to copyright. All rights are solely and exclusively licensed by the
Publisher, whether the whole or part of the material is concerned, specifically the rights of
translation, reprinting, reuse of illustrations, recitation, broadcasting, reproduction on
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electronic adaptation, computer software, or by similar or dissimilar methodology now
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The use of general descriptive names, registered names, trademarks, service marks, etc. in this
publication does not imply, even in the absence of a specific statement, that such names are
exempt from the relevant protective laws and regulations and therefore free for general use.
The publisher, the authors and the editors are safe to assume that the advice and information
in this book are believed to be true and accurate at the date of publication. Neither the pub-
lisher nor the authors or the editors give a warranty, expressed or implied, with respect to the
material contained herein or for any errors or omissions that may have been made. The
publisher remains neutral with regard to jurisdictional claims in published maps and institu-
tional affiliations.
Cover illustration: Images Etc / Getty Images
This Palgrave Macmillan imprint is published by the registered company Springer Nature
Switzerland AG.
The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland
Acknowledgments
This book would not have been written without the support I received by
Christoph Meyer, Professor of European and International Politics at
King’s College London: not only did he give me a chance to design and
teach the module “Discovering Diffusion: Perspectives on the Interactions
of the Franco-German Couple” whose contents formed the basis for this
book. He also became a stimulating role model thanks to his professional
ethics and his personal kindness.
I thank the students participating in the mentioned module for their
curiosity and commitment that motivated me to transform this course
into a book.
Furthermore, I thank Thierry Balzacq, Alain Dieckhoff, Mathias
Delori, Laurence Dufourg, Mareike König, Thomas Lindemann, Léo
Péria-Peigné, Holger Stritzel, and Pascal Vennesson for their useful feed-
back and advice on various parts of the book.
I am also grateful for research support provided by librarians at the
German Historical Institute in Paris, the King’s College Library, the
Bibliothèque de Sciences Po Paris, and the Bibliothèque nationale
de France.
I would not have been able to finish the book on time without the kind
support of my colleagues at Sciences Po Lille, above all the IR teaching
staff, including Anne Bazin, David Delfolie, Sami Makki, and Charles
Tenenbaum. Not only did they make me feel welcome at my new home
institution but also greatly facilitated my first year as a lecturer.
The countless lunches and coffee breaks with my colleagues and friends
at the BNF, including Mirjam Dageförde, Sabine Dini, Živilė Kalibataitė,
v
vi ACKNOWLEDGMENTS
Wendy Ramadan-Alban, Elise Rousseau, Thomas Scapin, and Achille

Sommo Pende, made me enjoy the long writing sessions between July
2018 and September 2019.
Last but not least I thank Milena for making me discover, besides many
other things, the streets in which the ‘Zabern Affair’ took place more than
one-hundred years ago.
Contents
1 Introduction 1
2 The Mainstream Narrative of Franco-German Relations

and the Value of ‘Diffusion’ as a Complementary
Analytical Framework 9
3 Exporting Revolutionary Institutions Across the Rhine 35
4 Importing ‘Alien’ or ‘Enlightened’ Law: Understanding

the Partial Diffusion of the Code Napoléon in the
Confederation of the Rhine 59
5 Importing Nationalist Warfare: Prussia’s Emulation of

the Napoleonic Way of War 81
6 Understanding the Incomplete Emulation of Prussian

Warfare by the French Army After the Franco-Prussian
War 103
vii
viii CONTENTS
7 Learning from the Prussian Schulmeister? German

Influences on French Primary Education Before and After
1870 123
8 The ‘Germanisation’ of Local Identities in Alsace-

Lorraine 147
9 Enabling Reconciliation Through the Recognition of

Mutual Entanglement: The Emergence of a Franco-
German Transnational Memory of the First World War 179
10 Understanding the Diffusion of West German Ordoliberal

Ideas Within the Context of the Introduction of the
European Monetary System 203
11 Conclusion: The Added Value of Studying Diffusion in

the Context of Franco-German Relations227
Index237
List of Figures
Chart 2.1 Number of Francophone and Germanophone publications

in WorldCat published on Franco-German relations
between 1900 and 2016 18
Chart 6.1 Replacement figures in the French Army, 1835 to 1856.
(Source: Schnapper 1968, p. 293) 111
Chart 7.1 Evolution of the number of municipalities without
schools in France, 1837 to 1876l. (Source: Grew et al.,
1983, p. 39) 129
Chart 7.2 Share of children of 5 to 15 years attending primary
schools, 1850 to 1876. (Source: Diebolt, Jaoul, & San
Martino, 2005, p. 476) 129
Chart 8.1 Literacy rates of Alsatian conscripts between 1875 and
1910, based on official conscription records from 1914
(Source: Harp, 1996, p. 204) 163
Chart 8.2 Conscription rates in the formerly Lorraine area between
1872 and 1895, according to official conscription records
(Source: Roth, 2011, p. 115) 164
Illustration 8.1 Contemporary memorial plaque in Zabern dedicated to
the commemoration of a street protest in November
1913. Picture taken by the author in August 2019 166
Illustration 8.2 Painting “La Tache Noire” by Albert Betannier, 1887.
From Wikimedia Commons under public domain.
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/File:1887_Bettannier_
Der_Schwarze_Fleck_anagoria.jpg168
Chart 10.1 Evolution of productive investment in France and West
Germany between 1974 and 1979. (Data source: Ziebura,
2012, p. 274) 210
ix
List of Tables
Table 2.1 The analytical strands of diffusion research in political science

(translated from Holzinger et al., 2007, p. 17) 25
Table 2.2 Basic analytical framework for the analysis of diffusion in the
Franco-German context 27
Table 2.3 Individual diffusion mechanisms and their specific characters 29
Table 3.1 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of French
revolutionary institutions 55
Table 4.1 Percentage of rulings using the Code Napoléon in trials at
Rhenish courts 70
Table 4.2 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of the Napoleonic
Code77
Table 5.1 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of nationalist warfare
in Prussia after 1806 98
Table 6.1 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of the Prussian
military system to France 120
Table 7.1 Primary school attendance rates of children of the age between
5 and 14 years 130
Table 7.2 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of Prussian norms on
primary education in France before and after 1870 142
Table 8.1 Election scores to the Reichstag in Alsace-Lorraine 172
Table 8.2 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of German national
identity to Alsace-Lorraine 174
Table 9.1 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of Franco-German
memory discourses on the First World War 198
Table 10.1 Summary of the analysis of the diffusion of ordoliberal ideas
from West Germany to France in the late 1970s 224
xi
List of Boxes
Actor Spotlight: Georg Wilhelm Böhmer 46

Actor Spotlight: Johann Nicolaus Friedrich Brauer 64
Actor Spotlight: Gerhard von Scharnhorst 90
Actor Spotlight: Napoléon III 107
Actor Spotlight: Victor Cousin 136
Actor Spotlight: Richard Stieve 156
Actor Spotlight: Jules Isaac 191
Actor Spotlight: Raymond Barre 213
xiii
CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Why Yet another Book on Franco-German

Relations?
In 2014, when I started using the Eurostar to travel between Paris and
London as part of a new job, I could not help but wonder why the two
cities were located in two separate time zones. Not that I was particularly
unhappy about this fact: more than once, the hour I ‘saved’ upon arrival
at St Pancras allowed me to be on time for my various appointments with-
out losing too much sleep. Still, every time I crossed the Channel Tunnel,
I asked myself if this time difference was not just another result of British
‘exceptionalism’.
It was only in the early days of the research for this book that I found
the real answer: the time difference was not at all a result of any British
insistence on maintaining its ‘splendid isolation’ from the continent but in
fact a side-effect of the German occupation of France during the Second
World War. As retraced in detail by Yvonne Poulle (1999), France had
adopted the Greenwich Mean Time (GMT) until its territory was divided
into a Northern part under direct German military administration, and the
formally independent Vichy France in the South. To facilitate train trans-
port, the military administration soon imposed the Central European
Time valid in the German Reich on occupied France. The resulting time
difference with Vichy France resulted in major difficulties in maintaining
© The Author(s) 2020 1

E. Sangar, Diffusion in Franco-German Relations, Studies in
Diplomacy and International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36040-5_1
2 E. SANGAR
regular train timetables on the French train network that still functioned
across the line of occupation. This prompted the leadership of the French
state railways to successfully lobby in favour of the adoption of the
‘German’ hour in Vichy France. Hence, the practical necessities of train
transport made France switch to the Central European Time, despite
being geographically situated in the GMT zone—a switch that was never
reversed after 1945.
This little anecdote should illustrate the main purpose of this book: to
illustrate how norms and ideas originating in one country have come to
influence the other—across diverse contexts, including in times that are
considered as being shaped by mutual hostility and conflict. In times of
apparently growing political fragmentation within and across societies, it
may be more important than ever to keep in mind that interconnectedness
and mutual influences do not cease even when formal institutions of inter-
national cooperation and integration lose their importance and policy-
makers return to framing policies in national terms. Privileging the
perspective of the impact of transborder circulation of norms and ideas—
without claiming that it is the only one valid—is, in my view, central to
overcoming methodological nationalism (Wimmer & Glick Schiller,
2002) in the study of bilateral relationship in the discipline of International
Relations (IR), be that in the Franco-German context or elsewhere.
Obviously, there is a plethora of books covering Franco-German rela-
tions. A simple keyword search for book titles on Franco-German relations
in WorldCat produces 166 results in English (“Franco-German rela-
tions”), 111 results in German (“deutsch-französische Beziehungen”),
and even 595 results in French (“relations franco-allemandes”). Still,
when I started preparing an undergraduate module on Franco-German
relations that I designed with a focus mainly on instances of mutual influ-
ence through travelling norms and ideas, I was disappointed to discover
that there was hardly any book I could recommend as accompanying read-
ing throughout the module. Indeed, the available recent volumes on
Franco-German relations published by Anglophone political science and
IR scholars subscribe to an analytical narrative emphasizing a history of
century-old political, economic and military rivalry and conflict, whose
disastrous effects have only been overcome through the parallel processes
of Franco-German reconciliation and European integration after 1945. In
this teleological narrative, Germany and France are often taken as separate
and independently evolving societies, with wars being represented as the
main instances of mutual interaction. By contrast, in the absence of actual
1 INTRODUCTION 3
violent conflict, many analyses present France and Germany as rather

autonomous political entities, whose economic, legal, and political
evolutions are shaped by predominantly internal dynamics, resulting in
sometimes harmonious, sometimes conflict political interests defended by
the respective national governments.
Two examples among others may help to illustrate this tendency in the
Anglophone IR literature on Franco-German relations: both Cole (2001)
and Webber (1999, 2005) are concerned with analysing the Franco-
German relationship, and both privilege an analytical perspective present-
ing the evolving policy positions of the two countries side-by-side,
focussing on negotiations via ‘high politics’ as the means of achieving
political agreement and neglecting underlying processes of mutual norma-
tive influence through learning or civil society communication. Krotz and
Schild acknowledge the importance of cross-border civil society and
‘parapublic’ communication but interpret such activities mainly as a result
of Franco-German intergovernmental negotiations (Krotz & Schild,
2013). The edited volume by Germond and Türk (2008) is the almost
only overview volume that also includes instances of transborder exchange
of norms and ideas, but it lacks a coherent analytical framework that builds
on the available categories of the study of diffusion in IR.
Yet, scholars of anthropology and cultural history have taught us that
individuals communicate and travel across the borders of their political
communities, and as a result also the norms and ideas they bring with them
from their home societies. These processes have often taken place not only
despite but even thanks to interstate conflict and proliferating nationalism
(Kaiser, 2005). Indeed, historians have produced a rich body of knowledge
detailing how France and Germany (or more precisely, the German states
prior to 1870) have become societies that are closely intertwined through
often complex processes of imitation, interpretation, and translation. Only
some of these works—such as the important studies by Alan Mitchell
(1979, 1984, 1991, 2005)—are available in English language. Others,
including the seminal study by Claude Digeon on the influence of German
philosophy on French intellectual life after the Franco-Prussian war (1959),
or the works by Michel Espagne and Michael Werner on ‘cultural transfers’
(Espagne, 1999; Espagne & Werner, 1987)—have never been translated
into English. Furthermore, as they are written by historians, these works
typically do not engage with the analytical tools developed in recent years
in political science and IR to capture the different theoretical mechanisms
of transborder ideational influence.
4 E. SANGAR
Aims of this Book

Indeed, since the 1990s and 2000s, there has been an important amount
of IR scholarship dedicated to the dynamics of international norm diffu-
sion. Thanks to these works, we know not only that processes of intentional
policy transfer and emulation but also of unintentional diffusion and circu-
lation of knowledge and ideas constitute an essential aspect of the evolution
of the international system and its units. We also know that the diffusion of
norms and ideas can be stimulated or blocked by domestic actors acting
often in non-linear fashion, and against the preferences of national govern-
ments. Building on these debates, the overall aim of this book is to offer an
alternative analytical view to the study of French-German relations in a
historical perspective. It will focus on instances when norms and ideas orig-
inating in one country were diffused to the other, resulting in (often non-
linear) change in the country of reception that would not have occurred
otherwise. More specifically, this book has three main objectives:
1. Exposing diffusion as an alternative—in the sense of complemen-

tary—perspective on Franco-German relations for an Anglophone
audience of IR students and scholars: in most existing accounts, the
manifold and complex interconnections between the French and
German societies have been neglected. Instead, scholars too often
focus on high politics and the resulting evolution of political prefer-
ences through intergovernmental negotiation. When social norms
and identities are discussed, they are often conceived as purely intra-
state phenomena, thus neglecting how social and political actors
have been influenced by transborder socialization or communicative
persuasion from across the Rhine. It will be shown that such dynam-
ics took place both in periods of conflict and of cooperation on the
intergovernmental level, and that it is therefore analytically useful to
go beyond a binary conceptualisation of Franco-German relations as
a history moving from ‘enmity’ to ‘amity’. By analysing why, how,
and to what effect norms and ideas originating in one country dif-
fused to the other, the book adopts a perspective which contrasts
with some of the more established analytical approaches in
Anglophone studies of Franco-German relations.
2. Importing and systematically analysing the rich historiographic
scholarship available in German and French language through the
established analytical framework of ‘diffusion’ in IR: so far, IR schol-
ars studying diffusion have largely focussed on contemporary
1 INTRODUCTION 5
henomena of transborder normative change involving transna-

p
tional agents (such as international organisations, NGOs, or epis-
temic communities). Doing this, they have neglected the occurrence
of diffusion in bilateral relationships, especially in their historical
width. The emerging strand of Historical IR reminds us, however,
that IR phenomena do have a history, and that mobilizing historiog-
raphy using the conceptual lenses of IR can be both empirically and
theoretically fruitful.
3. Producing potentially generalizable insights on the influence of spe-
cific diffusion mechanism and actor constellations on the outcome
of diffusion: the history of Franco-German relations can be consid-
ered an ideal ‘natural experiment’ to observe, for example, the
degree to which intergovernmental competition and conflict can
increase or decrease the ‘success’ of normative diffusion.
Conceptually, this book relies on a working definition of diffusion as a

process that occurs when political norms and ideas in a given country are
modified by political norms and ideas that originate from another country.
This definition privileges a dyadic hermeneutic perspective through which
international and transnational actors are seen rather as media than as
independent agents of diffusion. In an important conceptual article of
2012, Etel Solingen (2012) sketches out an analytical framework enabling
to understand diffusion across diverse geographical and temporal con-
texts. This framework will be used to construct the analytical narrative in
each of the individual chapters, whose main results will be summarized in
a table at the end of each chapter. The following questions will guide the
empirical analysis of each case study:
• Who is diffusing? Which actor(s) are ‘importing’ or ‘exporting’?

Which local actors are encouraging or opposing diffusion, and for
which reasons?
• What is being diffused? Are we looking at discourses and ideas that
are subject to a process of interpretation and translation, or are ‘for-
eign’ ideas directly and immediately implemented?
• How is diffusion taking place? Can we identify specific mechanisms,
such as violent coercion or persuasion? To what extent do these
mechanisms influence the participation or resistance of diffusion
‘receivers’?
6 E. SANGAR
• Which outcome can we discern? Why does diffusion often not result
in a straightforward transfer of ideas, discourses, and policies? Are
some diffusion mechanisms more ‘effective’ than others?
Contents and Structure

In terms of research material, the book will mainly mobilize historio-
graphic and political science literature produced in German, French, and
English. As mentioned above, there is an important amount of Francophone
and Germanophone historiography dedicated to the Franco-German cir-
culation of norms and ideas. This book will contribute to disseminate the
core results of this scholarly production among an Anglophone IR audi-
ence. It will also show how the use of national historiographies—despite
their embeddedness in academic debates specific to the respective aca-
demic communities—can actually be used as a ‘meta-archive’ by IR schol-
ars through a careful, hermeneutic search for empirical indicators of
available analytical concepts.
Following this introduction, the second chapter of this book will pres-
ent a short conceptual history of diffusion in the social sciences, a sum-
mary of the of available theoretical concepts for the analysis of diffusion in
the recent IR literature, and a critical analysis of the mainstream analytical
narratives on Franco-German relations, including the underlying emphasis
on a teleological evolution from ‘enmity’ over ‘reconciliation’ to ‘friend-
ship’ (for a critical review of this narrative, see Delori, 2007).
In the empirical chapters, various instances of Franco-German norma-
tive diffusion will be explored, including the export of legal norms, the
promotion of national identities, the transfer and emulation of universal
conscription, and the transnational construction of collective memories.
The chosen instances of diffusion reflect the areas covered by the most rel-
evant or most recent historiographic literature. Each of the chapters will
therefore focus on a specific empirical “case study”, taken from one of
three key historical contexts: The French Revolution and the Napoleonic
Wars (1789–1815); the aftermath of the Franco-Prussian War (1870–1914);
and Franco-German ‘reconciliation’ and partnership in the twentieth cen-
tury. Such a variety of cases may appear eclectic, but these three contexts
cover widely differing diffusion contents but also actors, mechanisms and
contextual conditions, including the presence and absence of nationalism,
military competition, or means of transnational communication and learn-
ing. The period of the Napoleonic Wars is shaped by an imperialist policy
of a centralized hegemonic power with a clear impetus to ‘export’ norms
1 INTRODUCTION 7
(including the Code Napoléon but also conscription, administrative cen-

tralization, and the abolition of feudal privileges). The period following
the Franco-Prussian War is characterized by competition and rivalry
between an established French and an emerging German nation-state. And
the period after 1945 features an increasing willingness of both states to
cooperate and overcome past conflict in an international context driven by
the Cold War confrontation. The overall question that will be answered in
the conclusion will be to what extent such contextual variance changes the
dynamics and outcome of individual diffusion processes.
The presented case studies can be read individually and thus be also
used to accompany or complement courses on Franco-German relations.
Cross-case observations will be presented in the concluding chapter, which
will also detail some implications for theory development on bilateral dif-
fusion in IR.
References
Cole, A. (2001). Franco-German Relations. Harlow: Longman.
Delori, M. (2007). La symbolique franco-allemande en panne d’idées?
Introduction: Pour un retour critique sur le grand récit de la réconciliation.
Cahiers d’histoire: Revue d’histoire critique, 100, 11–21.
Digeon, C. (1959). La crise allemande de la pensée franc̜aise, 1870–1914. Paris:
Presses universitaires de France.
Espagne, M. (Ed.). (1999). Les Transferts Culturels Franco-Allemands. Paris:
Espagne, M., & Werner, M. (1987). La construction d’une référence culturelle
allemande en France: genèse et histoire (1750–1914). Annales. Histoire,
Sciences Sociales, 42(4), 969–992. https://doi.org/10.3406/ahess.1987.
283428
Germond, C., & Türk, H. (Eds.). (2008). A history of Franco-German Relations
in Europe: From “Hereditary Enemies” to Partners (1st ed.). New York: Palgrave
Macmillan.
Kaiser, W. (2005). Transnational Mobilization and Cultural Representation:
Political Transfer in an Age of Proto-Globalization, Democratization and
Nationalism 1848–1914. European Review of History: Revue europeenne
d’histoire, 12(2), 403–424. https://doi.org/10.1080/13507480500269324
Krotz, U., & Schild, J. (2013). Shaping Europe: France, Germany, and Embedded
Bilateralism from the Elysée Treaty to Twenty-First Century Politics. Oxford:
Oxford University Press.
Mitchell, A. (1979). The German Influence in France After 1870: The Formation of
the French Republic. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
8 E. SANGAR
Mitchell, A. (1984). Victors and Vanquished: The German Influence on Army and
Church in France After 1870. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Mitchell, A. (1991). The Divided Path: The German Influence on Social Reform in
France After 1870. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press.
Mitchell, A. (2005). A Stranger in Paris: Germany’s Role in Republican France,
1870–1940. New York: Berghahn Books.
Poulle, Y. (1999). La France à l’heure allemande. Bibliothèque de l’école des chartes,
157(2), 493–502. https://doi.org/10.3406/bec.1999.450989
Solingen, E. (2012). Of Dominoes and Firewalls: The Domestic, Regional, and
Global Politics of International Diffusion. International Studies Quarterly,
56(4), 631–644. https://doi.org/10.1111/isqu.12034
Webber, D. (Ed.). (1999). The Franco-German Relationship in the European
Union. London: Routledge.
Webber, D. (2005). The Franco-German Relationship in the EU. London:
Routledge.
Wimmer, A., & Glick Schiller, N. (2002). Methodological Nationalism and
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CHAPTER 2
The Mainstream Narrative of Franco-German

Relations and the Value of ‘Diffusion’
as a Complementary Analytical Framework
The purpose of this chapter is twofold: The first section will critically
examine the dominant strands of interpretation in the political science
scholarship of Franco-German relations, especially those found in existing
Anglophone manuals used to teach this topic. The second section will
present the concept of trans-border diffusion as a complementary analyti-
cal paradigm. Summarising key analytical tools and concepts developed in
the IR literature on diffusion, a conceptual framework will be presented
which will enable to explore and compare some of the most influential
different diffusion processes and outcomes that have occurred between
France and Germany since the French Revolution.
The Teleological Mainstream Narrative

in the Literature on Franco-German Relations
According to Wikipedia’s article “France-Germany relations”, this rela-

tionship is characterised by “three grand periods: ‘hereditary enmity’
(down to 1945), ‘reconciliation’ (1945–1963) and since 1963 the ‘special
relationship’ embodied in a cooperation called Franco-German Friendship”
(Wikipedia contributors, 2017). Of course, Wikipedia should not be con-
sidered an authoritative source of academic scholarship—but as the
increasing use of Wikipedia in teaching and media indicates, in many cases
the crowdsourced encyclopaedia does indicate a working consensus that
© The Author(s) 2020 9

E. Sangar, Diffusion in Franco-German Relations, Studies in
Diplomacy and International Relations,
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-36040-5_2
10 E. SANGAR
has been agreed upon in scholarly and public debate. And as practical
experience suggests, Wikipedia’s definition will be by far the most fre-
quently used definition in student papers and presentations. So, if we
accept for the moment that a Wikipedia article does represent an influen-
tial, semi-public, semi-academic representation of the relationship between
France and Germany, what does this definition entail? There seem to be at
least three constitutive elements.
First, there is a clearly teleological aspect that, according to this view,
distinguishes Franco-German relations from other interstate relationships,
which are typically shaped by a rather non-linear quality. Whereas popular
representations of other relationships between states of similar size (such
as the relations between France and Britain or Russia and the U.S.) seem
to emphasise the succession of temporary periods of both cooperation and
conflict, the history of France and Germany appears to be perceived as
shaped by an almost linear evolution that has moved from apparently
‘hereditary’ (that is, ‘natural’ and therefore unchangeable) conflict over an
almost miraculous ‘reconciliation’ towards the salvation of mutual ‘friend-
ship’ (or, according to some observers’ preferences, ‘marriage’).
Second, it is assumed that there are clearly identifiable ruptures in the
history of the Franco-German relationship. The ‘hereditary enmity’,
which in this view has characterised for more than thousand years the
interaction between ‘France’ and ‘Germany’ as discernible political enti-
ties, is supposed to have suddenly ended in 1945. In a period of only
18 years, this hostility then is portrayed as having undergone a transforma-
tion in a process of ‘reconciliation’. By 1963, this has resulted in the insti-
tutionalisation of binational ‘friendship’ (often identified with the Elysée
Treaty of 22 January 1963). Although not mentioned in the above-
mentioned definition, it seems that some specific decisions or historical
events must have been powerful enough to cause this transformation—
rather than slow and gradual processes of change.
Third, and most importantly, in all periods of this narrative of Franco-
German relations, France and Germany appear as two separate, autono-
mously evolving political units. Even as ‘friends’, these units ‘cooperate’
but do not seem to directly influence each other, let alone ‘integrate’.
Although not made explicit, changes in their relationship are less per-
ceived as a result of a process of mutual exchange or even isomorphism but
appear to be the result of autonomous evolutions within both states.
Furthermore, not only are France and Germany seen as distinct units, they
are also collectively homogenised as political entities capable of emotions
2 THE MAINSTREAM NARRATIVE OF FRANCO-GERMAN RELATIONS… 11
usually found on the individual level, including friendship. It remains

unclear to what extent such emotional homogenisation is merely a meta-
phor characterizing intergovernmental relations, or if this refers indeed to
a thorough transformation of collective emotional states that include all—
or at least a majority of—members of both societies.
If we look at major Anglophone IR publications dealing with Franco-
German relations, we will find characterisations that share similar features
concerning the distinctiveness of this relationship. In a 2014 article, Ulrich
Krotz, one of the most prominent IR scholars specialized in Franco-
German relations, provides a perspective which is representative of many
others. He writes:
A long-term perspective on the Franco-German relationship a hundred years

after the onset of the First World War throws into sharp relief three major peri-
ods in affairs between the two countries: the era of ‘hereditary enmity’ from
1871 (or before) to 1945; the ‘reconciliation’ of 1945–63; and the ‘special rela-
tionship’, a period of resilient cooperative bilateralism, which has endured since
1963. […] Three emblematic observations come into focus from a broad reflec-
tion on France, Germany and their relations ‘a hundred years after’. The first
is the seemingly total break with the open hatred and wars of the times of ‘hered-
itary enmity’—inimitié héréditaire or Erbfeindschaft—which culminated so
brutally in the trenches and mud of the Great War battlefields. […] Second, the
fundamental nature of the ‘special relationship’ between France and Germany,
codified by and nourished through the 1963 Franco-German ‘Elysée Treaty’,
emerges in sharp contrast to what preceded it. […] Third, the significance of
European and Franco-German crises a hundred years after the First World
War lies not in particular momentary troubles or short-term turmoils but far
beyond them; for these crises carry the potential to unravel constitutive aspects of
Franco-German relations of the past 50 years and the joint role of the two states
in Europe at large. (Krotz, 2014, pp. 337–338)
We can see that Krotz’s conceptualisation of the specificity of the

Franco-German relationship essentially shares the elements of the defini-
tion presented above. This includes the teleological narrative going from
‘enmity’ towards reconciliation and a ‘special’ relationship’, the identifica-
tion of disruptive turning points on a historical timeline, and an emphasis
on interstate ‘cooperation’ (thus acknowledging the autonomy of both
states). What this conceptualisation adds is a focus on government action:
The contemporary era of Franco-German cooperation is portrayed as a
result of the 1963 conclusion of the Elysée Treaty. Thus, one can conclude
12 E. SANGAR
that the driving actors in this relationship have been both countries’ gov-
ernments, who are at least implicitly conceived as being able to change and
transform mutual emotions and perceptions in their respective societies.
Such state-centric analytical conceptualisations, emphasising the pri-
mordial relevance of governmental action, and as a result conceiving
inter-state relations as the result of interactions between self-contained
‘billiard balls’ (Hobson, 2000, p. 3; Waltz, 2010 [1979]), have been
thoroughly challenged in other areas of International Relations and
Political Science. It is therefore even more surprising to what extent the
mainstream narrative of Franco-German relations still remains present in
contemporary manuals.
For instance, Cole argues in the introductory chapter of his book
‘Franco-German Relations’ that “since the Thirty Years’ War (1618–1648),
which reduced Europe to ruins, hegemony within Europe has involved a
contest between these two continental European states, and their precur-
sors.” (Cole, 2001, p. 1) This fundamental conflict between France and
Germany has only been overcome through intergovernmental coopera-
tion after the Second World War: “postwar Franco-German relations have
built upon a measure of convergence of ideas and interests, a joint man-
agement of political projects and an institutionally embedded existence.”
(Cole, 2001, p. 4).
Even the more recent edited volume by Germond and Türk, which
contains several chapters that to some extent challenge features of the
mainstream narrative identified above (including the primacy of govern-
ment action, and the autonomous evolution of both societies), adheres to
the teleological interpretation of the Franco-German relationship. Already
in the first two paragraphs of their introductory chapter, the editors state:
the history of Franco-German relations before 1945 is characterised by a long-

lasting antagonism feeding on rivalry for territory and hegemony on the
European continent, as well as humiliated national sentiments and revenge
discourses. […] There was thus a long way to go before the former alleged
“hereditary enemies” became the close partners they are now in the European
Union (EU) and the world. (Germond & Türk, 2008, pp. 1–10)
This omnipresence of the mainstream narrative can only be partially

explained by the historical record. To be sure, numerous wars occurred
between the political entities that formed the French kingdom and later
French republic, on the one hand, and (some of) the German states loosely
confederated in the Holy Roman Empire until the proclamation of the

German nation-state in 1870, on the other hand. The Napoleonic Wars,
the Franco-Prussian War, and the two World Wars are the most recent but
by far not the only examples. Since the fifteenth century, the French king-
dom perceived an increasing danger of encirclement from the growing
territorial possessions of the Habsburg Empire in Spain, Burgundy, and
the Low Countries. This tension escalated repeatedly in violent conflict
between the two powers, including the Thirty Years’ War, the Nine Years’
War, or the War of Spanish Succession. The ascension of Prussia as second
German power was also accompanied by armed conflict with France, long
before the Franco-Prussian War of 1870. During the Seven Years’ War,
considered by some as the first ‘world war’ due to its theatres being dis-
persed over several continents, France sought to prevent the formation of
a unified German state under Prussian auspices and wreaked havoc on
many German territories along its Eastern border.
But the historical record shows as well that conflict between France and
German states has neither been ‘hereditary’, nor that political rivalry has
necessarily led to an absence of trans-border exchange and influence. Not
only did smaller German states, such as Bavaria, regularly seek alliances
with France in order to protect themselves against perceived threats from
larger states within the Holy Roman Empire, including Austria and
Prussia. More importantly, political elites, social movements, and intel-
lectuals also looked to their counterparts on the other side of the Rhine to
gain inspiration, role models, and resources to promote change in their
own society—and this especially in periods of heightened interstate rivalry,
such as the late nineteenth century (Kaiser, 2005). Even Frederic II of
Prussia, whose kingdom was brought to the brink of defeat by a Franco-
Austrian alliance during the Seven Years’ War and who was later portrayed
as the forefather of German nationalism, imitated the French model of
absolutist rule and even preferred to speak French over German (Réau,
2013 [1938], p. 84). Scope and impact of this type of non-violent interac-
tion are much more difficult to observe and assess than the outbreak and
consequences of war. Yet, an even cursory look at the amount of newer
historiographical research produced on topics of trans-border circulation
and communication confirms that such processes have been as much a
‘hereditary’ feature of the Franco-German relationship than have been
mutual hatred and armed conflict. The question remains: Why has the
teleological mainstream narrative of Franco-German relations remained
so dominant?
14 E. SANGAR
At least one part of the answer to this question can be found in the fact
that the mainstream narrative in Anglophone IR has often followed the
evolution of official discourses on both sides of the Rhine. The notion of
Franco-German ‘hereditary enmity’, which had only been supported by a
small minority of nationalist intellectuals prior to 1789, became part of
rulers’ discourse after the end of Napoleonic Wars. This was partially a
result of re-establishing stable domestic rule: The restoration of the Ancien
Régime in both France and the German states was confronted with a legit-
imation crisis as a result of the disruption of the previous territorial and
social order in the aftermath of the French Revolution. The ‘new’ old rul-
ers reacted by using a legitimatory resource that had already proven to be
effective during the so-called Liberation Wars, namely the promotion of
authoritarian nationalism, justified by the need to defend the ‘fatherland’
against the enemy of the last war. This legitimation strategy may be less
surprising for a state like Prussia, which had fought several wars against
revolutionary France and was even occupied by French troops between
1806 and 1813 (Hagemann, 2009). But even a state like Bavaria, which
historically had more often than not been allied to France and which had
supported the Napoleonic Empire until its eventual defeat seemed inevi-
table, chose to portray its monarchic ruler as a stiff defender of the German
fatherland after 1815, even if that implied building monuments of the
Battle of Leipzig of 1815, in which the Bavarian Army had not even par-
ticipated (Murr, 2003).
In France, already prior to 1815, ‘Germany’ had been constructed as a
space of cultural difference that served both as an illustration of French
civilizational lead and as a justification of France’s ambition to ‘advance’
European polities through the means of military conquest and occupation
(Rapport, 2009). After 1815, the restoration of the Bourbon monarchy
provoked at times violent opposition from French bourgeois liberals and
radical republicans. Overcoming the defeat and reconquering the ‘natural’
frontier of the Rhine from Prussia became a rare element of consent
between the opposing domestic political forces (Grosjean, 1930,
pp. 10–12; Ulbert, 2008, p. 44), as did the denunciation of Prussian
troops occupying French territories as yet another episode in the historic
struggle to preserve French civilisation against foreign barbarism
(Jeismann, 1992, pp. 162–163).
The mostly domestically motivated ‘invention’ of the notion of Franco-
German enmity can therefore help to explain why the Franco-Prussian
War of 1870 was later remembered as the ‘culmination’ of a century-old
enmity between nations, rather than as a temporary military conflict

among others (Werner, 1995). For Germany, this war represented the
founding myth of the German Empire (Buschmann, 2003): it enabled the
creation of a German nation-state “within the continuity of the Franco-
German conflict over foreign domination and national self-determination
that had shaped the relations between the two countries since the begin-
ning of the century, […] indeed transforming it into the notion that the
two countries were ‘hereditary enemies’, a conviction that was then passed
down from one generation to the next.” (Marcowitz, 2008, pp. 13–26) In
France, on the other hand, especially the annexation of Alsace-Lorraine
was perceived as a national humiliation, whose overcoming was conveyed
as a ‘national duty’ in the press and even in primary school teaching
(Lehmann, 2015; Turetti, 2008).
These efforts to repurpose nationalism, originally conceived as a
Republican tool to mobilise populations in view of defending revolution-
ary institutions against (internal and external) opposition, into a means to
legitimate the ancien régime, coincided with another evolution: the pro-
fessionalisation of historiography towards an academic discipline using a
common set of accepted research methods and writing practices, and exer-
cised by professional scholars in university establishments, rather than
untrained laypersons (Hroch, 2015, pp. 167–179). This institutionalisa-
tion—which, of course, meant an increase in social, political, and eco-
nomic capital for historians—came with a price. In exchange for the
provision of career opportunities and institutional recognition, historians
all over Europe participated in the writing of ‘national histories’ (Berger,
2007). Although these histories could not simply be ‘invented’ but had to
take into account existing local and regional memories and material relics
from the past (Hroch, 2015, p. 39), their underlying interpretations often
subscribed to the preferred official narratives, including the notion of a
national destiny that historically had to be defended against aggression
from other nations. It is therefore little surprising that the historiographi-
cal interpretation of one and the same event, such as the French Revolution,
sharply diverged according to the needs of the official narratives: “The
revolutionary tradition in France rendered all other national histories mere
sideshows to the real progress of humanity, which, of course, had only
taken place in France (Berger, 2007, p. 61). In Germany, on the other
hand, it “remains remarkable […] how intensively the German historical
profession […] treated the 1806–1815 period, which […] they unani-
mously defined as a national foundation period, and how strongly their
16 E. SANGAR
competing interpretations were molded by ideology, consistently influ-

enced by the political aims of their day.” (Hagemann, 2015, p. 299).
Under these conditions, the idea of a historically ‘proven’ notion of
Franco-German enmity strongly influenced the historiographical debate
in France and Germany during the nineteenth and twentieth centuries,
and fostered the popularity of ‘patriotic’ history-writing (Gödde-
Baumanns, 1988). In both countries, historians such as Heinrich von
Treitschke and Jacques Bainville gained prominence and access to political
elites by conceptualising the history of the relations between both coun-
tries as one of perennial conflict, in which the values of one’s own nation
had to be defended against the perverted and/or barbaric aggression of
the other. Both ‘national historians’ used the term ‘hereditary enmity’ as a
metaphor to characterize the natural condition of Franco-German rela-
tions, discarding the many episodes of cooperation and alliance between
France and individual German states (Frey & Jordan, 2008, pp. 61–62).
As a result, in both historians’ discourses, “there are fundamental similari-
ties at play. […] the association of the enemy with disease and violence; the
nondiscussion of the enemy’s homeland, a nonplace to be attacked. […]
the shared belief in the right of power to determine international rela-
tions.” (Frey & Jordan, 2008, pp. 69–70).
The political utility of the notion of ‘hereditary enmity’ endured even
after 1945, when the outcome of the Second World War had fundamen-
tally altered the foreign policy imperatives of both the French and German
governments. By then, it was no longer the notion of Franco-German
‘enmity’ but ‘friendship’ that could provide essential legitimacy to both
governments that were struggling with overcoming the material but also
social and political disaster of the war. While by 1958, the French presi-
dent Charles de Gaulle started to view Germany as a key partner that
would enable him to build a united Europe under French leadership as a
third bloc in international politics (Rosoux, 2001, p. 27), Germany’s
chancellor Adenauer perceived a partnership with France as an essential
precondition for gaining West Germany’s full sovereignty and integration
within the Western alliance (Banchoff, 1996). This common interest facil-
itated a political impetus for the ‘invention’ of the reconciliation narrative,
in which the history of France and Germany is still portrayed as a history
of conflict and mutual hatred—but whose heritage of enmity can and
should be overcome by reinterpreting it as the unfortunate struggle
between culturally and politically similar nations (Delori, 2016,
pp. 164–166; Rosoux, 2007, p. 23).
Just like one century earlier, official historical narratives in France and
Germany aimed at the construction of the notion of “hereditary enmity”
to legitimise nationalist foreign and domestic policies in both countries, in
the mid-twentieth century history was used again: this time, however, to
promote and justify reconciliation. Adenauer and de Gaulle started a pro-
cess of re-interpretation of Franco-German history through which “sym-
bolic acts and practices—the gestures, rituals, and ceremonies between
these two states since the late 1950s—have charged relations between
France and Germany with a specific historical meaning and a particular
social purpose.” (Krotz & Schild, 2013, p. 76) Only by portraying the
previous millennium of Franco-German relations as a story of never-
ending conflict could bilateral reconciliation truly be seen as a ‘historic’
miracle (Delori, 2016, p. 165). Thus, Adenauer and de Gaulle were able
to construct a bilateral founding myth that would help legitimise the new
agenda of close intergovernmental cooperation and leadership (Buffet &
Heuser, 1998). Contemporary observers disseminated this narrative, such
as a German journalist who described the Elysée treaty as a “historic
turning-point. […] it stands as the crowning triumph for all time, for it is
indeed a long-term instrument, overcoming centuries of enmity.” (Fackler,
1965, p. 27) This narrative was promoted and stabilised in the following
decades. Since the mutual state visits of Adenauer and de Gaulle, and the
conclusion of the Elysée Treaty in 1962, official Franco-German declara-
tions invariably feature “the conjuring of the ‘common historical mission’
of France and Germany [which] that follows the ritual enumeration of
Franco-German progress. These almost rigid patterns hardly vary from
one head of state to the next.” (Rosoux, 2001, p. 89).
What is less known is that the post-1945 intergovernmental initiative
to reconstruct the Franco-German narrative was also legitimised, again,
by a flow of academic production, especially in the newly established
field of ‘Franco-German studies’ (Rittau, 2011, p. 220). This scientific
production was facilitated by an impressive number of publicly funded
bilateral institutions and programmes supporting research on Franco-
German topics. These institutions include a number of local Franco-
German research centres (‘Centres culturels franco-allemands’), the
Franco-German research institute DFI (‘Deutsch-Französisches
Institut’) in Ludwigsburg, the Centre Marc Bloch in Berlin, the Franco-
German University UFA (‘Université franco-allemande’), which hosts
several cooperation programmes for French and German scholars and
universities, or the more recently created funding and networking struc-
18 E. SANGAR
ture for Franco-German studies CIERA (‘Centre interdisciplinaire

d’études et de recherches sur l’Allemagne’). Studying the history of the
Franco-German relationship with the implicit objective of legitimising
‘reconciliation’ thus became a career opportunity for historians, sociolo-
gists and political scientists that by the end of the twentieth century had
grown into a sub-discipline on its own, representing dozens of research
centres, specialised chairs, BA and MA programmes, and, last but not
least, comparatively accessible funding opportunities for academic
research and networking.
In both countries, this institutional and financial impetus has stimu-
lated a flow of publications on Franco-German relations, starting in the
1960s and lasting until today. The following chart illustrates impressively
the dynamic growth of the research output on the relations of both coun-
tries since the 1960s (Chart 2.1).
Beyond this quantitative expansion, the participation of academic
research in the legitimation of the reconciliation narrative even led to the
production of a common history schoolbook, whose three volumes are
used to teach history modern and contemporary European history at sec-
ondary schools. Academics in both countries thus at least indirectly
200
180
160
140
120
100
80
60
40
20
0
1900 1910 1920 1930 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 2010
"Relations franco-allemandes" "Deutsch-französische Beziehungen"
Chart 2.1 Number of Francophone and Germanophone publications in

WorldCat published on Franco-German relations between 1900 and 2016
c ontributed to legitimise a narrative according to which ‘reconciliation’

and ‘friendship’ in the present had put an end to ‘enmity’ and ‘conflict’
in the past.
The Shortcomings of the Mainstream Narrative

Having explained why the mainstream narrative Franco-German remain
so powerful, one might ask: why is this narrative actually problematic?
Of course, there are a number of empirical arguments that can be
used to counter or at least to relativize the main tenets of the mainstream
narrative. As already mentioned above, one could argue that the clear sep-
aration between a period of conflict and a period of cooperation is not
confirmed by the historical record. One could refer, in particular, to the
reconciliation initiatives of the interwar period started by Aristide Briand
and Gustav Stresemann. One could also highlight the fragmented nature
of the German polity prior to 1870, which makes any attempt of qualify-
ing the relationship between France and ‘Germany’ (even as a geographi-
cal space) highly difficult.
But these criticisms could be, at least to some extent, integrated in a
further ‘revised version’ of the teleological narrative. There are, however,
a number of analytical and normative arguments that highlight the need
for a complementary (not necessarily alternative) analytical perspective on
Franco-German relations. These include criticism of, first, the state-centric
conception of Franco-German relations, second, the resulting neglect of
civil society dynamics, and third, the preference for methodological
nationalism.
The first criticism concerns the inherent tendency of the mainstream
narrative to rely on highly visible intergovernmental interactions (such as
wars, diplomatic negotiations, state visits, etc.) in order to ‘operationalise’
the underlying theory about the evolving relations between the two coun-
tries. The ‘big moments’ of ‘high politics’—battles, capitulations, encoun-
ters of heads of state—thus become indicators of continuity and change in
the Franco-German relationship and enable the identification of chrono-
logical ‘turning points’. And since these events are used as primary indica-
tors, government actors involved in deciding their outcome—such as
heads of state, military chiefs, officials—become the decisive agents, acting
apparently according to their perceptions of the national interest. As a
result, the mainstream narrative is locked into a state-centric conception of
20 E. SANGAR
international relations that is close to the IR paradigm of classical realism,

ignoring many of the ontological and epistemological debates that have
thoroughly challenged the conceptual primacy of the state over the
last decades.
The second criticism concerns the resulting neglect of civil society
actors. In recent historiography, there has been strong and ample evidence
of intellectuals, social movements, or businesspeople either perceiving the
other country in a light that is contrary to the official discourse (Dienel,
1999; Digeon, 1959; Espagne, 1999; Mucchielli, 1993), or even fostering
trans-border communication in periods of intense conflict on the political
level. Such evidence is largely ignored or even qualified as irrelevant by the
mainstream narrative. Yet a lasting transformation of mutual perceptions
between political communities involves more than agreement on common
interests and cooperation among political leaders and governments alone.
If we assume that whole societies are actually able to change their mutual
perceptions from ‘enmity’ to ‘friendship’, this necessarily involves pro-
cesses of change in social communication, education, and probably direct
encounters on the level of civil society. Therefore, it appears necessary to
take into account how civil society actors in France and Germany have
perceived each other, how they have influenced each other, and how such
interaction might even have paved the way for legitimising official recon-
ciliation attempts in the first place.
The third criticism concerns some problematic analytical and normative
implications of implicit methodological choices of the mainstream narra-
tive. The tendency towards state-centric interpretations and the neglect of
cross-border communication and influence can be seen as a by-product of
the reliance on methodological nationalism in most accounts of Franco-
German relations. According to the widely cited article by Wimmer and
Glick Schiller, methodological nationalism can be “understood as the
assumption that the nation/state/society is the natural social and political
form of the modern world.” (Wimmer & Glick Schiller, 2002, p. 301)
Since national governments are perceived and analysed as the principal
agents of continuity and change in Franco-German relations, the autono-
mous existence of France and Germany as separately evolving political
entities is commonly assumed. Of course, these entities interact, but this
interaction is mostly conceived on the intergovernmental level and thus
not influence the formation of ‘national’ interests. Consequently, ques-
tions of interdependency, of mutual learning, or of lasting interference of
one state into the ‘internal’ affairs of the other, are typically neglected.
Acknowledging such processes would, of course, threaten the very exis-

tence of the narrative of transformation of the relationship of two
autonomous entities from ‘enmity’ into ‘friendship’. But beyond this criti-
cism, what is even more problematic is the continuous dissemination,
including through school and university teaching, that even two spaces as
closely interwoven as France and Germany can and should be treated as
separate units, pursuing individual ‘national’ interests, autonomous
decision-making processes, and nationally contained histories and cul-
tures. At a time when policy-makers actively promote the illusion of a
‘return’ to national sovereignty and independence from multilateral insti-
tutions and decision-making, the continuous reliance on methodological
nationalism is of little help to challenge such attempts.
Diffusion as a Complementary Analytical Framework

for Understanding the Interdependent Evolution
of France and Germany
What could be a different analytical perspective for analysing Franco-

German relations—one that allows to integrate the agency of non-state
actors, that is more receptive for gradual change instead of ‘big events’,
and that allows to detect the importance of interdependence in the rela-
tionship of two neighbouring, permanently interacting societies?
In the Francophone and Germanophone literature on Franco-German
relations, there have been important studies focussing on the transborder
circulation of ideas and the mutual influence of French and German intel-
lectuals and civil societies. Published in 1959, Claude Digeon’s study La
crisée allemande de la pensée française can be seen as a pioneering study
that examined systematically how the context of the aftermath of the
Franco-Prussian war stimulated the reception of German philosophers
French intellectuals changed. Since the 1980s, other French and German
historians, including the Michel Espagne and Michael Werner, have
launched an important research programme in cultural history introduc-
ing the concept of ‘cultural transfer’ (Espagne, 1999, 2013; Espagne &
Werner, 1985, 1987). They deliberately positioned this perspective as an
alternative to the traditional comparative approach in cultural history,
highlighting that the French and German cultural and intellectual histo-
ries are closely intertwined. In its empirical approach, the ‘cultural trans-
fer’ approach emphasized the roles of individuals in ‘receiving’ and
22 E. SANGAR
‘translating’ ideas from across the Rhine, such as in the volume on ‘cul-
tural mediators’ published in 1996 (Espagne & Greiling, 1996).
This perspective was also adopted by German and French political sci-
ence scholars such as Hans Manfred Bock, Ulrich Pfeil, or Corine Defrance.
In his works, Bock (1998, 2005) highlights the role of individual Franco-
German ‘mediators’ as well as civil society institutions in facilitating the
political project of Franco-German reconciliation since 1945. Defrance
and Pfeil have a similar research agenda, (Defrance, 1994, 2008; Defrance,
Kissener, & Nordblom, 2010; Defrance & Pfeil, 2005; Pfeil, 2007), focus-
sing on the importance of Franco-German interaction in the scientific and
civil society spheres after 1945.
This existing scholarship, which unfortunately has not systematically
been translated into English so far, has already put into question many
parts of the mainstream narrative, and some of the authors have recently
deconstructed its underlying ‘myths and taboos’ (Pfeil, 2012). However,
while there has been an important effort of conceptualisation with regards
to the concept of ‘cultural transfer’, this notion has been exclusively
applied to subjects of intellectual and cultural history and is of limited
heuristic value to the study of the circulation of political norms and ideas,
often influenced by an interplay of domestic and international power
interests. By contrast, the works by Bock, Defrance, and Pfeil, although
highlighting the importance of encounters and exchange between civil
society actors, typically study only the period of post-1945 and therefore
cannot take into account how such transnational exchange processes have
taken place in periods of intergovernmental rivalry and conflict.
In this book, I suggest applying the IR concept of ‘diffusion’ as a com-
plementary perspective that can help to usefully analyse and compare pro-
cesses of transborder exchange of norms and ideas in various
political contexts.
The concept of diffusion has been used in social science for more than
a century. The first use of the term can be traced back to nineteenth cen-
tury European anthropology. As the emergence of this discipline was
closely linked to the expanding and increasingly scientifically explored
European colonial empires (Lewis, 1973; Said, 1989), one of the main
research problems for anthropologists was to explain observed similarities
between geographically dispersed cultures. The first approach to explain-
ing this problem drew on Darwin’s evolutionary theory, arguing that simi-
lar cultural characteristics can develop independently as a result of similar
functional requirements. However, in a famous article published in
the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1889, the British

polymath Francis Galton criticised the underlying methodological
assumptions of this evolutionary approach of anthropological explanation
in a comment to a paper given by Edward Tylor:
full information should be given as to the degree in which the customs of the
tribes and races which are compared together are independent. It might be, that
some of the tribes had derived them from a common source, so that they were
duplicate copies of the same original. (Galton, in: Tylor, 1889, p. 270)
Galton’s criticism addressed a general problem of comparative statisti-

cal analysis—namely the problematic assumption of the absence of mutual
influence among compared units—that has since been known as ‘Galton’s
problem’. His remarks also helped initiate the emergence of new anthro-
pological approaches focussing on direct or indirect communication
between societies to explain cultural similarity. By the end of the nine-
teenth century, ‘diffusionism’ had become the dominant analytical para-
digm, with anthropologists such as Friedrich Ratzel (1882), Franz Boas
(1970 [1897]), or Robert H. Lowie (1920) seeking for evidence of direct
(through marriage, warfare, or trade) or indirect (through long-distance
travel or mediated communication) contact among societies that facili-
tated the circulation of cultural resources. The difficulty of locating the
original source of these resources led some anthropologists to develop
variants of ‘hyper-diffusionism’: according to this view, almost all cultural
inventions were made by one founding civilisation and then gradually
spread to other, less advanced societies. One example of this is the work by
G. Elliot Smith (1928), who assumed that ancient Egypt was the source of
all human culture.
During the twentieth century, anthropological diffusionism was increas-
ingly criticised for its inherent assumption of cultural hierarchies between
more and less advanced societies, and for neglecting societies’ indepen-
dent capabilities to innovate. At the same time, the concept of diffusion
became increasingly popular in other disciplines, including economics,
sociology, and political science.
The first sociologists using the concept of diffusion were above all
interested in understanding the spread of (technical) innovation within
a given society. Already in the late nineteenth century, French sociolo-
gist Gabriel Tarde developed a model for the gradual diffusion of inno-
vation, based on exponentially growing imitation and modification of a
24 E. SANGAR
creation that originally had only limited geographical or social impact.

This model introduced the S-shaped curve, which has remained a stan-
dard visualisation until today (Tarde, 1890). These ideas were later
applied to the field of economic innovation, especially in the works by
Bryce Ryan and Neal Gross (1943) as well as Everett Rogers (1983).
The latter work, analysing the causes of differing adoption rates of prod-
uct innovations in commercial markets, emphasised the importance of
distinguishing specific social contexts, communication channels, as well
as diffusion agents and recipients. Some of these arguments have also
been applied to the study of the spread of social movements (Tilly,
2005), and to the international circulation of knowledge and ideas
(Bourdieu, 2002).
Scholars of Political Science and International Relations discovered the
utility of the concept of diffusion relatively late. In 1983, the sociologists
Paul J. DiMaggio and Walter W. Powell introduced the term of ‘institu-
tional isomorphism’ and differentiated between three key mechanisms of
political diffusion: “(1) coercive isomorphism that stems from political
influence and the problem of legitimacy; (2) mimetic isomorphism result-
ing from standard responses to uncertainty; and (3) normative isomor-
phism, associated with professionalisation.” (DiMaggio & Powell, 1983)
In the 1990s and 2000, their pioneering work inspired a wealth of political
science literature focussed on explaining the observed tendency of increas-
ing similarities between policies and political institutions.
According to Holzinger, Jörgens, and Knill (2007), three analytical
strands can be differentiated in this literature, namely policy convergence,
policy transfer, and policy diffusion. These three strands differ in their
analytical focus and explanatory ambition. Studies of policy ‘transfer’ and
‘diffusion’ are both interested in the ways in which policies diffuse, they
differ, however, in their empirical focus: scholars of policy transfer prefer
small-n case studies of mostly exchange processes, whereas scholars of
policy diffusion are interested in large-n phenomena of policy spread.
Scholars of policy convergence, on the other hand, try to explain differ-
ent outcomes of diffusion, mostly via comparative large-n studies
(Table 2.1).
What this scholarship has in common is its focus on relatively clearly
identifiable policies, understood mainly as pieces of regulation, policy
instruments, or institutions. Due to the interest in formal processes of
exchange (such as membership in international organisations, bilateral
consultations, etc.), this also implies an emphasis on official actors, who
Table 2.1 The analytical strands of diffusion research in political science (trans-
lated from Holzinger et al., 2007, p. 17)
Policy transfer Policy diffusion Policy convergence
Analytical Process Process Result

focus
Dependent Contents and process of Adoption Similarity increase or decrease
variable policy transfers sequences of national policies
Level of Micro level Macro level Macro level
analysis
are supposed to initiate and drive policy diffusion processes (Holzinger

et al., 2007, p. 16). By contrast, as many of the research designs attempt
to test variable-based causal mechanisms, the analytical function of non-
state actors often remains to an ‘intervening variable’ (Holzinger et al.,
2007, pp. 30–31).
Since the 1980s, scholars of International Relations have successfully
applied functional arguments on diffusion to analyse phenomena of
‘interdependence’ and the emergence of ‘world society’. Scholars inter-
ested in the former see the increasing mutual dependence of states as a
driving force for the development of multilateral regimes and institu-
tions that foster the homogenisation of national institutions and policies
(Jacobson, 1979; Rosenau, 1980; Zürn, 2002). By contrast, the ‘world
society’ approach conceives diffusion as a top-down process in which
international organisations and transnational networks provide role
models for nation-states, resulting in increasingly homogenous national
institutions and policies (Meyer, Boli, Thomas, & Ramirez, 1997;
Wotipka & Ramirez, 2008).
More recently, IR scholars have developed more inclusive conceptuali-
sations of diffusion. Pioneering work in this regard has been done by con-
structivist scholars such as Martha Finnemore, Margaret Keck, Kathryn
Sikkink, or Richard Price, who emphasised the independent agency of
non-state “norm entrepreneurs” in the diffusion of transnational norms
via the socialisation of state actors and subsequent instrumental and com-
municative learning processes (Finnemore & Sikkink, 1998; Keck &
Sikkink, 1999; Price, 1998). Others have developed conceptual tools that
enable to link potential diffusion mechanisms to the different theoretical
paradigms in IR, including realism, neoliberalism, and constructivism
(Dobbin, Simmons, & Garrett, 2007; Gilardi, 2012). Last but not least,
26 E. SANGAR
while the occurrence of diffusion often (but not necessarily) requires some
voluntary participation among the recipient audience, scholars have also
emphasised that diffusion politics among these audiences need to be taken
more seriously as they can favour the emergence of (typically idiosyncratic)
norm ‘localisation’ (Acharya, 2004) or even ‘firewalls’ rejecting the adop-
tion of diffusion contents altogether (Solingen, 2012). More recently, IR
scholars have pointed to the importance of analysing ‘norm structures’
and ‘norm emergence’ (Rosert, 2019; Winston, 2018).
For the purpose of this book, the concept of ‘diffusion’ appears to be
more useful than the narrower concepts of ‘convergence’ and ‘transfer’.
A meso level of analysis will be privileged, in which change on the macro
level (state) will be studied through a qualitative analysis of micro- and
meso-level interactions (between individuals, non-state groups, and/or
institutions) in selected historical case studies, based on available histo-
riographical analysis. The empirical analysis will rely on a relatively inclu-
sive definition of diffusion, understood as a process that occurs when
ideas, norms, and institutions in a given country are modified by dis-
courses, ideas, norms, and policy decisions originating in other coun-
tries. Empirically, for diffusion to take place, this will require some
evidence of domestic change as a result of cross-border contact, even if
this contact can take many forms and is not necessarily intentionally
initiated by foreign actors. Although diffusion can, of course, occur
through many channels, the emphasis for this analysis will be on bilateral
diffusion processes and their outcome between France and Germany
(respectively the states and territories that formed the former Holy
Roman Empire).
The conceptual debate on diffusion in the IR literature has been used
to develop a flexible framework to enable the inductive, systematic analysis
of the intertwined processed and outcomes of specific cases of diffusion in
the context of Franco-German relations during the nineteenth and twen-
tieth centuries. The framework relies on the four analytical categories sug-
gested by Etel Solingen, combining agents and structures as constitutive
elements of any diffusion process:
1. An initial stimulus, trigger, event, model, archetype, or innovation.

2. A medium, context, structure, milieu, or environment through which
information about the initial event may or may not travel to a given
destination.
3. Social agents affected by the positive or negative externalities of the

initial stimulus, who aid or block the stimulus’ journey to other
destinations.
4. Outcomes that enable adequate discrimination among different
degrees of diffusion and resulting equilibria. (Solingen, 2012, p. 632)
These four categories will provide answers to the questions of what is

being diffused and for which reason, through which channels does diffu-
sion occur, who is supporting or resisting diffusion, and which outcome we
can observe.
A fifth analytical category needs to be added, namely the identification
of specific diffusion mechanisms enabling to answer the question of how
diffusion is taking place. This last category points to the discussion of the
different logics of social action which can influence both the process and
outcome of diffusion. These can include rationalist diffusion strategies
using instrumental incentives or persuasion, as well as social learning and
persuasion, for example as part of role-model imitation. Table 2.2 sum-
marised the analytical categories used in this book.
Differentiating diffusion mechanisms is relatively tricky, since they
sometimes involve types of interaction that are difficult to observe (such as
the influence of external role models). Furthermore, it may be difficult to
actually identify and differentiate the presence of specific mechanisms
because these “often operate in tandem and interactively and are hard to
disentangle from each other. They may also work sequentially, as when
one mechanism facilitates the operation of another or the medium
Table 2.2 Basic analytical framework for the analysis of diffusion in the Franco-
German context
Analytical Diffusion Diffusion Diffusion Diffusion Diffusion

category objects channels agents mechanisms outcome
Research What is being Through which Who is How is Which

question diffused? media does fostering or diffusion outcome
diffusion occur? resisting taking place? can we
diffusion? observe?
Empirical Pieces of Personal Government Coercion, Full
examples legislation, encounters, actors, socialisation adoption,
military mediated traditional open
institutions, communication elites, experts resistance,
identities localisation
28 E. SANGAR
rivileges one or the other over time.” (Solingen, 2012, p. 634) This
p
being said, one can assume that diffusion outcomes will differ depending
on which diffusion mechanism was used: for example, in Iraq after 2003,
the imposition of democracy by military force without accompanying
efforts to ‘teach’ and socialise local political actors in democratic norms
has been identified as one of the causes of the failed regime change, whose
consequences persist until today.
Many different terms for individual diffusion mechanisms have been
discussed in the IR literature. However, according to Tanja Börzel and
Thomas Risse (2009, p. 9), beyond specific terminologies one can differ-
entiate four basic types that correspond to four fundamental logics of
social action in international politics: coercion (logic of violence), rational
interest (logic of instrumental action), socialisation (logic of appropriate
action), and persuasion (logic of communicative action). Empirically, the
occurrence of these logics might be linked to specific diffusion channels
and imply distinctive observable diffusion strategies on the part of diffu-
sion agents. Furthermore, the variants of diffusion mechanisms can lead to
different outcomes, depending on the reaction of diffusion recipients.
These can principally react either with acceptance of change or resis-
tance—yet acceptance or resistance will take specific forms, depending on
the logic of action through which diffusion occurs.
The following table summarises the four diffusion mechanisms, as well
as their related diffusion strategies and variants of outcome (Table 2.3).
This analytical framework—composed of the five categories diffusion
objects, agents, channels, mechanisms, and outcome—will be applied to
key historical case studies of Franco-German relations in the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries. The empirical evidence used to conduct this anal-
ysis will be mainly retrieved from existing historiographical research as this
scholarship has already built an impressive record of usable records, with-
out, however, systematically applying the presented analytical categories to
their interpretation.
This case-study based analysis will not only offer a complementary per-
spective on Franco-German relations, relativizing the binary distinction
between periods of ‘enmity’ and of ‘friendship’ that is promoted by the
mainstream analytical narrative. It will also help to better understand the
dynamics of diffusion in changing contexts of the Franco-German rela-
tionship, including a better understanding of the conditions under which
diffusion can take place in periods of bilateral conflict. The outcome of
this meta-analysis will be discussed in the conclusion of the book.
Table 2.3 Individual diffusion mechanisms and their specific characters
Diffusion Coercion Rational interest Socialisation Persuasion

mechanism
Potential Use of violent Cost-benefit Provision of Engagement in

strategies of force analysis role-models, direct
diffusion offers of positive communication,
agents self-identification promotion of
internal and/or
public debate
Potential Rule Material Presence of role Mutual trust,
diffusion stabilisation, interests in model and/or willingness of
stimuli regime change, contexts of normative (mutual) exchange
resource international authority
extraction competition
and/or
domestic
politics
Potential Military Institutional Public education, Media debates,
diffusion conquest, ‘engineering’ via schooling, interpersonal
channels insurrection, copying of ceremonies, exchange, expert
bureaucratic specific policies popular culture assessment
imposition and institutions
Potential (Temporary) Instrumental Internalisation, Consensus,
forms of obedience learning, imitation complex learning
recipients’ (temporary) (involving identity
acceptance adaptation change)
Potential Violent Compromise, Localisation, Arguing, dissent
forms of resistance, civil negotiation counter
recipients’ disobedience role-modelling
resistance
Empirical Imposition of Emulation of Transfer of Import of
examples conscription in Prussian military German identity ordo-liberal
from the German system in France to Alsace-Lorraine monetary policies
Franco- territories inhabitants after to France during
German occupied by the Franco- the 1980s
context France during Prussian War
the Napoleonic
Wars
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without those within being able to retaliate. Breaches were made,
and through these the Castilian chivalry rushed to the assault,
driving before them up the streets the diminished garrison. At length
a knight, more intrepid than the rest, leaping from roof to roof along
the low white houses, planted his banner on the principal mosque.
His action completed the enemy’s despair; and on Ferdinand’s offer
of generous terms the inhabitants surrendered.
Had they known it, even while they bargained, help was on the
way; for Hamet “El Zegri,” driving before him the herds of Medina-
Sidonia, was returning across the mountains, when the sound of
distant cannon and falling masonry caused him and his men to put
spurs to their horses. It was nightfall when they arrived in the
neighbourhood of Ronda, and descending from the mountains,
sword in hand, attacked the sleeping camp. Up and down the
precipitous slopes the battle raged, but, fierce as each onslaught
proved, the Castilians beat it back; and “El Zegri,” at length
acknowledging his defeat, withdrew in sullen fury. Ronda had fallen,
and the western frontier of the Moorish kingdom was in Christian
hands.
Such a loss did not help to rebuild Muley Hacen’s military
reputation; indeed there was murmuring in Granada that no land
could prosper whose ruler was almost in his dotage, unable either to
lead his armies or to cope with the work of government. Things
would have been different, if only their King had been a hero like his
brother Abdallah “El Zagal,” “the Valiant.”
Muley Hacen, both weary of war and intrigue and terrified lest the
populace in their anger should clamour for his death, hastily
abdicated; whereupon El Zagal, who had only been awaiting a
favourable opportunity to seize the throne, hurried to the capital.
Fortune threw a glamour over his advent; for, as he passed through
the Sierra Nevada, he surprised by chance a body of Christian
knights enjoying a halt in one of the fertile valleys. These were
Knights of the Order of Calatrava, sent out from Alhama to forage for
the garrison; but the success of their raid had rendered them
careless, and no sentry warned them of the enemy’s approach.
Dismounted and scattered, some without arms, and none fully
prepared, they broke before the thunder of the Moorish cavalry; and
“El Zagal” and his men entered Granada with a train of captives and
the heads of those whom they had slain hanging from their saddles.
It was an omen to delight the patriotic; but the new Sultan’s peace
of mind was soon rudely shaken, for Muley Hacen died within the
year, and rumour at once connected his sudden end with the brother
who had usurped his power. Boabdil also, from his refuge at
Cordova, declared himself the undoubted King of Granada now that
his father was no more, and the sovereigns, who saw their way to
fomenting new discord amongst their enemies, instantly offered him
any assistance in their power.
Boabdil, Abdallah “El Chico” “the Young,” as he was often called to
distinguish him from his rival Abdallah, “El Zagal,” could count as
well on the support of many Moorish families who hated and feared
his uncle; and though on the whole the chances of the duel were
against him, yet the issue was sufficiently doubtful to make both
parties willing to compromise. In the end a treaty of partition was
signed. By this “El Zagal” kept the seaboard with the important
towns of Almeria, Malaga, and Velez, the mountainous tract of the
Alpujarras famous for its warriors, and half the town of Granada with
the palace of the Alhambra. To Boabdil were left the Alcazaba and
poorer quarter of the city, with all the northern part of the kingdom
adjoining Andalusia.
Delighted to be once more sovereign in his own land, the young
Sultan sent to inform his Christian patrons of the settlement he had
made, begging them in virtue of his submission to spare his
territories in their future invasions. Such a concession was far from
Ferdinand’s thoughts; and he replied by denouncing his vassal as a
traitor who had perfidiously allied himself with the open enemies of
Castile. At the same time he and his army advanced on Loja, one of
the few important towns that had been left to Boabdil, and whose
possession the Christians had long desired in order to establish easy
communication with their outpost of Alhama.
The unfortunate Abdallah “El Chico,” victim alike of craft and
circumstances, collected his Moorish supporters and sallied out to
the relief of his city with what show of scorn and defiance he could
muster, hoping by personal bravery to triumph over those whose
skill and cunning he had learned to dread. The ensuing combat,
according to the chronicles, was marked on both sides by striking
deeds of valour, but perhaps the honour of the day rested, amongst
the Christians at least, with an English noble, who had lately joined
in the crusade with some four hundred foot-soldiers of his nation,
armed with bows and axes.
This knight, called by his Spanish allies the “Conde de Escalas”
from his family name of Scales, finding the scope for cavalry action
too restricted for his taste, dismounted and led his men to an assault
on the walls of Loja. He was already mounting a ladder, when a stone
well-aimed from above caught him full on the face, hurling him to
the ground, and he was with difficulty extricated and carried to his
tent. Here it was discovered that the blow had deprived him of two of
his front teeth, a loss likely to disturb the equanimity of a cavalier of
fashion however courageous. The Conde de Escalas nevertheless rose
to the occasion; and when the King, going to visit him during his
convalescence as a mark of favour, condoled with him on what he
had suffered, he replied cheerfully: “God Who hath made this
building, my body, hath but opened a door, that He may the more
clearly see what passeth within.” Rewarded for his assistance and
valorous deeds by rich gifts he departed not long afterwards to his
own land.
Of the Moors, both Boabdil and his principal general, Hamet “El
Zegri,” were wounded, and after negotiations with the young
Gonsalvo de Cordova on behalf of the Christians, consented to the
capitulation of Loja on the 29th of May, 1486. The terms were
sufficiently humiliating to punish Boabdil well for his supposed
perfidy; for he agreed to surrender his title “King of Granada” and to
become merely Duke of Guadix, with the lordship of that town, if
within six months he or his Christian allies should succeed in
wresting it from his uncle. On the latter he promised to make
unceasing war. In contrast to this severity, the inhabitants of Loja
were allowed to depart where they would, carrying with them their
movable property.
The capture of the famous “Flower among the Thorns” opened up
a way into the heart of Granada, of which the Christians were not
slow to take advantage, its possession being quickly followed by the
reduction of several Moorish fortresses of minor importance. To the
camp before Moclin, one of these strongholds, came the Queen
herself to share in the triumph of her army, and with her the Infanta
Isabel, now a Princess of marriageable age.
The Curate of Los Palacios has described the scene of her arrival
with a minute attention to detail that would have made his fortune as
a modern journalist of fashions. From him we know the exact
costumes worn, not only by the Queen and her daughter, but by
Ferdinand and the young English Conde de Escalas who rode in his
train, while we are given a curious little picture of the formal greeting
between husband and wife.
Before they embraced, they bent low each of them three times in reverence, and
the Queen took off her hat, so that she remained in her coif with her face
uncovered; and the King came to her and embraced her and kissed her on the
cheek. Afterwards he went to his daughter and embraced and kissed her also,
making the sign of the cross in token of his blessing.
Isabel remained with the Christian forces for the rest of the
campaign; while in the following spring she and Ferdinand collected
a new army at Cordova, mainly recruited from the levies of
Andalusia. It was their intention to attack the town of Velez-Malaga,
now left high and dry, but then a flourishing seaport, situated at the
extremity of a long ridge of mountains stretching down to the
Mediterranean. Its capture would not only lay bare the fertile valley
to the west, but would also insert a hostile wedge between the
important city of Malaga some five miles distant and the capital,
where El Zagal maintained his uneasy throne.
The relations between the rival Sultans had not been improved by
the capitulation of Loja; and soon afterwards an unsuccessful
attempt on the part of the uncle to poison his nephew had led to
renewed struggles in Granada itself. Boabdil, in his eagerness for
revenge had appealed to Ferdinand for help; but the commander of
the Christian troops sent to the scene of action, while pretending to
lend support, contented himself with fomenting the discord that he
found, thus encouraging the “King of the Alhambra” and the “King of
the Albaycin” to work their mutual destruction.
When the news came that the Christian army had pitched its camp
before Velez-Malaga, bringing with it all its heavy guns, “El Zagal”
was torn with indecision. To go to the assistance of the besieged was
to leave his palace of the Alhambra exposed to Boabdil’s attack; to
stay was to sacrifice an important harbour, besides losing his
popularity with the inhabitants of Granada, who looked to him for
the deeds of valour befitting his name. His choice was that of the
warrior; and the despairing inhabitants of Velez-Malaga who were on
the point of surrender rejoiced to see the mountains lit up with
bonfires, warning them of their Sultan’s approach. The Christians on
their part were fully prepared to defend their camp; the bravest of
their chivalry under the Marquis-Duke of Cadiz opposed themselves
again and again to the Moorish onslaughts, until “El Zagal” was
beaten back in confusion from Velez-Malaga as Hamet “El Zegri” had
been from Ronda.
The capitulation of the town followed at the end of April, 1487; and
then the Christian army pushed forward to Malaga, a port famous for
its commerce from the days of Phœnician traders. The enthusiasm of
the troops was raised to white heat by success and by the personal
bravery of Ferdinand, who, on one occasion during the late siege,
seeing a company of Castilians about to retreat, had hurled himself
on the enemy armed only with his breastplate and sword. On the
remonstrances of his generals, who besought him in future to
remember what his death would cost them, he replied: “I cannot see
my men in difficulties and not go to their aid.” It was an answer more
likely to endear him to Castilian hearts than any act of legislation.
The courage that inspired the Christians was not lacking in
Malaga, where the fierce Hamet “El Zegri” and his garrison had
pledged themselves to starve rather than yield. The fire of the heavy
lombards, disembarked from the Castilian ships and pointed on the
Moorish towers and ramparts, was answered by cannon equally
deadly in their aim; the mines planted deep behind trenches were
met by counter-mines; the Christian raids on the suburbs by
midnight sallies of such unexpected ferocity that often massacre
ensued, until reinforcements at length drove the invaders back to
their walls.
The summer months passed slowly; and hunger and pestilence
added their gaunt spectres to the sufferings of the besieged. In vain
Ferdinand, courting a speedy surrender, sent messengers to offer
generous terms, such as he had granted at Ronda and Loja; in vain
he threatened the alternative of slavery in case of prolonged
resistance; in vain the more peace-loving citizens pleaded with their
governor to accept a settlement that would save the prosperity of
their port. Hamet “El Zegri” returned a scornful refusal. Soon, he
declared the rainy season would begin, and the Christian camp
would be turned into a swamp, fit breeding-ground for death in all its
forms. Malaga had only to hold firm to triumph. What matter if the
victory cost her the ruin of her commerce? It was a question to which
garrison and merchants returned a different answer.
In the meanwhile Isabel had appeared in person at the Christian
camp, not, as the Moors expected, to persuade her husband to raise
the siege, but to second his efforts. Her presence was heralded by the
fire of all the guns at once, a thunder that shook Malaga to its
foundations and filled Castilian hearts with pride. Fanaticism was
now to play its part in the history of the siege, persuading Hamet “El
Zegri” and his supporters of divine interposition, when all human aid
had failed them. Their first would-be saviour was a certain Abraham
“El Gerbi,” a dervish of holy life imbued with a hatred of the
Christians. This man, gathering to his standard some four hundred
warriors of Guadix, whom he had inspired with the belief that he was
protected by the angels of Mahomet, led them to an attack on the
camp before Malaga. Had his efforts ended here the incident would
have been speedily forgotten, for in spite of its bravery the band of
fanatics was too small to create more than a momentary panic.
Abraham “El Gerbi,” however, was captured alive. No one suspected
in that saintly face and wasted form the man who had planned the
mad expedition; and when the old dervish declared himself a
prophet, and begged for an interview with the King and Queen that
he might explain how Malaga could be taken, the Marquis-Duke of
Cadiz led him at once to headquarters.
There was some delay in seeing the sovereigns, so the prisoner was
made to wait in a neighbouring tent, where a Portuguese Prince, Don
Alvaro, a cousin of the Queen, and Beatriz de Bobadilla, Marchioness
of Moya, were playing chess. Unable to understand Castilian, the
dervish believed the players the object of his fanatical hatred, and,
drawing a knife he had concealed in the folds of his cloak, he
attacked the Prince, wounding him in the head. Next he hurled
himself on the Marchioness of Moya, but before he could achieve his
purpose the swords of those standing by had ended his life. That
night the body of Abraham “El Gerbi” was hurled by Christian
catapults into the Moorish town.
It would seem as if Malaga’s faith in dervishes might have been
shaken; but a new prophet shortly appeared, this time within the
city, pledging himself by a certain sacred banner to bring victory to
Moorish arms. His preaching, seconded by Hamet “El Zegri’s” fiery
patriotism, stirred the flagging energy of the besieged to a more
desperate sally than any that had yet been made. Out of the city they
poured, the white standard floating at their head, and before this
unexpected avalanche of spears and scimitars the Christians for the
moment quailed; the next, their courage returning, they closed upon
their foes from all sides. The battle wavered, then a stone from a
catapult struck the dervish prophet down, and with a shout of
triumph the Christians saw the sacred banner fall and drove back the
Moors, routed and dismayed, within the walls of Malaga.
The city was doomed. Even Hamet “El Zegri” acknowledged this,
and leaving the citizens to their fate, withdrew with some of his
warriors into the fortress of the Gibralfaro; but the offers of peace
and safety he had before derided could be no longer claimed.
Fanaticism had left its mark also on the Christian camp; and
amongst the Castilian soldiery the enemy’s entreaties for life and
freedom were met by threats of a general massacre.
Since hunger and not goodwill prompts you to the surrender of your city [said
the Chief Commander, of Leon, replying to an embassy from Malaga], either
defend yourselves or submit to whatever sentence shall be pleasing to the King and
Queen;—to wit, death to those for whom it is destined, slavery to those for whom
slavery.
It was a bitter answer; and only sheer necessity drove Malaga to a

submission from which she could hope so little. Amid fear and
wailing, the capitulation was signed, and on August 20th, the
sovereigns made their triumphal entry into the city. Hamet “El Zegri”
still withstood their power in the Gibralfaro, but treachery amongst
his garrison at length led to his betrayal, and the whole of Malaga lay
at the Christian mercy. Its renegades, where they were discovered,
were put to death, and on the rest of the inhabitants the sovereigns
passed the sentence of perpetual slavery;—so many to be distributed
amongst the Castilian nobles, so many to be sold for the benefit of
the treasury, so many apportioned for the ransom of Christian slaves
in Africa. A picked group of one hundred and eighty warriors were
dispatched to the Pope as fruits of the crusade, while the Queen of
Portugal and the Queen of Naples each received fifty of the fairest
maidens.
MALAGA TO-DAY
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY LACOSTE,

MADRID
“The fate of Malaga,” says Prescott, “may be said to have decided

that of Granada.” Cut off entirely from the western part of the
kingdom, that had proved so valuable a storehouse of men and the
necessaries of life, she lay ringed round by enemies, who only
awaited the moment to strike her death-blow. Yet for this low estate
to which she had fallen she could not hold herself blameless. In her
passionate distrust of failure she had made and unmade her rulers,
regardless of the handicap thus placed upon their actions. “El Zagal”
had been right in his fears for his throne, when he sallied forth to the
relief of Velez-Malaga. The dread of the fickle populace he had left
behind him had hung over his wild encounters with the chivalry of
Spain; and when he returned, beaten but patriotic and valorous as of
old, it was to find the gates of the capital closed against him, and his
rival Sultan, not only of the Albaycin, but the Alhambra. In bitterness
of spirit he marched eastwards to protect the cities of Guadix, Baeza,
and Almeria, that still remained loyal to his cause; and it was against
these that the Catholic sovereigns planned their next campaign.
The early part of the year 1488 they spent in Aragon, settling the
affairs of that kingdom, and receiving the acknowledgment by the
national Cortes of Prince John, now a boy of ten as heir to the
Spanish throne. By June, however, Ferdinand arrived in Murcia and
soon pushed southwards with a large army; but the campaign was
not destined to follow the glorious lines of its predecessor. El Zagal,
from his headquarters at Guadix, and his brother-in-law Cid Haya at
Baeza knew the country well, and were on the watch for the least
rash or mistaken move that their opponents might commit. Several
of the smaller fortresses succumbed to Castilian lombards; but such
gains were fully counterbalanced by a repulse from Almeria, and a
well-planned ambush, from which the Marquis-Duke of Cadiz only
extricated himself and his troops with considerable difficulty and
loss.
Ferdinand, despairing of further efforts at the moment, withdrew
to winter at Valladolid; but in the next spring he and Queen Isabel
appeared in Jaen, determined on the reduction of Baeza, the most
important town in eastern Granada. The preparations were on a
scale that surpassed all former efforts of the kind; for the
neighbouring country with its thick orchards and easily flooded
rivers was difficult and treacherous; while the inhabitants were even
more hostile to the Christians than their western compatriots.
The cornfields of Baeza had not ripened at the time of the enemy’s
advance; but the grain was already cut and stored within the city lest
the hated unbelievers should reap it for their own consumption. The
supply of food was but one of the many pressing problems that the
sovereigns were called on to solve; and, as the time passed,
Ferdinand was almost tempted to raise his camp and retire until he
should have made himself master of the surrounding district. To this
policy he was urged by the majority of his generals, who contrasted
the massive fortifications of Baeza, her hardy soldiers, and her stores
of provisions, with the Christian lines, then threatened by
inundations of water and decimated by disease.
Don Gutierre de Cardenas, Commander of Leon, alone protested
against a retreat that would represent the waste of so much labour
and money; and he was to find a staunch supporter in the Queen,
who from Jaen implored her husband not to listen to advice as
cowardly as it was mistaken. If he would continue the campaign, she
on her part pledged herself to keep a line of communication open,
pouring daily into the camp all that it should require in the way of
food or ammunition.
The chroniclers have left us minute accounts of her labours to this
end, carried through with the characteristic thoroughness that had so
often brought her success. The purchase of the crops of Andalusia
and the lands belonging to the Military Orders; the transference of
this grain and hay by a procession of fourteen thousand mules to the
seat of war and the outposts already in Christian hands; the repair of
the roads, worn by traffic and the heavy rains, by the vigilance of an
army of engineers, kept ever at hand for the purpose; the enrollment
of fresh troops and workmen to replace those lives lost in the great
crusade; most arduous of all the continual disbursement of the
money that came so slowly again into the royal treasury. At times the
attempt to adjust the balance between demand and supply appeared
impossible; and rents and subsidies failed as expenses grew, but
Isabel’s hand on the helm of affairs never wavered. The crown jewels
were pawned to the merchants of Valencia and Barcelona, but the
campaign against Baeza did not slacken.
Ferdinand and his generals, certain of support from their base of
operations, took new heart; and to the dismay of the besieged huts
made of clay and timber began to replace the old tents, and traders to
appear with their merchandise of comforts and luxuries, till the camp
gradually assumed the air of a permanent settlement or village.
To it amongst other strangers came Franciscan friars from the
Holy Land, bearing despatches from the Sultan of Egypt, in which he
complained of the destruction that was being wrought against the
Mahometans in Spain. Unless such hostility ceased, he declared his
intention of venting his wrath on any Christians he might find in
Palestine. The sovereigns, in answer, protested their right to
reconquer the kingdom of Granada which had belonged to their
ancestors; but they expressed their willingness to deal kindly by such
Moors as proved themselves good subjects. Not content with
explaining the situation by letter they even sent an embassy to the
Sultan some years later, with Peter Martyr, the young Italian noble
who had been an eye-witness of so much of the war, at its head; and
his eloquence succeeded in establishing friendly relations.
In November, 1489, Isabel herself visited the camp; and Cid Haya,
with that courtesy that often lent so fine a shade to mediæval
warfare, granted a truce that she might go and inspect the farthest
trenches and outposts in safety. Pulgar declares enthusiastically that
her advent changed the whole spirit of the campaign, putting an end
to the vindictive bitterness that had hitherto marked the contest on
either side. Moors and Christians alike were weary of fighting; and
Cid Haya, who had none of Hamet “El Zegri’s” fierce intolerance,
recognized that he was waging a lost cause and decided to make good
terms while he was in a position to do so. At the beginning of
December, Baeza capitulated on the promise of security of life and
property for all its defenders and inhabitants; with the proviso that
they might live if they chose as Castilian subjects, keeping their own
religion and laws.
Cid Haya himself was received by the sovereigns with such marked
attention and honour that he was speedily led to abjure his faith and
become a Christian, marrying in later years one of the Queen’s
favourite ladies-in-waiting. His first service to his new masters was
to visit his brother-in-law, “El Zagal,” at Guadix and to persuade him
of the futility of further resistance. Almeria had already surrendered,
and but for Guadix no independent city of importance remained save
Granada, with whom there could be no hope of any alliance.
“El Zagal,” bowing his pride to necessity, agreed to a treaty of
capitulation that left him the title “King of Andaraz” with the district
of that name and a considerable revenue; but he did not possess Cid
Haya’s light-hearted temperament, and soon found life in Spain
intolerable under the new conditions. Determined to break with all
that could remind him of his lost glory, he sold his estates to
Ferdinand and sailed to Africa; but he was to experience worse
treatment at the hands of co-religionists than from his Christian foes.
A tale of his wealth had spread abroad, and the King of Fez at once
proceeded to rob and imprison him. When at length he gained his
freedom, “El Zagal,” the once valiant warrior king, whose name had
been the terror of the Andalusian border, had fallen to beggary, and
blind and ragged sought alms from door to door, until a man who
had known him in prosperity took pity on him and granted him an
asylum.
With the conquest of eastern Granada, the Moorish war entered on
its last phase. Boabdil was nominally at peace with Castile; but
pretexts were not lacking to embroil him afresh, as soon as the close
of the struggle with his uncle left Ferdinand and Isabel free to
embark on a fresh campaign.
By the terms of the capitulation of Loja Boabdil had agreed to
surrender his claims to the throne on the capture of Guadix, and to
retire to that city with the title of Duke. The sovereigns now
demanded the fulfilment of this promise; but the outlook had
changed since the days when the young Sultan had been merely
doubtful “King of the Albaycin,” and knew not if the next week would
find him in exile. Lord of the whole of Granada, the prospect of the
Duchy of Guadix was not alluring to his ambitions; nor, had he
wished to surrender, was he in a position to do so. Raised to the
throne by all the martial element in the kingdom, that had not bowed
the knee before the Cross, his very life depended on his popularity
with the fierce warriors of the Alpujarras and the rest of the Moorish
soldiery, who for one reason or another were pledged to maintain the
city’s independence.
BOABDIL, LAST KING OF GRANADA
FROM ALTAMIRA’S “HISTORIA DE

ESPAÑOLA”
Thus it was that the Christian demands were met by defiance, and
the sovereigns provided with an excuse for prosecuting the war to its
bitter end. The Moorish messengers had found them in Seville,
whither they had gone in April, 1490, to celebrate the betrothal of
their daughter Isabel with Don Alfonso, the heir to the Portuguese
throne; but, this concluded, Ferdinand collected an army and,
crossing the Sierra Elvira, proceeded to ravage the plains of Granada.
Within sight of the city he knighted his son Prince John, on whom so
many hopes were centred, that in this last act of the crusade,
inheritance of his race, the boy of twelve might receive initiation into
a great future.
Boabdil, in the meanwhile, had not waited to be attacked; and his
generals, taking the offensive, endeavoured to recapture some of the
smaller fortresses that had fallen into Christian hands, besides
stirring up revolt in the larger towns which had lately surrendered,
such as Guadix and Baeza. Both efforts met with a measure of
success; for many of the Moors, who had faithfully served “El Zagal”
throughout his struggles with his nephew, were so disgusted at
seeing his banner in the Christian camp, and at witnessing the soft
complacency of Cid Haya, that they turned willingly from their old
allegiance to the Prince who offered them deliverance from a foreign
yoke.
Their patriotism came too late. The hour had passed when
rebellion could do more than temporarily retard the waning
Crescent; and the punishment of failure was meted out by Ferdinand
and his generals with no unsparing hand. Yet this severity had its
semblance of mercy. The inhabitants of the town in question might
choose between exile with their movable property, or a full judicial
inquiry into their conduct. Who were guilty? The citizens looked at
one another and knew that few would be able to prove complete
innocence before a hostile judgment seat, with racial hatred holding
the balance; and their decision was not long in forming.
From the fairest cities in Granada passed away the population that
had made her fame; and, as the exiles sailed to Africa, Castilians took
possession of their deserted homes. The Curate of Los Palacios, in
the case of Guadix, congratulates himself on Ferdinand’s cleverness
in thus winning this town so completely from the enemies of the
Holy Catholic Faith. “It is one of the mysteries of Our Lord,” he adds,
“who would by no means consent that so noble a city should remain
longer in the power of the Moors.”
Round Granada itself the Christian lines were closing in; and
successful though arduous campaigns into the mountains of the
Alpujarras had cut off the beleaguered city from hope of succour in
that direction. Christian Europe, humbled by the fall of
Constantinople, awaited the issue with expectant joy; and it seemed
in this supreme moment as if the chivalry of both the Crescent and
the Cross, conscious of universal interest, were inspired to a last
emulation in the quest of glory. Never before in the crusade had the
sallies of the besieged or the furious attacks of besiegers exhibited
such contempt of personal danger; never before had schemes
emanating from the council-chamber been supplemented by such
deeds of individual bravery.
Chief hero of these days was the young Castilian noble, Hernando
de Pulgar, “He of the Exploits,” as his countrymen proudly named
him. Already in the earlier stages of the war he had earned a
reputation for reckless daring; but the crowning touch to his fame
was given by his midnight entry into Granada with fifteen
companions of the same hazard-loving temperament. Led by a
converted Moor, the little band of Christians scaled the walls and,
making their way through the town by deserted streets, arrived
unperceived at the principal mosque. Here Hernando de Pulgar drew
from his pocket a strip of parchment, on which were inscribed the
words dear to every Catholic but anathema to the sons of Islam, “Ave
Maria!” and fixed it by his dagger to the door. Before he could follow
up his intention of setting fire to the neighbouring houses, he was
discovered; but nevertheless he and his friends succeeded in making
their escape by dint of hard riding and a liberal use of their swords,
before the majority of the inhabitants were even aware of their
inroad.
It was an action to fire the imagination of all the young hot-bloods
in the camp; and when in the summer of 1491 Isabel and a number of
her ladies-in-waiting appeared at the seat of war, the incentive to
deeds of prowess was redoubled. The sovereigns, though delighted
with Hernando de Pulgar’s exploit, for which they rewarded him with
every mark of honour and favour, were yet too practical to encourage
a needless loss of life. They had long recognized, as we have seen,
that in patience rather than in daring lay their hope of success; and
when a fire broke out in the Queen’s tent and destroyed a good part
of the camp, they determined to prepare for a long siege and to build
more solid accommodation, as they had done at Baeza.
To this end the Spanish soldier was converted into a workman;
and under his willing hands a city arose, not merely of clay and
timber, but of stone. In shape a square, cut into four by wide
crossroads, each quarter with its fine houses contained a block of
marble inscribed with the names of those cities of Spain that had
helped in its construction, the whole being finished within eighty
days from its commencement.
ALHAMBRA, PATIO DE L’ALBERCA
FROM A PHOTOGRAPH BY
ANDERSON, ROME
The building of Santa Fé, “Holy Faith,” as Isabel characteristically

christened the city when asked to name it after herself, had been
witnessed from the walls of Granada; and Boabdil’s heart sank
within him at this token of the iron determination he knew and
feared. Already hunger was rife amongst his subjects; and though he
might prolong the siege for months or even longer he realized that
only ultimate failure lay before him. So did his principal councillors,
and in October, 1491, acting on their advice, he entered at last into
negotiations for surrender.
The terms to which both sides finally agreed, besides guaranteeing
to the inhabitants of Granada the safety of their lives and property,
granted them also the free exercise of their religion, laws, and
customs. They were to speak their own language, keep their own
schools, and appoint their own judges and priests, submitting to no
Christian authority save that of the Governor-General of the city. For
three years they were to pay no taxes, and after that date none that
should exceed those that had been ordinarily exacted by their
Mahometan rulers. These rights were to be enjoyed by Jews as well
as Moors; while the Christian captives then in the city were to be
exchanged for an equal number of Moorish slaves. Above all Boabdil
stipulated that no partisan or servant of “El Zagal” should be allowed
a share in the government.
The surface value of these conditions was fair enough;
treacherously fair, according to the Moorish warriors still disinclined
for peace.
“If you think,” exclaimed one of them, “that the Christians will
remain faithful to what they have promised, or that their sovereign
will prove as generous a conqueror as he has been a valiant enemy,
you deceive yourselves.”
His contemptuous refusal to have part or parcel in the transaction
was echoed through the streets.
“Traitors and cowards all!” cried an old dervish, gathering behind
him the more excitable element of the town; and soon a mob was
beating on the gates of the Alhambra.
Boabdil succeeded in restoring order; but the fear of another riot
made him hastily dispatch a letter to Ferdinand and Isabel, asking
them in view of his critical position to take possession of the town
some days earlier than they had settled. His interest in smoothing
out all difficulties is explained by the secret stipulations affixed to the
general terms of surrender. By these he and his immediate relations
were to keep the lands that already formed their private patrimony,
while he himself was to receive in addition the lordship and revenue
of a large district in the Alpujarras, the sovereigns paying him the
sum of thirty thousand castellanos on the day of their entry.
Thus Boabdil hoped to buy peace, and in the guise of a territorial
magnate to free himself from the unlucky star that had haunted his
path as King.[3] On the 2d of January, 1492, at the signal of a cannon
fired from the Alhambra he left for ever the palace that had been the
scene of so many vicissitudes in his life. At the same moment the
Christian army in festival attire, with banners flying and amid the
blare of trumpets issued from the gates of Santa Fé; the Cardinal of
Spain and Don Gutierre de Cardenas leading the triumphal march
that was to end at last in the goal of all their ambitions.
3. Boabdil, like his uncle “El Zagal,” finally sold his patrimony to the Catholic
sovereigns and sailed to Africa. He was killed in a battle some years later fighting
on behalf of the King of Fez against an African tribe.
The two Kings met on the banks of the Genil, where Boabdil would
have knelt to kiss the other’s hand, had not Ferdinand with quick
courtesy prevented him. “Take these, Señor, for I and all in the city
are thine,” exclaimed the Moor, as in profound melancholy he
yielded up the keys of his capital. Then he passed on his way. As the
turrets of the Alhambra grew dim behind him, the vanguard of the
Christian army crossed its threshhold; and Ferdinand and Isabel
without the gate saw raised on the Tower of Colmares, first, the silver
cross that had been blessed at Rome, and then the royal banner and
the standard of Santiago.
“Granada! Granada! for the sovereigns Don Fernando and Doña
Isabel,” cried the king-at-arms in a loud voice; and the Queen falling
on her knees and all with her, the solemn chant of the Te Deum rose
to Heaven. The object of ten years of arduous warfare was achieved,
the dream of eight centuries realized; and none of those who knelt in
heartfelt thankfulness doubted that the gift was of God.
Four days later, on the 6th of January, 1492, the Feast of the
Epiphany, the Catholic sovereigns made their formal entry into
Granada.
CHAPTER VIII
THE INQUISITION
Some allusion has already been made in our introductory chapter to

the character of the Castilian Church in mediæval times. Strongly
national in its resentment of papal interference, as in its dislike of
alien races within the Spanish boundaries, its wealth and popularity
were a sure index of the large part it must play in any difficult crisis.
Amongst churchmen both Henry IV. and the rebels who opposed
him had found their councillors and their generals; to the Church
Queen Isabel had turned, with a confidence that was not belied, for
financial help against the Portuguese; and it was a churchman,
sitting in constant deliberation with her and Ferdinand, who gained
amongst contemporaries the proud title of “the Third King.”
Pedro Gonsález de Mendoza had been a favourite of fortune from
his birth. A member of one of the proudest and wealthiest families in
Spain, the settlement of his profession had been almost coincident
with his admission to its material benefits; and, from holding a
curacy in early boyhood and a rich benefice at twelve years old, he
had passed through the lesser offices of the episcopate to succeed
Don Alonso Carrillo, on his death in 1482, as Archbishop of Toledo
and Primate of Castile. Judicious influence had previously obtained
him a Cardinal’s hat; but, marked though her favour had been, his
reputation was not solely of fortune’s weaving.
Pedro Gonsález was in himself a striking personality. Nature had
made him a Castilian noble, and, in adopting one of the few careers
considered worthy of his rank, it never occurred to him that the
claims of religion should exclude those of his blood and class. A
clear-headed practical statesman, whose loyalty proved none the less
valuable that it had been inspired by a cautious regard to the
interests of himself and his house, he was also a liberal patron of
education and philanthropy, and an accomplished soldier and
courtier.
“There was never a war in Spain during his time,” we are told, “in
which he did not personally take part, or at least have his troops
engaged”; nor did he disdain the amours, that with conspiracies and
duelling formed the fashionable life of Henry IV.’s Court. When that
impressionable monarch succumbed to the charms of the Portuguese
lady-in-waiting, Doña Guiomar, the name of Gonsález de Mendoza,
then Bishop of Calahorra, was linked with that of the favourite’s
cousin; and the chronicles record that two of his sons in later years
intermarried, through their father’s influence, with connections of
the royal family.
Illegitimacy carried with it little stain amongst a people whose
standard of life was as low as their ideals were often high; and the
Church, sharing deeply as we have seen in the national life, paid the
penalty of this intimacy in a blinding of her own eyes to the distance
many of her sons had wandered from their Master’s footsteps. Queen
Isabel, whose personal purity was a standing witness to the high code
of morality in which she believed, was yet daughter enough of her
age to accept Cardinal Mendoza at his popular value. He had been
her protector and advisor through many of her difficulties, showing
himself subtle and far-seeing in politics, as well as the kindly friend a
man of mature years will often prove to young ambitions. Ferdinand
and Isabel owed him much, and they paid their debt by a trust and
reverence that gained him honour in Spain only second to that
accorded to themselves.
Peter Martyr, in a letter to the Cardinal, addresses him as, “You,
without whom the King and Queen never take the smallest step,
whether engaged actively in war or enjoying peace, and without
whose advice they arrive at no important conclusion.” It is the
language of eulogy, but it touches truth at bottom; and the strength
of Isabel’s affection for her chief councillor may be gauged by her
deference to his will, on those occasions that it happened to clash
with her own. When, in 1485, she would have carried the royal
jurisdiction with her to Alcalá de Henares, superseding temporarily
with her prerogative all local justice, as elsewhere on her progress,
the Cardinal declined to admit her claims within the boundaries of
his diocese of Toledo. To all her expostulations he returned an

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Diffusion in Franco-German Relations:

A Different Perspective on a History of

The Op-Ed Novel: A Literary History of Post-Franco

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Studies in Diplomacy and International Relations

Cover illustration: Images Etc / Getty Images

Wendy Ramadan-Alban, Elise Rousseau, Thomas Scapin, and Achille

2 The Mainstream Narrative of Franco-German Relations

3 Exporting Revolutionary Institutions Across the Rhine 35

4 Importing ‘Alien’ or ‘Enlightened’ Law: Understanding

5 Importing Nationalist Warfare: Prussia’s Emulation of

6 Understanding the Incomplete Emulation of Prussian

7 Learning from the Prussian Schulmeister? German

8 The ‘Germanisation’ of Local Identities in Alsace-­

9 Enabling Reconciliation Through the Recognition of

10 Understanding the Diffusion of West German Ordoliberal

11 Conclusion: The Added Value of Studying Diffusion in

Chart 2.1 Number of Francophone and Germanophone publications

Table 2.1 The analytical strands of diffusion research in political science

Actor Spotlight: Georg Wilhelm Böhmer 46

Why Yet another Book on Franco-German

© The Author(s) 2020 1

violent conflict, many analyses present France and Germany as rather

Aims of this Book

1. Exposing diffusion as an alternative—in the sense of complemen-

­henomena of transborder normative change involving transna-

Conceptually, this book relies on a working definition of diffusion as a

• Who is diffusing? Which actor(s) are ‘importing’ or ‘exporting’?

Contents and Structure

(including the Code Napoléon but also conscription, administrative cen-

The Mainstream Narrative of Franco-German

The Teleological Mainstream Narrative

According to Wikipedia’s article “France-Germany relations”, this rela-

© The Author(s) 2020 9

usually found on the individual level, including friendship. It remains

A long-term perspective on the Franco-German relationship a hundred years

We can see that Krotz’s conceptualisation of the specificity of the

the history of Franco-German relations before 1945 is characterised by a long-­

This omnipresence of the mainstream narrative can only be partially

confederated in the Holy Roman Empire until the proclamation of the

enmity between nations, rather than as a temporary military conflict

competing interpretations were molded by ideology, consistently influ-

ture for Franco-German studies CIERA (‘Centre interdisciplinaire

Chart 2.1 Number of Francophone and Germanophone publications in

c­ ontributed to legitimise a narrative according to which ‘reconciliation’

The Shortcomings of the Mainstream Narrative

international relations that is close to the IR paradigm of classical realism,

Acknowledging such processes would, of course, threaten the very exis-

Diffusion as a Complementary Analytical Framework

What could be a different analytical perspective for analysing Franco-­

the Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute in 1889, the British

Galton’s criticism addressed a general problem of comparative statisti-

creation that originally had only limited geographical or social impact.

Analytical Process Process Result

are supposed to initiate and drive policy diffusion processes (Holzinger

1. An initial stimulus, trigger, event, model, archetype, or innovation.

3. Social agents affected by the positive or negative externalities of the

2 The Mainstream Narrative of Franco-German Relations

3 Exporting Revolutionary Institutions Across the Rhine 35

4 Importing ‘Alien’ or ‘Enlightened’ Law: Understanding

5 Importing Nationalist Warfare: Prussia’s Emulation of

6 Understanding the Incomplete Emulation of Prussian

7 Learning from the Prussian Schulmeister? German

8 The ‘Germanisation’ of Local Identities in Alsace-

9 Enabling Reconciliation Through the Recognition of

10 Understanding the Diffusion of West German Ordoliberal

11 Conclusion: The Added Value of Studying Diffusion in

Actor Spotlight: Georg Wilhelm Böhmer 46

henomena of transborder normative change involving transna-

the history of Franco-German relations before 1945 is characterised by a long-

c ontributed to legitimise a narrative according to which ‘reconciliation’

What could be a different analytical perspective for analysing Franco-