Disability In Practice Attitudes Policies And Relationships Adam Cureton full chapter pdf docx

Disability in Practice: Attitudes,
Policies, and Relationships Adam

Cureton
Visit to download the full and correct content document:
https://ebookmass.com/product/disability-in-practice-attitudes-policies-and-relationshi
ps-adam-cureton/
More products digital (pdf, epub, mobi) instant
download maybe you interests ...
The Palgrave Handbook of Disability Sport in Europe:

Policies, Structures and Participation Caroline Van
Lindert
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-palgrave-handbook-of-
disability-sport-in-europe-policies-structures-and-participation-
caroline-van-lindert/
Intellectual Disability and Social Policies of

Inclusion: Invading Consciousness without Permeability
1st ed. Edition David P. Treanor
https://ebookmass.com/product/intellectual-disability-and-social-
policies-of-inclusion-invading-consciousness-without-
permeability-1st-ed-edition-david-p-treanor/
Couple relationships in the 21st century Fink
https://ebookmass.com/product/couple-relationships-in-the-21st-
century-fink/
The Marriage and Family Experience: Intimate

Relationships in a Changing
https://ebookmass.com/product/the-marriage-and-family-experience-
intimate-relationships-in-a-changing/
Interface between English Language Education Policies
and Practice: Examples from Various Contexts Eric
Enongene Ekembe
https://ebookmass.com/product/interface-between-english-language-
education-policies-and-practice-examples-from-various-contexts-
eric-enongene-ekembe/
Innovation and Industrial Policies Deschamps
https://ebookmass.com/product/innovation-and-industrial-policies-
deschamps/
Understanding Disability and Everyday Hate Leah Burch
https://ebookmass.com/product/understanding-disability-and-
everyday-hate-leah-burch/
Shakespeare and Disability Studies Sonya Freeman Loftis
https://ebookmass.com/product/shakespeare-and-disability-studies-
sonya-freeman-loftis/
Disability in International Human Rights Law Gauthier

De Beco
https://ebookmass.com/product/disability-in-international-human-
rights-law-gauthier-de-beco/
OUP CORRECTED PROOF – FINAL, 05/21/2018, SPi
Disability in Practice
ENGAGING PHILOSOPHY
This series is a new forum for collective philosophical engagement with controversial
issues in contemporary society.
Attitudes, Policies, and Relationships
Edited by Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Taxation
Philosophical Perspectives
Edited by Martin O’Neill and Shepley Orr
Bad Words
Philosophical Perspectives on Slurs
Edited by David Sosa
Attitudes, Policies,
and Relationships
edited by
Adam Cureton
and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
1
3
Great Clarendon Street, Oxford, OX2 6DP,
United Kingdom
Oxford University Press is a department of the University of Oxford.
It furthers the University’s objective of excellence in research, scholarship,
and education by publishing worldwide. Oxford is a registered trade mark of
Oxford University Press in the UK and in certain other countries
© the several contributors 2018
The moral rights of the authors have been asserted
First Edition published in 2018
Impression: 1
All rights reserved. No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in
a retrieval system, or transmitted, in any form or by any means, without the
prior permission in writing of Oxford University Press, or as expressly permitted
by law, by licence or under terms agreed with the appropriate reprographics
rights organization. Enquiries concerning reproduction outside the scope of the
above should be sent to the Rights Department, Oxford University Press, at the
address above
You must not circulate this work in any other form
and you must impose this same condition on any acquirer
Published in the United States of America by Oxford University Press
198 Madison Avenue, New York, NY 10016, United States of America
British Library Cataloguing in Publication Data
Data available
Library of Congress Control Number: 2017962345
ISBN 978–0–19–881287–6
Printed and bound by
CPI Group (UK) Ltd, Croydon, CR0 4YY
Links to third party websites are provided by Oxford in good faith and
for information only. Oxford disclaims any responsibility for the materials
contained in any third party website referenced in this work.
For Julie and Robin, and in memory of Claudia

Acknowledgments
Many people helped to make this volume possible. We are grateful to our respective
universities and philosophy departments at the University of Tennessee (Cureton) and
the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill (Hill). Thanks are due to the Kenan
Foundation for providing funds to Hill that allowed us to organize a memorable
workshop on disability at Emerald Isle, North Carolina in May 2013 and to support a
research assistant.
We are especially grateful to our contributors for the significant time and effort they
put into addressing an important set of issues in original, insightful, and morally
sensitive ways. We also appreciate their patience with us as we worked to bring this
project to fruition.
We should also acknowledge the many wise scholars who have enhanced our
collective understanding of disability and its implications for moral philosophy. Many
of them are mentioned in the bibliographies, but their influence on us and the con-
tributors goes far beyond what can adequately be described in this volume.
The Oxford University Press editors and staff have been especially encouraging,
patient, and efficient throughout the process of putting this volume together. We were
both fortunate to have the support of Tamara Fakhoury, who did extensive copy
editing and formatting as Hill’s research assistant.
Finally, we are very grateful for the love, help, and support of our families, who in
many ways cooperated together to allow us to pursue this project. Julie and Robin
primarily organized the 2013 workshop; both of them continue to accommodate our
respective disabilities; and they put up with and often joined our long conversations,
over Scotch whiskey, where most of our work for this volume was done.
Contents
List of Contributors xi
Introduction1
Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Part I. Attitudes and Relationships

1. Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 15
Adam Cureton
2. Beneficence and Disability 33
Sarah Holtman
3. Pretending Not to Notice: Respect, Attention, and Disability 50
Karen Stohr
4. Respect for Human Beings with Intellectual Disabilities 72
Oliver Sensen
Part II. Attitudes and Policies

5. Not Alive Yet 91
J. David Velleman
6. Respect, Regret, and Reproductive Choice 99
David Sussman
7. Neurodiversity and the Rejection of Cures 115
Richard Dean
8. “I Would Rather Die than Live Like This”: When the Newly
Disabled Refuse Life-Sustaining Treatment 134
Andrew M. Courtwright
Part III. Justifying Frameworks

9. Disability, Basic Justice, and Habilitation into Basic Good Health 153
Lawrence C. Becker
10. Contractarian Justice and Severe Cognitive Disabilities 174
Samuel Freeman
x Contents
11. Obligations to the Cognitively Impaired in Non-Structured Contexts 204

Richard Galvin
12. Moral Disability, Moral Injury, and the Flight from Vulnerability 227
Virginia L. Warren
Index 245
List of Contributors
Lawrence C. Becker is Fellow of Hollins University and Professor of Philosophy

Emeritus at the College of William & Mary. His philosophical monographs and articles
include work on topics in contemporary ethical theory, stoicism, social, political, and
legal philosophy, as well as the role of human agency in practical affairs.
Andrew M. Courtwright received his MD and PhD in philosophy from the
University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. He completed his internship, residency,
and fellowship at Massachusetts General Hospital and Brigham and Women’s Hospital.
He is currently a transplant pulmonologist at the Hospital of the University of
Pennsylvania where he serves on the hospital ethics committee.
Adam Cureton, Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Tennessee,
works primarily on ethics, Kant, and disability. He co-edited (with Kimberley Brownlee)
Disability and Disadvantage (2009) and he is currently co-editing (with David
Wasserman) the Oxford Handbook of Philosophy and Disability. He is President of the
Society for Philosophy and Disability.
Richard Dean is Associate Professor of Philosophy at California State University
Los Angeles. He has published and presented work on normative ethical theory, the
history of moral philosophy, and several issues in applied ethics. These publications
include The Value of Humanity in Kant’s Moral Theory (2006), “Respect for the
Unworthy,” “Does Neuroscience Undermine Deontology,” “Humanity as an Idea, as an
Ideal, and as an End in Itself,” and “Stigmatization and Denormalization as Public
Health Policies.”
Samuel Freeman, Professor of Philosophy and of Law at the University of
Pennsylvania, works in social and political philosophy, ethics, and philosophy of law.
He has written books on Justice and the Social Contract (2006) and on John Rawls.
He edited The Cambridge Companion to Rawls (2006), John Rawls’ Collected Papers
(1999), and his Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (2008). Freeman’s book,
Liberalism and Distributive Justice, is forthcoming in 2018.
Richard Galvin is Betty S. Wright Professor in Applied Ethics in the Philosophy
Department at Texas Christian University. His publications include articles in Mind,
Philosophical Quarterly, Journal of Politics, Legal Theory, Kant-Studien, History of
Philosophy Quarterly, and Journal of Social Philosophy. His areas of interest include moral
theory (especially Kant), applied ethics, political philosophy, and philosophy of law.
Thomas E. Hill, Jr., Professor Emeritus at the University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, is author of essays in moral and political philosophy collected in Autonomy
and Self-Respect (1991), Dignity and Practical Reason in Kant’s Moral Theory (1992),
xii List of Contributors
Respect, Pluralism, and Justice (2000), Human Welfare and Moral Worth (2002),
and Virtue Rules and Justice (2012). He co-edited (with Arnulf Zweig) Kant’s
Groundwork for the Metaphysics of Morals (2002) and edited A Blackwell Guide to
Kant’s Ethics (2009).
Sarah Holtman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of
Minnesota, Twin Cities. She holds a JD from the University of Virginia and a PhD
from the University of North Carolina at Chapel Hill. A specialist in moral, political, and
legal philosophy, her work lies at the borders of these and draws inspiration from
Kant’s practical philosophy. Her published articles appear, inter alia, in Ethics, Kant-
Studien, Kantian Review, American Philosophical Quarterly, Utilitas, and The Blackwell
Guide to Kant’s Ethics (2009).
Oliver Sensen is Associate Professor and Director of Graduate Studies at Tulane
University. He is the author of Human Dignity (2018), Kant on Human Dignity (2011),
the editor of Kant on Moral Autonomy (2012), as well as the co-editor of three other
volumes and the author of about 50 articles. As co-editor, he also has under contract a
collection on “Respect.”
Karen Stohr is Associate Professor of Philosophy at Georgetown University, as well
as Senior Research Scholar at Georgetown’s Kennedy Institute of Ethics. She works
in normative ethical theory, especially Kantian ethics and Aristotelian virtue ethics.
Her publications include numerous articles and a book, On Manners (2011). She is
currently working on a second book, tentatively titled Minding the Gap: Moral Ideals
and Moral Improvement.
David Sussman is Associate Professor of Philosophy at the University of Illinois,
Urbana-Champaign. His principal research interests are ethics, moral psychology,
and Kant.
J. David Velleman is Professor of Philosophy and Bioethics at New York University.
His papers in bioethics have been collected in the volume Beyond Price: Essays on Birth
and Death (2015).
Virginia L. Warren is Professor of Philosophy at Chapman University. Her
research and teaching interests lie in ethical issues in medicine, the environment, and
race, class, and gender. She has written on autonomy, the ‘medicine is war’ metaphor,
and feminist medical ethics. Recently she has returned to the question addressed in
her dissertation on Kierkegaard: how to choose between different ways of life and views
of the self. She has learned much about living ethically from serving on the ethics com-
mittee of the Children’s Hospital of Orange County and, recently, from coaching teams
for the Association for Practical and Professional Ethics’ Ethics Bowl competition.
Introduction
Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
Everyone is disabled in some respect, of course, at least in the sense that others can do
things that we cannot, but significant limitations on pursuing major life activities due
to severely limited eyesight, hearing, mobility, cognitive functioning, and so on pose
special problems that fortunately have been recognized (to some extent) in our public
policies. Public policy is important, as are also the deliberative frameworks that we use
to justify it, and the original essays in the second and third sections of this volume
have significant implications for public policy and offer new proposals for justifying
frameworks. Underlying public policies and their assessment, however, are the attitudes,
good and bad, that we bring to them, and our attitudes as well deeply affect our inter-
personal relationships. Although some excellent work in the philosophy of disability
has been done in this area of attitudes and relationships, more discussion is needed.
The essays here, especially in the first section, reveal how complex and problematic our
attitudes towards persons with disabilities are when we are in relationships with them
as care-givers, friends, family members, or briefly encountered strangers. Our attitudes
towards ourselves as persons with (or without) disabilities are implicated in these
discussions, as personal relationships are always in some respects reciprocal.
Among the special highlights of this volume, in our view, are its focus on moral
attitudes and relationships involving disabilities, its contributors’ recognition of the
multi-faceted nature of disability problems, and their serious, critical, but non-polemical
manner of examining complex moral questions. The importance of respect for persons
as a necessary complement to generosity, beneficence, and charity is an underlying
theme in many of the essays, and a deeper understanding of respect is made possible by
considering closely its implications for relationships with persons with disabilities.
Awareness of the common and uncommon human vulnerabilities makes clear the need
for modifying traditional deliberative frameworks for assessing policies, and several
essays make constructive proposals for the changes that are needed.
Our contributors are known for their excellent philosophical work in ethics and
related areas. Almost all of them have personal experience with disabilities of their own,
their relatives, or others close to them, but many of them are writing professionally on
disability issues here for the first time. Many of the authors also take a broadly Kantian
2 Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.
perspective, interpreting and applying this broad framework in subtle and sometimes
surprising ways. Samuel Freeman and Lawrence Becker, however, take up alternative
frameworks, such as contractualism and eudaimonism, modifying and applying them as
apparently needed to address adequately the special vulnerabilities and potential con-
tributions of persons with disabilities. For Richard Galvin our philosophical perspectives
are what need to be examined, and Virginia Warren too highlights a need to move beyond
traditional perspectives to confront the challenges posed by severe cognitive and moral
incapacities. Karen Stohr comes to disability issues from previous work in virtue ethics
and about good and bad manners. Whatever their philosophical orientation, most of the
authors focus directly on the practical choices that are affected by our attitudes towards
disability, such as a disabled person’s decision to hide his disability from others, a
bypasser’s decision to assist someone with a disability, a scientist’s search for “cures,” a
physician’s decision not to intervene when a patient depressed by a recent disability wants
to die, and a woman’s choice to end a pregnancy when a severe disability is anticipated.
We, the editors Cureton and Hill, developed our desire to reflect philosophically on
disabilities in ways that are different but probably not unusual. As someone who has
been (legally) blind since birth but determined not to let this physical limitation matter
or even be noticed, Cureton has been especially alert to empowering technologies and
aware of the sometimes offensive responses that well-meaning people have when they
see others as disabled. Coming to analytical philosophy and the history of ethics from
Oxford and the University of North Carolina, he could see the potential and need for
philosophical exploration of our attitudes and policies regarding people with disabilities
and the deliberative frameworks needed to justify them. Hill came to philosophy of
disability after he had been teaching ethics for many years without special attention to
disabilities issues, but this changed when he started working with Cureton, sharing
time with a nephew who has Down syndrome, and developing his own age-related
handicaps. Cureton started up the American Philosophical Association-recognized
Society for Philosophy and Disability and together he and Hill have organized several
workshops in this area.
We were deeply saddened to lose our friend, Claudia Card, who had shared her
experiences and reflections about disabilities with us at our workshop on Emerald Isle,
North Carolina, in May 2013. Claudia was working on her paper for this volume when
she fell ill and she was unable to complete it.
We are grateful to all of the contributors for their deeply serious, thoughtful, and
original discussions, and we hope their essays will inspire the further philosophical
reflection that these topics deserve.
Here, in the paragraphs below, are brief summaries of the essays in this volume.
Part I Attitudes and Relationships

These four chapters discuss the attitudes, good and bad, that we can have towards
people with disabilities, ourselves as well as others, as we engage with others in personal
introduction 3
relationships of various kinds, including friendship, care-giving, and more casual

interactions even with strangers.
One way to explore various informal social attitudes towards disability and some of
the ways that these attitudes inform and shape our relationships with disabled people
is to take up the perspective of a disabled person and consider whether we might be
tempted to hide or downplay our disability from others if we ourselves were disabled.
In his chapter “Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled,” Adam Cureton, who
is legally blind, draws on his own experiences of passing as non-disabled to explain
how a disabled person can hide his disability, why he might choose to do so, and what
costs and risks he and others might face along the way. Some of the most significant
potential benefits of hiding one’s own disability, Cureton argues, include greater social
acceptance and inclusion in joint projects, an enhanced sense of belonging and of
self-worth, and an easier time forming and maintaining personal relationships. Yet,
Cureton explains, hiding one’s disability can also undermine some of these same social
values when hiding one’s disability, for example, prevents someone from living up to
normal social expectations or from sharing important aspects of himself with others.
Hiding a disability, Cureton explains, can also interfere with a person’s self-respect,
self-acceptance, integrity, and self-development. Although Cureton does not take a
stand on whether hiding a disability is, overall, prudent, wise, or morally justified, he
provides a subtle account of some of the informal social attitudes that disabled people
face and draws out some lessons about attitudes towards and relationships with persons
with disabilities from why someone might want to hide his own disability.
What attitudes should we have towards people with disabilities? We might initially
think that a good and sufficient answer is sympathy, kindness, or eagerness to help.
But in practice attempts to express these beneficent attitudes can be offensive, and this
calls into question our understanding of these attitudes and what they require. Sarah
Holtman, in her chapter “Beneficence and Disability,” identifies what is problematic in
our common assumptions about when and how to express our caring attitudes and
offers a subtle alternative that is sensitive to the moral complexities of these questions.
Her chapter draws on testimony by and about Helen Keller as well as on lesser
known aspects of Kant’s moral framework to describe and justify morally appropriate
attitudes to have when considering whether and how to help others. “Reciprocal
beneficence,” as she calls this attitude, includes three elements. The first, which
Holtman labels “fellowship,” is a mutual recognition that human beings, whether
disabled or not, have common forms of vulnerability, need, and dependency that bind
us together and call for assistance and understanding from one another. The second
element of reciprocal beneficence, according to Holtman, is that this attitude of fellow-
ship should be informed and shaped by sympathetic understanding, which involves
actively sharing and understanding the particular feelings, goals, values, and needs of
others in the contexts in which they arise as well as attempting to learn how we can help
others and desiring to do so. Developing and exercising this attitude towards people
with disabilities in particular, Holtman argues, requires a willingness to listen to and
learn from them as well as to use our imagination and personal experiences to
understand and sympathize with them as best we can. The third element of reciprocal
beneficence, according to Holtman, is gratitude to others who help us to develop the
kinds of understanding and sympathy towards them that bind us together in respectful
relationships of fellowship. These three features compose an attitude of beneficence
because this attitude is appropriately engaged when others may need our help; and this
attitude is reciprocal because it is toward everyone, it involves sympathizing with and
understanding the interests of others as similar to our own interests, and it requires an
openness and readiness to appreciate others for what they teach us about ourselves.
Our attitudes—good and bad—are reflected in what we notice; and to a remarkable
extent what we notice and attend to about a person is guided and restricted by social
conventions. Not noticing a person’s suffering can be wrong, but paying attention to
what embarrasses a person can be unkind. As Karen Stohr’s chapter “Pretending
Not to Notice: Respect, Attention, and Disability” makes clear, understanding and
assessing the relevant conventions is not easy but nevertheless is important when
considering what attitudes to take and how to behave with respect to people who have
perceptible disabilities.
In her chapter, Stohr explores the nature and moral underpinnings of the complicated
social conventions that should govern whether we notice others, what (if anything) we
notice about them, how (if at all) we express what we notice, and how (if at all) others
respond to us in turn. She begins with a subtle description of our actual social practices
about what sorts of things in the world we pay attention to, become conscious of, and
potentially think about when our noticing of them in these ways is reasonably apparent
to others. She explores conventions about, for example, glancing, staring, making eye
contact, prying, shunning, and pretending not to notice. Stohr also explains how these
conventions are sensitive to, for example, the space that people share, their expectations
of privacy, and their aims and goals. Social conventions of noticing, Stohr argues, help
to establish and communicate boundaries among persons by determining, for example,
what is a suitable topic of conversation; but they also determine when we should notice
that someone is in duress and in need of our help.
These conventions of noticing, Stohr goes on to argue, are not simply rules of etiquette
or efficient forms of coordination; they are also justified by moral considerations of
respect and beneficence. Working in a broadly Kantian framework, Stohr argues
that respect for others involves “keeping our distance” from them, which often gives us
reasons not to seek out, pay attention to, or concern ourselves with the personal infor-
mation of others as well as reasons to act as if we do not notice facts we are not entitled
to know if we cannot help but notice them. Beneficence, on the other hand, “draws us
closer” to others, which often gives us reasons to notice how others are feeling, how
well off they are, and whether they could use our help. Social conventions of noticing,
she concludes, are justified and shaped by our potentially conflicting concerns to show
respect and love for other people, which helps to explain why those practices are often
so complicated and difficult to navigate in particular cases.
introduction 5
Stohr then applies her general discussion of noticing to several issues of disability.
Staring at someone’s visible disability, perhaps because we find it surprising or shocking,
is incompatible with Kantian respect, in part because our stare includes an implicit
demand on the person to, for example, explain her condition and how she came to
have it. Yet in other cases, our genuine concern for a disabled person may lead us
to notice her disability so that we can help her, justifiably adjust our expectations of
her, or express our recognition of her as the person she is. In light of the potentially
conflicting reasons of respect and beneficence, moral judgment and sensitivity, Stohr
argues, are needed to determine whether we should notice or show that we notice that
someone has a perceptible disability.
What attitudes should we have in our interactions with people who have severe
cognitive disabilities? Ordinary moral thinking, according to Oliver Sensen, suggests
that people with severe cognitive disabilities deserve respect, yet it is difficult to explain
why they merit respect and what forms of respect we should have towards them. In his
chapter “Respect for Human Beings with Intellectual Disabilities,” Sensen criticizes what
he calls ‘third-personal’ conceptions of respect, which hold that some features of a thing,
such as its rational capacities or sentience, make it worthy of respect. Such views, accord-
ing to Sensen, do not adequately capture our commonsense judgments about the many
possible objects of respect, which include not just persons, human beings, and sentient
creatures, but also deceased people, the environment, flags, traditions, and ideas. Sensen’s
alternative, ‘first-personal’ account holds that our reasons to have and show respect are
justified independently of any characteristics that the appropriate objects of respect
might have. He suggests that having respect for something may instead be justified on the
basis of one’s own flourishing, by the ways in which respect tends to promote other moral
values, or because respect for various things is a constitutive feature of rational agency.
A ‘first-personal’ view of this sort, Sensen claims, stands a better chance of providing a
unified explanation for why different kinds of things deserve our respect.
Sensen then explains why his ‘first-person’ account of respect implies that people
with severe cognitive disabilities deserve respect, not because of any features of them
but because respect for them is a morally appropriate attitude for us to have. Respect,
according to Sensen, is best understood as an attitude of accepting that something
places limits on us, of leaving something as it is, and treating it as if it is very important.
According to Sensen, we respect people with severe cognitive disabilities by, for example,
not condescending to them, regarding ourselves and others as equally important parts
of a larger society, treating one’s own happiness as no more important than theirs, not
mocking, ridiculing, or harming them, and avoiding cruelty towards them.
Part II Attitudes and Policies

The next four chapters focus especially on the implications of moral attitudes, such
as respect and love, for social policies, for example, regarding reproductive deci-
sions, research to find “cures” for disabilities, and physicians’ assessments of the
decision-making capacities of newly disabled patients to accept or reject life-

sustaining support.
The fact that an embryo or fetus is likely to result in a child with a disability is widely
regarded as a strong reason to select a different embryo, abort the fetus, or otherwise
prevent the child from coming to exist. Some disability advocates and anti-abortion
activists counter that, even if embryos and fetuses are not persons, allowing parents to
prevent the birth of a disabled child as such demeans existing disabled people by
implying that they are not valuable, that they should not have been born, or that their
lives are not worth living. In “Not Alive Yet,” J. David Velleman denies these supposed
implications and argues instead that the intrinsic value of personhood provides
reasons not to bring people with certain kinds of disabilities into existence as well
as reasons to love and respect existing people who live with those conditions.
Velleman begins with the Kantian assumption that persons are “self-standing” ends
who, as such, warrant respect as a fitting response to their basic moral value. According
to Velleman, respect for persons, which can be directed at people we are familiar with
as well as those who are known to us only under certain descriptions, is only a negative
constraint on how we may treat them. Because respect for personhood does not
require positive actions, Velleman argues, it cannot provide reasons to bring persons
into existence.
Respect can provide reasons, however, to refrain from creating persons if doing so is
incompatible with the value of personhood. In particular, Velleman claims that respect
for personhood requires us not to create children who would lack the capacity for
independent and autonomous activity.
Love, Velleman claims, is another fitting response to the intrinsic value of persons.
Unlike respect, however, the object of love must be singular, which means we can
only love someone we know “in person” rather than as someone who is picked out by
some description. Because our potential or future children do not exist, we cannot be
acquainted with them in the way that love for them requires. At most, we can know
them only under some description, such as “my future child.” Velleman concludes that
we cannot love our potential or future children or bring them into existence out of
love for them. Only once a disabled child is born, Velleman claims, is she an appro-
priate object of love. Velleman concludes that prospective parents should sometimes
abort or select against embryos or fetuses because the resulting children would be
severely disabled even though they should also love and respect existing people who
have those conditions.
Velleman goes on to consider whether allowing prospective parents to make such
reproductive choices implies that the lives of existing disabled people are not worth
living or that they should not have existed. He notes that there are many cases in which
it is appropriate for parents to make reproductive choices for the sake of the well-being
of their potential children, such as delaying pregnancy until the prospective parents
have sufficient income or have traveled the globe, without implying that the lives of
introduction 7
people who are born in the circumstances the parents aimed to avoid are any less
worthwhile or that their lives are regrettable.
In “Respect, Regret, and Reproductive Choice,” David Sussman attempts to explain
and resolve an apparent inconsistency in the forward-looking and backward-looking
attitudes we might have about knowingly and deliberately creating a disabled child.
When we are considering what sort of child (if any) to produce, we might come to the
all-things-considered judgment that we should not create a disabled child. But, later,
when we are the parents of a disabled child that we nonetheless decided to create, we
might overall affirm, and not regret, our decision to have him. These two attitudes,
according to David Sussman, seem to be in tension with one another: If prospective
parents believe they should not create a disabled child, then, were they to intentionally
produce one anyway, they would apparently be rationally required to regret their
decision after the child is born; and, conversely, if actual parents of a disabled child
do not regret having him, then, apparently, their prior judgment that they should
not do so was irrational. Drawing on and supplementing prominent discussions by
Jeff McMahan, R. Jay Wallace, and J. David Velleman, Sussman offers a novel explan-
ation for why, in many cases, it makes sense for parents of disabled children to affirm
their own prior reproductive decisions that, at the time, they themselves thought
were unjustified.
According to Sussman, when we love someone, we accept that he has his own values,
ends, and concerns; we give him a special standing to make claims on us on behalf of
his interests; and we recognize corresponding reasons to take his claims seriously, to
answer them, and sometimes to fulfill them. In Sussman’s view, our love for others thus
tends to shape our overall conception of ourselves and of what we regard as valuable
and meaningful in life by the ways we tend to respond to the perspectives, interests,
and claims of those we love. Once we have incorporated the claims and demands of our
disabled child, for example, into our sense of self then Sussman thinks that our love for
him becomes part of the fixed background from which we can evaluate ourselves
and the world. In particular, our love for our existing child precludes any rational
assessment about the importance of him or his life because our current perspective
takes his value to us as given. Therefore, Sussman argues, the love that parents have for
their disabled child prevents them from genuinely forming the belief that they should
not have created her, which implies that it is impossible for them to have overall regret
for that decision. The parents could have been correct that producing a disabled child
would be a mistake for them; but from their current standpoint, they necessarily affirm
their decision to have the child because he is now part of who they are.
In “Neurodiversity and the Rejection of Cures,” Richard Dean examines and partially
evaluates growing debates about whether we should attempt to ‘cure’ autism. The
debate, Dean argues, comes down to whether conditions on the autism spectrum are
merely different, and not defective, forms of neurological organization or whether
some or all of those conditions are, at least in part, medical deficiencies. If autism is
merely a difference then, in light of historical injustices and continued oppression

of autistic people, seeking a cure for those conditions in our society sends a false and
disrespectful message that there is something wrong or defective about people who
identify as autistic when in fact what is wrong is how they tend to be treated by society.
But, Dean argues, if autism is to some extent an inherent medical problem or defect
then attempting to correct it would not necessarily send a disrespectful message of
rejection to those who are autistic.
Dean proposes an innovative way to assess whether autism is a defect or a mere
difference, which is to imagine a fully rational and reasonable person with autism who is
living in an idealized society in which autistic people are the dominant group who
make up the vast majority of the population. We then try to assess what attitudes
an autistic person of this sort would have about attempts at curing conditions on
the autism spectrum in a society that is, according to Dean, fully just in its treatment
of autistic people. If such a person would oppose searching for a cure for autism as a
waste of time and resources then, according to Dean, this would support the claim that
autism is not a defect of persons. If, however, she would favor trying to cure certain
forms of autism despite the fact that her society treats autistic people justly then this
would be evidence that those conditions are, at least in part, defects rather than mere
differences. Once we have a better grasp of whether various conditions on the autism
spectrum are defects or mere differences, then, Dean argues, we can better determine
whether seeking a cure for autism in our world is more akin to trying to cure someone
of an addiction or trying to ‘cure’ someone of being gay.
In “ ‘I Would Rather Die than Live Like This’: When the Newly Disabled Refuse
Life-Sustaining Treatment,” Andrew M. Courtwright describes and evaluates how
current medical practice assesses the decision-making capacities of newly disabled
people to accept or reject life-sustaining treatment. Drawing on his own experiences
as a practicing physician, Courtwright explains how medical professionals tend to
operationalize and apply the idea of respecting the autonomous decisions of their
patients. Whether such an assessment is performed in the first place, Courtwright
explains, depends on the seriousness of the choice that the patient faces and whether
her decision-making capacities have already been assessed in the past. When medical
professionals do perform such assessments, they attempt to determine, first, whether a
patient’s empirical beliefs about, for example, her medical condition and the risks
involved in accepting or refusing the life-sustaining intervention are reasonable,
whether the patient can reasonably explain these beliefs and her reasons for affirming
them, whether these beliefs are reasonably consistent with the patient’s other beliefs
and convictions, and whether these beliefs are reasonably responsive to evidence.
Second, medical professionals try to figure out whether the patient’s desires, such as
whether she wants the treatment or not and what (if any) goals she aims to achieve in
accepting or rejecting the treatment, are reasonably consistent with one another and
other things she cares about, whether these desires are best explained by a diagnosable
introduction 9
psychiatric disorder, and whether her desires are reasonably firm. Finally, medical
professionals assess whether the resulting decision that the patient makes is stable
across several contexts and interactions. In each of these three dimensions, the idea of
reasonableness is left vague, which, Courtwright notes, raises problems about different
physicians evaluating the decision-making of their patients differently.
This model for assessing whether a patient’s decision to refuse life-sustaining
treatment is autonomous, according to Courtwright, should be supplemented by a
more expansive view of autonomy as a property of the person making decisions rather
than just a property of particular decisions. Respecting the autonomy of a person faced
with a choice between accepting or rejecting life-sustaining treatment, according to
Courtwright, requires us to regard her as an agent who has capacities to, for example,
think for herself, endorse her own set of values, and deliberate on the basis of reasons.
Courtwright notes several implications that this broader idea of respect for the autonomy
of persons has. First, physicians must engage their patients with reason and argument
and be sensitive to the effects of informal social pressures; they should work with their
patients over time to evaluate relevant risks and outcomes; and physicians should
sometimes offer alternative, perhaps less effective, therapies that are more amenable
to the patient. Second, physicians should attempt to alleviate any conditions that are
impairing a person’s decision-making capacities; when necessary, they should try to
convince patients to change their self-destructive behaviors through rational processes
rather than through coercion or force; and physicians should stand ready to revise
their assessments of a patient’s decision-making capacities. And third, in extreme
cases, physicians should seek surrogate decision-makers for the patient who should in
turn try to balance what the patient would want and what is in her best interests.
Part III Justifying Frameworks

The chapters in our last section step back from questions about particular relationships
and policies to consider what deliberative frameworks are appropriate for justifying
and assessing them. The authors show how basic moral attitudes can be relevant not
only in practice but in how we reflect and debate about the justice of our practices and
the scope of our moral consideration.
Lawrence Becker’s chapter “Disability, Basic Justice, and Habilitation into Basic Good
Health” draws on and extends ideas he developed in his recent book Habilitation, Health,
and Agency: A Framework for Basic Justice. Becker proposes a novel conception of the
circumstances in which questions of basic justice arise and argues that, on his account,
health and disability are central concerns of justice. Rather than conceiving of the
circumstances of justice as conditions of conflict among persons, Becker suggests that
issues of justice arise when and because all people have necessary interests in acquiring
and maintaining certain capacities or functional abilities that they cannot develop or
maintain without help or non-interference from others. Normative conceptions of
justice are then needed to explain how these interests in ‘habilitation’ should be
secured, whether through interpersonal assistance, cooperative social arrangements,
or some other mechanism. This account of the problem of basic justice, Becker goes
on to argue, shows that health is a basic concern of justice because the lifelong process of
acquiring the capacities and abilities we need to survive and live minimally decent
lives requires what Becker calls basic good health. Becker’s conception of basic good
health has several interesting features. He defines it in functional terms as reliable and
competent physical and psychological functioning in some range of environments; he
emphasizes that good health involves not just absence of pathology but also physical
and psychological energy and resilience; he suggests a way of operationalizing his
definition of good health for practical contexts; and he notes some consequences of
his conception for healthcare policy.
The main focus of Becker’s account of the circumstances of justice, which is on
coping with the fact that no one can survive and prosper if they or others do not acquire
certain abilities and capacities, provides an organizing theme for addressing issues
of disability. When our aim is to ensure that people have the abilities they need, our
attention is drawn to factors such as basic good health, the structure of the physical and
social environment, rehabilitation, and other ways of creating and sustaining abilities
in all persons, whether they are disabled or not.
Contractarian conceptions of justice are widely criticized for their apparent inability
to justify the claims and rights that people with severe and lifelong cognitive disabilities
have against society. Martha Nussbaum, Eva Kittay, Marilyn Friedman, and many others
have argued that people who lack any capacity for reasoning, who require extensive
protection and care to function, and who are incapable of making social or economic
contributions are, for these reasons, not owed duties of justice on contractarian views
because these conceptions ground principles of justice in hypothetical agreements
among normal and fully cooperating members of society.
Several features of Rawls’ contractarian view, or of his presentation of it, have
invited this charge, including Rawls’ use of contract metaphors, his idea of justifiability,
his conception of the person as free and equal, his understanding of cooperation as
mutually advantageous, his assumption that the contracting parties are normal and
fully cooperating members of society, and his postponement of certain questions of
justice for severely disabled people.
In “Contractarian Justice and Severe Cognitive Disabilities,” Samuel Freeman
defends Rawls’ contractarian framework from the charge that it fails to respect the
dignity and equal moral status of severely disabled people. Drawing on and supple-
menting his previous work, Freeman puts the offending ideas in context, explains how
they are often misunderstood, points out the limited role they play in Rawls’ theory,
and emphasizes aspects of Rawls’ view that others may have missed. Freeman argues
that the main criticisms of moral contractarian views, and of Rawls’ view in particular,
are not impediments to justifying the claims and rights of severely disabled people.
introduction 11
In addition to offering various objections to competing conceptions of justice,

including Nussbaum’s capabilities approach, Freeman makes some suggestions for
how a comprehensive moral contractarian framework can be developed in ways that
fully incorporate the interests of severely disabled people. Such views, he claims, should
assume as a starting point that all human persons, as such, have dignity, are owed
respect as moral equals, and have basic rights and claims against society. Moral con-
tractarian theories should make use of multiple conceptions of the person, including
conceptions of severely disabled people that capture and explain their fundamental
needs and interests, and incorporate these ideas into different contracting procedures
that are appropriate for addressing various moral issues. The basic interests that people
with severe disabilities have in being protected and in having their basic needs met,
according to Freeman, ground certain basic rights and forbid ignoring or trading
them off for the sake of aggregate welfare. Beyond this, moral contractarian frame-
works should distinguish between questions of equal justice, which concern equal
rights among normal and fully cooperating members of society, and other questions of
justice that concern how these rights can be justifiably limited for people with severe
cognitive disabilities in order to protect them from harm. Moral contractarian views,
Freeman suggests, should also incorporate notions of reciprocity and respect into their
ideas of social cooperation and account for moral duties and obligations beyond those
of justice. And they should postpone the choice of certain principles, such as those
about the special needs of people with severe disabilities, when these issues presuppose
prior principles of social organization and depend on particular facts about a society,
without assuming that these principles are any less fundamental or important than
ones already selected.
According to Richard Galvin in his chapter “Obligations to the Cognitively Impaired
in Non-Structured Contexts,” moral philosophers who have seriously reflected on
issues of cognitive disability tend to proceed in a ‘top-down’ fashion, by adopting,
interpreting, and supplementing traditional moral frameworks and applying them to a
narrow set of public-policy and justice-related issues for the cognitively disabled.
Galvin contends that these sorts of approaches to thinking about how to regard and
treat cognitively disabled people are unpromising because of difficulties they have in
explaining why people with moderate or severe cognitive disabilities count as moral
persons and in explaining how, in particular, we should regard and treat them in more
informal and interpersonal contexts. Galvin proposes an alternative, ‘bottom-up’ way
of approaching moral issues of cognitive disability that begins with commonsense
moral judgments about how to regard and treat cognitively disabled people in every-
day life. Generalizing from these judgments, Galvin argues that participation in
cooperative activities, agency and self-respect are mutually supporting moral goods
that many cognitively impaired people can achieve to some extent. Non-disabled
people have duties to promote these goods for cognitively impaired people who are
capable of them, Galvin argues, which not only implies that those people have moral
standing but also provides specific guidance about how to treat them in informal,
daily interactions.
Disabilities are usually thought to be impairments that substantially limit one or
more ‘major life activities,’ such as caring for oneself, eating, or walking. In her chapter
“Moral Disability, Moral Injury, and the Flight from Vulnerability,” Virginia Warren
aims to extend our understanding of disability by adding a new ‘major life activity’
to the standard definition of disability, namely the activity of living a full moral life.
A “moral disability,” according to Warren, is thus an impairment that significantly
limits a person’s ability to live as a full moral person.
What does it mean to live a full moral life? Part of this activity, according to Warren,
is engaging in moral reflection and moral decision-making, having the motivation to
act morally, and executing one’s moral decisions. These moral abilities in turn depend
on other abilities, such as those of attention, self-awareness, empathy, and long-term
planning. Certain cognitive or psychological impairments are moral disabilities
because they tend to prevent or significantly interfere with these prerequisites that
are essential for moral agency. Other kinds of moral disabilities, Warren argues,
may be willful, as in certain forms of self-deception or distraction. One form of
disabling self-deception that Warren discusses is to distract oneself from the basic and
unchanging fact that we are vulnerable creatures by either denying our vulnerability
to, for example, illness, domination, or dependence on others or by aspiring to an ideal
of invulnerability.
Another part of living a moral life, according to Warren, is having integrity, which
can be undermined by, for example, choosing to violate one deeply held moral value
for the sake of another. These ‘moral injuries’ that, for example, soldiers suffer in war as
a result of the difficult decisions they face, are also moral disabilities because they
tend to shatter a person’s sense of herself as a moral person.
Warren goes on to note several implications that her idea of moral disability has for
ethical thinking about a variety of apparently unrelated moral issues, such as ones
concerning gun control, climate change, and war.
PA RT I
Attitudes and Relationships
1
Hiding a Disability and Passing
as Non-Disabled
Adam Cureton
People with disabilities often have some control over whether or not other people know
that we are disabled.1 Some disabilities, such as blindness, deafness, autism, traumatic
brain injury, and chronic fatigue, may not be immediately perceptible to casual bystanders.
The obvious symptoms and signs of other disabilities, such as missing limbs or physical
deformities, can sometimes be disguised or covered. And many disabled people can
conceal their disabilities by mostly isolating themselves from others.
Suppose someone has a non-perceptible disability and is deciding whether or not
to pursue a general and long-term policy of hiding his disability and passing as a non-
disabled person in contemporary Western society. He is considering whether or not to
embark or continue on a systematic course of deception, pretense, and concealment
so that others do not know he has a disability and do not think of him as disabled. His
policy would extend to most everyone besides a very small group of confidants whom
he trusts to keep his secret and, in some cases, assist him in his ruse.
Attempting, in this way, to impersonate a non-disabled person may seem to be an
irrational, unwise, and immoral project for a disabled person to undertake. Hiding
most kinds of disabilities, including ones that are not immediately perceptible, is very
difficult or impossible to pull off, especially over an extended period of time. It seems
foolish to forgo accommodations that would allow a disabled person to perform
various major life activities and otherwise actively engage in social life, just to keep his
disability under wraps. And, deception, manipulation, and lying are generally regarded
as morally wrong in many circumstances, especially when they are pre-meditated and
methodically and systematically employed.
A far more pressing concern for people with imperceptible disabilities, it may seem,
is not with whether to conceal their disabilities but with convincing others that they
1
I am grateful to audiences at the University of California, San Diego and the University of North
Carolina, Asheville as well as at the 2014 Eastern APA and 2015 Central APA meetings for their feedback
on ideas I discuss in this chapter. Special thanks go to Tom Hill, Bernard Boxill, and Cheshire Calhoun.
16 Adam Cureton
are actually disabled. Ordinary people are often skeptical about the supposed disabilities
of others when those conditions are not readily apparent, so when people who have
imperceptible disabilities ask for special treatment or fail to meet certain expectations,
they tend to be regarded as malingerers and frauds (Stone 2005).
Most of my own life, however, has been spent successfully concealing the fact that I
am legally blind from teachers, friends, colleagues, and most everyone else. There have
also been periods in my life when my disability was widely known among some groups,
so I have first-hand experience of what it is like both to be accepted as non-disabled
and to be regarded as disabled. I have often asked myself why I spent so much time and
effort concealing my disability and whether it was prudent, wise, and morally justifiable
for me to have done so. Many other disabled people continue to confront these same
kinds of questions about hiding, downplaying, or covering for their disabilities. My aim
in this chapter is to draw on my own experiences, as well as those of other disabled
people, to explain how a disabled person can hide her disability and pass as non-disabled,
why she might want to do so, and what costs and moral risks she and others might face
along the way.2 The issue of how, if at all, to portray one’s disability in public, I argue,
involves many competing and complex considerations that are difficult to interpret,
apply, and combine together, but my more general aim is to show that there are important
lessons to be learned about disability from understanding and assessing why a person
might try to hide his own disability.
1 Passing
Let’s begin with the general idea of “passing” as, for example, male, white, heterosexual,
or non-disabled. According to Erving Goffman, a person passes as a member of a social
group when she is accepted as or is believed to be a member of that group even though
she does not qualify as part of it (Goffman 1959, 1963). Passing can be deliberate, as
when Jews pretended to be Christian in order to avoid the wrath of the Nazis or women
pretended to be men so that they could fight in the Civil War, but passing can also
result from a person’s accidental qualities and appearances, as when someone of black
ancestry is regarded as white because of his light skin or a gay person is assumed to be
straight because of his unintentional mannerisms and habits.3
Many people with disabilities have attempted to pass as non-disabled, with varying
degrees of success.4 With the help of his trusted advisors and a compliant press corps,
2
Recent work in epistemology has suggested that testimonial evidence from members of oppressed
groups should be regarded as especially reliable evidence about our own lives and experiences (Fricker 2007,
Alcoff 1991).
3
See the following for discussions of passing in the context of race (Piper 1992, Fabi 2001, Wald 2000,
Ginsberg 1996, Griffin 1961), sexual orientation (Mohr 1992, Cooley and Harrison 2012, Lingel 2009,
Card 1995, Sedgwick 1990), gender (Meyerowitz 2002), and religion (Shirer 1960).
4
For discussion of passing in the context of disability, see Roding et al. (2003), Stone (2005), Siebers
(2004), Samuels (2003), Kleege (1999), Griffin (2004), Titchkosky (2003), Corey (1968), Kuusisto (2006),
Shakespeare (1998), Zola (1982), Gallagher (1985), Thomas (2013), Brueggemann (1997).
Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 17
Franklin D. Roosevelt, for example, portrayed himself to the general public as a healthy
person who had recovered from polio, despite the fact that he needed crutches, braces,
and wheelchairs to compensate for his very limited mobility (Gallagher 1985). Before
John Howard Griffin wrote his famous account of passing as a black man in the Jim Crow
South, he lost most of his vision in World War II and successfully passed as sighted for
many years until his vision was suddenly restored (Griffin 2004, Brune 2013). And, in
my own case, I have spent most of my life passing as fully sighted even though I am
legally blind as a result of an uncorrectable and congenital eye condition.
The desire to pass as non-disabled, along with the talents and skills that are necessary
to do so, are often encouraged in disabled children by their doctors, families, schools,
and wider society. Polio survivors in the 1920s, for example, were often taught to walk
naturally with painful leg braces that could be concealed, to lean on sturdy objects for
support, and to make eye-contact with people rather than look down to avoid obstacles
(Sheed 1995, Gallagher 1985). Blind children frequently learn to hold their heads in
the same ways as sighted people do when having conversations, to adopt a general
expression of preoccupation, to walk quickly and purposefully, and to act as if they
have misplaced their glasses if they are asked to read something (Kleege 1999,
Griffin 2004, Titchkosky 2003). Therapy for people with certain mental illnesses is
often aimed at teaching them strategies to mask the external symptoms of their condi-
tions such as not to wring their hands, talk to themselves, or furtively move their eyes
in public (Cox 2013). And one of the main approaches to deaf education has been to
emphasize methods of oral communication, rather than manual methods such as sign
language, by teaching Deaf children to read lips, to mimic the sounds of ordinary
speech, and to use hearing aids so that they can more easily integrate into mainstream
culture (Van Cleve 2007, Harmon 2013).
2 How to Pass as Non-Disabled

A person with an imperceptible disability who is deciding whether or not to pursue
the goal of passing as non-disabled should consider whether he can achieve this goal
and, if he can, what it would take for him to do so effectively and efficiently. Scott, let’s
assume, is a legally blind person who is not generally known to be disabled, perhaps
because he has recently moved to a new place. The few people who do know about his
visual impairment are likely to keep his secret if he asks them to. His disability is not
perceptible to casual observers, so he does not have to worry about others simply con-
cluding that he is disabled from casual observation. A policy of passing as non-disabled
obviously requires Scott not to tell others about his disability and to be very cautious
about who he does confide in, for fear that they will, intentionally or not, pass on his
secret to others.
It may seem unlikely that Scott and other disabled people can actually manage to
hide their disabilities, at least without extraordinary talent and resources that are
18 Adam Cureton
beyond the reach of most people. The following are some general techniques, heuristics,
and rules of thumb, however, that Scott and other people with imperceptible disabilities
might use to hide their disabilities and pass as non-disabled. Many of them are not
especially difficult or taxing while some are made easier by implicit or unconscious
cooperation from the people Scott is attempting to deceive.
The most difficult obstacle that Scott must overcome in order to be accepted as a
person without a disability is that others are likely to infer that he has a disability on the
basis of various kinds of indirect evidence.
Asking for or using certain kinds of adaptive equipment or special accommoda
tions when others are around, for example, would likely arouse suspicion that he has a
disability, so he should generally refuse to use identifiable adaptive equipment or
special accommodations in the company of all but his most trusted confidants. If he
does make use of accommodations for his disability, he should ask for them privately
and insist that they are either provided discretely so that others will not recognize
them as special assistance or demand that they are made available to all participants
so that no one knows who, if anyone, needs them. He could generally limit his par-
ticipation at meetings, for instance, to those that follow the principles of what has
come to be called “universal design,” which is a design philosophy that aims to make
buildings, products, and environments accessible for all people by, for example,
requiring that electronic copies of handouts are made available to all participants
(Connell et al. 1997, Cureton 2017).
Scott should generally avoid associating with other people with disabilities, partici-
pating in programs and groups for disabled people, or advocating for disabled people,
because others may think that the most likely explanation for his special interest in these
activities is that he is disabled himself. He should instead favor activities, occasions,
and environments that allow him to be an active participant while still keeping his
disability hidden. I have made excuses, for example, for why I would not be attending
certain large gatherings where I would have trouble identifying people from a distance
or participating in sports that involve small balls.
When Scott is around non-disabled people and wants them to accept him as one
of them, he must not only imitate their mannerisms, appearance, and behavior, but
he must also seem to do so with normal ease and grace. There are many ways that
disabled people have devised for accomplishing these tasks. Someone with a mobility
impairment may, for instance, learn to appear as if he walks and stands naturally even
though doing so is quite painful and burdensome to him. A person with a speech
impairment may avoid words that cause him to stutter. Someone who is hearing
impaired may speak softly, let her sentences trail, and develop generic reactions for
occasions in which she does not hear what people say (Brueggemann 1997). And
someone, like me, who has a visual impairment can learn to fake eye contact, pretend
to read what others give to me by holding the paper at a normal distance, use memory,
context clues, and the reactions of others to guess at what I am supposed to be observing
at a distance or how I am expected to respond, memorize texts that I might be asked to
read aloud, scout unfamiliar environments in advance, identify people by the sound of
their voice or the motion of their gait, ignore or smile at people who approach me
or call me from a distance, and rely on widely used devices, such as smartphones, to
find my way.
Other people can be especially useful in covering for a disability. Confidants can
help disabled people to spot others in a crowd, find the nearest restroom, or take the
blame for mishaps. Even when others are not aware of Scott’s disability and so have no
intention to accommodate it, he can nonetheless use them in various ways without
arousing suspicion. He can, for example, ask them apparently innocuous questions in
order to gain information about his surroundings, take note of what they order at a
restaurant when he cannot read the menu, covertly listen to other conversations, and
surreptitiously walk with them to the next meeting location. A Deaf person might sit
next to a person with a loud voice at a noisy restaurant or keep a watchful eye on how
others are reacting to a musical performance.
Even when these techniques are applied reasonably well, a person with an imper-
ceptible disability may not always be able to hide some of the effects of his disability.
His covering tactics might sometimes appear somewhat odd or unusual; he may let
his guard down on some occasions or fail to predict or plan for certain eventualities;
or he may simply be unable to conceal the markers of his disability. In order to pass
as non-disabled, Scott must develop back-up strategies for maintaining his cover. If
others notice that a person with an imperceptible disability is exhibiting behavior that
is unusual or strange for a non-disabled person, he should prevent them from drawing
what is often the natural conclusion, which is that he is disabled.
One technique is to lead others to think that there are better explanations for the
effects of his disability other than that he is disabled. For example, I have sometimes
allowed and encouraged people to assume I am dim-witted, ignorant, unprepared,
aloof, uninterested, or easily bored when I cannot see what is being discussed, slovenly
when I have unnoticed stains on my shirt, indifferent or uncaring when I fail to notice
that someone needs assistance, rude when I do not acknowledge people or insincere
when I acknowledge everyone I see, buffoonish when I trip or spill something, haughty
or lazy when I refuse to participate in certain activities, or absent-minded, eccentric, or
inept when I leave things behind, miss typos, or make the text on my computer larger
than normal.
I have also acted as if my unusual behavior or appearance is actually intentional and
part of a larger project. When someone points out to me that I am headed in the wrong
direction, I would usually make up some plausible excuse for why I meant to be going
that way. My questions to teachers and presenters have sometimes been founded on
assumptions that were explicitly rejected in the handout or slideshow, but instead of
admitting that I could not see the material, I have simply “rephrased” my question in a
way that showed it had some “deeper” point.
A second technique to prevent others from concluding that a person who exhibits
signs of disability is actually disabled involves humor, abrupt changes of subject, and
20 Adam Cureton
other forms of misdirection so that they quickly forget what they perceived about the
person or do not bother to seek an explanation for it. On one occasion, for example,
after it was clear to my dinner companions that I was unable to read a street sign,
I casually began “reading” the names of distant restaurants that I remembered from a
map so that my mistake would be quickly disregarded. As long as Scott portrays himself
as having abilities and attributes that fall within normal ranges for non-disabled people,
he is likely to be accepted as one of them. Deaf people who are native English speakers,
for instance, have found that they can sometimes explain away their Deaf accent by
claiming to be German (Brueggemann 1997). People with mobility impairments who
are uneasy on their feet have led others to think that they are simply under the influence
of alcohol (Stone 2005). Disabled people who walk with assistive aids will sometimes
use underarm crutches rather than forearm crutches so that their impairment appears
to be temporary rather than permanent (Siebers 2004). And I have sometimes conceded
that I could not “see well” in a way that still gave the impression that my visual acuity
was only somewhat low but within the normal range.
Despite his best efforts at passing as non-disabled, other people may sometimes
come to know that Scott has a disability. When this happens, he may be able to maintain
his cover by leading others to forget or doubt this fact or not attend to it in their thinking.
He can refuse to break his cover by simply denying that he is disabled, perhaps while
feigning surprise at the suggestion that he is, while continuing on as before in the hope
that, after enough time has passed, they will no longer regard him as disabled. But when
the jig is finally up and someone has caught him out, he can attempt to mitigate the
damage this might cause to his overall project by downplaying the severity of his con-
dition while also trying to convince the person that she should respect his privacy and
not share his secret with others.
Using these strategies and techniques effectively in order to pass as non-disabled
takes significant study, planning, practice, and guesswork. A disabled person must also
possess realized talents and skills of improvisation, attention, memory, adaptability,
creativity, patience, and cunning in order to maintain his cover. Developing the
necessary abilities and habits may have taken many years, perhaps stretching back to
early childhood. The person’s disability may have to be predictable and not very severe
in order for him to put on a convincing performance. And, perhaps most importantly,
others in society must be susceptible to his deception. I have found that hiding my
disability is much easier than it may seem because most people tend to ignore, overlook,
and act as if I do not have a disability as long as I am reasonably effective at blending in.
Even when there is ample evidence that I am visually impaired, most people do not
become suspicious that I am disabled but instead overlook these obvious signs, accept
what can be ludicrous explanations for the effects of my disability that they notice,
quickly forget that I am disabled if they do find out, and otherwise seem to unconsciously
want to accept my pretense of normalcy (see Siebers 2004, Stone 2005). Perhaps some
of these people were playing along with my attempts at deceiving them, knowing full
well that I was disabled, but many people, I suspect, have genuinely accepted me as a
non-disabled person (see Brueggemann 1997).
3 Social Circumstances
Let’s suppose, then, that Scott has the ability to pass as non-disabled. We can next ask
whether doing so is in Scott’s interests. Answering this question depends, in significant
part, on the social circumstances in which Scott lives. Hiding one’s disability may be
necessary to avoid being euthanized, as in Nazi Germany, or forcibly sterilized, as in
certain parts of America in the 1920s (Kevles 1985). In the United States before the
Americans with Disabilities Act, someone may have wished to hide her disability because
she would otherwise have faced explicit discrimination in employment, education,
housing, healthcare, and transportation. Revealing one’s disability in these kinds of
societies carried significant risks, but passing as non-disabled was also very difficult
without studded walkways, large-screen monitors, and other accommodations that a
disabled person can covertly use.
Let’s further suppose, then, that Scott lives in a society that guarantees people with
disabilities the same basic civil rights as others, bans various forms of outright dis-
crimination against the disabled, and requires public and private organizations to
make the environment accessible and to honor specific requests for reasonable
accommodations.
In societies of this sort, the costs and benefits to a person of passing as non-disabled
depend largely on the negative social attitudes that people generally have about dis-
abled people. Not everyone holds these attitudes; those who hold them do not do
so to the same degree; and many people may not be aware that they possess negative
attitudes towards disabled people. Although most people with disabilities have experi-
enced some form of stigma because of their disability, there is a danger of exaggerating
how widespread or deeply held these attitudes are by extrapolating from a few egregious
instances. We must be careful not to be too confident in attributing bias and prejudice
to people. A person who is deciding whether to hide his disability in these circumstances
must therefore consider, as best he can, how others are likely to react if his disability is
widely known.
The following are some of the negative social attitudes that, in my experience,
disabled people face when and because others know that we are disabled.
I have noticed that people who know that I have a visual impairment are more likely
to ignore me than those who are unaware of my disability. I have also noticed that
people tend to be more awkward, uncomfortable, and standoffish in their interactions
with me when they are aware of my condition. People also tend to be preoccupied with
my disability when they are aware of it. Their attention seems to be mostly focused on
what I can and cannot see, how I manage to get around, the workings of the adaptive
equipment I use, other people they know who have similar impairments, and the
22 Adam Cureton
nature and causes of my underlying condition. People often steer conversations to

my disability or seem distracted by it because they are clearly thinking about my
condition even if they are too polite to say so. One reason for their preoccupation may
be a sort of morbid curiosity with a condition that painfully reminds them of their own
vulnerability and that may provide a cautionary tale for how they can avoid such a fate
themselves. I have even been subjected to disconcerting whispers, stares, ridicule,
and derision on account of my disability and its effects. I suspect that my disability
has been my most salient feature to many people who tended to see me primarily as a
disabled person.
When people know that I have a disability, they tend to have lower expectations of
me and assume I am much less capable than I am. In some cases, people have simply
told me so, but more often they refuse to assign important responsibilities to me, to
trust or rely on me to accomplish various goals, to give me opportunities to collaborate
with them on shared projects, or to hold me to high standards by blaming me when I
fail to meet those expectations or praising me when I manage to do so. When considering
what abilities I have, people seem to rely on stereotypes, folk wisdom, and their own
guesses about how they would fare with a visual disability: They often assume, for
example, that having a visual disability implies that I have a cognitive disability, that
my visual impairment has prevented me from acquiring certain knowledge and skills,
that I am likely to take longer and require more assistance than others in order to
accomplish various goals, and that most of the mistakes I do make are a result of my
disability rather than the more typical causes of mistakes.
Rather than seeing me as a capable person who can fully participate in joint activities,
many people who know that I am disabled instead tend to regard me as more or less
helpless. Some people respond to me by offering assistance in ways that are unwanted,
unneeded, ineffective, and in some cases even burdensome and disrespectful to me
(Cureton 2016, Driver 1997). They seem to be motivated by misplaced compassion or
pity because they regard my visual impairment as a serious misfortune that calls for
beneficence and charity, along with accompanying gratitude on my part, rather than as
calling for rightful and just accommodation. These people tend to aim at making my
life more comfortable and pleasant rather than putting me in a position to participate
in social activities on an equal footing with others. Other people, it seems, want to
avoid the inconveniences and extra responsibilities that they think come from
assisting me, or they are simply unsure how to help and wish to avoid the awkwardness
of asking me directly. My accomplishments and successes, I have sometimes noticed,
are less likely to be appreciated by others because my successes tend to be attributed
more to my accommodations rather than my abilities, while the admiration I do
receive is more often for my ability to overcome my disability rather than for my
successes themselves.
When I have openly asked for or used certain accommodations, especially ones that
are not widely understood, some people seem to assume that I am griping, malingering,
making illegitimate excuses, or taking unfair advantage of others (see Siebers 2004).
Because my visual impairment is not readily apparent to others, people are particularly
likely to wonder why I need or deserve certain accommodations and to express their
resentment and indignation at what they see as my unjustified special pleading. When
I ask for one kind of accommodation, such as extra time on an exam, but afterwards
join in a soccer match, people have questioned whether I even have a disability or
whether I am simply attempting to “game the system.” In order to avoid these attitudes
and secure important accommodations I need, I have sometimes been forced to
exaggerate my disability in humiliating ways by playing the part of what most people
expect from a visually impaired person.
4 Benefits of Passing as Non-Disabled

Many of the negative social attitudes that people with disabilities face are unjustified
and mistaken, but if we assume that they are part of the social world in which Scott and
other people with disabilities currently live, we can next ask what Scott might stand to
gain by avoiding these attitudes. What follows is a list of some of the benefits that a
policy of passing as non-disabled might have for Scott and other disabled people.
One reason someone may want to pass as non-disabled is that he values social
acceptance for its own sake and he suspects that if others know about his disability
then they are less likely to form personal relationships or group ties with him. One
reason for this is that the types of interpersonal interactions that help to forge social
bonds tend to be less natural, spontaneous, and fluid when other people are awkward,
standoffish, fixated on a person’s disability, lamenting his misfortune, or thinking
about what they need to do to help him. The reactions a disabled person has to these
attitudes can sometimes get in the way as well. I have brusquely refused assistance,
for example, expressed exasperation when accommodations were not forthcoming,
or shown annoyance when others have bombarded me with questions about my con-
dition. A further difficulty is that when others know that a person is disabled, they
tend to see him as someone to be cared for and tolerated, whose opinions, values,
and talents are not taken as seriously as those of others. This makes it less likely that a
disabled person will be included as a full, contributing, and valued member of the
group whose skills and talents are valued and appreciated.
A disabled person may also value for its own sake participating in joint activities and
cooperative projects. Yet he knows that if others are aware of his disability then he is less
likely to be trusted with important responsibilities, allowed to take up positions of
authority, or otherwise permitted to contribute to shared ends and activities as an equal.
A disabled person may want to pass as non-disabled in order to avoid painful feelings
of embarrassment that tend to arise in him when others know about his disability.
He may feel embarrassed in such cases because he knows that other people tend to
regard his disability as a defect or flaw and they tend to look down on him because of it.
24 Adam Cureton
A disabled person may aim for a kind of independence or self-reliance in which he

does not depend on the charity or beneficence of others. Hiding his disability, he may
think, will tend to diminish the beneficent acts that others do for him and allow him to
pursue his goals by his own efforts, talents, rights, and luck. He will also be forced to
develop various talents and skills that make him less vulnerable when others are not
around to assist him.
Scott may know that his self-esteem and sense of his own worth depend in various ways
on being accepted and appreciated by other people. He may want to hide his disability so
that it is easier to fit in with them, form relationships with them, engage in joint projects,
and secure their appreciation for his accomplishments, talents, and skills as ways of
avoiding feelings of despondency and self-doubt and of securing a sense of his own worth.
Scott may worry that if he is subject to common social attitudes towards disability
then he will eventually internalize these attitudes himself. He may be concerned, in
particular, that he would come to adjust his aspirations and motivations to the low
expectations others have of people with his kind of impairment, lose his sense of
independence and purpose, and come to see himself as incapable, pitiful, or malin-
gering. The attitudes that others have about him, he may worry, are often difficult for
him to resist, so he may choose to hide his disability in order to avoid adopting those
attitudes towards himself.
If Scott has partially internalized some of these social attitudes already then he may
feel ashamed of his disability because he regards it as a personal fault or defect. Hiding
his disability from others may be a way of deceiving himself that he is not disabled after
all so that he can avoid the feelings of shame he would have if he were regularly treated
as a person with a disability.
Scott may take pride in his abilities and talents. When people express their low
expectations of him, tell him he cannot do something, express pity for him, or attribute
his successes mainly to his accommodations, he may in some cases form a desire to
show himself to be more capable than they think. His pride may also be at risk when
he wonders, perhaps at the prompting of others, whether the various accommodations
he receives are forms of unfair special treatment. He may wish to resist most all accom-
modations so that he is sure to avoid any illegitimate complaining, whining, or special
pleading. Accomplishing these goals, he may think, is more difficult if others know he
has a disability, so he may aim to hide his disability as a way of maintaining a sense of
pride and satisfaction in himself.
A disabled person may seek to pass as non-disabled in order to pursue other personal
goals and projects he has, such as securing a good job, maintaining personal safety, and
preventing his children from being taken away by overzealous child welfare officials.
He may also want to develop his strength of will to overcome obstacles and ignore
inconvenience and pain, as well as cultivate other talents and skills, free from various
kinds of interference from others.
A disabled person may wish to pass as non-disabled so that others are not incon-
venienced or made to feel uncomfortable by his disability, its effects, or the measures
they would have to take in order to accommodate it. Sign-language interpreters, for
example, can be distracting, producing accessible print materials is sometimes
annoying, and insisting on accessible restaurants can be disruptive, so a disabled person
may prefer to hide his disability rather than burden others with it (Zola 1982).
Finally, a person with an imperceptible disability may, in some ways, feel like a fraud
when he considers the challenges that people with more severe disabilities face. Those
people, he may think, are the ones who truly deserve special consideration, whereas
his limitations are moderate by comparison, so hiding his disability may be his way of
not presenting himself as meriting the same kind of concern and respect that is due to
people with more significant disabilities (Stone 2005).
5 Costs to Passing as Non-Disabled

There are also various costs to Scott embarking on a systematic policy of hiding his
disability in the social environment.
A systematic policy of hiding one’s disability can exact a significant psychological
toll. Scott must be constantly vigilant about keeping his secret, maintain a heightened
awareness of how he is perceived by others, and take extensive precautions so that his
true identity is not discovered. He is likely to be in a perpetual state of worry, anxiety,
and fear that his cover will be blown, which may sometimes be debilitating or prevent
him from enjoying the common pleasures of naturalness, spontaneity, and tranquility.
As with any personal project, he also risks self-reproach when he does not carry out his
policy effectively as well as regret if his policy is unsuccessful as a result of unfortunate
circumstances and bad luck. And Scott is likely to meet with deep frustration when
he must find unorthodox ways to accomplish various tasks or at least appear to
accomplish them, avoid certain kinds of activities he would like to participate in, and
otherwise put up with hardship that results from his disability without revealing that
he has one.
Not only is a policy of passing as non-disabled likely to be psychologically exhausting,
but the policy itself, as well as the time, effort, and attention that go into implementing
it, may interfere with the pursuit of other goals and aims. On many occasions, for
example, I have missed flights, gotten off at the wrong bus stop, misplaced my wallet
and keys, settled with unwanted food because I could not read the menu, avoided
social gatherings or conferences I would like to have attended, been bored at events
I could not see, avoided interacting with other blind people, and been late to meetings
and classes because I refused to reveal that I had a disability. I did not spend much time
at art galleries, theatre performances, or my children’s sporting events because I refused to
use visual aids. At certain times of my life, hiding my disability was such a fundamental
aspect of my identity that I explicitly or unconsciously adapted and adjusted many of
my other goals and projects to what I thought I could accomplish while keeping my
disability secret. Who knows whether I would have wanted to be a surgeon, historian,
26 Adam Cureton
musician, or physicist if I had been willing to accept accommodations for my visual

impairment at an early stage of life, but as things stand my choice of one career
over others was probably influenced, to some extent, by the deep desire I had to hide
my disability.
Choosing to hide one’s disability can also interfere with developing and exercising
one’s skills and talents. When I was in school, I did not allow most of my teachers to
know that I had a visual impairment. I refused to use large-print materials, magnify-
ing glasses, or telescopes but instead bumbled my way through dissections, guessed
at what was in books I could barely read, hoped that someone would happen to recite
what was on the board, and listened intently in order to piece together what we were
supposed to be learning. At the time, I knew I was not performing to my full potential
or learning the material as well as I could have if I had accepted accommodations, but I
was willing to accept these costs because of the social benefits that came from passing
as non-disabled. I was fortunate to have done well enough in school in spite of these
obstacles, to have eventually found accommodations that have allowed me to overcome
many of them, and to have chosen a profession where the critical thinking, listening,
and social skills I developed serve me well, but it nonetheless seems that in general
choosing to hide one’s disability can dramatically interfere with the development and
realization of one’s talents and skills. Moreover, because I aimed to keep my disability a
secret at an early age, I did not practice some of the skills that are needed to make effective
use of accommodations for visually impaired people, such as reading Braille or using
canes, guide dogs, or text-to-speech readers, although I did develop more convoluted
ways of achieving some of the same results while keeping my disability hidden.
There may be physical costs to hiding one’s disability as well. In my case, eye strain
and bright fluorescent lights can be very painful even though I could ameliorate these
discomforts in various ways that would make my disability obvious. It is sometimes
dangerous for me to walk in unknown environments where I risk tripping, walking
into traffic, or getting lost in unsafe places where I am especially vulnerable.
A further danger to hiding a disability is that others may depend on Scott to know
where he is going, alert them to dangers, or assist them if they are in trouble. He may
also be more likely to stumble into other people, step on their toes, or nudge them into
traffic. I have developed various strategies to make myself more dependable, but I may
not be as reliable as I appear to be, which may give others a false sense of security and
put them at some risk of danger.
Although a person who aims to hide his disability may secure social acceptance and
some appreciation for his talents and accomplishments, he also risks social disapproval
from others when they regard him as foolish, rude, uncaring, or dim-witted for actions
and behaviors that actually result from his hidden disability. As long as these attribu-
tions are within the normal range, however, he is still likely to be treated as a full and
equal member of various social groups than if others know that he has a disability.
He may not be as successful at realizing his talents or contributing to shared goals
because of his hidden disability, but in some cases he may receive more appreciation
from others for his skills and accomplishments than if they knew he was disabled.
His sense of his own worth may be further reinforced by the hidden knowledge that
he would be even more effective if he made use of accommodations in a social envir-
onment that did not disadvantage people for doing so.
Although hiding his disability may allow him to secure greater social acceptance,
Scott may also feel somewhat isolated and lonely because he cannot openly share
certain important features of himself with others or allow them to get to know him
too well for fear that they would come to learn about his disability. He may have a few
close confidants that he can trust with his secret, but he may lose out on some of the
values of friendship and solidarity because he cannot tell other people the real reasons
why he is frustrated, anxious, or depressed or rely on their emotional support and
understanding when he finds his disability and his attempts to hide it particularly
burdensome.
Scott may come to worry that by refusing to ask for and utilize various accommodations
that are due to him as a matter of right and justice, he is adopting an inappropriately
servile attitude that denies his equal moral status within the true system of moral
rights. If he does not understand his moral rights to accommodations or if he places a
comparatively low value on them as compared to others then his policy of hiding his
disability may express a form of servility that is incompatible with proper self-respect.
If, on the other hand, he fully acknowledges and appreciates the value of his rights and
his moral status, but chooses to hide his disability for other reasons, he may not betray
a lack of self-respect (Hill 1991).
Scott also risks a kind of self-abnegation if he comes to believe his own deceptions
and so no longer sees or accepts himself as a disabled person. Or Scott may come to
recognize that many of the social attitudes and stereotypes that tempt him to hide his
disability are unjustified. If he chooses to pass as non-disabled without also fighting
to change these attitudes, he may betray some lack of integrity by acting in accordance
with attitudes that he believes are mistaken while allowing or even encouraging others
to maintain those same attitudes.
A disabled person may also worry that passing as non-disabled would harm other
disabled people by implicitly supporting or failing to challenge the oppressive social
attitudes that he aims to avoid for himself. Many disability activists see this kind of
passing, if it becomes widespread, as a threat to the political power, culture, and collect-
ive identity of disabled people (Adam 1978, Siebers 2004, Gill 1997, Longmore 2003).
Finally, a significant risk to passing as non-disabled is that doing so involves
deceiving, manipulating, and sometimes lying to others. Such acts are thought to be
wrong in many contexts, but it is less clear how we should think about the morality of
deception, manipulation, and lying when openness and honesty are likely to be met with
oppression, discrimination, and stigma. Moreover, having and exercising a right to
privacy with regard to certain aspects of oneself may, in certain circumstances, imply
a permission to deceive, manipulate, or perhaps lie to others when doing so is necessary
to protect that personal information. There may also be differences among these types
28 Adam Cureton
of acts that make them more or less open to moral criticism—an outright and solemn
lie that I do not have a disability when someone asks me to watch her children may
be wrong, while politely declining her request in a way that deceives her about my con-
dition may be permissible.
6 Further Reflection on Whether or Not

to Pass as Non-Disabled
These are just some of the complex and competing factors that should figure in a
disabled person’s decision about whether or not to hide his disability and pass as
non-disabled. I suspect that the wisdom of hiding one’s disability will depend on the
person’s particular circumstances and require significant reflection and informed judg-
ment to balance these and other conflicting considerations. One source of uncertainty
is about the various instrumental benefits and costs of hiding one’s disability as well
as the likelihood that such a policy will be effective. One way Scott might proceed is
by reflecting more deeply on his goals and the relative priority that they have for him.
Scott might reflect first on the relative importance of developing his talents and
skills as compared to certain aspects of social acceptance such as the conveniences,
comforts, and pleasures of fitting in. On reflection, he may decide that one set of ends
is more important than the other. Matters may be more difficult if he stands to be
ostracized if others know he has a disability or if social inclusion is necessary for other
important ends he has, but even so he may discover ways of scheduling his final ends
by, for example, accepting accommodations for his disability during his education
and training while playing down his disability in later life.
Scott may worry that adopting a policy of hiding his disability because of the social
attitudes he would face if his disability were known cedes too much control to other
people over his life and makes him an instrument of his own oppression (Frye 1983).
He may think that he should be more secure in himself without needing the approval,
admiration, or acceptance of others in order to live a happy and fulfilled life. Although
it may be difficult, he may decide to give less consideration to the attitudes of others in
his choice of plans and projects, seek to maintain his sense of his own worth by his own
rights, efforts, talents, and accomplishments, and learn to bear the social costs of his
stigma with self-possession and grace.
Scott may come to think that his efforts to hide his disability arise in some way from
his own difficulties in accepting himself as a person with a disability. He may think that
he should come to terms with who he is and refrain from deceiving himself about basic
aspects of himself. If he can manage to do these things, his desire to hide his disability
from others may somewhat subside.
On reflection, Scott may think that the kinds of relationships and ties that depend
on hiding his disability are less valuable to him than the relationships he might have
with people who would accept him for who he is. If some people would exclude or look
down on him for his disability then they may not be the kinds of people he wants to
relate with anyway.
Suppose one of Scott’s reasons for hiding his disability is that he takes pride in his
abilities and talents, which he aims to develop and utilize in fair and open competition
with others without unjustified special treatment. Some accommodations, he may
recognize, are legitimate while others may not be, so instead of hiding his disability
altogether to avoid special pleading, he may try to be honest and meticulous in only
accepting the accommodations that he needs to compete on a fair and equal basis
with others.
Finally, when Scott is uncertain about how others would react to his disability,
he might adopt a stance of reasonable hope that they will eventually overcome their
stereotypes about people with disabilities and come to accept him as a full and equal
member of society. Perhaps his assessment of the consequences of openly living his life
as a person with a disability should not be simply based on a calculation of the odds
but should also incorporate some degree of reasonable hope that social attitudes
towards disability will someday become less oppressive.
7 Alternative Policies to Passing as Non-Disabled

As Scott deliberates about whether or not to pass as non-disabled, he should also
consider alternative policies for how, if at all, to present his disability in public.
One possibility is to openly rebel against the oppressive social attitudes that disabled
people face by wearing his disability as a badge of honor and adopting the customs and
norms of blind culture. He may gain social acceptance in disability circles, take on
positions of authority and responsibility in the Disability Rights Movement, and secure
appreciation from others for combating stereotypes and advocating for disabled
people (Gill 1997, Griffin 2004, Brune 2013, Siebers 2004). He may also take pride
in his talents, skills, and accomplishments in service of these shared aims, regard his
disability as a valued part of his identity, and prize the relationships that his disability
makes possible.
Another policy is not to hide his disability or to openly advertise it either. He may
think “this is who I am, I am not embarrassed or ashamed by my disability, so others
should simply deal with it.” He may come to find that he is not especially concerned
with gaining social acceptance from people who stigmatize people with disabilities
and he may value the sense of self-acceptance, self-respect, and integrity that come
from living his life in accordance with the attitudes, values, and commitments that he
thinks everyone should have.
Finally, Scott may take a more nuanced approach to how he portrays his disability
in public by generally keeping it private unless doing so conflicts with other important
ends he has. Under this policy, he would be more willing to ask for and use accommo-
dations in certain circumstances but still refuse them for more trivial matters. In many
30 Adam Cureton
cases he would hide his disability in order to overcome the initial reluctance people
have to engage with people with disabilities, but once they got to know him, he would
be more willing to share his disability with them if there were compelling reasons to
do so. One such reason may be to combat stereotypes about people with disabilities
by leading them to recognize how resourceful, trustworthy, and talented people with
disabilities can be.
8 Conclusion
Decisions about whether or not to hide one’s disability are often more complicated
than they may initially appear. I have explored some of the moral and non-moral con-
siderations that may figure in these decisions and suggested that wisdom, judgment,
and sensitivity are needed to make a reasonable choice about how, if at all, to portray
one’s disability in public. For my own part, I have given up my charade of passing as a
non-disabled person to some extent, but I am not sure exactly why I have done so or
whether I have gone far enough.
Works Cited
Adam, Barry D. 1978. The Survival of Domination: Inferiorization and Everyday Life. New York:
Elsevier.
Alcoff, Linda. 1991. “The Problem of Speaking for Others.” Cultural Critique 20: 5–32.
Brueggemann, Brenda. 1997. “On (Almost) Passing.” College English 59 (6): 647–60.
Brune, Jeffrey A. 2013. “The Multiple Layers of Disability Passing in Life, Literature, and Public
Discourse.” In Disability and Passing: Blurring the Lines of Identity, edited by Jeffrey A. Brune
and Daniel J. Wilson, 36–57. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Card, Claudia. 1995. Lesbian Choices. New York: Columbia University Press.
Connell, Bettye Rose, Mike Jones, Ron Mace, Jim Mueller, Abir Mullick, Elaine Ostroff,
Jon Sanford, Ed Steinfeld, Molly Story, and Gregg Vanderheiden. 1997. The Principles of
Universal Design. Raleigh, NC: Center for Universal Design.
Cooley, Dennis R., and Kelby Harrison. 2012. Passing/Out: Sexual Identity Veiled and Revealed.
Burlington, VT: Ashgate.
Corey, Paul. 1968. The Planet of the Blind. London: Hale.
Cox, Peta. 2013. “Passing as Sane, or How to Get People to Sit Next to You on the Bus.”
In Disability and Passing: Blurring the Lines of Identity, edited by Jeffrey A. Brune and Daniel J.
Wilson, 99–110. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Cureton, Adam. 2016. “Offensive Beneficence.” Journal of the American Philosophical
Association 2 (1): 74–90.
Cureton, Adam. 2017. “Using QR Codes to Make Presentation Materials More Accessible.”
Society for Philosophy and Disability. <http://societyforphilosophyanddisability.org/2017/05/
using-qr-codes-to-make-presentation-materials-more-accessible/>.
Driver, Julia. 1997. “The Ethics of Intervention.” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research
57 (4): 851–70.
Fabi, M. Giulia. 2001. Passing and the Rise of the African American Novel. Urbana: University of
Illinois Press.
Fricker, Miranda. 2007. Epistemic Injustice: Power and the Ethics of Knowing. Oxford: Oxford
University Press.
Frye, Marilyn. 1983. The Politics of Reality: Essays in Feminist Theory. Trumansburg,
NY: Crossing Press.
Gallagher, Hugh Gregory. 1985. FDR’s Splendid Deception. New York: Dodd, Mead.
Gill, Carol J. 1997. “Four Types of Integration in Disability Identity Development.” Journal of
Vocational Rehabilitation 9 (1): 39–46.
Ginsberg, Elaine K. 1996. Passing and the Fictions of Identity. Durham, NC: Duke University
Press.
Goffman, Erving. 1959. The Presentation of Self in Everyday Life. Garden City, NY: Doubleday.
Goffman, Erving. 1963. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice-Hall.
Griffin, John Howard. 1961. Black Like Me. Boston, MA: Houghton Mifflin.
Griffin, John Howard. 2004. Scattered Shadows: A Memoir of Blindness and Vision. Maryknoll,
NY: Orbis Books.
Harmon, Kristin C. 2013. “Growing Up to Become Hearing: Dreams of Passing in Oral Deaf
Education.” In Disability and Passing: Blurring the Lines of Identity, edited by Jeffrey A. Brune
and Daniel J. Wilson, 167–98. Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Hill, Thomas E., Jr. 1991. “Servility and Self-Respect.” In Autonomy and Self-Respect, 4–18.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Kevles, Daniel J. 1985. In the Name of Eugenics: Genetics and the Uses of Human Heredity.
New York: Knopf.
Kleege, Georgina. 1999. Sight Unseen. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
Kuusisto, Stephen. 2006. Eavesdropping: A Life by Ear. 1st ed. New York: W. W. Norton.
Lingel, Jessa. 2009. “Adjusting the Borders: Bisexual Passing and Queer Theory.” Journal of
Bisexuality 9 (3–4): 381–405.
Longmore, Paul K. 2003. “The Second Phase: From Disability Rights to Disability Culture.” In
Why I Burned My Book and Other Essays on Disability, edited by Paul K. Longmore, 215–24.
Philadelphia, PA: Temple University Press.
Meyerowitz, Joanne J. 2002. How Sex Changed: A History of Transsexuality in the United States.
Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Mohr, Richard D. 1992. Gay Ideas: Outing and Other Controversies. Boston, MA: Beacon
Press.
Piper, Adrian. 1992. “Passing for White, Passing for Black.” Transitions 58: 4–32.
Roding, J., B. Lindstrom, J. Malm, and A. Ohman. 2003. “Frustrated and Invisible: Younger
Stroke Patients’ Experiences of the Rehabilitation Process.” Disability and Rehabilitation
25 (15): 867–74.
Samuels, Ellen. 2003. “My Body, My Closet: Invisible Disability and the Limits of Coming-Out
Discourse.” GLQ: A Journal of Lesbian and Gay Studies 9 (1–2): 233–55.
Sedgwick, Eve Kosofsky. 1990. Epistemology of the Closet. Berkeley: University of California
Press.
Shakespeare, Tom. 1998. “Disability, Identity, Difference.” In Exploring the Divide: Illness and
Disability, edited by Colin Barnes and Geof Mercer. Leeds: Disability Press.
32 Adam Cureton
Sheed, Wilfrid. 1995. In Love with Daylight: A Memoir of Recovery. New York: Simon and Schuster.
Shirer, William L. 1960. The Rise and Fall of the Third Reich: A History of Nazi Germany.
New York: Simon and Schuster.
Siebers, Tobin. 2004. “Disability as Masquerade.” Literature and Medicine 23 (1): 1–22.
Stone, S. D. 2005. “Reactions to Invisible Disability: The Experiences of Young Women
Survivors of Hemorrhagic Stroke.” Disability and Rehabilitation 27 (6): 293–304.
Thomas, M. E. 2013. Confessions of a Sociopath: A Life Spent Hiding in Plain Sight. New York:
Broadway Books.
Titchkosky, Tanya. 2003. Disability, Self, and Society. Toronto: University of Toronto Press.
Van Cleve, John V. 2007. The Deaf History Reader. Washington, DC: Gallaudet University
Press.
Wald, Gayle. 2000. Crossing the Line: Racial Passing in Twentieth-Century U.S. Literature and
Culture. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
Zola, Irving Kenneth. 1982. Missing Pieces: A Chronicle of Living with a Disability. Philadelphia,
PA: Temple University Press.
Another random document with
no related content on Scribd:
Transcriber’s Notes
Punctuation, hyphenation, and spelling were made
consistent when a predominant preference was found in the
original book; otherwise they were not changed.
Simple typographical errors were corrected; unbalanced
quotation marks were remedied when the change was
obvious, and otherwise left unbalanced.
Illustrations in this eBook have been positioned between
paragraphs and outside quotations. In versions of this eBook
that support hyperlinks, the page references in the List of
Illustrations lead to the corresponding illustrations.
Page 85: “He went to school as Cæsar” was originally
printed as “He went to school to Cæsar.”
*** END OF THE PROJECT GUTENBERG EBOOK GREAT
CAPTAINS ***
Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

will be renamed.
Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

copyright law means that no one owns a United States copyright
in these works, so the Foundation (and you!) can copy and
distribute it in the United States without permission and without
paying copyright royalties. Special rules, set forth in the General
Terms of Use part of this license, apply to copying and
distributing Project Gutenberg™ electronic works to protect the
PROJECT GUTENBERG™ concept and trademark. Project
Gutenberg is a registered trademark, and may not be used if
you charge for an eBook, except by following the terms of the
trademark license, including paying royalties for use of the
Project Gutenberg trademark. If you do not charge anything for
copies of this eBook, complying with the trademark license is
very easy. You may use this eBook for nearly any purpose such
as creation of derivative works, reports, performances and
research. Project Gutenberg eBooks may be modified and
printed and given away—you may do practically ANYTHING in
the United States with eBooks not protected by U.S. copyright
law. Redistribution is subject to the trademark license, especially
commercial redistribution.
START: FULL LICENSE

THE FULL PROJECT GUTENBERG
LICENSE
PLEASE READ THIS BEFORE YOU DISTRIBUTE OR USE THIS WORK
To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the

free distribution of electronic works, by using or distributing this
work (or any other work associated in any way with the phrase
“Project Gutenberg”), you agree to comply with all the terms of
the Full Project Gutenberg™ License available with this file or
online at www.gutenberg.org/license.
Section 1. General Terms of Use and

Redistributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works
1.A. By reading or using any part of this Project Gutenberg™
electronic work, you indicate that you have read, understand,
agree to and accept all the terms of this license and intellectual
property (trademark/copyright) agreement. If you do not agree to
abide by all the terms of this agreement, you must cease using
and return or destroy all copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in your possession. If you paid a fee for
obtaining a copy of or access to a Project Gutenberg™
electronic work and you do not agree to be bound by the terms
of this agreement, you may obtain a refund from the person or
entity to whom you paid the fee as set forth in paragraph 1.E.8.
1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only

be used on or associated in any way with an electronic work by
people who agree to be bound by the terms of this agreement.
There are a few things that you can do with most Project
Gutenberg™ electronic works even without complying with the
full terms of this agreement. See paragraph 1.C below. There
are a lot of things you can do with Project Gutenberg™
electronic works if you follow the terms of this agreement and
help preserve free future access to Project Gutenberg™
electronic works. See paragraph 1.E below.
1.C. The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation (“the
Foundation” or PGLAF), owns a compilation copyright in the
collection of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works. Nearly all the
individual works in the collection are in the public domain in the
United States. If an individual work is unprotected by copyright
law in the United States and you are located in the United
States, we do not claim a right to prevent you from copying,
distributing, performing, displaying or creating derivative works
based on the work as long as all references to Project
Gutenberg are removed. Of course, we hope that you will
support the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting free
access to electronic works by freely sharing Project
Gutenberg™ works in compliance with the terms of this
agreement for keeping the Project Gutenberg™ name
associated with the work. You can easily comply with the terms
of this agreement by keeping this work in the same format with
its attached full Project Gutenberg™ License when you share it
without charge with others.
1.D. The copyright laws of the place where you are located also
govern what you can do with this work. Copyright laws in most
countries are in a constant state of change. If you are outside
the United States, check the laws of your country in addition to
the terms of this agreement before downloading, copying,
displaying, performing, distributing or creating derivative works
based on this work or any other Project Gutenberg™ work. The
Foundation makes no representations concerning the copyright
status of any work in any country other than the United States.
1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project

Gutenberg:
1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

immediate access to, the full Project Gutenberg™ License must
appear prominently whenever any copy of a Project
Gutenberg™ work (any work on which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” appears, or with which the phrase “Project
Gutenberg” is associated) is accessed, displayed, performed,
viewed, copied or distributed:
This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United

States and most other parts of the world at no cost and with
almost no restrictions whatsoever. You may copy it, give it
away or re-use it under the terms of the Project Gutenberg
License included with this eBook or online at
www.gutenberg.org. If you are not located in the United
States, you will have to check the laws of the country where
you are located before using this eBook.
1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

derived from texts not protected by U.S. copyright law (does not
contain a notice indicating that it is posted with permission of the
copyright holder), the work can be copied and distributed to
anyone in the United States without paying any fees or charges.
If you are redistributing or providing access to a work with the
phrase “Project Gutenberg” associated with or appearing on the
work, you must comply either with the requirements of
paragraphs 1.E.1 through 1.E.7 or obtain permission for the use
of the work and the Project Gutenberg™ trademark as set forth
in paragraphs 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

posted with the permission of the copyright holder, your use and
distribution must comply with both paragraphs 1.E.1 through
1.E.7 and any additional terms imposed by the copyright holder.
Additional terms will be linked to the Project Gutenberg™
License for all works posted with the permission of the copyright
holder found at the beginning of this work.
1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

Gutenberg™ License terms from this work, or any files
containing a part of this work or any other work associated with
Project Gutenberg™.
1.E.5. Do not copy, display, perform, distribute or redistribute
this electronic work, or any part of this electronic work, without
prominently displaying the sentence set forth in paragraph 1.E.1
with active links or immediate access to the full terms of the
Project Gutenberg™ License.
1.E.6. You may convert to and distribute this work in any binary,
compressed, marked up, nonproprietary or proprietary form,
including any word processing or hypertext form. However, if
you provide access to or distribute copies of a Project
Gutenberg™ work in a format other than “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or
other format used in the official version posted on the official
Project Gutenberg™ website (www.gutenberg.org), you must, at
no additional cost, fee or expense to the user, provide a copy, a
means of exporting a copy, or a means of obtaining a copy upon
request, of the work in its original “Plain Vanilla ASCII” or other
form. Any alternate format must include the full Project
Gutenberg™ License as specified in paragraph 1.E.1.
1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

performing, copying or distributing any Project Gutenberg™
works unless you comply with paragraph 1.E.8 or 1.E.9.
1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or

providing access to or distributing Project Gutenberg™
electronic works provided that:
• You pay a royalty fee of 20% of the gross profits you derive from
the use of Project Gutenberg™ works calculated using the
method you already use to calculate your applicable taxes. The
fee is owed to the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
but he has agreed to donate royalties under this paragraph to
the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation. Royalty
payments must be paid within 60 days following each date on
which you prepare (or are legally required to prepare) your
periodic tax returns. Royalty payments should be clearly marked
as such and sent to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation at the address specified in Section 4, “Information
about donations to the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation.”
• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

notifies you in writing (or by e-mail) within 30 days of receipt that
s/he does not agree to the terms of the full Project Gutenberg™
License. You must require such a user to return or destroy all
copies of the works possessed in a physical medium and
discontinue all use of and all access to other copies of Project
Gutenberg™ works.
• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

any money paid for a work or a replacement copy, if a defect in
the electronic work is discovered and reported to you within 90
days of receipt of the work.
• You comply with all other terms of this agreement for free
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ works.
1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project

Gutenberg™ electronic work or group of works on different
terms than are set forth in this agreement, you must obtain
permission in writing from the Project Gutenberg Literary
Archive Foundation, the manager of the Project Gutenberg™
trademark. Contact the Foundation as set forth in Section 3
below.
1.F.
1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

considerable effort to identify, do copyright research on,
transcribe and proofread works not protected by U.S. copyright
law in creating the Project Gutenberg™ collection. Despite
these efforts, Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, and the
medium on which they may be stored, may contain “Defects,”
such as, but not limited to, incomplete, inaccurate or corrupt
data, transcription errors, a copyright or other intellectual
property infringement, a defective or damaged disk or other
medium, a computer virus, or computer codes that damage or
cannot be read by your equipment.
1.F.2. LIMITED WARRANTY, DISCLAIMER OF DAMAGES -

Except for the “Right of Replacement or Refund” described in
paragraph 1.F.3, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation, the owner of the Project Gutenberg™ trademark,
and any other party distributing a Project Gutenberg™ electronic
work under this agreement, disclaim all liability to you for
damages, costs and expenses, including legal fees. YOU
AGREE THAT YOU HAVE NO REMEDIES FOR NEGLIGENCE,
STRICT LIABILITY, BREACH OF WARRANTY OR BREACH
OF CONTRACT EXCEPT THOSE PROVIDED IN PARAGRAPH
1.F.3. YOU AGREE THAT THE FOUNDATION, THE
TRADEMARK OWNER, AND ANY DISTRIBUTOR UNDER
THIS AGREEMENT WILL NOT BE LIABLE TO YOU FOR
ACTUAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, CONSEQUENTIAL, PUNITIVE
OR INCIDENTAL DAMAGES EVEN IF YOU GIVE NOTICE OF
THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
1.F.3. LIMITED RIGHT OF REPLACEMENT OR REFUND - If

you discover a defect in this electronic work within 90 days of
receiving it, you can receive a refund of the money (if any) you
paid for it by sending a written explanation to the person you
received the work from. If you received the work on a physical
medium, you must return the medium with your written
explanation. The person or entity that provided you with the
defective work may elect to provide a replacement copy in lieu
of a refund. If you received the work electronically, the person or
entity providing it to you may choose to give you a second
opportunity to receive the work electronically in lieu of a refund.
If the second copy is also defective, you may demand a refund
in writing without further opportunities to fix the problem.
1.F.4. Except for the limited right of replacement or refund set

forth in paragraph 1.F.3, this work is provided to you ‘AS-IS’,
WITH NO OTHER WARRANTIES OF ANY KIND, EXPRESS
OR IMPLIED, INCLUDING BUT NOT LIMITED TO
WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY OR FITNESS FOR
ANY PURPOSE.
1.F.5. Some states do not allow disclaimers of certain implied

warranties or the exclusion or limitation of certain types of
damages. If any disclaimer or limitation set forth in this
agreement violates the law of the state applicable to this
agreement, the agreement shall be interpreted to make the
maximum disclaimer or limitation permitted by the applicable
state law. The invalidity or unenforceability of any provision of
this agreement shall not void the remaining provisions.
1.F.6. INDEMNITY - You agree to indemnify and hold the

Foundation, the trademark owner, any agent or employee of the
Foundation, anyone providing copies of Project Gutenberg™
electronic works in accordance with this agreement, and any
volunteers associated with the production, promotion and
distribution of Project Gutenberg™ electronic works, harmless
from all liability, costs and expenses, including legal fees, that
arise directly or indirectly from any of the following which you do
or cause to occur: (a) distribution of this or any Project
Gutenberg™ work, (b) alteration, modification, or additions or
deletions to any Project Gutenberg™ work, and (c) any Defect
you cause.
Section 2. Information about the Mission of

Project Gutenberg™
Project Gutenberg™ is synonymous with the free distribution of
electronic works in formats readable by the widest variety of
computers including obsolete, old, middle-aged and new
computers. It exists because of the efforts of hundreds of
volunteers and donations from people in all walks of life.
Volunteers and financial support to provide volunteers with the

assistance they need are critical to reaching Project
Gutenberg™’s goals and ensuring that the Project Gutenberg™
collection will remain freely available for generations to come. In
2001, the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation was
created to provide a secure and permanent future for Project
Gutenberg™ and future generations. To learn more about the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation and how your
efforts and donations can help, see Sections 3 and 4 and the
Foundation information page at www.gutenberg.org.
Section 3. Information about the Project

Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation
The Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation is a non-
profit 501(c)(3) educational corporation organized under the
laws of the state of Mississippi and granted tax exempt status by
the Internal Revenue Service. The Foundation’s EIN or federal
tax identification number is 64-6221541. Contributions to the
Project Gutenberg Literary Archive Foundation are tax
deductible to the full extent permitted by U.S. federal laws and
your state’s laws.
The Foundation’s business office is located at 809 North 1500

West, Salt Lake City, UT 84116, (801) 596-1887. Email contact
links and up to date contact information can be found at the
Foundation’s website and official page at
www.gutenberg.org/contact
Section 4. Information about Donations to

the Project Gutenberg Literary Archive
Foundation
Project Gutenberg™ depends upon and cannot survive without
widespread public support and donations to carry out its mission
of increasing the number of public domain and licensed works
that can be freely distributed in machine-readable form
accessible by the widest array of equipment including outdated
equipment. Many small donations ($1 to $5,000) are particularly
important to maintaining tax exempt status with the IRS.
The Foundation is committed to complying with the laws

regulating charities and charitable donations in all 50 states of
the United States. Compliance requirements are not uniform
and it takes a considerable effort, much paperwork and many
fees to meet and keep up with these requirements. We do not
solicit donations in locations where we have not received written
confirmation of compliance. To SEND DONATIONS or
determine the status of compliance for any particular state visit
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
While we cannot and do not solicit contributions from states

where we have not met the solicitation requirements, we know
of no prohibition against accepting unsolicited donations from
donors in such states who approach us with offers to donate.
International donations are gratefully accepted, but we cannot

make any statements concerning tax treatment of donations
received from outside the United States. U.S. laws alone swamp
our small staff.
Please check the Project Gutenberg web pages for current

donation methods and addresses. Donations are accepted in a
number of other ways including checks, online payments and
credit card donations. To donate, please visit:
www.gutenberg.org/donate.
Section 5. General Information About Project

Gutenberg™ electronic works
Professor Michael S. Hart was the originator of the Project
Gutenberg™ concept of a library of electronic works that could
be freely shared with anyone. For forty years, he produced and
distributed Project Gutenberg™ eBooks with only a loose
network of volunteer support.
Project Gutenberg™ eBooks are often created from several

printed editions, all of which are confirmed as not protected by
copyright in the U.S. unless a copyright notice is included. Thus,
we do not necessarily keep eBooks in compliance with any
particular paper edition.
Most people start at our website which has the main PG search
facility: www.gutenberg.org.
This website includes information about Project Gutenberg™,

including how to make donations to the Project Gutenberg
Literary Archive Foundation, how to help produce our new
eBooks, and how to subscribe to our email newsletter to hear
about new eBooks.

Disability In Practice Attitudes Policies And Relationships Adam Cureton full chapter pdf docx

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Disability In Practice Attitudes Policies And Relationships Adam Cureton full chapter pdf docx

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Disability in Practice: Attitudes,

Policies, and Relationships Adam

The Palgrave Handbook of Disability Sport in Europe:

Intellectual Disability and Social Policies of

Couple relationships in the 21st century Fink

The Marriage and Family Experience: Intimate

Innovation and Industrial Policies Deschamps

Understanding Disability and Everyday Hate Leah Burch

Shakespeare and Disability Studies Sonya Freeman Loftis

Disability in International Human Rights Law Gauthier

For Julie and Robin, and in memory of Claudia

Part I. Attitudes and Relationships

Part II. Attitudes and Policies

Part III. Justifying Frameworks

11. Obligations to the Cognitively Impaired in Non-Structured Contexts 204

Lawrence C. Becker is Fellow of Hollins University and Professor of Philosophy

xii List of Contributors

2 Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

Part I Attitudes and Relationships

relationships of various kinds, including friendship, care-giving, and more casual

4 Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

Part II Attitudes and Policies

6 Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

decision-making capacities of newly disabled patients to accept or reject life-­

8 Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

merely a difference then, in light of historical injustices and continued oppression

Part III Justifying Frameworks

10 Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

In addition to offering various objections to competing conceptions of justice,

12 Adam Cureton and Thomas E. Hill, Jr.

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 17

2 How to Pass as Non-Disabled

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 19

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 21

nature and causes of my underlying condition. People often steer conversations to

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 23

4 Benefits of Passing as Non-Disabled

A disabled person may aim for a kind of independence or self-reliance in which he

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 25

5 Costs to Passing as Non-Disabled

musician, or physicist if I had been willing to accept accommodations for my visual

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 27

6 Further Reflection on Whether or Not

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 29

7 Alternative Policies to Passing as Non-Disabled

Hiding a Disability and Passing as Non-Disabled 31

Updated editions will replace the previous one—the old editions

Creating the works from print editions not protected by U.S.

START: FULL LICENSE

To protect the Project Gutenberg™ mission of promoting the

Section 1. General Terms of Use and

1.B. “Project Gutenberg” is a registered trademark. It may only

1.E. Unless you have removed all references to Project

1.E.1. The following sentence, with active links to, or other

This eBook is for the use of anyone anywhere in the United

1.E.2. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

1.E.3. If an individual Project Gutenberg™ electronic work is

1.E.4. Do not unlink or detach or remove the full Project

1.E.7. Do not charge a fee for access to, viewing, displaying,

1.E.8. You may charge a reasonable fee for copies of or

• You provide a full refund of any money paid by a user who

• You provide, in accordance with paragraph 1.F.3, a full refund of

1.E.9. If you wish to charge a fee or distribute a Project

1.F.1. Project Gutenberg volunteers and employees expend

11. Obligations to the Cognitively Impaired in Non-Structured Contexts 204

decision-making capacities of newly disabled patients to accept or reject life-