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Sounds – Meaning – Communication 1 1 Sounds – Meaning – Communication 1
Hubert Kowalewski
Hubert Kowalewski
Hubert Kowalewski
ISBN 978-3-631-67107-8
Hubert Kowalewski
Hubert Kowalewski
Hubert Kowalewski
Editorial Board:
Eugeniusz Cyran (John Paul II Catholic University of Lublin)
Halina Chodkiewicz (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin)
Adam Głaz (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin)
Haike Jacobs (Radboud University (Nijmegen), The Netherlands)
Henryk Kardela (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin)
Przemysław Łozowski (Maria Curie-Skłodowska University, Lublin)
Bert Peeters (Australian National University (Canberra) and Griffith University
(Brisbane), Australia)
VOLUME 1
I would like to thank prof. dr hab. Henryk Kardela for encouragement and in-
valuable assistance at every stage of writing this book.
I would also like to thank my friends and colleagues at the English Depart-
ment of Maria Curie-Skłodowska University and elsewhere: prof. William Sul-
livan, dr hab. Waldemar Skrzypczak, prof. dr hab. Jolanta Szpyra-Kozłowska, dr
hab. Przemysław Łozowski, dr hab. Adam Głaz, dr hab, Paweł Frelik, dr Andrzej
Kowalczyk, dr Florian Bast, Mila Lorenc-Wawruch, Laetitia Rigobert, Beata
Marczyńska-Fedorowicz, and everyone who was willing to listen why an orange
is called orange.
5
Table of Contents
Acknowledgements�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������5
Typographic conventions....................................................................................11
Introduction�������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������������13
7
2.1.2 The linguistic sign...................................................................................73
2.1.3 Language as a system..............................................................................76
2.1.4 Arbitrariness and motivation................................................................84
2.2 Charles Sanders Peirce.......................................................................................88
2.2.1 Firstness, Secondness, Thirdness..........................................................89
2.2.2 Sign............................................................................................................91
2.3 The sign in cognitive linguistics..................................................................... 104
2.3.1 Partial autonomy of phonological and conceptual structures........ 104
2.3.2 Plunging into the depth: from semiotic
dyad to semiotic tetrad........................................................................ 110
8
4.3 Monokini........................................................................................................... 171
4.4 -punk.................................................................................................................. 174
4.5 Dress out............................................................................................................ 181
4.6 Packet Internet Groper..................................................................................... 185
4.7 Knock-kneed, coughing like hags, we cursed through sludge….................... 189
4.7.1 Sound symbolism and imitative iconicity......................................... 191
4.7.2 Structural iconicity............................................................................... 194
References............................................................................................................... 201
9
Typographic conventions
concept contiguity
phonological
similarity
form
maximum
symbolic link
similarity
cognitive frame
11
Introduction
Linguistic motivation is one of the oldest topics within the study of language. The
basic questions concerning the motivated nature of language are older than linguis-
tics itself: one of the earliest (if not the earliest) discussions on what is nowadays
understood as motivation dates back to the 5th century BC and Plato’s dialogue
Cratylus. In this dialogue Socrates and Hermogenes debate over the relationship
between words and phenomena denoted by these words: is the phonological shape
of an expression determined by pure convention or essential properties of referent?
From the point of view of the 21st century semiotics, Cratylus remains an out-
standing text for several reasons. First of all, it documents one of the earliest de-
bates on “linguistics” in Western civilization. Obviously, the approach to language
in the Platonic dialogue differs significantly from modern linguistics, exemplified
by meticulous analysis of morphological and syntactic patterns, psychophysiologi-
cal details of speech production, comprehensive description of lexicons of vari-
ous languages, cross-cultural comparative studies, and many more. The questions
asked by Plato and his contemporaries are questions about the very nature of lan-
guage, and from today’s perspective can be viewed as more “philosophical” than
“scientific.” They appear to be less complex, but also more fundamental. It is hardly
surprising that when linguistics was defined as a fully-fledged discipline in early
20th century, the questions of motivation surfaced immediately in the theory of
Ferdinand Saussure, and the answer became the cornerstone of the new branch
of science.
For several decades the problem discussed by Socrates and Hermogenes seemed
to be settled by Ferdinand de Saussure, who postulated that the linguistic sign is
arbitrary. However, the post-structuralist revolution after the Second World War
called for a deep revision, and often downright rejection of the structuralist legacy
of the Swiss linguist. The new intellectual spirit sipped slowly, but ceaselessly into
the study of language. Even though most linguists recognize Saussurean roots of
their discipline, few of them accept strict Saussureanism unquestioningly. Thus,
questions about motivation and arbitrariness boomeranged, especially in cognitive
linguistics. This book seeks to provide an answer, rather than the answer to these
questions. It is intended to be a voice (not the first one, and most certainly not the
last) in the debate that has lasted (with long periods of silence) for more than two
millennia.
Chapter 1 of this book presents the paradigm of cognitive linguistics. As op-
posed to more formalist approaches, most notably Chomskyan linguistics, which
13
views language as an inborn mental mechanism for grammatically correct sentenc-
es, the cognitive paradigm sees language as a direct reflection (or more technically,
symbolization) of semantic content of the human mind. Since cognitive linguists
believe that language reflects human understanding of the world, questions about
motivation, that is factors shaping linguistic forms of concepts, come naturally in
this tradition and lie at the very heart of the theory of language. Before we delve
any further into the state-of-the-art of the research in motivation, it is necessary to
clarify one potential source of confusion. Motivation as defined in this book is an
omnipresent force inside language or human mind that determines every single as-
pect of language. Perhaps, to make the terminology crystal clear, the term semantic
motivation should be used, because motivation is understood here as various ways
in which the structure of meaning influences the structure of form used to express
this meaning. This, however, is not to claim that all aspects of linguistic form are
shaped by meaning alone. Some linguistic changes are indeed guided by semantic
processes like metaphorization or metonymization. Nonetheless, some linguistic
changes have little to do with meaning: some of them may result from internal
dynamics of linguistic system or social dynamics in community of speakers. One
example of such a “meaning-independent” change is the Great Vowel Shift in Eng-
lish, when a change of one vowel led to a number of changes in the whole vocalic
system. While semantics might have made some contribution to the Great Vowel
Shift (perhaps changes arose because speakers wanted to avoid undesired homon-
ymy between words the vowel shift), the phonological forms did not change due to
semantic factors, but because of other sound changes. Thus, the Great Vowel Shift
will not be treated as an instance of a (semantically) motivated linguistic change.
Chapter 2 sketches the state-of-the-art of the study in motivation, focusing on
three main areas of linguistics and semiotics that contribute to the study of mo-
tivation: the linguistics of Ferdinand Saussure, the semiotics of Charles S. Peirce,
and recent developments in cognitive linguistics, especially Ronald W. Langacker’s
Cognitive Grammar with contributions from John R. Taylor. The share of Ferdi-
nand Saussure in the study of motivation is somewhat forgotten: the scholar is
remembered primarily as the one who formulated the principle of arbitrariness of
the linguistic sign, which effectively banished the notion of “naturalness” from lin-
guistics. However, the belief that Saussure downplayed the role of motivation is a
result of rather selective reading of Course in General Linguistics, which, for better
or for worse, has become the dominant interpretation of the Saussurean theory
of language. A more careful reading reveals that the Swiss scholar offers valuable
insights into the subject of linguistic motivation, even though he focuses on one
particular type of this phenomena, i.e. the syntagmatic motivation. Despite the
fact that Saussure’s treatment of phenomena like iconic motivation is highly un-
14
satisfactory from the modern perspective, I do not wish to discard the entirety of
Saussurean approach; instead, critical evaluation and a progressive problem-shift
(in Lakatos’s understanding, cf. Lakatos 1980) will be offered in the third chapter.
Charles Sanders Peirce main interests lied in the field of semiotics of math-
ematics and logic, but it is he, rather than Saussure, who is the most frequently
quoted by modern motivation researchers. The key contribution of the American
philosopher into the discipline of semiotics is the tripartite model of sign and a
“typology” of signs. The distinction between the index, the icon, and the symbol
have been zealously (and usually over-zealously) taken over by linguists, who tend
to see them as the most important tools for analyzing motivation in language.
Even though Peirce’s theory suffers from a number of serious limitations when
applied in linguistics (that will be become apparent after a closer inspection in the
third chapter), his methodological framework will serve as an invaluable source
of inspiration for formulating a more detailed and comprehensive theory of mo-
tivation. In particular, the concepts of the index, the icon and the symbol, which
seem to successfully recognize many aspects of motivation, will be modified and
adapted to the overall theoretical framework of cognitive linguistics in order to
increase its practical explanatory potential in the analysis of actual linguistic data.
The third area of motivation studies outlined in Chapter 2 is the contemporary
cognitive theory of language and the linguistic sign. While cognitive linguistics
is a conglomerate of different, and not always mutually compatible, theories and
approaches, all of them are founded on a number of basic assumptions about the
nature of language. Two authors will be discussed in this section: Ronald W. Lan-
gacker and John R. Taylor. For both scholars the linguistic sign is essentially Saus-
surean in nature, i.e. it is constituted by the semantic and the phonological poles
connected by an associative link. However, the authors modify and expand the
original model proposed by the Swiss linguist and pave the way to a more com-
prehensive cognitive study of iconicity and other types of motivation in language.
Chapter 3 offers a new comprehensive approach to motivation. The new model
incorporates the syntagmatic motivation discussed by Saussure, the iconic moti-
vation studied by modern cognitive linguists, and phenomena which constitute
an important aspect of linguistic motivation but receive less attention from re-
searchers. This chapter begins, however, with critical evaluations of Saussure’s
and Peirce’s theories of motivation,1 in order to demonstrate that neither of them,
1 Peirce himself never formulated explicitly any theory of linguistic or semiotic motiva-
tion. Nonetheless, if we bear in mind the importance of the philosopher for the study
of motivation, it becomes apparent that his heritage needs to be investigated in more
detail.
15
despite invaluable insights, is satisfactory from the point of view of the questions
asked by modern linguists. Hence a need for a more complete model capturing
all the complexities of motivation in language proposed in the following part of
the chapter. The evaluation is followed by a brief overview of the phenomena
that linguists classify as motivation, and on this basis a comprehensive definition
of motivation is proposed. This definition revisits the traditional concept of the
“naturalness” of the linguistic sign (originally proposed and rejected by Saussure),
and uses the revised version of this notion as the foundation of the new theory
of motivation and linguistic sign in general. In the reinterpreted understanding
of the term “natural” the word becomes synonymous with “normal,” “expected,”
and “cognitively appealing,” rather than “coming from nature” and “not made by
humans.” In order to parametrize the new understanding of motivation, three fac-
tors contributing to “naturalness” will be discussed in more detail: conceptualized
contiguity, conceptualized similarity, and conventionality.
Furthermore, this chapter includes a section on the terminology used in refer-
ence to various aspects of motivation. Qualifying and disambiguating the terms
symbolic, motivated, arbitrary, and natural is more than just a methodological
neatness. The lack of precise, clear, or at least mutually non-conflicting definitions
of the above terms leads to many misunderstandings in the field of semiotics in
general and linguistics in particular. For example, I will argue that problems with
categorizing a sign as either conventional or iconic, reflect not classificatory dif-
ficulties, but terminological vagueness of the terms “conventional” and “iconic.”
Once a coherent set of definitions is proposed, many such problems evaporate
(although new problems may take their place). For this reason, establishing unam-
biguous terminological conventions is as important a part of the the new frame-
work for analyzing motivation as formulating a definition of the phenomenon and
identifying related factors. In addition, this part of the book provides an opportu-
nity to explore nuances of the new approach proposed in this book.
Chapter 3 concludes with a brief discussion on the scope of the new theory
of motivation. The new framework seeks to explain motivation on various levels
of linguistic organization (free and bound morphemes, polymorphemic words,
complex lexical items like phrasal verbs, and syntactic phenomena), but it is
not, and was never intended to be, a “supertheory of supereverything” (to use a
tongue-in-cheek phrase by the singer Eugene Hütz). The chief goal of the frame-
work is to describe certain aspects of linguistic signs and, more specifically, vari-
ous ways in which the semantic content can determine the phonological structure.
This, however, is not to say that the framework can predict future shapes of novel
expressions, or exhaustively reconstruct diachronic semantic processes which
shape expressions (at least not on the basis of the linguistic system alone). These
16
limitations are not inherent weaknesses of the theory. They are caused by the non-
deterministic nature of human conceptualization of the world and diachronic de-
velopment. The meaning does not evolve in a way that is entirely describable in
terms of inexorable, universal, and empirically testable laws of any kind (psycho-
logical, language systemic, historical, etc.). Semantic changes tend to follow cer-
tain general tendencies and local patterns, but at the same time they are influenced
by many random extra-systemic factors (including, but not limited to, historical,
social, and cultural changes), which push diachronic development in random di-
rections. This randomness makes reliable predictions impossible by definition and
retrodictions usually require extensive background knowledge.
The final chapter presents seven case studies that demonstrate usefulness of the
framework developed in the third chapter. The data for the analysis was chosen
from various semantic fields and different strata of structural organization to il-
lustrate how the factors of motivation described in the framework manifest them-
selves in various areas of language. Needless to say, these analyses are far from
complete. Each of the case studies deserves a longer and more comprehensive
description. However, even the sketchy account in the fourth chapter illustrates
the explanatory potential of the new framework. The analyses are accompanied
by figures, which render the matrix of motivating relations graphically and dem-
onstrate the relations described in a more reader-friendly fashion.
Every theory, scholarly or scientific, is no more and no less than an attempt to
explain something about the world. The explanation is tailored to (and limited by)
the capacities of human minds. It is hard to argue that a theory is “true” in an abso-
lute and objective sense, or even that it is “truer” than another theory. Yet scholarly
and scientific research does not have to be seen as “a quest for truth”. Thomas S.
Kuhn notes that progress of knowledge is “a process of evolution from primitive
beginnings – a process whose successive stages are characterized by an increas-
ingly detailed and refined understanding of nature. But nothing that has been or
will be said makes it a process of evolution toward anything” (1970 [1962]: 171).
Later, the author asks rhetorically:
Can we not account for both science’s existence and its success in terms of evolution from
the community’s state of knowledge at any given time? Does it really help to imagine that
there is some one full, objective, true account of nature and that the proper measure of
scientific achievement is the extent to which it brings us closer to that ultimate goal? If we
can learn to substitute evolution-from-what-we-do-know for evolution-toward-what-we-
wish-to-know, a number of vexing problems may vanish in the process. (Kuhn 1970: 171)
Perhaps progress towards truth is not possible, but progress towards better expla-
nations is a realistic option. How can the new approach to motivation be “better”
17
than previous approaches? Paul Feyerabend observes that “theories and ideas
in general are usually accepted because they have some advantages. They may
put some order into material that at first sight looks unmanageable and chaotic”
(2011: 49). As far as motivation is concerned, Saussure’s theory imposes order by
ignoring or conflating semantic phenomena that do not fit into the slot labeled
“arbitrariness.” From the methodological point of view, this is a high price paid
for the order in the theory. Modern linguists, especially the ones working within
the cognitive paradigm, reclaim the ignored aspects of motivations and disman-
tle the Saussure’s conflations, but their efforts usually result in “unmanageable
and chaotic” set of concepts (several symptoms of this chaos and confusion are
mentioned in Chapter 3). The approach proposed in this book seeks to “put some
order into the material” without ignoring and conflating “inconvenient” distinc-
tions. For this reason, the new framework can be seen as a progressive problem-
shift in Lakatos’s sense. It is a problem-shift, because it modifies and refines the
classic concept of “naturalness” of linguistic signs, proposed and discarded by
Saussure. It is progressive, because it allows for a more fine-grained description
of the link between the phonological form of an expression and its semantic
content. Where Saussure saw homogeneous arbitrariness which did not require
much attention, the new approach recognizes heterogeneous structure and pro-
vides tools for describing its topology.
18
Chapter 1. Cognitive Linguistics:
Language vs. Reality
Motto:
The narrator of Victor Pelevin’s The Sacred Book of the Werewolf does not question
the fact that language reflects reality, but it merely plays with the idea of guessing
which came first. If one reads reality in the above quotation as conceptual reality
of a speaker, one comes close to the fundamental postulate of almost all para-
digms in broadly understood cognitive linguistics: the main theoretical commit-
ment of this book. This chapter aims at summarizing the main assumptions of
cognitive linguistics, partly in comparison with other theories of language. The
following sections are devoted to aspects of the cognitive paradigm that are par-
ticularly relevant for the study of motivation in language: the symbolic nature of
grammar, categorization by prototype and by schema, metaphor, metonymy, and
subjectification. The list is by no means exhaustive, but the topics outlined in this
part of the book will suffice to sketch the basic tenets of the paradigm and the
direction where the further discussion will proceed.
Despite the fact that various schools of cognitive linguistics share a number of
core assumptions, it must be borne in mind that “cognitive linguistics” is often
used as an umbrella term for, as John R. Taylor puts it, “a rather broad movement
within modern linguistics (…) [which] includes a variety of approaches, meth-
odologies, and emphases” (Taylor 2002: 3). The term also has a more restricted
meaning: it may refer specifically to a particular theory of language within the
movement (in such a case, the term is usually capitalized). In other words, not
all linguists highlighting the importance of cognitive processes in the study of
language are by definition cognitive linguists in a narrow understanding of the
term. Unless stated otherwise, this book uses the term “Cognitive Linguistics” in
the narrow sense. The capitalized Cognitive Linguistics is not just a linguistics
that respects the role of human cognition in production and interpretation of lin-
guistic expressions, but a fully-fledged paradigm as defined by Thomas Kuhn, i.e.
a collection of “some accepted examples of actual scientific practice – examples
19
which include law, theory, application, and instrumentation” which “provide
models from which spring particular coherent traditions of scientific research”
(both quotations in Kuhn 1970: 10).
There are two main reasons that make Cognitive Linguistics a particularly at-
tractive approach for a motivation researcher. First of all, since CL is a semantics-
oriented paradigm, it provides, in the words of Kuhn, “law, theory, application,
and instrumentation” for studying semantic phenomena, which also includes
motivation (at least in my understanding of the term). Second, and more impor-
tantly, the problem of motivation gains significant attention from cognitivists,
for whom phenomena like iconicity, metaphor and metonymy, are crucial for
understanding the nature of language.2
20
(d) Supporting (c), it can be presumed that semantic structure is universal, while gram-
matical structure varies greatly from language to language.
(e) In accordance with theses (c) and (d), syntactical structure relies crucially on gram-
matical morphemes, which are often meaningless and serve purely formal purposes.
(f) Syntactic structure is abstract. Syntactic structures often derive from deep struc-
tures which are significantly different in character and contain elements (e.g. gram-
matical morphemes) that have no place in underlying structure.
(g) Syntax consists primarily of general rules. It is to be distinguished sharply from
lexicon, the repository for irregularity and idiosyncrasy. (Langacker 1982: 22)
These claims form what Langacker in the very same article calls “the transforma-
tional archetype,” or, to use more Kuhnian terminology, “the transformational par-
adigm.” The paradigm as defined by Chomsky (e.g. in Chomsky 1957) proposes a
highly formalist (and highly formalized), syntax-centered approach to language.
Generative linguists perceive language as a “generator” capable of producing well-
formed, grammatically acceptable utterances. The paradigm was probably in-
spired, directly or indirectly, by formal logic, where the “well-formedness” of an
expression relies solely on the formal properties of the expression, and not on the
semantic content. In the context of formal logic, the separation of the structural
and the semantic aspects roughly corresponds to the distinction between valid-
ity and soundness. Thus, a valid argumentation yiels true conclusions from true
premises on the basis of the structural properties alone, but does not necessarily
correspond to real-world state of affairs. A sound argumentation, on the other
hand, is valid and “true to the world.” In linguistics, this distinction is illustrat-
ed with the famous sentence composed by Chomsky Colorless green spirits sleep
furiously (1957: 15). The sentence is grammatically correct (i.e. well-formed or
“valid”), but nonsensical (i.e. semantically abnormal or “unsound”). If this formal
logic approach to language is accepted, linguistic structures can be manipulated
“mechanically” in accordance with strict syntactic laws, but with no consideration
for semantics.
In Chomskyan linguistics, it is believed that sentences are generated in the pro-
cess of manipulation of syntactic elements. The starting point is a hypothetical deep
structure, which is “an abstract underlying form which determines the meaning
of a sentence” (Kaznowski 1980: 31). The deep structure is formed in accordance
with Phrase Structure rules and undergoes numerous syntactic processes, called
transformations (such as movements, ellipses, etc.). The final result is the surface
structure, which is “the actual organization of a sentence” (Kaznowski 1980: 31) as
manifested in an utterance.
The verb “generate” is not accidental: in Chomskyan linguistics viewing the
linguistic system as a “generator” operating on a quasi-mathematical “algorithm”
21
is an informal, but widely accepted metaphor.3 The metaphor pops up when Ka-
znowski writes that “transformational grammar is viewed as a device – a finite set
of rules – that will generate all and only grammatical sentences of the language”
or that “[syntax] is the central component [of grammar]; semantics and phono-
logical components being auxiliary, ‘outer’ blocks of rules working on the outputs
of syntax” (both quotations in Kaznowski 1980: 25 and 33). George Lakoff notes
that the generative paradigm employs the so called Recursive Function Theory,
which relies on a mechanistic of desemanticized symbols, which is also the cor-
nerstone of computer science (cf. Lakoff 2007: 6). This claim is partly supported
by Jerold A. Edmondson and Donald A. Burquest, who draw explicit parallels
between Phrase Structure rules and mathematical formulas (cf. 1998: 16–22).
In other words, in the transformational-generative model, syntax is the central
mechanism of grammar, which mediates between semantics and phonology;
meaning is the input for the “syntactic machine,” which employs Phrase Structure
rules and transformations to produce phonological structures.
The paradigm requires sharp distinctions between particular components of
grammar (cf. thesis (b) and (c) of Langacker’s list). In generative linguistics, se-
mantics is clearly separated from the morpho-syntactic component, which in
turn does not overlap with phonology; semantics does not coincide with prag-
matics, etc. Rules governing particular strata of grammar are of different natures
and do not cross the boundaries between modules of the linguistic system. One
of the key distinctions is drawn between syntax and lexicon, the former being
almost entirely regular and predictable on the basis of fixed, deterministic rules,
and the latter being highly irregular and unpredictable. Obviously, this is not to
say that components of grammar are isolated and disconnected; on the contrary,
they do interact with each other in a very complex way in the course of speech
production. However, it is held that linguistic expressions can be broken down
into smaller components (e.g. phonemes, morphemes, phrases) that can be un-
equivocally ascribed to one and only one component (phonology, morphology,
syntax) and can be analyzed without any reference to other components.
3 Interestingly, according to Kuhn, metaphors of this type are not just handy rhetoric
devices aimed at explaining highly abstract, and perhaps somewhat cryptic, aspects
of a paradigm. Metaphors of this sort are the so-called heuristic models, which are
constitutive elements of a paradigm because they “supply the group with preferred
or permissible analogies and metaphors” and “[by] doing so they help to determine
what will be accepted as an explanation and as a puzzle- solution; conversely, they as-
sist in the determination of the roster of unsolved puzzles and in the evaluation of the
importance of each” (both quotations in Kuhn 1970: 184).
22
Sharp distinctions seem to lie at the very heart of transformational grammar
in general. Another example concerns the notion of grammaticality, i.e. the struc-
tural well-formedness of a sentence. The criterion of grammaticality pertains to
the morpho-syntactic structure of an expressions and, as already mentioned, it
is roughly equivalent to validity in formal logic in that semantic content is not
considered to be relevant in either of them. The syntactic rules are regular and
deterministic, which means that the evaluation of grammaticality is an either-or
decision: it neither accepts, nor requires gradation. In other words, according to
generative linguists, every sentence falls into one of two clearly delineated non-
intersecting classes: grammatical sentences and ungrammatical sentences. Gram-
maticality, however, should not be confused with acceptability, which pertains to
the way speakers evaluate sentences on the basis of practical and more “common
sense” criteria. Acceptability is to some extent gradable. The difference between
grammaticality and acceptability is illustrated by the pair of sentences provided
by Kaznowski (1980: 19):
(1) I called the man who wrote the book that you told me about up.
(2) I called up the man who wrote the book that you told me about.
Both sentences are grammatical, i.e. they are fully compatible with syntactic rules,
but (1) “is not likely to be produced by a speaker of the language and, nor is it im-
mediately understood when produced” (Kaznowski 1980: 19). Since acceptability
has more to do with psychological predispositions and even personal preferences
of speakers, generativists typically push it outside the area of legitimate linguistics
proper.
Despite the fact that the transformational-generative paradigm is often viewed
as radically different from the cognitive model, Taylor emphasizes that the Chom-
skyan revolution was in fact the beginning of the cognitive turn in linguistics
(cf. Taylor 2002: 6). Indeed, it was generativism that drew attention to importance
of cognitive processing in speech production. The transformational model attempts
to characterize language in terms of abstract quasi-mathematical rules, but it also
claims that the rules reside in the human mind and that extra-linguistic capacities
of the human mind influence language production (cf. e.g. Chomsky 1964). Naoki
Fukui and Mihoko Zushi note that “Generative Grammar consistently defines lan-
guage as the linguistic competence that a human being holds inside his or her
mind/brain” (2004: 1). However, it should be borne in mind that grammar, despite
the emphasis on its psychological nature, is believed to be autonomous and self-
contained mental faculty. Thus, even though psychological factors, like memory
and attention, may affect speech production, in principle they have no significance
in the description of mental grammar.
23
To be precise, the autonomy thesis has at least two interpretations. The “strong”
interpretation holds that “various essential properties of the language faculty are
truly specific to language and cannot be found in any other cognitive domain
outside language” (Fukui and Zushi 2004: 10). According to this interpretation,
grammar may and should be analyzed in its own terms and no extra-linguistic
factors are relevant for its complete characterization. However, the development
of cognitive science that followed the formulation of the strong version of the
autonomy thesis revealed that linguistic competence is more intimately linked to
non-linguistic faculties, which suggests that the strong interpretation is too radi-
cal. Therefore, according to the weak version “[it] may well be the case that each
of the various elements of and mechanisms employed in the language faculty
have evolved for some other purposes not directly related to language, and there-
fore that they each may have applications in other human cognitive capacities as
well” (Fukui and Zushi 2004: 13; also cf. Chomsky 2000). Careful reading of the
“weak” interpretation shows that the original claim about the autonomy of gram-
mar remains intact: it is not language that depends on non-linguistic capacities,
but non-linguistic capacities appropriate mechanisms originally restricted to lan-
guage. Nonetheless, the weak version allows for some overlapping between the
linguistic and the non-linguistic modules of the brain.
Cognitive linguistics takes a different stand on almost all of the points dis-
cussed above. In “Space Grammar, Analysability’, and the English Passive,” the
critique of the seven claims of the transformational paradigm is merely a starting
point for the formulation of counter-theses, which eventually defined the cogni-
tive paradigm in linguistics:
(a’) Economy must be consistent with psychological reality. The grammar of a language
represents conventional linguistic knowledge and includes all linguistic units, i.e.
structures with unit status. Content units coexist in the grammar with the sub-
suming schemata.
(b’) Only semantic, phonological and bipolar symbolic units are posited. Sharp
dichotomies are usually found only by arbitrarily selecting examples from opposite
endpoints of a continuum.
(c’) Syntax is not autonomous, but symbolic, forming a continuum with lexicon and
morphology. Syntactic units are bipolar, with semantic and phonological poles.
(d’) Semantic structure is language specific, involving layers of conventional imagery.
Semantic structure is conventionalized conceptual structure, and gram-
mar is the conventional symbolization of semantic structure.
(e’) Most grammatical morphemes are meaningful, and are present because of their
semantic contribution.
(f ’) Grammatical structure is almost entirely overt. No underlying structures and deri-
vations are posited.
24
(g’) Lexicon and grammar form a continuum of symbolic structures. This continuum
contains no sharp dichotomies based on generality, regularity or analysability. (Lan-
gacker 1982: 23)
The above points suggest that the cognitive paradigm is an almost complete con-
tradiction of generative linguistics. One of few points which remain unaltered is
the belief that language is a psychological phenomenon and is in many ways re-
lated with other mental capacities of the human mind. Nevertheless, these simi-
larities are of a very general nature, because the place of language within the matrix
of overall cognitive abilities is perceived differently in the two theories. While for
generative linguists grammar is a discrete module connected with other cognitive
capacities, for cognitive linguists grammar is a cognitive capacity. This means that
in the cognitive paradigm there is no clear-cut distinction between language and
other mental capabilities, since “[language] is an integral part of human cognition”
(Langacker 1987: 12). No “linguistic” ability is restricted to language alone, all of
them are viewed as components of “cognitive processing in general” (Langacker
1987: 13). In other words, one of the most profound differences between cognitive
and generative linguistics is the rejection of the autonomy thesis by the former.
This radical redefinition of the role of language in the overall configuration of
mental processes leaves one fundamental question unanswered, namely: what is
language? The heuristic model of a “generator” that constitutes the generative para-
digm is rejected altogether, along with the belief in the modular and autonomous
nature of language. Language is not a generativist “set of (…) sentences (…) con-
structed out of a finite set of elements” (Chomsky 1957: 13), but a symbolic reflec-
tion of conceptual structures. In other words, language is a reflection of the way
humans perceive the world, think about the world, and (re)construct the world
in their minds. If language is to be compared to anything, the closest metaphor is
that of a symbol of thought. Despite the fact that metaphorical understanding is
to some extent misleading and must be approached with caution, the language-
as-symbol metaphor takes us to another crucial point of the cognitive paradigm.
25
Since symbolicity lies at the very heart of the cognitive paradigm, a reasonable
discussion on this approach cannot afford this definitional carelessness. For this
reason, this section is devoted to explaining what symbolicity in cognitive lin-
guistics means and entails.
To say that a linguistic expression is symbolic is to say that it is an association
of certain semantic content with certain phonological representation. The term
“phonological representation” may be slightly misleading, as the adjective “phono-
logical” may suggest that such entities are sound patterns produced by the speaker
and perceived by the listener. This interpretation is inaccurate for at least two rea-
sons. Firstly, it ignores non-acoustic modalities in which linguistic expressions
may be produced, most notable writing and gestures of sign languages. Cognitive
grammar has no intention of neglecting or playing down the importance of non-
acoustic expressions; on the contrary, there has been considerable effort to study
such expressions from the cognitive perspective.4 Secondly, and more important-
ly, “phonological representations” are of mental rather than physical nature and
should not be confused with actual sound patterns (vibrations of air) produced
while speaking. In fact, phonological representations are “word concepts” or, to
put it more technically, mental images of “auditory and articulatory events” (Taylor
2002: 44).
In this respect, the cognitive paradigm accepts the basic tenet of classic theory
of Ferdinand de Saussure, for whom language is entirely conceptual (for a more
detailed discussion of Saussure’s theory of language, see Section 2.1. of this book).
It is important to recognize in full the consequences of this assumption. From the
point of view of cognitive linguistics, a sign cannot denote anything but a con-
cept. Thus, the word (or, to be more precise, the phonological representation) tree
denotes the concept TREE rather than a physical object in the real world. What
is a concept, precisely? Taylor (2002: 42–43) warns against mistaking concepts
for mental images of physical entities. Even though humans are able to produce
coherent conceptual representations of physical entities on the basis of sensory
stimuli (e.g. a mental impression of a tree that arises whenever one sees a real
world tree), these sensory representations are not proper concepts. This point
is even more obvious when we consider abstract notions like IDEA, PACIFISM,
COURAGE, etc., whose conceptualizations cannot be based in sensory input and
therefore cannot be rendered as a sensory image. The conclusion that naturally
follows is that a concept should be viewed in more abstract terms. For the time
4 For cognitive analyses of writing conventions and sign language see e.g. Hiraga (2005)
and Emmorey (1999) respectively.
26
being, let us accept a somewhat simplified claim that a concept is an abstract,
schematized, and conventionalized conceptualization of an object (entity, rela-
tion, process or anything that can constitutes the content of a concept). The con-
ceptualization is schematized, because it needs to be general enough to represent
all instances of an object, which requires abstracting away fine-grained details
between various instantiations of one concept. For example, the concept TREE
is a schematic characterization has to be general enough to represent an oak, a
pine, a spruce and a willow, regardless of numerous differences between these
plants. Since it is not possible to come up with an accurate image depicting all
sorts of trees equally well, concepts cannot be image-like representationd. At the
same time, a concept should embrace enough information to facilitate efficient
categorization of an object as an instantiation of this concept.5
Let us return to the theses formulated by Langacker in “Space Grammar, Ana-
lysability, and the English Passive” (Section 1.1.), especially to the points (e’) and
(f ’). If linguistic expressions are direct symbolic reflections of semantic content, it
is difficult to defend some postulates of generative grammar. For example, within
the paradigm some linguistic entities, like the preposition of, are considered to
be devoid of meaning and are inserted into a sentence in order to satisfy the
formal requirements of syntactic rules (cf. thesis (e)). Moreover, the generative
model proposes a set of “invisible markers” present in the deep structure, but not
manifested overtly in the surface structure. Cognitive grammar does not make
allowances for “semantically empty” elements, because all components of an ex-
pression are symbolic structures, which have overt phonological layers by defini-
tion. The meaning of the linguistic structures which are often called “functional,”
including prepositions and inflectional endings, may be extremely abstract and
underdetermined, or “schematic”, as Langacker would put it, but it is not non-
existent. By the same token, “invisible markers” play no role in the cognitive de-
scription of language; semantic content and grammatical functions are always
marked overtly.
In Langacker’s Cognitive Grammar, this prohibition is called the content re-
quirement (cf. Langacker’s 1987: 53–54). This principle states that the only enti-
ties accepted in the linguistic description are symbolic structures consisting of
5 In fact, the matter is slightly more complex and problematic, but I will postpone a
more detailed discussion on concepts to the sections to follow. Section 1.2. elaborates
on the nature of knowledge involved in forming a concept, the internal structure of a
concept, and the relationship between concepts and their instantiations. Relationships
between concepts, phonological representations of real world entities, and material
manifestations of signs will be analyzed in some detail in Chapter 2.
27
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letzteren ermöglichen die Verbreitung der Fischarten aus einem
Flusssystem in ein benachbartes. Hierzu kommen die allmählichen
Veränderungen, welchen die Konturen des Festlandes im Laufe der
geologischen Perioden unterworfen sind und welche die weitläufige
Trennung von ursprünglich eng verbundenen Landmassen bewirken,
während sie anderseits Länder, die von einander entfernt gelegen
haben, durch Landbrücken mit einander verbinden können. Dies
sind die Umstände, welche die Verbreitung der Fischarten des
süssen Wassers herbeizuführen pflegen.
Seine Stütze erhält der Fischkörper durch die ihn der Länge nach
durchziehende W i r b e l s ä u l e . Bei den Knochenfischen besteht
dieselbe aus durchbohrten bikonkaven cylindrischen
Knochenstücken, den Wirbeln, deren Innenräume durch die
elastische Chorda ausgefüllt sind. Nach oben und unten setzen sich
an jeden Wirbelkörper paarweise knöcherne Fortsätze an, die
Rücken- und Bauchstrahlen. Die Rückenstrahlen jedes
Wirbelkörpers bilden einen Kanal, indem sie an ihren oberen Enden
mit einander verschmelzen. In dem so gebildeten Kanal an der
Oberseite der Wirbelsäule liegt das Rückenmark. Die Bauchstrahlen
verschmelzen nur im Schwanzteil des Fischkörpers mit einander zu
einem Kanal, der die grossen Blutgefässe des Schwanzes[LXXV]
aufnimmt. Im Vorderteil des Körpers bilden sie als Rippen die
Stützen der Seitenwände der Leibeshöhle.
Die Organe der Ernährung und ihre Hilfsorgane liegen teils in der
Mundhöhle, teils in der Bauchhöhle. Die M u n d h ö h l e nimmt den
unteren Teil des Kopfes ein, während in dem oberen, in einer Kapsel
aus Knorpel (Neunauge, Stör) oder Knochen (bei den meisten
Knochenfischen), das Gehirn eingebettet ist. Die Knochen, welche
den vorderen Teil des Bodens des Hirnschädels bilden, sind das
Dach der Mundhöhle, deren Seitenwände und Boden teils aus den
Kiemenbögen und den ihnen homologen Knochenbögen, den
Unterschlundknochen und dem Zungenbein, teils aus den
Kieferknochen, und aus ihren häutigen und muskulösen
Verbindungen bestehen. Die Öffnungen zwischen den Kiemenbögen
führen in die Kiemenhöhlen, welche nach aussen durch die mehr
oder minder beweglichen Kiemendeckel geschlossen sind.
Alle Knochen der Mundhöhle sind mit einander beweglich
verbunden, sodass die Mundhöhle bedeutender Erweiterung fähig
ist. Je nach der Nahrung des Fisches sind die Gestalt der
Mundöffnung und die Bezahnung der Mundknochen verschieden.
Die Perciden, Kaulköpfe, Aalquappe, Wels, auch manche
Cypriniden, wie Rapen, Döbel, Orfe, ferner die Aesche, der Stint, die
Salmo- und Trutta-Arten, Hecht und Aal haben ein breites, weit
aufsperrbares Maul und, mit Ausnahme der Cypriniden, auf mehr
oder minder zahlreichen Knochen desselben teils nur feine
Zähnchen, die in grosser Zahl mehr oder minder dicht beisammen
stehen (Sammet-, Bürsten-, Hechelzähne, z. B. beim Aal, Barsch,
Wels), teils zwischen diesen noch grössere Fangzähne (Zander,
Hecht, Lachs, Forelle)[40]. Diese Fische sowie die Stichlinge nähren
sich ausschliesslich, wie Lachs, Hecht, Wels und Zander, oder
teilweise von Fischen, welche sie, auch wenn sie über die
Mundhöhle hinausragen, mittels der Zähne festhalten können. Die
meisten Cypriniden, Maränen und Clupeiden haben dagegen eine
kleine rundliche oder mehr hohe als breite Mundöffnung, welche am
Ende einer rüsselartig vorstreckbaren, häutigen Röhre liegt, die oben
von den halbringförmigen Zwischen- und Oberkieferknochen, unten
von dem Unterkiefer gestützt wird. Mittels dieses Saugrüssels
schlürfen diese Fische ihre aus kleinen niederen Tieren bestehende
Nahrung ein, nach welcher sie teils im freien Wasser, teils an den
festen Gegenständen in demselben, den Pflanzen, Steinen, dem
Holzwerk, oder auf dem Grunde suchen. Sie finden hier kleine
Crustaceen aus den Ordnungen der Cladoceren, der Ostracoden,
der Copepoden, ferner die das Wasser bewohnenden Larven vieler
Insekten, namentlich der Mücken und Eintagsfliegen, auch Würmer,
Rädertiere, kleine Weichtiere, nehmen wohl auch die schleimigen
Massen der Kieselalgen und den für sie allerdings unverdaulichen
Mulm zerfallener Pflanzenteile, Sand und Schlamm ein, verschonen
auch nicht, wie hier gleich erwähnt sein mag, Eier und Brut von
Fischen, selbst nicht die eigene Nachkommenschaft. Man
unterscheidet die letztgenannte Gruppe von Fischen als
Kleintierfresser oder Friedfische von den ersterwähnten
Raubfischen[41].
Während die Kiemenspalten der breitmäuligen Fische ziemlich
weit und nur mit weitläufig gestellten Zähnen versehen sind, sind die
Kiemenspalten der engmäuligen Fische eng, meist kurz, die
Kiemenbogen sind an der Innenseite mit je zwei Reihen dicht
gestellter Stäbchen besetzt, welche in einander greifend einen
reusenartigen Verschluss bilden, durch den wohl das in die
Mundhöhle aufgenommene Wasser, nicht aber die feinkörnige
Nahrung in die Kiemenhöhle entweichen kann. Am Gaumen vieler
Cypriniden findet sich ein muskulöser Wulst, welcher Sinnesorgane
(Schmeckbecherchen) enthält. Jede Berührung dieses Organs bringt
eine Anschwellung der berührten Stelle hervor. Es scheint auch
durch seine Kontraktionen beim Aufsaugen der Nahrung
mitzuwirken.
Am hinteren Abschluss der Mundhöhle haben die Cypriniden,
welche sonst ganz zahnlos sind, auf den Unterschlundknochen
stumpfe aber starke Zähne, deren bei den einzelnen Arten
verschiedene Form ein vorzügliches Mittel zur Abgrenzung und
Erkennung der Arten ist. Diesen Zähnen gegenüber steht am
Gaumen eine harte Knorpelplatte. Zwischen den Zähnen und der
Gaumenplatte wird die Nahrung zerdrückt. Die Zähne werden bei
den Cypriniden nach v. S i e b o l d jährlich in der Laichzeit
abgestossen und erneuert.
Abweichend von dem Maul der übrigen Fische ist das der
Neunaugen gebaut. Es ist eine am vorderen Körperende gelegene
Saugscheibe, welche mit mehreren zahntragenden Hornplatten
ausgestattet ist. Es dient dem Fisch vornehmlich dazu, sich an feste
Gegenstände oder an seine Beute anzusaugen. Die letztere wird
dann mittels der Zähne angebohrt und ausgesaugt.
Das durch die Kiemenspalten abfliessende Wasser gelangt in die
K i e m e n h ö h l e n , in welchen sich die Kiemenbögen befinden. Die
Kiemenbögen bestehen aus gebogenen rinnenförmigen
Knochenplatten mit nach unten gekehrten Rinnen. In diesen Rinnen
laufen die Blutgefässe, welche das Blut aus dem Herzen in die
Kiemen leiten, und andere, die das Blut aus den Kiemen dem Körper
zuführen. In den Kiemenblättchen, welche an jedem Bogen in zwei
Reihen dicht gedrängt stehen, tritt das kohlensäurehaltige Blut mit
dem sauerstoffhaltigen Wasser in Gasaustausch, das Blut tritt
sauerstoffreich in den Körper zurück, während das verbrauchte
Atemwasser unter dem Kiemendeckel durch die Kiemenöffnung
abfliesst und durch neues aus der Mundhöhle ersetzt wird. In der
Regel sind vier Paar Reihen von Kiemenblättchen auf jeder Seite
des Kopfes vorhanden. An der Innenseite des Kiemendeckels sitzt
häufig noch eine sogenannte Nebenkieme (z. B. beim Stör), welche
aber funktionslos ist. Die Acanthopsiden (Schlammpeitzker,
Steinbeisser und Schmerle) können im Notfalle auch durch den
Darm die Atmung vollziehen, indem sie Luft einschnappen und durch
den Darm treten lassen, wobei sie einen quietschenden Ton
erzeugen. Die anderen Fische atmen dagegen hauptsächlich durch
die Kiemen. Manche Fische, welche einen sehr fest schliessenden
Kiemendeckel haben, wie der Aal und viele Cypriniden, können
stundenlang, selbst tagelang ausserhalb des Wassers zubringen,
ohne zu ersticken, indem die Wassermenge, welche in den nach
aussen fest geschlossenen Kiemenhöhlen zurückgehalten ist,
genügt, um die Aufnahme der durch den Mund eingeschnappten Luft
durch die Kiemen zu vermitteln. Andere Fische, namentlich die mit
sehr weiten Kiemenspalten und kurzen Kiemendeckeln versehenen
Salmoniden, sterben aus dem Wasser genommen sehr bald ab. Bei
den Neunaugen weichen auch die Kiemen von denen der anderen
Fische ab. Sie sind nicht an Kiemenbögen befestigt, sondern
bestehen jederseits in sieben Säckchen, welche durch ein festes
Knorpelgerüst gestützt werden, und im Innern mit zahlreichen
Kiemenfalten, welche die Stelle der Kiemenblättchen vertreten,
bekleidet sind. Das Atemwasser wird aus der Mundhöhle durch
einen besonderen Längskanal, welcher mit entsprechenden
Seitenöffnungen versehen ist, zugeführt, und fliesst aus jedem
Kiemensäckchen durch eine besondere Öffnung nach aussen ab.
Die sieben äusseren Kiemenöffnungen samt dem Auge und dem
einfachen Nasenloch sollen dem Fisch seinen Namen „Neunauge“
gegeben haben.
Ausser den Kiemen atmen die Fische auch durch die Haut, wie
A . v o n H u m b o l d t und P r o v e n ç a l [42] durch Versuche nachwiesen.
Kohlensäure wirkt nach diesen Forschern tödlich auf die Fische,
während Stickstoff und Wasserstoff, wie bei den höheren
Wirbeltieren, indifferent sind. In luftlosem (ausgekochtem) Wasser
starben die eingesetzten Fische nach 1¾ bis 4 Stunden. Nach den
genannten Untersuchungen berechnete T r e v i r a n u s , dass die
Schleihe, deren Sauerstoffbedürfnis für gering zu halten ist, für je
100 Gran Körpergewicht in 100 Minuten 0.01 cbcm Kohlensäure
erzeugt, während Säugetiere das fünfzigfache an Kohlensäure
produzieren.